Summary Report: A New Approach to Security in Northeast Asia – Breaking the Gridlock Workshop

by Binoy Kampmark, Peter Hayes, and Richard Tanter

November 20, 2012

This report is based on the New Approach to Security in Northeast Asia: Breaking the Gridlock workshop held on October 9th and 10th, 2012 in Washington, DC. All of the papers and presentations given at the workshop are available here, along with the full agenda, participant list and a workshop photo gallery.

A PDF version of this report is available at: https://nautilus.org/projects/by-name/korea-japan-nwfz/workshops/gridlock/summary-report

Nautilus invites your contributions to this forum, including any responses to this report.

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CONTENTS

I. Introduction
II. Report by Binoy Kampmark, Peter Hayes, and Richard Tanter
III. References
IV. Attachments
V. Nautilus invites your responses

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I. Introduction

This summary report is based on the Breaking the Gridlock workshop, which convened senior international experts in the field of security in Washington, D.C. on October 9th and 10th, 2012. The purpose of this meeting was to access Morton Halperin’s proposal that establishing a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) would strengthen peace and security in the region, reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation regime and facilitate nuclear disarmament on the Korean Peninsula. The workshop built upon the findings of the East Asia Nuclear Security Workshop in 2011 to further explore the proposal’s limits, weaknesses and possible means of implementation.

Binoy Kampmark is a Lecturer at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology. Peter Hayes is the Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute and Richard Tanter is an Associate of the Nautilus Institute.

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II. Report by Binoy Kampmark, Peter Hayes, and Richard Tanter

Summary Report: A New Approach to Security in Northeast Asia – Breaking the Gridlock Workshop
by Binoy Kampmark, Peter Hayes, and Richard Tanter

Executive Summary

This report is based on a workshop of senior international experts in the field of security who convened in Washington, D.C. for two days – October 9 and 10, 2012. The first session was held at Restaurant Nora with the bulk of the workshop held at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars the next day. It was co-sponsored by the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, with funding assistance from Ploughshares and the Norwegian Foreign Ministry.

The gathering built on the extensive canvassing of options for a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) presented by a gathering of security experts in 2011 at the East Asia Tokyo Workshop.[1] Since that workshop, the center piece proposal underpinning such a zone, advanced by Morton Halperin, has been further developed.[2] The purpose of the D.C. workshop was to identify possibilities, weaknesses and limits in such a proposal which would contribute to the strengthening of peace and security, reinforcing of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and facilitate nuclear disarmament on the Korean Peninsula. The express purpose here was to move beyond the international gridlock.

Halperin proposed that a NWFZ be set in a broader security arrangement and normalization of relations on the Korean Peninsula. Features would include a denuclearized Peninsula, a peace treaty, the creation of a permanent council on security, a mutual declaration of no hostile intent, provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy for the DPRK, a termination of sanctions, and response to violations of the treaty.

The Halperin proposal itself was subjected to scrutiny on various levels: the role that would be played by great powers – primarily China and the United States – towards the DPRK and each other in the context of such an arrangement; the core issues around allies in the region (ROK and Japan), including domestic limitations that might inhibit the establishment of a NWFZ; the strategic environment (the “rise of China”, and U.S. “rebalancing” in the Asia-Pacific); the role played by deterrence (nuclear, conventional) and the respective stances taken toward it by major actors in Northeast Asia (Taiwan included); the normalization framework to be put into place to terminate the state of war on the Peninsula, including the involvement of non-nuclear powers such as Mongolia and Canada; the debate about viable verification of DPRK nuclear dismantling; the security mechanics of the nuclear fuel cycle; and the nature of the NWFZ itself and how it would impact on strategic engagements between the parties.

Specific disagreements were raised. It was fine to be “thinking outside the box” and move beyond the “dead end” in dealing with the DPRK, but the Halperin plan could be deemed too radical rather than gradualist, and was simply not propitious. It was fine to think outside the strategic “box”, but beyond the box lay an optimal distance. It was suggested that the plan may not have taken into account the vicissitudes of domestic politics of the various relevant parties – of the ROK, Japan and the U.S. Nor should coercive leverage, effective interdiction, counter-proliferation measures such as missile defense, and the credibility of extended U.S. deterrence be abandoned.

A few specifics were noted. China was considered indispensable to any regional denuclearization agreement. A proposal that did not involve cast iron assurances of Beijing’s active involvement in the regional process would make a proposal of denuclearisation, and by virtue of that, an NEA-NWFZ, unlikely. Disagreement arose as to whether China should or would want to take the initiative, although it purports to share the common goal of denuclearization.

Allied attitudes and approaches in the region were discussed and debated. Japan, it was suggested, is more focused on an alliance first program, less able to influence multilateral arrangements, and was not interested in acquiring nuclear weapons while the U.S. nuclear umbrella remains credible. A NWFZ might actually do little to reassure Tokyo about U.S. deterrent capabilities. This view was countered by the notion that conventional deterrence was desirable, feasible and credible, and that Japan’s alliance with the U.S. and ROK was not inconsistent with non-nuclear principles. As for the ROK and its attitudes to a NWFZ, it was suggested that, whoever would win government in Seoul in the coming election, a desire was there to re-engage the DPRK.

A declaration of no hostile intent towards the DPRK by Washington might be based on the Southeast Asian Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) but this was considered as possibly too far from the box of possibilities to initiate. A dispute resolution mechanism such as a High Council was also considered, though this had never been used in the Southeast Asian context.

Additional parties such as Canada and Mongolia could be vital to both security and normalization for the Peninsula given their histories of multilateral, novel engagement with security issues in Northeast Asia. Prospects of current Canadian involvement in a Halperin-style plan were regarded with some pessimism, given Ottawa’s current endorsement of “controlled engagement” over “engagement without illusions.”

Other participants urged broadening the points of discussion beyond the issue of nuclear weapons in terms of how to stabilize the Peninsula. A focus on stabilisation through economic reforms was raised as an option, accompanied by the provision of food, farming techniques and electrical power on the understanding that these would cease on the breach of any Peace Treaty. Debate took place over what sort of economic reform stance the DPRK would adopt, given its reluctance to embrace any Beijing model. Human rights should also be added to the mix, though this was not something participants necessarily agreed with. One possibility was to look at that problem through the prism of DPRK labor rights, given the presence of North Korean laborers in Russia and China.

The viability of verification of DPRK compliance in dismantling its nuclear facilities was deemed a challenging, if not impossible prospect, given Pyongyang’s history on the matter. This was emphasized in relation to technical limitations on verification of cessation of uranium enrichment, though this was disputed by participants. Despite such skepticism  a framework, underpinned by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors who would be sent in to examine the relevant facilities and documentation, could be used. The IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the Additional Protocol (AP), policed by some regional organisation, was raised as a possible model for a Northeast Asian NWFZ, with the additional proviso for the irreversible and verifiable dismantlement of existing nuclear weapons programs. Examples such as a potential monitoring and verification system for Iran, as suggested by former IAEA monitoring and verification experts, might be considered.

Despite identifiable disagreements, common ground was found. It was agreed that coercive diplomacy was required to deal with the DPRK, and that re-engagement with the DPRK was required. Some measure of assistance was conceded as necessary, albeit linked to a high bar for engagement (verification beyond the NPT standards, human rights, transparency). Countries such as Japan, China and ROK see a NWFZ as possible, though they have differing priorities in terms of timing and effect. Doctrines such as U.S. conventional deterrence need not necessarily be undermined by a NEA-NWFZ.  Such a zone might also contribute to security, monitoring and positive economic impact of the nuclear fuel cycle.

The window of opportunity in pursuing such a broad arrangement, including the NWFZ, was stressed as small, given the unprecedented change and overlapping of leadership transitions over December 2012-June 2013 in all six NEA states. The urgency of pressing for such an agreement is considerable, given the nature of the DPRK, and regional suspicions on nuclear capabilities.

Further work on the project that will involve Mongolia is now being considered, with the establishment of a panel of eminent persons to consider the NWFZ and report back to their respective governments.

Most of the papers delivered at the workshop are available on the Nautilus website.[3] Correspondence should be sent to Peter Hayes at phayes@nautilus.org.

Summary Report

1.      INTRODUCTION

This report is based on a workshop of senior international experts in the field of security who convened in Washington D.C. for two days – October 9 and 10, 2012. The first session was held at Restaurant Nora with the bulk of the workshop held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars the next day. It was co-sponsored by the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability with the Wilson Center  with funding assistance from Ploughshares and the Norwegian Foreign Ministry.

The gathering of senior members of security and defense was convened with a view of expanding on work done at the East Asia Security Workshop in Tokyo held in November 11, 2011 on identifying the prospects, obstacles and means by which a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) could be established. This workshop built on two conceptual foundation stones laid in previous decades by John Endicott and Hiro Umebayashi on how to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia.[4]

A key question posed at Tokyo was whether a NEA-NWFZ would provide a plausible and desirable means to restrain, reverse or remove the nuclear threat posed by the DPRK, and reduce the role played by nuclear weapons between the countries in the region, including the ROK (South Korea), the DPRK (North Korea), and Japan.[5] The role of the Washington, D.C. workshop was to clarify and examine a revised version of Morton Halperin’s paper which provided the guiding proposal for such a zone embedded in a broader security framework.[6] In Halperin’s paper, emphasis was placed on the development and implementation of a process of regional security cooperation in Northeast Asia which would ultimately denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, thereby arresting the risks of proliferation. What was suggested was the security environment itself needed to be reshaped.[7]

The urgency of reaching such a settlement in the region is pressing given the emergence of the DPRK as an aggressive, nuclear armed-state, one prone to attacking the ROK with conventional forces, with the prospects of the ROK seeking nuclear armament or redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons, and the U.S. rebalancing of forces in the Asia-Pacific. The Fukushima catastrophe in Japan has also added another dimension to the nuclear paradigm.[8]

Various critical and interrelated matters were raised in discussions, all focused on aspects of the Halperin proposal and how it related back to a NEA-NWFZ. The dimensions of a comprehensive security settlement were considered, along with the regional framework necessary to make it work. Linked to that were the ways the regional security framework might be managed and expanded (the monitoring of the nuclear fuel cycle; verification of DPRK dismantling; the addition of powers such as Canada and Mongolia). Great power interests and strategies along with alliance relationships in the region vis-à-vis the regional security framework and a NEA-NWFZ were also considered, as were the fundamental military concerns of nuclear and conventional deterrence, compellence, and reassurance. Additionally, the workshop identified various important factors in normalizing relationships on the Peninsula such as the use of confidence building measures, the necessity of pressing Pyongyang for economic reform whilst also providing measures of assistance.

2.      BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE HALPERIN PROPOSAL

Halperin’s proposal at the 2011 workshop had been revised, seeking to clarify a range of issues. Three objectives of the proposal were expanded upon:

• that the U.S. maintain and strengthen military capability, notably conventional forces, while strengthening relations with allies;
• that the sanctions regime against North Korea via the UN Security Council and other means be maintained and strengthened until and at such time as the DPRK had verifiably dismantled all of its nuclear weapons capability; and
• that a process of regional security cooperation in NE Asia be established to regulate and maintain a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.

The merits of the plan lie in the fact that there are no “major resource implications” (that is, military, diplomatic, or economic) until and unless complete agreement is reached.[9]

Other supposedly more pressing security threats can be dealt with simultaneously, including the Taiwan Straits issue or concerns between China and Japan. The assumption here is that the first objective (U.S. and allied expanded conventional capability) remains in place irrespective of whether the new approach works; the second (the sanctions regime) continue until objectives of the third prong (a cooperative security process resulting in denuclearization) are achieved and there is verifiable dismantling on the part of DPRK.

The comprehensive agreement on security would require ratification by a number of states, though adherence to sections would be specific to the signatory states. Provisions would come into effect in a staggered manner – immediately upon ratification or when various conditions are met. The elements of the treaty would be:

• a termination of state of war;
• the creation of a permanent security council on security dealing with monitoring compliance and deciding on violations;
• a mutual declaration of no hostile intent;
• provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy;
• a termination of sanctions; and
• a nuclear weapons free zone.

In terms of how these elements worked vis-à-vis each other, it would not necessarily require all of them to come into play at once. A security arrangement might still be created between  relevant powers without the creation of a NWFZ per se. What mattered was that negotiations for these elements take place simultaneously.[10] Alternatively, the security arrangement or organisation might deal exclusively with a NWFZ – in terms of monitoring compliance, verification and imposing sanctions should the need arise.[11] Beijing may consider the proposal a ploy to dilute Chinese influence in the region which speaks to the levels of clarity all sides will need to make this proposal functional.[12]

The treaty provisions on entry into force and possible transition period should be structured in a manner that maximises pressure on the DPRK while giving all parties immediately concerned, in particular Beijing and Pyongyang, the greatest incentives to accept the framework. The treaty might include other elements that the DPRK has been seeking. An entry into force scenario adhered to by Japan and the ROK might also be considered. Both states could be permitted to sign and ratify the treaty conditionally. It would only come into effect with ratification by at least three of the Nuclear Weapon States (U.S., Russia, and China) and two or more Non-Nuclear Weapon States (Japan, ROK), as defined by NPT legal categories. A withdrawal mechanism will also be built in – non-nuclear weapon states would have the right to withdraw from the treaty after 3 to 5 years unless the provisions had been enforced effectively on the Korean Peninsula. In that case, the ROK and Japan might either wish to remain party to the treaty arrangements for another 3 to 5 years or terminate their obligations.[13]

The effect of such provisions will be: making the ROK surrender any nuclear weapons or weapons grade material it acquires as a result of the collapse of the DPRK, reassuring China that, if it persuaded the DPRK to comply with the treaty, neither Japan nor the ROK would acquire nuclear weapons or permit them to be stored on their territory. The DPRK would be aware of this, and would be, in turn, reassured by a negative security assurance by Washington if it joined the treaty.[14]

Provisions covering issues of transit of nuclear armed ships or planes and defining the territorial limits of the treaty in terms of international waters would have to be included.

It was acknowledged that the Halperin proposal would throw up a set of challenges. A series of metaphors were used by participants: it was a matter of “thinking outside the box”; it was an attempt at moving “beyond” a “dead end” in dealing with the DPRK.[15] Participants were mixed on this – some chose to see the proposal as conceptually striking and worthwhile pursuing – by enlarging the problem, one had a better means of solving it; others regarded it as radical rather than gradualist, a grand masterpiece approach, a proposal that, for all its merits, was neither “propitious” in terms of timing, nor “realistic” in terms of likelihood to bear fruit. It was fine to think outside the strategic “box”, but beyond the box lay an optimal distance.[16] Nor should coercive leverage, effective interdiction, counter-proliferation measures such as missile defense, and the credibility of extended U.S. deterrence be abandoned.[17]

Views were also expressed wondering how the plan sufficiently took into account the vicissitudes of domestic politics of the various relevant parties – of the ROK, Japan and the U.S.[18] A denuclearized DPRK would have to be considered a fundamental objective for the U.S. Congress, but the DPRK itself has made it clear that a peace treaty would have to precede denuclearization.[19] One way of doing so might be the implementation of interim peace agreements leading to a treaty. The sovereignty of the DPRK would be acknowledged in return for steps towards permanent dismantlement of nuclear and missile production facilities.[20] It was also pointed out that the peace treaty that is fundamental here is one between Washington and Pyongyang, rather than Pyongyang and Seoul.[21]

A few participants were encouraged by the proposal’s breadth, seeing it as the basis of a regional framework of cooperation and security in Northeast Asia, though it was noted that the bar would have to be high.[22] Halperin’s proposal might be tinkered to include an OSCE for Northeast Asia, one that would not necessarily require a treaty. More specifically on the point of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, the same powers that made up the Six-Party Talks could also be involved, boosted by the “world without nuclear weapons” agenda of the Obama administration. This would enable the discussion of a NWFZ to be injected into the conversation, with the powers pledging to work towards creating a world free of nuclear weapons.[23] Others wished to see such a NWFZ embedded in the proposal to not merely be a “technical” document but one concretely related to demilitarization, neutralization and also inclusive of WMDs.[24]

3.      GREAT POWER ISSUES

Washington’s goals regarding a Korean Peninsula in transition were essentially: preventing conflict; reducing the risk of ROK proliferation; denuclearizing the DPRK and preventing proliferation of nuclear technologies; maintaining a U.S. presence on the Peninsula; keeping U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan alliances strong; maintaining a positive stance towards Beijing; and help create conditions for the integration of the Korean Peninsula into the international system. Although Washington’s relationship with Seoul had become deeply embedded in almost all sectors of South Korean society, across the political spectrum, and so solid that changes of respective administrations would do little to shake it, Korean nationalism as a domestic force could not be underestimated. Budgetary constraints in Washington might well drive policy priorities, whatever the strategic interest or logic of the parties to the Korean conflict; and perceptions of this financial constraint on US policy will affect US ability to lead, whatever the budgetary outcome in early 2013.[25]

The role China would play in the process was thought vital, though a few participants suggested that the PRC has less influence over the DPRK’s actions than is often assumed. In fact, the DPRK has always paid a high price to  maintain its autonomy from the great powers throughout its short history. The current positioning of China, and revised hierarchies of power in the region, suggested that the PRC would have to be involved in any regional denuclearization agreement. It was Beijing that would provide the ability to leverage. A proposal that did not involve cast iron assurances of its active involvement in the regional process would make a proposal of denuclearization and by virtue of that, an NEA-NWFZ, unlikely as a sell.[26] That said, given that the DPRK might not be initially involved in the process might doom the involvement of the PRC to begin with. It would also depend on what was being sought – it would be hard for the U.S., the ROK and Japan to come into a security arrangement without the DPRK undertaking to give up its nuclear weapons capability from the start, or at the very least seriously committing to a process leading to that end.[27]

It was noted that the PRC was not an easy negotiating partner, nor was it simple to work with China on regional security issues. Although it must be involved to give an energized sense to the negotiations, other powers cannot simply wait for Beijing to take the lead. It was constrained by internal forces and could not be expected to manage matters alone.[28] Beijing was also proving strikingly inflexible in its positions on other regional security issues. Threatening Beijing had to be avoided. It was suggested that a position of mutual deterrence be accepted between Washington and Beijing, something which the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (2010) does not state. This was one way whereby the United States might frame a no first use policy. [29]

As for the PRC’s position more specifically towards a NWFZ in Northeast Asia, it was suggested that support in Beijing exists for such a proposition, as evidenced by its NWFZ Working Paper submitted to the Eighth NPT Review Conference in May 2012.[30] Some of the features of that increasingly flexible position are: that the guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1999 on establishing NWFZs be adhered to; that such a zone be established on the basis of consultations among themselves and voluntary agreements in light of actual regional conditions; that nuclear weapon states unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or nuclear weapon free zones and conclude an international instrument to that effect.[31] The PRC’s stance to the DPRK was not one of promoting the regime’s collapse—something that it felt was being pushed by the United States and its allies—but more regime transformation.[32]

The new regime in Pyongyang could prove promising in terms of initiating internal reform, though this could be affected by Beijing’s position in ensuring internal stability and Washington’s obstinate stance on the non-recognition of the DPRK’s regime, which has been interpreted as one of “hostile intent”.[33] Beijing’s own interests would be threatened by instability and regime change in North Korea, and issues with Washington would arise over the specifics on how Korean reunification would take place.[34] It was observed that the PRC-DPRK relationship has proven a frustrating one, but that the sources of Chinese insecurity had to also be understood.[35]

An agreement in the format as outlined by the Halperin proposal would be of benefit to China, stabilizing Northeast Asia and sparing diplomatic energy and resources invested in the Six Party Talks. A “nuclear domino chain reaction” in Northeast Asia would thereby be averted, prospects for a regional arms race diminished, and the need for aggressive Missile Defense measures reduced.[36]

Russia’s potential role in the process was also considered, with an air of regret on Moscow’s part in the creation of DPRK’s capabilities. All options, it was reiterated, were on the table, including the prospects of creating a NWFZ in Northeast Asia. Of course, saying yes to something did not imply action on it. Indeed, Russia has previously considered that a mechanism of peace was needed to move the Peninsula process forward (denuclearization, non-interference with domestic affairs, confidence building measures, a peace treaty, normalization of bilateral relations). Russia was against regime change, but in favour of attaining security through a chain of summit meetings. A regional security forum to deal with Asian matters should also be considered. It might, however, be appropriate to expand the focus of the NWFZ to include not merely nuclear weapons, but all WMDs.[37]

4.      ALLIES AND OTHER POWERS: ISSUES

Japan’s approach to both a regional security arrangement and more specifically a NWFZ was the subject of some disagreement. An emphasis was placed on Tokyo’s insistence on an alliance first program, irrespective of who was in power in Tokyo. Second, Tokyo’s ability to support multilateral arrangements in terms of clout had diminished. Third, lurking in the background was the possibility of Tokyo itself acquiring nuclear weapons – its own commitment to avoid acquiring a nuclear capability lay less on the issue of the threat posed by the DPRK and more on the issue of credible nuclear deterrence stemming from Washington.[38] The Halperin proposal would have to take into account the linkages between U.S. commitments to extended deterrence to its allies and Tokyo’s commitment to a non-nuclear status. Indeed, it might be argued that a NWFZ might actually be of little value at all to Tokyo, given its stated and firm stance on not going nuclear. It might even prove less than reassuring and not address perceptions of risk issuing from China’s nuclear arsenal which would have to be dealt with for a NWFZ to be effective.[39]

Domestic issues would also hamper Japanese involvement – the matter of Japanese abductees in the DPRK being particularly acute and corrosive. It would also diminish prospects of Japanese aid to Pyongyang that would accompany any peace treaty. However, the occurrence of the Fukushima meltdown might have made entry into a NWFZ a more attractive proposition, despite the limitations.[40]

In contrast, it was suggested that the creation of such a NWFZ that would extend beyond an exclusive Korea zone (one involving Japan and ROK) would increase strategic stability by keeping U.S. forces in ROK permanently, thereby creating a buffer between Tokyo and Beijing.[41] Furthermore, it was claimed that Japan’s relationship with other regional actors, including South Korea, was not inconsistent with non-nuclear principles. It was suggested that Japan, given the stance taken by the Obama administration to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons, should not continue to exclusively rely on extended nuclear deterrence.[42] Indeed, U.S. “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific region provides an opportunity to reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons and can converge with the defense postures of its allies to provide a more reliable deterrence posture.[43] Greater emphasis must be placed on conventional deterrence, though this is something that Beijing still sees as a threat.[44] Besides nuclear deterrence was something of a fiction, given that there have been no forward deployed nuclear weapons in the region since 1991.[45]

Debate arose on the role of the ROK and its attitudes to a NWFZ. It was suggested that, whoever would win government in Seoul in the 2012 elections, a desire was there to re-engage the DPRK. The ROK government’s policy towards a NWFZ was to first seek denuclearization. Should significant progress be registered on that front, negotiations for a peace regime and a NWFZ could take place.[46] With that said, there has been little consistency from Seoul and Washington on a uniform position towards the DPRK, a matter rooted in their democratic political systems.[47]

5.      BROADENING THE SCOPE: NORMALIZATION AND ADDITIONAL PARTIES

Additional features that might be included in the broader security arrangement on the one hand, and the NWFZ on the other, were mentioned at particular stages. It was noted that the NWFZ should not merely be conceptualized as a document of dry legal articles – but that it be part of a broader political process.[48]

The specifics of normalization were considered. It was stressed that a termination of the state of war on the Peninsula and creation of a permanent peace regime were essential – the “breaking point” being another conflict. There had been an absence of inter-governmental dialogue between the ROK and DPRK, with deepened distrust in each other’s leadership during the Lee Myung-bak government. OPLAN 5029 and OPLAN 5030, U.S. operational plans created to prepare for a collapse of North Korea have also compounded the threat of instability on the Peninsula —-at least from a DPRK and possibly Chinese perspective.[49] The Armistice was observed to be the disease called “the Korean problem” set around a confrontation structure, strengthening hostility and enmity.[50] In terms of dealing with this, it was observed the DPRK did not have permanent friends and enemies. The impetus to normalization was there given the threat of severe instability on the Peninsula, and might take place on three tracks: international agreements (one for instance, ending the state of war on the Peninsula), government-to-government arrangements (featuring a bilateral document laying out a means of reducing political, legal and economic barriers to normalization), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with proven track records in development.[51] Normalization would not have to be decoupled from the threats of Pyongyang’s aggression, given this three track approach. Another view was that provocation and efforts to normalize should be decoupled, given the time wasted on the part of both parties in normalization efforts.[52]

As a precedent for a declaration of no hostile intent by Washington that might figure in the normalization process, the Southeast Asian Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) was thought a relevant model should a comprehensive agreement on peace and security in Northeast Asia become feasible. It might, however, be too far from the box of possibilities to initiate. Feasibility would be improved by the crisis in the Northeast Asia region abating independently, or a creative drive that would encourage bold diplomacy. Serial-multilateralism (an expanded base of parties in the process) could also be encouraging. The High Council that the TAC provides to resolve conflicts peacefully might be an attractive model for an NEATAC, but the point is a difficult one in terms of comparison. The Southeast Asian Council has never been convened, largely due to a general absence of intra-Southeast Asian conflicts, and in some cases reliance on extra-TAC methods of conflict resolution (bilateral de-escalation, and the International Court of Justice).[53]

Additional parties such as Canada and Mongolia were proposed as potential and important additions to the security and normalization arrangements for the Peninsula. Such third parties could act as valuable brokers – Mongolia being significant in terms of its relationship with the DPRK and its own singular experience with establishing a nuclear weapon free zone; Canada with its history of multilateral, novel engagement with security issues in Northeast Asia.[54] Prospects of current Canadian involvement in a Halperin-style plan were regarded with some pessimism, given Ottawa’s current endorsement of bilateralism and coalitions of the willing. Regarding Pyongyang, Canada has severely curtailed dealings, suspending senior-level contact with North Korean officials except on those topics linked to human rights in the North, regional security, inter-Korean relations and consular issues and imposing sanctions via the Special Economic Measure Act. A policy of “controlled engagement” has taken the place of “engagement without illusions.”[55]

Other participants urged broadening the points of discussion beyond the issue of nuclear weapons in terms of how to stabilize the Peninsula. A focus on stabilization through economic reforms was suggested as an option, together with the provision of food, farming techniques, and electrical power on the understanding that these would cease on the breach of any Peace Treaty.[56] The U.S. could not be seen to be making economic concessions to the DPRK, but should not oppose the ROK’s economic advances to Pyongyang.[57] The regional security framework might enable the DPRK to be drawn into a web of interdependent connections (cross investment and production) with the ROK, to provide Pyongyang with self-interest in regional stability.[58] Debate took place over what sort of economic reform stance the DPRK would adopt despite some doubt about Pyongyang’s willingness to “open up” – it certainly would not be the model Beijing had been seeking to promote to Pyongyang and to economically liberalize in that manner might result in collapse.[59] It was also noted that an economically stable DPRK might make it more attached to nuclear weapons, rather than less.[60]

The role played by human security should not be neglected and any agreement had to be mindful of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), though there was a sense of vagueness on how this might be included in the basket of possibilities.[61] Furthermore, it was argued that raising human rights in such agreements can prove problematic, given that the United States itself had relationships with powers – Saudi Arabia as a case in point – where human rights simply did not feature.[62] One way of approaching it would be through the prism of labour rights, specifically DPRK foreign labour, of which thousands of workers are present in China, Russia and other countries.[63] An informational element might also be involved seeking to publicize the role of human rights abuses within the DPRK itself, something that could promote transformation within the DPRK.[64] NGOs (construction, humanitarian) might also be facilitated in this regard, though remarks made to that effect did not clarify the complex multidimensional typologies of what types might be involved.

6.      STRATEGIES, RE-BALANCING AND DETERRENCE

Emphasis was made on placing less reliance on nuclear weapons in the context of deterrence, and privileging massive conventional deterrence, though it was suggested that removing nuclear weapons from the mix might threaten the image of credibility.[65] That potential reduction of reliance in nuclear weapons with U.S. “rebalancing” provides impetus for a Northeast Asian NWFZ to gain more traction politically and strategically, though it is conditional on Washington’s drawing down of military commitments in the Middle East.[66] U.S. allies in Northeast Asia could also assist in this regard, improving allied deterrence and defense capabilities. Examples such as Japan’s ballistic missile defences, anti-submarine warfare and mine countermeasures were cited as examples of “defensive cover” for U.S. forces. The deployment of the MV-22 Osprey aircraft to western Japan, while politically controversial, would increase political sustainability of the U.S. military presence in Okinawa.[67]

Deterrence as a concept was, however, a slippery one and far from unitary in terms of regional relationships.[68] Nuclear diplomacy is a “multiplayer” game on the Peninsula with its own specific considerations. ROK’s dependence on the nuclear umbrella was fundamentally based on the threat from the DPRK. Japan, on the other hand, sees extended deterrence as essential against China.[69] U.S. deterrent capabilities were also applicable to the Taiwan Strait contexts. Neither capability nor credibility of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent would be undermined by a NE Asian NWFZ – at least in the short or medium term. Chinese military modernization would, however, undermine the balance of power across the Strait, in which case the NWFZ might hamper options open to Washington and its allies in the context of a war over Taiwan. Limits on Chinese deployments and force structure were more desirable than periodic renewal requirements in the agreement, though Beijing would be reluctant, in the short term, to discuss strategic nuclear arms control given its stress on medium and intermediate-range nuclear forces. Given the gains for China in limiting the introduction of nuclear weapons into the NEA region, it may well in time be open to discussing limitations on its own forces or activities in exchange for limits on others. Current interest from Washington was focusing on peerless conventional deterrence. This might work in the case of dealing with the DPRK, with its inferior conventional armed forces, but the case with China and their upgraded nuclear and conventional forces optimized Taiwan Strait scenarios (the use of anti-access, area denial systems), posed a different set of challenges. Washington’s advantages in any Taiwan Straits crisis would still be formidable, and the use of US nuclear weapons could, in any case, take place from the continental U.S, irrespective of a NEA-NWFZ.[70]

A NEA-NWFZ would also have additional benefits in not merely reducing the probability of conflict on the Korean Peninsula, but the possibility of simultaneous conflict on the Peninsula and over the Taiwan Strait. This would enable the U.S. to buttress its deterrent capability against China in a Taiwan scenario with freed up resources. It was suggested that a two-front war was of very low probability even in the absence of a NEA-NWFZ – Pyongyang might want to extract concessions in the event of a Taiwan war, but would be unlikely to initiate an unwinnable conflict. Nor would China wish to entertain the risks inherent in attempting to mobilize DPRK support.

What of the continued credibility of U.S. deterrence? Certainly, covering ROK and Japan with a credible conventional strike capability could be done, though it might not fit the orthodox view of what was required during the Cold War for a stable architecture in the region.[71] Re-balancing U.S. forces in the “pivot” towards the Asia-Pacific is designed to check the rise of Chinese military power but also reassure U.S. friends and allies that Washington’s power was not diminishing.[72] In real terms, the increase will be smaller than assumed (a net increase of 23 ships by the end of this decade), but the overall percentage of U.S. navy ships allocated to the Pacific Fleet will constitute 60 percent of its strength. New operational concepts are also being deployed – Air Sea Battle (ASB) or “area access” is being undertaken by U.S. forces against the “counter intervention operations” doctrine of the PLA (area denial) based on submarine forces, land-based aircraft with anti-ship missiles and, in future, ballistic missiles with the ability to hit moving ships. The region, in the foreseeable future, will be the ground for a “military capabilities competition.”[73]

In another context, it has been argued that the DPRK has itself been attempting to convey its own version of deterrence, which found form in the sinking of the ROK’s Cheonan on March 26, 2010 and the shelling of Yeonpyeong on November 23, 2010 as measures to restore damaged pride.[74]

7.      FEASIBLE VERIFICATION?

At points, discussion focused on whether verification of DPRK compliance in dismantling its nuclear facilities was, in fact, a feasible proposition at all, given Pyongyang’s poor record on adhering to “binding” agreements.[75] One school of thought on this was that a modern verification regime was impossible regarding Pyongyang, unless it focused on specific variables – nuclear tests and the shutdown of the Yongbyon nuclear reactor in 2007-8 being suggested examples.[76] Another view posed was that this was too bald a claim – that it was, in fact, possible to specify the information on enrichment capacities, which could then be assessed by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors who would be sent in to examine the relevant documentation.[77] An intrusive, but fair monitoring regime to confirm an absence of the reconstitution of the program would be doable and has, in fact, been previously done. Any regional organization would probably be sui generis, given that organizations such as Argentina’s ABACC and Europe’s EURATOM were not created to confirm an absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.[78]

Verification, in fact, is a broad and critical issue for any NWFZ, and one that has implications in a region where nuclear infrastructure – Japan and ROK – is present and growing. Any verification regime would have to be rigorous and comprehensive, combined with an ongoing system of sanctions, interdiction, coercive diplomacy and engagement.[79] It would have to take heed of delivery vehicles and instances of non-compliance.[80] The IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with the Additional Protocol (AP), policed by some regional organisation, was considered as a possible model for a Northeast Asian NWFZ, with the additional proviso for the irreversible and verifiable dismantlement of existing nuclear weapons programs. With this in mind, it is expected that nuclear material accountancy keeping records and reports and information on the design facilities would be different from the CSA as they would be insufficient to address such matters as the historical production of nuclear material and dismantlement.[81] A possible option could be the verification and monitoring measures that have been suggested for Iran’s nuclear program by former IAEA experts. The package would include transparency, openness, co-operation and confidence building measures. Amongst stipulated requirements, Iran would agree to implement fully its obligations under the IAEA Statutes, Iran’s Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, and return to the provisional implementation of the Additional Protocol and works for its early ratification.[82]

8.      SECURITY, THE NUCLEAR CYCLE AND CONFIDENCE MEASURES

Debates on verification dovetailed neatly into discussions over security and the nuclear fuel cycle. Would cooperative action dealing with the nuclear fuel cycle between states be included as part of a NWFZ treaty or in separate parallel side agreements, wherein some would be regional and others DPRK-specific?[83] For a durable NWFZ in Northeast Asia, it was essential that weapons-related fissile materials and spent fuel from power reactors were secured. A regional nuclear materials regime could be central to a permanent council on security established as part of a comprehensive Treaty on Peace and Security in Northeast Asia.[84] “Front end” issues of the nuclear cycle could be dealt with through a series of options, amongst them a regional consortium of nuclear fuel enrichment; limits on, or foregoing or ending reprocessing in non-nuclear states in a NEA-NWFZ; the creation of regional emergency enriched “fuel banks”; and collaboration on the manufacture and export of nuclear equipment, with a nuclear vendor code of conduct. “Back end” issues – spend fuel storage and disposal – could be covered with a regional enrichment consortium incorporating the DPRK’s enrichment capacities that would be safeguarded in a multinational scheme of exchange; with planning to commence for a power system for development of a DPRK grid capable of supporting a fleet of small LWRs.[85]

There was, however, no agreement within the nuclear non-proliferation community on how to minimize proliferation risks of fuel cycle capabilities, even in official U.S. government circles. Allowing enrichment and reprocessing in both the ROK and DPRK would pose a high proliferation risk.[86] Allowing ROK to enrich and reprocess would give the DPRK another reason to demand equivalent treatment. Few worry today that  the ROK would proliferate, but the DPRK has proven it will do so and nuclear fuel collaboration could enhance its opportunity to engage in further proliferation.

Any broad settlement that would allow the DPRK to use nuclear energy would have to ensure that it was being done for peaceful purposes. It might be encouraged to see this as part of a package of non-nuclear options in terms of power generation. Flexibility towards Pyongyang might increase over time, but initial steps had to be small. The DPRK had to demonstrate a lower proliferation risk than previously. That same settlement had to avoid damaging the NPT regime at large (a suggested example of this would be letting the DPRK retain sensitive nuclear facilities, though what exactly could be deemed “sensitive” was not clarified), and there was room for a Korean agreement to go beyond the NPT in term of assistance and restrictions. This case has to be made given that the DPRK has previously violated the NPT.[87] Precedents such as the dismantlement of South Africa’s weapons program and Iran’s attempt to acquire a nuclear option ought to be dismissed as models – because the former acquired its nuclear weapons prior to joining the NPT regime, and the latter, while in violation of the NPT regime, remains in the regime, and has not yet tested a weapon. Consequently higher standards are required of the DPRK to demonstrate a lowered proliferation risk.

Options might include the remnants of enrichment or reprocessing to be carefully monitored, while others might call for temporary bans (and destruction or denaturing) or demand a permanent ban. A regime of assistance for restrictions could come into play – the more restrictions that were accepted, the more assistance would be provided. Assistance in training, equipment, evaluations for safety, security and safeguards, co-ownership, assured fuel supply and even fuel cycle collaboration could be provided. A NEA-NWFZ might deal with national ownership of fuel cycle capabilities, with a possibility of moving to multinational ownership of Japanese enrichment, a model of reprocessing which could be regionally expanded. Fuel cycle capabilities, as another possibility, might be dispersed across ROK, DPRK and Japan.[88]

Despite such difficulties, there was a general note of agreement struck amongst participants that confidence building measures were necessary.[89] Current measures in some form did exist, including those of the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), though there might be an argument to be made for Chinese assistance in that regard to smooth matters with the DPRK.[90] There would be no need for the MAC once the armistice is replaced by a treaty, but there should be the transfer to an observer force staffed, in part, by personnel from non-aligned nations to help establish the peaceful regime.[91] The peace treaty itself, to be effective, would probably require all parties to the Korean War to sign on, which is urgent given the lack of any agreed framework of engagement in the west sea.[92] One could not hope for a dramatic Perestroika-like revolution in the DPRK, even with a “Hollywood” styled leader.[93]

9.      NEA-NWFZ: SPECIFICS

Several critical issues pertaining to the creation of a NEA-NWFZ were elaborated, including purpose, differentiated obligations, membership compositions, and precedents.[94] Realizing a NEA-NWFZ faced challenges before an aggressive DPRK, but Pyongyang’s nuclear capability was of the political-psychological quality rather than military in nature. A strategic environment would have to be created to shape the DPRK’s choices, rather than the other way around. Strategic deterrence between the nuclear weapon states would be managed and proliferation potential in the ROK, Japan and Taiwan would be addressed within such a structure. There would be no need for the DPRK to sign onto the agreement immediately, with Japan, the ROK, Canada and Mongolia signing at the outset. ROK and Japan might join the treaty first, bringing the zone into existence over their territories without the need for all parties to sign first. Halperin’s plan adds a five year contingency period to this, within which the DPRK would join meeting its full obligations, or the agreement becoming void. The door should be kept open to non-nuclear weapon states (NNWs) to join.[95]

Critical issues remained: the nature of whether a NEA-NWFZ might be part of a standalone arrangement, or whether it needed a broad ranging foothold as articulated by Halperin; questions of maritime transit of nuclear weapons; and the deployment of nuclear weapons by nuclear weapons states out of the zone.[96]

Discussion also centred on timing in terms of pushing and bringing the zone into force. While other zones have been negotiated with consideration scope of time – 18 years to take the Latin American example of the Treaty of Tlatelolco – there was urgency about creating a nuclear weapons free zone in Northeast Asia. December 2012-June 2013 sees a unique period in history – the overlapping of leadership transitions in all six NEA states. Such an opportunity should not be wasted.[97]

10.   THE FUTURE: PROSPECTS AND POSSIBILITIES

Despite a degree of reservation to aspects of the Halperin plan, common grounds were identified. In terms of an overall framework, Halperin’s working paper was deemed workable by a number of participants, with reservations expressed on various points: for example, the domestic dimensions affecting the will of potential parties to form a NEA-NWFZ (Japan, U.S., and the ROK). However these were not deemed insurmountable by several of the participants, given the urgency to normalize the strategic framework on the Peninsula. The feasibility of verifying DPRK compliance with dismantling its nuclear facilities was contested, but again, this barrier might be overcome. The questionable will on the part of certain outside countries to engage the plan as third powers (Canada) was not, in principle, a refutation of the argument. Concerns of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, at least in terms of how it would be sold to both allies and opponents in the wake of a NWFZ, could also be addressed – at least for now.[98]

A positive mood was struck in attempting to find a new way of dealing with the impasse of the DPRK and confronting its nuclear facilities, something that participants broadly accepted in the face of the current stalemate. At no point did participants challenge the idea that current U.S. policy towards the DPRK was unsatisfactory and severely limiting. This was despite a few reservations that the timing of this new proposal was not propitious. Mongolia has shown willingness to examine options with taking the plan further, having considered ecological, economic and personal security as more important than nuclear options.[99] The strength of the Halperin proposal lies in its multidimensional features: how it attempts to embed the NWFZ in a broader set of treaty and security arrangements, premised on both verifiable compliance with agreements by the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear weaponry, and the creation of some regional forum of security in Northeast Asia. The proposal has clarified that sanctions will not necessarily be abandoned as diplomatic efforts to re-engage the DPRK take place. Energy and probably economic assistance needs to be provided to the DPRK, though these would cease in the case of breaches.

Formidable challenges remain. Prediction on what might happen with the plan’s reception is difficult. But one had to be careful to not believe one’s own or other’s prejudices when consulting allies. Matters such as verification are feasible in terms of destruction of the current nuclear inventory in the DPRK, while nuclear reactors had to be identified and an undertaking made to not produce weapons grade material. Whether Pyongyang will come on board and react favourably to the proposals around the Halperin plan remains to be seen and needs to be pursued actively, perhaps with the support of friendly states able to host dialogues with DPRK officials.

The creation of a “track 1.5” Eminent Persons Group, to be convened to study a NEA-NWFZ and report back to governments was mooted as a point of discussion, and the mechanics of that are under consideration as of this report’s publication.[100]

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III. References

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V. Nautilus invites your responses

The Nautilus Peace and Security Network invites your responses to this report. Please leave a comment below or send your response to: napsnet@nautilus.org. Comments will only be posted if they include the author’s name and affiliation.

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