CAROL ANN JONES OCTOBER 31, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Carol Ann Jones concludes: “Denying a country use of their nuclear combat forces could be the key to avoiding or limiting damage from a pending strike, but it could trigger unexpected actions from that country’s nuclear forces (assuming the weapons and launch capability were […]
RICHARD TANTER NOVEMBER 2, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, the author discusses recently released Australian cabinet papers dealing with a decision in September 1997 to allow the establishment of a Joint Australia-United States Relay Ground Station at Pine Gap to support two United States early warning satellite systems in place of its predecessor, […]
WILLIAM H BOOTHBY OCTOBER 31 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Bill Boothby observes: “For all States, there is an obligation to take constant care in nuclear operations to spare civilians and civilian objects. More detailed precautionary rules apply to all States with certain additional rules only applying to States that are party to API […]
PAUL K. DAVIS OCTOBER 24, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Paul Davis suggest that US NC3 modernization “should place increased emphasis on assuring control, avoiding accidents, and avoiding ill-informed or unwise employment of nuclear weapons.” Paul K. Davis is a senior principal researcher, retired adjunct (RAND). Dr. Davis was a senior executive in […]
DARYL G. PRESS OCTOBER 17 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay Daryl Press focuses on the growing threats to nuclear command and control and communication (NC3) systems around the world and the links between vulnerable NC3 and strategic instability due to the risky steps that nuclear weapons states may adopt to protect their arsenals during […]
AVNER COHEN OCTOBER 11 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Avner Cohen traces and exposes Israel’s two most fundamental principles of the Israeli NC3 thinking: first, insisting on strict physical and organizational separation between nuclear (e.g., pits) and non-nuclear assets (e.g., military delivery platform); second, creating a two-tier governance architecture at various levels. Avner Cohen […]
MASON WILLRICH OCTOBER 3, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Mason Willrich suggests that there are important lessons for NC3 operators in how electric power utilities control their grids, and especially, how they ensure that interconnections with adjacent grids are maintained continuously in spite of the potentially catastrophic risks of grid failure arising from instability […]
FEROZ HASSAN KHAN SEPTEMBER 26, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Feroz Hassan Khan describes the unique challenges faced by Pakistan’s NC3 given “the volatile nature of national and security situations, compounded by evolving military doctrines warranting sudden transition from peace to crises to war management.” Pakistan, he notes, “is grappling with the pace […]
VIPIN NARANG SEPTEMBER 19, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Vipin Narang argues that eventually “all states delegate—that is, cede the ability to use nuclear weapons, irrespective of the authority to do so—at some point. The question is when.” Vipin Narang is an Associate Professor of Political Science at MIT and a member of MIT’s Security Studies Program. A podcast […]
JOHN GOWER SEPTEMBER 12, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, John Gower states that the UK Nuclear Weapon Command Control and Communications (UK NC3) architecture is designed and operated to support SSBN strategic nuclear deterrence in all foreseeable circumstances from peacetime to nuclear conflict. “Through multiple paths and frequencies, fall-back and alternative systems and […]
