Universal Compliance: Summary of Policy Recommendations

Universal Compliance: Summary of Policy Recommendations

Chapter Three: Strengthening Enforcement


•    Develop model national laws to criminalize, deter, and detect nuclear proliferation pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1540. (p. 53)
•    Develop universal international law to criminalize nuclear weapon and material proliferation and facilitate prosecution of states and nonstate actors. (p. 54)
•    Develop a declaration system or reporting requirement to distinguish between legal and illegal nuclear trade. (p. 55)
•    Encourage the IAEA to adopt rules restricting nuclear assistance to states not in full compliance with NPT obligations. (p. 55)
•    Adopt resolutions through the UN Security Council to hold states that withdraw from the NPT responsible for violations of the treaty, and prohibit their continued use of materials and facilities acquired while party to it. (p. 56)
•    Pursue voluntary codes of conduct and related measures with investment, banking, and manufacturing firms to discourage and prevent nuclear trafficking. (p. 57)
•    Undertake a comprehensive review of how existing maritime and customs control measures could contribute to new, tougher enforcement activities under the PSI. (p. 62)


•    Convene a P-5 summit to specify national commitments needed to strengthen nonproliferation mechanisms and laws. (p. 65)
•    Strengthen the monitoring committee established for UN Security Council Resolution 1540 to collect and evaluate state reports documenting implementation of nonproliferation laws. (p. 65)


•    Urge the UN secretary-general to charter a review of the performance of its two Iraq-focused commissions, UNSCOM and UNMOVIC. (p. 67)
•    If the findings of this review warrant, urge the UN Security Council to consider establishing a permanent international nonproliferation inspection capability for chemical and biological weapons and delivery systems. (p. 67)
•    Use all venues to advocate adoption of the IAEA’s Additional Protocol by all states. (p. 66)
•    Work to provide international inspection regimes with a strong international mandate, sufficient budgets and resources, and international consensus on robust consequences in the event of noncompliance. (p. 69)


•    Enhance and broaden counterproliferation strategy beyond purely military responses to encompass the capabilities most likely to deter and defend against the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. (p. 71)
•    Restructure missile defense research and subject all antimissile systems to realistic testing. (p. 72)
•    Develop international guidelines for preventive military action in the absence of imminent threat. (p. 75)

Chapter Four: Blocking Supply


•    Create a high-level “Contact Group to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism” to lead efforts to improve the security of all weapon-usable nuclear materials. (p. 87)
•    Establish an effective global standard of protection for all weapon-usable fissile materials and create international obligations to protect these materials. (p. 88)
•    Expand and enhance the G-8 Global Partnership program to improve nuclear security assessments, upgrades, and material relocation. (p. 89)
•    Accelerate and increase funding for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to secure and relocate vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide within four years. (p. 89)
•    Seek an internationally endorsed ban on production of HEU and a decades-long moratorium on the separation of additional weapon-usable plutonium. Aggressively pursue proliferation-resistant fuel cycle concepts that avoid plutonium separation (p. 91)
•    Provide guaranteed, economically attractive fuel services to states that do not enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium, and consider ways to place existing facilities under new institutional controls. (p. 94)
•    Reevaluate and re-prioritize the U.S.-Russian plutonium disposal program, with a renewed emphasis on securing plutonium under international monitoring. (p. 107)
•    Develop a global nuclear accounting and transparency system. (p. 108)


•    Develop a strategy to extend threat reduction cooperation to new countries and regions, building on experience in Russia and the former Soviet republics. (pp. 112–113)
•    Expand the number of target countries and partners participating in the G-8 Global Partnership program. (p. 112)
•    Engage President Bush and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, to establish cooperation as a top policy priority and resolve stumbling blocks to implementation. (p. 114)
•    Launch a fast-paced initiative, in partnership with Russia, to fully protect Russian nuclear weapon–usable material by 2008. (p. 115)
•    Establish a senior coordinator, or focused coordination team, within the White House with a mandate to oversee, prioritize, and expedite threat reduction programs. (p. 114)


•    Expand membership in and compliance with export control regimes to all states with relevant capabilities. (p. 117)
•    Expand export control assistance to emerging supplier states and key transit states. (p. 121)
•    Reform existing export control regime operations by requiring notices of all sensitive exports, moving away from consensus rule making, establishing cooperative reviews of export control
implementation, and considering penalties within export control systems for noncompliance. (pp. 119–120)
•    Make the IAEA Additional Protocol a condition of supply for all Nuclear Supplier Group transfers. (p. 120)
•    Pass a new and strengthened U.S. Export Administration Act. (p. 121)
•    Establish an international code of compliance for exporters of sensitive materials and technologies. (p. 121)
•    Expand the scope of the PSI to cover shipments through inter-national waters and airspace. (p. 124)
•    Ground the PSI in international law by means of a UN Security Council Resolution. (p. 124)

Chapter Five: Abating Demand


•    Reward states that contribute to nonproliferation with economic, political, and other inducements. (p. 129)
•    Facilitate development and funding of substitute energy technologies and proliferation-resistant nuclear reactors. (p. 129)
•    Devalue the security and political status associated with nuclear weapons by, among other things, breaking the correlation between nuclear weapon possession and veto power in the UN Security Council. (p. 130)


•    Raise global political demands that states that possess nuclear weapons must exert greater leadership to moderate and resolve regional conflicts that drive proliferation and possible use of nuclear weapons. (Specific obligations of the United States, Israel, India, Pakistan, and other states with nuclear weapons are discussed throughout this report, particularly in chapter 2, under obligation 6, and in chapter 6.) (p. 132)


•    The objectives of preventing the spread and use of nuclear weapons should now drive U.S. nuclear policy. (p. 133)
•    While nuclear threats remain in the world, the United States must maintain an effective nuclear deterrent. (p. 133)
•    The role of nuclear weapons in national security policy should be de-emphasized, and the norm against the use of these weapons should be strengthened. (p. 137)
•    The United States should halt research into and development of new nuclear weapons, pursue ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and continue a moratorium on testing in the meantime, and continue to develop non-nuclear strike assets. (pp. 134–137)
•    The United States and Russia should reduce nuclear risks by standing down from hair-trigger postures and by ending preemptive strategies and the forward deployment of weapons. (p. 139)
•    The United States should work with Russia and other countries to restore the momentum toward verifiably and irreversibly reducing nuclear weapons and materials. (p. 147)


•    Rearm and act to implement the thirteen steps agreed to in 2000, or negotiate and implement similar disarmament steps. (p. 150)
•    To demonstrate commitment to disarmament, the nuclear weapons states and states with stocks of fissile materials should publish white papers detailing how they could dismantle their nuclear arsenals or account for and securely store all their fissile materials in a verifiable manner as would be required in a world without nuclear weapons. These papers should be discussed and debated in an appropriate international forum. (p. 154)

Chapter Six: Applying the Strategy to Regional Crises


•    Lead an initiative to ensure that Pakistan and India employ state-of-the-art practices and technologies to secure nuclear facilities, material, and know-how. (p. 160)
•    Encourage Pakistan and India to negotiate and properly implement nuclear risk reduction practices. (p. 161)
•    Encourage India and Pakistan to cease uranium enrichment and plutonium separation, in return for ending international restrictions on nuclear technology and fuel service cooperation. (p. 162)
•    Encourage India and Pakistan to accept a permanent cease-•re across the Line of Control between India and Pakistan. (p. 163)
•    Strengthen civilian political parties and institutions in Pakistan. (p. 164)
•    Promote stable conventional force balances and security relationships among Pakistan, India, and China. Do not provide U.S. weaponry capable of delivering nuclear weapons, such as fighter-bomber aircraft, or of destabilizing the strategic balance, such as ballistic missile defenses, unless and until India and Pakistan have stabilized their relationship so that new strategic capabilities would only be seen to serve defensive, not offensive, purposes. (pp. 165–166)
•    Extend international cooperation to India and Pakistan (and Israel) to upgrade the safety of reparable existing nuclear plants, if and when all civilian nuclear facilities are placed under safe-guards. (p. 167)
•    Resist Indian demands to waive or amend nonproliferation prohibitions against nuclear technology commerce for new reactors, in the absence of support from key non-nuclear weapon states. (p. 167)


•    Actively support France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in their efforts to negotiate long-term arrangements with Iran that objectively guarantee that its nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. (p. 170)
•    Communicate to the current Iranian government that the United States will not pursue regime change through military action if Tehran verifiably forswears acquisition of capabilities to produce materials that can be used in nuclear weapons and ends its support of groups that conduct terrorism. (p. 172)
•    Support nuclear negotiations, including positive incentives to the Iranian government and people, while concurrently championing political reform in Iran. (p. 172)
•    Establish a security dialogue among Persian Gulf states, including representatives of Iran and Iraq. (p. 173)
•    Strengthen intelligence efforts to identify all Iranian nuclear activities and facilities and to work through the PSI to interdict illicit transfers of technology, material, or know-how. (p. 174)
•    Urge the UN Security Council to consider a positive resolution endorsing the terms of a deal worked out by the EU and Iran that objectively guarantees that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. (p. 174)
•    Clarify through the IAEA and the NPT Review Process that all states should suspend nuclear cooperation with any state for which the IAEA cannot provide sufficient assurances regarding the peaceful nature of that state’s nuclear program. (p. 175)
•    Move a UN Security Council resolution to make clear that any state that withdraws from the NPT remains responsible for violations committed while it was still a party to the treaty. (p. 175)
•    Move a UN Security Council resolution that a state that with-draws from the treaty—whether or not it has violated it—may no longer make use of nuclear materials, facilities, equipment, or technology acquired from another country before its withdrawal. (p. 175)
•    Establish a Nuclear Suppliers Group rule that all purveyors of nuclear technology must require contracts that specify that if a state receiving such technology withdraws from the NPT, the provided nuclear supplies may not be used or transferred. (pp. 175–176)


•    Muster greater U.S. involvement in the Middle East peace process. (p. 178)
•    Proactively call for a regional dialogue to specify conditions necessary to achieve a zone free of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. (p. 181)
•    Establish threshold conditions for serious progress. All states and parties must recognize Israel’s right to security and the right of Palestinians to a secure state. (p. 181)
•    Provide external leadership by outside actors to facilitate and complement direct negotiation of confidence-building and arms control measures by regional actors:
• Encourage friendly states and NGOs to conduct studies and dialogues exploring key conditions that would have to be met for a zone free of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to be implemented. (p. 182)
• Design the verification procedures and practices that would have to be implemented to achieve a zone free of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons in the Middle East. (p. 182)
• Provide independent intelligence from outside states and international agencies to help verify that parties are fulfilling their pledges. (p. 183)
• Push for high levels of transparency in national policies, budgets, and facilities. (p. 182)
•    Encourage Israel to sign and ratify both the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention, Egypt and Syria to sign and ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention and ratify the Biological Weapons Convention, Iraq and Lebanon to sign and ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the United Arab Emirates to ratify the Biological Weapons Convention. (p. 183)
•    Encourage Israel to declare that it has adopted an indefinite moratorium on producing plutonium and ceased the separation of plutonium from spent fuel. (p. 183)


•    Determine whether and under what conditions North Korea is willing to relinquish its nuclear capabilities. (p. 187)
•    Develop an international consensus through the UN Security Council that North Korea’s actions are a threat to international peace and security and that North Korea’s attempt to withdraw from an agreement it has violated is unacceptable. (p. 188)
•    Fully test the will of North Korea to verifiably implement the irreversible dismantlement of all nuclear weapon capabilities in exchange for a fundamentally different relationship with the United States and other countries, including diplomatic relations and reconstruction assistance. (p. 188)
•    Further enhance U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan to broaden support for U.S. security objectives in the region, including the absence of nuclear weapons. (p. 188)
•    End the state of permanent crisis by pursuing rapid and ongoing negotiations with North Korea led by a presidentially appointed envoy. This person must be fully authorized to negotiate, prepared and empowered to make serious progress, and in a position to meet with North Korean counterparts of sufficient rank to conduct substantive negotiations. (p. 188)
•    Prepare for the possibility that North Korea is unwilling to abandon its nuclear capabilities by reinforcing the diplomatic and military capabilities in the region with a view to enhancing deterrence and stability on the Korean peninsula and reducing incentives for other countries to follow North Korea’s nuclear lead. (p. 188)
•    Make clear that any attempt by North Korea to export weapon-usable nuclear materials or weapons will be considered a threat to international peace and security as defined by the UN Charter. (p. 189)