Engaging DPRK in a Verifiable Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone: Addressing Nuclear Issues of the Korean Peninsula

Hello! The below report is written in English. To translate the full report, please use the translator in the top right corner of the page. Do not show me this notice in the future.

Recommended Citation

Dingli Shen, "Engaging DPRK in a Verifiable Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone: Addressing Nuclear Issues of the Korean Peninsula", Global Problem Solving, May 06, 1994, https://nautilus.org/global-problem-solving/engaging-dprk-in-a-verifiable-nuclear-weapons-free-zone-addressing-nuclear-issues-of-the-korean-peninsula-2/

Engaging DPRK in a Verifiable Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone:

Addressing Nuclear Issues of the Korean Peninsula[*]

by Dingli Shen[**]

Center for American Studies,

Fudan University Shanghai, China

May 6, 1994


prepared for the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network managed by Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development


Berkeley, California
     ABSTRACT: This report discusses regional institutional 
building of nuclear nonproliferation on Korean Peninsula.  It 
proposes that a nuclear-weapons-free-zone (NWFZ) scheme could 
hopefully serve this purpose.  A regional nonproliferation regime 
should properly address security concern of the relevant parties 
to a possible Korean Peninsular NWFZ, while seeking from them 
cooperation on intrusive and symmetrical safeguarding 
inspections.  It is desired that outside powers should help the 
denuclearization process on the Peninsula.

1. The Origin of the Idea

With the end of the Cold War, tensions in Northeast Asia have 
been much reduced. Deplorably, however, this does not apply well 
to the Korean Peninsula.  The rivalries between the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, hereinafter as North Korea) and 
the Republic of Korea (ROK, hereinafter as South Korea), a legacy 
left over by the Cold War, have yet to be removed.  At the 
moment, the striking confrontation between North Korea and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and between North 
Korea and the United States, regarding special inspection to 
North's suspected nuclear facilities, has again become the focal 
point of world attention.  The Korean nuclear issue is 
challenging the human wisdom to produce a workable solution to 
nuclear nonproliferation.

Proposals for breaking the Korean nuclear impasse vary, from 
economic sanctions to "surgical operation"-like military 
preemption, to peaceful settlement through talks and dialogue.  
As modern history has indicated, economic sanctions usually would 
not work.[1]  This author is skeptical that, given the unique 
political culture of North Korea, the North would succumb to 
pressure at all.[2]  A resort to sanctions seems to be 
counterproductive to curtail the spread of nuclear weapons in 
that part of the world, let alone the undesired effect, such as 
regional unrest, that the sanctions would likely bring about.  In 
my opinion, a plausible approach to solving the problem is to 
address the security concern of North Korea carefully, and, take 
appropriate measures accordingly.

Admittedly, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction has 
been widely accepted as an international norm.  Nevertheless, to 
go nuclear is still a viable option of any country if it deems 
that its national interest would be thus best guaranteed, and if 
it prefers not to be bound to any international norm.  Although 
it is still uncertain of the actual status and even purpose of 
North Korea's nuclear program, an adequate analysis of the 
North's security environment and consideration, as made by Andrew 
Mack, would suggest that it is not incomprehensible that North 
Korea might have virtually embarked on a nuclear program of 
weapons potential.[3]

In this connection, were the North's interest in such a nuclear 
program to be discouraged, the best formula is to work out a 
security arrangement in which the international nonproliferation 
regime would be well preserved and in the meantime, the North 
would feel secure to a credible degree.  This report will explore 
how a nuclear-weapons-free-zone scheme on the Korean Peninsula 
could help serve this purpose.  It is understood that the 
interest of the relevant powers, viz., the United States, Russia, 
China, and Japan, converges in this area.  Their contributions to 
establishing such a zone would be crucial and therefore highly 
desired.[4]

2. Various Regional NWFZs[5,6]

This section briefly reviews various kinds of nuclear-weapons-
free zones.  The concept of NWFZ is not a new one.  It originated 
in the 1950s as a form of arms control, calling for a ban on the 
possession of nuclear weapons in a certain area defined by a NWFZ 
treaty.  Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki proposed this idea 
as early as 1957.

During the Cold War, NWFZ issues were frequently raised and 
debated at various international arms control fora, but often led 
to propaganda ends.  The United States, wary that its free access 
to a certain area would be impeded and hence its national 
interest undermined, often had a negative view toward NWFZ 
proposals.  For instance, there had been serious talks on the 
creation of a NWFZ in the ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian 
Nations) region. However, the U.S. once made it clear that this 
would be contrary to its national interest and that pursuing this 
idea further would jeopardize U.S. protection for the states 
concerned.  In Europe, proposals for NWFZs at subregional levels 
-- in the northern region, in the Baltic, along the Central Front 
and in the Balkan -- had all failed because of the different 
alliance strategies of the Cold War.[7]

Now that the strategic landscape has been reshaped, nuclear-
weapons-free-zone has gained wider support.  The Government of 
South Africa has denounced its nuclear weapons program, and in 
turn taken a position in support of the creation of an African 
NWFZ.[8]  On May 29, 1991, President Bush announced a Middle East 
arms control initiative which, among other things, urged a 
verifiable ban on the production and acquisition of weapons-
usable nuclear materials be implemented by states in that region.  
There has been continuing enthusiasm in the Clinton 
Administration seeking to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East.[5]

In addition, there has been Congressional interest in urging the 
U.S. Government to join the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone 
Treaty, as part of the overall American nonproliferation strategy 
toward the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the extension 
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).[9]  Most recently, 
the United States mooted a "5+2+2" multilateral conference on 
nuclear nonproliferation and regional security with an aim at 
establishing a NWFZ modality in South Asia,[10] an issue 
highlighted during the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott's visit to New Delhi and Islamabad in the early April of 
1994.[11]

Currently, two types of nuclear-weapons-free zone exist.  One is 
for populated areas, like Latin America and the South Pacific.  
The other is for unpopulated areas, such as the Antarctic, the 
seabed, and outer space.

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 
(Treaty of Tlatelolco). This Treaty entered into force on April 
22, 1968.  It prohibits the testing, use, manufacture, production 
or acquisition by any means, as well as the receipt, storage, 
installation, deployment and any form of possession of any 
nuclear weapons by Latin American countries.  The parties permit 
verification of this commitment by a regional inspection 
organization known as the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL).  Argentina and Chile have 
recently brought the Treaty into force.[12]  (Brazil signed the 
Treaty in 1968, but is yet to bring it into force; Cuba is the 
only major state of this region which remains outside the 
Treaty.)  Recognizing the provision for no-stationing of nuclear 
weapons, the U.S. has signed two protocols to the Treaty.  China 
is a party to the Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco.

South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga).  
This Treaty entered into force on December 11, 1986.  It 
prohibits the manufacture or acquisition by other means of any 
nuclear explosive devices, as well as possession or control over 
such device by the parties anywhere inside or outside the zone 
area described specifically.  The parties also undertake not to 
supply nuclear material or equipment, unless subject to IAEA 
safeguards, and to prevent in their territories the stationing as 
well as the testing of any nuclear explosive device.  Each party 
remains free to allow visits, as well as transit, by foreign ship 
and aircraft.  China has signed Protocol 2 and Protocol 3 to the 
Treaty, whereas the U.S. has not yet agreed to the protocols to 
honor its restriction.

Aside from these two treaties for populated areas, the following 
three "non-armament treaties" have been established for 
unpopulated areas: 

Antarctic Treaty.  This Treaty, entered into force on June 23, 
1961, declares the Antarctic an area to be used exclusively for 
peaceful purposes.  It prohibits any measure of a military nature 
in the Antarctic, such as the establishment of military bases and 
fortifications, and the carrying out of military maneuvers or the 
testing of any types of weapons.  The Treaty also bans any 
nuclear explosion as well as the disposal of radioactive waste 
material in the Antarctica.

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons 
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean 
Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (The Seabed Treaty).  This 
Treaty, effective as of May 18, 1972, prohibits implanting or 
emplacing on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil 
thereof beyond the outer limit of a 12-mile coastal zone any 
nuclear weapons or any types of weapons of mass destruction as 
well as structures, launching installations or any other 
facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using 
such weapons.

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty).  This Treaty became 
effective on January 27, 1967.  As its name implies, the Outer 
Space Treaty prohibits placing into orbit around the Earth any 
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of 
mass destruction, the installation of such weapons on celestial 
bodies, or the stationing of them in outer space in any other 
manner.  The establishment of military bases, installations and 
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the 
conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies are also 
forbidden.

All these existing NWFZs, as well as other NWFZ-type of arms 
control initiatives, have manifested a common feature: possession 
and/or even physical presence of nuclear weapons in the zone area 
is banned by a nuclear-weapons-free-zone treaty.  Such regional 
nuclear weapons nonproliferation institutions require states 
within the zone to pledge at least to forgo developing and 
possessing nuclear weapons.  NWFZ treaties usually require 
nuclear powers to honor relevant treaty provisions and undertake 
their respective obligations.

3. Establishing a NWFZ on Korean Peninsula

Both North and South Korea have expressed commitment to peaceful 
use of nuclear energy.[13] As a signatory to the NPT, one should 
unconditionally accept international inspection, special (or 
challenge) inspection included, to all of its nuclear facilities.  
Fairness aside, this is the obligation a signatory should have 
understood before acceding to the NPT, since such inspection 
provisions have already been set up as part of the NPT/IAEA 
safeguarding regime.  However, Pyongyang argues that at the 
moment it is at a special stage as its decision to withdraw from 
the NPT is being temporarily suspended.

The North's conflict with IAEA surrounds IAEA's request of full 
inspection to two suspected places in Yongbyon.  One of the two 
places is reported as typical of a waste site which could be 
associated with an earlier Soviet-supplied 4MWt (IRT-DPRK) 
reactor in Yongbyon.  This place is reportedly almost exactly the 
same as the waste site in Iraq near the Soviet-supplied nuclear 
reactor there.  The other suspected facility is a two-floor 
building, code named Building 500 by CIA, built in 1991-1992 with 
tanks believed to be in a concealed lower level.  IAEA inspectors 
did visit this building on an earlier inspection, finding no 
evidence of clandestine activities there.[14]  When IAEA was 
later inclined to drill through the basement of the building, 
Pyongyang responded by threatening to withdraw from the NPT, 
three days after the start of 1993 "Team Spirit" military 
exercise, on the grounds that inspection to its military places 
would infringe North Korea's national security.

To strike a balance, a party to the NPT does have its right to 
withdraw from the treaty, if it determines that to continue to 
stick to the treaty would be harmful to its national interest.  
It is too obvious that the nonproliferation regime would incur a 
serious setback if the North does quit. It is therefore evident 
that keeping the North in the NPT would be of vital importance to 
nuclear nonproliferation and to ensure regional stability in 
Northeast Asia.

As such, a balanced approach to dealing with the thorny problem 
is to think of a Korean Peninsular nuclear-weapons-free zone 
(KPNWFZ).  It would feature at least two characteristics.

Firstly, as a regional approach, the KPNWFZ mandates a regional 
nonproliferation regime out of the willingness of the states in 
that region.  North Korea has repeatedly indicated that it has 
neither the capability nor the desire to make a nuclear bomb; 
South Korea has said more categorically that it will forswear any 
nuclear fuel-cycle program which could lead to a weapon- end 
use.[15]  So, why not to install a KPNWFZ to legalize their 
positive intention?  Unlike some South Asian states, neither 
North nor South Korea has linked its non-nuclear proposal to a 
global non-discriminatory nonproliferation regime.  The current 
NPT is indeed discriminatory. However, exercising restraint on 
nuclear capability before the NPT is reformed helps contain the 
spread of nuclear weapons at regional level a lot more easier.

Secondly, the tenet of a NWFZ treaty is that all parties to it 
have to assume the same responsibility not to acquire nuclear 
weapons.  As Treaty of Tlatelolco and Treaty of Rarotonga have 
shown, NWFZ approach would impose symmetrical obligations to all 
signatories in the respective region.  At this time, the Korean 
nuclear problem remains with the "special inspection".  A 
symmetrical treatment of intrusive verification on nuclear 
activities on both Koreas, as would be mandated by a KPNWFZ 
Treaty, could possibly render full inspections more acceptable, 
provided synergetic measures are taken.

In fact, in the December 1991 "Joint Declaration for a Non-
Nuclear Korean Peninsula", the two Koreas already pledged:[16]

* Not to test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use 
nuclear weapons; 

* Not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium 
enrichment;

* To use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes;

* To verify compliance upon the request of one party but agreed 
to by both;

* To ensure implementation through the establishment and regular 
meeting of a South-North

Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC).

Such pledges have well provided the foundation for establishing a 
NWFZ on the Korean Peninsula.

4. Critical Issues to KPNWFZ

Successful implementation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone must 
guarantee the security of nations in the region, if they forgo 
nuclear weapons option.  Otherwise, NWFZ approach would be 
unattractive and eventually fail.

On Korean Peninsula, a NWFZ regime has to ensure that:

* Neither North Korea nor South Korea would develop and possess 
nuclear weapons;

* Out of their own willingness, the two Koreas would develop 
their civil nuclear programs
designed least divertible to military application; 

* All nuclear powers should honor their restrictions regarding 
this zone;

* An effective, symmetrical verification will be put in place.

These issues will be addressed in the following sequence: i) 
Definition of a relevant NWFZ in Northeast Asia; ii) Nuclear 
security assurance from the nuclear powers; iii) Peaceful use of 
nuclear energy in the zone area; iv) A confidence-building 
safeguarding system; v) Cessation of presence of foreign troops 
and conventional arms control in the region.

First of all, geographical limits of the area of the proposed 
zone.  The country in question is North Korea, which is situated 
on the Korean Peninsula, or, in Northeast Asia in a larger 
geographical scope.  Normally, Northeast Asia is considered as 
comprised of Far Eastern Russia, Northeastern China, Japan, the 
Koreas, and Mongolia.  Russia and China are the two nuclear 
states in the region.  The United States once stationed naval and 
tactical nuclear weapons abroad, including Japan and South Korea.  
Now the U.S. has declared that such weapons have been withdrawn.

What size will the NWFZ in this region be?  Including the whole 
Northeast Asia?  This depends upon the geopolitical situation of 
this region.  Apparently Russia, and perhaps China too, would not 
be interested in establishing a NWFZ where their territories will 
be involved.

If a Northeast Asian nuclear-weapons-free zone (NENWFZ) is to 
cover Russia, Russia's sea exit of nuclear force to the Pacific 
would be likely blocked.  It is understood that Russia's Pacific 
Ocean Fleet, homeported on the Kamchatka Peninsula and at Far 
East coastal bases near Vladivostok and around the Sea of 
Okhotsk, includes those nuclear-powered nuclear-tipped- 
ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs).  How could it be imagined 
that Russia, a nuclear power, would impose a nuclear-free zone on 
its own territory and territory waters?

In China, there has been no credible information in the public 
domain regarding basing of its nuclear weapons.  Thus one cannot 
ascertain whether there has been nuclear weapon in Northeastern 
China.  It looks beyond imagination that a regional non-nuclear 
sanctuary will be encouraged to include China, an acknowledged 
nuclear power.

Even though it seems unlikely Russia and China would endorse a 
NENWFZ involving themselves, the Governments of the two countries 
have been in favor of a nuclear-free zone on Korean Peninsula 
proper.

Japan has long embedded a non-nuclear-weapon policy in its 
Constitution.  Although there has been pro-nuclear sentiments in 
Japan, a near-term nuclearization of Japan is beyond scene. What 
does concern the world community is Japan's technical capability 
to go nuclear in a crash program.  Japan's excessive accumulation 
of plutonium also upsets the world at large.  It would be 
beneficial if Japan joins the Koreas in a regional NWFZ 
arrangement.  But Japanese politicians might not be interested in 
being treated as the same as the Koreans, especially when nuclear 
powers of this region will be absent.  In order not to complicate 
the urgent task of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, one could 
just perceive a NWFZ established on the Peninsula.  Japan might 
not be involved in the beginning.  Meanwhile, if the two Koreas 
pledge in the NWFZ Treaty not to enrich uranium and reprocess 
plutonium, Japan should consider to give up its plutonium recycle 
program.  Mongolia is neither a course to the Korean nuclear 
problem nor a critical solution to it.  One may not consider that 
it should join a NWFZ in the context of Korean Peninsula.

Second, nuclear powers should provide negative security assurance 
to the proposed KPNWFZ. As seen from those established NWFZs, 
nuclear weapons states should pledge not to use or threaten to 
use nuclear weapons against the nuclear weapons free zone.  
Regarding KPNWFZ, it seems clear that Russia and China are ready 
to provide negative security assurance to this region.  In fact, 
China is inviting other nuclear powers to sign a global "No-
First-Use" Agreement.[17]  Also, it does no harm for Britain and 
France to do the same.

The United States has for many years stationed nuclear weapons on 
South Korea.  But in the recent years, the U.S. is believed to 
have withdrawn its tactical nuclear weapons home, in light of the 
changing security environment.  It is welcome that the U.S. has 
promised North Korea, through a joint statement of June 11, 1993, 
that it will agree to principle of assurances against the threat 
and use of force, including nuclear weapons.[18]  This is an 
indication that the U.S. is departing from its current 
conditional no-first-use policy.

However, the U.S. is still providing a nuclear umbrella to South 
Korea.  Thus, the U.S. is adopting a conflicting policy: while 
providing negative security assurance to North Korea, it provides 
positive security assurance to South Korea at the same time, 
according to the 1954 U.S.-Korean Mutual Defense Treaty.  The 
U.S. cannot do this in the legal sense.  It can stick to one of 
them, but not both.  Of course, it is very constructive if the 
U.S. withdraws its nuclear protection to South Korea, in the 
post-Cold War time.  It seems that North Korea doesn't have any 
nuclear backing on its side.  In addition, South Korea and the 
U.S. have enough conventional means to handle a crisis on Korean 
Peninsula, even responding to a nuclear crisis.

Third, to realize a KPNWFZ, both North and South Korea should 
turn their nuclear program to peaceful uses.  Since both sides 
have expressed intention not to retain uranium enrichment and 
plutonium reprocessing, they have promised to go beyond the 
normal requirement against nuclear proliferation.  This is 
certainly welcome.  One should be aware that, however, some 
nationalist elements of South Korea are advocating to reverse the 
course set by Roh Tae Woo.  And, it is hard to accept that the 
Yongbyong "radiochemistry" Laboratory is not a reprocessing 
facility and could be waived from inspection.  Further, providing 
means to North Korea to produce less nuclear waste through 
nuclear power generation would be helpful.  Providing an LWR 
(light- water-reactor) is probably an alternative.[19]

Fourth, on safeguards.  North Korea may not have acquired 
kilogram-quantity of plutonium, but its degree of cooperation in 
accepting inspection does raise suspicion of its nuclear 
ambition. It is expected that the international community would 
insist on intrusive inspection on the North's nuclear program, 
particularly, to investigate DPRK's plutonium reprocessing 
history.  It could be painful for oriental countries to accept 
intrusive inspection.  Nevertheless, it is important to become a 
respected member of an established world order, though the order 
itself needs to be improved.  Thus an appropriate attitude to be 
cooperative is much desired.  For North Korea to be more 
cooperative in accepting inspection, the North would likely 
request to impose a similar intrusive inspection on South Korea's 
nuclear facilities.  A NWFZ scheme provides a means in which 
intrusive and symmetrical safeguards can be equally applied to 
both Koreas.

Finally, let me address an important aspect which remains outside 
the nuclear realm, i.e., the U.S.-South Korean annual "Team 
Spirit" exercise.  To be sure, North Korea should unconditionally 
accept inspection as long as it is still a signatory to the NPT.  
And, NPT does not regulate any connection between one party's 
acceptance of nuclear safeguards to another party's military 
exercise with a nuclear power.  However, the Korean nuclear issue 
is far more complicated than this simple reasoning.  North Korea 
demands that such exercise be stopped since North Korea regards 
it insecure vis-a-vis a rival allied with a nuclear power which 
is demonstrating its support through military exercise.  My 
opinion is that the U.S. can well help denuclearization of North 
Korea, partially through the permanent cancellation of "Team 
Spirit" exercise or its equivalent.  To show the U.S. goodwill 
posture, the United States should not condition its cancellation 
of such exercise on North Korea's acceptance of nuclear 
inspection.

In turn, the U.S. positive initiative could result in a positive 
feedback from North Korea.

Besides, there is no longer a necessity to keep U.S. troops on 
South Korea.  Obviously there has been no foreign troops 
stationing on North Korea.  As said above, no nuclear power seem 
ready to unfold a nuclear umbrella over North Korea.  Given the 
fact that South Korea has a population twice that of the North, 
given the fact that the South's economy is more than ten times 
greater, Seoul is predicted to match the force level of the North 
within this decade.  So, there is indeed no necessity for 
Americans to defend South Korea.  It is quite logical at this 
time to let American troops go home.[20]  This will only remove 
any remaining reasons of North Korea to stay in the margin of the 
NPT.

It is understood that conventional arms reduction should be in 
parallel to the denuclearization process of the Korean Peninsula.  
A DPRK Army of more than 1.1 million troops vis-a-vis a ROK Army 
of 0.6 million plus provides no sense of security to either side, 
but to exhaust a large portion of their national resources.[21]  
Conventional arms control and transparency building deserve due 
attention.

5. Conclusion

Given a Korean Peninsula receiving negative security assurances 
from all nuclear powers, given the U.S. Army withdrawal from 
South Korea, given a permanent cancellation of "Team Spirit" and 
a close of the nuclear umbrella for South Korea, an intrusive and 
symmetrical safeguards institution could be more hopefully 
applied to both North and South Korea.  In this way, the North 
Korea, as well as South Korea, could be integrated into a 
verifiable regional NWFZ scheme.  The world community at large 
should facilitate the process of denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula through establishing a NWFZ in this area.

 ENDNOTES

[*] Draft report to the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network 
(NAPSN) based at Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable 
Development, Berkeley, California; and to the Fourth ISODARCO 
Beijing Seminar on Arms Control (April 26-30, 1994, Beijing).  
The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author 
only, representing neither his affiliations nor the Government of 
China.

[**] Dingli Shen is an associate professor of Fudan University.  
He co-chairs the Program on Arms Control and Regional Security at 
the Center for American Studies of Fudan University.

[1] Kimberly Ann Elliot pointed out that only 23% of 115 cases of 
economic sanctions imposed since World War I have been successful 
in achieving "major goals."  See, "Will Sanctions Work against 
North Korea?" NAPSN Working Paper #24, December 17, 1993, pp.7-9.

[2] As John Curtis Perry has put it, "DPRK will change only in 
its own way."  See, "Dateline North Korea: A Communist Holdout", 
Foreign Policy, No.80, Fall 1990, p.172.

[3] Andrew Mack, "The Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula", 
Asian Survey, Vol.XXXIII, No.4, April 1993, pp.339-359; "North 
Korea and the Bomb," Foreign Policy, No.83, Summer 1991, pp.87-
104. For the nuclear threat North Korea has received, see also, 
Bruce Cumings, "Spring Thaw for Korea's Cold War?" The Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scientists, April 1992, pp.14-23; "Who's 
Intimidating Whom?" in "Ending the Cold War: Cuba, North Korea, 
and Vietnam", The Defense Monitor, Vol. XXIII, No.1, 1994, p.5.

[4] There has been an extensive literature on interrelations 
between the Koreas and the U.S., Russia and Japan.  For Chinese 
analyses in English on Sino-Korean relations, see, Jia Hao and 
Zhuang Qubing, "China's Policy toward the Korean Peninsula", 
Asian Survey, Vol.XXXII, No.12, December 1992, pp.1137-1156; Hao 
Yufan, "China and the Korean Peninsula: A Chinese View", ibid., 
Vol.XXVII, No.8, August 1987, pp.862-884; Hong Li, "The Sino-
South Korean Normalization: A Triangular Explanation", ibid., 
Vol.XXXIII, No.11, November, 1993, pp.1083-1094.

[5] Zachary S. Davis and Warren H. Donnelly, "A Nuclear-Weapons-
Free Zone in the Middle East: Background and Issues", CRS Issue 
Brief, The Library of Congress (Order Code: IB92041), updated 
October 1, 1993.

[6] SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament 
(SIPRI/Oxford University Press (OUP), 1993), pp.759-762.

[7] SIPRI Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and Disarmament 
(SIPRI/OUP, 1990), p.578. At the Fourth Review Conference of the 
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 
Indonesia and Malaysia again strongly endorsed the proposal for a 
NWFZ in the ASEAN region.  See, SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World 
Armaments and Disarmament (SIPRI/OUP, 1991), p.565.

[8] SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament 
(SIPRI/OUP, 1992), p.99.

[9] Zachary S. Davis and Warren H. Donnelly, "The South Pacific 
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty [The Treaty of Rarotonga]", CRS Report 
for Congress, The Library of Congress, 93-610-ENR, June 25, 1993.

[10] The proposed "5+2+2" nine-nation conference will involve the 
five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Germany and 
Japan, and India and Pakistan.

[11] K. K. Katyal, "India not for nuclear talks proposed by 
U.S.", The Hindu, April 2, 1994, p.1; "U.S. keen on stronger 
ties", ibid., April 7, 1994, p.1; P. S. Suryanarayana, "Pak. cool 
to U.S. plans", ibid., April 6, 1994, p.13; "'Broad accord' with 
Pak: Talbott", ibid., April 10, 1994, p.1.

During Talbott's recent visit, the U.S. proposed objective of 
"first capping, then reducing and eventually eliminating weapons 
of mass destruction and ballistic missiles from South Asia".  The 
U.S. is believed to have urged New Delhi and Islamabad give up 
their nuclear weapons option, cut off production of unsafeguarded 
fissile materials, and, place future civil nuclear material 
production and nuclear facilities under international safeguards.

[12] Dispatch (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public 
Affairs), January 31, 1994, Vol.5, No.5, p.47.

[13] North and South Korea announced a "Joint Declaration for a 
Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula" in Panmunjom on December 13, 1991.  
The two sides pledged not to test, produce, receive, possess, 
store, deploy or use nuclear weapons and not to possess 
facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment.  On 
November 8, 1991, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo announced 
that it would not manufacture, retain, stockpile, equip with and 
use nuclear weapons.  He also pledged to accept full-scope 
international safeguards on its nuclear facilities and materials.  
See, AFP, November 8, 1991; Xu Baokang, "A Sound Basis for 
Nuclear-Free Korea", Beijing Review, December 16-22, 1991, pp.10-
11.

[14] Satellite photos taken during the construction period of 
Building 500 showed what was like a heavily shielded nuclear 
waste storage site in the basement.  See, "North Korea at the 
Crossroads: Nuclear Renegade or Regional Partner?" Arms Control 
Today, May 1993, p.4; Arms Control Reporter (IDDS), June 1993, 
Section 457.E, p.2.

[15] Endnote No.13.  Most recently, North Korean President Kim Il 
Sung said on April 16, 1994 that he had no plan to develop 
nuclear weapons and wanted peace.  AP, April 17, 1994.

[16] Michael Krepon, Dominique M. McCoy and Matthew C. J. 
Rudolph, eds., A Handbook of Confidence-Building for Regional 
Security, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Handbook No.1, September 
1993, p.30.

[17] Xinhua News Agency, March 24, 1994.

[18] Joint Statement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
and the United States of America, New York, June 11, 1993.

[19] Within the NAPSN there have been some analyses already on 
supplying LWRs to DPRK.  See, Peter Hayes, "Light Water Reactor 
Technology Transfer to North Korea: Does It Make Sense?" Working 
Paper #21, September 1993; Saloman Levy, "Supply of Light Water 
Reactors to Pyongyang: Technical Issues and Their Possible 
Resolution", Working Paper #22, December 1993; Victor Gilinsky 
and William Manning, "A U.S.-Type Light Water Reactor for North 
Korea? The Legal Implications", Working Paper #23, December 1993.

[20] In July 1977, General Bernard Rogers, Chief of Staff of the 
U.S. Army (1976-1979) quoted a South Korean Colonel as saying, 
"We will hate to see our friends go, but if we are going to grow 
up, and, we are going to walk alone, you have to take this 
(withdrawal).  I think the time has come". See, "Mission 
Accomplished in Korea: Bringing U.S. Troops Home", The Defense 
Monitor, Vol.XIX, No.2, 1990, p.7.

[21] The Military Balance: 1993-1994 (Brassey's for IISS, 1993), 
pp.159-162.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published.