Engaging DPRK in a Verifiable Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone:
Addressing Nuclear Issues of the Korean Peninsula[*]
by Dingli Shen[**]
Center for American Studies,
Fudan University Shanghai, China
May 6, 1994
prepared for the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network managed by Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development
ABSTRACT: This report discusses regional institutional
building of nuclear nonproliferation on Korean Peninsula. It
proposes that a nuclear-weapons-free-zone (NWFZ) scheme could
hopefully serve this purpose. A regional nonproliferation regime
should properly address security concern of the relevant parties
to a possible Korean Peninsular NWFZ, while seeking from them
cooperation on intrusive and symmetrical safeguarding
inspections. It is desired that outside powers should help the
denuclearization process on the Peninsula.
1. The Origin of the Idea
With the end of the Cold War, tensions in Northeast Asia have
been much reduced. Deplorably, however, this does not apply well
to the Korean Peninsula. The rivalries between the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, hereinafter as North Korea) and
the Republic of Korea (ROK, hereinafter as South Korea), a legacy
left over by the Cold War, have yet to be removed. At the
moment, the striking confrontation between North Korea and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and between North
Korea and the United States, regarding special inspection to
North's suspected nuclear facilities, has again become the focal
point of world attention. The Korean nuclear issue is
challenging the human wisdom to produce a workable solution to
Proposals for breaking the Korean nuclear impasse vary, from
economic sanctions to "surgical operation"-like military
preemption, to peaceful settlement through talks and dialogue.
As modern history has indicated, economic sanctions usually would
not work. This author is skeptical that, given the unique
political culture of North Korea, the North would succumb to
pressure at all. A resort to sanctions seems to be
counterproductive to curtail the spread of nuclear weapons in
that part of the world, let alone the undesired effect, such as
regional unrest, that the sanctions would likely bring about. In
my opinion, a plausible approach to solving the problem is to
address the security concern of North Korea carefully, and, take
appropriate measures accordingly.
Admittedly, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction has
been widely accepted as an international norm. Nevertheless, to
go nuclear is still a viable option of any country if it deems
that its national interest would be thus best guaranteed, and if
it prefers not to be bound to any international norm. Although
it is still uncertain of the actual status and even purpose of
North Korea's nuclear program, an adequate analysis of the
North's security environment and consideration, as made by Andrew
Mack, would suggest that it is not incomprehensible that North
Korea might have virtually embarked on a nuclear program of
In this connection, were the North's interest in such a nuclear
program to be discouraged, the best formula is to work out a
security arrangement in which the international nonproliferation
regime would be well preserved and in the meantime, the North
would feel secure to a credible degree. This report will explore
how a nuclear-weapons-free-zone scheme on the Korean Peninsula
could help serve this purpose. It is understood that the
interest of the relevant powers, viz., the United States, Russia,
China, and Japan, converges in this area. Their contributions to
establishing such a zone would be crucial and therefore highly
2. Various Regional NWFZs[5,6]
This section briefly reviews various kinds of nuclear-weapons-
free zones. The concept of NWFZ is not a new one. It originated
in the 1950s as a form of arms control, calling for a ban on the
possession of nuclear weapons in a certain area defined by a NWFZ
treaty. Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki proposed this idea
as early as 1957.
During the Cold War, NWFZ issues were frequently raised and
debated at various international arms control fora, but often led
to propaganda ends. The United States, wary that its free access
to a certain area would be impeded and hence its national
interest undermined, often had a negative view toward NWFZ
proposals. For instance, there had been serious talks on the
creation of a NWFZ in the ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian
Nations) region. However, the U.S. once made it clear that this
would be contrary to its national interest and that pursuing this
idea further would jeopardize U.S. protection for the states
concerned. In Europe, proposals for NWFZs at subregional levels
-- in the northern region, in the Baltic, along the Central Front
and in the Balkan -- had all failed because of the different
alliance strategies of the Cold War.
Now that the strategic landscape has been reshaped, nuclear-
weapons-free-zone has gained wider support. The Government of
South Africa has denounced its nuclear weapons program, and in
turn taken a position in support of the creation of an African
NWFZ. On May 29, 1991, President Bush announced a Middle East
arms control initiative which, among other things, urged a
verifiable ban on the production and acquisition of weapons-
usable nuclear materials be implemented by states in that region.
There has been continuing enthusiasm in the Clinton
Administration seeking to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East.
In addition, there has been Congressional interest in urging the
U.S. Government to join the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty, as part of the overall American nonproliferation strategy
toward the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the extension
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Most recently,
the United States mooted a "5+2+2" multilateral conference on
nuclear nonproliferation and regional security with an aim at
establishing a NWFZ modality in South Asia, an issue
highlighted during the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe
Talbott's visit to New Delhi and Islamabad in the early April of
Currently, two types of nuclear-weapons-free zone exist. One is
for populated areas, like Latin America and the South Pacific.
The other is for unpopulated areas, such as the Antarctic, the
seabed, and outer space.
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
(Treaty of Tlatelolco). This Treaty entered into force on April
22, 1968. It prohibits the testing, use, manufacture, production
or acquisition by any means, as well as the receipt, storage,
installation, deployment and any form of possession of any
nuclear weapons by Latin American countries. The parties permit
verification of this commitment by a regional inspection
organization known as the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL). Argentina and Chile have
recently brought the Treaty into force. (Brazil signed the
Treaty in 1968, but is yet to bring it into force; Cuba is the
only major state of this region which remains outside the
Treaty.) Recognizing the provision for no-stationing of nuclear
weapons, the U.S. has signed two protocols to the Treaty. China
is a party to the Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga).
This Treaty entered into force on December 11, 1986. It
prohibits the manufacture or acquisition by other means of any
nuclear explosive devices, as well as possession or control over
such device by the parties anywhere inside or outside the zone
area described specifically. The parties also undertake not to
supply nuclear material or equipment, unless subject to IAEA
safeguards, and to prevent in their territories the stationing as
well as the testing of any nuclear explosive device. Each party
remains free to allow visits, as well as transit, by foreign ship
and aircraft. China has signed Protocol 2 and Protocol 3 to the
Treaty, whereas the U.S. has not yet agreed to the protocols to
honor its restriction.
Aside from these two treaties for populated areas, the following
three "non-armament treaties" have been established for
Antarctic Treaty. This Treaty, entered into force on June 23,
1961, declares the Antarctic an area to be used exclusively for
peaceful purposes. It prohibits any measure of a military nature
in the Antarctic, such as the establishment of military bases and
fortifications, and the carrying out of military maneuvers or the
testing of any types of weapons. The Treaty also bans any
nuclear explosion as well as the disposal of radioactive waste
material in the Antarctica.
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean
Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (The Seabed Treaty). This
Treaty, effective as of May 18, 1972, prohibits implanting or
emplacing on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil
thereof beyond the outer limit of a 12-mile coastal zone any
nuclear weapons or any types of weapons of mass destruction as
well as structures, launching installations or any other
facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty). This Treaty became
effective on January 27, 1967. As its name implies, the Outer
Space Treaty prohibits placing into orbit around the Earth any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of
mass destruction, the installation of such weapons on celestial
bodies, or the stationing of them in outer space in any other
manner. The establishment of military bases, installations and
fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the
conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies are also
All these existing NWFZs, as well as other NWFZ-type of arms
control initiatives, have manifested a common feature: possession
and/or even physical presence of nuclear weapons in the zone area
is banned by a nuclear-weapons-free-zone treaty. Such regional
nuclear weapons nonproliferation institutions require states
within the zone to pledge at least to forgo developing and
possessing nuclear weapons. NWFZ treaties usually require
nuclear powers to honor relevant treaty provisions and undertake
their respective obligations.
3. Establishing a NWFZ on Korean Peninsula
Both North and South Korea have expressed commitment to peaceful
use of nuclear energy. As a signatory to the NPT, one should
unconditionally accept international inspection, special (or
challenge) inspection included, to all of its nuclear facilities.
Fairness aside, this is the obligation a signatory should have
understood before acceding to the NPT, since such inspection
provisions have already been set up as part of the NPT/IAEA
safeguarding regime. However, Pyongyang argues that at the
moment it is at a special stage as its decision to withdraw from
the NPT is being temporarily suspended.
The North's conflict with IAEA surrounds IAEA's request of full
inspection to two suspected places in Yongbyon. One of the two
places is reported as typical of a waste site which could be
associated with an earlier Soviet-supplied 4MWt (IRT-DPRK)
reactor in Yongbyon. This place is reportedly almost exactly the
same as the waste site in Iraq near the Soviet-supplied nuclear
reactor there. The other suspected facility is a two-floor
building, code named Building 500 by CIA, built in 1991-1992 with
tanks believed to be in a concealed lower level. IAEA inspectors
did visit this building on an earlier inspection, finding no
evidence of clandestine activities there. When IAEA was
later inclined to drill through the basement of the building,
Pyongyang responded by threatening to withdraw from the NPT,
three days after the start of 1993 "Team Spirit" military
exercise, on the grounds that inspection to its military places
would infringe North Korea's national security.
To strike a balance, a party to the NPT does have its right to
withdraw from the treaty, if it determines that to continue to
stick to the treaty would be harmful to its national interest.
It is too obvious that the nonproliferation regime would incur a
serious setback if the North does quit. It is therefore evident
that keeping the North in the NPT would be of vital importance to
nuclear nonproliferation and to ensure regional stability in
As such, a balanced approach to dealing with the thorny problem
is to think of a Korean Peninsular nuclear-weapons-free zone
(KPNWFZ). It would feature at least two characteristics.
Firstly, as a regional approach, the KPNWFZ mandates a regional
nonproliferation regime out of the willingness of the states in
that region. North Korea has repeatedly indicated that it has
neither the capability nor the desire to make a nuclear bomb;
South Korea has said more categorically that it will forswear any
nuclear fuel-cycle program which could lead to a weapon- end
use. So, why not to install a KPNWFZ to legalize their
positive intention? Unlike some South Asian states, neither
North nor South Korea has linked its non-nuclear proposal to a
global non-discriminatory nonproliferation regime. The current
NPT is indeed discriminatory. However, exercising restraint on
nuclear capability before the NPT is reformed helps contain the
spread of nuclear weapons at regional level a lot more easier.
Secondly, the tenet of a NWFZ treaty is that all parties to it
have to assume the same responsibility not to acquire nuclear
weapons. As Treaty of Tlatelolco and Treaty of Rarotonga have
shown, NWFZ approach would impose symmetrical obligations to all
signatories in the respective region. At this time, the Korean
nuclear problem remains with the "special inspection". A
symmetrical treatment of intrusive verification on nuclear
activities on both Koreas, as would be mandated by a KPNWFZ
Treaty, could possibly render full inspections more acceptable,
provided synergetic measures are taken.
In fact, in the December 1991 "Joint Declaration for a Non-
Nuclear Korean Peninsula", the two Koreas already pledged:
* Not to test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use
* Not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium
* To use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes;
* To verify compliance upon the request of one party but agreed
to by both;
* To ensure implementation through the establishment and regular
meeting of a South-North
Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC).
Such pledges have well provided the foundation for establishing a
NWFZ on the Korean Peninsula.
4. Critical Issues to KPNWFZ
Successful implementation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone must
guarantee the security of nations in the region, if they forgo
nuclear weapons option. Otherwise, NWFZ approach would be
unattractive and eventually fail.
On Korean Peninsula, a NWFZ regime has to ensure that:
* Neither North Korea nor South Korea would develop and possess
* Out of their own willingness, the two Koreas would develop
their civil nuclear programs
designed least divertible to military application;
* All nuclear powers should honor their restrictions regarding
* An effective, symmetrical verification will be put in place.
These issues will be addressed in the following sequence: i)
Definition of a relevant NWFZ in Northeast Asia; ii) Nuclear
security assurance from the nuclear powers; iii) Peaceful use of
nuclear energy in the zone area; iv) A confidence-building
safeguarding system; v) Cessation of presence of foreign troops
and conventional arms control in the region.
First of all, geographical limits of the area of the proposed
zone. The country in question is North Korea, which is situated
on the Korean Peninsula, or, in Northeast Asia in a larger
geographical scope. Normally, Northeast Asia is considered as
comprised of Far Eastern Russia, Northeastern China, Japan, the
Koreas, and Mongolia. Russia and China are the two nuclear
states in the region. The United States once stationed naval and
tactical nuclear weapons abroad, including Japan and South Korea.
Now the U.S. has declared that such weapons have been withdrawn.
What size will the NWFZ in this region be? Including the whole
Northeast Asia? This depends upon the geopolitical situation of
this region. Apparently Russia, and perhaps China too, would not
be interested in establishing a NWFZ where their territories will
If a Northeast Asian nuclear-weapons-free zone (NENWFZ) is to
cover Russia, Russia's sea exit of nuclear force to the Pacific
would be likely blocked. It is understood that Russia's Pacific
Ocean Fleet, homeported on the Kamchatka Peninsula and at Far
East coastal bases near Vladivostok and around the Sea of
Okhotsk, includes those nuclear-powered nuclear-tipped-
ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs). How could it be imagined
that Russia, a nuclear power, would impose a nuclear-free zone on
its own territory and territory waters?
In China, there has been no credible information in the public
domain regarding basing of its nuclear weapons. Thus one cannot
ascertain whether there has been nuclear weapon in Northeastern
China. It looks beyond imagination that a regional non-nuclear
sanctuary will be encouraged to include China, an acknowledged
Even though it seems unlikely Russia and China would endorse a
NENWFZ involving themselves, the Governments of the two countries
have been in favor of a nuclear-free zone on Korean Peninsula
Japan has long embedded a non-nuclear-weapon policy in its
Constitution. Although there has been pro-nuclear sentiments in
Japan, a near-term nuclearization of Japan is beyond scene. What
does concern the world community is Japan's technical capability
to go nuclear in a crash program. Japan's excessive accumulation
of plutonium also upsets the world at large. It would be
beneficial if Japan joins the Koreas in a regional NWFZ
arrangement. But Japanese politicians might not be interested in
being treated as the same as the Koreans, especially when nuclear
powers of this region will be absent. In order not to complicate
the urgent task of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, one could
just perceive a NWFZ established on the Peninsula. Japan might
not be involved in the beginning. Meanwhile, if the two Koreas
pledge in the NWFZ Treaty not to enrich uranium and reprocess
plutonium, Japan should consider to give up its plutonium recycle
program. Mongolia is neither a course to the Korean nuclear
problem nor a critical solution to it. One may not consider that
it should join a NWFZ in the context of Korean Peninsula.
Second, nuclear powers should provide negative security assurance
to the proposed KPNWFZ. As seen from those established NWFZs,
nuclear weapons states should pledge not to use or threaten to
use nuclear weapons against the nuclear weapons free zone.
Regarding KPNWFZ, it seems clear that Russia and China are ready
to provide negative security assurance to this region. In fact,
China is inviting other nuclear powers to sign a global "No-
First-Use" Agreement. Also, it does no harm for Britain and
France to do the same.
The United States has for many years stationed nuclear weapons on
South Korea. But in the recent years, the U.S. is believed to
have withdrawn its tactical nuclear weapons home, in light of the
changing security environment. It is welcome that the U.S. has
promised North Korea, through a joint statement of June 11, 1993,
that it will agree to principle of assurances against the threat
and use of force, including nuclear weapons. This is an
indication that the U.S. is departing from its current
conditional no-first-use policy.
However, the U.S. is still providing a nuclear umbrella to South
Korea. Thus, the U.S. is adopting a conflicting policy: while
providing negative security assurance to North Korea, it provides
positive security assurance to South Korea at the same time,
according to the 1954 U.S.-Korean Mutual Defense Treaty. The
U.S. cannot do this in the legal sense. It can stick to one of
them, but not both. Of course, it is very constructive if the
U.S. withdraws its nuclear protection to South Korea, in the
post-Cold War time. It seems that North Korea doesn't have any
nuclear backing on its side. In addition, South Korea and the
U.S. have enough conventional means to handle a crisis on Korean
Peninsula, even responding to a nuclear crisis.
Third, to realize a KPNWFZ, both North and South Korea should
turn their nuclear program to peaceful uses. Since both sides
have expressed intention not to retain uranium enrichment and
plutonium reprocessing, they have promised to go beyond the
normal requirement against nuclear proliferation. This is
certainly welcome. One should be aware that, however, some
nationalist elements of South Korea are advocating to reverse the
course set by Roh Tae Woo. And, it is hard to accept that the
Yongbyong "radiochemistry" Laboratory is not a reprocessing
facility and could be waived from inspection. Further, providing
means to North Korea to produce less nuclear waste through
nuclear power generation would be helpful. Providing an LWR
(light- water-reactor) is probably an alternative.
Fourth, on safeguards. North Korea may not have acquired
kilogram-quantity of plutonium, but its degree of cooperation in
accepting inspection does raise suspicion of its nuclear
ambition. It is expected that the international community would
insist on intrusive inspection on the North's nuclear program,
particularly, to investigate DPRK's plutonium reprocessing
history. It could be painful for oriental countries to accept
intrusive inspection. Nevertheless, it is important to become a
respected member of an established world order, though the order
itself needs to be improved. Thus an appropriate attitude to be
cooperative is much desired. For North Korea to be more
cooperative in accepting inspection, the North would likely
request to impose a similar intrusive inspection on South Korea's
nuclear facilities. A NWFZ scheme provides a means in which
intrusive and symmetrical safeguards can be equally applied to
Finally, let me address an important aspect which remains outside
the nuclear realm, i.e., the U.S.-South Korean annual "Team
Spirit" exercise. To be sure, North Korea should unconditionally
accept inspection as long as it is still a signatory to the NPT.
And, NPT does not regulate any connection between one party's
acceptance of nuclear safeguards to another party's military
exercise with a nuclear power. However, the Korean nuclear issue
is far more complicated than this simple reasoning. North Korea
demands that such exercise be stopped since North Korea regards
it insecure vis-a-vis a rival allied with a nuclear power which
is demonstrating its support through military exercise. My
opinion is that the U.S. can well help denuclearization of North
Korea, partially through the permanent cancellation of "Team
Spirit" exercise or its equivalent. To show the U.S. goodwill
posture, the United States should not condition its cancellation
of such exercise on North Korea's acceptance of nuclear
In turn, the U.S. positive initiative could result in a positive
feedback from North Korea.
Besides, there is no longer a necessity to keep U.S. troops on
South Korea. Obviously there has been no foreign troops
stationing on North Korea. As said above, no nuclear power seem
ready to unfold a nuclear umbrella over North Korea. Given the
fact that South Korea has a population twice that of the North,
given the fact that the South's economy is more than ten times
greater, Seoul is predicted to match the force level of the North
within this decade. So, there is indeed no necessity for
Americans to defend South Korea. It is quite logical at this
time to let American troops go home. This will only remove
any remaining reasons of North Korea to stay in the margin of the
It is understood that conventional arms reduction should be in
parallel to the denuclearization process of the Korean Peninsula.
A DPRK Army of more than 1.1 million troops vis-a-vis a ROK Army
of 0.6 million plus provides no sense of security to either side,
but to exhaust a large portion of their national resources.
Conventional arms control and transparency building deserve due
Given a Korean Peninsula receiving negative security assurances
from all nuclear powers, given the U.S. Army withdrawal from
South Korea, given a permanent cancellation of "Team Spirit" and
a close of the nuclear umbrella for South Korea, an intrusive and
symmetrical safeguards institution could be more hopefully
applied to both North and South Korea. In this way, the North
Korea, as well as South Korea, could be integrated into a
verifiable regional NWFZ scheme. The world community at large
should facilitate the process of denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula through establishing a NWFZ in this area.
[*] Draft report to the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network
(NAPSN) based at Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable
Development, Berkeley, California; and to the Fourth ISODARCO
Beijing Seminar on Arms Control (April 26-30, 1994, Beijing).
The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author
only, representing neither his affiliations nor the Government of
[**] Dingli Shen is an associate professor of Fudan University.
He co-chairs the Program on Arms Control and Regional Security at
the Center for American Studies of Fudan University.
 Kimberly Ann Elliot pointed out that only 23% of 115 cases of
economic sanctions imposed since World War I have been successful
in achieving "major goals." See, "Will Sanctions Work against
North Korea?" NAPSN Working Paper #24, December 17, 1993, pp.7-9.
 As John Curtis Perry has put it, "DPRK will change only in
its own way." See, "Dateline North Korea: A Communist Holdout",
Foreign Policy, No.80, Fall 1990, p.172.
 Andrew Mack, "The Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula",
Asian Survey, Vol.XXXIII, No.4, April 1993, pp.339-359; "North
Korea and the Bomb," Foreign Policy, No.83, Summer 1991, pp.87-
104. For the nuclear threat North Korea has received, see also,
Bruce Cumings, "Spring Thaw for Korea's Cold War?" The Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, April 1992, pp.14-23; "Who's
Intimidating Whom?" in "Ending the Cold War: Cuba, North Korea,
and Vietnam", The Defense Monitor, Vol. XXIII, No.1, 1994, p.5.
 There has been an extensive literature on interrelations
between the Koreas and the U.S., Russia and Japan. For Chinese
analyses in English on Sino-Korean relations, see, Jia Hao and
Zhuang Qubing, "China's Policy toward the Korean Peninsula",
Asian Survey, Vol.XXXII, No.12, December 1992, pp.1137-1156; Hao
Yufan, "China and the Korean Peninsula: A Chinese View", ibid.,
Vol.XXVII, No.8, August 1987, pp.862-884; Hong Li, "The Sino-
South Korean Normalization: A Triangular Explanation", ibid.,
Vol.XXXIII, No.11, November, 1993, pp.1083-1094.
 Zachary S. Davis and Warren H. Donnelly, "A Nuclear-Weapons-
Free Zone in the Middle East: Background and Issues", CRS Issue
Brief, The Library of Congress (Order Code: IB92041), updated
October 1, 1993.
 SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament
(SIPRI/Oxford University Press (OUP), 1993), pp.759-762.
 SIPRI Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and Disarmament
(SIPRI/OUP, 1990), p.578. At the Fourth Review Conference of the
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
Indonesia and Malaysia again strongly endorsed the proposal for a
NWFZ in the ASEAN region. See, SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World
Armaments and Disarmament (SIPRI/OUP, 1991), p.565.
 SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament
(SIPRI/OUP, 1992), p.99.
 Zachary S. Davis and Warren H. Donnelly, "The South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty [The Treaty of Rarotonga]", CRS Report
for Congress, The Library of Congress, 93-610-ENR, June 25, 1993.
 The proposed "5+2+2" nine-nation conference will involve the
five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Germany and
Japan, and India and Pakistan.
 K. K. Katyal, "India not for nuclear talks proposed by
U.S.", The Hindu, April 2, 1994, p.1; "U.S. keen on stronger
ties", ibid., April 7, 1994, p.1; P. S. Suryanarayana, "Pak. cool
to U.S. plans", ibid., April 6, 1994, p.13; "'Broad accord' with
Pak: Talbott", ibid., April 10, 1994, p.1.
During Talbott's recent visit, the U.S. proposed objective of
"first capping, then reducing and eventually eliminating weapons
of mass destruction and ballistic missiles from South Asia". The
U.S. is believed to have urged New Delhi and Islamabad give up
their nuclear weapons option, cut off production of unsafeguarded
fissile materials, and, place future civil nuclear material
production and nuclear facilities under international safeguards.
 Dispatch (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public
Affairs), January 31, 1994, Vol.5, No.5, p.47.
 North and South Korea announced a "Joint Declaration for a
Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula" in Panmunjom on December 13, 1991.
The two sides pledged not to test, produce, receive, possess,
store, deploy or use nuclear weapons and not to possess
facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment. On
November 8, 1991, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo announced
that it would not manufacture, retain, stockpile, equip with and
use nuclear weapons. He also pledged to accept full-scope
international safeguards on its nuclear facilities and materials.
See, AFP, November 8, 1991; Xu Baokang, "A Sound Basis for
Nuclear-Free Korea", Beijing Review, December 16-22, 1991, pp.10-
 Satellite photos taken during the construction period of
Building 500 showed what was like a heavily shielded nuclear
waste storage site in the basement. See, "North Korea at the
Crossroads: Nuclear Renegade or Regional Partner?" Arms Control
Today, May 1993, p.4; Arms Control Reporter (IDDS), June 1993,
Section 457.E, p.2.
 Endnote No.13. Most recently, North Korean President Kim Il
Sung said on April 16, 1994 that he had no plan to develop
nuclear weapons and wanted peace. AP, April 17, 1994.
 Michael Krepon, Dominique M. McCoy and Matthew C. J.
Rudolph, eds., A Handbook of Confidence-Building for Regional
Security, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Handbook No.1, September
 Xinhua News Agency, March 24, 1994.
 Joint Statement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
and the United States of America, New York, June 11, 1993.
 Within the NAPSN there have been some analyses already on
supplying LWRs to DPRK. See, Peter Hayes, "Light Water Reactor
Technology Transfer to North Korea: Does It Make Sense?" Working
Paper #21, September 1993; Saloman Levy, "Supply of Light Water
Reactors to Pyongyang: Technical Issues and Their Possible
Resolution", Working Paper #22, December 1993; Victor Gilinsky
and William Manning, "A U.S.-Type Light Water Reactor for North
Korea? The Legal Implications", Working Paper #23, December 1993.
 In July 1977, General Bernard Rogers, Chief of Staff of the
U.S. Army (1976-1979) quoted a South Korean Colonel as saying,
"We will hate to see our friends go, but if we are going to grow
up, and, we are going to walk alone, you have to take this
(withdrawal). I think the time has come". See, "Mission
Accomplished in Korea: Bringing U.S. Troops Home", The Defense
Monitor, Vol.XIX, No.2, 1990, p.7.
 The Military Balance: 1993-1994 (Brassey's for IISS, 1993),