FIONA S. CUNNINGHAM JULY 18 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Fiona Cunningham describes the origins of China’s NC3 system and its primary role in supporting China’s land-based missile force. She outlines recent developments including mobility, “informatization” and automation of parts of the NC3 system, pending deployment of nuclear missile submarines, early warning systems, evolving […]
LEONID RYABIKHIN JULY 11 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Leonid Ryabikhin argues that distrust, misunderstanding and concern prevail in US/NATO and Russia relations “which increases the risk of unintended or accidental conflict. Human or technical mistakes and a variety of natural events can cause the failure or malfunction of technical systems and errors […]
ELVERT L. GARDNER July 2, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Elvert Gardner describes NDU’s inaugural NC3 study course on the readiness of the industrial base to support US NC3 modernization and supply chain risks that may impede DoD’s ability to purchase technology in a timely and affordable manner. Colonel Elvert Gardner is an […]
DAVID VON HIPPEL AND PETER HAYES JUNE 30, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this Special Report, David von Hippel and Peter Hayes provide estimates of DPRK supply of and demand for petroleum products in recent years. Demand (and thus balancing supply) for key oil products in 2017 seems to have been considerably higher than official […]
CAN KASAPOĞLU JUNE 27, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Can Kasapoğlu argues that in contrast to the other four NATO “nuclear delivery states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Turkey), Turkey no longer appears to have an active nuclear weapons delivery mission using bombers and its NC3 system is likely dormant. “Yet,” he concludes, “in […]
JON R. LINDSAY JUNE 20, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Jon Lindsay argues that “As NC3 increasingly uses digital technologies to enhance efficiency and reliability, the cybersecurity of NC3 becomes a pressing concern. Adversaries have incentives to penetrate NC3 for intelligence in peacetime and for counterforce in wartime. Given the broad diffusion of cyber […]
BENOÎT PELOPIDAS JUNE 13, 2019 II. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Benoît Pelopidas outlines what is known about French NC3 and identifies discursive, sociological and temporal challenges to assessing the validity of claims on this topic. After reviewing the primacy of presidential nuclear authority, the nuclear chain of command, civilian control over the arsenal, tension […]
MYEONGGUK CHEON JUNE 6, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Myeongguk Cheon describes what is known about North Korea’s NC3 system. He concludes: “Regarding the DPRK’s NC3 system, however, many questions remain unanswered, even though it is clearly identified who has the final approval authority and what forces operates delivery systems for the employment […]
ERIC GROSSE MAY 30, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this paper, Eric Grosse argues: “Much of the security progress over the past decade has been at large-scale, finding and patching vulnerabilities in widely used applications or defending networks of millions of machines containing high-value data. The lessons there may help military systems, but for the […]
DAVID VON HIPPEL May 27, 2019 I. INTRODUCTION In this report, David von Hippel “provides a demonstration of the potential impact of remote sensing methods and testing in the DPRK in reducing uncertainties in cumulative historical uranium production, and thus in fissile materials inventories; and, offers conclusions, resulting from the potential impacts of uncertainty […]
