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Donald S. Zagoria, Project Director for Northeast Asia Projects at the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP), wrote this summary report from the 3rd Conference on Northeast Asian Security Co-sponsored by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) and the DPRK Institute for Disarmament and Peace (DPRK IDP). The report states: “it is unclear whether North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons program. But in the next year or two, there will be an opportunity to test that country’s intentions through a serious diplomatic effort. A well-organized and well-focused Track 1.5 effort could play an important role in assisting the official U.S. effort.”

The Nautilus Institute released this report analyzing the ROK offer of 2 Gigawatts of energy aid to the DPRK as part of the six party talks. The report suggests, “that the participants at the six-party talks should consider the full scope of activities needed to implement the South Korean scheme; that they should explore an alternative approach that would link the Russian and South Korean grids, thereby achieving the same outcome at lower cost and lesser political risk; and that the six parties should consider adopting a short-term, alternative package rather than resuming HFO deliveries to the DPRK because this approach would provide more energy services, faster, and at lower risk and cost to give immediate substance to statements of longer-term intention to supply assistance to the DPRK. We further suggest that these issues be explored with the North Koreans at the six-party talks at a subsequent technical working group before major commitments are made to proceeding with the South Korean proposal.”

The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA) released this final report from their Multilateral Workshop, held in Shanghai and cosponsored by the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), part of IFPA’s Building Six-Party Capacity Project (http://www.ifpa.org/projects/carnrok.htm). The report states: “Ultimately, it matters less exactly what form the capacity-building effort assumes. Instead the most important factor is that collective discussion be initiated and expanded among a wider range of functional activities, and preferably away from media attention and with minimal political interference.”

Robert Litwak, a National Security Council staff member in the mid-1990s and director of international studies at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, and Kathryn Weathersby, a senior associate of the center’s Cold War International History Project and coordinator of its Korea Initiative, which obtained the documents cited in this article, wrote: “The Bush administration cannot ground its negotiations with North Korea on the assumption — or vain hope — that the regime is in danger of imminent collapse. Despite economic implosion and famine, that regime has proved far more durable than anyone expected.”

Mark Manyin, Specialist in Asian Affairs at the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division of the Congressional Research Service, wrote: “Congress and the Administration have a variety of options for future assistance to North Korea. Given the suspension of the KEDO project, the immediate decisions will revolve around food aid, particularly given increased demand for food assistance from other areas of the world. Additionally, if talks with North Korea over its nuclear program begin and score a breakthrough, there will likely be consideration of a broader economic assistance package.”

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill, interviewed by Cheong Wook Sik, a representative of the Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea (CNPK), stated: “I think we made it very clear that we are prepared to give all kinds of security assurances [to the DPRK]. And we are willing to do those in the context of multilateral security — in guarantees. If the North Koreans want something else, then they should sit at the table and tell us.”

Dan Fata, Republican Party Committee Policy Director for National Security and Trade, writes: “It is not too late to avert a North Korean nuclear test. However, the key to preventing a nuclear test lies primarily with China. The PRC must be made to understand that its failure to convince North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program will have dramatic effects on China’s relationship with the United States and its own neighbors ­ and, ultimately, on its own security.”

US AID, in this report to Congress required by the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, discusses US aid to the DPRK though the World Food Program. It also discusses aid given in response to the April 2004 Ryongchon blast and the April 2005 Bird Flu Outbreak.

US AID, in this report to Congress required by the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, discusses US humanitarian assistance to the DPRK though the World Food Program, noting problems in meeting international standards for WFP distribution as well as attempts to improve transparency, monitoring, and access in the DPRK. It also discusses assistance given in response to the April 2004 Ryongchon blast and the April 2005 Bird Flu Outbreak.