



New Security Challenges and Opportunities in  
East Asia:  
Views from the Next Generation



Program Publication  
Edited by  
Brad Glosserman

Issues & Insights  
Vol. 5 – No. 7

Pacific Forum CSIS  
Honolulu, Hawaii  
July 2005

## Pacific Forum CSIS

Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS ([www.csis.org/pacfor/](http://www.csis.org/pacfor/)) operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate areas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

# Table of Contents

	Page
<a href="#">Foreword</a> . . . . .	v
<a href="#">Acknowledgements</a> . . . . .	vi
<a href="#">Introduction</a> by Brad Glosserman . . . . .	I
<b>Chapter I: The Future of U.S.-ROK Relations and Four-Way Cooperation with Japan and China</b>	
<a href="#">Northeast Asian Security and Cooperation-Domestic Politics and Sun-National Forces, by Celeste Arrington</a> . . . . .	I-1
<a href="#">Northeast Asian Integration: The U.S. Perspective, by Christine Brown</a> . . . . .	I-5
<a href="#">A Grand Bargain for Japan and Northeast Asia, by Allen Chen</a> . . . . .	I-11
<a href="#">On the Potential for Quadrilateral Cooperation in East Asia, by Larry Ferguson</a> . . . . .	I-15
<a href="#">A Matter of Orientation: Control the Blind National Emotion of South Koreans, by Kim Jae-Eun.</a> . . . . .	I-19
<a href="#">Building Up Northeast Asian Humanitarian Cooperation: Lessons from the Indian Ocean Earthquake-Tsunami, by Ah-Young Kim</a> . . . . .	I-21
<a href="#">The Problems Facing North Korea's Nuclear Program, by Jang-Wook Lee</a> . . . . .	I-25
<a href="#">Wanted: A Healthy National Mentality, by Fan Li</a> . . . . .	I-29
<a href="#">Joint Crisis Management as a Way to Increase Multilateral Cooperation, by Sachi Nagaoka</a> . . . . .	I-33
<a href="#">After Reunification, by Yumiko Nakagawa</a> . . . . .	I-37
<a href="#">The Future of the U.S. in East Asia: Integrating China, by Drew Thompson.</a> . . . . .	I-41
<a href="#">What does Pyongyang Want?, by Qinghong Wang</a> . . . . .	I-45
<a href="#">The Clash of Nationalism in Northeast Asia in the Transitional Context, by Qi Zeng</a> . . . . .	I-49

## Chapter II: Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Asia Pacific

<a href="#"><u>Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Standoff, by Claire Bai.</u></a> . . . . .	2-1
<a href="#"><u>The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: An Imbalance, by Hyun Jung Jo Choi</u></a> . . . . .	2-3
<a href="#"><u>The A.Q. Khan Network, Geography, and Political Will, by Justin Hastings.</u></a> . . . . .	2-5
<a href="#"><u>Export Controls in the Asia Pacific, by Sophia McIntyre</u></a> . . . . .	2-9
<a href="#"><u>Non-Proliferation of WMD: An Agenda for ASEAN and the ARF?</u></a> <a href="#"><u>by Raymund Quilop</u></a> . . . . .	2-13
<a href="#"><u>About the Authors</u></a> . . . . .	A-1

## Foreword

The Pacific Forum CSIS organizes and promotes regional security dialogue aimed at addressing and hopefully ameliorating East Asia security challenges and concerns. We regularly host conferences and seminars with like-minded institutes throughout the United States and Asia to explore contentious issues, share ideas, and build networks of individuals and institutions that can influence regional policy-makers.

In the past few years, we have noticed a common theme that emerges in our discussions: the impact of generational change, especially in democratic societies. The post-World War II/Korean War and colonial-era generations are being replaced by more nationalistic, less patient societies. These groups see the world and their place in it quite differently from their predecessors. They are more focused on the future and less captured or controlled by the past. Yet as we look around our conference tables, we have been confronted by a troubling fact: while a great deal of time is spent analyzing the new generation, few of its members are present at such gatherings. This is disturbing on two counts. First, it deprives these individuals of interaction with more experienced experts and analysts. Second, our discussions lack the insight of this younger generation, views that are becoming increasingly important, and increasingly divergent from those of their elders. The gap is especially evident among young professional women who are even less integrated into international policy debates than their male peers.

To help remedy this situation, the Pacific Forum CSIS founded the Young Leaders fellowship program in 2004, with the support of grants from the Freeman Foundation and the Hawaii-based Strong Foundation, plus in-kind support from the CNA Corporation's Center for Strategic Studies. The program aims to foster education by exposing Young Leaders to the practical aspects and complexities of policy-making, while also generating a greater exchange of ideas between young and seasoned professionals, thus promoting cross-cultural interaction and cooperation, and enriching policy research and dialogue. This is the second volume of Young Leaders' papers; the first, "China's Emergence and its Impact on the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan: Views from the Next Generation," was published in January 2005 (and is available on our website, [www.csis.org/pacfor/](http://www.csis.org/pacfor/)). We will publish a third volume in a few months.

We hope the Young Leaders program will provide an extraordinary opportunity for networking and training for young professionals from the U.S. and Asia who would otherwise have only limited opportunities to be involved in senior-level policy research and debate. We believe this program provides unique benefits and opportunities not only to the upcoming generation, but to the deliberations of their senior colleagues as well.

Ralph A. Cossa  
President, Pacific Forum CSIS

## Acknowledgements

The Pacific Forum CSIS would like to thank the Freeman Foundation and the Hawaii-based Strong Foundation for their support for this program. We are also grateful to the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, Sandia National Laboratories, the Korea Economic Institute – KEIP, and the CNA Corporation for their assistance. Dr. T. J. Pempel of the University of California, Berkeley, also provided support for this program.

The Pacific Forum CSIS would like to especially thank the New Asia Research Institute in Seoul for its collaboration on these projects.

The views expressed here represent personal impressions and reflections of the Young Leaders program participants; they do not necessarily represent the views of the relevant governments, or the co-sponsoring or parent organizations and institutes.

## Introduction

The significance of generational change in Asia and the United States has become too obvious and too important to ignore. At virtually every conference, discussions of key issues turn on changing perspectives produced by the coming of age of a new generation in these societies. Yet all too often, those views are not presented by these “youngsters” themselves, but by older professionals who interpret those views through their own particular lenses and filter them accordingly.

The new generation has very different formative experiences. Older Koreans are scarred by the memory of the Korean War; for their children, the Kwangju Incident is likely to be more important. For older Japanese, the bitter legacy of World War II and the Cold War define thinking about politics and security issues; younger Japanese are less burdened by the actions of the Imperial Japanese Army and more inclined to assume the role of a “normal nation.” Older Chinese remember the Japanese occupation and the unrest of the Cultural Revolution. Younger Chinese have known far greater wealth and stability than their elders; for them China’s rise is both natural and inevitable. Almost all younger Asians see the U.S. in a much different way than do their parents. For Americans, the logic of a superpower standoff and mutually assured destruction has given way to the unilateral moment. Unequaled U.S. power is the defining feature of the international system in which most young Americans have come of age.

While their particular outlooks may differ, there are similar influences at work on all these societies. Younger Asians are used to far more affluence, they have better access to information, and have more exposure to the outside world. They are the products of increasingly pluralistic societies, with more options and opportunities than their parents had. Their familiarity with new technologies is especially important. Youth in all societies are increasingly international, whether they know it or not. In important ways, similarities cut across generational lines, rather than societies. In other words, age, not nationality, is becoming an increasingly important variable in our analysis.

The Pacific Forum CSIS Young Leaders Program is a product of the recognition that meaningful analysis of international relations must take into account this new perspective. We have endeavored to bring talented young professionals, working on the particular subjects of our meetings, to the table to enrich our discussions and to provide them with the opportunity to acquire on-the-job training and exposure to individuals and ideas that they might only otherwise encounter in books. Generous support from The Freeman Foundation, the Hawaii-based Strong Foundation, and assistance from other partnering institutions, have made this program possible. (For more information on the YL program, go to the Pacific Forum CSIS website, [www.csis.org/pacforum/programs.cfm](http://www.csis.org/pacforum/programs.cfm))

This project aims to develop a network of as many as 100 Young Leaders, who will have participated in multiple events during an initial three-year period. The continued participation of Young Leaders over several years will maximize the benefit of the experience by enhancing their comfort and skill level in the dialogue setting, provide the

opportunity for personal connections with other Young Leaders and senior experts, and act as a proving ground for testing ideas and building confidence. This continuing participation differentiates our program from educational exchange programs offered by other institutions. The first volume of YL papers, “China’s Emergence and its Impact on the United States, the Republic of Korea, and Japan: Views from the Next Generation,” is also available on the Pacific Forum website.

### **Young Leaders Seminar, Maui, April 2005**

On April 20-22, 2005, the Pacific Forum CSIS along with the Seoul-based New Asia Research Institute and the Washington-based Korea Economic Institute convened the ninth round of our annual bilateral U.S.-ROK dialogue. This meeting focused on quadrilateral cooperation among the U.S., South Korea, Japan, and China. Eighteen Young Leaders joined experts and officials – meeting in their private capacity – to analyze problems in and prospects for Northeast Asia. (“The Future of U.S.-ROK Relations and Four-Way Cooperation with Japan and China” is also available on the Pacific Forum website.)

The meeting explored the unprecedented strains in the U.S.-ROK alliance. Generational change, evolving perspectives of the post-Sept. 11 security landscape, and the emergence of new defense capabilities and doctrines have produced tensions and frictions in the bilateral relationship; these problems have been magnified by the difficulties in relations with North Korea, in particular the nuclear crisis that began in October 2002.

The inclusion of Japanese and Chinese experts shifted our discussions to a regional, rather than purely bilateral, perspective. We searched for common interests and objectives that could provide the foundation for cooperation and coordination. While all agreed on the need to think more expansively about regional issues, there were doubts whether there existed a consensus about approaches and results that would permit the four countries to work together.

Our Young Leaders, like their “seniors,” spent considerable time debating history. Rather than focusing on grievances, however, they were determined to identify ways to overcome the lingering hurt. As one Chinese explained, the problem is not history per se, but individuals’ attitudes toward history. In other words, there is a premium on outreach programs that can change perceptions and the “use” of history. Freer flows of information will have an impact on this process – not necessarily all for the better. Discussion focused on getting participants in the national debates over history to look forward, not back. Several Young Leaders noted that there need to be disincentives to the misuse of history by politicians.

The papers also highlight areas of possible cooperation. The response to the Dec. 26, 2004 tsunami that claimed hundreds of thousands of lives in Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Africa was used to demonstrate one way to cooperate. East Asia is hit too frequently by such disasters and the governments of Northeast Asia and the U.S. are best able to respond in a timely and efficient manner. The prospect of a humanitarian disaster in North Korea is very real; the four governments would be well advised to prepare for it.



## **CSCAP WMD Meeting, Singapore, May 2005**

Pacific Forum CSIS is one of the founding members of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), the premier track-two vehicle for security discussions in the region (for information about CSCAP, see the Pacific Forum CSIS website). As Secretariat for the U.S. committee (USCSCAP), the Pacific Forum also serves as the co-chair for the Study Group on Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the Asia Pacific. At the study group's inaugural meeting in Singapore, May 26-28, 2005, 30 experts and government officials – again, in their private capacities – looked at the WMD threat and examined ways to combat that menace. Participants focused on efforts by Asian-Pacific nations to shore up the global nonproliferation regime; we met just after the “collapse” of the 2005 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. The group endorsed the creation of an East Asian Nonproliferation Strategy, which would draw on the experience of the European Union Nonproliferation Action Plan.

The Singapore WMD meeting was the first time that a Young Leaders component had been introduced into the CSCAP process. Our discussions focused more on the best way to integrate the two programs than the substantive issues under review. Nonetheless, there was enthusiasm among participants and a high level of intellectual engagement with key issues. (Several Young Leaders were called upon – unexpectedly – by the chair to present to the entire group when the discussion turned to issues upon which they had been working.) All of them agreed on the seriousness of the WMD threat, and echoed concerns that North Korea's nuclear programs could undermine regional peace and security. In their papers, the Young Leaders looked at the gamut of WMD issues: from Southeast Asia's threat perceptions to the U.S. failure to follow up on its obligations under Article VI of the NPT to take steps toward nuclear disarmament. We hope to continue and deepen the involvement of Young Leaders in the CSCAP process.



Chapter I  
The Future of U.S.-ROK Relations and Four-Way Cooperation  
with Japan and China

April 20-22, 2005

Cosponsored by  
the New Asia Research Institute,  
the Korea Economic Institute-KIEP,  
and the Pacific Forum CSIS

Honolulu, Hawaii







# Northeast Asian Security and Cooperation—Domestic Politics and Sub-National Forces

By Celeste Arrington

Deep, meaningful regional cooperation and integration appear hopeless in the face of East Asia's intractable security problems, with the current impasse over North Korea's nuclear program being the most immediate concern for U.S.-ROK relations. However, the politician or analyst who views these acute conflicts without careful attention to the domestic or intra-national economic, political, social, and temporal frames in which they arose and in which they exist will attribute excessive causal force to inter-national dynamics as hindering regionalism. For instance, the lack of agreement among participants in the Six-Party Talks is not so much a reflection of inter-governmental divergence as it is an indication of governments being hampered by domestic politics. Thus, as we learned throughout this conference, the future security of East Asia rests on a complex interwoven foundation of domestic politics and sub-national dynamics that, in turn, affects regional security and determines the extent of regional cooperation.

What I took away from the conference was a conviction that overcoming the region's security problems will require both leadership and a convinced domestic populace that supports national efforts to address security dilemmas at the international level. Ironically, especially as cross-border communication becomes easier through technology and greater movements of people, domestic politics and sub-national actors will possibly frustrate regional cooperation and integration. It is therefore essential for each country to foster open and honest dialogue domestically about security and for them to realize the ramifications of domestic political forces on regional relations.

The widespread neglect or oversimplification of domestic politics and sub-national level factors is largely a consequence of the ontologies, or worldviews, behind the dominant paradigms of international security studies. On the one hand, liberal-institutionalists make indiscriminate claims about the pacifying effects of sub-national linkages, such as growing cross-border economic and business ties, cultural and educational exchanges, technology, and extra-governmental institutional developments. Because this school of thought is aiming for positive prognoses that support its claim that trade is mutually beneficial and that institutions are not merely the handmaidens of great-power interests, such scholars tend to downplay the negative effects that sub-national level factors could have on efforts to ameliorate regional security. For instance, where liberal-institutionalists see burgeoning ROK-China trade as increasing Beijing's incentives to maintain peace in the region, others may see such augmented trade as igniting anti-Japanese or anti-American sentiments in South Korea and the PRC. Moreover, economic pressures and transportation advances have increased the movements of people, both internally and across borders. Rather than facilitate people-to-people communication and generate shared interests, such migrants may trigger nationalist (economic protectionist) sentiments that could irritate otherwise strong alliances, such as the U.S.-ROK relationship. Furthermore, recent anti-Japanese protests in China blossomed as a result of Internet and cell phone communication, just as some chat sites in the ROK spur anti-Japanese sentiment. In sum, it is naïve to assume that freer trade, more

institutions, enhanced democracy, and more communications technology will necessarily promote interconnectedness and therefore security and stability in East Asia.

Structural-realist scholars, on the other hand, tend to sideline, rather than misread, sub-national trends as a result of their focus on an international system of unified state actors and the national characteristics that determine states' capabilities in that system. Less frequently do they unpack the black box of the state or trace the causal chain to investigate what spawned the national characteristics they observe. Instead, realists consider "national identity" to be a unified notion, though globalization has clearly had diverse impacts on the way people in East Asia conceive of themselves in relation to others. In addition, while the realist would expect a military buildup of U.S. forces in South Korea in response to North Korea's brazen admission of enriching uranium, a closer look at domestic South Korean opinions of crimes committed by U.S. soldiers or the vast footprint of the U.S. forces reveals part of the reason why the United States intends to scale back its military presence. Clearly, multilevel conceptions of regional cooperation with special attention to domestic and sub-national factors highlight otherwise abstruse interaction effects.

In reality, states are never unified actors on the international stage. At work is something more than a "two-level game" in which one national government might influence or be influenced by sub-national actors in its interlocutor nation. Anne-Marie Slaughter has discussed the ways in which government officials form networks that become alternatives to traditional international organizations. The conception advanced in this paper goes beyond her "new image of global politics" that consists of interactions among constituent parts of national governments exercising a different kind of power in new ways. From our conference, I perceived networks of complex interdependence (not necessarily with constructive or positive effects) spanning global, regional, national, and sub-national levels of analysis, making the scholar's and, indeed, the politician's task of unraveling East Asian security particularly difficult. Such sub-national forces interact with domestic politics, further complicating a national government's efforts to address such security threats as the North Korean nuclear crisis.

Arguably the strongest sub-national force that has been exploited in domestic politics is the issue of history. As our conference demonstrated, simmering mistrust and feelings of economic competition among the peoples of Northeast Asia has been fed by national politicians eager to maximize short-term political benefits with little attention to the international ramifications of domestic politics. The perpetual thorn of history has been aggravated by Japanese domestic political obligations to conservative, rightist groups and by over-emotional Korean and Chinese protests. One might question the coincidence of anti-Beijing protests in the PRC over pensions with the more publicized and encouraged anti-Japanese protests. The Tokdo/ Takeshima question, most recently raised by a local government in Japan, has also ballooned into a diplomatic war between Japan and South Korea.

Acknowledging the important role of domestic politics and sub-national actors in future cooperation over the Korean Peninsula and other acute conflicts in East Asia will help politicians and scholars to decipher the hurdles to regional integration and thereby thwart



potential hurdles. This begins with building the U.S. government's understanding of generational gaps and their relation to political ideology in South Korea, as well as the nuanced spectrum of South Korean views on the future of their peninsula. The same proscription can be made for the U.S., Japan, and China; in a sense, they need to clean their own houses before blaming others. In formulating and implementing foreign policy in East Asia, the U.S. under both administrations of George W. Bush has paid little attention to such critical sub-national forces and domestic politics affecting regional policy coordination. Considering the post-9/11 prominence of non-state or sub-state groups, such as al-Qaeda and other political groups, Washington's inattentiveness to sub-national currents is ironic. The United States' perceived unilateralism has angered many groups across Asia, and their actions have had ripple effects on other countries.

This conference amply demonstrated both the variety of mutual misperceptions and animosities that reign in East Asia and the benefits of dialogue groups, such as this forum. A theme running throughout the conference was the lack of domestic understanding and political support behind the extant and highly limited efforts at regional security cooperation. Instead of long-term visions for the region, short-term political priorities rule the game, even in non-democracies where leaders should, in theory, have more maneuvering room to formulate foreign policy. The usual analytical approaches to the future of East Asian security either neglect or misread the impact of local political affairs and sub-national factors on interstate relations. As such, it is critical for us, as scholars and as participants in the multilevel game of international relations, to promote an enhanced dialogue about the ramifications of domestic politics and sub-national variables on the future shape of security in Northeast Asia.



# Northeast Asian Integration: The U.S. Perspective

By Christine P. Brown

Regionalism in East Asia and more specifically in Northeast Asia has only begun to flourish in the last decade, largely in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. However, even with the explosion of interest in regional groupings, very few of the regional discussions in the region have translated into fully institutionalized structures. Debate continues as to why this is so and whether the United States should respond.

This paper will provide a quick overview of the Northeast Asian regionalism, highlighting key characteristics and the chief reasons why regionalism has not taken hold in Northeast Asia at the same rate as elsewhere. In looking at the ever-expanding list of regional groupings, this paper examines the cooperation involving China, Korea, and Japan—first, among themselves, and then with the wider East Asia and Asia Pacific region. Then I will examine the U.S. response thus far, and conclude with some policy options that the U.S. might consider.

## **Northeast Asian Regionalism**

Increasingly, there is an alphabet soup of groupings in East Asia that Northeast Asian countries are a party to in one form or another—APEC, ASEAN+3 (APT), ARF, the Trilateral Group, the Three-Way Summit, KEDO, ARF, EAVG, not to mention a growing number of Track 1.5 and Track II dialogues, such as CSCAP and NEACD, and an ever-expanding list of free trade agreements (FTAs).

Looking at the growing list of regional groupings, two overall characteristics emerge. First, whether examining economic or security groupings, there are very few formal groupings in Northeast Asia. While this may seem obvious, it is relatively shocking given the amount of concern raised about the lack of U.S. engagement in the region.

The Three-Way Summit, bringing together Korea, China, and Japan, arose out of the APT process and provides an annual opportunity for the three countries to examine regional economic issues. As a result of these meetings, the three countries now hold annual economic, finance, and foreign ministers meetings. As part of this process, the three countries have undertaken a feasibility study (undertaken by the Development Research Center of China, the National Institute for Research Advancement of Japan, and the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy) of a possible trilateral FTA, initially proposed by Chinese scholars, but in general it is a coordinating and discussion forum, not a negotiating forum.

There has been a lot of discussion about the Six-Party Talks as a possible framework for a future regional security forum—an idea being put forward by the Chinese and others, including Korean experts in the Washington policy community. Amb. Jim Lilley recently gave testimony to the House International Relations Committee in which he suggested institutionalizing the six-party process and expanding it to include economic development, human rights, and environmental issues. However, the U.S. administration and South Korean

officials have said that it is too early to talk about deepening the six-party process. Furthermore, it is unclear at this juncture whether or not the process will survive the current stalemate.

Even on the economic side, no intra-Northeast Asia FTA has been completed. The only possibility on the horizon is the Japan-Korea FTA, but those negotiations have stalled over Korean demands for greater agricultural market access, Japan demands for a quicker phase out for industrial tariffs, and political tensions, as a result of the Tokdo/Takeshima islands and textbook disputes.

Aside from these, the connections within Northeast Asia have been largely Track 1.5 and Track II, such as NEACD and CSCAP. Although the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) still exists, it has lost a significant amount of its luster, largely because of failed attempt to create a Track I complement in 1998 and because Kim Dae-jong placed a priority on a bilateral summit. The three countries and in some cases the business communities within them are taking a serious look at other areas of possible cooperation, including the energy sector, technology development, a legal framework for investment, and a proposal to bring together legislative representatives from each country.

However, most of the formal government-to-government connections among China, Korea, and Japan have been with countries and groupings outside Northeast Asia—APEC, APT, ARF, and FTAs between ASEAN and each of the Plus Three partners.

Second, despite the increasing dialogue among partners, there has been very little action in terms of deliverables and even less institutionalization.

Over the last few years, the members of ASEAN+3 have discussed the possibility of evolving their meetings to the East Asian Summit, which will hold its first meeting at the end of this year. However, discussions on the form and process have been slowed by disagreements among the parties over process and the countries to include. While APT has done much in the realm of dialogue and confidence building, it is still far from being a fully institutionalized forum.

The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI)—the example often held up as the great deliverable—represents meager, but symbolic, steps forward. When the bilateral swap agreements are revisited, it will present an opportunity for all the countries to increase their commitments substantially.

On the security side, there has been even less. The principal government group is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which includes a much wider grouping of countries beyond East Asia. The ARF has been effective in promoting not only understanding, but a shared sense of purpose that has gone to great lengths in bringing the countries together and building confidence and security in the region.

That is not to say that there is no value in the process there is, and clearly without dialogue hope for a more institutionalized process is unimaginable but before more is solidified, I would caution against making a mountain of a molehill.

### **Why Has Regionalism Not Caught On?**

Regionalism, particularly on security matters, has not caught on in Northeast Asia. As the discussion above reveals, there has been an increase in the number of regional bodies that include Northeast Asian countries (individually or collectively), but on the whole regionalism still has not taken hold as elsewhere.

Why? There seem to be five main reasons:

- *Territorial disputes*: Over the last weeks and months, the public re-emergence of territorial disputes have chilled relations between Northeast Asian countries. Korea and Japan over the Tokdo or Takeshima islands; between China and Japan over the Diaoyu or Senkaku islands; and last summer between Korea and China over Koguryeo. And of course, the status of Taiwan creates tensions in the region.
- *Mutually reinforcing suspicions*: Each one of the countries in the region is suspicious of the other intentions, China's peaceful rise, Japan's perceived remilitarization, and Korea's desire to play a "balancer" role.
- *Historical Legacies*: World War II and the Cold War both leave legacies of division in the region. Unlike Germany, which has been forced to acknowledge and apologize for the legacy of World War II (i.e., the Holocaust), Japan has not been forced to take full accountability for the atrocities it committed during World War II. These legacies are apparent in Chinese and Korean opposition to a permanent UN Security Council seat for Japan.
- *Competition*: China, Japan, and Korea compete among each other for status. The ASEAN-China FTA negotiations pushed Japan and Korea to launch negotiations with ASEAN and Korea has made a great deal about how their FTA with ASEAN would be the first to be completely phased in by 2009, one year before China and two before Japan. Recent reports also point to Korea and Japan successfully lobbying Latin American countries to vote against extending China membership to the Inter-American Development Bank.
- *United States*: The United States has been a barrier to Northeast Asian regionalism in two respects: the existing bilateral alliance system and a lack of leadership. The hub and spoke U.S. alliance system has created built-in barriers to cooperation among the countries in the region. Despite the productive work of the TCOG, U.S. allies in the region have been given little incentive to work together. While there is clearly disagreement about the necessity of U.S. leadership, it is unlikely that China or Japan would be permitted to take a full leadership role in the region given the existing suspicions.

## U.S. Response & Implications

Despite U.S. government assertions that the United States is fully engaged in Asia, one cannot help but notice that the United States has other priorities (the war on terror and the Middle East) that trump interests in or divert attention away from Asia.

- *Greater emphasis on security than economics:* Despite the region's economic importance to the United States, the Bush administration, when it is engaged in the region, seems focused on security matters rather than economics.
- On the security front, the administration has its bilateral alliances, the TCOG, and the ARF.
- On the economic front, the United States has also been largely absent in Asia, with FTAs only with Singapore and Australia and ongoing negotiations with Thailand. The U.S. FTA policy has been largely focused on the Western Hemisphere and the Middle East. It would be quite hypocritical for the U.S. to oppose Asia's FTA explosion, when the U.S. has increased its own FTA push. That said, the administration has criticized the comprehensiveness of the agreements completed in Asia.

The Bush administration has even expanded some of the region's economic organizations to include security concerns. APEC remains on the Bush administration's radar, and while it has been seen as a forum to advance the administration's trade priorities (Doha), the U.S. government has primarily seen it as a opportunity to advance its security agenda (couched in terms of providing the necessary stability for regional prosperity).

- Unlike in earlier decades, when the U.S. government rallied Japan and others to oppose Mahathir's East Asia Economic Caucus, because it excluded the United States, the Bush administration has viewed Asian-only groupings as relatively benign. As the discussion above reveals, this could largely be because so far few of these groupings have been fully institutionalized. It is in the U.S. interest to encourage dialogue among the countries of East Asia. The important factor is that the U.S. is party to the organizations, and remains actively engaged in them.
- Furthermore, many of the countries in the region want the United States to be active in the region either for economic reasons (as a market for final goods or a source of investment capital) or as a counterweight to regional powers. Increasing ties to China is a fact of life for all the countries in the region and worldwide. China recently overtook the U.S. as Korea's and Japan's number one trading partner; however, this does not mean that these countries are not looking for ways to increase their space for policy action and the U.S. provides just that.

## Possible Policy Options

Even though Northeast Asia is unlikely to overcome the significant built-in obstacles to regionalism in the near future does not mean that the United States can remain disengaged. The U.S. has essentially three options: (1) decrease engagement, (2) maintain the same level of engagement, or (3) increase engagement. Although decreasing engagement is in the realm of possibilities, it is hard to imagine that the U.S. government would even seriously consider it a policy option, so this paper limits its discussion to the other two options.

- (1) *Maintain*: This is the most likely scenario. A second-term Bush administration is unlikely to change its policy, unless something happened in the region that would change the administration's calculus. Under this scenario, the administration would continue to use APEC to advance its multilateral trade agenda and anti-terrorism goals. To a limited extent that United States would also strengthen its bilateral trade ties. It currently is negotiating a FTA with Thailand, but negotiations have been bogged down on key issues, such as market access to services industries. And while the United States and Korea are currently holding preliminary discussions on a possible FTA, chances are slim that a negotiation will be launched unless Korea makes significant progress on key bilateral trade issues, such as reopening the Korean market to U.S. beef. On the security front, the administration is likely to continue to focus on bilateral security arrangements, but these will continue to be affected by the transformation of U.S. forces globally.
- (2) *Increase*: This is the option that most Asia experts would advocate, but this group comes to the table with a certain bias. Increasing engagement could come in any combination of the following.
  - Security: ARF, Six-Party Talks
  - Trade: bilateral free trade agreements, regional free trade agreements (APEC, APFTA), sectoral agreements (medical equipment), enforcement
  - Cultural/Educational: visas for business and education.

Getting in the game early and being proactive is better than arriving late and being reactive. Just as the U.S. wants to encourage dialogue within Northeast Asia, it wants to ensure it also has avenues for its voice to be heard.





# A Grand Bargain for Japan and Northeast Asia

By Allen Chen

As important as its bilateral relationships with China, Japan, and the ROK may be, the U.S. has enormous stakes in two bilateral relationships to which it is not a party: the Japan-ROK relationship and the China-Japan relationship. In the undesirable event that relations between the U.S. and China should turn hostile, US options will be maximized by a strong three-way relationship between the U.S., Japan, and the ROK. A faltering and antagonistic relationship between Japan and the ROK would be contrary to U.S. interests. With the interconnected global economy and the US defense commitment to Japan, unrestrained animosities between China and Japan could have disastrous consequences for the world and the US.

At present, a fleeting opportunity exists to achieve a breakthrough in addressing the main bogeyman in Japan-China and Japan-ROK relations: the history issue. Although the odds of success are slim, the striking of a comprehensive grand bargain over Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council could push the history issue into the past. For foresighted parties in all three countries already eager to resolve the history issue, Japan's bid for a permanent seat creates conditions in which stepped-up and unusually adroit domestic and diplomatic maneuvering may yield results.

A grand bargain would consist of assent and diplomatic support for a permanent seat for Japan in exchange for the adoption of the German model by Japan in its treatment of its past. Most importantly, the grand bargain would be struck behind closed doors and never be acknowledged publicly as an explicit quid pro quo. Far less important than the specific steps committed to by the Japanese side is that in the aggregate, they meet two key thresholds: (1) the publics of China and the ROK perceive a change of heart in Japan and a sincere determination to squarely face and acknowledge the past, and (2) the steps agreed to by the Japanese government are such that difficult to reverse by subsequent governments. Nevertheless, the content of any such agreement would likely include remedies to hot-button items such as the Yasukuni Shrine, as well as long-term, structural issues, such as the version of history taught in Japanese classrooms. Under no conditions would an agreement have to include the payment of financial reparations by Japan, limited as they would be in their ability to address what is at heart an emotional issue. In its most ambitious form, an agreement might include the renunciation of claims by Japan to the Takeshima/Tokdo islands in a friendship treaty. Any agreement would need to include reciprocal commitments by the ROK and especially China to modify their version of history taught in their classrooms, which has had a hugely inflammatory and perpetuating effect on the history issue.

Until now, Japanese intransigence on the history issue has had two primary causes. First, the confrontational approach often taken by China and the ROK has made it politically hazardous for Japanese politicians to adopt a rigid stance demonstrating that Japan cannot be intimidated, resulting in a vicious cycle of confrontation and intransigence. Second, nationalist elements in Japan have long had disproportionate sway over Japanese society and the political system, due to the dominance and composition of the Liberal Democratic Party and the willingness of the ultra-right to resort to intimidation.

The achievement of a quid pro quo hinges on successfully navigating around these two obstacles. The initial task rests with factions in China and the ROK in favor of a resolution of the history issue. These factions must maneuver internally to ensure that the quid pro quo appears at most to be a tacit one and not explicit. Public badgering will only scuttle a deal. A policy of restraint in Beijing and Seoul will make possible the next stage essential to a deal, which involves a bruising battle within Japan culminating in the acquiescence of the right to a policy reversal on the history issue. Little of the behavior of the Japanese right follows from pragmatic reasons. It will not be persuaded by pragmatic assessments of what best suits Japan's national interest. The Japanese right must be compelled to take action contrary to its inclinations. A realist will argue that the Japanese right will never consent to a reversal on the history issue. Such a view is likely to be correct. However, if the Japanese right can ever be compelled to concede on the history issue, then it is difficult to imagine a more opportune moment than one where an ambition so dear to it, a permanent seat on the Security Council, is at stake. But the Japanese right will never acquiesce to a situation where Japan appears to undergo what it perceives to be a humiliation. The Japanese right must at once be forced into a position where it feels it has no alternative and yet have latitude to assert that Japan is acting out of magnanimity and its own volition. Speculation of a grand bargain must remain simply speculation.

The sale of a reversal on the history issue to both the right and the general public in Japan would be a formidable challenge. The recognition of several considerations would greatly ease the task. Most importantly, Japanese proponents of a resolution of the history issue must realize that "apology fatigue" is indeed real and a major obstacle. Allowing opponents of their campaign to paint it as yet another apology by Japan, even a final one, would likely doom it to failure. Rather than framing the campaign as a final push to resolve the past, proponents must articulate a forward-looking vision in which the adoption of a German-like treatment of the past ushers Japan into its future as a fully "normal" nation, ready to take its rightful place in the world. The approach would co-opt some of the language and agenda of the right and appeal for a demonstration of Japan's maturity and magnanimity. In addition to taking into account the depth of apology fatigue, proponents would also benefit from recognizing the fallacy in the argument of those who believe that to compromise on the history issue is to compromise on principle. The reality is that the morally appropriate level of atonement for Japan is murky. On the one hand, many nations have never accounted properly for past wrongdoings, and it could be unfair to hold Japan to a higher standard. On the other hand, no one is asking Japan to hold to a standard higher than any other country. At most, voices have argued for Japan to match the standard set by Germany. For a nation that already holds and aspires to an even greater leadership role in the world, it is not a travesty to ask it to attempt to meet the most exemplary standard. With as much ambiguity as there is about what constitutes the morally appropriate level of accounting for Japan's past actions, it would be wrong for those who oppose compromise on the history issue to regard it as a matter of principle. From a pragmatic standpoint, expressions of apology can be a cheap way to advance the national interest and do not cost blood or treasure. Finally, proponents of a resolution of the history issue should recognize the importance of securing Prime Minister Koizumi's support, without which their campaign could not succeed. His solid nationalist credentials are actually a blessing, enabling him to play the role of a Nixon going to China.

Japan's foreign policy has been reactive, devoid of strategic focus, and lacking in recognition of where the true national interest lies. No matter how strong the U.S.-Japan alliance is, Japan cannot afford to go it alone in Asia. Nevertheless, policymaking in Tokyo has appeared to betray a certain unwillingness to accept this fact. The shape of Asia is much different than it was at the beginning of the last century. Already a nuclear power, China is emerging as a global economic colossus, with its political clout and military might advancing rapidly as well. In some of the world's most prized industries, Korean companies have overtaken Japanese companies in market and technological leadership. As an island nation, Japan has limited natural resources and depends heavily on potentially vulnerable shipping lanes.

It would seem wise to actively build bridges toward others instead of allowing oneself to become alienated from them. Many in Japan, including large numbers on the right, have sensible notions of building Japan's influence through the spread of "soft" power. However, soft power comes more easily to those who earn the confidence and trust of others. While the history issue is indeed exploited by various parties within China and the ROK for political purposes, the response to such efforts cannot be solely explained by manipulation and reflects the depth of genuine popular feeling on the issue. Those who try to raise Pearl Harbor or the American firebombing of Tokyo as examples of how nations can overlook the past miss the essential point that some events simply inflict far greater trauma on the national psyche. For China and Korea, the harrowing experience of occupation by Japan was such an event. For various practical and moral considerations, Japan can only go so far in healing the wounds of its neighbors, but, as pointed out earlier, for Japan to match the German example would not constitute a sacrifice of principle.

Japanese foreign policy has been excessively reflexive and insufficiently strategic. Reflexive impulses have driven the reaction to China, which has included strengthening the U.S.-Japan security alliance, increasing defense spending and vigorously opposing various Chinese challenges, such as territorial disputes or incursions. However, the eagerness to resist China has not translated into a truly strategic understanding of the situation and the steps necessary to advance the national interest. The reactive nature of Japan's response to China's overtures to Southeast Asia demonstrated clearly China's possession of the strategic initiative. The failure of Japanese policy to recognize that the nature of the Japan-ROK relationship must be one of ardent courtship from the Japanese side is emblematic of the lack of strategic thinking in Tokyo and must be rectified.

Japan is the indispensable ally to the US in Asia. The US has a deeply vested interests in seeing that its ally is not isolated and marginalized. It is in the mutual interest of both countries to conduct their foreign policies as to maximize options in future contingencies for including other countries into their alliance, formally or otherwise. For its part, the U.S. must also play the role of a suitor to the ROK and act with great sensitivity toward the delicate balancing act the ROK must maintain, surrounded by powerful neighbors. Rather than siding squarely with the US-Japan alliance, the current ROK administration appears to prefer the more ambiguous path of tilting toward China so that lured by the prospect of better relations, China always prefers to court rather than coerce Korea. The U.S. must adjust to new realities and avoid the alienating consequences of expecting the ROK to

behave like the steadfast and pliant ally of the past. The competition for Korea's affections could be fierce.

For example, in a clever exploitation of the complicated three-way dynamics between China, Japan, and the ROK over the history issue, China could choose to sabotage efforts by Japan to make progress with the ROK by unleashing a stream of rhetoric that would make it untenable for Japanese conservatives to acquiesce to any concession on the history issue, for fear that Japan would be seen as bowing to intimidation from China, even if the concession was actually intended for the ROK. Such a difficulty would require the greatest dexterity in Tokyo and Seoul to overcome.

Nevertheless, the U.S. must have faith that it and the U.S.-Japan alliance will ultimately have the greater claim on Korea's affections, as long as Japan does not end up pushing Korea into the embrace of China. Given China's rapidly growing strength, it is conceivable that China will need Korea far less than the U.S.-Japan alliance would need Korea. If Korea tilted too strongly toward China, there could be little to prevent it from being swallowed by China, in terms of its freedom of action. As the faraway power, the U.S. is a safe ally, not one that will claim Koguryo. Cooler heads in Seoul should recognize that drifting too far from the U.S.-Japan could gravely damage Korean security and not let emotions get in the way of Korea's pragmatic interest in strong and warm ties with Japan. Sandwiched between the two great powers of Asia, Korea can have much to lose if relations between China and Japan turn hostile. This need for cordial relations between the two neighbors should provide an additional incentive for ROK leaders to do their utmost to encourage a domestic climate in Japan that is favorable to a resolution of the history issue.

# On the Potential for Quadrilateral Cooperation in East Asia

by Larry Ferguson

In light of the growing list of transnational concerns in an increasingly interconnected East Asia, four-way cooperation between the United States, the Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China, and Japan has been suggested as a multilateral venue able to grapple with issues outside the scope of any single bilateral exchange. In time, such a relationship could create increased security and stability throughout the region. If properly nurtured, this security could then create a stable international environment in which bilateral, regional, and global commerce might flourish to an even greater extent than it already has.

However, because it is unlikely that all parties would agree upon all of the issues all of the time, such an arrangement would do well to be flexible and able to function, at least in part, on an issue-by-issue basis. An issue specific approach that focused on overarching issues of transnational importance would allow the four-way partnership to address pressing areas of mutual concern while preserving the flexibility needed to address more contentious problems as the relationship evolves. Indeed, within this quadrilateral relationship, there are likely to be several issues best dealt with in a multilateral fashion. From the perspective of the United States alone, judged in part by its most recent *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (released in September 2002), a preliminary list of such concerns in Asia might include:

- The non-proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction
- Preparation for the humanitarian, proliferation, and security crises that might arise in a failed state scenario
- Counter-terrorism activities
- Counter-narcotics initiatives
- The development of rapid response humanitarian aid capabilities
- Counter-trafficking efforts, to include measures that prevent the trafficking of both women and children
- Efforts to curb the spread of HIV/AIDS and to treat those already ill
- Energy Security Initiatives
- Issues of maritime security, especially piracy
- The advancement of human rights and religious freedom

Nevertheless, although a cooperative quadrilateral relationship between the United States, Republic of Korea, China, and Japan has the potential to bring great stability and prosperity to the region, serious obstacles to achieving such cooperation exist. While there are areas of mutual concern, tensions exist in the bilateral relationships of the four nations involved that might seriously hinder the development of a larger cooperative relationship.

Tension exists between the People's Republic of China and Japan. While China values the robust economic relationship it shares with Japan, one of its top three trading partners, it also has serious concerns about the reemergence of the island nation in the post World War II era. These concerns were highlighted when China voiced its opposition to the participation of Japan's Self Defense Forces in the global war on terror. More recently, China has also voiced opposition to Japan's ascension to the United Nations Security Council. Ongoing popular demonstrations throughout China illustrate the depth of concern Chinese feel on this issue. There is also an ongoing territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands and the potential mineral resources that exist on their periphery. Finally, many Chinese remain deeply hurt by Japan's actions during the Second World War and are sensitive to perceived slights. China regularly decries both visits by Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine and the publishing of textbooks that contain an account of Japan's wartime activities that many Chinese find offensive.

Japan, too, has concerns about Chinese intentions in Asia. While the emergence of the Chinese economy provides opportunities, it also presents great challenges for the island nation. How will it thrive alongside China's booming economy? How best can it compete for the resources it needs to grow and prosper? How can it leverage China's competitive advantage, along with its own, to provide for the next generation of Japanese? In addition to economic concerns, Japan is also wary of the growing military might that Beijing wields. Will Beijing use its power responsibly? How does this dynamic change the security situation in the region? How will this impact its relationship with the United States?

Because of the breadth and scope of Sino-US relations, tensions naturally exist within this bilateral relationship as well. A full list of these issues is well beyond the scope of this essay, but an extremely brief list would include:

- Differences regarding Taiwan, heightened by China's recent an Anti-Secession Law
- Differences in policy towards North Korea
- Disputes arising within the context of free trade agreements
- US concerns about China's modernizing military
- Chinese concerns about US intentions in the Pacific
- Event-based tensions, such as the 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the EP-3 incident, the 1996 missile tests across the Taiwan Straits, and the persecution of the Falun Gong worshippers
- Arms embargos, specifically with regard to the European Union
- Differences on human rights and the expansion of religious and democratic freedoms
- Tensions arising from visa and immigration-related issues

The ROK- Japanese relationship is also not without its own difficulties. These include, but are not limited to:

- Disputes regarding free trade agreements
- Differences on policy towards North Korea

- Disputes over the Takeshima/Dokdo island chain
- Issues regarding Japan's wartime activities on the Korean Peninsula, including visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and the publishing of controversial history books
- Korean concern over the expanded role of Japan's Self Defense Forces

Despite strong cooperation on security matters, the United States and the Republic of Korea have their differences as well. To name a few:

- Differences on policy towards North Korea
- US force realignment and its implication for the ROK
- Anti-Americanism in South Korea
- ROK civilian casualties as a result of the US military presence, whether accidental or due to misconduct
- Diplomatic tensions such as the construction of the US Embassy in Seoul and the lack of a visa waiver for Koreans traveling to the US

While these brief lists of the bilateral tensions that exist between the US, ROK, Japan and China may seem daunting, a four-way cooperative relationship is well worth pursuing. Because peace and stability are in the interests of each nation individually, and in the interests of the region as a whole, any framework that enhances the prospects for both warrants consideration. The United States would therefore be well served to consider four-way cooperation when struggling with the various challenges it and its allies face in East Asia.





# **A Matter of Orientation: Control the Blind National Emotion of South Koreans**

By Kim Jae-Eun

South Koreans' understanding of national security is growing. I became a university student in 2001 and, as a freshman, I saw shocking scenes that made me feel international politics and the importance of national security. At that time, ordinary Koreans did not realize the threats that underscored national defense policy except those posed by North Korea. Yet there is a growing concern among Korean leaders and the nation about crisis management. For instance, suspicion of North Korea's nuclear program, reconsideration of the U.S.-ROK alliance, the reduction of the U.S. forces in South Korea, sending military forces to Iraq, and territorial disputes with China and Japan are all issues of public concern.

However, ordinary people do not understand international relations. Instead, they just react emotionally out of violent nationalism and this is seen as the opinion of the nation as a whole from the outside. That is why I thought of the problem of egoism, in particular, South Koreans' blind patriotism. To support this idea, I examine U.S.-South Korea relations and the reality of anti-Americanism, together with Koreans' impulsive confrontation with Japan over Japan's baseless assertion of control over Tokdo island.

## **Strengthening strategic alliance with the U.S.**

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun publicly said that Korea should be a kind of mediating balm in Northeast Asia; this is sometimes called the "Northeast Asia balancer theory." He endorsed a "diplomatic war" and maintained that South Korea would keep the balance in Northeast Asia. Convincing people to take an aggressive approach is understandable, but in my opinion this is rash behavior that incites people to excessive nationalism and anti-Americanism. I do not think for a moment that the U.S. is hostile to Korea. The U.S. was keen to democratize Korea, and offered economic support in addition to sending soldiers during the Korean War. Therefore, I stress this sentiment -- opposition to the U.S. -- is not general in South Korea. Of course, it can be strong but it is not the thinking of the majority.

Maintaining "balance" as President Roh declared is not compatible with the U.S.-South Korea alliance. Indiscreet anti-Americanism and demonstrations calling for reduction of U.S. forces in Korea weaken cooperation in regional security. The U.S. plays an influential role in keeping order in Northeast Asia. It has mediated competition among four major powers, relieving them of the security dilemma. Various security crises were handled and disputes were settled by the superior negotiating and bargaining power of the U.S. The survival of our land depends on strengthening the strategic alliance with the U.S. We cannot afford meaningless agitation.

## **Suppress Koreans' impulsive hostility to Japan**

Currently, South Korea has a territorial dispute over Tokdo Island with Japan. Reports that Japan claims the island created a storm throughout the Korean Peninsula. However, I can not understand why Koreans did not proceed in a cool-headed manner. Last year, anti-Americanism reached a climax. Now, anti-Japanese sentiment is rising. Many kinds of cultural interchange between Korea and Japan were canceled or interrupted. The president should try to control nationalistic outbursts by people overwhelmed by controversial depictions of history.

When anti-Japanese feeling rises, the president should take a different stand as a decision maker and handle the matter. President Roh must dissuade people from inflammatory agitation and calm feelings, restoring constructive relations with Japan. Yet, President Roh strained relations with Japan, riding on top of the trends. What does this stand provide Korea? He needs to know that excessive consciousness of domestic affairs can clash with regional security demands of Northeast Asia.

Koreans probably assumed that they can influence other countries' foreign policy with their national sentiment. Given the way that Tokyo-Seoul relations have soured in recent weeks, a formidable counterweight in this bitter dispute would be best achieved by steadfastness, not fussiness.

## **Conclusion**

As mentioned, President Roh said that South Korea would be an active player in balancing in Northeast Asia. However, many political leaders and elites in Korea doubt whether we have the national capabilities suitable for this role. Is there any strategic choice? Is there any specific action plan? Achieving regional peace depends upon a robust alliance between the United States and South Korea. We should make maximum efforts to solidify U.S.-ROK relations and reduce high emotion when dealing with external matters.

Key to national security is political and diplomatic behavior. The cornerstone of diplomacy is the nation's power and capability. In the last two years, North Korea's nuclear issue, the dispatch of troops to Iraq, and the reduction of U.S. forces in Korea have been three controversial ideas in international politics. These are issues for the entire region, not just Korea. What can be done? The U.S. has deterrent capability on the Korean Peninsula. We should remember that maintaining cooperative connections with the U.S. is key. South Korea should recognize the strategic importance of concrete U.S.-ROK relations, keeping trust among the U.S., Japan, and Korea, and controlling strong nationalism. In addition, it is leadership that induces cooperation and coordination. Eventually, successful leadership can be attained through assistance from neighboring countries. It cannot be gained by a president's sole efforts. At all times, the most important motive is enhancing national security and status. This is the most crucial issue for South Korea and it has to become conventional wisdom.

# Building Up Northeast Asian Humanitarian Cooperation: Lessons from the Indian Ocean Earthquake-Tsunami

By Ah-Young Kim

The Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami of Dec. 26, 2004 was unprecedented not only in terms of the scale of the destruction (12 affected countries, 175,000+ deaths, and more than 1 million people displaced), but also in the generous response from the international community. This response consisted of financial contributions, military assets and assistance, and relief supplies from multilateral institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and private citizens. Northeast Asia actively participated in this endeavor. This essay examines how the lessons of the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami can pave the way for future Northeast Asian cooperation on humanitarian issues.

## **Lesson #1: Financial Contributions**

According to the latest estimates from the United Nations' OCHA financial tracking service (FTS), a total of \$6.7 billion has been pledged, committed, or contributed to all recipients in response to the tsunami. Of this, 95 governments and inter-governmental organizations have pledged, committed, or contributed \$5.8 billion; private individuals and institutions have contributed at least \$883 million.<sup>1</sup> Among Northeast Asian donors, Japan ranked highest in total humanitarian assistance, having committed/contributed \$500 million (with zero uncommitted pledges). China (PRC) committed/contributed \$55 million (with \$9 million in uncommitted pledges), the ROK committed/contributed \$5 million (with \$3 million in uncommitted pledges), and even the DPRK contributed \$150,000 in cash through bilateral channels.

Japan has historically been a high-giving donor, especially in official development assistance (ODA), and has contributed to more than 186 countries and regions over a 50-year period.<sup>2</sup> Much of their assistance focused on projects such as infrastructure, water, public health, and human resources development. I believe this historical background and accumulated experience played a significant role in Japan's ability to effectively distribute disaster relief funds, to implement community-building projects, and to establish regional partnerships. This experience can provide guidance for Northeast Asian countries to cooperate on humanitarian issues, whether through multilateral mechanisms like the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or through new channels. Two recent developments also highlight the importance of promoting Northeast Asian humanitarian-based cooperation. The Asian

---

<sup>1</sup> Financial Tracking Service (FTS): Tracking Global Humanitarian Aid Flows <http://www.reliefweb.int/fts> (accessed 15 April 2005); On FTS, a "pledge" is stated as "a non-binding announcement of an intended contribution or allocation by the donor. It can be specific as to appealing agency and project, or specify only the crisis or appeal." A "commitment" is defined as "creation of a legal, contractual obligation between the donor and recipient entity, specifying the amount contributed. Almost always takes the form of a signed contract." A "contribution" is defined as "the payment of funds or transfer of in-kind goods from the donor to the recipient entity."

<sup>2</sup> Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) celebrated its 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary in October 2004. "Japan's Official Development Assistance: Accomplishment and Progress of 50 Years," Ministry of Foreign Affairs pamphlet, 31 March 2005.

Development Bank established a \$600 million Multi-Donor Trust Fund for the tsunami-affected countries in rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts – all three countries (i.e. China, Korea, and Japan) are members and could benefit from trilateral meetings to enhance further discussion and cooperation. In addition, China recently has broken its 45-year record of receiving food aid and has become an official aid donor. This change in China's formal status from recipient to donor, along with its growing economy, has significant implications and creates opportunities for Northeast Asian cooperation in future humanitarian emergencies.

## **Lesson #2: Military Contributions**

More than 26 foreign militaries contributed their land, air, and maritime military assets to the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami, making it the largest peacetime deployment of military and civil defense assets in the history of the United Nations. This assistance played a key role in sectors such as engineering, communications, housing, water purification and sanitation, medical support, transportation and delivery, forensics, disaster assessment, and environmental surveys in the tsunami-affected region.

Among Northeast Asian nations, Japan contributed around 1,000 Self-Defense Forces (SDF) members – one of the biggest foreign military presences – mostly around Aceh and also established a joint coordination center in Thailand with other foreign military partners (i.e., the U.S., Australia, Germany, the UK, and France). The ROK dispatched military aircraft and a navy landing ship, which assisted in the transportation of relief materials such as food, medical supplies, and heavy machinery to Indonesia; an additional navy landing ship was deployed to Sri Lanka to deliver relief goods. The PRC contributed around 35 military personnel (mostly medics and engineers) to Indonesia, keeping a low profile. Critics have claimed that the small deployment of PRC military assets to the tsunami-affected area is due to a combination of factors such as sensitivity, adherence to the principle of non-interference, and overall PRC military capacity.<sup>3</sup>

It is important to analyze how China has perceived the military contributions of other Northeast Asian countries, especially Japan's SDF, to the tsunami-affected region, and how China will deploy military assets in future humanitarian emergencies. The militaries in both China and Korea play an important role in national natural disasters such as floods and evacuations, but what role will they play outside their own borders? A challenge for Northeast Asia is to examine how Japan, China, and Korea can collaborate in deploying military assets for future humanitarian emergencies (i.e., natural and complex emergencies). For example, what happens if a devastating earthquake occurs in Japan? What if a humanitarian crisis arises in the DPRK? The three nations should start discussing future possibilities for military cooperation on the humanitarian level.

## **Lesson #3: Regional Initiatives**

Many lives could have been saved from the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami if an effective early warning system was in place. This not only requires technology such as

---

<sup>3</sup> See "China's Tsunami Aid Package Highlights Beijing's Rising Profile" <http://quickstart.clari.net/voa/art/ce/2005-01-21-voa12.html> (accessed 15 April 2005) and "China fails the tsunami test," by Michael Moran, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6785287/> (accessed 15 April 2005).

network sensors and seismic data analysis systems, but also a communications infrastructure that can disperse timely warnings for evacuations. Tsunamis are not frequent in the Indian Ocean. Due to the recent tsunami, governments in the Asia-Pacific region are actively participating in an overall multi-hazard warning system (which includes tsunamis). In addition, international initiatives and conferences, organized by the United Nations and the ADB, have garnered support in terms of balancing both international and regional frameworks and priorities in early warning, and adding components of disaster awareness, reduction, and prevention.

Japan, with its extensive experience in dealing with earthquakes and natural disasters, has taken initiative in the Indian Ocean tsunami-earthquake. In March 2005, a government delegation of 32 natural disaster experts was sent to Sri Lanka to advise officials in setting up a disaster management system. In January 2005, Japan successfully hosted the World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe. This conference was attended by more than 160 member states (including China and Korea) and launched the *Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters*. Japan's Meteorological Agency has offered to provide tsunami early warning faxes to 13 nations (i.e., Australia, Indonesia, India, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mozambique, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Tanzania, and Thailand) utilizing their own seismographic and oceanographic data in the Indian Ocean.<sup>4</sup> This is a good opportunity for China and Korea to join this process and expand the scope of discussion. Japan should also take initiative and develop ways to incorporate a Northeast Asian dimension as a counterpart to ASEAN initiatives in establishing early warning systems. Even the European Union (EU) approved an action plan in January 2005 to incorporate all EU initiatives within the framework of the response to the tsunami – I see no reason why Northeast Asia could not do the same.

#### **Lesson #4: The U.S. Dimension**

Let's not forget the U.S. dimension in the Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami and how each Northeast Asian country (Japan, China, and South Korea) can utilize the lessons learned from the tsunami to cooperate with its Pacific partner. The U.S. was also a key player in the earthquake-tsunami: the U.S. pledged \$857 million in tsunami aid (out of which \$366.4 million has been allocated)<sup>5</sup>; contributed 16,000 military personnel, 26 ships, 58 helicopters, and 43 aircraft; and delivered more than 10 million pounds of relief supplies to the tsunami-affected areas.<sup>6</sup> The U.S. cooperated with its regional partners, especially on the military level, by organizing Combined Support Groups with a headquarters in Thailand. Regional partners such as Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and tsunami-affected countries' militaries such as India, Indonesia, and Thailand participated and offered support.

---

<sup>4</sup> "Japan starts tsunami warning system for Indian Ocean countries," *Associated Press*, 31 March 2005.

<sup>5</sup> "Big donors get mixed score card on tsunami aid," *Reuters*, 17 May 2005, <http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/aidtracker/> (accessed 17 May 2005). See also Reuters AlertNet Tsunami AidTracker which shows a country by country breakdown of donor pledges and allocations <http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/aidtracker/list.htm>

<sup>6</sup> US Support for Earthquake and Tsunami Victims, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/tsunami/> (accessed 17 May 2005).

This spirit of cooperation will not only further strengthen U.S.-Japan military ties, but may also serve as an opportunity for the U.S.-ROK alliance to expand its military ties beyond the traditional, security realm of the Korean Peninsula and to discuss cooperation in a more regional, less traditional, and human security-based area. Although U.S.-PRC military cooperation is difficult to picture, there is always the opportunity to discuss the balance between humanitarian assistance and the respect for national sovereignty and authority – a key concern of the PRC. With the U.S. playing a key role both financially and militarily in the region, the important lesson is that all Northeast Asian countries can benefit from positive cooperation with the U.S.

### **Lesson #5: Future Implications**

The Indian Ocean earthquake-tsunami showed that the mass destruction on this scale goes beyond national borders – it affected the entire world, and the international community responded. Northeast Asia still has a long way to go to support cooperation on the humanitarian level. Setting aside politics, how can a more humanitarian dimension to cooperation be discussed among the three nations? I believe that the DPRK would be a good starting point.

Many believe that a humanitarian crisis is ever possible in the DPRK. If this situation is combined with a natural disaster, how will Northeast Asia react? Will they cooperate? The DPRK recently stated that it does not require humanitarian assistance, but development assistance. However, the World Food Programme (WFP) reports that 35 percent of North Koreans are malnourished and around 6.5 million North Koreans require food aid. Will China, now an official aid donor, be willing to contribute through public channels? And the ROK should consider the implications of a humanitarian crisis rather than facilities at Mt. Gungang and the impact on future unification. And how does Japan, one of the largest ODA donors in the region, fit into this picture? The Indian Ocean earthquake tsunami has made plain the need for Northeast Asia to discuss about the possibilities of cooperation on the humanitarian level, especially for the future.

# The Problems Facing North Korea's Nuclear Program

By Jang Wook Lee

The situation has become unpredictable. North Korea has publicly acknowledged that it does, in fact, possess nuclear weapons and withdrew from the Six-Party Talks aimed at resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Korean specialists – such as Aidan Foster-Carter – argue that the Six-Party Talks have failed and that optimism is hard to maintain. It is not clear if the Six-Party Talks have failed, but it is clear that we continue to have the hardest time dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue.

What are the problems facing the North Koreans nuclear program?” “What point of view does each nation have with regard to this issue? What policies are supported by each nation involved in the talks? Is it possible to settle their differences? These are my questions for this year's conference. This essay reflects one way of approaching the North Korea nuclear problem, the problems of the Six-Party Talks, and some suggestions on how the Six-Party Talks can succeed.

## **Think simple: What does the North Korean nuclear problem mean?**

Let us start by simply thinking about the meaning of the “North Korean nuclear problem.” The North Korean nuclear problem is the problem of nuclear capability and the problem of North Korea's regime. These two ideas can be elaborated upon as follows:

### 1. The Problem of Nuclear Capability

The problem concerning North Korea's nuclear capability focuses on North Korea's nuclear weapons, selling nuclear materials and technology, etc. In this problem, two points of view focus on the critical issue of “CVID” (Complete, Verifiable, and Irreversible Dismantlement). One point of view regards CVID as inevitable to achieving the denuclearization of North Korea and can be regarded as the ultimate goal of the Six-Party Talks. This point of view aims to achieve the total dismantlement of all nuclear programs and facilities, including the North's plutonium and HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) programs, as well as all acquired nuclear weapons, and asks North Korea to take action first regarding nuclear dismantlement.

The other point of view stresses that CVID is neither acceptable nor the goal of the Six-Party Talks. This point of view proposes that the complete dismantlement of the nuclear program is not a short-term goal but a long-term one, which suggests that it is impossible to achieve CVID through the Six-Party Talks. This point of view has different opinions concerning how the North's nuclear programs should be dismantled; only weapon-grade nuclear programs should be dismantled, while other peaceful nuclear programs and facilities should be excluded.

### 2. The Problem with North Korea's Regime

The problem in regards to North Korea’s regime raises a question: is the policy (or measure) of regime change acceptable? There are two points of view regarding the issue of “regime change.” One view insists that the North’s nuclear problem was a product of Kim Jong-il’s regime, which enjoys playing the game of engaging in conflict with other nations. In addition, Kim’s regime has other alternatives – other WMD such as bio-chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, and conventional weapons, etc. – to play games with nations in Northeast Asia. Following this point of view, regime change could be a desirable measure to solve the problem.

The other point of view emphasizes the status quo in Northeast Asia. Any contingencies, instability, or a change in the status quo is not regarded as desirable. This point of view also believes that regime change will create more problems – such as the Roh Moo-hyun government’s anxiety about 23 million North Koreans facing unemployment, and the PRC’s anxiety about North Korean defectors. People with this point of view insist that North Korea’s nuclear problem should be considered as part of North Korea’s nuclear capability.

These four points of views have different goals. These 4 four policy goals can be seen in Table 1.

Table 1 Policy Goals as Points of View

		The Problem with North Korea’s Regime	
		Regime Transformation is acceptable	Regime Transformation is not acceptable
The Problem of Nuclear Capability	Supporting CVID	Radical Denuclearization by Radical Regime Change of North Korea (RDRRC)	Radical Denuclearization only (RD)
	Opposing CVID	Incremental Denuclearization by Incremental Regime Change (IDIRC)	Incremental Denuclearization only (ID)

As Table 1 shows, four policy goals can be envisioned. I think some people might prefer the combination of “Incremental Denuclearization by Radical Regime Change” (IDRRC) or “Radical Denuclearization by Incremental Regime Change” (RDIRC). In my opinion however these preferences would not be realized. Because radical regime change is apt to bring about radical denuclearization of North Korea, incremental denuclearization can only exist with incremental regime change. In the case of RDIRC, radical denuclearization could only match a radical regime change, because regime change would be regarded as the measure of denuclearization. RDIRC would mean that the measure (Incremental Regime Change) was achieved after the goal (Radical Denuclearization) was already achieved.

What goals does each of the six nations have? In my opinion, the U.S. follows RDRRC. The PRC and Russia follow ID, and South Korea follows RD. It is not easy to determine Japan’s goal because Japan has shown hesitation with regard to regime change, in regard to North Korea, so as not to agitate Kim Jong-il’s regime. However, considering the



consolidation of the U.S. and Japan alliance and the Koizumi government's recent negative attitude toward North Korea – such as the negative campaigns following the revelations about abducted Japanese – Japan would follow RDRRC. In the case of North Korea, ID would be thought of as its goal. Some people may think of RD as North Korea's goal because North Korea constantly insists on a package deal in exchange for its nuclear problem. But, I think North Korea has the goal of RD only when it is possible is high to achieve all of what North Korea wants. If there is the likelihood that North Korea will see no or a low possibility to achieve what it wants, then it would follow ID or carry out measures to delay things – such as the withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks.

### **The Problem of the Six-Party Talks**

To the U.S. the current situation is not desirable. Since the inception of the Six-Party Talks, the U.S. has intended to carry out a “5 vs. 1” (the U.S., South Korea, the PRC, Japan, and Russia vs. North Korea) strategy. However, the reality has been a “2 vs. 3 vs. 1” (the U.S. and Japan vs. PRC, Russia, and North Korea vs. South Korea). Furthermore, two camps (the PRC, Russia and North Korea vs. the U.S. and Japan) within the Six-Party Talks have opposite points of views on “the problem of nuclear capability” and “the problem of North Korea's Regime.” The most serious problem of the Six-Party Talks came from the lack of shared values. The Six-Party Talks are a multilateral approach and as such needs consensus on values and reciprocity among participants. However, participants in the six-party process do not share the same values. The U.S., ROK, and Japan share the values of democracy and freedom while China, Russia and North Korea have different point of views regarding democracy and freedom. Without shared values, the only thing that can be expected is the maintenance of the status quo. The status quo could be accepted as a desirable result by all nations in peacetime but that would not be the case in a crisis. This lack of shared values leads to the problem of a lack of cooperation among all five nations. Without shared values involving political identity or ideology, it would be very difficult to get cooperation with a key player in these talks – China.

### **Conclusion: What can be done?**

As mentioned, the most serious problem facing the Six-Party Talks is related to the lack of shared values between the participating countries. It takes a lot of time to create shared values. But the North Korean nuclear problem is a clear and imminent danger that needs to be solved. To make breakthroughs in these talks, what can be done? I would like to mention some options under the assumption of the Libyan model, but if North Korea insists on following the Pakistan model, solutions dependent only on diplomatic approaches may not be available.

First, the U.S. needs to take a more flexible attitude toward regime change in North Korea. The issue of regime change has not only made cooperation with China more difficult, but it has also made relations between the Bush administration and the Roh government uncomfortable. The reason behind this is that the Roh government believes that regime change would have terrible repercussions for the Korean Peninsula.

To solve this problem, separating regime change from the options for denuclearization could be considered by the U.S. This would mean the U.S. changes its goal to RD (Radical Denuclearization only). However, it does not mean the U.S. has to give up its policies that encourage freedom and human rights in North Korea. These policies are separate from options in the Six-Party Talks. The U.S. could designate regime change in North Korea as a “long term goal” and the policies toward North Korea’s regime could be maintained as separately. Recently, the Bush administration’s flexible attitude toward the nuclear problem with North Korea and its inviting of a North Korean defector to the White House could be an example of changed policies.

Second, the U.S., ROK, and Japan should make efforts to convince China that CVID is a positive goal. China’s opposition to CVID does not mean China accepts the Norths having nuclear weapons. China just worries about contingencies and instabilities during the process of denuclearization. However, China should know that North Korea would take full advantage of such attitudes. China now faces the problem of being surrounded by nuclear-armed neighbors – India, Pakistan, Russia, and North Korea. The U.S., Japan, and ROK should persuade China that nuclear proliferation is a clear and imminent danger to China’s security and that China should take a more active role in the Six-Party Talks.

Third, the ROK and U.S. need to show a more confident attitude to the U.S.-ROK alliance. For instance, the ROK government must explain to the U.S. that its self-reliant defense program will coordinate with the U.S.-ROK alliance and remove other misunderstandings concerning ROK’s defense and security policies.

Fourth, the ROK should send a clear message for denuclearization to Kim Jong-il’s regime. The ROK’s passive attitude on denuclearization – including a passive commitment to CVID – or neglecting the spread of the Korean nation’s nuclear (Minjok Heak) theory could lead to other countries misunderstanding the situation.

Fifth, the ROK, Japan, and China should be more cautious in their reactions to history problems. These three nations have historical experiences relating to each other. These nations should not use policies that can stimulate the others’ national sentiment. There could be conflicts which arise from trying to solve these historical problems. However, these three nations have to make great efforts not to spill the antagonists generated by these historical problems into the Six-Party Talks.

The future of the Six-Party Talks depends on cooperation among the five nations – U.S., ROK, China, Japan, and Russia because cooperation among the U.S., the ROK, Japan, and China is the key to success. Although the lack of shared values creates serious barriers to cooperation and time is needed for values to be shared, these four nations should make every effort to find other ways in which to cooperate with each other. The current situation demands these four nations to use wisdom to avoid the catastrophe of a nuclearized Northeast Asia.

# Wanted: A Healthy National Mentality

By Fan Li

The fate of the Six-Party Talks has been the center of attention in East Asia since Pyongyang's Feb. 10 announcement that it was suspending participation in the talks and that it had nuclear weapons. The world holds high expectations for China and sees it as an indispensable player in helping to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis.

Spreading anti-Japanese demonstrations and a boycott of Japanese products in China suggest China may have other priorities. Two weeks ago, a Chinese student online community launched a survey of the younger generation's thinking about the world. When asked which country is least trustworthy, 73 percent of the 27,000 respondents named Japan, followed by the United States, Russia, and India. North Korea was not even on the list.

Nuclear bombs may be hidden in Kim Jong-il's backyard, but a revised textbook that "whitewashes" Japan's wartime crimes in Asia, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's annual visits to Yasukuni Shrine, and a defense program that identifies China as a potential threat are visible. So why shouldn't Chinese be more concerned about the "Japan threat," especially if, judging from the old friendship between China and North Korea, it's very unlikely that North Korea would use nuclear weapons against China?

One can argue that anti-Japanese sentiment in China is not news. But the backward moves between Japan and South Korea caused by territorial conflicts over the Takeshima islands (Tokdo in Korean) is a big blow to the honeymoon in relations since the two nations co-hosted the 2002 World Cup soccer final and appear to have undone the goodwill created by the culture boom known as "Han-Ryu" in Japan. If the deadlock over the sovereignty of the Northern Territories, occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II, is added, it looks like Japan is taking the lead in a fight with three members of the Six-Party Talks.

It's not fair to force Japan to take all the blame. But Japan's recent behavior has complicated the atmosphere surrounding the multilateral talks on North Korea, which is unfortunate for Japan and the region. In Northeast Asia, history is not just about the past. Unresolved issues, some going back more than a century, cast giant shadows over the continent at a time of rapid economic change and shifting power balances.

Among all the conflicts, the Sino-Japanese rift is most important, and as a result can threaten the peace and security of the entire world. As Deng Xiaoping pointed out 30 years ago, the most important bilateral relationship for China is Sino-Japan relations.

The term "peaceful rise" (heping jueqi) put forward by the Hu Jintao administration sums up Beijing's goal of good neighborliness and global responsibility. However, there are doubts and concerns in Japan about how the terms "peaceful" and "rise" relate to each other, especially given China's exploratory drilling in the East China Sea, submarine incursions, and the exclusionary nationalism in China. At the same time, China considers Japan's hard work to become a "normal country" and obtain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council an excuse for failing to seriously address its historical disputes with its neighbors.

In fact, these two countries are looking in the same direction: toward a peaceful rise. China has achieved dramatic development in recent years, and as it comes to play an increasing role on the international scene, as in the Six-Party Talks, it is only natural for the Chinese to desire to make China both rich and strong, as well as to reunite the “lost territories” with the motherland.

As for Japan, it is now represented by the Koizumi administration, which is backed by a new generation that does not feel it should be judged by misbehavior in the past. Many feel the time has come for Japan to play a more active role as the world’s second largest economy, the main sponsor of the UN and other international institutions, and Japan deserves a permanent seat on the UN Security Council to justify and encourage its contribution to international peacekeeping.

So what is the obstacle? For a win-win peaceful rise, both countries need to nurture a healthy national mentality. There is no greater threat to peace than the emergence of a major power with a “victim mentality.”

Traditionally, the Chinese take the 100-plus years beginning in the mid-19th century as a period of national humiliation. It was a time when the once-powerful kingdom was invaded and bullied by Western powers and Japan. It was also the time when China realized, for the first time in its 5,000-year history, that it was no longer a strong nation.

These deep wounds to China’s pride take time to heal. The fundamental reason lies in the Chinese belief that it was “the Middle Kingdom” for many centuries before it declined. A sense of cultural superiority has been bred in the Chinese people that makes it still harder for them to suffer the humiliations of backwardness in modern times. It seems that the Chinese care about their sensibilities and dignity more than anyone else.

As China takes a greater role in global affairs, abandoning the victim complex is a must. Shaking off that complex does not mean that the Chinese should divorce themselves from history. It only means they ought to perform on the world stage as a normal partner, and in a more open and forward-looking mode.

Japan must rid itself of this mental illness as well. Japan has accused China of harboring a victim mentality, but Japan itself is hiding in the shadows of the U.S. nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It is true that Japan was a victim as well as an aggressor, but this does not justify Japan turning its back on its history of aggression. There appears to be a trend in which all history textbooks delete facts about “comfort women” while ensuring that they include the name of Yokota Megumi, the missing hostage kidnapped by North Korea. As a great power in Asia, Japan needs courage to face a complete version of its history and it must make concrete efforts to improve relations with its neighbors.

Nobody can tell if the Six-Party Talks are the best way to solve North Korea’s nuclear crisis. But it is important to recognize that this is not only a process of negotiating with North Korea, but also a process of communicating among the five other countries.

China, Japan, and South Korea should use this opportunity to build a stronger coalition in East Asia.

Key to this process is greater grassroots exchanges. Seeing is believing. It may seem overly simple, but one of the reasons that anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan is not as strong as anti-Japanese feeling in China is that more Japanese have chances to visit China than Chinese can visit Japan. The Chinese government began a Japanese visa waiver program in 2003, but it's very difficult for Chinese to come to Japan. This is something that could be worked on and improved by both governments.

A nation that forgets its past has no future. However, that nation can hardly move forward if it puts itself in the throes of past humiliations forever. Maybe the best way to remember the past is to learn to forgive and move on, and that would require a real "great power mentality."



# Joint Crisis Management as a Way to Increase Multilateral Cooperation

By Sachi Nagaoka

The U.S., ROK, Japan, and China will help create future order in Asia, and these four countries are therefore responsible for developing a common vision for peace and prosperity beyond their own national interests. This conference is a step toward establishing common perceptions to settle the problems that currently exist in Northeast Asia. It is especially meaningful that the conference provides a forum for multilateral talks, which offer the possibility of settling problems that could not be resolved in bilateral talks. In fact, the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG): U.S.-ROK-Japan process proves that bilateral security connections between U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan could improve another weak bilateral relationship, that of Japan and the ROK<sup>1</sup>. TCOG has grown into a multilateral framework to confront a common threat, North Korea, and it is clear that multilateral talks have helped to improve complicated bilateral relations in Northeast Asia. Movement toward multilateralism also offers the greatest chance to improve bilateral relations in this region.

Asian regionalism should not be exclusionary. A positive U.S.-ROK relation is vital to establishing effective Six-Party Talks for resolving North Korean issues, as well as for the formation of a stable multilateral framework in Asia. In fact, the rapid response of the U.S. in combined military and civilian operations to the 2004 tsunami has provided a positive evaluation of the U.S. role in management. Asian countries must develop a common perception that forming an Asian community and allowing a U.S. presence are not mutually exclusive, but instead can be of great benefit in helping establish positive relations among Asian countries. In this context, Japan and ROK are responsible as allies of the U.S. for encouraging the U.S. to take a positive role in this region based on cooperation rather than self-interest.

## **Building Cooperation and Managing Competition**

The topic “Building Cooperation and Managing Competition” provided the opportunity to discuss and present concrete possibilities for future quadrilateral cooperation, especially in regard to security issues. Preparing for disaster relief and North Korea’s expected refugee crisis are feasible and emergent areas for quadrilateral cooperation. Again, the response to the 2004 tsunami disaster demonstrates clearly that four countries possess capabilities to contribute to crisis management in Asia. In this section, I will examine Japan’s role in handling this crisis and offer insights into the lessons Japan should learn from for future quadrilateral coordination.

In the early stages following the tsunami, Japan decided to give grant aid of more than \$500 million to the affected countries, a decision that the Indonesian foreign minister said set the tone for the other donor countries - Germany and Australia both subsequently pledged even larger amounts of aid. In addition to its generous financial offer, Japan also

---

<sup>1</sup> Interim Report, *The Evolution of the TCOG as a Diplomatic Tool*, IFPA, 2004.11, p.1

sent more than 1,000 Self Defense Forces (SDF) personnel to the affected countries. However, generous the aid, Japan made two crucial errors in the deployment of the aid.

The first criticism is that Prime Minister Koizumi failed to send a strong message to international society, while the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao showed his country's strong initiative just after the tsunami disaster<sup>2</sup>. On Dec. 26, 2004, the Chinese government decided to give humanitarian aid to India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Thailand, in addition to preparing to send an emergency support team of 40 personnel on the same day. Prime Minister Wen pledged financial support of approximately \$60 million directly to the ambassadors of 10 affected countries in Beijing on Dec. 31.

The second criticism is that Japan delayed deployment of the SDF personnel until the end of January, even though the Indonesian government had requested support on Jan. 3<sup>3</sup>. This criticism is heard at home and abroad, even though Japan decided to mobilize 21 personnel of a civilian disaster relief team on the day the tsunami occurred. Lack of coordination between civilian and military personnel has been a consistent problem for Japan and is a consequence of constitutional limitations, but the government is currently reforming government agencies to make the best use of resources. The "Japan Platform," which was established 2000, is one of the country's efforts to coordinate NGOs, media, and business groups. The Japanese Diet is also considering changing the Constitution and reforming the bureaucrat-dominated structure; however the lack of strong leadership continues to make inter-agency cooperation difficult.

In international society, the military has taken an important role in disaster relief and in other situations requiring humanitarian assistance, especially since the end of the Cold War, and the 2004 tsunami is no exception. The U.S. operation, called "Operation Unified Assistance" (OUA), has shown an "unprecedented level of interagency operation<sup>4</sup>," in which "the military units involved in the relief effort would interact at all levels with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in the State Department<sup>4</sup>." As the U.S. response to the tsunami exemplifies, coordinating military and civilian operations is the key to a quick and effective response to crisis. Japan needs to follow this example and develop a systematic approach to coordination in future relief efforts.

In regard to following the U.S. model of quick mobility and military-civilian coordination, Japan is not alone. Both ROK and China could take lessons from the rapid response of the U.S. to the tsunami crisis. More than that, the four countries could develop common exercises or coordinating mechanisms to facilitate even greater cooperation in future crises.

---

<sup>2</sup> Atsushi Kusano, On Kahou ni Okure wo totta Koizumi Performance, *Syokun*, p.128-133, 2005.3.

<sup>3</sup> Second Interim Report, *Security Policy Reforms in East Asia and a Trilateral Crisis Response Planning Opportunity*, IFPA, 2005.3, p.19.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p.16



There is another explanation for the speed and efficiency of the U.S.<sup>5</sup> response to the tsunami: Cobra Gold, the annual military exercise between Thailand and U.S. This could serve as a model for multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia. In fact, ROK, Japan, and China have participated in Cobra Gold as observers and the Japan Defense Agency just announced that the SDF will participate directly in the annual Cobra Gold military exercise in April 2005<sup>6</sup>. This shows that Southeast Asian countries could be a catalyst for cooperation among Northeast Asian nations. ASEAN Plus Three is one such example, in which ASEAN countries help to deepen relations among Northeast Asian countries. We should continue to evaluate the role of other Asian countries positively in the context of cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Northeast Asia remains a place where the detritus of the Cold War remains, and even more deeply, where the tangled emotions created by World War II continue. It is time that four countries deal with the unresolved problems and issues that continue to plague this region, and we should seize this rare opportunity to move forward collectively toward a future that is bright for all.

---

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 21

<sup>6</sup> Asahi Shinbun, *SDF to join 4-nation military drill in Thailand*, April 20 2005



## After Reunification

by Yumiko Nakagawa

Peaceful reunification of Korea has been a goal of regional cooperation for the last several decades. However, from a humanitarian worker's standpoint, reunification is a starting point, not a goal. Reunification is a reasonably foreseeable future. Peaceful or not, one way or another, when two countries become one, the joy of reunification will be followed by the agony of reconstruction. The task of reconstruction is a costly and delicate process, which demands regional cooperation.

Reconstruction is more than rebuilding infrastructure. Ultimately, reconstruction is the process in which people adjust to a new reality and get back on their own feet. The work of reconstruction is often given to humanitarian workers, but its success and failure is a matter of regional security. The humanitarian dimension of reconstruction is about extending hands to those in need. The non-humanitarian aspect of reconstruction is a contest of national interests of countries. Building a framework for regional cooperation for North Korean reconstruction is crucial to avoid the danger of North Korean reconstruction becoming a source of tension in the region.

Putting cost into the picture, it quickly becomes evident why regional coordination is a necessity and needs to start now than later. Reconstruction is a costly business. The cost of reconstruction in recent years makes the point clearly. Afghan reconstruction demands \$10 billion for the next 10 years (pledged \$5 billion for population of 25 million). \$4 billion was spent for Lebanon (for 10 years: population 4 million), \$5.4 billion for Bosnia (for 4 years: population 5 million), and \$350 million for East Timor (for three year period, 0.5 million population).

At this point, any attempt to calculate the cost of reconstruction is nothing more than an intelligent guess, but the reconstruction of North Korea with 22 million people will probably require billions of dollars for 10 years after reunification. Considering the current amount of *total* foreign aid by South Korea (\$200 million), Japan (\$7 billion), and the U.S. (USD 7 billion), it is not reasonable to assume any country will pay the reconstruction bill from its own pocket. In addition, evidence shows that a good portion of the funds pledged at the time of emergency were not delivered. For example, after the genocide in Rwanda, international community pledged \$707 million, but only \$71 million was actually paid by the government<sup>1</sup>. "The international community" is less committed to the financial responsibility in the face of complex emergencies despite the numbers they promise on the spot.

The conceivable high costs, shortages of funds, and the importance of successful reconstruction of North Korea warn us to be prepared for what comes after the reunification. Below is the description of what reconstruction entails. Most of the examples were drawn

---

<sup>1</sup> Peter Walker, Ben Wisner, Jennifer Leaning, and Larry Minear. *Smoke and Mirrors: Deficiencies in Disaster Funding*, BMJ volume 330, Jan. 29, 2005.

from Afghanistan, which shares some characteristics with North Korea. (Long isolation from the international community, poor governance, neglect of welfare of people.)

*Infrastructure:* Rebuilding infrastructure is key to successful reconstruction. Rebuilding and improving infrastructure in North Korea to the level of that in South Korea is an essential step for economic development of North Korea. Without an economic development plan, the reconstruction process will eventually fail. Infrastructure to be rebuilt include transportation facilities, public building, and power plants. Just to give an example of cost, \$3 million has been spent to construct the road between two major cities of Afghanistan (the 500 km Kabul-Kandahar road). I should note, however, that \$3 million dollars was not enough to pave the roads in Kabul with asphalt (mostly concrete or dirt) and the roads from Kabul to the other major cities are rarely paved enough for industrial use. Roads and buildings in North Korea are not made of dirt, hence the extent of improvement might be different from the case in Afghanistan. However, the testimonies of North Korean defectors and visitors suggest a poor quality of buildings and roads, which indicates a certain amount of investment in infrastructure needed.

The other investment, which was not a part of many other post-conflict reconstruction projects, needs to be directed to the transformation of its nuclear power plant for peaceful use. (Data was not available for calculation.)

*Education:* Reconstructing a country with a foreign ideology will require more than rebuilding schools. In Afghanistan, post-Taliban restructuring of the education system is estimated to cost \$1.25 billion for next 10 years.<sup>2</sup>

Rebuilding basic educational infrastructure for primary education of 2-3 million North Korean children may cost as much as \$2 million. The number was estimated on the basis of the cost in Afghanistan, where building a school for 1,200 children ((2 shifts, each class room has 80 students<sup>3</sup>) with basic facilities (desks, chairs, and blackboards) costs roughly \$9,000 as of 2004. Furthermore, school supplies will be distributed by UNICEF, if the situation demands. UNICEF Afghanistan has spent \$15 million to supply basic school kits (pencils, notebook and other basic materials) for 3-5 million children to return to primary school<sup>4</sup>.

As well as construction of infrastructure, teacher training will be an urgent and critical task. What matters in education is not only a classroom, but what children learn in the classroom. North Korean teachers trained under the existing political ideology will need to go through appropriate training.

*Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR):* Reconstruction means restructuring the defense system. Demobilization and disintegration of North Korean forces might not be as difficult as in Iraq, Sierra Leone, or Afghanistan, assuming reunification with South Korea is supported by the majority of population, which leaves less room for

---

<sup>2</sup> [www.eurasianet.org/resource/afghanistan/hypermail/200207/0005.shtml](http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/afghanistan/hypermail/200207/0005.shtml)

<sup>3</sup> calculated based on the regulation of Afghan Ministry of Education standard.

<sup>4</sup> [http://www.unicef.org/media/media\\_7322.html](http://www.unicef.org/media/media_7322.html)

resistance by the old regime. However, reintegration may require serious investment. Reintegration of soldiers means creation of jobs. Members of the force will not be required to remain in the military forces as the tension on the Peninsula vanishes. However, ex-soldiers will need jobs. Typically, professional soldiers leave without job skills, thus the reintegration process includes creation of employment specifically targeted for ex-soldiers. In Afghanistan, creating emergency employment (a portion of the reintegration process) alone cost \$16 million. The need for investment is even more serious for North Korean ex-soldiers, as they will need to compete with more skilled South Korean job-seekers in the same job market.

*Demining:* Demining is another crucial step in the reconstruction process. Demining comes before any attempt for rebuilding infrastructure. Without clearing mines completely, land cannot be used. The cost of demining depends on the availability of maps of landmine installation and types of mines installed. Simply multiplying the assumed mined area and the average cost of demining (\$6/m<sup>2</sup>), the cost for demining 71km<sup>2</sup> (supposed the area of 300m from 238km-long border with South Korea is mined) is \$40 million.

*Public Health:* For a population suffering from both chronic and acute malnutrition, reconstructing public health is crucial. The reconstruction of public health entails training of health workers, provision of equipment and supplies, management of organization of health services, and rebuilding infrastructure<sup>5</sup>. Among all these needs, developing public health workers is crucial and urgent, as public health expert Annalies Borrel urges after a mission to North Korea<sup>6</sup>. With extremely high infant mortality rate of 24/1,000 live births<sup>7</sup> (4 times the 6/1,000 in South Korea) indicates a public health system deficit in North Korea, which requires another serious investment.

These are just several examples of the costs and tasks involved in the reconstruction of North Korea. The amount and complexity requires neighboring countries to be prepared for future cooperation. What exactly, then, does cooperation mean in the context of North Korean reconstruction? On the government level, potential donors now create a consensus on what North Korean reconstruction will likely consist of. The reconstruction, at least in the initial stage, will rely on funds from donors (South Korea, Japan, China, and the U.S.). Aid policies of these potential donors can be reviewed and recommendations made to design specific schemes for aid for North Korean reconstruction. Ideally, planning should be jointly conducted among main stakeholders so that aid will be efficiently spent to create an attractive environment for money from the private sector. When discussing the reconstruction of North Korea, all stakeholders have to be careful not to fill the vacuum with outsiders. It is important aspect of reconstruction for donors to create new room for development, but filling it with outsiders will create a serious dependency on donors. For example, it might appear easier for South Korean teachers and hospital workers to take jobs of North Koreans, but it will not work. Aid planning has to be made in a way to reserve room for North Koreans.

---

<sup>5</sup> Salama, Spiegel, Brennan, and Borrel. "Post-Conflict Reconstruction in the Health and Nutrition Sector" (not published yet)

<sup>6</sup> Phone interview on March 31, 2005.

<sup>7</sup> CIA Fact Book.

South Korea, Japan, China, and the U.S. need to cooperate in future planning. Not because the cost needs to be shared, but because each country has an interest in the success of reconstruction of North Korea. From a Japanese point of view, success of North Korean reconstruction is a national interest as peace on the peninsula contributes to the stability and prosperity of the region and the beyond. Second, a contribution to the reconstruction of North Korea is a way to keep the regional balance. It is not in Japan's interest to see one country (except for South Korea) dominate North Korea. Third, the success or prospect of reconstruction will prevent the influx of refugees to neighboring countries, including Japan. The reconstruction of North Korea can be a win-win situation for all stakeholders, and cooperation, as always, is the key.

# The Future of the U.S. in East Asia: Integrating China

By Drew Thompson

Foreign policy experts in the United States frequently state that one of the greatest challenges facing the U.S. in East Asia is “managing” the inevitable rise of China. However, it is somewhat presumptuous to assume that the U.S. can “manage” China, and perhaps more reasonable to state that the U.S. must endeavor to successfully integrate China into the global community. The strategic U.S. decision to engage China during the Cold War as a balance against the Soviet Union in many ways initiated this process and has over time proven successful. For the past 25 years, the process of integrating China into the global community has contributed to security and stability in the region, substantially contributed to global wealth creation, and successfully lifted a substantial proportion of the planet’s population out of poverty.

However, as China’s economic development has progressed in tandem with China’s integration into the global community, China’s national interests increasingly affect global economic and geopolitical arrangements that have been in place since the end of World War II. As the dominant power in East Asia, it falls upon the United States to maintain stability and security in the region through the application of hard power as well as diplomatic, economic, and trade policies that guide peaceful trends in the region. The U.S. bilateral relations in the region are a fundamental structure that contributes to peace and development in the region. However, as China’s economy grows and its national interests increasingly extend beyond its borders, the U.S. and its allies will have to work together to ensure that peace predominates and that the national interests of each country in the region are protected.

## **U.S., ROK, and Japan relations as China’s rise looms**

The United States’ bilateral relations with the Republic of Korea and Japan are increasingly affected both by the forces of globalization that increase economic interdependence as well as the evolving national identities in the region.

It is simplistic to identify “nationalism” as a force that threatens to fray the robust ties that have developed between the U.S.-China-ROK-Japan. However, recent events have dramatically highlighted disturbing trends in the region that reflect long-standing sentiments and underlying concerns that Japan, China, and South Korea harbor toward one another. Undoubtedly over 200 years of “history” contribute to friction that the forces of globalization and economic interdependence have been unable to reduce. While democracy and political pandering might help explain Japan’s and South Korea’s growing “nationalism,” recent violent outbursts in China establish that manifestations of nationalism are not driven exclusively by politicians seeking the votes of their constituents. Arguably, Japan’s efforts to gain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, coupled with unresolved territorial disputes (driven by ocean-mapping efforts and unease over long-term energy supplies) are causing some of the recent incidents. China’s and South Korea’s distrust of Japan is affecting U.S. bilateral relations as well as the balance of power in the region, with Japanese nationalism pushing South Korea to hedge and lean closer to China. Unfortunately, barring unexpected political introspection into “history” by Japan and China, these potentially

destabilizing trends and resulting mutual suspicions are likely to continue and will remain a counterproductive force to efforts to integrate the region into a coherent regional grouping.

Trade and the forces of globalization will hopefully remain the key “balancer” that keeps U.S.-China-Japan-ROK relations on an even keel. China’s economic development and limitless ability to absorb U.S., Japanese, and South Korean investment create a mutual interest for all four nations to collaborate to contribute to China’s reform process, such as improving governance, the rule of law, and respect for intellectual property. These efforts and the relentless forces of globalization will continue to bind all four nations and create significant disincentives for conflict.

China’s neighbors and some in the United States are concerned that China’s economic growth and integration are contributing to its ability to build “comprehensive national power” that will ultimately be wielded in a regional military conflict. However, this assumption ignores China’s efforts to avoid conflicts with the U.S. and resolve disputes with neighbors. China’s primary national interest is domestic stability, which ensures the continued rule of the Communist Party, achieved largely through delivery of economic goods. As such, China’s foreign policy has been largely “inward looking” and focused on maintaining economic growth achieved through economic reforms and integration into the globalized economy. “China’s rise” is not necessarily driven by an inherent desire to become a “big power” or a regional hegemon, but is a reflection of the need to achieve the primary goal of stability through economic growth. Economic growth requires trade with neighbors and foreign direct investment, and therefore the relatively recent economic “rise” is accompanied by the relatively recent need to protect interests abroad, such as ensuring access to imported raw materials and energy.

### **Managing U.S. policies in the region**

Despite growing economic interconnectedness and rising wealth in the region, East Asia remains one of the few remaining regions where a “hot war” could abruptly occur. The two key “stumbling blocks” of North Korea and Taiwan argue for a significant, continued U.S. military presence in the region. The stalled Six-Party Talks will contribute to U.S. concern that its interests are not adequately addressed by China, which remains largely unconvinced that the DPRK presents a direct threat to the U.S. Likewise, the unresolved status of Taiwan remains the most likely scenario where U.S. forces would confront China.

Even if positive outcomes were to result from a “peaceful resolution” of the Taiwan issue and China’s brokering efforts at the Six-Party Talks, a strategic consensus has not been reached by the U.S. or China on whether the U.S. military should remain in the region and who will ultimately be the dominant force in the region. China has paid lip service to the concept that the U.S. military contributes to regional stability, but the notion that “Asians can take care of Asia” predominates thinking in most policy circles.

In the current environment, it is not in the interest of anyone to reduce the U.S. diplomatic, economic, or military presence in the region. Tensions and mistrust are deep seated and never far from the surface, emerging most recently in the anti-Japanese protests in



China and Korea. Robust trade links between all Asian nations and the U.S. are vital in maintaining stability and providing the most important deterrent to outright conflict. China's apparent discomfort with the U.S. presence is manifested by its obvious discomfort in inviting the U.S. to participate in the ill-defined East Asia Summit, reinforcing concerns by some in the United States that Beijing remains an ungrateful trading partner that is simply "biding its time and hiding its capabilities" until it can deny U.S. companies access to its markets and kick the U.S. out of the region.

The mutual mistrust, particularly China's mistrust of the U.S. and Japan and the rest of the region's unease with China's rise and Japan's "history," places the U.S. in an awkward position. The U.S. bilateral alliances with South Korea and Japan are balanced by U.S. interests in a fully engaged China. Doubtless, the U.S. is faced with a complex job as peacemaker. U.S. corporations have invested heavily in China, particularly manufacturers that have shifted much of their low-end manufacturing, and retailers who rely on China's comparative advantages to deliver the lowest cost goods that drive sales and boost retailers' margins. The U.S. must maintain the strength of its alliances with South Korea and Japan, ideally promoting reconciliation between them, to prevent China and South Korea from forming a block against Japan. South Korea's government is validating the perception of many South Korean young people who believe that their future lies with China. South Koreans make up the largest single contingent of foreign students studying in China, creating future links that will continue to tie these societies together. The U.S. will have to actively promote mutual understanding between China and South Korea with Japan to avoid polarization.

China is clearly changing the Asian regional order that has been dominated by the U.S. since the end of World War II. The U.S. challenge will be to engage China while maintaining the bilateral alliances with South Korea and Japan that have maintained the peace. This entails managing China-policy as much as "managing China." However, China's growing economy, dependence on foreign markets, and increased need for imported energy and raw materials are causing it to more broadly consider protecting its interests around the world, potentially causing friction with the U.S. and its neighbors. Managing a policy that contributes to the shaping of China into a status quo nation that has bought into globalization as it stands, not "globalization with Chinese characteristics," will be the great policy priority for the U.S. and its allies in the next decade.



# What does Pyongyang Want?

By Qinghong Wang

On Feb. 10 2005, the second day of the Lunar New Year of the Rooster, the DPRK shouted the first cock crow of the year with a surprising “gift” declaring that North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons and indefinitely suspended participation in the Six-Party Talks. Right after the declaration, two opposite predictions on the future of Six-Party Talks were made: termination or reconfiguration. Taking into the consideration the facts that (1) little concrete consensus had been reached after three rounds of Six-Party Talks in Beijing since August 2003 due to the lack of mutual trust and sincerity between North Korea and other five parties, and (2) the resolute attitude to quit had been expressed in the North Korean declaration, the former prediction seems justified. But more optimistic supporters argue that more patience is needed for any real progress from this multilateral dialogue and North Korea is now repeating the same tactics that it used to decline to return to the fourth round of Six-Party Talks scheduled for Sept. 2004. There are important questions for further inquiry beyond the uncertain future of Six-Party Talks: What does Pyongyang want? What is the security impact? What are implications for relations among the six parties?

## **North Korea’s Strategy— “Shooting Six Hawks with One Arrow”**

North Korea’s declaration is a well-schemed multipurpose strategy, “shooting six hawks with one arrow,” serving the international and domestic interests of Pyongyang. Undoubtedly, the U.S. is the most obvious “hawk” in the bull’s eye of Kim Jong-il’s target. However, the most injured “hawk” is probably not the U.S., but China. Japan, and South Korea are two smaller “hawks” hit by the arrow of “revenge and extortion”, while the Russian “hawk” is unintentionally injured. Finally, the domestic adversaries of Kim Jong-il in North Korea are probably the first and the only “hawk” killed by this rhetorical arrow.

## **Aiming at the U.S.**

After carefully watching the U.S. war on terrorism in Iraq and Bush’s recent repeated stress on diplomatic approaches to solving the North Korean nuclear crisis, Pyongyang must have thought two things. First, if the DPRK announces it has a capability to launch nuclear attacks, there will be much lower possibility that the U.S. would launch a massive military campaign against North Korea, a member of the “axis of evils” along with Iraq and Iran by Bush. Second, Bush II has little strength to tackle issues on the Korean Peninsula by military action since most U.S. troops are on duty in the Middle East. So the first purpose of this declaration is to intimidate the world rather than Bush II (the U.S. intelligence community already announced their estimation of North Korea’s capability for nuclear attacks in the early 1990s) that any military attack against the DPRK would trigger a nuclear war. The second purpose is to help North Korea to obtain a more advantageous position and some political weight for bargaining in the next round of multilateral or bilateral negotiations. Pyongyang is playing the typical “good cop-bad cop” strategy with the U.S. and other five parties, but North Korea prefers to make as many trade-offs as possible directly with the U.S. prior to bargaining with other parties. Which explains why the DPRK would immediately demand bilateral negotiations with the U.S. after the declaration.

## **Aiming at China**

Obviously, the declaration of North Korea is either a slap in the face or a stab in the back of China, the key mediator and initiator of the Six-Party Talks. Beijing, although sincerely advocating the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, holds an ambiguous position on the nuclear capability of the DPRK. This not only helps China avoid the embarrassment of openly choosing between North Korea and international community on this issue, but indirectly helps North Korea undermine the accusations by the international community. China does not want to lose either a good “card” or the credibility in the international community. But Pyongyang is reluctant to buy Beijing’s “good will,” which goes against her own goal of openly possessing nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Pyongyang must worry that the role of North Korea, serving as China’s card against the U.S. on the issue of Taiwan, will be devalued after the realization of the direct two-way flights across the Taiwan Strait during the Chinese New Year holiday, an event that helped reduce the antagonism between mainland China and Taiwan. Therefore, Kim Jong-Il, taking the same strategy of “testing the red line” as Chen Shui-bian did during Taiwan’s 2004 presidential election campaign, attempts to test the red lines of both the U.S. and China on North Korean nuclear issues. Another possible motivation for Pyongyang’s declaration is to help North Korea walk out of the shadow of China, the rising power in East Asia. Therefore, North Korea attempted to change the roles that Pyongyang and Beijing had played in the previous Six-Party Talks: Pyongyang played the role of “red face” (the hardliner) while Beijing played the role of “white face” (the compromiser). This time, Kim Jong-il desires to bypass China and directly bargain with the U.S. right after announcing its provocative declaration, signaling the “independence” of North Korea from China.

## **Aiming at Japan**

Since Japan has recently threatened to nullify the DPRK-Japan Pyongyang Declaration and suspend her economic aid to the DPRK after accusing North Korea of sending the wrong remains of Japanese abductees, Pyongyang’s declaration that it possesses nuclear weapons is the best counterattack. As one of the richest governments in the world with the reputation of being willing to pay ransoms or protection fees, Japan has been at the top of North Korea’s intimidation list for a long time. Given the panic in Japan when North Korea launched two missiles to the Sea of Japan in 1998, Pyongyang must be pretty optimistic to see Japan, the only nation that has experienced an atomic bombing world would become more obedient and cooperative with the newly announced nuclear power North Korea.

## **Aiming at South Korea**

The astonishing disclosure last fall of South Korea’s nuclear tests must have been considered by Pyongyang as an attempt to balance North Korea’s potential nuclear capability. So Kim Jong-il might consider this declaration of possessing nuclear weapons as necessary to prevail over South Korea. Since the Roh Moo-hyun administration in South Korea, following Kim Dae-jung’s “Sunshine policy,” adopted the peace and prosperity

policy of engagement with Pyongyang, North Korea must have expected more bribes or economic aid from the South after the declaration that it possessed nuclear weapons.

### **Aiming at Russia**

As a comparatively peripheral participant of Six-Party Talks, Russia was not Pyongyang's target of intimidation or extortion. On the contrary, North Korea might consider Russia as the only potential hidden backer for its dash to nuclearization because the Kremlin's recent dissatisfaction with U.S. interference in Ukraine's 2004 presidential election. Pyongyang might want the Kremlin to play a more active role to protect North Korea, as "the oldest Soviet brother" did in the past.

### **Aiming at Political Adversaries in North Korea**

Pyongyang's declaration on Feb. 10 raised the curtain on many important commemorations in North Korea this year. Feb. 16 is the 63 birthday of Kim Jong-il, June 15 is the fifth anniversary of Inter-Korean Summit (2000), Aug. 15 is the 60th anniversary of North Korea's liberation from the Japanese occupation (1910-45), and Oct. 10 is the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Worker's Party of Korea (1945). The announcement that it possesses nuclear weapons would provide the North Korean propaganda machine with the best material to boost national pride and the personality cult of Kim Jong-il. On the other hand, given the unverified news of fierce power struggles in North Korea (such as the purge of Kim Jong-Il's brother-in-law, the contest among his sons, and the removal of Kim Jong-il's pictures in public), "diverting all the gunshots toward outsiders" by raising the volume against foreign enemies and attracting international attention on North Korea's nuclear weapons might be one of the most efficient approaches for Kim to consolidate power and crush any domestic political rivals within Pyongyang.

### **Main Concerns of Five Parties after Pyongyang's Declaration**

One of the biggest concerns of the U.S. might be how to force North Korea to promptly destroy its nuclear weapons and how to prevent the proliferation of those nuclear weapons into the hands of international terrorists. The other main concern of the U.S. might be that the U.S.'s role as a reliable power maintaining regional security in the East Asia is openly challenged by Pyongyang's declaration. China's biggest concern might be how to prevent potential nuclear military contests among neighboring countries or the breakout of other turmoil triggered by Pyongyang's declaration, how to bring North Korea back to the Six-Party Talks, and repair Beijing's tarnished role of being responsible for regional stability. Both Koizumi and Roh Moo-hyun might share similar concerns about how to respond to the criticism of their engagement policies with North Korea and how to reduce public concern caused by Pyongyang's declaration. Russia might be mainly concerned about the danger of exposing its Far Eastern region to nuclear war or nuclear proliferation and the possible arrival of North Korean refugees following Pyongyang's declaration.

## Possible Solutions for the Deadlock

Pyongyang has left enough leeway in the declaration for the Six-Party Talks to overcome this deadlock. Pyongyang is waiting for economic and political offerings from the other five parties. First, North Korea did not “quit” but “suspended” participation of Six-Party Talks in order to validate the continuous existence of this dialogue channel. Second, North Korea set two vague and flexible provisos “until the atmosphere surrounding the talks changes” and “until they (North Korea) can expect positive results” to show Pyongyang’s intention to bargain with other parties. Finally, the declaration concludes that “there is no change in North Korea's position of resolving the nuclear issue through negotiations and that North Korea's ultimate goal is a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.”<sup>1</sup> This statement “saves the face” of other parties, especially China.

The main issue for the other five parties now is not whether Pyongyang would return to the Six-Party Talks, but how to minimize the price and maximize national interests to maintain the stability of East Asia. At least two key consensuses should be reached among five parties. First, the five parties should stick to solving the problem within the framework of multilateral negotiations and coordinate each other’s response to Pyongyang. Any split will favor Pyongyang. The U.S. dismissal of North Korea’s demand for bilateral negotiations set a good example for others. China should use all the economic and political leverage to force North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible. Second, the five parties should adopt the strategy of “leaving the boy crying for candies alone” to downplay the impact of this event. Any exaggeration of this issue in the media and any excessive response would bring unnecessary conflict and distrust, which is what North Korea wants. So far, all five governments and their media have showed patience and the appropriate attitudes in response to Pyongyang’s declaration.

---

<sup>1</sup> On Feb. 10 2005, the Foreign Ministry of North Korea declared that the hostile policy of the U.S. towards the DPRK, requires North Korea to possess a nuclear deterrent. The Foreign Ministry also declared that North Korea wants to participate in the Six-Party Talks, but that they have indefinitely suspended participation until the atmosphere surrounding the talks changes and until they can expect positive results. The statement concluded that there is no change in North Korea's position of resolving the nuclear issue through negotiations and that North Korea's ultimate goal is a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.  
<http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/050211.htm>

# The Clash of Nationalism in Northeast Asia in the Transnational Context

By Qi Zeng

2005 marks the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II. In oriental philosophy, each period of 60 years is considered a completion of one cycle of the universe, and the 60th year is believed to be the turning point from one era into a new one. If we take Europe of 1945, which was gravely wounded and divided by the national hatreds and conflicting ideologies, and the Europe of 2005, which is prosperously integrated economically and politically, as an example, then this “60-year cycle” theory seems plausible. But when we compare the Northeast Asia of 1945 with the Northeast Asia of 2005, this theory seemingly does not fit. Despite the 60-year span of time, international relations in the region display many of the same divisions at both ends of the cycle. History, after 60 years, is still deeply interlocked with the present in this region. Such issues as the disharmony and lack of reunification in South and the North Korea and mainland China and Taiwan, and the national hatreds and territorial disputes between Japan and her neighbors have not been resolved in the past 60 years and continue to act as the main obstacles to Northeast Asia’s security and regional development in the 21st century.

And yet, the international context of these unresolved issues has undergone great changes in the past 60 years. First, the end of the Cold War in 1991 not only changed the international structure but also left a power vacuum in Northeast Asia, where the U.S. keeps predominant influence. Second, along with the rapid increase of transnational communication, trade, and cooperation among Northeast Asian countries in the 1990s, the interdependence among these traditional regional adversaries has reached an unprecedented level. In other words, the political and economic interests of international activities actors in Northeast Asia have been tightly interlocked.

Furthermore, those unsolved issues themselves have been intertwined for 60 years. At the root of this regional hatred toward Japan is the long, brutal invasion and occupation by the Japanese military of China, Korea and other countries in the region, which predate the end of World War II. The subsequent attempts at “liberation” in Northeast Asia conducted by the soon to be great rivals of the Cold War—the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.—at the end of World War II, resulted in the division of Korea into North and South, the separation between mainland China and Taiwan, and other territorial disputes between Japan and her neighbors. North Korea’s attempt in 1950 to unify the Korean Peninsula triggered the Korean War and the U.S. sending the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to prevent a similar attack by mainland China on Taiwan. With its ability to liberate Taiwan thwarted and with serious concerns by China about the security of Manchurian industrial bases, China joined the Korean War and directly confronted the U.S. After the restoration of the 38 Parallel to separate the Korean Peninsula into South and North, China won a staunch ally in Northeast Asia—the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea—and a good card to bargain on the Taiwan issue with the U.S.

## **Nationalisms and Divergent Interests**

Since the end of the Cold War in early 1990s, nationalism has gradually become the predominant ideology in Northeast Asia. Although nationalism in different countries correlates to divergent national interests, similar characteristics can be found within each country's version of the ideology. On the one hand, they all long for the restoration of traditional territories, such as mainland China's claim on Taiwan, South and North Korea's pursuit of reunification of the Korean Peninsula, and Japan's claim to the four Northern islands occupied by Russia. They are all rebuilding their national identities, such as China's rehabilitation of traditional culture after the Cultural Revolution, both South and North Korea's replacing Chinese characters with the Korean writing system, and Japan's singing of the national anthem, "Kimigayo Hangul".

As a result of their intertwined history, the build-up nationalisms in Northeast Asia inevitably lead to clashes between countries. For example, the diplomatic disputes and military clashes over territory, such as the dispute over Diaoyu (Senkaku) Island between China and Japan, and the dispute over Dudaο (Takeshima, known in Korea as Tokdo) between Japan and South Korea, greatly increased the nationalistic fever in each nation. Then again, some ways to rebuild national identity can really offend other countries and increase the distrust and hatred in the region. An example of this is South Korea's protest in 2004 against some Chinese history books arguing that Gaogouli (Koguryeo), the ancestral kingdom of Korea, was a state of China. Another example is China and Korea's recent protests against both Japan's efforts to "whitewash" Japanese war crimes committed during World War II in primary- and secondary-school history textbooks, and Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine, where 14 Japanese A-Class war criminals are enshrined.

Behind the clashes of nationalism are contests for all kinds of regional power, resources, and interests among Northeast Asia countries. The huge fishery around the Dudaο Island is believed to be the real trophy disputed by Japan and Korea. Similarly, the potential huge oil resources around Diaoyu Island may be the real treasure over which China and Japan are contending. And the anti-Japanese demonstrations in China can be interpreted to some extent as China's attempt to block Japan's way to permanent membership on the UN Security Council and to win its rivalry with Japan as the leading political and economic power in Northeast Asia.

## **Transnational Trends and Mutual Interests**

It is ironic that this clash of nationalism occurs in an era of globalization and in the context of rapid cultural and economic integration among Northeast Asia countries, which are based on many mutual interests. The slogan "boycott Japanese-made products" called out in the current anti-Japanese demonstrations in China is impossible to realize in the context of globalization. Many "Japanese" products are manufactured in China by Chinese workers. In 2004, China, with exports and imports totaling \$206 billion, surpassed the U.S. and became the biggest trading partner of Japan. How can China boycott one of its biggest trading partners?



The political and economic mutual interests shared by the three countries can not overwhelmed by rising nationalism. China, Japan, and South Korea are the key players to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis and to keep the peace across the Taiwan Strait as long as they can establish mutual trust. There are also many opportunities for the three countries to cooperate on environmental protection, disease control, anti-terrorism, anti-international crimes, and other regional security and development issues. Economic cooperation in the area is also achievable by the synergy of China's huge market and giant cheap labor force, Japan's great financial capacities and advanced technologies and management, and South Korea's great number of well-educated technicians and management personnel. The commonality in ancient cultures shared by the three countries also lays the social-cultural foundation for economic integration. The deeper integration of Sino-Japanese-Korean economic systems, the more benefits and potential development these three countries can achieve.

### **Alternative Scenarios**

Actually, the clash of nationalisms is only one scenario, which may be the least compatible in the context of regional integration. The political and economic transitions of China, Japan, and South Korea are not necessarily zero-sum games. A win-win situation is an ideal alternative scenario for Northeast Asia. But there are some premises to achieve this goal.

First, all three countries should realize that nationalism is a double-edged sword and should thus try to reduce its negative effects. Japan should sincerely examine and reduce the harms of its nationalism to other countries in the region. Its provocative "identity-rebuilt" nationalism is the catalyst of Chinese and Korean nationalist tendencies. China and South Korea also should restrict their nationalisms within the "boundary" of non-violent demonstration and reduce the propensity of demonstrations to propel their foreign policy decision-making.

Second, these three countries should jointly conduct some researches on the European experience of overcoming historical obstacles and promoting regional integrations. Japan should learn some lessons from Germany on how to win the trust of neighboring countries. Japan has the rights to develop its political and military powers, but not through current approaches. All three countries should learn how to become constructive partners of Northeast Asia, like Britain, France, and Germany.

Ultimately, as the only superpower in the world and the predominant power in Northeast Asia, the U.S. should play a more active role in curbing nationalism and promoting as peaceful transitions in the three countries. Also, as a victim of Japanese militarism, the U.S. should send clearer signals against Japan's wrong attitudes toward history. Otherwise, the enhanced U.S.-Japan Security and Defense Treaty might be misinterpreted as U.S. actions to support Japanese nationalism against China and South Korea. Given the population size and the political, economic, and military capabilities in Northeast Asia, more stable the trilateral relations among China, Japan and South Korea will have the most benefits for the U.S.

**Chapter II:  
Countering the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in  
the Asia Pacific**

*Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)  
Study Group Meeting*

*May 26-28, 2005*

*Cosponsored by  
CSCAP Singapore and  
USCSCAP*

*Singapore*





# Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Standoff

By Claire Bai

A nuclear-equipped North Korea poses a direct threat to its neighbors, and risks triggering a nuclear domino effect in Northeast Asia. South Korea is the country most directly threatened by DPRK's military power; Japan is also within range of North Korean missiles; China is concerned about the impact the nuclear spillover might have on Taiwan and the prospect of a flood of Korean refugees into China as a result of military confrontation. With this in mind, three rounds of Six-Party Talks — conducted by the U.S., North Korea, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia — were held in 2003 and 2004, to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula and to facilitate a dialogue between the DPRK and the U.S. toward resolving the crisis. The main disagreement lay in North Korea's demands for a U.S. security guarantee as a minimum requirement for denuclearization, while the U.S. saw the DPRK's dismantling of its nuclear program as a precondition for direct negotiations.

Just when the negotiations seemed to be making progress, tensions between the U.S. and North Korea escalated dramatically in August 2004, due to a series of contentious remarks made by both countries, resulting in the DPRK's official withdrawal from the working group preparing for the fourth round of talks. With President Bush's reelection in November, the U.S. retains its previous position, and neither the U.S. nor the DPRK has taken steps to lessen hostilities or assuage fears of a derailment of the negotiations. Instead, in late 2004, the U.S. signed the North Korean Human Rights Act into law, condemning the reclusive country and encouraging defections. The DPRK, in turn, bluntly declared in February 2005 that it possesses nuclear bombs and would be ready for war should the U.S. refer the stalled nuclear talks to the United Nations Security Council.

All these changes made a rapid resolution of the nuclear crisis highly unlikely; furthermore, they rendered three possible outcomes to this standoff: (1) without sufficient incentives from the U.S. and/or other regional parties, the status quo continues: the crisis remains unchanged, the Six-Party Talks are indefinitely postponed, and no compromise is reached; (2) Negotiations break down and tensions escalate, which would risk either military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula or a further withdrawal of the DPRK from negotiations. This is the worst outcome for all countries involved, with the threat of nuclear proliferation becoming more of a reality. (3) The situation improves: the DPRK recognizes proper incentives, returns to nuclear talks and negotiates peacefully with the U.S. to reach a mutually agreed upon resolution; the U.S. delivers on its promises and the DPRK enters into a new agreement to begin dismantling its nuclear program. This scenario would benefit all countries significantly and allay fears of proliferation throughout Northeast Asia.

I have developed several tentative policy recommendations:

## To the U.S. Government

To achieve diplomatic detente and mend relations with the DPRK, the U.S. should reverse the damage committed by defaming Kim Jong-il. The U.S. could (1) release a formal letter to Kim, apologizing for the contentious remarks; (2) halt its condemnations at least until the DPRK returns to nuclear talks; (3) dispatch a high-ranking State Department officer

or a prominent former government official for bilateral talks with the DPRK government; (4) sincerely express its willingness to remove the DPRK from the list of terrorist states; and (5) propose specific strategies for the U.S.' allies, and China, to lobby North Korea about the benefits of overlooking the remarks and of accepting the "New Agreed Framework" offered at the third Six-Party Talks as the basis for re-engaging in the talks. If these measures prove successful, then the U.S. needs to be flexible in offering longer-term, non-provisional security assurances in order to move North Korea toward a CVID of its nuclear program.

#### To the PRC Government

China has a unique opportunity to strengthen its long-term influence in Northeast Asia — both military and economic — through a peaceful de-escalation of the current hostilities. China's primary national interests lie in (a) ensuring the continuation of the DPRK regime; (b) preventing other Northeast Asian countries from "going nuclear" or being shielded by a U.S. theatre missile defense (TMD); and (c) limiting, and hopefully reducing, the U.S. military presence in the region. The PRC government could try to (1) urge the DPRK to submit a detailed demand for material changes from the U.S. and conditions to return to nuclear talks; (2) ask the U.S. to be more realistic and flexible in providing security assurances, as well as be more specific in its packages; (3) frequently dispatch envoys to Pyongyang to address non-security issues, using such "detours" to lead the DPRK back to nuclear negotiations; (4) take concrete steps to help the DPRK adopt a Chinese-style reform to peacefully improve its domestic situation and foreign relations; and (5) persuade the DPRK to realize its earlier offer of a "freeze for compensation," and gradually accept CVID (complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programs).

#### To Third-Party/Nongovernmental Actors

Nongovernmental forces can also play an important part in conflict resolution. A good example is former U.S. President Jimmy Carter's mediation during the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994. Carter's meetings with Kim Il-sung helped prevent military conflict between the DPRK and the U.S. His success could largely be ascribed to his standing as a former president, his ability to talk directly and respectfully to the key decision makers, and his personal charisma (Kim Il-sung called Carter a "man of justice"). When initiated by other qualified intermediaries, this type of diplomacy might succeed as well. It could start with informal, unofficial contacts, and private dialogues between a third-party NGO with the DPRK government, in order to gradually facilitate official visits and the signing of agreements. In view of the current domestic political situation in the U.S., it might be desirable for a nongovernmental actor, especially one that is well respected by the Republicans, to step in and offer mediation strategies. One option is for a former high-ranking official in first George H.W. Bush administration, or even former President Bush himself, to replay President Carter's role in 1994.

While the DPRK uses development of nuclear weapons as both a deterrent and a bargaining chip to acquire security assurances and aid, the denuclearization of the DPRK is of core interest to the U.S. and Northeast Asian countries. Even though the Six-Party Talks have reached an impasse, they remain the most feasible way for the U.S. to make compromises while saving face.

# The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: An Imbalance

By Hyun Jung Jo Choi

It has been 35 years since the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was signed into force. The NPT is the most widely subscribed multilateral security treaty in the world and is the only legal document that commits states to nuclear disarmament.<sup>1</sup> The treaty has had considerable success since its creation – it has seen more nations give up nuclear weapons programs than start them and boasts a membership of 188 states. However, the NPT has faced multiple compliance crises, with India and Pakistan emerging as nuclear states, Iran and North Korea pursuing clandestine uranium enrichment programs, and the uncovering of black market trades in nuclear technology. In addition, the nuclear weapon states are making no concerted efforts toward nuclear disarmament and are in fact actively pursuing new nuclear weapons technology, in direct contravention of their treaty obligations.

The NPT held its seventh review throughout the month of May in 2005 in New York. The three-week long review conference ended without producing a consensus document. Has the failure to produce a consensus document dealt a serious blow to the viability of the NPT regime? What lies ahead for the NPT? This short article shall examine the current imbalance of the NPT between nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament efforts.

## **Hypocrisy of the Nuclear Weapon States**

The U.S. is demanding that Iran place its nuclear program under international control and is threatening UN sanctions if Iran remains noncompliant. In addition, the U.S. is also leading an effort to rectify the loophole in the NPT that currently allows signatories to build nuclear fuel facilities through access to nuclear information and technology via the NPT, and then withdraw from the treaty with impunity and produce nuclear weapons. The lack of major international consequences for North Korea's withdrawal from the treaty after successfully hiding its nuclear weapons program has highlighted this loophole. These actions represent efforts on the part of nuclear weapon states to focus the NPT on nonproliferation aspects, while diminishing the importance of the disarmament element within the NPT.

Despite their insistence that the NPT be complied with, the U.S. and other nuclear powers have reneged on the grand bargain that lies at the core of the treaty. Despite Dr. Lawrence Scheinman's comments at our Singapore meeting that some believe disarmament can only begin when proliferation ends, the actions of nuclear weapon states have not only undermined disarmament efforts, but have also added to the dangers of proliferation. Instead of pursuing negotiations to achieve "general and complete disarmament," nuclear powers such as the U.S. have plans to develop "bunker-busting" nuclear weapons and new nuclear

---

<sup>1</sup> Williams, J. and J. Wolfsthal. (2005). "The NPT at 35: A Crisis of Compliance or a Crisis of Confidence?" Available online at:

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16850>. Accessed on May 15, 2005.

warheads that do not require testing and can be stored longer than existing ones. The administration has also abandoned attempts to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would prohibit nuclear testing. Other nuclear powers such as China and France carried out nuclear tests during a window of opportunity between the 1995 extension of the NPT and the signing of the CTBT in 1996. In addition, nuclear states have been helping other non-nuclear weapon states develop nuclear capabilities. For example, China is suspected of having supplied Pakistan and other “rogue states” with nuclear technology, the U.S. gave India a head start in the nuclear race in South Asia, and Russia has also been helping “rogue states” such as Iran develop their nuclear capabilities.

The double standards adopted by the nuclear powers are not lost on non-nuclear states. Nuclear powers emphasize the obligations of nonproliferation efforts and export controls of the NPT, and yet engage in behavior that undermines the very essence of the treaty. One example is the security assurances given to non-nuclear states by nuclear powers that they would not threaten or attack non-nuclear states with nuclear weapons. However, the U.S. has since suggested that it may use such weapons in the event of a chemical or biological attack or in response to other circumstances. According to Kim Sam Jong from North Korea, the DPRK believes that its national security is at stake and even believes that the U.S. is threatening North Korea with a preemptive nuclear attack. Although the U.S. has not in reality threatened North Korea with a preemptive nuclear attack, it has, through its actions, created dangerous misperceptions of its intentions. The inconsistent and hypocritical behavior of nuclear powers do little to inspire confidence in the viability of the NPT regime, and leads many to believe that those with nuclear weapons have the power to engage in activities that contravene the treaty, while other non-nuclear states have little choice but to stand idly and accept the terms dictated to them.

## **Conclusion**

The NPT is facing a crisis of noncompliance in the wake of recent actions by Iran and North Korea, as well as a crisis of confidence due to the fact that the nuclear powers are continuously pursuing new nuclear technology in obvious violation of their treaty obligations. If the NPT is to be infused with a new legitimacy, there has to be a balance between emphasis on nonproliferation efforts and disarmament obligations. It appears dangerous to set the precedent of allowing those with nuclear weapons the freedom to pursue more nuclear weapons and technology while imposing nonproliferation obligations on those without weapons, as this reinforces the belief that one’s power is enhanced through the possession of nuclear weapons.



# The A.Q. Khan Network, Geography, and Political Will

## By Justin Hastings

For all the speculation about links between nonstate actors, especially terrorists, and nuclear proliferation, the Abdul Qadeer Khan network that was revealed in late 2003 is still the only full-scale network discovered that has actually been centered around a nonstate actor. What lessons can be drawn from the A.Q. Khan network. Nonstate nuclear proliferation networks are not free-floating; states and geography remain central to their operation. While we can tighten export controls and fine-tune international law, states' political will is most important when dealing with nuclear proliferation by nonstate actors. Unless states care whether a terrorist group or rogue state acquires nuclear weapons, there is little point to the non-proliferation regime.

My current research focuses how a region's geography and political conditions combine with the perceptions and goals of a clandestine network, such as a terrorist group or a smuggling ring, to influence the network's activities. Because they have to move goods around the world covertly, and generally have adversarial relationships with the states in which they operate, clandestine networks must adapt to the geography of the region in which they would like to move, and deal with varying levels of government hostility. As a result, the more hostile and capable the states arrayed against it, the more a clandestine network must adopt covert operating techniques that shape, and to a certain extent limit, its international mobility and activities. This is arguably true of the networks that are the focus of my research in Southeast Asia, such as Jemaah Islamiyah, GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or Free Aceh Movement), and maritime piracy groups. While the A.Q. Khan network has similarities with other clandestine networks, an analysis of the network's structure reveals how little political pressure it actually faced.

Clandestine networks seem to be only as secretive as they need to be in response to the forces of the state arrayed against them, since a higher level of secrecy can hinder its smooth operation and transport of goods. What is noteworthy about the AQ Khan network is not how crafty Khan was in concealing his activities, but in how little he tried to do so. Khan took steps to cover his tracks, through front companies, falsified documents, and the like. But he was not unknown to nonproliferation investigators before his private network began to be revealed at the end of 2003. He had been convicted in 1983 in the Netherlands for stealing documents from URENCO, the European uranium enrichment authority.<sup>1</sup> And he was removed from his position as head of Khan Research Laboratories (KRC) in March 2001 by the Pakistani government for suspected financial improprieties and proliferation activities, which should have set off alarm bells.

Khan was apparently not overly concerned about being traced. When Libya handed over bomb blueprints based on a 1966 Chinese bomb design, they were still in an Islamabad dry cleaners bag that originally had been used to hold them. When shipping the P-2 centrifuge components, the network used standard shipping routes. Khan and his associates sent the cargo ships to Italy from Malaysia via Dubai, using false end-user certificates. The

---

<sup>1</sup> The conviction was overturned on a technicality.

centrifuges were simply renamed "used equipment." In Dubai, Khan's associate Buhary Seyed Abu Tahir set up a front company that vouched for the goods, made the paperwork appear legitimate, and sent them on their way.

Nor did the network studiously avoid countries with strong nuclear export control regimes. Khan built up a network of suppliers from around the world, but especially in Europe. Many of the suppliers for the private proliferation network were associates of Khan (or their sons) in various parts of Europe, even the Netherlands, from which Khan had stolen the URENCO blueprints, from the period when he was building up Pakistan's nuclear program, and he simply began over-ordering components to build up his side business. While Italy was used as a waypoint for Libya, parts were also apparently ordered from companies in Spain and Turkey, and centrifuge components have turned up in South Africa, which is an important transshipment hub. For shipments to North Korea, Singapore may have been used as a transshipment point, although much of whatever Khan used to barter with the North Koreans entered North Korea via Pakistani Air Force cargo planes. A number of these suppliers were investigated, and some have been brought up on charges, but many insisted they had done nothing illegal, or they had no knowledge of the true nature of the orders.<sup>2</sup>

Even if Khan built up his network and conducted these exchanges at the behest of the Pakistani government when it was developing its nuclear capability, there was never any indication that this network ceased to function simply because Pakistan got its nuclear bomb. Nor does it seem that Pakistan, or many of the other states involved, ever made sure that the network was shut down. While the quality of the nuclear regulatory regimes of Spain, Italy, Turkey, Malaysia, and others may vary, none of these constitute cases of state failure that would have allowed the Khan network easily to operate even in the face of government hostility. Rather, the governments preferred not to ask questions given other political concerns or what promised to be lucrative business deals. Malaysia was strongly promoting advanced engineering business opportunities with Muslim countries, for example.<sup>3</sup> And when Pakistan finally did remove Khan as head of KRL in 2001, apparently it was only after long, agonizing deliberations.<sup>4</sup>

The locations of the countries involved also provide a hint of the level of political pressure felt by the A.Q. Khan network. The network was far-flung: components have been found as far away as South Africa. While the uranium hexafluoride Libya received was flown aboard a Pakistani cargo plane to Libya, most of Libya's order came by ship. The longer a ship spends in transit, the easier it is for navies to track and interdict them. Authorities boarded the *BBC China* in Taranto harbor in Italy on the way to Libya from Dubai, after tracking the cargo from Malaysia. Those arranging the transport of the centrifuge components do not seem to have been overly concerned about being interdicted.

---

<sup>2</sup> A much more detailed description of nuclear proliferation smuggling routes can be found in Andrew Prosser, "Nuclear Trafficking Routes: Dangerous Trends in Southern Asia", November 22, 2004, Center for Defense Information. [<http://www.cdi.org/PDFs/TraffickingSmuggling.pdf>]

<sup>3</sup> "MALAYSIA FRIENDLY BASE FOR 'NUCLEAR TRADE RING', SAYS US DAILY," Bernama Malaysian National News Agency, February 25, 2004.

<sup>4</sup> David Rohde and Amy Waldman, "PAKISTANI LEADER SUSPECTED MOVES BY ATOMIC EXPERT," *The New York Times*, February 10, 2004.

Khan also shipped the centrifuge samples that he sold to Iran in 1994 and 1995 through Dubai, but the short route from Pakistan to Dubai and on to Iran does not allow for the relatively leisurely decision-making that led to the *BBC China* seizure. With resourcefulness, people who want nuclear components can probably get them, but certain transit points, such as Dubai, which advertises itself as a port that does not hinder cargo transit, are more attractive than others for hiding the origin and destination of question cargo, and the A.Q. Khan network took full advantage of this.<sup>5</sup>

Export controls can be tightened, UN Security Council resolutions can be passed, and earnest speeches can be given, but these are irrelevant if states, lack the political will to enforce the spirit of nuclear nonproliferation regulations. With the exception of Pakistan, every country involved in the network, either as an unwitting supplier, or as a buyer, was a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The A.Q. Khan network operated in the political space opened up states that had other priorities, and it is a sad fact that Khan did not have to go to extreme lengths to get the components he wanted. It seems that the most time- and labor-intensive part of the operation was simply building the network of engineers and shady businessmen necessary to procure and transport the components. Once the network was in place, both during the time when Khan was acting at the behest of the Pakistani government and during the time when Khan was (apparently) freelancing, the countries from which many of the suppliers hailed did little to stop them, a consequence, perhaps, of seeing nuclear proliferation networks not as security threats, but as a criminal issue. Some members of the NPT, it seems, do not see further nuclear proliferation as the end of the world, and enforcing nuclear regulations nearly always comes in second to promoting business opportunities or protecting a country's sovereignty. As a result, it is dangerous to focus obsessively on modifying the nonproliferation regime when many countries simply do not have the will to stop proliferation.

---

<sup>5</sup> See Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motz, "Nukes 'R' Us," *The New York Times*, March 4, 2004.



# Export Controls in the Asia Pacific

By Sophia McIntyre

Many states parties to the international arms control treaties – the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) - apply national export controls as a means of implementing their obligations under these conventions.

The purpose of export controls is to monitor and control trade in certain goods and technologies. Controls are placed on goods or technologies for defense purposes, or much more commonly in the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) context, goods with civil or peaceful applications that can be adopted for use in weapons programs. These goods are referred to as “dual-use” items.

Many of the countries that apply export controls aim to harmonize their export licensing arrangements through participation in the major export control regimes. These regimes are: the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Australia Group (in the field of chemical and biological weapons), the Wassenaar Arrangement (in the field of conventional weapons and dual-use technologies), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

The export control regimes are an effective tool for preventing the supply of materials and technology suitable for the development of WMD and their delivery systems.

Much of the work of these regimes is aimed at regulating trade in dual-use items. These items are intrinsically difficult to regulate because they can be used to make WMD, but in many instances have perfectly legitimate civil uses. For example, an item such as a mass spectrometer to analyze chemicals, can be used for the nuclear fuel cycle in a country trying to develop a nuclear weapon or for completely legitimate purposes. Sodium cyanide is commonly used in the processing of gold, but can also be used in the manufacture of one of the deadliest nerve agents – tabun.

## **Why we need export controls**

We know there is a real terrorist threat in the Asia-Pacific region. The bombings in Bali, and the bombings of the Marriot hotel and Australian Embassy in Jakarta demonstrated the reality of this threat. Osama bin-Laden and other terrorist organizations have openly declared their intention to acquire and use chemical, biological, and radiological weapons.

In addition, some states are currently developing capability consistent with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in contravention of, or outside, obligations imposed by international treaties. Several regional countries are also developing manufacturing capabilities for dual-use items, but whose export they do not control.

We know that certain states and terrorist groups have set up networks to access WMD. The exposure of the A.Q. Khan proliferation network showed how extensive this activity can be. The Khan network included sourcing of items from Asia. We also know that

shipments of other items which could have been used for WMD programs in the region have been stopped during transshipment.

Given the global nature of the WMD threat, the success of counter-proliferation measures depends on the combined commitment of as large a number of countries as possible. States and nonstate actors of proliferation have shown themselves only too willing and able to exploit weak links in counter-proliferation measures aimed at combating illicit dual-use trade. It is worth noting that WMD-relevant items can now be sourced from far more countries than was the case in the past. And given that a significant proportion of world trade passes through the region it is strategically vital in efforts to curb WMD proliferation.

The benefits of the NPT are beyond any doubt in the area of safeguards. However, as we discussed, some states remain outside the NPT. And while many states parties to the CWC and the BWC apply export controls in the implementation of their convention obligations, others do not. And many fail to enforce controls in a robust and effective manner.

Moreover, in the absence of a verification body for the BWC, the Australia Group's development of control lists covering materials and technology relevant to the production of biological weapons represent the only harmonized form of control over these items.

### **Enhancing Export Controls in the Asia-Pacific Region**

Few countries in the Asia-Pacific region participate in the four export control regimes. Encouragingly, however, Asia-Pacific countries are increasingly looking to export control regimes for guidance in formulating their own export controls. Some countries in Asia have introduced export control licensing measures based on the benchmarks set by the export control regimes. For example, China has incorporated most items controlled by the export control regimes into its control lists. Significantly, considering its role as a major transshipment hub, Singapore has also recently introduced comprehensive export control legislation.

Australia has an active outreach program to promote the adoption, implementation and enforcement of national export controls among Asia-Pacific countries at the international, regional, and bilateral levels.

Our bilateral activities are chiefly aimed at providing assistance and training on export control measures, including model legislation, domestic outreach to industry and academia, licensing arrangements, and enforcement. They are very much in the spirit of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, but have a much wider dimension in seeking to enhance measures directed against proliferation activity by state as well as non-state actors.

We have sought to increase the effectiveness of our outreach activities by improving our coordination with other countries conducting similar activities in the region, such as the

United States and Japan. By increasing consultations on export controls in the region we are also better placed to provide targeted assistance and respond to specific requests.

In November last year we hosted an export control workshop in Thailand, jointly with the United States. The workshop focused on practical aspects of implementing tighter export controls, as well as nuclear safeguards training. Also in November, we hosted a regional nuclear safeguards and security ministerial conference in Sydney.

In the past year we have also deepened consultations with Singapore and China on counter-proliferation issues and consulted with Indonesia and The Philippines on possible assistance measures. An outreach visit to Vietnam will take place next week.

### **Australia Group Measures**

In Australia's role as Chair of the Australia Group we have been working to improve regional export controls on dual-use chemical and biological materials through our Asia Pacific Regional Action Plan. The purpose of this plan is to provide a non-prescriptive framework for specific outreach activities and to facilitate, for the first time, such activities being jointly undertaken by Group participants in a cooperative and inclusive spirit with non-participants. The main focus for outreach is to ensure that key supplier and transshipping countries employ best practice in export licensing, especially with a view to preventing diversion of dual-use items to states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The plan is now being used as a model for outreach in other regions.

We have been encouraged by the positive response to these outreach efforts and the interest from many countries in taking measures to improve their export licensing systems. This reflects the increasing acceptance of Australia Group standards as an international benchmark for export controls on CBW-relevant materials. It also serves as acknowledgement that the harmonized export controls implemented by Australia Group members bring increased security to trade in dual-use items, without restricting legitimate trade. And increased security is of benefit to everyone.

### **Conclusion**

In conclusion, I would like to highlight the importance of practical action at the national level to prevent the weapons-related materials falling into the hands of proliferators. After all, on the global level export controls can only be as effective as they are wide. This means not only the introduction of comprehensive export control legislation but also the effective implementation and enforcement of that legislation. Increasingly sophisticated procurement methods being used by proliferators, including the challenges posed by issues like transshipment, brokering and intangible technology transfers, also means that our export control measures must be capable of adapting to confront new threats. As a region, we have a shared responsibility to use fully the tools at our disposal to protect our collective security.





# Non-Proliferation of WMD: An Agenda for ASEAN and the ARF?

By Raymund Jose G. Quilop

The issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), particularly nuclear proliferation, may be something that Southeast Asia may not immediately and directly feel concerned about for the simple reason that Southeast Asian states do not possess WMD nor do they depend on nuclear technology for electricity. However, as part of the Asia Pacific, which includes states that either possess WMD, are in the process of developing WMD (specifically nuclear weapons), or utilize nuclear technology for civilian use, Southeast Asia should examine the gravity of this issue, and take necessary steps to address or manage this security challenge, primarily by establishing or developing a regional regime on nonproliferation.

This is particularly important given that WMD and its proliferation is a key issue in relations among the major powers of the region. The production and proliferation of WMDs result from the security dilemma that states face in an international system characterized by anarchy or, simply put, an international environment without a world government. Unlike the domestic setting where individual citizens are no longer responsible for their own security because national governments take care of it individual states have to fend for themselves and secure themselves against other sovereign states. And the best tool for doing this, of course, is weapons; the more lethal the weaponry, the more effective it is in ensuring security, or so they believe.

Unfortunately, in the quest to enhance security, they create insecurity for others, which then take measures to enhance their own security, through the production and acquisition of more lethal weapons and so on. Before these states realize it, are engaged in an arms race and contribute to the proliferation of weapons.

What is more disturbing is the possibility, previously seen as remote but recently acknowledged as likely, of WMD becoming accessible to nonstate actors, particularly terrorists who may use these weapons, even in their most crude form, to undermine governments and inflict harm on civilians.

At the global level, WMD proliferation is an issue in which the necessary institutional infrastructure for addressing it is available: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are two of the many institutions that ensure that nuclear weapons and technology do not proliferate. More recently, the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which has been seen as strengthening “norms and principles that hinder the acquisition of WMD capabilities by non-state actors,” is another nonproliferation initiative of the global community. The challenge therefore in regard to nonproliferation of WMD is not the absence of institutions to address the problem, but rather making these institutions work more effectively.

While the issue of nonproliferation may not have been on the main agenda of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), these regional institutions could still provide avenues for the development of a nonproliferation regime. ASEAN developed the concept of a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971 and the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (ZEANFWZ) Treaty in 1995. Although the context for which these instruments were developed may be different and the objectives may be unique to the time when they were crafted, these two instruments could still be used for the development of a nonproliferation regime in Southeast Asian and in the Asia-Pacific region.

It must be recognized, however, that institutions could be a constraint in developing a regime, particularly if institutions do not have this particular issue on their agenda when they were established or when a particular issue requires examination or even reform of the principles and norms of existing institutions. Specifically, will ASEAN and the ARF be able to move beyond their institutional state: informal, emphasizing more the process of interaction rather than structures that deal with specific issues such as WMD proliferation? This is a fundamental issue that must be addressed as dealing with WMD proliferation may require formal structures. It was comforting to learn, through the intervention of one participant during the CSCAP WMD meeting, that ASEAN has started to welcome the idea of developing more formal structures. Likewise, at the level of the ARF, its inter-sessional support group on confidence building measure (ISG-CBM), which is a key structure in the ARF in promoting confidence building measures, has recently been made into an ISG on CBM and Preventative Diplomacy (PD). This could signal the ARF's eventual progress toward the promotion of preventive diplomacy measures, which necessitates a more formal approach compared to the promotion of confidence building measures.

In this context, there is the prospect of ASEAN and ARF addressing WMD proliferation. But there are also challenges that must be addressed, which the study group on Proliferation of WMD organized by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) may help in identifying as well as recommending measures to address them.

## About the Authors

**Peng Claire Bai** is the 2005 Pacific Forum CSIS Vasey Fellow.

**Christine P. Brown** is director of Congressional Affairs and Trade Policy at the Korea Economic Institute of America.

**Allen Chen** was a research intern at Pacific Forum CSIS and is currently an MBA candidate at the University of Virginia's Darden Graduate School of Business Administration.

**Hyun Jung Jo Choi**, a summer 2005 Pacific Forum Vasey Fellow, is pursuing her MA in Law and Diplomacy at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

**Larry Ferguson** is an Asia security analyst at Project Asia, the Center for Strategic Studies at the Center for Naval Analyses.

**Brad Glosserman** is the Director of Research at the Pacific Forum CSIS.

**Justin Hastings** is a PhD candidate in political science at the University of California, Berkeley, currently in residence at the Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore.

**Kim Jae-Eun** is an undergraduate student in the department of Political Science at Sung Kyun Kwan University.

**Kim Ah-Young** is Associate Expert of the Humanitarian Emergency Branch of the UN OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). She was the 2003 Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS.

**Lee Jang-Wook** is a Researcher at the New Asia Research Institute, ROK.

**Li Fan** is executive director at Global Links Initiative.

**Sophia McIntyre** is an Executive Officer at the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, where she works in the Arms Control and Counter-Proliferation Branch.

**Nagaoka Sachi** is a PhD candidate at the Keio University.

**Nakagawa Yumiko** is an MA candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. She was the 2002 Vasey Fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS.

**Qi Zeng** is a PhD Candidate in the Dept. of Political Science at the University of Hawaii.

**Raymund Jose G. Quilop** is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of the Philippines in Diliman, Quezon City, a Senior Researcher/Analyst of the Office of Strategic and Special Studies, Armed Forces of the Philippines and a fellow of the Institute for Strategic and Development Studies.

**Andrew Thompson** is assistant director at the Freeman Chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.

**Wang Qinghong** is a PhD Candidate at the University of Hawaii.

**Guy Wilson-Roberts** is former deputy director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at Victoria University, Wellington, a policy advisor for the Ministry of Defence, and a senior policy advisor with the Office of the Commissioner of Police.

---