NOVEMBER 10 2024 VINCE SCAPPATURA I. INTRODUCTION Vince Scappatura documents the novel use of Australian territory in supporting US B-2 bombers en route and in return from strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen on October 17, and highlights the profound strategic significance of this event for the future role Australia may play in US strategic […]
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NUCLEAR-CAPABLE B-52H STRATOFORTRESS BOMBERS: A VISUAL GUIDE TO IDENTIFICATION
VINCE SCAPPATURA AND RICHARD TANTER AUGUST 26 2024 I. INTRODUCTION Vince Scappatura and Richard Tanter use open-source information to identify US B-52 bombers that are nuclear weapons capable and may visit or be stationed at foreign airfields versus B-52s that are solely able to be armed with conventional, non-nuclear weapons. Where governments, as in […]
REVISITING THE COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY ROADMAP TO REDUCE THE RISK OF WAR ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA
JOHN DELURY, MORTON HALPERIN, PETER HAYES, CHUNG-IN MOON, LEON SIGAL, TOM PICKERING APRIL 19 2024 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, the authors revisit the concept of comprehensive security in Northeast Asia as the guiding principle that should be used to reduce tension, avoid war, and re-engage on a constructive peace-making cooperative security agenda in Northeast […]
BEHAVIORAL ARMS CONTROL AND EAST ASIA
BEHAVIORAL ARMS CONTROL AND EAST ASIA ULRICH KÜHN AND HEATHER WILLIAMS APRIL 16 2024 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Ulrich Kuhn and Heather Williams suggest that a “Behavioral Arms Control” framework between China and the United States be used to reduce the risk of war by building confidence and developing bilateral arms control initiatives. Ulrich […]
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? PRACTICAL POLICIES TO PREVENT NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE
VAN JACKSON MARCH 29 2024 I. INTRODUCTION This report by Van Jackson argues that Northeast Asia is the epi-center of global nuclear tension with high “nuclear precarity” due to nuclear arms racing, reliance on nuclear signally, and evolving nuclear postures. The report offers practical policy recommendations for avoiding nuclear war aimed at the governments of Japan, […]
NUCLEAR STRATEGY OF THE DPRK: DOCTRINE EVOLUTION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
ANASTASIA BARANNIKOVA MARCH 15 2024 I. INTRODUCTION In this essay, Anastasia Barannikova analyses the DPRK’s hybrid nuclear weapons strategy and argues that its impressive progress was the result of clear strategic planning and a vision of the role of nuclear weapons in the DPRK’s defense strategy. Anastasia Barannikova is a Research Fellow at Laboratory for […]
NUCLEAR THREATS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW PART II: APPLYING THE LAW
ANNA HOOD AND MONIQUE CORMIER MARCH 8 2024 I. INTRODUCTION Anna Hood and Monique Cormier analyse the legality of certain threats under the jus ad bellum regime of international law that regulates recourse to war between states, before turning to consider specific threat examples in the context of the jus in bello regime, which applies […]
NUCLEAR THREATS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW PART I: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
ANNA HOOD AND MONIQUE CORMIER MARCH 1 2024 I. INTRODUCTION Anna Hood and Monique Cormier map existing prohibitions against nuclear threats at international law and seek to explain the scope and remit of such laws. The essay explains different views and their significance about the way these international laws apply to threats to use nuclear […]
HUMANITARIAN IMPACTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE IN NORTHEAST ASIA: IMPLICATIONS FOR REDUCING NUCLEAR RISK
DAVID VON HIPPEL, EVA LISOWSKI, PETER HAYES, SHATABHISHA SHETTY, TATSUJIRO SUZUKI, FUMIHIKO YOSHIDA, MICHIRU NISHIDA, STEVE FREEDKIN MARCH 31 2023 I. INTRODUCTION This report summarizes the second year of work on estimating the humanitarian impacts of nuclear war in Northeast Asia. Based on five of the thirty plausible nuclear use cases developed in year 1 […]
TALK US THROUGH AUKUS…AND AUSTRALIA’S DREAM SUBMARINE
ALLAN BEHM FEBRUARY 22 2023 I. INTRODUCTION In this report, Allan Behm argues that the 2021 AUKUS agreement “remains essentially an exercise in political theatre, lacking in both legal enforceability and a wealth of practical detail—and Australia is no closer to the actual acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines than it was when the agreement was […]