During 1962, Chinese ground forces lost one line division, even though the army had a slight gain in personnel. The air force suffered a significant loss of jet aircraft, most probably because of lack of essential spare parts, a dwindling production rate, and a virtual absense of deliveries of aircraft or spare parts from Soviet Block countries.
Missile sites continued to expand, with the number of surface-to-air missile sites doubling from four in 1961 to eight. Moreover, a surface-to-surface missile site was reported at Lien Shan.
In CINCPAC’s annual Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study to the Joint Chiefs of Staff predicting the needs for Fiscal Year 1965, the main difference compared with the previous year was a greater recognition of the Allied nuclear capable delivery vehicles to give fire support in the Taiwan and Korean areas.
During the year CINCPAC intelligence performed two particular threat assessments involving China. One involved an analysis of North Korean and Chinese forces to assess whether South Korean forces could be reduced. Early indications were that a reduction could not be justified. The other assessment analyzed the threat against Japan, and concluded that China did not pose a threat but that an overt threat would only occur in a general war situation and that it would be primarily Soviet.
These plans and operations are described in more detail in the selected pages from the 1962 CINCPAC history provided below:
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, “CINCPAC Command History 1962,” April 30, 1963. Only selected pages. Partially declassified and released under FOIA. (0.72 MB)
Funding for this project was provided by the The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and Ploughshares Fund. For information about the Nuclear Strategy Project contact Hans M. Kristensen.