Engaging DPRK in a Verifiable Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone: Addressing Nuclear Issues of the Korean Peninsula[*] by Dingli Shen[**] Center for American Studies, Fudan University Shanghai, China May 6, 1994 prepared for the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network managed by Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development Berkeley, California ABSTRACT: This report discusses regional institutional building of nuclear nonproliferation on Korean Peninsula. It proposes that a nuclear-weapons-free-zone (NWFZ) scheme could hopefully serve this purpose. A regional nonproliferation regime should properly address security concern of the relevant parties to a possible Korean Peninsular NWFZ, while seeking from them cooperation on intrusive and symmetrical safeguarding inspections. It is desired that outside powers should help the denuclearization process on the Peninsula. 1. The Origin of the Idea With the end of the Cold War, tensions in Northeast Asia have been much reduced. Deplorably, however, this does not apply well to the Korean Peninsula. The rivalries between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, hereinafter as North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (ROK, hereinafter as South Korea), a legacy left over by the Cold War, have yet to be removed. At the moment, the striking confrontation between North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and between North Korea and the United States, regarding special inspection to North's suspected nuclear facilities, has again become the focal point of world attention. The Korean nuclear issue is challenging the human wisdom to produce a workable solution to nuclear nonproliferation. Proposals for breaking the Korean nuclear impasse vary, from economic sanctions to "surgical operation"-like military preemption, to peaceful settlement through talks and dialogue. As modern history has indicated, economic sanctions usually would not work. This author is skeptical that, given the unique political culture of North Korea, the North would succumb to pressure at all. A resort to sanctions seems to be counterproductive to curtail the spread of nuclear weapons in that part of the world, let alone the undesired effect, such as regional unrest, that the sanctions would likely bring about. In my opinion, a plausible approach to solving the problem is to address the security concern of North Korea carefully, and, take appropriate measures accordingly. Admittedly, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been widely accepted as an international norm. Nevertheless, to go nuclear is still a viable option of any country if it deems that its national interest would be thus best guaranteed, and if it prefers not to be bound to any international norm. Although it is still uncertain of the actual status and even purpose of North Korea's nuclear program, an adequate analysis of the North's security environment and consideration, as made by Andrew Mack, would suggest that it is not incomprehensible that North Korea might have virtually embarked on a nuclear program of weapons potential. In this connection, were the North's interest in such a nuclear program to be discouraged, the best formula is to work out a security arrangement in which the international nonproliferation regime would be well preserved and in the meantime, the North would feel secure to a credible degree. This report will explore how a nuclear-weapons-free-zone scheme on the Korean Peninsula could help serve this purpose. It is understood that the interest of the relevant powers, viz., the United States, Russia, China, and Japan, converges in this area. Their contributions to establishing such a zone would be crucial and therefore highly desired. 2. Various Regional NWFZs[5,6] This section briefly reviews various kinds of nuclear-weapons- free zones. The concept of NWFZ is not a new one. It originated in the 1950s as a form of arms control, calling for a ban on the possession of nuclear weapons in a certain area defined by a NWFZ treaty. Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki proposed this idea as early as 1957. During the Cold War, NWFZ issues were frequently raised and debated at various international arms control fora, but often led to propaganda ends. The United States, wary that its free access to a certain area would be impeded and hence its national interest undermined, often had a negative view toward NWFZ proposals. For instance, there had been serious talks on the creation of a NWFZ in the ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) region. However, the U.S. once made it clear that this would be contrary to its national interest and that pursuing this idea further would jeopardize U.S. protection for the states concerned. In Europe, proposals for NWFZs at subregional levels -- in the northern region, in the Baltic, along the Central Front and in the Balkan -- had all failed because of the different alliance strategies of the Cold War. Now that the strategic landscape has been reshaped, nuclear- weapons-free-zone has gained wider support. The Government of South Africa has denounced its nuclear weapons program, and in turn taken a position in support of the creation of an African NWFZ. On May 29, 1991, President Bush announced a Middle East arms control initiative which, among other things, urged a verifiable ban on the production and acquisition of weapons- usable nuclear materials be implemented by states in that region. There has been continuing enthusiasm in the Clinton Administration seeking to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East. In addition, there has been Congressional interest in urging the U.S. Government to join the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, as part of the overall American nonproliferation strategy toward the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Most recently, the United States mooted a "5+2+2" multilateral conference on nuclear nonproliferation and regional security with an aim at establishing a NWFZ modality in South Asia, an issue highlighted during the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott's visit to New Delhi and Islamabad in the early April of 1994. Currently, two types of nuclear-weapons-free zone exist. One is for populated areas, like Latin America and the South Pacific. The other is for unpopulated areas, such as the Antarctic, the seabed, and outer space. Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco). This Treaty entered into force on April 22, 1968. It prohibits the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means, as well as the receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapons by Latin American countries. The parties permit verification of this commitment by a regional inspection organization known as the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL). Argentina and Chile have recently brought the Treaty into force. (Brazil signed the Treaty in 1968, but is yet to bring it into force; Cuba is the only major state of this region which remains outside the Treaty.) Recognizing the provision for no-stationing of nuclear weapons, the U.S. has signed two protocols to the Treaty. China is a party to the Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). This Treaty entered into force on December 11, 1986. It prohibits the manufacture or acquisition by other means of any nuclear explosive devices, as well as possession or control over such device by the parties anywhere inside or outside the zone area described specifically. The parties also undertake not to supply nuclear material or equipment, unless subject to IAEA safeguards, and to prevent in their territories the stationing as well as the testing of any nuclear explosive device. Each party remains free to allow visits, as well as transit, by foreign ship and aircraft. China has signed Protocol 2 and Protocol 3 to the Treaty, whereas the U.S. has not yet agreed to the protocols to honor its restriction. Aside from these two treaties for populated areas, the following three "non-armament treaties" have been established for unpopulated areas: Antarctic Treaty. This Treaty, entered into force on June 23, 1961, declares the Antarctic an area to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. It prohibits any measure of a military nature in the Antarctic, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, and the carrying out of military maneuvers or the testing of any types of weapons. The Treaty also bans any nuclear explosion as well as the disposal of radioactive waste material in the Antarctica. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (The Seabed Treaty). This Treaty, effective as of May 18, 1972, prohibits implanting or emplacing on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit of a 12-mile coastal zone any nuclear weapons or any types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty). This Treaty became effective on January 27, 1967. As its name implies, the Outer Space Treaty prohibits placing into orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, the installation of such weapons on celestial bodies, or the stationing of them in outer space in any other manner. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies are also forbidden. All these existing NWFZs, as well as other NWFZ-type of arms control initiatives, have manifested a common feature: possession and/or even physical presence of nuclear weapons in the zone area is banned by a nuclear-weapons-free-zone treaty. Such regional nuclear weapons nonproliferation institutions require states within the zone to pledge at least to forgo developing and possessing nuclear weapons. NWFZ treaties usually require nuclear powers to honor relevant treaty provisions and undertake their respective obligations. 3. Establishing a NWFZ on Korean Peninsula Both North and South Korea have expressed commitment to peaceful use of nuclear energy. As a signatory to the NPT, one should unconditionally accept international inspection, special (or challenge) inspection included, to all of its nuclear facilities. Fairness aside, this is the obligation a signatory should have understood before acceding to the NPT, since such inspection provisions have already been set up as part of the NPT/IAEA safeguarding regime. However, Pyongyang argues that at the moment it is at a special stage as its decision to withdraw from the NPT is being temporarily suspended. The North's conflict with IAEA surrounds IAEA's request of full inspection to two suspected places in Yongbyon. One of the two places is reported as typical of a waste site which could be associated with an earlier Soviet-supplied 4MWt (IRT-DPRK) reactor in Yongbyon. This place is reportedly almost exactly the same as the waste site in Iraq near the Soviet-supplied nuclear reactor there. The other suspected facility is a two-floor building, code named Building 500 by CIA, built in 1991-1992 with tanks believed to be in a concealed lower level. IAEA inspectors did visit this building on an earlier inspection, finding no evidence of clandestine activities there. When IAEA was later inclined to drill through the basement of the building, Pyongyang responded by threatening to withdraw from the NPT, three days after the start of 1993 "Team Spirit" military exercise, on the grounds that inspection to its military places would infringe North Korea's national security. To strike a balance, a party to the NPT does have its right to withdraw from the treaty, if it determines that to continue to stick to the treaty would be harmful to its national interest. It is too obvious that the nonproliferation regime would incur a serious setback if the North does quit. It is therefore evident that keeping the North in the NPT would be of vital importance to nuclear nonproliferation and to ensure regional stability in Northeast Asia. As such, a balanced approach to dealing with the thorny problem is to think of a Korean Peninsular nuclear-weapons-free zone (KPNWFZ). It would feature at least two characteristics. Firstly, as a regional approach, the KPNWFZ mandates a regional nonproliferation regime out of the willingness of the states in that region. North Korea has repeatedly indicated that it has neither the capability nor the desire to make a nuclear bomb; South Korea has said more categorically that it will forswear any nuclear fuel-cycle program which could lead to a weapon- end use. So, why not to install a KPNWFZ to legalize their positive intention? Unlike some South Asian states, neither North nor South Korea has linked its non-nuclear proposal to a global non-discriminatory nonproliferation regime. The current NPT is indeed discriminatory. However, exercising restraint on nuclear capability before the NPT is reformed helps contain the spread of nuclear weapons at regional level a lot more easier. Secondly, the tenet of a NWFZ treaty is that all parties to it have to assume the same responsibility not to acquire nuclear weapons. As Treaty of Tlatelolco and Treaty of Rarotonga have shown, NWFZ approach would impose symmetrical obligations to all signatories in the respective region. At this time, the Korean nuclear problem remains with the "special inspection". A symmetrical treatment of intrusive verification on nuclear activities on both Koreas, as would be mandated by a KPNWFZ Treaty, could possibly render full inspections more acceptable, provided synergetic measures are taken. In fact, in the December 1991 "Joint Declaration for a Non- Nuclear Korean Peninsula", the two Koreas already pledged: * Not to test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons; * Not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment; * To use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes; * To verify compliance upon the request of one party but agreed to by both; * To ensure implementation through the establishment and regular meeting of a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC). Such pledges have well provided the foundation for establishing a NWFZ on the Korean Peninsula. 4. Critical Issues to KPNWFZ Successful implementation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone must guarantee the security of nations in the region, if they forgo nuclear weapons option. Otherwise, NWFZ approach would be unattractive and eventually fail. On Korean Peninsula, a NWFZ regime has to ensure that: * Neither North Korea nor South Korea would develop and possess nuclear weapons; * Out of their own willingness, the two Koreas would develop their civil nuclear programs designed least divertible to military application; * All nuclear powers should honor their restrictions regarding this zone; * An effective, symmetrical verification will be put in place. These issues will be addressed in the following sequence: i) Definition of a relevant NWFZ in Northeast Asia; ii) Nuclear security assurance from the nuclear powers; iii) Peaceful use of nuclear energy in the zone area; iv) A confidence-building safeguarding system; v) Cessation of presence of foreign troops and conventional arms control in the region. First of all, geographical limits of the area of the proposed zone. The country in question is North Korea, which is situated on the Korean Peninsula, or, in Northeast Asia in a larger geographical scope. Normally, Northeast Asia is considered as comprised of Far Eastern Russia, Northeastern China, Japan, the Koreas, and Mongolia. Russia and China are the two nuclear states in the region. The United States once stationed naval and tactical nuclear weapons abroad, including Japan and South Korea. Now the U.S. has declared that such weapons have been withdrawn. What size will the NWFZ in this region be? Including the whole Northeast Asia? This depends upon the geopolitical situation of this region. Apparently Russia, and perhaps China too, would not be interested in establishing a NWFZ where their territories will be involved. If a Northeast Asian nuclear-weapons-free zone (NENWFZ) is to cover Russia, Russia's sea exit of nuclear force to the Pacific would be likely blocked. It is understood that Russia's Pacific Ocean Fleet, homeported on the Kamchatka Peninsula and at Far East coastal bases near Vladivostok and around the Sea of Okhotsk, includes those nuclear-powered nuclear-tipped- ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs). How could it be imagined that Russia, a nuclear power, would impose a nuclear-free zone on its own territory and territory waters? In China, there has been no credible information in the public domain regarding basing of its nuclear weapons. Thus one cannot ascertain whether there has been nuclear weapon in Northeastern China. It looks beyond imagination that a regional non-nuclear sanctuary will be encouraged to include China, an acknowledged nuclear power. Even though it seems unlikely Russia and China would endorse a NENWFZ involving themselves, the Governments of the two countries have been in favor of a nuclear-free zone on Korean Peninsula proper. Japan has long embedded a non-nuclear-weapon policy in its Constitution. Although there has been pro-nuclear sentiments in Japan, a near-term nuclearization of Japan is beyond scene. What does concern the world community is Japan's technical capability to go nuclear in a crash program. Japan's excessive accumulation of plutonium also upsets the world at large. It would be beneficial if Japan joins the Koreas in a regional NWFZ arrangement. But Japanese politicians might not be interested in being treated as the same as the Koreans, especially when nuclear powers of this region will be absent. In order not to complicate the urgent task of denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, one could just perceive a NWFZ established on the Peninsula. Japan might not be involved in the beginning. Meanwhile, if the two Koreas pledge in the NWFZ Treaty not to enrich uranium and reprocess plutonium, Japan should consider to give up its plutonium recycle program. Mongolia is neither a course to the Korean nuclear problem nor a critical solution to it. One may not consider that it should join a NWFZ in the context of Korean Peninsula. Second, nuclear powers should provide negative security assurance to the proposed KPNWFZ. As seen from those established NWFZs, nuclear weapons states should pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the nuclear weapons free zone. Regarding KPNWFZ, it seems clear that Russia and China are ready to provide negative security assurance to this region. In fact, China is inviting other nuclear powers to sign a global "No- First-Use" Agreement. Also, it does no harm for Britain and France to do the same. The United States has for many years stationed nuclear weapons on South Korea. But in the recent years, the U.S. is believed to have withdrawn its tactical nuclear weapons home, in light of the changing security environment. It is welcome that the U.S. has promised North Korea, through a joint statement of June 11, 1993, that it will agree to principle of assurances against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons. This is an indication that the U.S. is departing from its current conditional no-first-use policy. However, the U.S. is still providing a nuclear umbrella to South Korea. Thus, the U.S. is adopting a conflicting policy: while providing negative security assurance to North Korea, it provides positive security assurance to South Korea at the same time, according to the 1954 U.S.-Korean Mutual Defense Treaty. The U.S. cannot do this in the legal sense. It can stick to one of them, but not both. Of course, it is very constructive if the U.S. withdraws its nuclear protection to South Korea, in the post-Cold War time. It seems that North Korea doesn't have any nuclear backing on its side. In addition, South Korea and the U.S. have enough conventional means to handle a crisis on Korean Peninsula, even responding to a nuclear crisis. Third, to realize a KPNWFZ, both North and South Korea should turn their nuclear program to peaceful uses. Since both sides have expressed intention not to retain uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, they have promised to go beyond the normal requirement against nuclear proliferation. This is certainly welcome. One should be aware that, however, some nationalist elements of South Korea are advocating to reverse the course set by Roh Tae Woo. And, it is hard to accept that the Yongbyong "radiochemistry" Laboratory is not a reprocessing facility and could be waived from inspection. Further, providing means to North Korea to produce less nuclear waste through nuclear power generation would be helpful. Providing an LWR (light- water-reactor) is probably an alternative. Fourth, on safeguards. North Korea may not have acquired kilogram-quantity of plutonium, but its degree of cooperation in accepting inspection does raise suspicion of its nuclear ambition. It is expected that the international community would insist on intrusive inspection on the North's nuclear program, particularly, to investigate DPRK's plutonium reprocessing history. It could be painful for oriental countries to accept intrusive inspection. Nevertheless, it is important to become a respected member of an established world order, though the order itself needs to be improved. Thus an appropriate attitude to be cooperative is much desired. For North Korea to be more cooperative in accepting inspection, the North would likely request to impose a similar intrusive inspection on South Korea's nuclear facilities. A NWFZ scheme provides a means in which intrusive and symmetrical safeguards can be equally applied to both Koreas. Finally, let me address an important aspect which remains outside the nuclear realm, i.e., the U.S.-South Korean annual "Team Spirit" exercise. To be sure, North Korea should unconditionally accept inspection as long as it is still a signatory to the NPT. And, NPT does not regulate any connection between one party's acceptance of nuclear safeguards to another party's military exercise with a nuclear power. However, the Korean nuclear issue is far more complicated than this simple reasoning. North Korea demands that such exercise be stopped since North Korea regards it insecure vis-a-vis a rival allied with a nuclear power which is demonstrating its support through military exercise. My opinion is that the U.S. can well help denuclearization of North Korea, partially through the permanent cancellation of "Team Spirit" exercise or its equivalent. To show the U.S. goodwill posture, the United States should not condition its cancellation of such exercise on North Korea's acceptance of nuclear inspection. In turn, the U.S. positive initiative could result in a positive feedback from North Korea. Besides, there is no longer a necessity to keep U.S. troops on South Korea. Obviously there has been no foreign troops stationing on North Korea. As said above, no nuclear power seem ready to unfold a nuclear umbrella over North Korea. Given the fact that South Korea has a population twice that of the North, given the fact that the South's economy is more than ten times greater, Seoul is predicted to match the force level of the North within this decade. So, there is indeed no necessity for Americans to defend South Korea. It is quite logical at this time to let American troops go home. This will only remove any remaining reasons of North Korea to stay in the margin of the NPT. It is understood that conventional arms reduction should be in parallel to the denuclearization process of the Korean Peninsula. A DPRK Army of more than 1.1 million troops vis-a-vis a ROK Army of 0.6 million plus provides no sense of security to either side, but to exhaust a large portion of their national resources. Conventional arms control and transparency building deserve due attention. 5. Conclusion Given a Korean Peninsula receiving negative security assurances from all nuclear powers, given the U.S. Army withdrawal from South Korea, given a permanent cancellation of "Team Spirit" and a close of the nuclear umbrella for South Korea, an intrusive and symmetrical safeguards institution could be more hopefully applied to both North and South Korea. In this way, the North Korea, as well as South Korea, could be integrated into a verifiable regional NWFZ scheme. The world community at large should facilitate the process of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula through establishing a NWFZ in this area. ENDNOTES [*] Draft report to the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network (NAPSN) based at Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, Berkeley, California; and to the Fourth ISODARCO Beijing Seminar on Arms Control (April 26-30, 1994, Beijing). The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author only, representing neither his affiliations nor the Government of China. [**] Dingli Shen is an associate professor of Fudan University. He co-chairs the Program on Arms Control and Regional Security at the Center for American Studies of Fudan University.  Kimberly Ann Elliot pointed out that only 23% of 115 cases of economic sanctions imposed since World War I have been successful in achieving "major goals." See, "Will Sanctions Work against North Korea?" NAPSN Working Paper #24, December 17, 1993, pp.7-9.  As John Curtis Perry has put it, "DPRK will change only in its own way." See, "Dateline North Korea: A Communist Holdout", Foreign Policy, No.80, Fall 1990, p.172.  Andrew Mack, "The Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula", Asian Survey, Vol.XXXIII, No.4, April 1993, pp.339-359; "North Korea and the Bomb," Foreign Policy, No.83, Summer 1991, pp.87- 104. For the nuclear threat North Korea has received, see also, Bruce Cumings, "Spring Thaw for Korea's Cold War?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1992, pp.14-23; "Who's Intimidating Whom?" in "Ending the Cold War: Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam", The Defense Monitor, Vol. XXIII, No.1, 1994, p.5.  There has been an extensive literature on interrelations between the Koreas and the U.S., Russia and Japan. For Chinese analyses in English on Sino-Korean relations, see, Jia Hao and Zhuang Qubing, "China's Policy toward the Korean Peninsula", Asian Survey, Vol.XXXII, No.12, December 1992, pp.1137-1156; Hao Yufan, "China and the Korean Peninsula: A Chinese View", ibid., Vol.XXVII, No.8, August 1987, pp.862-884; Hong Li, "The Sino- South Korean Normalization: A Triangular Explanation", ibid., Vol.XXXIII, No.11, November, 1993, pp.1083-1094.  Zachary S. Davis and Warren H. Donnelly, "A Nuclear-Weapons- Free Zone in the Middle East: Background and Issues", CRS Issue Brief, The Library of Congress (Order Code: IB92041), updated October 1, 1993.  SIPRI Yearbook 1993: World Armaments and Disarmament (SIPRI/Oxford University Press (OUP), 1993), pp.759-762.  SIPRI Yearbook 1990: World Armaments and Disarmament (SIPRI/OUP, 1990), p.578. At the Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Indonesia and Malaysia again strongly endorsed the proposal for a NWFZ in the ASEAN region. See, SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World Armaments and Disarmament (SIPRI/OUP, 1991), p.565.  SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament (SIPRI/OUP, 1992), p.99.  Zachary S. Davis and Warren H. Donnelly, "The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty [The Treaty of Rarotonga]", CRS Report for Congress, The Library of Congress, 93-610-ENR, June 25, 1993.  The proposed "5+2+2" nine-nation conference will involve the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, Germany and Japan, and India and Pakistan.  K. K. Katyal, "India not for nuclear talks proposed by U.S.", The Hindu, April 2, 1994, p.1; "U.S. keen on stronger ties", ibid., April 7, 1994, p.1; P. S. Suryanarayana, "Pak. cool to U.S. plans", ibid., April 6, 1994, p.13; "'Broad accord' with Pak: Talbott", ibid., April 10, 1994, p.1. During Talbott's recent visit, the U.S. proposed objective of "first capping, then reducing and eventually eliminating weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles from South Asia". The U.S. is believed to have urged New Delhi and Islamabad give up their nuclear weapons option, cut off production of unsafeguarded fissile materials, and, place future civil nuclear material production and nuclear facilities under international safeguards.  Dispatch (U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs), January 31, 1994, Vol.5, No.5, p.47.  North and South Korea announced a "Joint Declaration for a Non-Nuclear Korean Peninsula" in Panmunjom on December 13, 1991. The two sides pledged not to test, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons and not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment. On November 8, 1991, South Korean President Roh Tae Woo announced that it would not manufacture, retain, stockpile, equip with and use nuclear weapons. He also pledged to accept full-scope international safeguards on its nuclear facilities and materials. See, AFP, November 8, 1991; Xu Baokang, "A Sound Basis for Nuclear-Free Korea", Beijing Review, December 16-22, 1991, pp.10- 11.  Satellite photos taken during the construction period of Building 500 showed what was like a heavily shielded nuclear waste storage site in the basement. See, "North Korea at the Crossroads: Nuclear Renegade or Regional Partner?" Arms Control Today, May 1993, p.4; Arms Control Reporter (IDDS), June 1993, Section 457.E, p.2.  Endnote No.13. Most recently, North Korean President Kim Il Sung said on April 16, 1994 that he had no plan to develop nuclear weapons and wanted peace. AP, April 17, 1994.  Michael Krepon, Dominique M. McCoy and Matthew C. J. Rudolph, eds., A Handbook of Confidence-Building for Regional Security, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Handbook No.1, September 1993, p.30.  Xinhua News Agency, March 24, 1994.  Joint Statement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America, New York, June 11, 1993.  Within the NAPSN there have been some analyses already on supplying LWRs to DPRK. See, Peter Hayes, "Light Water Reactor Technology Transfer to North Korea: Does It Make Sense?" Working Paper #21, September 1993; Saloman Levy, "Supply of Light Water Reactors to Pyongyang: Technical Issues and Their Possible Resolution", Working Paper #22, December 1993; Victor Gilinsky and William Manning, "A U.S.-Type Light Water Reactor for North Korea? The Legal Implications", Working Paper #23, December 1993.  In July 1977, General Bernard Rogers, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army (1976-1979) quoted a South Korean Colonel as saying, "We will hate to see our friends go, but if we are going to grow up, and, we are going to walk alone, you have to take this (withdrawal). I think the time has come". See, "Mission Accomplished in Korea: Bringing U.S. Troops Home", The Defense Monitor, Vol.XIX, No.2, 1990, p.7.  The Military Balance: 1993-1994 (Brassey's for IISS, 1993), pp.159-162.
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