NAPSNet Daily Report 30 July, 1999

Recommended Citation

"NAPSNet Daily Report 30 July, 1999", NAPSNet Daily Report, July 30, 1999, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-daily-report/napsnet-daily-report-30-july-1999/

 
CONTENTS

I. United States

II. Republic of Korea

III. Japan

I. United States

1. US-ROK Cooperation on DPRK Policy

The Associated Press (Paul Shin, “NKOREA URGED TO CANCEL MISSILE TEST,” Seoul, 07/30/99) and Pacific Stars and Stripes (Jim Lea, “U.S., SOUTH KOREA WON’T RULE OUT FORCE AGAINST NK,” Seoul, 07/31/99, 1) reported that US Defense Secretary William Cohen and ROK Defense Minister Cho Sung-tae said that the US and the ROK would not rule out military action if the DPRK fires a Taepodong-2 missile. Cohen said, “There are a number of negative consequences that (will) flow from a missile launch, but it would not be appropriate for me to spell out in advance. Certainly there will be diplomatic and economic consequences. Beyond that, we would have to reserve our judgment as to what would be an appropriate measure of response. The United States and South Korea will maintain a strong alliance based on shared values and close security cooperation.” Cho said that it will take some time for the DPRK to prepare for the test-firing and said that “we will be able to gain prior indication of any imminent launch.” Cho added that the ROK and US strategy is to “make North Korea realize it has more to lose than gain from a missile firing.” [Ed. note: This article was one of the top stories in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for July 30.]

2. ROK Missile Development

The International Herald Tribune (Don Kirk, “U.S. TO UPGRADE SOUTH KOREA MISSILES,” Tokyo, 07/30/99) reported that, according to analysts, the acquisition of air-to-ground missiles by the ROK Air Force will give a strong message to the DPRK. ROK Brigadier General Cha Young-koo said, “This gives some strong message that they should stop such actions. This kind of cooperative relationship is an important message to North Korea.” Park Young- ho, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute of National Unification, said, “It is very significant for South Korea. It gives some psychological relaxation.” Park added that the ROK’s interest in increasing its inventory of missiles as complementing ROK President Kim Dae-jung’s “sunshine policy.” [Ed. note: This article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for July 30.]

3. DPRK Economy

The Associated Press (Paul Shin, “NORTH’S ECONOMY IMPROVING,” Seoul, 07/30/99) reported that, according to an assessment by the ROK government, the DPRK’s economy has improved with the help of growing industrial production and power generation. The assessment backed a claim by the DPRK’s official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) this week that its economy was recovering and that industrial production was up 20 percent in the first half of 1999, compared with the same period last year. KCNA said that the electricity output grew by 40 percent and coal production rose by 13 percent in the first six months of 1999, compared to last year. KCNA also said that more than 6,500 factories are performing better. ROK officials said that they believe that DPRK’s economy turned around in 1998 after hitting its lowest point a year before. ROK Foreign Ministry official Kwon Tae-hyon said, “The North Korean economy, as a whole, is still in deep limbo but the worst seems to be over.” David Morton, the UN World Food Program (WFP) representative in the DPRK, said that the power supply had improved this year in Pyongyang. Morton added that favorable weather conditions and continued international food aid have alleviated hunger in the DPRK.

4. DPRK Defectors

The Associated Press (“TWO N. KOREANS DEFECT TO S. KOREA,” Seoul, 07/30/99) reported that, according to the ROK Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry, two men from the DPRK arrived in Seoul on Friday to seek asylum. The ministry identified the defectors only as a 37-year old artist and a 26-year-old laborer.

5. Bombing of PRC Embassy in Belgrade

Reuters (Matt Pottinger, “US, CHINA SETTLE OVER EMBASSY BOMB VICTIMS,” Beijing, 07/30/99) reported that, according to US State Department official David Andrews, the US will pay US$4.5 million in compensation for the three people killed and 27 wounded when NATO bombed the PRC embassy in Belgrade. The agreement was reached after PRC and US negotiators held three days of talks in Beijing over compensation. Talks to set compensation for the PRC embassy and for US missions in the PRC damaged by protesters will resume next month. Andrews said, “The breakdown of the figure will be done by the Chinese side. This payment will not create any precedents.” Sources familiar with the negotiations said the US$4.5 million figure was a compromise between the PRC’s demand for US$7 million and the US offer of US$2 million. The PRC’s official Xinhua news agency reported that the funds would be paid to the PRC government, which would divide the money among the wounded and the relatives of those killed.

6. US Military Visits to Hong Kong

South China Morning (Glenn Schloss and Oliver Chou, “US AIR FORCE PLANE ALLOWED SAR STOPOVER,” 07/30/99, Pg. 1) reported that a US Air Force cargo plane was granted permission from Beijing to land in Hong Kong on Thursday. According to analysts, the PRC Foreign Ministry’s go-ahead for the landing signaled that the PRC was starting to lift its sanctions on the US military. Diplomatic analysts said that no indication had been received from the PRC about what permission for the landing meant for future visits. According to military analyst Paul Beaver, spokesman for the Jane’s Defence Group, if the landing indicated that the ban was being lifted, “It is a small signal but nevertheless an important signal.” PRC adviser Li Kwok-keung said the landing was a clear signal of an improvement in US-PRC relations. [Ed. note: This article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for July 30.]

7. PRC-Taiwan Relations

The Associated Press (Annie Huang, “TAIWAN REAFFIRMS STATEHOOD CLAIM,” Taipei, 07/30/99) and Reuters (“CHINA UNMOVED BY TAIWAN CLARIFICATION ON TIES,” Beijing, 07/30/99) reported that a spokesman for the PRC’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) dismissed Taiwan Straits Exchange Foundation chairman Koo Chen-fu’s attempt on Friday to clarify Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s statement. The ARATS spokesman said that an earlier statement issued by Koo was “a grave violation of our 1992 agreement to uphold mutual recognition of the one-China principle and we reject it.” ARATS returned Koo’s letter, which contained the policy clarification, unopened. Earlier on Koo had said, “The existing policy toward unification has not changed.” Koo had reiterated Lee’s controversial “state to state” pronouncement. Koo repeated official statements that the new designation for contacts was necessary because the PRC had used the old “one China” formula. Koo also appealed to the PRC not to let the dispute wreck plans for a “historic” meeting between himself and ARATS chairman Wang Daohan.

8. Blackout in Taiwan

The Associated Press (Annie Huang, “BLACKOUT IN TAIWAN LINGERS,” Taipei, 07/30/99) reported that a blackout occurred in Taiwan when a utility tower collapsed in Tainan on Thursday night, cutting power to 7 million households around the island. Electricity was expected to be restored throughout the island by late Friday. According to Taiwan’s United Evening News, when a short circuit triggered an air-raid siren in the southern city of Tainan, many citizens called police to ask if fighter jets have arrived from the PRC to attack Taiwan. Officials said that the outage was not caused by sabotage and was unrelated to recent tensions with the PRC. According to Taiwan’s newspapers, Taiwan’s military suspected foul play at first and was relieved that an inspection of the island’s three nuclear power plants found no sign of attack. Taiwanese Defense Ministry spokesman Kung Fan-ting told Eastern TV that the blackout did not affect Taiwan’s combat readiness because the military was prepared to cope with such emergencies. He said it was a simple electrical outage and urged the public not to “surmise nor make unnecessary associations.”

9. Philippine-US Military Exercises

The Associated Press (“PHILIPPINE-US DRILLS ‘NOT A PROVOCATION’,” Manila, 07/30//99) reported that, according to Philippine military chief of staff General Angelo Reyes, joint Philippine-US military exercises planned for early next year are not intended to provoke the PRC. Reyes said that some of the exercises would be held in Palawan province, which has jurisdiction over islands in the Spratlys chain occupied by Filipino soldiers. Reyes said, “We would not want to deliver any political message here. This has no relation whatsoever to the Spratlys issue. Our policy is to seek a diplomatic solution to the problem in the Spratlys and we would not want to do anything to deviate from that particular thrust.” Reyes added that potential PRC objections were hindering an offer by Taiwan to sell surplus fighter jets to the Philippines at bargain prices. Reyes said, “Acquiring the jets from Taiwan would have political consequences.” He said that the Philippines could “launder” the sale by routing the jets through a third country first, but added, “Beijing would know that and we don’t want to harm our good relations with Beijing.” [Ed. note: This article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for July 30.]

10. US-Russia Nuclear Talks

Reuters (“RUSSIA, U.S. TO HOLD ARMS TALKS ON AUGUST 17-19,” Moscow, 07/30/99) reported that, according to a Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Russia and the US will hold talks next month on a START III treaty. The spokesman said, “The Russian and American sides have agreed to hold consultations on matters relating to the START-3 Treaty and the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty in Moscow on August 17-19.”

11. India-Pakistan Relations

Reuters (Raja Asghar, “PAKISTAN WANTS INDIA TO COMMIT TO SINCERE TALKS,” Islamabad, 07/30/99) reported that Pakistan urged India on Friday to make a public commitment of sincerity before the beginning peace talks. Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman Tariq Altaf said that Pakistan was interested in a fruitful dialogue, but Indian “intransigence” had made talks in the past futile. Altaf said, “To my mind, India needs to commit herself clearly that the dialogue the two countries will enter into will be sincerely and clearly leading us to a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute. I think this commitment of sincerity, of fruitfulness, is essential.”

II. Republic of Korea

1. DPRK Missile Test

Chosun Ilbo (Yoo Yong-won, “US BEEFS UP PRESENCE IN KOREA,” Seoul, 07/29/99), The Korea Times (“US SHOWS UNSWERVING DETERMINATION TO COUNTER N.KOREAN MISSILE THREATS, Seoul, 07/29/99) and The Korea Herald (Shin Yong-bae, “KIM, COHEN AGREE ON TOUGH ACTION AGAINST N.K.,” Seoul, 07/30/99) reported that the ROK and the US agreed on Thursday to station more US forces, including aircraft carriers and fighter planes, throughout and around the peninsula in an effort to persuade the DPRK not to conduct a second ballistic missile test. ROK Defense Minister Cho Sung-tae and US Defense Secretary William Cohen agreed to take full military measures to deter the DPRK’s missile tests, assessing them as a threat to the national security of not only the ROK, but Japan and the US as well. The US is mobilizing the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk of the US 7th fleet, Aegis class cruisers, a nuclear submarine, and other naval vessels, to form a formidable first naval line. The US is also deploying a more powerful air force including F-15 fighter jets, AWACS, and other jets to tip the power balance in favor of the ROK-US forces. Secretary Cohen said in a press conference after the talks that if the DPRK insists on launching its missiles, their action would only bring about negative diplomatic and economic results and other notable changes in policies towards the DPRK. Cohen feared that if the missile is test-fired, no one could predict what kind of effect it would have on the Geneva agreements.

Joongang Ilbo (“‘INCENTIVES TO NK FOR NOT TESTING MISSILE’, PRESIDENT KIM SAYS,” Seoul, 07/29/99) and The Korea Herald (Lee Sung-yul, “S. KOREA, U.S. WARN AGAINST ANOTHER N.K. MISSILE LAUNCH,” Seoul, 07/30/99) reported that ROK President Kim Dae-jung said on July 29 that the DPRK should be offered incentives to give up plans for a missile test that could erode stability in Northeast Asia. President Kim made the remark in talks with US Defense Secretary William Cohen at a lakeside retreat where the ROK leader is vacationing. Presidential spokesman Park June-young said that Kim did not elaborate on what kind of benefits should be granted to the DPRK if it gives up preparations for a launch of a long-range ballistic missile. Kim, however, also backed the US warning to the DPRK. ROK military officials said that both ROK and US forces, if they see signs of the DPRK preparing to test a ballistic missile, would likely enhance their surveillance of the DPRK forces’ move, with the US expected to double reconnaissance over the DPRK. In the meantime, Kim urged Russia and the PRC to publicly oppose the test. Kim also briefed Cohen on the ROK’s desire to expand its own missile industry to counter the DPRK.

2. Mt. Kumgang Tour

The Korea Herald (Kim Ji-ho, “UNPAID FEES MAY EMERGE AS NEW ISSUE IN HYUNDAI-N.K. TALKS TO RESTART TOUR,” Seoul, 07/30/99) and The Korea Times (“HYUNDAI BANNED FROM SENDING $8 MIL. TO NK,” Seoul, 07/29/99) reported that ROK analysts said on Thursday that the Hyundai Group’s failure to send this month’s tour fee of US$8 million to the DPRK is expected to cause more problems to its already troubled talks with the DPRK on restarting the Mt. Kumgang tour. According to Hyundai officials, however, the total amount of US$942 million Hyundai agreed to pay to the DPRK until January 2005 was the cost for the group’s exclusive rights to develop Mt. Kumgang area. “The contract stipulates that the monthly fees are installment payments in return for our exclusive business rights for developing the area,” a Hyundai official said while requesting anonymity. “As our staff members are still working in Mt. Kumgang, DPRK officials may regard the failure to send the money as a violation of contract by us, or the ROK government, under the pretext of suspended tours.” Therefore, the official went on to say, if the DPRK threatens to scrap the whole contract on the development because of the issue of unremitted money, the ROK side may be left with few excuses, he added. A group of Hyundai officials are still negotiating with their DPRK counterparts in Beijing. According to sources, the stickiest issue in the negotiations is whether to let the DPRK government apply DPRK law to ROK tourists. Another thorny issue in the negotiations is said to be the operation of a panel, comprising several officials from both the DPRK and Hyundai, which will deal with conflicts occurring during the tour.

III. Japan

1. ROK Policy toward DPRK

The Daily Yomiuri (Justin McCurry, “FORUM TOLD DIALOGUE WITH N. KOREA NEEDED,” Kyoto, 07/29/99) reported that the Fourth UN Conference on Disarmament Issues was held at Kyoto International Conference Hall in Sakyo Ward, Kyoto on July 28, gathering 60 experts from 25 countries. The DPRK rejected an invitation to attend. Lee Seo-hang of the ROK Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security said that the ROK and the international community should continue with the current policy of economic and diplomatic engagement with the DPRK to defuse mounting tension in Northeast Asia. Lee warned that recent events, including the DPRK’s test-launch of a Taepodong- 1 missile last August and the naval confrontation between the ROK and the DPRK in the Yellow Sea earlier this year, proved that “inter-Korean relations are still far from peaceful coexistence and cooperation.” As a result, he called for the continuation of confidence-building initiatives, which, he said, would ease tensions and reduce the possibility of armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula. On the bilateral front, Lee praised the ROK’s policy of engaging the DPRK in dialogue and promoting economic cooperation and person-to-person contact. Furthermore, he called for perseverance on the part of multilateral institutions, such as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). While acknowledging the “remarkable” advances made in bilateral relations, Lee said the DPRK appeared reluctant to commit itself to the sunshine policy, and continued to show signs of belligerence, including the possibility of a second missile launch. During a question-and-answer session, Lee said that although the ROK was not, in principle, opposed to the theater missile defense (TMD) system currently being considered by the US, it did not intend to participate in its development due to the cost involved and doubts about its effectiveness given the proximity of the DPRK.

2. Japanese Policy toward DPRK

The Japan Times (“FOOD AID TO NORTH COMES AT A PRICE,” 07/27/99) reported that Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka said on July 27 that the DPRK should first try to resolve pending issues with Japan before requesting food aid. During talks with Soko Shimabukuro, an Upper House member, and Osamu Yatabe, a former Upper House member who returned from a five-day trip to Pyongyang last Saturday, Nonaka urged the DPRK to first halt its reported preparations for another test-launch of a ballistic missile. Nonaka cited two other major problems that remain unresolved between the two countries–homecoming visits and missing Japanese, saying that a third group of Japanese women married to DPRK citizens should be allowed to make a homecoming trip to Japan. Nonaka said, “If Pyongyang deals with those issues, we are ready to launch negotiations between the two governments and dispatch a suprapartisan group led by former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama…. The government will sincerely deal with North Korea’s requests (for food aid).” A top government official warned, “At a time when its people are suffering from hunger, it is abnormal to increase defense spending…. It is natural for us to demand the country to restrain itself.”

3. DPRK Missile Test

The Asahi Shimbun (Toshio Jo, “US URGES UNITY ON MISSILE THREAT,” 07/29/99) reported that in his meetings with Japanese political leaders before he left for the ROK on July 27, US Defense Secretary William Cohen emphasized the importance of Japan, the US, and the ROK taking concerted diplomatic and political action if the DPRK launches a ballistic missile. In his meeting with Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, Cohen said that a Taepodong II missile would expose US territory to security risks. Cohen also said it is important to make the DPRK realize what kind of benefits it would lose if it test-fires the missile, according to Foreign Ministry officials. Cohen said, “The North Koreans have been made aware of the potential benefits of having a more cooperative relationship with the United States, Japan and South Korea. I think that they are fully aware of the potentiality involved in such (cooperative) posture on their part.” The report cited a senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official as saying, “The thrust of Cohen’s visit to Tokyo is to forge a united front against the DPRK’s posture to test-fire a ballistic missile.” Cohen stated, “There are a number of activities and actions that Japan, the US and the ROK can take in the field of economic and diplomatic initiatives, but that remains to be determined.” He added, “The US is not in the business of trying to retaliate, to escalate tensions in the region. What we are trying to do is to resolve those tensions diplomatically in a non- confrontational style. Hopefully, the North Koreans will see the benefit of this.” Cohen noted that the 1994 Agreed Framework should be maintained even if the DPRK fires the missile. Cohen said, “We think that the Agreed Framework is in the interest of all concerned that the DPRK not seek to develop further any endeavor in the field of nuclear weaponry.” He acknowledged, however, that the DPRK’s missile launch would put political pressure on Japan to suspend its financial contributions to the KEDO project. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka said in a separate meeting with Cohen that a DPRK missile launch would create a difficult political environment for Japan to continue its financial assistance to KEDO.

4. US-Japan Defense Talks

The Daily Yomiuri (“COHEN: US TO COOPERATE ON SATELLITE DEVELOPMENT,” 07/29/99) reported that visiting US Defense Secretary William Cohen said on July 28 that the US will support Japan’s plan to develop intelligence-gathering satellites. Cohen also told Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi that the US is deeply concerned over the DPRK missile issue. Cohen made the remarks in separate meetings with Obuchi, Defense Agency Director General Hosei Norota and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka. In a meeting with Nonaka, Cohen said the US will support and cooperate in the development of the intelligence-gathering satellites and wants to discuss details at a working level. Cohen told Obuchi that a launch of a missile by the DPRK would also pose a risk to US security, and reconfirmed that Japan, the US and the ROK should cooperate to prevent it. Cohen showed understanding toward the Japanese government’s plan to freeze financial aid to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) as a penalty if the DPRK launches another missile. Cohen said that it is necessary to maintain the framework of KEDO as far as possible, but that he understands Japan’s position on the matter. Cohen told Norota that he wants to resolve the issue of the relocation of the US Futenma Air Station in Okinawa Prefecture, before the Group of Eight summit meeting in Okinawa Prefecture next year, but Norota replied that the summit meeting and the Futenma issue should not be linked. Norota and Cohen agreed that the two countries would strengthen their information exchange activities concerning the DPRK missile issue.

5. Japanese Defense White Paper

The Japan Times (“PYONGYANG MISSILE POSTURING AN EXTREME CONCERN: REPORT,” 07/27/99) reported that the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) released its 1999 white paper on July 27. The paper said that the DPRK’s ability to produce missiles that can reach any part of Japan is a cause for extreme concern and an issue that directly affects Japan’s security. The annual report urged that Japan beef up its intelligence-gathering capability and countermeasures while promoting coordination with the US, the ROK, and other countries concerned about the matter. In a special chapter added to this year’s report, the agency re-examined the DPRK’s launch of a Taepodong ballistic missile last August as well as the Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF) chase of two DPRK spy ships that entered Japanese territorial waters in March. Councillor Nobumasa Ota, who briefed reporters prior to the submission of the white paper to a Cabinet meeting, said, “These incidents are new challenges from outside” against Japan’s security. The annual report welcomed the government’s decision to introduce four information-gathering satellites by fiscal 2002. The white paper also said the DPRK is likely to have completed development of 1,300-km range Rodong missiles and deployed them to put most of Japan within shooting range, but the missiles lack the accuracy necessary to execute pinpoint attacks on certain facilities. The white paper noted, “The DPRK’s missile development, coupled with the suspicion over its nuclear weapons development, is a serious concern which is becoming a destabilizing factor not only for the Asia-Pacific region but for the entire world.” Regarding military situations in other countries, the report pointed out that the US sees the development of Ballistic Missile Defense systems as one of its most urgent defense tasks. The paper maintained that the future course of the Russian military is unclear and should therefore be carefully watched, citing the nation’s shaky political and economic state, a delay in military realignment and the Russia-NATO friction showcased by NATO’s airstrikes on Yugoslavia. The white paper said that the PRC is attempting to convert its military power from quantity-oriented to quality-oriented, adding that Japan must continue to watch the progress of the PRC military’s modernization and the expansion of the sphere of the PRC’s maritime activities. The white paper urged passage of emergency defense legislation, which would exempt SDF members from some existing laws to allow them “legally” to cope with emergencies should Japan come under direct military attack.

6. Forum on Nuclear Disarmament

The Daily Yomiuri (Justin McCurry, “FORUM TOLD DIALOGUE WITH N. KOREA NEEDED,” Kyoto, 07/29/99) reported that at the Fourth UN Conference on Disarmament Issues on July 28, Former UN Undersecretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Yasushi Akashi defended a report adopted by the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament against charges that it was too pessimistic about the current international security situation. Akashi said, “I think the (international) situation is quite serious…. (The report) is arguing against complacency and pessimism, and recommends steps that should be taken now, and not in the long term.” Akashi voiced skepticism over the value of global intergovernmental initiatives in addressing the growing number of regional disarmament issues. Akashi also said, “In disarmament, what is needed is not doctrines and declarations, but substantive and concrete steps.” The report added that at the end of the session, Toshio Sano, director of the Foreign Ministry’s arms control and disarmament division, announced that the government would ask the UN to adopt the forum’s report as an official UN document.

The Japan Times (Eric Johnston, “UNSC URGED TO PREVENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION,” Kyoto, 07/29/99) reported that delegates to the Fourth UN Conference on Disarmament Issues in Kyoto on July 29 discussed the nonproliferation treaty, urging the UN Security Council to do more to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Marcos Azambuja, the Brazilian ambassador to France said, “While some agreements, notably the Antipersonnel Mines Treaty, have been a success, over the last 10 years, the five declared nuclear powers have failed to pursue disarmament vigorously.” He also criticized the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament, saying that it must be fundamentally revised and revitalized to allow for more regional diplomatic efforts. Previously, on July 28, controversy erupted after delegates criticized an unofficial report released on July 25 by the Tokyo Forum on regional disarmament. Delegates took issue with a number of the report’s suggestions, especially a recommendation that India and Pakistan accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as nonnuclear weapon states. Former UN Undersecretary General Yasushi Akashi, who chaired the Forum, acknowledged the criticism that this proposal was unrealistic but said the purpose of the recommendation was to allow both India and Pakistan to take intermediate steps so that, in the long run, this would be possible. Toshio Sano, director of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s arms control and disarmament division, concluded the afternoon session by saying the Japanese government supports the report in principle and would recommend it to the UN at an unspecified future date. Sponsored by the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs and the Tokyo-based UN Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific, the Kyoto conference is unofficial in nature, with the 60 participants from 24 countries having been invited in a personal, not official, capacity.

The NAPSNet Daily Report aims to serve as a forum for dialogue and exchange among peace and security specialists. Conventions for readers and a list of acronyms and abbreviations are available to all recipients. For descriptions of the world wide web sites used to gather information for this report, or for more information on web sites with related information, see the collection of other NAPSNet resources.
We invite you to reply to today’s report, and we welcome commentary or papers for distribution to the network.

Produced by the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development in partnership with:
International Policy Studies Institute Seoul, Republic of Korea
The Center for Global Communications, Tokyo, Japan
Center for American Studies,
Fudan University, Shanghai, People’s Republic of China

Timothy L. Savage: napsnet@nautilus.org
Berkeley, California, United States

Wade L. Huntley: napsnet@nautilus.org
Berkeley, California, United States

Lee Dong-young: UNPOL@netsgo.com
Seoul, Republic of Korea

Hiroyasu Akutsu: akutsu@glocomnet.or.jp
Tokyo, Japan

Peter Razvin: icipu@glas.apc.org
Moscow, Russian Federation

Chunsi Wu: dlshen@fudan.ac.cn
Shanghai, People’s Republic of China

Dingli Shen: dlshen@fudan.ac.cn
Shanghai, People’s Republic of China

 


Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published.