NAPSNet Daily Report 24 September, 2001

Recommended Citation

"NAPSNet Daily Report 24 September, 2001", NAPSNet Daily Report, September 24, 2001, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-daily-report/napsnet-daily-report-24-september-2001/

 
CONTENTS

I. United States

1. Inter-Korean Relations
2. DPRK Missile Sales
3. DPRK on Terrorism
4. ROK Aid in US Retaliation
5. PRC Aid in US Retaliation
6. US Retaliation Effects on PRC
7. Warnings of Terrorist Attacks in Japan
II. Republic of Korea 1. IAEA on DPRK
2. DPRK on Missile Use
3. DPRK on ROK Support of US Retaliation
4. US-DPRK Relations
5. DPRK Defectors in PRC
6. ROK Group to Visit DPRK

I. United States

1. Inter-Korean Relations

The International Press Service carried an analytical article (Tim Shorrock “DESPITE SOME PROGRESS, PEACE PROCESS FACES NEW ROADBLOCKS, Washington, 9/21/01) which said that the resumption of bilateral talks between the DPRK and the ROK and the October series of reunions between divided families was a hopeful sign, but progress toward reconciliation in the Korean peninsula faces new, serious roadblocks ahead. With the US Bush administration already suspicious of DPRK intentions, many experts believe that talks between the two Koreas as well as negotiations between the US and the DPRK over missiles and other issues may be in a holding pattern for several years. Kyongsoo Lho, a specialist on military affairs at Seoul National University and a former adviser to the ROK government, said, “Until this latest crisis, Korea was high on the US security agenda, but it is definitely now on the backburner.” Selig Harrison, a senior scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, said that he was more hopeful than Lho “because of economics.” Harrison said that even if the ROK and the US are not engaged in the peace process, several key economic initiatives are moving forward that will promote stability in the Korean Peninsula and the Asia region in general. Harrison noted that the focus is on economics because “military tensions will not be dealt with until the US joins in the process. It is incorrect to underrate the potential for getting this economic process underway.”

2. DPRK Missile Sales

The Associated Press (“NKOREA DENIES CIA MISSILE REPORT,” 8/22/01) reported that the DPRK denied a US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report that said the country continued to export missile equipment and technology to countries in the Middle East, South Asia and North Africa last year. The official KCNA said on September 21, “It’s nothing but a shameless allegation. The United States is absurdly picking quarrels with us and other countries.” The CIA had said earlier this month that the DPRK “places a high priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles.”

3. DPRK on Terrorism

Korea Times (Oh Young-jin and Son Key-young, “NK SENT US PRIVATE CABLE ON ANTI-TERRORISM,” 9/24/01) reported that ROK officials said on September 24 that the DPRK contacted the US immediately after the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., telling the US that it regretted the attacks and did not have anything to do with them. A senior ROK official said, “The North sent a ‘private communication’ to that effect to the US State Department via the Swedish Embassy in Pyongyang. The US appreciated Pyongyang’s prompt expression of its anti-terrorism stance. It is likely to improve Pyongyang’s image and help resume their suspended bilateral talks on a more conciliatory note.” The DPRK Foreign Ministry, in the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), condemned the attacks on September 12, the day after they took place, saying that they were tragic and regretful events. Sources say, however, that the DPRK’s private communication was more strong- worded than its official announcement. Evans Revere, deputy chief of the mission at the US Embassy, said on September 21 that the terrorist attacks would not adversely affect the US engagement effort toward the DPRK. [Ed. note: This article appeared in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for September 24, 2001.]

4. ROK Aid in US Retaliation

Reuters (“SOUTH KOREA NOT CONSIDERING COMBAT TROOPS FOR US,” Seoul, 9/24/01) reported that the ROK said on Monday that it would send medical teams to help any US-led anti-terrorism force but was not considering contributing combat troops for now. Kim Ha-joong, chief security adviser to ROK President Kim Dae-jung, said in a statement, “The government is not considering sending combat troops as of now.” He confirmed the ROK would contribute medical teams, aircraft, ships and liaison officers and pool intelligence. Kim noted that more than 100 countries had announced that they would support the US, but just a few had pledged combat troops, including Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand. He said that the US had not asked the ROK for combat troops but he did not rule out the possibility altogether. Except for financial aspects, the size of the support is expected to be similar to that the government extended during the Gulf War, when it sent medical staff and provided transport.

5. PRC Aid in US Retaliation

The Washington Post (Steven Mufson, “CHINA TELLS U.S. IT WILL SHARE INFORMATION,” 9/22/01) and the Washington Times (Nicholas Kralev, “China, U.S. Ready To Share Intelligence,” 9/24/01) reported that PRC Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said on September 21 that PRC counter- terrorism experts will meet US officials on September 23 to share intelligence that might help the US Bush administration’s war on terrorism. However, Tang cautioned that the anti-terrorism campaign should “respect the United Nations charter and norms of international law.” In a 20-minute meeting with US President George W. Bush and an earlier two-hour meeting with US Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, Tang pledged PRC support for battling terrorism. Powell and Tang said that the issue of PRC-US military cooperation to combat terrorists did not come up. Powell stated, “I made the point to the foreign minister that we would be looking at a complete campaign that would involve going after finances, information, intelligence, law enforcement, and might have a military component. But we did not get into any details of a military component, nor did I ask the Chinese government what their reaction might be, nor did they suggest to me any participation.” Much of the meeting was devoted to preparing for the Bush trip, including discussion of nonproliferation, human rights and missile defense. Tang said later that Taiwan remained the “most important and outstanding issue in US-China relations.” [Ed. note: Both articles appeared in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for September 23, 2001.]

6. US Retaliation Effects on PRC

The Wall Street Journal carried an analytical article (Charles Hutzler, “CHINA WORRIES THAT RISING U.S. INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA COULD HARM ITS INTERESTS,” Beijing, 9/24/01) reported that the PRC is concerned whether a US military presence in Pakistan and Central Asia will undercut its growing role in the region. Andrew Nathan, a PRC expert at Columbia University in New York, said, “A skillful U.S. handling of the situation, even though this is what China hopes for, will produce problems in U.S.-China relations.” Several of the PRC’s strategically important neighbors may now move toward closer alliances with the US. Among them is Pakistan, which had grown increasingly reliant on the PRC for trade, investment and weapons as relations with the US suffered in the past decade over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Two of four Central Asian countries now in an antiterrorism alliance with the PRC– Kazakstan and Uzbekistan–also have not ruled out cooperating with the US. While the PRC wants to show the world that it can cooperate in the global fight the US says is needed, the PRC also is hoping to serve as a useful counterbalance against what it and its neighbors sometimes see as US adventurism. [Ed. note: This article appeared in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for September 24, 2001.]

7. Warnings of Terrorist Attacks in Japan

Reuters (“US WARNS JAPAN OF ANOTHER ATTACK THIS WEEK,” Tokyo, 9/23/01) reported that the Japan’s Jiji news agency quoted Japanese government sources as saying that the US has warned its allies of a possible second round of attacks by the end of this week. Jiji reported that according to the information provided to Japan by the US, during the next round of attacks, the “means of terrorism” would be “more cruel and shocking” than the September 11 attack. The report could not be confirmed by the US embassy in Tokyo, which said it was not aware of any new information regarding the possibility of another attack. US government sources said attacks on Japan could not be ruled out since it has expressed support for US retaliation against the September 11 strikes. Japan’s public security authorities have gone on heightened alert since receiving the information from the US.

II. Republic of Korea

1. IAEA on DPRK

The Korea Herald (Hwang Jang-jin, “IAEA CALLS ON N.K. TO COMPLY WITH NUCLEAR INSPECTION,” Seoul, 09/21/01) reported that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) during its annual general conference last week called on the DPRK to cooperate with plans for an international inspection of its nuclear activities. The IAEA adopted a resolution without vote, “strongly encouraging the DPRK to respond positively” to its proposal earlier this year. The proposal said that the DPRK needed to take the first “concrete steps” required for the verification process without delay. The resolution said, “The IAEA is continuing to monitor the ‘freeze’ on facilities under the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and DPRK, but it remains unable to verify fully the DPRK’s initial 1992 declaration of its nuclear program.”

2. DPRK on Missile Use

The Korea Herald (“N.K. SAYS NO MISSILES IF NOT ATTACKED,” Seoul, 09/21/01) reported that DPRK’s Rodong Sinmun newspaper said on September 22 that the country’s missile development program was defensive in nature and that missile production would not be necessary if it was not threatened by outside powers. The official newspaper for the DPRK’s ruling Workers Party said that the US deployed nuclear weapons and missiles in and around the Korean Peninsula, and as long as no hostile actions were taken against the DPRK, it would not use its missiles. The editorial, however, said that developing missiles or rockets for peaceful purposes was the country’s sovereign right and that it would not tolerate any outside interference.

3. DPRK on ROK Support of US Retaliation

Chosun Ilbo (Kim In-ku, “PYONGYANG BLASTS SEOUL FOR SUPPORTING US,” Seoul, 09/23/01) reported that the DPRK’s Radio Pyongyang broadcast on September 22 that the ROK alliance with the US is an anti-national and anti-unification act. The station insisted that ROK military officials and conservatives have taken sides with the US and persecute unification activists and patriots in the name of national security. It criticized conservatives, saying that they were sacrificing the national interest to obtain foreign favors, and said that war is against the nature of the June 15 Joint Declaration.

4. US-DPRK Relations

Joongang Ilbo (Kim Ki-chan, “TERRORIST ATTACK IN U.S. WILL NOT AFFECT U.S.-DPRK RELATIONS,” Seoul, 09/21/01) reported that Evans J.R. Revere, the acting US ambassador to the ROK, in his luncheon speech on September 21 said that the US would put a key priority on the DPRK’s full cooperation with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As for the terrorist attack on the US, Revere said that he does not agree with the fears of the possible negative impact on the existing policy toward the DPRK. Citing US Secretary of State Colin Powell that the US is still willing to engage in talks with the North without precondition, he pointed out instead that “… the terrorist attacks provide an opportunity for the DPRK to cooperate with the international community in its campaign against terrorism.”

5. DPRK Defectors in PRC

Joongang Ilbo (Kim Hee-sung, “CHINA EXPELS ANNUALLY 3,000-4,000 DEFECTORS,” Seoul, 09/21/01) reported that a source estimated on September 20 that the PRC expels an average of 3,000-4,000 DPRK defectors per year. Currently, about 10,000-30,000 DPRK defectors are likely to be hiding out in the region. The figure is based on firsthand interview with the defectors, contacts with Korean residents in the PRC, and various international relief organizations. However, the source said, the overall number of defectors decreased somewhat compared to the same time last year due to the relative improvement in food conditions in the DPRK. On the other hand, more defectors came to choose a new sanctuary, namely Mongolia, which is considered much safer than the PRC. Meanwhile, many relief organizations were also persecuted and kicked out from the territory by authorities. An average of US$500-4,000 fine is placed on anyone helping out the defectors, while rewards are given to those notifying authorities about the hideouts. The procedures are allegedly funded by the DPRK Government behind the scene.

6. ROK Group to Visit DPRK

Joongang Ilbo (Kim Ki-chan, “UNION GROUP OFF TO PYONGYANG TUESDAY,” Seoul, 09/20/01) reported that eleven representatives of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions will visit Pyongyang at the invitation of the DPRK’s General Federation of Korean Trade Unions from next September 24- 27. The ROK side also plans to seek a change to the DPRK group’s position on the nature of future reunification. “We plan to propose to the North removing the clause on reunification by federation based on North Korean ideology from its draft statement” and replacing it with something more neutral.

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International Peace Research Institute (PRIME),
Meiji Gakuin University, Tokyo, Japan
Monash Asia Institute,
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Gee Gee Wong: napsnet@nautilus.org
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Timothy L. Savage: napsnet@nautilus.org
Berkeley, California, United States

Kim Hee-sun: khs688@hotmail.com
Seoul, Republic of Korea

Hibiki Yamaguchi: hibikiy@dh.mbn.or.jp
Tokyo, Japan

Rumiko Seya: rumiko-seya@geocities.co.jp
Tokyo, Japan

Hiroya Takagi: hiroya_takagi@hotmail.com
Tokyo, Japan

Peter Razvin: icipu@glas.apc.org
Moscow, Russian Federation

Yunxia Cao: yunxiac@yahoo.com
Shanghai, People’s Republic of China

Dingli Shen: dlshen@fudan.ac.cn
Shanghai, People’s Republic of China

John McKay: John.McKay@adm.monash.edu.au
Clayton, Australia

 


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