NAPSNet Daily Report 22 February, 2000

Recommended Citation

"NAPSNet Daily Report 22 February, 2000", NAPSNet Daily Report, February 22, 2000, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-daily-report/napsnet-daily-report-22-february-2000/

 
CONTENTS

I. United States

1. Defection of DPRK Missile Expert
2. DPRK View of US Missile Defense
3. DPRK Defectors in PRC
4. PRC White Paper on Taiwan
5. US Response to PRC White Paper
6. Taiwan Response to PRC White Paper
7. Analysis of PRC White Paper
8. US-PRC Talks
9. PRC Military
10. PRC Participation in G8
11. US-Japan Talks
12. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
II. Republic of Korea 1. Defection of DPRK Missile Expert
2. DPRK Defectors in PRC
3. DPRK-Japan Talks
4. DPRK-ROK Economic Cooperation
5. ROK Aid to DPRK
6. DPRK-ROK Cultural Exchanges
7. Kim Jong-il’s Alleged Slush Fund
8. ROK Naval Preparedness
9. Korean War Massacre
III. Russian Federation 1. Alleged DPRK-RF Missile Agreement
2. Defection of DPRK Missile Expert
3. RF Policies toward DPRK, Vietnam
4. DPRK Leader’s Birthday
5. ROK-RF Relations
6. RF-Japan Naval Contacts
7. PRC-Japan Cyberspace Confrontation
8. Cross-Straits Relations
9. PRC Membership in WTO

I. United States

1. Defection of DPRK Missile Expert

The International Herald Tribune (Don Kirk, “NEW MISSILE REPORTED IN NORTH KOREA,” Seoul, 2/19-20/00) reported that the ROK newspaper Chosun Ilbo reported that a senior DPRK scientist, Lim Ki-sung, who reportedly defected to the US, has told ROK authorities that the DPRK has developed a missile capable of reaching California. Lim said that the missile had a range of 6,000 kilometers (3,725 miles). Cho Chung-pyo, assistant foreign affairs secretary on the staff of ROK President Kim Dae-jung, said, “that distance would be a really big development. That kind of capability was never previously indicated.” The newspaper said that Lim, who is 59, fled the DPRK in December 1999 along with his son, 31, also a missile expert, and a nephew, 32, who had been a DPRK Army officer. A US State Department official refused to comment on the report, saying, “We don’t confirm or deny whether a specific individual may or may not have been granted asylum.” The Chosun Ilbo said the three had passed on vital information on the DPRK missile program. Cheon Seong-wun, a senior research fellow in the Korean Institute of National Unification, an adjunct of the ROK’s Unification Ministry, said that a number of DPRK experts had defected in recent months and questioned whether the DPRK could fire a long-range missile with any accuracy. The Chosun Ilbo reported that Lim had said the DPRK’s missile technology was “first class” and that the 6,000-kilometer-range missile was “apparently ready to fly.” Lim said, “North Korea is aiming at America, not South Korea. North Korea has been nurturing the long-range missile despite hunger or hardship.” [Ed. note: This article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for February 22, 2000.]

The Washington Times published an opinion article by Frank Gaffney Jr., the president of the Center for Security Policy (“MISSILE RISKS RISING,” 2/22/00) which said that Lim Ki-sung’s account about the DPRK possibly possessing the missile capability to strike the US could be true. Gaffney criticized the US intelligence community’s “chronic inability to estimate correctly what is, arguably, the most serious threat facing the United States today.” Gaffney said that a contributing factor was that intelligence analysts and their political superiors exhibit “cognitive dissonance” where they do not see what they do not want to see. Gaffney also said that the US vulnerability lies in the US administration’s insistence that the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty remains the cornerstone of strategic stability. Gaffney criticized US President Clinton’s desire to deploy only a limited National Missile Defense which he says, would “leave the American people permanently vulnerable to attacks involving more than a few missiles, or even less coming from the wrong quadrants.” Gaffney concluded, “there is no time to lose in defending the United States against missile attack. The Clinton-Gore team remains determined to trust in arms control, not effective anti-missile systems, despite the rejection of that approach by an overwhelming percentage of the American people. This is the stuff of which national elections – and mandates – must be made.” [Ed. note: This opinion article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for February 22, 2000.]

2. DPRK View of US Missile Defense

The Associated Press (“N. KOREA DENOUNCES US DEFENSE SYSTEM,” Seoul, 2/22/00) reported that the DPRK on Tuesday denounced the US for planning to build an anti-missile defense system, calling the plan an attempt to dominate the world. A commentary in the DPRK’s Rodong Sinmun said, “the US seeks to cover the world with its missile network and completely take hold of it.”

3. DPRK Defectors in PRC

The Washington Post (John Pomfret, “N. KOREAN REFUGEES INSECURE IN CHINA,” Renming, 02/19/00, A01) reported that the situation of the estimated 30,000-50,000 DPRK refugees in the PRC has become increasingly precarious due to improved relations between the DPRK and other countries. An unnamed UN official described the international response to the recent forced repatriation of seven DPRK refugees as “total silence. This was a direct and clear violation of international law. In most parts of the world, the Americans would be outraged.” Aid officials said foreign governments grateful for the easing of tension over the DPRK’s weapons programs have been less energetic about pressuring the DPRK on refugees or food aid distribution. In some areas, refugees estimated that the death toll from the famine has reached 15 percent of the population. Unnamed Western experts said that the government of Kim Jong-il appears to be stronger than it was when the famine began in 1995. One DPRK doctor who fled to the PRC late last year described the distribution of Western medicine in his hospital in Chongjin as “Ten percent for war preparations, 10 percent for the people and 80 percent for the officials. The United Nations came to my hospital once. It was very sad. We would have loved to have told them the truth, but that would have meant arrest for us. So we just smiled.” Kim Jae-ru, a former member of the DPRK’s Korean Workers’ Party, stated, “Only the children of powerful or useful people get UN food all the time. The normal people get UN food only on special days, like the birthdays of Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-il. But in private markets, there is lots of UN food and medicine.'” Peter Smerdon, a spokesman for the World Food Program, stated, “We supply food to schools, nurseries and kindergartens but we realize that not all children are in those institutions. We are very concerned about the children we are missing…. We know we are not reaching everyone who needs food.”

4. PRC White Paper on Taiwan

The New York Times (Erik Eckholm, “CHINA SAYS TAIWAN CANNOT CONTINUE DELAYING REUNION,” Beijing, 2/22/00) and The Washington Post (John Pomfret, “CHINA ISSUES NEW TAIWAN ULTIMATUM DELAY IN REUNIFICATION WOULD SPUR USE OF FORCE,” Beijing, 2/21/00) reported that the PRC State Council issued an official 11,000-word white paper, entitled “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue,” on February 21. The paper said, “if the Taiwan authorities refuse … the peaceful settlement of cross-straits reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese government will only be forced to adopt all drastic measures possible, including use of force.” The report did not provide a timetable or deadline for the negotiations. The paper rejected the possibility of political reform in the PRC, a key condition put forth by the Taiwanese government to begin talks. However, it said, “provided that it is within the framework of one China, any question can be discussed,” including “Taiwan’s international space for economic, cultural and social activities compatible with its status, the political status of the Taiwan authorities and other questions.” The paper also suggested that the PRC would be justified in attacking Taiwan if the US continued its arms sales to the island, or if Taiwan revises its constitution to modify support of the “one China” principle. US officials said that the US State Department is studying the document carefully, but will refrain from detailed reaction until the full meaning is clear. US State Department spokesman James P. Rubin said, “we have an abiding interest in peaceful resolution of the cross-strait issue. And we urge both sides to foster dialogue to resolve that issue.” Michel Oksenberg, an expert on China’s security affairs at Stanford University, said, “the good news is that this is better than something military. The bad news is that the Chinese felt compelled to do anything at all when it looked liked things were heading their way.” Oksenberg said the white paper appeared to be a tactical maneuver, and “the two sides are circling around each other to see about resumption of dialogue after the election. They are trying to set the terms of the debate.” Andrew Yang, secretary general of the China Council of Advanced Policy Studies, a private group in Taipei, said, “this is a signal that Beijing is getting impatient with the delays in the process of reunification. This is a warning to the people of Taiwan.” [Ed. note: The New York Times article was one of the top stories in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for February 22, 2000.]

The Washington Times (Gus Constantine, “CHINA WARNS OF ATTACK ON TAIWAN,” 2/22/00) reported that the PRC’s official People’s Daily said in an editorial on Tuesday that following the PRC’s release of its White Paper on Taiwan, reunification had taken on a new urgency. The editorial hinted at the approval for a proposal by Taiwan’s vice president and presidential candidate, Lien Chan, for more direct trade links between Taiwan and the PRC. The report said, “since Hong Kong and Macao returned to the motherland, the cause of resolving the Taiwan issue and achieving complete reunification has entered into a new stage.” The report also said that the PRC will be “more active in pushing forward cross-straits personnel exchanges in the economic and cultural fields, and establish direct links in trade, transport and postal services as soon as possible.”

5. US Response to PRC White Paper

Reuters (“US REJECTS FORCE, URGES CHINA, TAIWAN TO TALK,” Washington, 2/22/00) and the Associated Press (Terence Hunt, “US REJECTS CHINESE FORCE THREAT,” Washington, 2/22/00) reported that US White House spokesman Joe Lockhart said on Tuesday that the US views any threat to Taiwan with “grave concern.” Lockhart said, “we reject any use of force or any threat of force in this situation. We believe that peaceful dialogue and bilateral engagement between the two sides is the way to move forward. We have repeated, in I think both actions and words, that we view any threat to Taiwan with grave concern.” Asked what the US would do if the PRC acted on its ultimatum, Lockhart said, “in 1996 we responded appropriately to what we viewed was a threat. That should give you some indication of how we view this situation.” Lockhart said he did not expect the latest developments to affect negotiations the PRC’s entry into World Trade Organization (WTO). Lockhart said, “the benefits of China’s ascension into the WTO and the vast … increased openness of China’s market to America’s business remains very much in our national interest. The agreement is very much in our country’s interest.”

Agence France Presse (“TAIWAN TIGHTENS SECURITY AS TIES WITH CHINA DOMINATE POLLS CAMPAIGN,” Taipei, 2/20/00) reported that a Taiwanese defense ministry spokesman said Taiwan has tightened the island’s security to counter any potential threat from the PRC. The spokesman said, “the military has stepped up alertness at this point … measures regarding the surveillance of the enemy’s intelligence and movements have been put in place. But there is not any sign suggesting massive movement of Chinese communist troops … and neither has the (Chinese) military heightened the level of war preparedness.” United Daily News said on February 20 that, in order not to provoke the PRC, Taiwanese military authorities have cancelled the planned test firing of an anti-ballistic missile as a peace gesture. Taiwan’s Defense Minister Tang Fei said on February 19 that military exercises had been halted in the run-up to the elections and he urged the PRC not to use the event as an opportunity to cause trouble.

6. Taiwan Response to PRC White Paper

The Associated Press (William Foreman, “TAIWAN TELLS CHINA TO BE FLEXIBLE,” Taipei, 2/22/00) reported that Taiwan responded to the PRC’s release of “The One-China Principal and the Taiwan Issue” by urging the PRC on Tuesday not to get bogged down in old disputes and to be more flexible in solving differences between the two sides. Lin Chong-pin, vice chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, said, “Communist China’s continual denial of the existence of the Republic of China is going to create more trouble for the two sides and make the relations more tense.” Lin said that the PRC and Taiwan should return to their flexible 1992 consensus in which they acknowledge the existence of “one China” but are each free to have a different view of what that China is.

Agence France Presse (“CHINA CONCILIATORY AFTER WAR THREAT, BUT TAIWAN RESPONDS WITH DEFIANCE,” Beijing, 2/22/00) reported that in the first official reaction to the PRC’s new White Paper on Taiwan, Taiwanese foreign ministry spokesman Henry Chen said that the PRC must stop trying to intimidate the island and accept it is an independent sovereign state. Chen said, “the Republic of China has been an independent sovereign state since its establishment in 1912. We hope Communist China can face the realities that the two sides have been governed separately since 1949 and stop squeezing us in the international community and abandon military threats to promote positive cross-strait ties.” The Taiwanese military also responded by pledging to keep up arms purchases to ensure the island’s defense.

7. Analysis of PRC White Paper

Agence France Presse (“CHINA SEEKING INFLUENCE OVER TAIWAN LEADERS’ POLICY: ANALYSTS, PRESS,” Taipei, 2/22/00) reported that Taiwanese analysts and newspapers said Tuesday that the PRC is trying to force Taiwan’s new leaders to reshape their cross-strait policy by hardening its position on reunification. Taiwanese analysts said that the move reflected the PRC’s anxieties about Taiwan’s March 18 presidential elections. The Taiwanese daily China Times said in a commentary, “it shows Beijing’s attempts to influence the platform of presidential candidates and force the new president to redesign the country’s mainland policy guidelines. There are no longer sentimental calls to the Taiwan government and people for reunification, but a cold and stern statement. There will be undoubtedly less flexibility in cross-strait exchanges which will certainly pose a tough challenge to the new leader.” Political science professor Yang Kai-huan from Soochow University said, “seeing that the platform of the three leading candidates are more or less in line with Lee Teng-hui’s policy, Beijing was forced to harden its determination for reunification feeling urgency for the issue.” Yang said the move was not necessarily aimed to sway voters but as “a warning to the new president.”

8. US-PRC Talks

The New York Times (Elisabeth Rosethal, “US SAYS TIES WITH CHINA ARE ON THE MEND,” Beijing, 2/19/00) reported that US officials felt optimistic that the recent two-day talks between US and PRC officials will help normalize relations between the two countries. US officials said that they told their PRC counterparts that they thought, “what happened in 1996 was counterproductive,” although they said they were “unclear” if the PRC officials shared their same view. One anonymous US official said, “we said we should regard the period ahead as a period of opportunity but also a period by definition of some uncertainty, that requires the greatest possible degree of restraint, caution and prudence on everybody’s part.” The US officials also said that the PRC government has been studying politics in Taiwan closely and seemed to understand the complexities of the upcoming election.

9. PRC Military

Agence France Presse (“CHINESE PRESIDENT TOURS SOUTH TO BOOST MILITARY MORALE,” Hong Kong, 2/20/00) reported that the Oriental Daily News said on February 20 that PRC President Jiang Zemin is boosting military morale and preparing for a personnel reshuffle in an unpublicized tour in the southern PRC. The report said that Jiang arrived in Zhanjiang in coastal Guangdong province on February 19 and visited a Su-27 fighter base at Maoming as well as the South Sea fleet. Jiang also met with Li Changchun, his protege and Guangdong communist party secretary, and customs and border control officials before moving on to Guangdong’s capital city Guangzhou. The Tin Tin Daily News said that Jiang also met a foreign official in Shenzhen on February 21 and visited high-tech enterprises in the Longjiang district. The report said that Jiang would also visit the coastal province of Fujian after he leaves Guangdong. The reports could not be independently confirmed. Tin Tin cited sources as saying that Jiang is attempting to boost military morale because both the South Sea fleet and the troops in the Guangzhou Military Region will play a major role if war broke out between Taiwan and the PRC. The newspaper said that sources also see Jiang’s visit to Guangdong as an opportunity for him to prepare the promotion of his protege Li to the post of deputy prime minister ahead of the National People’s Congress in March.

10. PRC Participation in G8

The Associated Press (“CHINA SAYS NO TO G-8’S JAPAN SUMMIT,” Beijing, 2/22/00) reported that the PRC on Tuesday rejected invitations to join this year’s Group of Eight (G-8) summit. PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao said, “China has made clear on many occasions that it has no intention to attend the G-8 summit and other related activities. The position and viewpoints of China on Asia-Pacific affairs and other major international issues are well-known. Meanwhile the Chinese side also wants to emphasize that the important role of the United Nations and the UN Security Council in international affairs is irreplaceable.”

11. US-Japan Talks

Agence France Presse (“ALBRIGHT, KONO HOLD ‘SUBSTANTIVE’ TALKS ON REGIONAL, BILATERAL ISSUES,” Washington, 2/20/00) reported that US State Department spokesman James Foley said that US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Japanese Foreign Minister Yohei Kono held “substantive” talks on February 20 on bilateral and regional issues. Foley said, “it was a very substantive and positive meeting. The Secretary of State returned from Albania early this morning and very much wanted to meet with Foreign Minister Kono at the end of his visit here.” Foley said that Kono and Albright met for about half an hour alone, and then were joined for a breakfast meeting with the wider delegation that lasted nearly an hour and a half. Foley said that Japan and the US “agreed on the excellent state of relations” between their countries and “the importance of our security alliance and partnership.” Speaking separately, Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman Yasuhira Kawamura said that Albright and Kono had restated their views on the importance of maintaining US bases in Japan, and agreed to details of Japan’s financial support of those bases. Kawamura said, “we need to discuss with our US counterparts how to deal with the period after that, and the fact that unfortunately Japan now faces financial difficulties.” Foley said that Kono and Albright also spoke on issues relating to the PRC, but did not disclose details of the discussion. Foley said that Japanese and US relations with the DPRK did not come up during the broader breakfast meeting but may have arisen during the one-on- one discussion between Kono and Albright.

12. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

The New York Times (Jane Perlez, “RUSSIAN AIDE OPENS DOOR A BIT TO US BID FOR A MISSILE DEFENSE,” Washington, 2/18/00) reported that Sergei B. Ivanov, head of Russia’s National Security Council, said on February 18 at a news conference at the Russian Embassy in Washington that Russia was willing to discuss the possibility of moving the US radar and interceptor site from North Dakota to another location. Ivanov said that it was possible “if we are talking about the geographic changes to deploy the system, instead of North Dakota, somewhere else. This is going to be the subject of further discussion.” However, Ivanov said, “if we are talking about slightly modifying the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) treaty at the same time as deploying national missile defense, these two things simply can’t exist together.” Ivanov described the ABM Treaty as “extremely valuable to us – among other factors, because it is very short, very clear and precise.” US National Security Council spokesman Mike Hammer said he did not have a comment on Ivanov’s remarks because “there’s not an overwhelming desire to shed much light.”

II. Republic of Korea

1. Defection of DPRK Missile Expert

Chosun Ilbo (Jee Hae-bom, “NK DEFECTORS DENIED BY SK EMBASSY IN BEIJING,” Beijing, 02/20/00), Chosun Ilbo (Jee Hae-bom, “NK MISSILE EXPERT DEFECTS TO US,” Beijing, 02/18/00) reported on February 20 that a 59-year old DPRK missile expert named Lim, his 31-year old son and his 32-year old nephew-in-law, defected to the US. They initially contacted the ROK embassy in the PRC, but were denied access. The father and son worked at a missile base in Yangang province. After crossing into Yenji, PRC, the three called the ROK embassy, identified themselves and asked for help to gain entry. According to a source in the PRC, Lim was repeatedly rebuffed by the ROK embassy, which told them, “we don’t need people like you.” He then called the US embassy and, one month later, the three flew to the US on new passports and visas. They left a letter in the PRC detailing the ROK embassy’s reputed refusals to interview them. The articles said that to date the ROK government has officially stated that it will accept all DPRK defectors without limitations, but in reality the embassy and consul generals in the PRC refuse to see DPRK Nationals because they fear upsetting PRC authorities.

2. DPRK Defectors in PRC

The Korea Times (“N.KOREAN REFUGEES IN CHINA BECOME MORE INSECURE AND ISOLATED,” Seoul, 02/20/00) reported that the Washington Post said on February 19 that the situation of an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 DPRK refugees in the PRC has become increasingly precarious as the PRC and Western countries have been improving relations with the DPRK. The report said that in January the West ignored when Russia and the PRC cooperated to forcibly repatriate seven DPRK citizens in what the UN High Commissioner for Refugees called a direct violation of international law. One UN official described the Western response to the forced repatriation as “total silence. This was a direct and clear violation of international law. In most parts of the world, the Americans would be outraged.” Citing aid officials, the daily said, “the silence fits a pattern that it was started last year when North Korea indicated that it was suspending its development of weapons of mass destruction.”

3. DPRK-Japan Talks

The Korea Times (Kim Kwang-tae, “PYONGYANG-TOKYO TALKS FACE HURDLES,” Seoul, 02/20/00) reported that scheduled preliminary talks between Japan and the DPRK hit snags when the DPRK demanded food aid and Japan asked for clarification from the DPRK over alleged kidnapping cases. The DPRK and Japan were to hold a second round of preliminary talks later this month in Beijing to normalize relations between the two countries. ROK Red Cross officials stated, “as a precondition to food aid, Japan called for a thorough explanation from the North as to the alleged kidnapping cases involving Japanese. Meanwhile, North Korea replied ‘no further negotiations,’ clouding the prospects of the talks.” Neither side is showing any sign of backing down. Though the DPRK and Japan held behind- the-scenes contacts to lay the groundwork for the preliminary talks, neither side has put forward a concrete timetable.

4. DPRK-ROK Economic Cooperation

The Korea Times (Kim kwang-tae, “S-N JOINT SOFTWARE CENTER EYED,” Seoul, 02/20/00) reported that Samsung Electronics Company and DPRK’s Chosun Computer Center will launch a joint computer program center in the PRC early next month. The two firms signed a contract last September under the auspices of the Asia Pacific Peace Committee of DPRK to develop software at a cost of US$1 million. Officials said that the joint venture plans to develop software, including word processors, Chinese characters recognition, games and graphics applications. “North Korea shows a strong interest in the project,” said a Samsung spokesman, adding the company will file applications with the Unification Ministry to launch the project. It is expected that the government will endorse the project. Samsung will provide capital and state-of-the-art technology while the DPRK offers labor. The labor costs that the ROK firm provides to the DPRK will be used to operate the center.

The Korea Times (Son Key-young, “MIN. PARK URGES NK TO RESPOND TO ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OVERTURE,” Seoul, 02/18/00) reported that ROK Unification Minister Park Jae-kyu on February 17 urged the DPRK to positively respond to ROK’s proposal that state-run research institutes of the ROK and the DPRK meet to discuss the formation of an inter-Korean economic community. At present, the joint committees are idle because of the ROK’s refusal to activate the process. Park stated, “if we want to resolve all problems between South and North Korea, it is indispensable for authorities to hold direct dialogue, which should be mutually beneficial.”

5. ROK Aid to DPRK

Joongang Ilbo (Lee Chul-hee, “SOUTH KOREA FORMS RELATIONS WITH 250 NORTH KOREAN CORN VILLAGES,” Seoul, 02/20/00) reported that ROK individuals, citizens’ groups, and firms have established connections with 250 DPRK corn villages. The North Korea Corn Planting Movement announced on February 20 that the firms and groups, in cooperation with International Corn Foundation, planted corn in 1,000 villages in the DPRK, and have now established “sisterhood” relationships with 250 villages. Christian circles established 161 of the 169 sisterhood relationships formed by religious groups. Meanwhile, some social groups, such as the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice and Buchun Citizens’ Coalition, participated in establishing the connections.

6. DPRK-ROK Cultural Exchanges

The Korea Times (“INTER-KOREAN ICE HOCKEY MATCHES PROPOSED,” Seoul, 02/20/00) reported that according to an official of the Korean Ice Hockey Association, the DPRK has proposed that the ROK and the DPRK hold friendly ice hockey matches in Seoul and Pyongyang alternately. The officials said on February 19 that the proposal was made by the DPRK team while it was taking part in the 2000 Asia-Oceania junior ice hockey championship. The DPRK side also offered that the ice hockey teams of ROK and the DPRK undergo joint training before they eventually form a unified Korean national team in international competitions. The official said that the ROK would accept and actively pursue the proposal after consultations with relevant government authorities in Seoul.

7. Kim Jong-il’s Alleged Slush Fund

The Korea Times (“KIM JONG-IL HAS SLUSH FUND OF 2 BILLION DOLLARS,” Seoul, 02/20/00) reported that 02/20/00) reported that an ROK government source said on February 19 that DPRK leader Kim Jong-il is believed to receive US$60-70 million yearly from various sources as slush funds and manages at least US$2 billion as such. The sources of funds include cash donations from all government agencies, “loyalty due” on the occasion of his birthday on February 16, US$500,000-600,000 from the minting company under the control of the DPRK’s finance and accounting ministry, and 100-200 kilograms of gold ingots from the defense ministry. The money collected is forwarded to Gold Star Bank, incorporated in Austria, in the form of letters of credit or remittances abroad. Kim normally withdraws US$7-8 million from the bank at a time. Kim’s private coffer is believed to originate from the US$10-20 million earned by Baek In-su, deputy chief of the DPRK Workers Party’s Number 39 office, while serving as an official at the DPRK’s trade representative office in Singapore in 1976. The office under the party’s secretariat is a base for the export of agricultural products and precious metals created to raise funds for Kim when he was named to the party politburo in 1974.

8. ROK Naval Preparedness

The Korea Times (Lee Chang-sup, “NAVY ASKED TO BE FULLY ALERT TO NK ACTION OFF W.COAST,” Seoul, 02/20/00) reported that ROK President Kim Dae-jung on February 19 instructed the military to be on a full alert to a possible DPRK retaliatory military action off the West Coast this year. During his New Year’s inspection visit to the Defense Ministry, Kim noted that the DPRK’s Navy might wage an armed provocation at the Northern Line Limit (NLL) off the West Coast, to offset its defeat last year. A navy commander answered that the ROK Navy has mapped out all contingencies aimed at deterring any type of DPRK provocation.

9. Korean War Massacre

The Korea Herald (Kang Seok-jae, “S. KOREAN INVESTIGATION TEAM TO VISIT U.S. FOR TALKS ON NOGUN-RI INCIDENT,” Seoul, 02/21/00) reported that the ROK Defense Ministry said on February 20 that an ROK inter-agency investigation team will leave for the US tomorrow for talks with US officials about the Nogun-ri incident. The six-member delegation, headed by Army Lieutenant General Kim Jong-hwan, is scheduled to attend the third Bilateral Cooperation Group (BCG) talks at the US Department of the Army on February 23. The two sides will also have two rounds of working-level talks until February 24 to exchange opinions on their respective interim investigations of the incident. They are expected to discuss future probe schedules and procedures in detail. The ROK team is scheduled to visit the US National Archives on February 23, where they can directly confirm and obtain US Army documents and records related to the Nogun-ri incident. The two sides are also planning to jointly listen to the testimony of some US veterans involved in the incident.

III. Russian Federation

1. Alleged DPRK-RF Missile Agreement

Izvestia’s Yury Golotyuk (“KOREAN MISSILE MEN’S WORD WAS TRUSTED TO BE TRUE,” Moscow, 4, 02/17/00) reported that DPRK leader Kim Jong-il failed to get his main gift on the occasion of his recently celebrated birthday, as the test launch of a modernized Taepodong missile was postponed at the very last moment. The launch was planned to take place at the missile base near Musudanri in Northern Hamgyong province on February 16. The DPRK Foreign Ministry said on January 23 that the DPRK would resume its missile tests if the US continued its anti- missile tests. Thus, “the diplomatic justification was faultless,” but RF Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov’s visit to Pyongyang a week ago “spoiled the party,” because when signing the new RF-DPRK treaty, the RF delegation persistently asked its DPRK counterparts not to breach the missile test moratorium. In exchange the DPRK asked for “an alliance” clause to be included in the treaty, which would have meant automatic “nuclear guarantees” to the DPRK on the part of RF strategic forces. Finally a compromise was reached, with the DPRK canceling the missile test and the RF agreeing to consider the DPRK “its full-fledged partner” at negotiations on creation of a global system of non- proliferation of missiles and missile technologies. Thus, the right of DPRK to join “the elite club” of countries possessing long-range missiles was recognized and the Taepodong test became unnecessary.

2. Defection of DPRK Missile Expert

Segodnya (“SEOUL DENIES THE FACT OF NORTH KOREAN EXPERT’S DEFECTION,” Moscow, 4, 02/22/00) reported that the ROK Foreign Ministry on February 21, after consultation with US security officials, denied a report in the Chosun Ilbo newspaper about the alleged defection of a DPRK missile expert and his two family members from DPRK to PRC and then to the US. Allegedly the missile expert told US Central Intelligence Agency officials that the DPRK possessed 6000-kilometer range missiles and that the only impediment to DPRK missile program was the lack of finances.

Segodnya’s Svetlana Sukhova (“A MISSILE MAN FLEW TO U.S.A.,” Moscow, 3, 02/19/00) reported that, according to Chosun Ilbo newspaper, a 59 year old DPRK missile expert called Lim, together with his son and his nephew, defected from the DPRK to the US via the PRC. Each similar case, Segodnya’s author noted, usually gets a wide mass media coverage. The reason is both the communism-capitalism ideological confrontation and “the desire of a part of US establishment to convince the public of the necessity to create new national anti-missile system to protect USA, as well as Japan and Taiwan…. Opponents of ABM system … do not get tired repeating that ‘North Korean threat’ is nothing but a myth.”

3. RF Policies toward DPRK, Vietnam

Dipkuryer NG’s Dmitry Kosyrev (“NEW POLICY FOR NEW ASIA,” Moscow, 2, 02/17/00, # 3(3)) commented on RF Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov’s recent East Asian visits. The author believed that the visit to Pyongyang was the most interesting. Despite “demonization” of the DPRK in mass media, RF delegation members said their DPRK counterparts seemed to be “quite rational people who really try to move DPRK out of its international isolation.” The talks concerned US-DPRK contacts, Korean unification options, and DPRK-Japan relations. In the author’s opinion, in Asia, as different from Europe, the formula “democratization today, prosperity tomorrow” does not work. Here “it is much safer to start with prosperity.” Therefore, the DPRK’s idea of national reunification through “confederation of 2 states, 2 economic and 2 political systems” is possibly more reasonable than many others. Also, “one should not think that North Korean leaders consider as normal the situation when Washington become almost their major partner…. DPRK industry is based on old Soviet-made enterprises, and Pyongyang would like Moscow to start a program of their re-equipment…. According to the existing information, Moscow, having no financial resources for that, has already raised the issue before Tokyo and in Tokyo they will think (for Japanese it is a very new idea, but it quite meets the interests of Japanese policy to make DPRK a predictable state and to prevent aggravation of the situation in Asia).” In Hanoi they were very interested in the RF-DPRK talks. Presently Vietnam continues negotiations with the RF in the military field. “In Asia there are no countries disinterested in continuation of that cooperation – even China, because USA turning into Vietnam’s military ally would have destabilized the whole continent … and Vietnam turning into a US ally would have meant to some extent a closure of the most painful page in America’s history.”

4. DPRK Leader’s Birthday

Segodnya’s Natalia Roslova (“NORTH KOREANS CELEBRATE THEIR LEADER’S BIRTHDAY,” Moscow, 4, 02/16/00) reported that on February 15, on the eve of DPRK leader Kim Jong-il’s 58th birthday, DPRK servicemen pledged to be faithful to him. The event took place at one of Pyongyang’s squares, where DPRK Minister of People’s Armed Forces Kim Il-cher addressed 6000 troops. There is little hope to see Kim Jong-il himself at the official events. According to the official version, he was born in “a hidden camp” in the mountains of Korea during the anti-Japanese resistance war, but another version says he was born in a Siberian village in the USSR.

5. ROK-RF Relations

Dipkuryer NG’s Dmitry Kosyrev (“LADY WROTE HER DOCTORATE THESES ON RUSSIAN MASONS,” Moscow, 4, 02/17/00, # 3(3)) published his half- page interview with Mrs. Lee In-ho, ROK Ambassador in Moscow. Chiefly the interview concerned historical and cultural issues from a personal perspective. Lee noted, in particular, that many ethnic Koreans who found themselves in the newly independent Central Asian states wished to leave those countries and to settle in RF, as there’s “a huge gap between them and Koreans from Korea…. Our official policy regarding Koreans not only in Russia, but also in the former Soviet republics and world-wide, is to help them become better citizens of the countries where they live.” Concerning the situation in the RF, she said, “everything seems better than we expected…. In general we look at the situation rather optimistically.”

6. RF-Japan Naval Contacts

Nezavisimaia Gazeta’s Valery Aleksin (“THE FIRST VISIT IN A HUNDRED YEARS,” Moscow, 2, 02/16/00) and Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye (“JAPANESE NAVAL LEADER VISITED RUSSIA,” Moscow, 3, 02/18- 24/00, #6(179)) reported that Admiral Kosei Fujita, Commander, Japanese Navy, made an official visit to RF on February 11-17. That was the first-ever visit since the last military contacts between the two countries more than a hundred years ago. In Moscow, Admiral Fujita met with Admiral Kuroyedov, Commander, RF Navy. They negotiated additional details of a bilateral naval interaction program. During the visit, they agreed to hold joint exercises on search and rescue of a ship in distress, as well as communication and maneuvering exercises according to a bilateral agreement on prevention of maritime incidents. Also Admiral Fujita met with Army General Anatoly Kvashnin, Chief, General Staff, RF Armed Forces. He then traveled to Vladivostok, in particular to meet Admiral Mikhail Zakharenko, Commander, RF Pacific Fleet.

7. PRC-Japan Cyberspace Confrontation

Segodnya (“CHINESE ATTACK JAPANESE,” Moscow, 5, 02/21/00) reported that PRC hackers based in Hong Kong temporarily blocked several dozens of Japanese companies from Internet access. They showered servers of large Japanese companies with their messages as a protest against statements made by some ultra-right Japanese groups refusing to admit the damage done to China by Japan during the Second World War.

8. Cross-Straits Relations

Izvestia (“CHINA THREATENS TO USE FORCE AGAINST TAIWAN,” Moscow, 7, 02/22/00) reported that Xinhua news agency disseminated a PRC governmental statement threatening that if “Taiwan leaders continue to object to negotiations on peaceful reunification of the island with the People’s Republic of China, our government will have to use the most radical means including the use of force.” On the eve of parliamentary elections in Taiwan, it said, “any sharp change in the situation displayed, for example, in proclamation of Taiwan’s independence may lead to the start of military actions.”

Segodnya (“CHINA ENVISAGES THE USE OF FORCE TO REUNIFY TAIWAN,” Moscow, 4, 02/22/00) reported that, according to German der Spiegel magazine and some other sources, the statement made by PRC State Council promising to use force against Taiwan. if its trends toward independence became stronger, was actually drafted by Subcommittee on Military Affairs of the Communist Party of China’s Central Committee.

9. PRC Membership in WTO

Nezavisimaia Gazeta (“THE ISSUE OF P.R.C. MEMBERSHIP IN W.T.O. TO BE DECIDED BY E.U.,” Moscow, 6, 02/22/00) reported that on February 21 in Beijing representatives of the PRC and the European Union (EU) discussed the issue of PRC membership in WTO. The EU is the only body that has not yet approved the admission of the PRC. Presently the parties are drafting a compromise agreement parallel to the US-PRC agreement concluded last November.

The NAPSNet Daily Report aims to serve as a forum for dialogue and exchange among peace and security specialists. Conventions for readers and a list of acronyms and abbreviations are available to all recipients. For descriptions of the world wide web sites used to gather information for this report, or for more information on web sites with related information, see the collection of other NAPSNet resources.
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Produced by the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development in partnership with:
International Policy Studies Institute Seoul, Republic of Korea
The Center for Global Communications, Tokyo, Japan
Center for American Studies,
Fudan University, Shanghai, People’s Republic of China
Asian Institute,
Monash University, Clayton, Australia

Timothy L. Savage: napsnet@nautilus.org
Berkeley, California, United States

Gee Gee Wong: napsnet@nautilus.org
Berkeley, California, United States

Kim Hee-sun: khs688@hotmail.com
Seoul, Republic of Korea

Hiroyasu Akutsu: akutsu@glocomnet.or.jp
Tokyo, Japan

Peter Razvin: icipu@glas.apc.org
Moscow, Russian Federation

Chunsi Wu: dlshen@fudan.ac.cn
Shanghai, People’s Republic of China

Dingli Shen: dlshen@fudan.ac.cn
Shanghai, People’s Republic of China

Leanne Paton: anjlcake@webtime.com.au
Clayton, Australia

 


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