NAPSNet Daily Report 21 November, 2000

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"NAPSNet Daily Report 21 November, 2000", NAPSNet Daily Report, November 21, 2000, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-daily-report/napsnet-daily-report-21-november-2000/

 
CONTENTS

I. United States

1. ROK Policy toward Criticism of DPRK
2. US View of DPRK-Japan Relations
3. Japan-US Relations
4. PRC Missile Policy
5. PRC Adherence to UN Human Rights Pact
6. Taiwanese Policy toward PRC
II. Republic of Korea 1. Inter-Korean Railway Project
2. DPRK Diplomacy
3. DPRK Development Plan
III. People’s Republic of China 1. PRC-US Relations
2. US Presidential Election and Taiwan
3. PRC View on US Asia-Pacific Strategy
4. Russia Proposal on Nuclear Disarmament
5. PRC Attitude to Nuclear Disarmament
6. PRC-Russian Relations
IV. Australia 1. Australian Foreign Minister’s DPRK Visit
2. DPRK Nuclear Program
3. US-Australian Defense Relations

I. United States

1. ROK Policy toward Criticism of DPRK

The Associated Press (“NKOREAN ACCUSES SKOREA ON CRITICISM,” Seoul, 11/21/00) reported that Hwang Jang-yup, the highest-ranking DPRK official to defect to the ROK, accused the ROK government on Tuesday of limiting his criticism of the DPRK. In a statement published in newspapers, Hwang and another defector, Kim Duk-hong, said that the ROK government has placed restrictions on their lectures, publications, and contact with media and politicians, as well as their involvement in a campaign calling for the overthrow of the DPRK leadership. Hwang said that the restrictions came after the publication in Japan last week of an article in which he said it was “tantamount to suicide” for the ROK to give economic aid to a DPRK whose “communist dictatorial regime has not changed at all.” The National Intelligence Service released a statement saying that it was concerned about the two defectors’ safety because of their uncompromising stand against the DPRK, which it said hurts reconciliation efforts. The agency said, “So, in order to protect them from possible assassination attempts and because their activities are not helpful for the advancement of inter-Korea relations, we have exhorted them to restrain themselves.”

2. US View of DPRK-Japan Relations

Reuters (Jonathan Wright, “US EXPECTS JAPAN TO PAY NORTH KOREANS REPARATIONS,” Washington, 11/20/00) reported that US Ambassador to Japan Thomas Foley said during a talk at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington on November 20 that he expected Japan to pay “significant reparations” to the DPRK in any normalization agreement. Foley said, “I think it’s generally accepted in Japan that when normalization occurs there will be a significant reparations payment to North Korea. Such a payment was made to South Korea many years ago, and I think there’s no question in Japan that that will happen. I would imagine that the Japanese, unless the climate changes, would want to express the assistance through some support for projects, rather than deliver cash to the North Koreans, which in a change of climate could produce more unpleasant consequences. Only the Japanese government is likely to have the resources or occasion to grant North Korea very extensive financial assistance.”

3. Japan-US Relations

The US Department of State’s Office of International Information Programs (“AMBASSADOR FOLEY NOVEMBER 20 REMARKS ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS,” 11/20/00) reported that according to US Ambassador to Japan Tom Foley, the US-Japan relationship in an administration headed by Texas Governor George Bush, or in one headed by US Vice President Al Gore, would have much of the same character it has today. Foleys aid the current state of relations between the US and Japan are arguably “better than they have ever been” and are unlikely to be affected by domestic political change within either country. He said, “Japan would be regarded by a Bush Administration or a Gore Administration as our strongest ally in the region and as a global partner for addressing our common challenges.” Foley said that the new US administration, whether Republican or Democratic, would maintain “the same fundamental goals” that the Clinton Administration has pursued with Japan. He added that the new administration would continue the Clinton Administration’s efforts at strengthening the US-Japan alliance as “the mainstay of a continuing forward-deployed presence in the region.” He also said that the new US administration also would follow the path of the Clinton Administration in seeking to work with Japan to ensure “effective management of changing circumstances on the Korean Peninsula.”

4. PRC Missile Policy

The Associated Press (Charles Hutzler, “CHINA PROMISES NOT TO SELL MISSILES,” Beijing, 11/21/00) reported that the PRC Foreign Ministry released a statement on Tuesday promising not to sell missiles or components to countries developing nuclear weapons. The statement was the PRC’s most explicit pledge to date on refraining from spreading missile technology. It covered not only whole missile systems, but also dual-use components that could be used in other technologies. Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi said in the statement carried by the official Xinhua News Agency, “China has no intention to assist, in any way, any country in the development of ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons.” Sun said that the PRC will improve controls to stop unlicensed transfers of missile technology and publish a comprehensive list of “missile-related items and dual-use items” whose export will be restricted. He said that for countries developing nuclear-capable missiles, “China will exercise special scrutiny and caution, even for items not specifically contained on the control list.” He added that before issuing export licenses, the PRC will consider whether an item could be diverted to missile programs.

The US Department of State’s Office of International Information Programs (“STATE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT ON CHINA’S MISSILE POLICY,” 11/21/00) reported that the US State Department welcomed the PRC’s November 21 statement declaring its commitment not to assist other countries in developing ballistic missiles that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons. In a statement released Tuesday, US State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher said that the PRC is also taking steps to improve and reinforce its export control system. He said, “This development can strengthen cooperation between the U.S. and China to achieve our common objective of preventing the spread of ballistic missiles that threaten regional and international security. This development can strengthen cooperation between the U.S. and China to achieve our common objective of preventing the spread of ballistic missiles that threaten regional and international security.” The statement also said, “In consideration of China’s commitment to strengthen its missile-related export control system, we have decided to waive economic sanctions required by U.S. law for past assistance by Chinese entities to missile programs in Pakistan and Iran.”

5. PRC Adherence to UN Human Rights Pact

The New York Times (Erik Eckholm, “CHINA SIGNS U.N. PACT ON RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW,” Beijing, 11/21/00) reported that Mary Robinson, the United Nations high commissioner for human rights, signed an agreement in Beijing with the PRC on November 20 for cooperation and training on individual rights and the rule of law. Under the agreement, the UN is to advise the PRC’s police forces, courts and prisons on sound legal procedures. It will also monitor legal changes that the PRC has to undertake to comply with two the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The PRC Parliament is considering ratifying the first, but the second remains on the back burner.

6. Taiwanese Policy toward PRC

Agence France Presse (“ADVISERS TO TAIWAN PRESIDENT DEBATE MAINLAND POLICY,” Taipei, 11/21/00) reported that observers said on Tuesday that advisers to Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian are locked in heated debate to draw up a feasible policy on ties with the PRC. The 22-member Advisory Group for Cross-Strait Relations is expected to finalize soon a proposed mainland policy to present to Chen. The group is led by Lee Yuan-tseh, who also heads Taiwan’s top academic research institution, Academia Sinica, and the debate has in part focused on the meaning of the so-called “one China” policy as well as calls for eventual independence. Lee has said that he supported the unwritten consensus reached by Taiwan and the PRC in 1992 that “each side makes its own interpretation of ‘one China’,” in order to push for a resumption of cross-strait talks. Lee said, “If the ‘one-China’ principle is agreed by the people here, then there is no reason and no room for President Chen to reject it.” The group will urge Chen to handle the “one China” issue according to constitution which refers to the “one China” spirit. It will also point out that Taiwan used to be part of “historic China,” and can still be considered a part of China in a broader sense. It will add that any changes in Taiwan’s status quo would need to be agreed by a democratic consensus.”

II. Republic of Korea

1. Inter-Korean Railway Project

The Korea Herald (Kang Seok-jae, “SEOUL OFFERS TO HOLD RAIL-LINK TALKS THURS,” Seoul, 11/21/00) reported that the ROK on November 20 gave a counterproposal to the DPRK that the first inter-Korean working-level military talks be held Thursday, two days later than the DPRK originally suggested, to discuss the construction of the inter-Korean railway and other issues, the Defense Ministry said. In a telephone message, the ROK also suggested holding a liaison officers’ meeting Tuesday at Panmunjom to discuss preparations for the talks. “After consultations among relevant government agencies, we decided to make a counterproposal on the dates of the working-level meeting,” said ROK Army Brigadier General Yoon Il-young, the spokesman for the ministry. He said that the ROK would complete the formation of a six-member delegation for the working-level military talks today, adding that it will be led by Army Brigadier General Kim Kyoung-duck, deputy director of the ministry’s Arms Control Bureau. “At the first working-level meeting, the two sides are expected to discuss matters concerning the establishment of their respective administrative sections in the DMZ for the inter-Korean railway and road projects,” he said.

2. DPRK Diplomacy

The Korea Herald (Shin Yong-bae, “N.K.’S DIPLOMATIC RESHUFFLE INDICATES PURSUIT OF PRAGMATISM IN FOREIGN POLICY,” Seoul, 11/21/00) reported that the ROK has recently conducted an overall reshuffle of its overseas mission chiefs, in a move that ROK officials and analysts say is aimed at shifting its ideological policies to more pragmatic ones. According to the DPRK news media, the DPRK government replaced ambassadors to Iran, Singapore and Egypt this month. Ambassadors to Ethiopia and Laos will be replaced soon. ROK Foreign Ministry officials said that the DPRK appeared to have carried out the reshuffle of diplomats as their three- year term of office expired, but they noted that Ambassadors Kim Jong-nam to Iran, Kang Dal-son to Singapore and Jang Myong-son to Egypt are all career diplomats. They said that it is an apparent departure from the DPRK’s earlier practice of appointing military and ruling Workers’ Party officials as ambassadors. “This reshuffle may show that the North’s foreign policy system, which had been put on an abnormal track since the death of its leader Kim Il-sung (in 1994), has returned to normalcy,” said a ministry official, asking to remain anonymous. DPRK watchers said that the DPRK’s selection of career diplomats as ambassadors demonstrates that the DPRK is trying to become more practical in foreign relations.

3. DPRK Development Plan

Chosun Ilbo (“KOLAND ANNOUNCES NK DEVELOPMENT PLAN,” Seoul, 11/21/00) reported that the Korean Land Corporation (KOLAND) announced Monday that it had agreed with DPRK authorities to build an industrial complex 4km north of the Northern Demarcation Line (NDL) on the outskirts of Kaesong. The complex will be situated close to Bongdong Station on the Seoul- Shinuiju line. Kim Young-chae, the president of KOLAND, who returned from the DPRK on November 18 after a four-day visit, said that construction will commence in the first half of next year after the selection of a contractor, adding that a preliminary land survey was underway and was scheduled to be finished December 10.

III. People’s Republic of China

1. PRC-US Relations

People’s Daily (Qian Tong and Ling Dequan, “PRESIDENT JIANG MEETS WITH HIS COUNTERPART CLINTON,” Bandar Seri Begawan, 11/16/00, P1) and China Daily (Zhao Huanxin, “PRESIDENTS PIN HOPE ON LASTING FRIENDSHIP,” Bandar Seri Begawan, 11/17/00, P1) reported that US President Bill Clinton’s efforts to improve and develop PRC-US relations during his eight-year term received high praise from PRC President Jiang Zemin during talks following the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. Jiang told Clinton that no matter what difficulties emerged, the PRC and the US could forge ahead with their relationship, braving challenges and keeping in close contact. Clinton thanked Jiang for his cooperation in the past eight years, during which he said they had conducted frank talks on several occasions, smoothing out difficulties when they emerged, always pushing forward the US-PRC relationship. Clinton said that it is very important for the US to see a strong, stable and prosperous China that plays positive roles in Asia and the world. He said that he would like to see the future of US-PRC ties characterized by cooperation instead of confrontation, and engagement instead of containment. Turning to the Taiwan question, Jiang noted that if Taiwan authorities accept the one- China principle, the two sides could discuss anything on an equal footing. He said he hoped that the US Government would scrupulously abide by its commitments and explicitly support China’s peaceful unification. Clinton said the US will continue to follow the one-China policy.

China Daily (Zhao Huanxin, “ALBRIGHT ASSURES RELATIONS,” Bandar Seri Begawan, 11/16/00, P2) reported that when meeting with PRC Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that she could not tell who will be the next US President, but that she was certain that he will surely have a “full understanding” of the importance of US-PRC relations. The PRC and the US have conducted “frank and constructive” talks on a host of issues in recent years, which have helped enhance mutual understanding, Albright said. She added that despite their disparities on some issues, the PRC and the US shared broad common ground on key matters such as peace and prosperity in the Asia- Pacific region and the world at large. On the Taiwan question, Tang told Albright that the PRC had “concerns” about the way the US had dealt with the Taiwan question in recent years. He urged the US to properly deal with the Taiwan question by scrupulously abiding by the one-China policy and honoring its commitments in relation to the issue. Albright reaffirmed the US’s one-China policy.

2. US Presidential Election and Taiwan

Ta Kung Pao (Shi Yinhong, “US’S CHINA POLICY AND THE FUTURE OF TAIWAN QUESTION,” Hong Kong, 11/18/00, PA4) carried an article written by a Professor in Nankin International Relations Institute on the US Presidential election and its implication to Taiwan question. Shi argued that it is easy to make an appraisal of the US’s China policy if Gore will be elected, based on his words in the election period and the Clinton administration’s policies. Generally speaking, Gore will mainly inherit Clinton’s policy—maintaining widespread engagement of the PRC on the basis of keeping and strengthening limited strategic defense, cooperating and coordinating with the PRC on various key international issues, and continuing its “three nos” policy and military balance strategy on the Taiwan issue. However, he noted, Gore’s China policy may be less positive than Clinton’s, taking into consideration such factors as his election partner, Joseph Liberman’s, hard attitude toward the PRC, Gore’s expressed inclination to neo-interventionism in recent years, the higher expectations for US-Japan alliance relations, and the Democratic Party’s close relationship with US labor circles. In terms of Bush, he demonstrated his unfriendly side to the PRC on Taiwan and Missile Defense issues in the election period, but was not confrontational. On the contrary, he even showed his positive attitudes toward some key issues in US PRC policies, such as the World Trade Organization, Permanent Normal Trade Relations, and the engagement policy. Shi added the US political history has proved the theory that the policies after taking power are more prudent and pragmatic than the political rhetoric proposed during the election. Shi concluded that no matter who becomes the next US President, he will follow the fundamental framework of US Taiwan policy– -no independence for Taiwan, no use of force by the mainland, negotiation to ease tensions, and maintaining the status quo of non-independence, non-unification and non-war. He stressed that the PRC and Taiwan can have a win-win outcome.

3. PRC View on US Asia-Pacific Strategy

People’s Daily (Guo Xinning, “NEW TENDENCIES IN THE US AISA-PACIFIC STRATEGY,” 11/16/00, P7) carried an article on new tendencies in the US military and security strategy since this year. Guo, based at the Strategic Study Institute of the PRC National Defense University, listed four points of his observation on the new development of US strategy in the Asia-Pacific regions. In Northeast Asia, which is considered by the author to be the US’ strategic focus, the US greatly adjusted its policy toward the DPRK to expand its influence on the Korean Peninsula. US President Clinton’s South Asia visit this March was the first US Presidential visit since 1978. One obvious feature of Clinton’s visit, he argued, was to strengthen US-Indian cooperation. The Vietnam visit by the US President further demonstrated US policies on South Asia and Southeast Asia. Guo noted that the sphere and scale of US military exercises in Asia-Pacific region this year has set a new record since the Cold War began. Besides, the US has been strengthening its military presence and improving its military intervention mechanisms in this region. Leaping forward from strengthening its military alliances right after the end of Cold War to currently establishing military intervention mechanisms, the US is ready to implement the third step– to set up a diplomatic intervention mechanism. Facing the fact that the financial crisis has undermined severely the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries’ role in Asia-Pacific security dialogue and cooperation, the US is now pushing to grasp the dominating position, and strive to inject western leverages in regional security cooperation within the framework of ASEAN Regional Forum. It is obvious, he said, that the US is preparing to dominate the Asia-Pacific region on economic, political and security issues in the new century.

4. Russia Proposal on Nuclear Disarmament

PLA Daily (Ling Dequan and Ming Dajun, “PUTIN PROPOSES TO DEEP CUT,” Bandar Seri Begawan, 11/17/00, P4) reported that when meeting with US President Bill Clinton on November 15, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed deep cuts on nuclear arsenals of both countries on the precondition that the US must stop its National Missile Defense (NMD) program. According to local news media, Putin did not mention the specific number of deep cuts. It is likely that this number has gone beyond the existing weapon control framework in which Russia proposed cutting down Russian and US warheads to 1500, the media said.

5. PRC Attitude to Nuclear Disarmament

China Daily (Shao Zongwei, “NATION AFFIRMS MIDEAST ROLE,” Beijing, 11/15/00, P1) reported that according to PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi, the PRC welcomed the Monday proposals by Russia to cut the nuclear arsenals of Russia and US to below 1,500 warheads each. “We hope that the US and Russia will soon ratify disarmament agreements, implement the agreements already ratified and start new rounds of disarmament talks at an early date,” said Sun. He also commented on the proposals for establishing an alliance between China, Russia and India. He said that PRC ties with Russia and India are based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and have enjoyed progress in recent years. The PRC hopes the development of bilateral relations will help bring peace and stability to the region, he added.

6. PRC-Russian Relations

PLA Daily (Li Shijia, “PRC ARMY CHIEF MEETS WITH RUSSIAN GUESTS,” Beijing, 11/15/00, P4) reported that on November 14, Zhang Wannian and Fu Quanyou met with Valeri Manilov, first Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Russian armed forces, stressing the importance of military links between the two nations. Manilov is attending the fourth round of meetings between the headquarters of the General Staff of the PLA and the Russian armed forces. Zhang, Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, said because PRC and Russia are neighboring countries, the maintenance and development of PRC-Russian relations conforms to the interests of the people of the two countries and is beneficial to peace and stability in the region and the world. He noted that the PRC-Russian strategic partnership of cooperation has been expanded with joint efforts from both sides. He added that the meeting, in which the leaders of the two armed forces discussed international and regional situations and issues of common concern, is an important component of this partnership and demonstrates the further development of military relations between the two countries. Zhang said that regular meetings promote mutual trust and understanding and help strengthen cooperation in international affairs. Manilov said that the Russian-Chinese partnership is based on equality and mutual benefit. It has been developing smoothly and the two armed forces cooperate well. The visit will strengthen friendly cooperation between the two armed forces and countries, he said. Fu Quanyou, Chief of General Staff of the PLA, said in a meeting with Manilov that the PRC hopes to maintain a good momentum in the development of PRC-Russian military relations.

People’s Daily (Wu Yimin, “JIANG MEETS WITH PUTIN,” Bandar Seri Begawan, 11/16/00, P6) reported that on November 15, PRC President Jiang Zemin and Russia President Vladimir Putin reaffirmed their cooperative relations. Putin said that the PRC and Russia have concluded a series of important agreements since this year, which facilitated the improvement and development of bilateral relations. Both countries not only have carried out widespread cooperation and exchanges in the economic field, but also have coordinated in international affairs and security issues, said Putin. He reaffirmed Russia’s position on the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Jiang echoed Putin’s remarks on the development of PRC- Russian cooperation. He believed that the economic and trade cooperation will increase in the new century. Jiang said, the resolution jointly introduced by the PRC and Russia at the UN General Assembly on the preservation and compliance of ABM Treaty has gained more and more support. The two leaders expressed that they will strengthen coordination and cooperation on anti-ballistic missile issues. They all hope that next-year summit meetings will further strengthen understanding, trust and cooperation in every field between the two countries.

IV. Australia

1. Australian Foreign Minister’s DPRK Visit

The Australian (Lynne O’Donnell, “DOWNER VETS N. KOREAN LINKS,” Sydney, 11/15/00) reported that Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer touched down on DPRK soil on November 14 on a two-day mission “to assess whether Pyongyang was serious about engaging Australia as a regional partner.” Downer said that Australia stood ready to cooperate across a range of issues. “We feel that a visit is an important part of bringing North Korea in from the cold and engaging them in the Asia-Pacific community,” Downer said. Topping Downer’s agenda for his talks with DPRK officials was the DPRK’s development of nuclear-capable missiles. Downer said, however, that he would not be attaching conditions to Australian engagement. Australia will provide US$5 million worth of wheat to the DPRK this year.

The Australian carried an editorial (“DOWNER MUST TREAD WARILY IN PYONGYANG,” Sydney, 11/15/00) which noted that in just a few months, “North Korea has been transformed from an isolated Stalinist state into a tentative new friend of the West.” The writer argued that “the signs are good that Pyongyang will continue to draw its iron curtain and Australia is in pole position to exploit the trade opportunities that it will bring.” Australia is attracted by the lure of a new market of 25 million people eager for consumer goods, and the DPRK is desperately in need of upgraded infrastructure. “Pyongyang must become part of a stable North Asia, so the region’s trade potential can be fulfilled.” However, “trade concerns must not come at the expense of other pressing questions.” There is an underlying agenda in encouraging diplomatic and trade contact with the DPRK. “All the handshaking will be pointless unless it halts North Korea’s missile defence program and military build-up along the demilitarised zone, as well as delivers assurances that foreign aid is reaching the poor.” It is understandable that western nations are eager to engage with the DPRK. “Yet it is important not to jump the gun before North Korea proves it is willing to give ground on key issues such as missile defence. Mr. Clinton is right to hold off on his North Korean visit until further security gains are made. Mr. Downer’s visit will be worthwhile if it impresses upon his counterpart, Paek Nam-Sum, the responsibilities that come with the relaxation of trade and diplomatic sanctions. It will also be useful if it opens trade doors. But it will be a waste of time if it is just another photo opportunity.”

2. DPRK Nuclear Program

The Australian (Lynne O’Donnell and Cameron Stewart “US NAVAL CHIEF WARNS AGAINST LINGERING NORTH KOREAN THREAT,” Sydney, 11/16/00) reported that the DPRK on November 15 committed itself to ending its nuclear missile program in exchange for western money, even as the US military commander in the Pacific “warned that it remained a substantial military threat.” Speaking in Melbourne, US Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Command, said “North Korea’s economy was still starving its people while funding a huge army.” These comments came as Alexander Downer, on the second day of his visit to the DPRK, said that he had secured a commitment from the DPRK that its nuclear missile program would be scrapped if the west paid adequate compensation. Downer said that no sum had been mentioned, and the issue of an Australian contribution to the final figure had not been raised. Downer said that he received positive indications that the DPRK would continue to pursue diplomatic engagements with western countries, but he added that there was “no interest at the upper echelons of the Government to move towards political or economic reforms.” DPRK officials also “indicated their willingness to reunify with South Korea in a confederation that would allow Pyongyang to retain its present Government.”

3. US-Australian Defense Relations

The Australian (Dennis C. Blair, “MENACED BY ASIAN MIND-SETS: TOGETHER THE US AND AUSTRALIA CAN KEEP THE REGION PACIFIC,” Sydney, 11/16/00) printed an edited version of a speech given by Admiral Dennis C. Blair in Melbourne. Admiral Blair suggested that “the alliance of the US and Australia is one of the most important factors in a peaceful and secure Asia-Pacific region.” The alliance is based on genuine partnership, not with one party serving as deputy to the other but each complementing the other, taking the lead where appropriate to provide the greatest contribution to our mutual security.” Admiral Blair suggested that the prevalent way of thinking about international relations throughout the region is in balance of power terms. “This is the world of Bismarck and 19th-century Europe. An alternative approach, better suited to the communal violence and transnational concerns of the 21st century, is one in which states concentrate upon shared interests in peaceful development, and actively promote diplomacy and negotiation to resolve disagreements. The fundamental security problem resides less in tangible differences than in zero-sum, balance-of-power mind sets, fuelled by ethnic and religious zeal and historical fears and grievances…. There is a great deal of historical distrust and antagonism in the region. There is a natural tendency to look for short-term, unilateral gain. There is a concern that compromise and negotiation will be interpreted as weakness. However, I am more optimistic than most. If pursued skilfully, I believe efforts to change mind-sets in Asia over time will take hold and build durable security.”

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Timothy L. Savage: napsnet@nautilus.org
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Seoul, Republic of Korea

Hiroyasu Akutsu: akutsu@glocomnet.or.jp
Tokyo, Japan

Peter Razvin: icipu@glas.apc.org
Moscow, Russian Federation

Yunxia Cao: yule111@sina.com
Shanghai, People’s Republic of China

Dingli Shen: dlshen@fudan.ac.cn
Shanghai, People’s Republic of China

John McKay: John.McKay@adm.monash.edu.au
Clayton, Australia

 


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