NAPSNet Daily Report 18 January, 2001

Recommended Citation

"NAPSNet Daily Report 18 January, 2001", NAPSNet Daily Report, January 18, 2001, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-daily-report/napsnet-daily-report-18-january-2001/

 
CONTENTS

I. United States

1. US Reaction to ROK Missile Guidelines
2. US-ROK Sign SOFA
3. DPRK in APEC Forum
4. Cross-Strait Relations
5. PRC-US Relations
6. PRC-India Relations
II. Republic of Korea 1. Unification Policy
2. ROK Policy DPRK
3. DRRK-Belgium’s Relations
4. Kim Jong-il Visit to PRC
6. Inter-Korean Economic Talks
III. Russian Federation 1. RF and PRC to Sign a Defense Treaty
2. Future Global Trends
3. PRC Spaceship Flight
4. PRC Armed Forces and Psychological Operations
5. RF-Japanese Territorial Dispute
6. RF Public Opposition to Return of South Kurils
7. Japan-RF Relations

I. United States

1. US Reaction to ROK Missile Guidelines

The US Department of State released a statement by State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher, (“NEW REPUBLIC OF KOREA MISSILE GUIDELINES,” 1/17/01) which affirmed the US support of ROK’s new missile guidelines. The statement said: “Earlier today in Seoul, the Government of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) announced new guidelines governing the Republic of Korea’s possession and development of missile and rocket systems. The Republic of Korea will be able under its new guidelines to possess missiles with range/payload capabilities up to the Missile Technology Control Regime threshold (missiles capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km). While addressing its legitimate defense and deterrence needs, the Republic of Korea is simultaneously respecting Northeast Asian security and global nonproliferation principles by remaining within the Missile Technology Control Regime threshold. Before announcing its new missile guidelines, the Republic of Korea consulted extensively with the U.S. This is because of our alliance relationship and the U.S.’s leading role in nonproliferation. The U.S. fully supports the Republic of Korea’s new missile guidelines. The U.S. believes those new guidelines strike the right balance between bolstering the Republic of Korea’s security and respecting regional stability and global nonproliferation principles. Taking account of the new guidelines, the U.S. will be supporting the Republic of Korea’s immediate membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime.”

2. US-ROK Sign SOFA

Agence France Presse (“SOUTH KOREA AND US SIGN NEW TROOP ACCORD,” Seoul, 1/18/01) and Associated Press (Sang-Hun Choe, “US, SEOUL SIGN MILITARY ACCORD,” Seoul, 1/18/01) reported that the ROK and the US on Thursday signed a revised Status Of Forces Agreement (SOFA) on after several years of difficult negotiations. ROK Foreign Minister Lee Joung-Binn said, “I am certain that the revised SOFA will contribute to a stable environment for the U.S. forces in Korea, foster friendship between them and the Korean public and further strengthen the ROK-US alliance.” Lee signed the accord with senior US embassy counsellor Evans Revere who stood in for ambassador Stephen Bosworth. The two sides said in a statement: “Both governments expressed the mutual understanding that this SOFA revision satisfactorily reflects both nation’s interests in a wide range of fields, including criminal jurisdiction, environment, labor, quarantine regulations, facilities and areas, non-appropriated fund facilities and civil proceedings.” The accord will go before the ROK National Assembly for ratification. The accord increases the number of crimes to be ruled by ROK courts to 12 and allows US suspects to be handed over to the ROK before indictment. There are also stricter environmental conditions for US bases and regulations for the dismissal of ROK employees on US bases.

3. DPRK in APEC Forum

Agence France Presse (“CHINA WILL BACK NORTH KOREA’S INVITATION TO APEC SUMMIT,” Beijing, 1/18/01) reported that the PRC said Thursday it would support any request by the DPRK to attend this year’s Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Shanghai. PRC foreign ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao said, “If the North Korean side raises the question and other countries think that this question is worth discussing, then our attitude will be positive.” The PRC will host the 2001 APEC meeting in Shanghai in October when the leaders of the 21 member nations hold their annual informal summit meeting.

4. Cross-Strait Relations

Singapore Straits Times (“CHINESE ‘BUILDING MISSILE BASE FACING TAIWAN,’ ” Hong Kong, 1/16/00) reported that the Hong Kong newspaper, Oriental Daily News, cited PRC intelligence information saying on January 15 that the PRC is building a base for advanced ground-to-air missiles in its coastal Fujian province which faces Taiwan. The paper said the long-range- missile base in Zhangzhou city will be used as a permanent deployment center for Russian-made S-300 PMU2 missiles which have a minimum range of 90 km and which could severely weaken Taipei’s defense of the Taiwan Strait. According to the paper, the PRC acquired the missiles before 1996. Officials from Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense said that the S-300 PMU2 was similar to Taiwan’s Sky Bow air defense system in which several long- range missiles could be launched against different targets simultaneously. The report said it could also counter electronic interference. The paper added that when the Zhangzhou missile base is completed, FT-2000 missiles developed by the PRC are also likely to be deployed there, a move expected to pose serious threats to Taiwan’s air space and ground radar stations. [Ed. note: This article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for January 18, 2001.]

5. PRC-US Relations

Boston Globe published an opinion article by Hui Zhang, a research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, (“US MUST CONSIDER HOW MISSILE DEFENSE PLAN WILL PLAY IN CHINA,” 1/18/01) which said President-elect George W. Bush will have to consider whether other nations’ reactions should affect his decision on a national missile defense (NMD). Zhang noted that the PRC, in particular, sees the system as a major challenge to its security, and is likely to respond in ways that threaten US interests. Zhang noted that the PRC is worried that the NMD will allow the US to feel that “it has more freedom to encroach on China’s sovereignty, including undermining efforts at reunification with Taiwan.” Zhang also wrote that there is little hope for the global Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty calling for cutoff treaty negotiations to start immediately and be completed in five years. Due to the PRC’s perceived threat from the US NMD deployment, the PRC might well decide to stop cooperating in the treaty and in other security areas, “such as constraining its nuclear and missile exports, or helping to convince North Korea to rein in its arms programs.” The cumulative effect of US plans, Zhang concluded, “could be a major collapse of the nuclear disarmament process, a dramatic increase in the number and capabilities of Chinese missiles aimed at the United States, and a breakdown of many of the world’s efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. That would not benefit any country’s security interests.” [Ed. note: This article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for January 18, 2001.]

6. PRC-India Relations

Agence France Presse (“CHINA REJECTS ARMS RACE FOLLOWING INDIAN MISSILE TEST,” Beijing, 1/18/01) reported that the PRC said Thursday that it would work with the international community to prevent an arms race in South Asia and that it had taken note of India’s test-firing of a nuclear-capable ballistic missile. PRC foreign ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao said, “The Chinese position on the nuclear question in South Asia is consistent and clear: China, together with the international community, hopes to see peace and stability in the region. We are unwilling to see any form of arms race in the region.”

II. Republic of Korea

1. Unification Policy

The Korea Herald (“SEOUL SHOULD EMBRACE N. KOREAN ELITES, SAYS FORMER E. GERMAN POLITICAL LEADER,”01/18/01) reported that a former East German political leader said that in their pursuit of national reunification, ROK leaders should not exclude DPRK elite groups but embrace them, noting that West Germans failed to do so. Gregor Gysi, 52, the last chairman of East Germany’s former ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED), presented this and other advice on Korean unification in an interview with The Korea Herald on January 16. He said, “We have completely replaced the East German elite class, triggering political and moral disputes. To eliminate the elite of a society is to deprive the society of its identity.” Touching on the inter-Korean relationship, he quoted Choe as emphasizing the need for “free comings and goings” between people from the two Koreas, while singling out the federation system as the most feasible unification formula. Gysi said, “His idea on the federation system sounded quite good.” He stressed that a long-term, phased unification would be much better for the Koreas than the “shock treatment.”

2. ROK Policy DPRK

The Korea Herald (“N.K. FOLLOWING CHINA’S EXAMPLE, PRESIDENT SAYS,”01/18/01) and Chosun Ilbo (Kim Min-bai, “GOVERNMENT TO SEEK PERMANENT PEACE SYSTEM,” Seoul, 01/17/01) reported that ROK President Kim Dae-jung said Wednesday that DPRK leader Kim Jong- il’s second visit to the PRC in about seven months proves that the country is following PRC’s path on reforming and opening its economy. In a National Security Council (NSC) meeting, Kim referred to “a second China” in describing the recent developments, including Kim Jong-il’s trip to the PRC and moves to improve relations with the US and other countries. Kim said, “North Korea is definitely changing.” He noted that the DPRK leadership publicly mentioned “new thinking” in his New Year’s message and that Kim Jong-il is touring industrial sites in the PRC. Kim added, “This shows that North Korea is deeply interested in the Chinese-style reform and open-door policy and that it is trying to become a second China.” Kim said the DPRK is expected to put its priority on the improvement of relations with the United States this year to ensure its security and economic rehabilitation. He said, “We should support the North’s efforts to improve relations with the international community.” Kim said the ROK does not have to be preoccupied with when Kim Jong-il should visit Seoul. He added, “We don’t have to speed it up nor delay unnecessarily,” stressing that what is important is what agreements to make in the second inter-Korean summit.

3. DRRK-Belgium’s Relations

The Korea Herald (“PYONGYANG ACCEPTS BELGIUM’S OFFER FOR TWIN MISSION TO SOUTH, N. KOREA,”01/18/01) reported that the DPRK has accepted Belgium’s proposal that it appoint its ambassador to the ROK to concurrently serve as top envoy to the DPRK, a Belgian diplomat here said Wednesday. The acceptance came during ongoing talks between Belgium and DPRK in the former country to open diplomatic relations, he said. But the embassy official denied a local report here that the two countries will sign an agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations January 23. The official said, “The exact date (on when to announce the agreement) has not been decided yet.”

4. Kim Jong-il Visit to PRC

Chosun Ilbo (“KIM JONG IL VISITS SHANGHAI SECURITIES EXCHANGE,”01/17/01) and Joongang Ilbo (Jin Se-keun, “SHENZHEN NEXT STOP ON VISIT AFTER TALK WITH ZHU,” Shanghai, 01/18/01) reported that DPRK leader Kim Jong-il visited the Shanghai Securitites Exchange (SSE) Wednesday accompanied by PRC Prime Minister Zhu Rongji. Kim later went to the high tech development zone of Pudong. Kim and his 50 car motorcade began the day at Saegae Park and then toured the Shanghai, Hwahoe-NEC joint venture with Japan which produces computer chips. In the afternoon, Kim visited the Pudong Development Administration’s office where he was informed of the history and economic strategy of the region. Following this he toured several IT companies in the area. Later, Kim returned to the Shizao Hotel before attending a special performance for the Lunar New Year at the Grand Theater. PRC sources say Kim will leave Shanghai for Beijing tomorrow afternoon and he will hold a meeting with Jiang Zemin on Friday.

6. Inter-Korean Economic Talks

Chosun Ilbo (“SEOUL PROPOSES ECONOMIC TALKS ON JANUARY 27,”01/17/01) reported that the ROK proposed Wednesday that the two Koreas hold economic talks on January 27 in Kaeseong, which lies between Seoul and Pyongyang. Vice Finance-Economy Minister Lee Jung-jae, ROK’s chief delegate, sent a letter to his DPRK counterpart via the liaison office at the border village of Panmunjom. In addition to the date for the economic talks, the ROK also proposed forming four joint working-level committees to discuss issues of flood control along the Imjin River.

III. Russian Federation

1. RF and PRC to Sign a Defense Treaty

Nezavisimaya gazeta (“CHINA AND RUSSIA WILL SIGN A DEFENSE TREATY”, Moscow, 1, 01/16/01) reported that RF and the PRC are holding talks on signing the first defense treaty since the end of the Cold War. The report said one of the aims of the treaty “will be to oppose US influence and to counter Pentagon’s plans to create an anti-missile shield in America and a part of Asia.” Qian Qichen , Deputy Premier of PRC State Council, confirmed that “the talks are going on” and that PRC intended “to undertake a significant step for improvement of relations with Moscow in the field of security”. At the same time he clarified that “it will not be an alliance” of the two countries.

2. Future Global Trends

Nezavisimaya gazeta (Aleksey Tamilin, “INDIA IS GOING TO BE A WORLD LEADER”, Moscow, 6, 01/17/01) reported that a “Global Trends 2015” report prepared by US National Intelligence Council claimed that “by 2015 India, Russia and China will in fact form a geostrategic alliance in an attempt to balance the impact of the US and Western countries”. At the same time the report predicted “a collapse of American-European alliance”.

3. PRC Spaceship Flight

Nezavisimaya gazeta (Yuriy Karash, “CHINA SENT ANUMALS INTO OUTER SPACE”, Moscow, 2, 01/11/01) and Segodnya (Igor Stadnyuk, “SPACE ODISSEE 2001”, Moscow, 6, 01/11/01) reported that the PRC launched its another “Shenzhou” (Divine Vessel) spaceship on January 10. The first “Shenzhou” successfully spent 21 hours in space in November, 1999. A manned flight with 3- 4 persons on board is expected in late 2002 or early 2003, but some experts think it might take place a year earlier. A British expert Philip Clark thinks that the Shenzhou program progresses faster than manned spaceship programs on USA and USSR in the past with their one-man spaceships. He believed that the PRC’s programs pursues three goals: to boost the prestige, to develop advanced technologies and to finally create a permanent so-called “Spylab” permanent manned orbital space station. Cheng Li, an expert from Singapore, thinks such station might be created in 10 to 15 years. Presently PRC develops a “Great March” type carrier missile to launch a smaller manned station in 2004-2005. Clark believes that would be preceded by a docking together of two Shenzhou spaceships in the orbit.

4. PRC Armed Forces and Psychological Operations

Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniey (“ATTACKING THE ENEMY’S MIND”, Moscow, 8, 01/12-18/01, #1(223)) published an article by Evgeniy Dezhin on the history and the present state of psychological and information warfare in PRC, starting from the 5th century BC. In a part titled “War before War”, the author argues that “in China presently information operations are understood to be a complex of measures to affect information and information systems of the enemy with simultaneous protection of one’s own information. A special emphasis is put on subversion of adversaries’ economies, their systems of military communications, links and troop control”. Analysis of the PRC military doctrine shows that in a modern war “at the initial stage the propaganda will be directed to weaken the morals and discrediting the temporary success of the enemy. After repulse of the adversary’s strategic advance it is necessary, by means of making use of defensive battle successes, to totally demoralize the enemies, to cast doubts in their minds concerning the possibility of reaching their set war goals and to encourage a certain part of enemy officers and soldiers to defect and join one’s own ranks. Strategic counteroffensive should be followed by call for mass surrender of enemy servicemen, especially those surrounded. When hostilities shift to enemy’s territory the tasks of the political units [of PRC Armed Forces] will include also moral-psychological indoctrination of the population of the areas occupied… The strategy and tactics of psychological warfare are actively developed by the leading military theorists of People’s Liberation Army of China. Some works on the subject make it possible to claim the existence in those of a kind of “Chinese specifics”… Firstly, one’s attention is drawn to a wide use of historical material and fundamental principles of Chinese art of war having millenniums long traditions. Secondly, an emphasis is laid on carrying out psychological operations in peace-time, those being considered a preparatory stage to large-scale information war under the conditions of open armed confrontation.”

5. RF-Japanese Territorial Dispute

Segodnya (Aleksandr Chudodeyev, “MOSCOW CLOSED THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE”, Moscow, 2, 01/17/01) reported that “the diplomatic scandal between Russia and Japan concerning preparation of a new Russian- Japanese summit… reached a new level.” Japanese Foreign Minister Iohei Kono on a visit to Moscow and RF Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov held talks concerning the treaty and the territorial issue, but the parties failed to agree on the date of the summit. Moreover, RF Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losyukov “made it become known to the Japanese that ‘for us the border is established: the four island are our territory, and the fact is stipulated by our Constitution’… According to the logic of that statement, Moscow is departing not only away from Yeltsin’s and Gorbachev’s positions on the territorial issue, but from those of Khrushchev as well, in other words it refuses to admit the existence of the territorial problem in general.” A source in RF Foreign Ministry explained to the author that the reason was simple: “first, Moscow has got nothing to suggest to Tokyo as a topic for talks instead of the territorial issue, as Japanese businessmen feel uneasy here. Secondly, in the Kremlin they have not yet decided how to perceive their Japanese neighbor – as a ‘partner’ (and to try once again to make the Japanese to postpone the issue of the isles), or with the addition of the word ‘strategic’ (and then to solve the territorial disputes about the same way as with the Chinese, that is to carry out a demarcation of the border giving away some territories).”

6. RF Public Opposition to Return of South Kurils

Sovetskaya Rossiya (“KURILS ARE THE THRESHOLD OF OUR HOME”, Moscow, 3, 01/13/01) published “An Open Letter to V.V.Putin, President of the Russian Federation” signed by more then twenty well-known academician in various fields ranging from law to fisheries to history and retired ambassadors. The authors expressed their concerns about “unclear and dubious position” of RF authorities on the issue of Japanese claims on South Kurils. They criticized RF-Japanese Declaration of September 3, 2000 for more mentioning of such “unfounded” and “unjustifiable” words as “border demarcation”, the need for solving the issue and for using Japanese names for the isles. The authors stand against “constant concessions” to Japan. The are concerned about the “propaganda” activities of various Japanese bodies and foundations among the RF population in favor of returning the isles. In their opinion, everything was settled between USSR and Japan, while the last decade has seen “nothing but departure from those agreements and arrangements”. RF-Japanese agreement of 02/21/98 is sharply criticized for “introducing an unprecedented regime of uncontrolled fishing by Japanese fishermen in Russian territorial waters”. The conclusion is that “at present time in Russia-Japan relations there are no unsettled issues requiring a peace treaty, which in this situation is needed to Japan just as a means to satisfy its territorial claims. Remember, there no peace treaty between us and Germany either… A revision of the territorial outcomes of the Second World War… will become a step causing inevitable ‘chain reaction’ of territorial re- divisions in the whole world… Friendship and cooperation with Japan -and not only Japan- must not be bought at the price of territorial concessions. It’s a dead-end road to nowhere.”

7. Japan-RF Relations

The Izvestia (Oleg Zhunusov, “PROFESSOR AKIHIRO IVASITA: OUR COUNTRIES HAVE LITTLE IN COMMON”, Vladivostok, 7, 01/17/01) took an interview with Professor Akihiro Ivasita of the University of Yamaguti Prefecture, Japan, concerning the issue of South Kurils and RF-Japanese economic relations. Professor Ivasita in particular claimed that “in principle the territorial issue between our countries is not an insurmountable obstacle on the path of development of international relations”. His argument was that territorial disputes between Japan, China and ROK did not hinder the relevant relations. In his words, “for 40 years Americans have been making Japan to insist on return of all 4 isles. China also tried to play up the Japanese card in its relations with USSR… The problem is that Japanese-Russian relations have not been self-sustainable and to a great degree have been shaped under the influence of the third countries, such as USA and China.” The real reason of low-level economic interaction, in his opinion, is the lack of interest in cooperation on the part of the Japanese businessmen. Some of the initially moved into the field of services in RF Far Eastern regions, but faced harassment on the part of local authorities. That affected negatively the prospects for future cooperation. Professor Ivasita admitted that US$25 billion worth Sakhalin shelf development project should become “a bridge to the 21st century for Japanese-Russian economic ties”. But Japan fulfils 86 percent of its oil consumption with Middle East oil (it was 78 percent in 1979). Economically and ecologically attractive transition from oil to natural gas use is not easy and besides Sakhalin gas is expensive and not quite compatible with Japanese industry. He concluded that “the parties should discuss not the question to whom which island belongs, but what can be done in the interests of both countries in the future”.

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Produced by the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development in partnership with:
International Policy Studies Institute Seoul, Republic of Korea
The Center for Global Communications, Tokyo, Japan
Center for American Studies,
Fudan University, Shanghai, People’s Republic of China
Monash Asia Institute,
Monash University, Clayton, Australia

Timothy L. Savage: napsnet@nautilus.org
Berkeley, California, United States

Gee Gee Wong: napsnet@nautilus.org
Berkeley, California, United States

Robert Brown: napsnet@nautilus.org
Berkeley, California, United States

Kim Hee-sun: khs688@hotmail.com
Seoul, Republic of Korea

Hiroyasu Akutsu: akutsu@glocomnet.or.jp
Tokyo, Japan

Peter Razvin: icipu@glas.apc.org
Moscow, Russian Federation

Yunxia Cao: yule111@sina.com
Shanghai, People’s Republic of China

Dingli Shen: dlshen@fudan.ac.cn
Shanghai, People’s Republic of China

John McKay: John.McKay@adm.monash.edu.au
Clayton, Australia

 


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