NAPSNet Daily Report 10 January, 2002

Recommended Citation

"NAPSNet Daily Report 10 January, 2002", NAPSNet Daily Report, January 10, 2002, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-daily-report/napsnet-daily-report-10-january-2002/

 
CONTENTS

I. United States

1. US-Russia Nuclear Relations
2. CIA Foreign Missile Developments Report
3. PRC Domestic Politics
4. DPRK Drug Smuggling Suspicions
5. Japanese Militarism
II. Japan 1. US Bases in Okinawa
2. Strife in the Democratic Party of Japan

I. United States

1. US-Russia Nuclear Relations

The Associated Press (Vladimir Isachenkov, “RUSSIA TAKES STAND ON NUCLEAR ARMS,” Moscow, 01/10/02) and Reuters (Ron Popeski, “RUSSIA UNEASY ABOUT U.S. ARMS CUTS PROPOSALS,” Moscow, 01/10/02) reported that Russia expressed unease on Thursday at US plans to store, rather than destroy, warheads to be removed from nuclear missiles. Russian Ministry spokesperson Alexander Yakovenko said, “We believe Russian-American agreements on further cuts in nuclear arsenals must firstly be radical – – down to 1,500-2,200 warheads — secondly verifiable, and thirdly irreversible. That means strategic nuclear weapons must be cut and not only ‘on paper.'” Alexei Pikayev, a military analyst with the Carnegie Endowment’s Moscow office, asked, “What sort of reductions can we speak of if in a matter of hours, the United States can return to START-1 levels?” Senior Russian parliamentarian and former ambassador to the US Vladimir Lukin said that such an approach undermines US notions that it now trusted Russia as a full-fledged ally — particularly after Moscow’s support for the anti-terror coalition. “After such forthright US declarations about disarmament and trust, it is clear that US actions do not bear this out. It is also clear that a handshake is not enough to proceed with arms reductions.” Lukin also commented, “If this means transferring warheads to a warehouse, it is better than leaving them on missiles, but worse than destroying them. And it sets a bad example for smaller nuclear powers being asked to cut their arsenals. What stimulus is there for them?”

2. CIA Foreign Missile Developments Report

The Associated Press (John J. Lumpkin, “CIA HIGHLIGHTS CHINA MISSILE THREAT,” Washington, 01/10/02) reported that according to a newly released CIA report, “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015,” the PRC sees a larger, mobile force as necessary to maintain its nuclear deterrent against the US and is expected to have as many as 100 long-range nuclear missiles aimed at the United States by 2015, many of them on hard-to-find mobile launchers. The report states, “Beijing is concerned about the survivability of its strategic deterrent against the United States and has a long-range modernization program to develop mobile, solid-propellant ICBMs. The (U.S. intelligence community) projects that by 2015, most of the China’s strategic missile force will be mobile.” Currently, the PRC has about 20 silos with CSS-4 nuclear ICBMs that are capable of reaching the US, the report says. Another dozen nuclear missiles can reach targets in Russia and Asia. It also has a few medium-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and probably only one submarine from which to launch them. The PRC military is developing three new missile systems, two truck-launched missiles and a new submarine-launched missile, all of which could be fielded by 2010, the report says. The PRC may be able to mount multiple-independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) on its older silo- based missiles. The PRC is also is expanding its short-range ballistic missile force, and will probably have several hundred by 2005, the report says. These are armed with conventional warheads which could be used to attack Taiwan from the PRC mainland.

The CIA report can be found at:
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/pubs.html

Reuters (“CHINA DENIES US REPORT ON ITS NUCLEAR AMBITIONS,” Beijing, 01/10/02) reported that the PRC dismissed a US intelligence report that said Beijing could increase its arsenal of nuclear warheads capable of reaching the US from about 20 to 100 over the next 15 years. PRC Foreign Ministry spokesperson Sun Yuxi stated, “Such news is just baseless speculation. China will increase its defense power based on its own needs.” The PRC called on the US to abide by and sign a treaty aimed at banning global nuclear tests after US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld left the door open to future underground nuclear tests. Sun commented, “We hope that all countries will strictly abide by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and sign and approve the treaty as soon as possible.”

3. PRC Domestic Politics

Agence France-Presse (“CHINA’S NEW LEADERS ALREADY LINED UP,” 01/10/02) and Deutsche Presse-Agentur (“WEN JIABAO TO SUCCEED PREMIER ZHU RONGJI IN RESHUFFLE,” Beijing, 01/10/02) reported that the next generation of PRC statespeople set to replace the current aging leadership has already been decided months before the autumn meeting of the Communist Party Congress. Informed sources disclosed that Vice Premier Wen Jiabao will become the PRC’s next head of government when Premier Zhu Rongji steps down in March 2003. Meanwhile, President Jiang Zemin plans to install his closest protege, Zeng Qinghong, as vice president while making way for his successor Vice President Hu Jintao. Jiang is expected to remain chairman of the Central Military Commission, which controls the 2.5- million armed forces. Zeng will assume Hu Jintao’s current positions as director of the Central Party School and will also get a seat on the Politburo Standing Committee. Pierre Cabestan, director of the French Center for Research of Contemporary China in Hong Kong highlighted that this arrangement could mean trouble for Hu as “It means Jiang will have a possibility of larger influence. It will be easier for him to enforce majority on the Standing Committee. This could be turning Hu Jintao into a transitional figure. Hu is clearly not Jiang Zemin’s man.”

4. DPRK Drug Smuggling Suspicions

Reuters (Teruaki Ueno, “NORTH KOREA SUSPECTED OF STEPPING UP DRUG SMUGGLING,” Tokyo, 01/10/02) reported that a high-ranking Japanese intelligence source states that the DPRK, having lost sources of hard currency funding, has stepped up drug smuggling activities. The anonymous source said that he believed that the suspected DPRK spy ship which sank after exchanging gunfire with Japanese coast guard vessels last month had been carrying a huge haul of stimulants. “We believe that they exploded the ship intentionally to destroy evidence,” the source said. The source went on to say, “Drug smuggling is one of North Korea’s main national projects. North Korea produced some 40 tons of opium on 7,200 hectares (17,800 acres) in 1996.” Another intelligence source said, “Although we have not been able to obtain information on recent production figures, based on various accounts provided by visitors and other sources opium production appears to have doubled the 1996 figure.”

5. Japanese Militarism

Agence France-Presse (“JAPAN HAS RENOUNCED MILITARISM FOREVER: KOIZUMI,” Kuala Lumpur, 01/10/02) reported that while on his tour of Southeast Asia, Japan’s Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s vowed on Thursday that Japan will never return to the militarist rule that led it to ruin in World War II. Koizumi told Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, “Japan will never again walk the path of a military power.” Koizumi continued, “I want to clarify that Japan’s security role lies within the framework of the constitution.” Concern has been raised by Japan’s decision to dispatch warships to the Indian Ocean to provide non-combat support for the US-led campaign in Afghanistan.

II. Japan

1. US Bases in Okinawa

The Asahi Shimbun (“KICK THE U.S. SOLDIERS AND BASES OUT OF OKINAWA, 12/26/01) held an interview with Kaoru Kiyan, a former Ryukyu government official and present mayor of the village of Kita-nakagusuku. Asked how he felt about Japanese police protecting US bases in Okinawa, Kiyan responded, “The US air assault on Afghanistan raises the possibility of US military facilities being targeted for terrorist attacks. The possibility becomes even greater with the Japanese government’s decision to send the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) overseas. It is certainly a rather odd thing that Japanese police have to guard US bases here. But our village is home to a sprawling US military base, and we need protection. But I wonder who will protect us? We want the US military to relocate all their bases to US soil. This, I believe, is what the Constitution dictates.”

The Asahi Shimbun (“TOKYO, LOCALS REACH FUTENMA DEAL,” Tokyo, 12/28/01) reported that Japanese government reached an agreement on December 27 with local government to go ahead with plans to replace the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma with an offshore facility near Nago, Okinawa Prefecture. At the meeting of central and local government officials, Nago Mayor Tateo Kishimoto said he would accept the construction of a facility on a reef off the city’s Henoko district. But he added that it would be desirable to build the facility as far from land as possible. The two sides agreed to hold further discussions on the scale of facility on the understanding that the runway will be available for both military and civilian use. One issue not addressed, however, was the request by the Okinawa prefectural and Nago municipal governments to place a 15-year limit on the US military’s use of the facility. Some Nago residents remain opposed to the planned relocation, and others have raised concerns about environmental damage. Central government officials are expected to put together a basic plan for the new facility as early as March, based on the details of the latest agreement.

Kyodo (“OKINAWA BASE TIME LIMIT ‘DIFFICULT,’ TANAKA SAYS,” Naha, 12/30/01) reported that it would be difficult to reach agreement with the US for a 15-year time limit to be set on the US military’s use of a new airport in Nago before construction begins. Okinawa Governor Keiichi Inamine and other prefectural officials are demanding that the time limit be set for the airport. Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka said, “I understand the governor’s feelings. But if the construction is delayed for the sake of setting a time limit, residents near Futenma will have to suffer longer and if it is moved up, it will conflict with the governor’s plan to place the 15-year limit at an early time.” She also said, “We must consider all of these issues together, while watching international developments and discussing the matter with the US.” The Japanese government has not clarified its position on the issue and has simply been conveying Okinawa’s wishes to US.

2. Strife in the Democratic Party of Japan

The Japan Times (“DPJ DISSIDENTS FORM STUDY GROUP,” Tokyo, 12/26/01) reported that conflict within the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) became more visible as 34 members who oppose party leader Yukio Hatoyama formed a new study group. The group primarily consists of former members of the Social Democratic Party who voted against the dispatching of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) ships to the Indian Ocean to provide logistical support for US. “The party should make clear its stance against the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),” said group leader Takahiro Yokomichi. The group may field a candidate of its own in the next presidential election in September, but a more likely scenario is to support Secretary General Naoto Kan, who is close to the group, party sources said.

The NAPSNet Daily Report aims to serve as a forum for dialogue and exchange among peace and security specialists. Conventions for readers and a list of acronyms and abbreviations are available to all recipients. For descriptions of the world wide web sites used to gather information for this report, or for more information on web sites with related information, see the collection of other NAPSNet resources.
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Produced by the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development in partnership with:
BK21 The Education and Research Corps for East Asian Studies
Department of Political Science Korea University, Seoul, Republic of Korea
Center for American Studies,
Fudan University, Shanghai, People’s Republic of China
International Peace Research Institute (PRIME),
Meiji Gakuin University, Tokyo, Japan
Monash Asia Institute,
Monash University, Clayton, Australia

Brandon Yu: napsnet@nautilus.org
Berkeley, California, United States

Timothy L. Savage: napsnet@nautilus.org
Berkeley, California, United States

Kim Young-soo: yskim328@hotmail.com
Seoul, Republic of Korea

Hibiki Yamaguchi: hibikiy@dh.mbn.or.jp
Tokyo, Japan

Saiko Iwata: saiko@akira.ne.jp
Tokyo, Japan

Hiroya Takagi: hiroya_takagi@hotmail.com
Tokyo, Japan

Peter Razvin: icipu@glas.apc.org
Moscow, Russian Federation

Wu Chunsi: cswu@fudan.ac.cn
Shanghai, People’s Republic of China

Dingli Shen: dlshen@fudan.ac.cn
Shanghai, People’s Republic of China

John McKay: John.McKay@adm.monash.edu.au
Clayton, Australia

 


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