CONTENTS
1. US-PRC Relations
2. US Policy toward PRC
3. PRC Military Exercises
4. Cross-Straits Relations
5. PRC Jamming of Taiwan Radio
II. Republic of Korea 1. US-DPRK Talks
I. United States
1. US-PRC Relations
The New York Times (“IN JIANG’S WORDS: ‘I HOPE THE WESTERN WORLD CAN UNDERSTAND CHINA BETTER’,” 8/10/01) reported that PRC President Jiang Zemin, asked whether he was concerned about anti-PRC sentiment within the US Bush administration said that it is not a new problem. Jiang stated, “At any time there are all kinds of people with different opinions.” Jiang disputed the need for a US missile defense, stating that “the purpose of our possession of weapons is not for offensive purposes, they are all for our own defense.” He added that the PRC response to US deployment of a national missile defense would be to “increase our defense capability in keeping with the development of the international situation, and we would do this for the sole purpose of self-defense. As to when and how we are going to do this … I cannot tell the details.” Regarding the possibility of the US selling more advanced weapons to Taiwan, Jiang said, “I can only say that it would be very dangerous. I hope the Western world can understand China better. This is not simply an issue that has a bearing on myself. It actually has a bearing on the pride and feelings of the 1.2 billion Chinese people and the tens of millions of Chinese descendants overseas. They all hope that Taiwan and the mainland can be reunified at an early date. So if this situation does not make a turn for the better, does not head toward such a conclusion, then it will be hard to cope with the emotions and desires of so many people. Our intention is peaceful unification and one country, two systems.” He added, “I am definitely not a belligerent person, but I would also like to note another aspect of our policy. That is, should the pro-independence Taiwanese or the overseas separatist forces intervene in the question of Taiwan and try to separate Taiwan away from the rest of China, China can never renounce the use of force.” Regarding generational transitions in the Chinese leadership, Jiang stated, “By the time I leave the historical stage, I don’t think there will be any change in the policies, in the direction that we have already set. The next generation of leaders will keep to this road. Maybe I’m too confident.” Jiang also stated, “It now looks like the momentum is good for [US-PRC] bilateral relations. Both sides share a positive desire to have a good relationship. It is in the interest of the whole world. In October there will be the APEC meeting in Shanghai, and President Bush will also visit Beijing. All these steps will push the relationship forward. We should try our best to find the common ground between us. Undoubtedly, for such two big countries, it would be strange if they had no disagreements at all. So we should work to solve those disagreements properly.” [Ed. note: This article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for August 10, 2001.]
2. US Policy toward PRC
The Far Eastern Economic Review (“PENTAGON’S CHINA EXPERT RESIGNS INTELLIGENCE,” 8/17/01) reported that John F. Corbett, Junior, the senior country director for the PRC in the US Defense Department, has resigned because of what colleagues describe as “dismay” at the attitude towards the PRC adopted by the new administration of US President George W. Bush. Sources at the US Defense Department said that Corbett left his post in late July and will formally step down on October 1. Corbett believed that the PRC military’s modernization efforts were part of a normal professionalization process, not a threat to Asia’s security. He had been portrayed by right-wing critics in Washington as a pro-PRC voice. Corbett declined to comment on his departure. [Ed. note: This article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for August 10, 2001.]
3. PRC Military Exercises
Agence France Presse (“CHINA PREPARES TO KICK OFF HUGE MILITARY DRILLS,” Hong Kong, 8/10/01) reported that a report said Friday that the PRC has begun final preparations for its largest-ever military exercises, which will simulate an invasion of the Taiwan-controlled Penghu islands. The PRC-backed Wen Wei Po said that all major roads in the Fujian provincial capital of Fuzhou leading southward to the Dongshan islands where the drills will take place some 250 kilometers (167.5 miles) northeast of Hong Kong have been taken over by the military. The paper, citing a military briefing, said that the aim of the drills, involving the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), air force and navy, was to simulate the seizure of Penghu. The paper said it was designed “to smash at any times any plots by Taiwan independent separatists. If the condition calls for the use of force to resolve the issue of Taiwan, the PLA will first of all invade Penghu.” They added that there were no plans “now or in the future” to take over Quemoy and Matsu islands, which lie close to the PRC in any invasion of Taiwan. The war games will involve military units from Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong provinces. The paper said the exercise, whose preparations started in April, will be the largest in PLA history and will include the most advanced armaments.
4. Cross-Straits Relations
Agence France Presse (“CHEN PLEDGES ALLEGIANCE TO TAIWAN’S ‘ONE CHINA’ PRINCIPLE,” Taipei, 8/10/01) and the Associated Press (“TAIWAN’S PRESIDENT TAKES HARD-LINE,” Taipei, 8/10/01) reported that Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian on Friday pledged his support for the “one China” principle outlined by his predecessors, clarifying his views on cross-Straits relations with the PRC. In a meeting with US Senator Christopher Bond, Chen said he supported the existing Taiwanese constitution. Chen said, “To solve the differences across the Strait, the spirit of ROC’s constitution has to be adopted to set the course. It is also the answer that could be accepted by the people and governments across the Strait, to the so-called ‘one China’ issue. Communist China has to accept the fact that I’m the ROC President, otherwise, it would be a denial to the ROC and the ROC constitution which I myself cannot accept, nor can the 23 million people in Taiwan.”
5. PRC Jamming of Taiwan Radio
The Associated Press (“TAIWAN’S PRESIDENT TAKES HARD-LINE,” Taipei, 8/10/01) reported that Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation said on Friday that the PRC state-run Voice of the Straits has jammed the broadcasts of at least two Taiwanese radio stations by using the same frequencies. The Foundation, a semiofficial group handling exchanges with the PRC, called on the PRC to stop the “inappropriate act” to allow free information exchanges between Taiwanese and Chinese.
II. Republic of Korea
1. US-DPRK Talks
The Korea Herald (Kim Ji-ho, “N.K. AGAIN TURNS DOWN U.S.-PROPOSED AGENDA,” 8/10/01) reported that the DPRK has vowed not to resume dialogue with the US unless it withdraws the items it has proposed be put on the agenda for future talks. A spokesman for the DPRK Foreign Ministry said on August 8, “We can never accept the agenda items unilaterally raised by the United States that are part of its intention to disarm and stifle the North.” Labeling the US proposals as an “anachronistic mode of thinking,” the DPRK spokesman said that his government would come to the negotiation table only when the Bush administration’s stance becomes “identical to that of the Clinton administration in its last period.” In response the US State Department reiterated that that the US is ready to hold talks with the DPRK without preconditions. US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said, “We have made it quite clear that there are a number of subjects that we do wish to discuss.” Boucher then renewed its proposal for dialogue topics, “such as implementation of the agreed framework, verifiable constraints on the missile programs and a less threatening conventional military posture on the (Korean) Peninsula.” Also on August 8, Radio Pyongyang, another official DPRK mouthpiece, claimed that the US call for the DPRK’s conventional disarmament is an intervention in its internal affairs. It said, “If the United States withdraws its troops stationed in the South, we won’t have to devote our energies to the conventional forces at the expense of economic development.” [Ed. note: This article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for August 10, 2001.]
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