NAPSNet Daily Report 08 January, 1999

IN TODAY’S REPORT:

I. United States

II. Republic of Korea

III. Japan

I. United States

1. Alleged DPRK Missile Launch Sites

The Associated Press (“PAPER: N. KOREA BUILDS LAUNCH SITES,” Tokyo, 01/08/98) reported that the Japanese Yomiuri newspaper said Friday that the DPRK has begun construction on at least five underground ballistic missile launch sites near its borders with the PRC and the ROK. It cited unnamed sources in the US and Japan as saying that the suspected launch sites are deeper than 150 feet and capable of multiple firings.

2. Implementation of Agreed Framework

The Washington Times (“NORTH KOREA WANTS U.S. COMPENSATION,” Tokyo, 01/08/99, 15) reported that a statement from the DPRK Anti-nuclear Peace Committee carried by the Korean Central News Agency on Thursday demanded compensation from the US for economic losses caused by US delays in implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework. The statement said, “U.S. moves to delay implementing the agreement have created four years of vacuum in the development of our self-supporting nuclear power industry and caused a great shortage of energy, thus having a serious effect on our socialist planned economy as a whole. In the long run, what we have gamed in ‘reward’ for faithfully implementing the agreement are nothing but economic losses.” [Ed. note: This article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for January 8.]

3. ROK Funding for Light-Water Reactor Project

The Associated Press (“S. KOREA TO RAISE ELEC RATES 3% TO PAY FOR REACTORS IN NORTH,” Seoul, 01/08/99) reported that ROK government officials said Friday that they will raise electricity rates by 3 percent to pay for the ROK’s share of the project to build two nuclear power plants in the DPRK. The hike translates into an average additional 3,100 won (US$2.6) in monthly electricity charges per ROK household. The plan requires approval from the National Assembly.

4. DPRK Diplomacy

The Associated Press (“NORTH KOREA OPENS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH BRUNEI,” Seoul, 01/08/99) reported that the DPRK’s Korean Central News Agency said Friday that the DPRK has established diplomatic relations with the Southeast Asian nation of Brunei. The broadcast said that the decision that went into effect Thursday will help “develop friendly relations and cooperation” between the two countries.

5. US Defense Secretary’s Asian Trip

US Defense Department Spokesman Ken Bacon (“PENTAGON SPOKESMAN’S REGULAR BRIEFING JANUARY 7,” USIA Transcript, 01/08/99) announced that US Defense Secretary William Cohen will leave on Sunday for Japan and the ROK to make up an earlier scheduled trip that was canceled due to the Iraqi situation. Bacon said that Cohen will “have his standard consultations in Korea, which are very important, and also a chance to meet with troops in both Japan and Korea and to meet with his counterparts in both countries, and also to meet with … U.S. commanders in both countries.”

6. PRC Military Readiness

The Associated Press (“CHINA PRESIDENT TELLS MILITARY TO BE PREPARED FOR THREATS,” Beijing, 01/08/99) reported that the PRC’s Xinhua News Agency and state television said that PRC President Jiang Zemin on December 25 urged the military to be prepared to protect the PRC from nuclear attacks from without and separatism from within. Jiang stated, “Hegemonism and power politics still exist. We must resolutely safeguard the unity of the motherland and the nation’s territorial integrity.” Jiang reminded military commanders that the People’s Liberation Army was “under the absolute leadership” of the communist party. He added that the party is committed to backing the military’s modernization so that it would be prepared to “ward off pre-emptive strikes as well as large-scale wars and nuclear war.”

7. Spratly Islands Dispute

The Associated Press (“CHINA SAYS DISPUTE OVER SPRATLYS AN ASIAN AFFAIR, U.S. SHOULD KEEP OUT,” Manila, 01/07/99) reported that PRC Ambassador to the Philippines Guan Dengming said Thursday that the territorial dispute over the Spratly Islands is an Asian matter in which other countries should not meddle. Guan stated, “I think we can solve the problem ourselves. It’s our problem. We don’t want other countries to interfere.” Guan insisted that structures recently built by the PRC on Mischief Reef in the Spratlys were shelters for fishermen and repeated the PRC’s offer to let the Philippines use the platforms.

8. US Sanctions on India

Reuters (Narayanan Madhavan, “U.S. OFFICIALS SEE END TO SANCTIONS ON INDIA AHEAD.” Jaipur, 01/08/99) reported that senior US officials and analysts said on Friday that the US is moving towards lifting economic sanctions imposed on India after last year’s nuclear tests. Representative Jim McDermott, chairman of the Indo-U.S. Interparliamentary Group of the US Congress, stated, “I believe it is possible this year, though one can’t say for sure.” He said that differences between the two nations were narrower than was widely perceived, and added that he would be visiting India next month with a delegation of lawmakers to interact directly with Indian officials. He stated, “I think the chasms between the two nations are narrow and the remaining issues are political rather than substantive.” George Pickart, senior adviser in the South Asia bureau of the US State Department, stated, “We really do hope to reconcile our non-proliferation concerns with India’s security interests. I am confident that we would be able to work through past challenges.” Stephen Cohen, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution think-tank, said that the US needed to increase India’s profile in its diplomatic relations. Cohen stated, “We Americans have insufficient understanding of Indian strengths. America must learn to treat India proportionately. Its power is likely to increase rather than decrease over the coming years.”

9. Russian Ratification of START II

US Defense Department Spokesman Ken Bacon (“PENTAGON SPOKESMAN’S REGULAR BRIEFING JANUARY 7,” USIA Transcript, 01/08/99) said that it remains to be seen whether the US might make unilateral reductions in its nuclear arsenal. Bacon stated, “As you know, right now, there’s a law that prevents us from going down unilaterally to the START II levels until the DUMA ratifies START II. Senator Warner, I believe, said earlier this week at a hearing that that would be — that this is something Congress would review. And it’s something that the administration will be glad to discuss with Congress. But right now, we are following the law, and we will continue to follow the law.” He added, “we remain hopeful that the Russians will ratify START II because they have to deal with the same problem we have to deal with, which is there a cost to maintaining the START I levels. The cost bites them much harder than it bites us. And therefore, they have a much greater incentive to go down to the START II levels under the START II treaty than we do.”

10. US National Missile Defense

US Defense Department Spokesman Ken Bacon (“PENTAGON SPOKESMAN’S REGULAR BRIEFING JANUARY 7,” USIA Transcript, 01/08/99) said that the basic program to work to develop a National Missile Defense system that has the capability of providing defense against a limited attack is on track. He stated, “the development phase is set to continue to the year 2000. And at that point, we’ll make a decision whether to begin deploying the system, or it could be made after that.” He added, “there will be money included in the future year defense plan, approximately $7 billion, to give us the option of moving toward deployment should that decision be made.” Bacon said that a “crucial” test of an interceptor missile will be held in June. He stated, “I think that will give us a good indication of where this system stands. There are other interceptor tests planned for later in the year or early next year. So based on that, we’ll make a decision about the schedule for the program.” Bacon noted that the anti-ballistic missile system treaty with Russia applies primarily to National Missile Defense rather than Theater Missile Defense. He added, “much of the Theater Missile Defense would be located away from the United States in the theater in which the threat occurs.”

II. Republic of Korea

1. ROK Aid to DPRK

Chosun Ilbo (“NO-STRINGS AID TO DPRK PROPOSED,” 01/08/99) reported that ROK Minister of Unification Kang In-duk said that, motivated by humanitarian factors, the ROK government is considering supplying fertilizer, agricultural insecticides, seeds, and ambulances to the DPRK without any reciprocal conditions. Currently, only food and medical supplies are provided as aid to the DPRK. The list will shortly be expanded to cover these other items. As a provision of the aid package, the ROK government will study ways to donate the items directly to DPRK, not via a third country or third-party intermediary. Commenting on previous conditions that donations of fertilizer supplies be contingent upon a reunion of separated families, the minister said that the DPRK must show comparable attitudes to the ROK’s expanded humanitarian efforts, which may in turn lead to success on the other front.

2. ROK Financing of Light-Water Reactor Project

Joongang Ilbo (“ROK GOVERNMENT IMPOSES HYDRO SURCHARGE TO FINANCE DPRK REACTOR,” 01/08/99) reported that the ROK government decided on January 3 to impose a special surcharge on consumers’ electricity usage to raise funds for a light-water reactor to be constructed in the DPRK. The surcharge will be 3 percent of the total usage. The total amount consumers spend on electricity is 15 trillion won, so 450 billion won will be accumulated by this special imposition. The ROK’s share of the construction costs is US$3.22 billion, which is about 70 percent of the total project’s budget, with Japan financing the remaining US$1 billion.

3. ROK-Japan Defense Talks

Korea Times (“TOKYO BULLIES TO STOP DPRK NUCLEAR PROJECT SUPPORT,” 01/07/99) reported that Tokyo has warned that it might have to withdraw its financial support, worth about US$1 billion, from the Korean Peninsula Development Organization (KEDO). This message was conveyed by Hosei Norota, chief of the Japan Defense Agency, to ROK Defense Minister Chun Yong-taek in a meeting of the two countries’ defense chiefs in the ROK on Thursday. Minister Norota took note of growing anti-DPRK sentiment in Japan since the August missile launch and said that another such incident would make it difficult to continue providing support for the KEDO project in the DPRK. The two ministers agreed that no concrete evidence of the imminent launch of another missile by the DPRK has been found. Minister Norota voiced his agreement with the ROK’s view that the Agreed Framework and KEDO formats will be preserved and that any potential crisis on the Korean peninsula should be resolved diplomatically without raising tensions. It was agreed that both countries will hold Navy-to-Navy and JCS-to-JCS meetings this year in accordance with a joint action plan announced during President Kim Dae-jung’s visit to Japan in October last year. During Thursday’s meeting, Japan explained to the ROK that it is planning to launch and operate a spy satellite from 2002 and promised full transparency as to its operation, easing concerns here about the intrusive nature of the satellite. Japan also informed the ROK that as of late last year it has joined the US-led theater defense missile (TMD) program aimed at defending against missile attacks. Chosun Ilbo (“ROK-JAPAN DEFENSE HOTLINE TO BE SET-UP,” 01/07/99) reported that ROK defense minister Chon Yong-taek and Japan’s defense minister Hosei Noroda, held talks on Thursday in the ROK. At the meeting, they agreed to establish a “hot line” to reinforce closer ties between the two ministries, particularly concerning urgent military responses to the DPRK’s test firing of missiles, infiltration, and other provocative actions. Another purpose of setting up this hot line is to beef up mutual preparedness for sea-borne surveillance and rescue missions. The two ministries agreed to carry out joint military exercises this year. The two ministers shared an understanding that it is essential for the ROK, Japan, and the US to cooperate closely with regards to allegations of the DPRK’s long-range nuclear missile program. Noroda, in particular, suggested that Japan would deal aggressively with the threat of a missile launch by the DPRK.

4. DPRK Underground Construction

Korea Herald (“U.S. DEMAND TO ACCESS DPRK SITE BEYOND INTERNATIONAL NORMS: CHINESE ENVOY,” 01/07/99) reported that PRC ambassador to the ROK Wu Dawei said Thursday that the US demand for access to the DPRK’s suspected underground nuclear site goes beyond what he thinks are international norms. Ambassador Wu, who assumed his ROK post last September, said no country should conduct an inspection of a facility in another sovereign state based only on suspicions. While the US claims it has evidence that the DPRK is constructing the site for nuclear purposes, Wu said that the PRC government has seen no hard proof. With some 70 percent of DPRK territory being mountainous regions, the site may be one of many plain underground sites it has built. He said that the PRC hopes that the US and the DPRK solve the nuclear issue through dialogue, consultation, and the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework. He added, “If (a demand for compensation) is the DPRK’s position, I am not sure though, if it is quite normal.” However, he complained about Japan and the US saying that that the firing of another missile by the DPRK could jeopardize the 1994 Agreed Framework and the reactor project. Wu mentioned that DPRK had already possessed its missile capability a long time ago and also that the missile issue is irrelevant to the Geneva Agreed Framework. “When the US and DPRK signed it, they never linked Pyongyang’s missile development programs to the agreement and also the KEDO project,” he said. The Chinese envoy also noted the DPRK’s declaration that it fired a multistage rocket to set a satellite in orbit. He said he hopes progress will be made in the upcoming four-party talks, scheduled for January 18-22 in Geneva, but he said it is too early to be too optimistic.

5. DPRK Refugees in PRC

Chosun Ilbo (“LIFE IS HARD FOR DPRK PEOPLE IN YENJI,” 01/08/99) reported that, as the number of DPRK refugees increases, PRC Public Security officers have been staging organized roundups of DPRK nationals crossing the border illegally. PRC authorities have even deported DPRK women who have married Chinese or ethnic Korean men in Yenji, apparently to discourage illegal aliens from considering that option. There are as many as 100,000 illegal DPRK nationals in the PRC’s three northeastern provinces. Many are paid as little as one-sixth of normal pay. “Kyung-soo,” a sixteen year-old DPRK boy who twice has crossed the border into the PRC despite once being deported, when asked why he took the risk, stated, “It’s better to risk getting killed than to die slowly.”

6. DPRK Foreign Policy

Korean Herald (“DPRK AT CROSSRADS OVER INSPECTIONS, ANALYST SAYS,” 01/08/99) reported that Professor Ahn Byung-joon of Yonsei University said Thursday that the DPRK is standing at a crossroads this year over whether to join the global community or remain an isolated country. Professor Ahn said that how the DPRK responds to demands for access to its suspected nuclear facilities will determine its future course. “If the DPRK refuses to accept international inspection of the suspected facilities, it will be isolated from the world and, in this case, tension will be intensified again on the Korean Peninsula,” Ahn said at a seminar on the outlook for inter-Korean relations of 1999, organized by the Institute for Far Eastern Studies of Kyungnam University. Ahn expects the DPRK to eventually open up its facilities in question, and resume the deadlocked government-level talks with the ROK. “While continuing negotiations with the US on pending issues, the DPRK will try to avoid facing a worst-case scenario,” he said. In the forum, Lee Jong-seok, a research fellow at Sejong Institute, said he expects DPRK leader Kim Jong-il to expand his focus outside the military this year, into the economic and administrative fields. Lee also noted the DPRK’s lack of action on reorganizing the powerful ruling Workers’ Party led by Kim, who is also general secretary of the party. It was also forecast that inter-Korean economic exchanges this year will be adversely affected by tension between the DPRK and the US over inspection of the suspect underground facilities and the depressed economic conditions on the Korean Peninsula.

7. Alleged DPRK Drug Smuggling

Chosun Ilbo (“JAPAN CONFIRMS DPRK AS DRUG SOURCE,” 01/07/99) reported that Japanese police confirmed Thursday that 200Kg of drugs confiscated prior to being off loaded in Japan were from the DPRK, according to the daily Yomiuri newspaper. The paper reported that, following the questioning of the smugglers involved, police discovered that they had had a rendezvous with a DPRK vessel disguised as a fishing boat, which delivered the drugs. The smugglers then tried to land on Kochi, but were intercepted by maritime police officers. The report noted that drugs in Japan primarily originated in the PRC, and this was the first time that the DPRK had been revealed as a source of drug smuggling, confirming rumors that the DPRK is now a distributor and producer of illegal narcotics.

8. DPRK Participation in 2002 World Cup

Korea Times (“DPRK TO BE OFFERED TWO WORLD CUP MATCHES,” 01/08/99) reported that the head of the ROK soccer association plans to ask the DPRK to host two of the finals matches in the 2002 World Cup, which the ROK is co-hosting with Japan. “I am thinking about staging two matches in Pyongyang,” Chung Mong-Jun, who is also vice president of the world soccer governing body FIFA, was quoted as saying by Japanese daily Asahi Shimbun. It was the first time Chung mentioned a specific number of matches to involve the DPRK in the premier sporting event, Asahi said. If the plan is realized, it will also help form a joint DPRK-ROK team for the 2002 World Cup, Chung told the newspaper. Chung visited the DPRK last week to discuss several issues, including the hosting of some matches of the 2002 World Cup and the fielding of a joint team. Chung also told Asahi that he would seek to push the inter- Korean World Cup project when he visits the DPRK January 12-16 at the DPRK’s invitation. He hoped to see a FIFA delegation inspect a DPRK football stadium early next year following talks between the governing body and the DPRK, according to Asahi. The DPRK capital of Pyongyang boasts of having a 100,000-seat stadium. Chung’s inter- Korean scheme received an added boost from FIFA president Sepp Blatter during his recent visit to Seoul. Blatter, who earlier this year ruled out any chance of the plan, has now softened his stance. He said that while it was not possible to change FIFA statutes to allow the DPRK to formally host games, if the ROK as a co-host made its own contacts with the DPRK, FIFA would not close the door. “We are open to any dialogue,” said Blatter. Blatter also revealed that he would visit the DPRK next year and he is expected to discuss their possible involvement in the World Cup.

9. ROK-Libyan Relations

Joongang Ilbo (“LIBYA THREATENS TO BANISH ROK COMPANIES,” 01/07/99) reported that ROK construction companies in Libya are facing a critical situation because the Libyan government is now considering the expulsion of all ROK nationals due to the ROK government’s support of the US attack on Libya last year. Libya’s governmental news agency JANA issued a warning message to the ROK’s major construction companies. Dong-A, Hyundai, and Daewoo are anxiously monitoring the situation. A source from Dong-A said, “In the past, this sort of warning was issued, but no actual expulsion has ever occurred. I hope this time is also just a cautionary warning.” Six ROK companies in Libya are working on 26 projects worth US$10 billion.

III. Japan

1. Alleged DPRK Missile Launch Sites

The Yomiuri Shimbun (“DPRK DEVELOPS BALLISTIC MISSILES AT FIVE UNDERGROUND SITES,” 01/08/99) reported that according to a Japanese-US source on January 7, the DPRK has at least five underground sites where the country is developing its ballistic missiles. Three of the five suspected sites are located near the DPRK-PRC border, while the other two are near the ROK-DPRK border. The sites are located deeper than fifty meters below the ground, and each can contain and launch more than one ballistic missile. According to the source, given that the Rodong 1, which has already been deployed for actual combat, is mobile, these underground sites are likely to be for Taepodong missiles. The source also observed that the DPRK may have been developing Taepodong missiles for actual combat since the test-launch of one of the missiles over Japan in late August, 1998. The Yomiuri report added that in the case of underground missile launch pads, because it is impossible to detect pre-launch activities, the DPRK’s neighboring countries, including Japan, face an increased threat, and that the DPRK’s missile development will inevitably be a major subject of future US-DPRK talks.

2. Alleged DPRK Drug Smuggling

The Yomiuri Shimbun (“ILLEGAL DRUGS CONFISCATED IN KOCHI PREFECTURE FOUND TO BE OF DPRK PRODUCT,” 01/07/99) reported that illegal drugs confiscated off the shore of Kochi, Japan in late August by the police authorities turned out on January 7 to be DPRK products. The drugs were sold to a Japanese smuggling group by a DPRK ship at sea. The police already arrested six members of the group and the drugs were found to be DPRK products in the process of their investigation. According the police, the group’s ship Tamamaru met with a DPRK ship on the East China Sea, and received the three hundred kilograms of drugs from the DPRK ship for smuggling into Japan. The police also found that one of the members entered the DPRK via a third country for the drug deal before the confiscation this time. The police had tightened their alert, especially after a similar case in April, 1997 in which a DPRK ship off the shore of Miyazaki, Japan was hiding Chinese-made drugs. The report added that then Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto said to reporters in May, 1997, “The DPRK may have something to do with this incident.”

3. Japanese-ROK Defense Talks

The Daily Yomiuri (Yutaka Sotome, “DEFENSE ACCORD WITH S. KOREA, US PLANNED,” Seoul, 01/08/99) reported that Japanese Defense Agency Director General Hosei Norota and ROK Defense Minister Chun Yong-taek agreed during talks held at the ROK Defense Department on January 6 and 7 that Japan, the US, and the ROK should establish a joint defense framework. They also agreed that the countries should continue to work to maintain the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and the DPRK. Norota said that maintaining the Agreed Framework was particularly important because the DPRK continues to refuse to allow inspections of its suspected underground nuclear facilities. Norota also said that Japan faces an increased security threat from the DPRK since the DPRK test-fired one of its Taepodong 1 missiles over Japan in late August, 1998. The two sides also agreed to set up a communication system, such as a telephone hot line, between their defense agencies. The details of the system are expected to be worked out later by lower-level officials. They also agreed that the hot line could be used to deal with contingencies such as the sinking of a DPRK submersible by ROK forces near the Tsushima Straits off Nagasaki Prefecture last December. The report said that Norota reportedly warned that if the DPRK launches another ballistic missile, the government is “very likely” to withdraw its contribution to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). In response, Chun said only that Japanese funding of KEDO was “extremely important.” They also agreed to conduct joint maritime search and rescue exercises by the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force and the ROK naval forces, a project the two governments have been considering for some time, according to the report.

4. Japanese-ROK Fishery Agreement

The Yomiuri Shimbun (“JAPANESE-ROK FISHERY ACCORD TO COME IN TO EFFECT, BUT TERRITORIAL DISPUTE STILL REMAINS HOT,” 01/8/99) reported that, in the wake of the ROK’s parliamentary approval of the Japanese-ROK Fishery Accord, the Japanese government decided to ratify the new accord at a cabinet meeting on January 19 and to exchange ratification with the ROK by January 22, when the existing fishery accord will be terminated. The new accord is expected to come into effect on the same day, but both countries have those who are still unhappy about the issues related to the territorial dispute over the Takeshima/Tokdo islet, including the nationality of Takeshima/Tokdo and the scope of fishing operations. The Yomiuri report sees this as a concern that may develop to a future cause of dispute between Japan and the ROK. According to the report’s background description, the issue of the sovereignty over Takeshima/Tokdo began to attract attention because the ROK demanded full delimitation of exclusive economic zones of the two countries based on the UN Law of the Sea in May, 1996. Japan, on the other hand, proposed to jointly control the so-called tentative zone while shelving the issue. The ROK agreed to the proposal in October, 1997. The ROK’s ratification of the accord came later than originally expected mainly because of opposition from opposition parties in the ROK. The report cited a Japanese Foreign Ministry official as saying with regard to this, “If another dispute between both countries over fishing stock and operation regulations were to occur, it might affect the issue of Takeshima/Tokdo, I’m afraid.”

5. Disposed Chemical Weapons in the PRC

The Nikkei Shimbun (“JAPAN TO BEGIN TO DEAL WITH DISPOSED CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN CHINA IN 2000,” 01/05/99) reported that the Japanese government decided to begin dealing in 2000 with the chemical weapons in China that Japan disposed of during World War II. The Japanese government will establish headquarters and five working teams for the task this year. There are estimated to be 700,000 disposed chemical weapons in the PRC. Japan is obliged by the Chemical Weapons Convention, which both Japan and the PRC already ratified, to deal with these weapons. The report added that Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi promised to PRC President Jiang Zemin last November at the time of Jiang’s visit to Japan that Japan would work as much as it can to solve the issue.

6. US-Japan Relations

The Sankei Shimbun (“JUSTICE MINISTER’S STATEMENT ON JANUARY 4,” 01/06/99) reported that Japanese Justice Minister Seizaburo Nakamura stated at the Justice Ministry on January 4, “The US realized that it cannot match Japan in manufacturing, and it is threatening Japan in the financial sector such as derivatives. Free market economy in the US definition does not mean freedom. It means that if the US is likely to lose to another country, it may drop A- bombs and launch missiles. The US also uses Super 301 to threaten (other countries). Their freedom does not mean free competition at all. The Japanese people are struggling because they cannot revise their constitution that was imposed by the Allies, that prohibits the right of war-fighting, self-defense, and possession of their own military. Although it is difficult not to lose to US strategy, we have to keep trying (not to lose) for the Japanese people. It is essential to reform our judicial system to adjust to the (present) era. Recently, (public) confidence in lawyers has been shaking. Public concern is growing that lawyers are behaving outrageously.”

The Sankei Shimbun (“DEMOCRATIC PARTY TO CRITICIZE NAKAMURA AT DIET,” 01/08/99) reported that the Democratic Party decided to criticize Justice Minister Seizaburo Nakamura at a normal Diet session slated for January 19 for his statement about constitutional revision, saying “(His statement) cannot be ignored. Withdrawal of the statement will not suffice.” Other opposition parties including the Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party already demanded that Nakamura step down from his post. Komei Party will also discuss the issue.

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