NAPSNet Daily Report 02 July, 1999

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"NAPSNet Daily Report 02 July, 1999", NAPSNet Daily Report, July 02, 1999, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-daily-report/napsnet-daily-report-02-july-1999/

 
CONTENTS

I. United States

II. Republic of Korea

III. Japan

I. United States

1. DPRK-ROK Talks

The Associated Press (Charles Hutzler, “S. KOREA LEAVES TALKS WITH NORTH,” Beijing, 07/02/99) and Reuters (Paul Eckert, “S.KOREANS SHELVE TALKS WITH NORTH, HEAD HOME,” Beijing, 07/02/99) reported that the ROK pulled its negotiators out of talks with the DPRK on Friday. ROK Vice Unification Minister Yang Young-shik stated, “So long as the North does not change its attitude, it is meaningless to go on like this, so we have decided to go back to Korea. We don’t want to carry on with meetings for meetings’ sake or hold more talks about talks.” Yang said that the ROK also decided to suspend the shipments of fertilizer until the DPRK decides to discuss reunions in good faith. Park Young-soo, head of the DPRK delegation, had not called Yang about resuming the Beijing talks as he had promised on Thursday. Yang added, “This behavior by the North shows that they are not prepared to discuss the divided family issue.” The DPRK officials were not available for comment on Friday.

Agence France-Presse (“NKOREA WALKS OUT OF CRUCIAL TALKS WITH SKOREA,” Beijing, 07/01/99) and Reuters (Paul Eckert, “KOREA TALKS ‘WALK PARALLEL LINE’ WITH NO PROGRESS,” Beijing, 07/01/99) reported that the ROK and the DPRK ended a third round of talks in Beijing on Thursday. ROK Vice Unification Minister Yang Young-shik described the talks as “walking on a parallel line of different positions.” Yang said that he was awaiting a telephone call from DPRK delegation head Park Young-soo to learn whether and when the two sides would resume discussions. Yang said that the DPRK failed to uphold a prior agreement to discuss the reunion of separated families. He stated, “It seems that they had some sort of plan in mind, but North Korea did not say anything about the separated family issue. They were very interested in the fertilizer.” Yang added that the DPRK said that it would begin discussing the divided family issue once the promised ROK fertilizer had been shipped. However, Yang added that that the walkout by the DPRK delegation was not a “breakdown” in the high- level talks and that the ROK would continue to wait for a positive response from the DPRK.

2. DPRK-UNC Talks

Reuters (Paul Eckert, “S.KOREANS SHELVE TALKS WITH NORTH, HEAD HOME,” Beijing, 07/02/99) reported that, according to United Nations Command (UNC) officials, a third round of talks between the DPRK and the UNC to discuss the Yellow Sea clash ended with no agreement. The UNC said that the Northern Limit Line should remain in effect and recommended direct communications channels between the two Koreas. The DPRK responded that the UNC’s stance was “intolerable, gangster-like sophism, which can never work on anybody.”

The Associated Press (“N. KOREA THREATENS RETALIATION AGAINST SOUTH,” Seoul, 07/02/99) reported that, according to the DPRK’s official Korean Central News Agency, DPRK Lieutenant General Ri Chan-bok stated, “More serious blood will be inevitable” if further intrusions occur in its territorial waters in the Yellow Sea. According to the KCNA report, Ri charged the ROK navy for having violated DPRK territorial waters in and around the disputed zone 63 times since the June 15 naval confrontation. US Major General Michael M. Dunn, representing the UNC, denied the charges and urged the DPRK navy to stay out of the disputed zone. Dunn added that the two sides were wide apart over measures to prevent similar clashes in the future. Measures proposed by Dunn included improved signaling methods and direct communications channels between the militaries of the two Koreas. The DPRK insisted that it would discuss practical measures to avoid armed clashes only if the ROK vessels withdrew from the area.

3. DPRK-Japan Talks

Japan Economic Newswire (“PYONGYANG WON’T CONTINUE UNOFFICIAL TALKS WITH JAPAN,” Tokyo, 07/01/99) and The Washington Times (“PYONGYANG SQUELCHES SMALL TALK WITH TOKYO,” Tokyo, 07/02/99) reported that, according to unnamed sources, the DPRK has declined to continue unofficial bilateral normalization talks with Japan after roughly seven months of informal dialogue. The sources said that in last week’s talks, the DPRK revealed that it would not welcome Japan’s coming to negotiations on normalizing relations without agreeing to provide food aid. The sources said that Japan decided to suspend the talks for the time being because it cannot compromise over key issues, including the DPRK’s missile project. The sources said that the DPRK position is believed to have been affected by having alternatives; for example, a separate negotiation track with the US and the official visit to the PRC last month by Kim Yong-nam, head of the standing committee of the DPRK Supreme People’s Assembly. [Ed. note: This article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for July 2.]

4. US Policy toward DPRK

The International Herald Tribune carried a commentary by Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution (“DEFANGING NORTH KOREA MUST TAKE PRIORITY IN ANY AID DEAL,” Washington, 07/02/99) which argued that the DPRK, through its naval maneuvers and preparations for test-firing another ballistic missile, is communicating that US DPRK Policy Coordinator William Perry’s package deal “is not good enough.” According to O’Hanlon, this interpretation of the DPRK’s behavior “makes sense” because “the DPRK needs money and knows it does not have many ways to earn it.” O’Hanlon asserted that the DPRK should not be paid to stop its missile program, but suggested that a grander package deal should be offered. O’Hanlon wrote, “As part of the bargain, North Korea should verifiably end all nuclear and missile programs, recognize South Korea and agree to a sweeping conventional arms treaty in which it would have to make larger cuts in armored forces than South Korea. In exchange, it would receive substantial amounts of Western economic aid that would go well beyond humanitarian relief.” O’Hanlon concluded, “This proposal would require strong U.S. commitment, as well as close cooperation with South Korea and Japan. Even so, North Korea might reject it. But it makes sense to give it a try.” [Ed. note: This article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for July 2.]

5. Detained US Citizen in DPRK

US Deputy State Department Spokesman James Foley (“STATE DEPARTMENT NOON BRIEFING,” Washington, USIA Text, 07/01/99) said that Sweden has still not been granted consular access to the detained US citizen in the DPRK. Foley said, “We continue to remain optimistic that the DPRK will abide by its international commitments and grant consular access to a detained American citizen. But we believe there will be consular access, through Sweden, granted; at least, we don’t have reason to believe that it won’t be granted.”

6. DPRK Ship in India

The Associated Press (“INDIA SEARCHES N. KOREAN SHIP,” Bombay, 07/02/99) reported that Indian customs officers on Friday searched a DPRK cargo ship at a western Indian port on suspicion it was carrying arms and ammunition for Pakistan. An unnamed Indian police officer stated, “So far no guns or ammunition have been found. But heavy machinery on board has raised suspicion and investigations are on.” According to the officer, the DPRK ship, carrying sugar from Singapore to Malta, arrived two days ago at Kandla Port, 330 miles northwest of Bombay. The next port of call after Kandla was Karachi, in western Pakistan. The officer added that the police boarded the ship to prevent any trouble between crewmembers and Indian customs officers as they checked the cargo.

7. ROK Missile Development

US State Department Deputy Spokesman James Foley (“U.S. PROVIDES TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR ROK SHORT RANGE MISSILES,” Washington, USIA Text, 07/01/99) said that the US has provided technological support to the ROK’s short-range missile capabilities. Foley noted that the US and the ROK “regularly consult on the best means of insuring adequate deterrent capabilities on the peninsula.” Foley emphasized that the US goal is to cooperate with the ROK government to insure adequate ROK defense while continuing to promote US regional and global nonproliferation objectives. Foley added, “we have repeatedly made clear to Pyongyang that any further missile tests would have serious consequences for our relations with North Korea. The United States views the North Korean missile program as a serious threat to the region and to our nonproliferation interests. We continue to press North Korea to cease all production, deployment, testing and export of missiles and missile technology.”

The International Herald Tribune (Don Kirk, “SEOUL SEEKS U.S. BACKING FOR MISSILE DEVELOPMENT,” Seoul, 07/02/99) reported that the ROK and the US officials are engaged in talks that the ROK hopes will result in approval for the development of a 300-kilometer (185-mile) range missile. An unnamed senior ROK official stated, “We have sort of a balance of terror on the Korean Peninsula. We want a reasonable level of capabilities.” Kim is expected to approach the missile issue in general terms over lunch in the White House with US President Bill Clinton, discussing the threat posed by the DPRK and asking for assurances of broad US support. Kim may get specific when he meets US envoy to the DPRK William Perry. Sohn Young-hwan, a missile expert with the Korea Institute of Defense Analyses, said, “The U.S. people don’t even want Korea to study long- range missiles. We think that kind of limitation is not proper.” Sohn said that he was not certain if the next missile would be “solely US,” noting that “for technology we have cooperation with other foreign countries.” Kim Chang-su at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses said, “The United States doesn’t want to antagonize North Korea. The United States wants us to report on processes with all information on test-firing.” [Ed. note: This article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for July 2.]

8. Kim Dae-jung’s Visit to US

US Deputy State Department Spokesman James Foley (“STATE DEPARTMENT NOON BRIEFING,” Washington, USIA Text, 07/01/99) said that ROK President Kim Dae-jung arrives in Washington on Friday morning for a one-day working visit. Foley stated, “US President Clinton is going to host a lunch for President Kim. It will be followed by a bilateral meeting. The two leaders will review our combined efforts to deal with the DPRK in ways that will eventually produce a peaceful Korean Peninsula. These efforts include President Kim’s engagement policy, our shared commitments to the agreed framework and to the Four Party Talks. President Kim’s visit comes at a time when the economic achievements of his leadership are more and more evident; and no doubt, these accomplishments will also be a focus of their discussion.”

9. PRC Political Leadership

The Wall Street Journal (Matt Forney, “ZHU STRUGGLES TO KEEP REFORM ALIVE AS RUMORS SPREAD ABOUT RESIGNATION,” Shanghai, 07/02/99) reported that Asian stock markets fell upon rumors that PRC Premier Zhu Rong-ji would be forced to resign. A PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman denied that Zhu is stepping down and dismissed as “sheer nonsense” that Zhu’s powers had been curtailed.

10. PRC Stance on Socialism

London Daily Telegraph (David Rennie, “JIANG STILL MAINTAINS SOCIALISM WILL TRIUMPH,” Beijing, 07/02/99) reported that in a speech to mark the PRC Communist Party’s (CCP) 78th anniversary, PRC President Jiang Zemin said that socialism would defeat capitalism. Jiang added there would be no all-out privatization of the state sector and that the PRC would continue to be guided by Marxism. Jiang also said that the PRC would be doomed if CCP members lost faith in communism. Jiang had told a party forum on Wednesday that the faith of “some comrades” in the victory over capitalism “has been weakened.” Diplomats in Beijing said that Jiang’s speech went further than the standard rhetoric that had been expected on the anniversary of the party. An unnamed diplomat stated, “This is not to say that they don’t want economic reform, but maybe they want it tomorrow, not today.”

11. Asian Conference on Security

Asian Wall Street Journal (Barry Wain, “MEETING ASIA’S SECURITY CHALLENGES,” Kuala Lumpur, 07/02/99, 2) reported that about 250 specialists, including current and former government officials, scholars, and researchers gathered in Kuala Lumpur last month at the annual Asia- Pacific Roundtable on security. The three broad areas that emerged from the discussion were non-military threats, US-Japan-PRC relations, and nuclear and missile proliferation in the region. [Ed. note: This article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for July 2.]

12. Kashmir Conflict

The New York Times (Barry Bearak, “INDIAN OFFICIAL DENIES TALKS WITH PAKISTAN OVER KASHMIR FIGHTING,” New Delhi, 07/02/99) reported that Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh said that India is not involved in “any negotiations” and “not even consultations” with Pakistan, rebutting speculation in both nations that behind-the-scenes diplomacy was under way to end the crisis in Kashmir. Singh said that former Pakistani Foreign Minister Niaz Naik’s comments amounted to little more than wishful thinking, that the former official had “gone back and given a certain interpretation of what he hopes, what he wishes to be done. So far as India is concerned, its position has been explicit: the present escalation has been caused by armed intruders mounting aggression from north of the Line of Control and the easiest way to de-escalate it is for Pakistan to pull back the intruders.” When asked if some understanding could ever be reached about a scheduled withdrawal, Singh said, “No understanding is required about pulling back to where you have come from.”

II. Republic of Korea

1. DPRK-ROK Talks

Chosun Ilbo (“LITTLE PROGRESS IN BEIJING TALKS,” Seoul, 07/02/99), Joongang Ilbo (Shim Shang-bok, “HIGH-LEVEL TALKS BETWEEN KOREAS STALL AGAIN,” Seoul, 07/01/99) and The Korea Herald (Shin Yong-bae, “SEOUL’S CALL FOR FAMILY REUNIONS IGNORED BY N. KOREAN NEGOTIATORS,” Seoul, 07/02/99) reported that the ROK and the DPRK met for the second day of deputy ministerial talks at the Beijing China World Hotel on July 1, 3pm local time (4pm KST). The ROK government suggested that first meeting between members of separated families be held around mid-September. In addition, prior to the meeting, the ROK suggested that a list of the whereabouts of approximately 300 families be exchanged, preferably in early August. The ROK is also said to have suggested a mail exchange among separated DPRK and ROK families twice a month after mid-September, and setting up a meeting place at Panmunjom in early August to facilitate reunions. However, the DPRK once again focused more on the West Sea (Yellow Sea) naval confrontation incident.

2. Kim Dae-jung’s Visit to US

Chosun Ilbo (Hong Joon-ho, “PRESIDENT EMBARKS ON NORTH AMERICA TRIP,” Seoul, 07/01/99) and The Korea Times (Lee Chang-sup, “KIM, CLINTON TO HOLD SUMMIT TOMORROW,” Seoul, 07/01/99) reported that ROK President Kim Dae-jung embarked on Friday on a 6-day trip to visit the US and Canada. Kim plans to have summit talks with US President Bill Clinton on Sunday morning Korea Standard Time in a bid to further coordinate the policies of the two countries towards the DPRK. Kim’s summit meeting with Clinton will be his third during his tenure as president.

3. DPRK Missile Test

Joongang Ilbo (“NK PREPARES A MISSILE TEST LAUNCH,” Seoul, 07/01/99) reported that Kurt Campbell, US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia-Pacific affairs, said in a breakfast meeting with reporters on Wednesday that the DPRK seems to be preparing a missile test launch that would have “very real consequences” for its relations with the US and US allies in Asia. Campbell stated, “It’s fair to say we have seen some preparations.” He declined to offer any details. Campbell said that too little is known about the preparations to say the exact type of missile involved. Campbell reiterated the administration’s warning that if another missile test is performed it will be viewed in the US as “a very serious act with very real consequences for U.S. policy toward North Korea.” He declined to define those consequences.

4. ROK Policy on POWs

The Korea Herald (Lee Sung-yul, “NEW REGULATIONS GIVE MORE SUPPORT TO RETURNED POWs,” Seoul, 07/02/99) reported that ROK officials said on Thursday that the ROK Defense Ministry has mapped out regulations aimed at giving more financial support to prisoners of the Korean War who have returned or will return from the DPRK. ROK ministry officials said that the regulations are based on a bill that recently passed through the ROK National Assembly. Under the new regulations, each of six ROK enlisted men who have in recent years escaped from the DPRK and returned to the ROK will be given about 130 million won (US$116,500) of overdue salaries, 690,000 won (US$618) to 810,000 won (US$726) as a monthly pension, and a 20-pyong apartment (1 pyong equals about 3.3 sq. meters). Soldiers who return from the DPRK in the future will also receive the same support.

III. Japan

1. PRC-DPRK Relations

The Nikkei Shimbun (Katsuji Nakazawa, “LI PENG TO VISIT DPRK: STRAINED US-PRC RELATIONS MAY BE BEHIND THIS,” Beijing, 06/30/99) reported that worsening US-PRC relations may have prompted the PRC’s decision in early June to send former prime minister Li Peng to the DPRK soon after the visit to the PRC by Kim Yong-nam, Chairman of the DPRK’s Supreme People’s Assembly Standing Committee. The report said that both the PRC and the DPRK have discussed amending their strained relations since 1992, but that mainly because of the DPRK’s own problems, high-level talks between the two countries had been expected to be postponed until after this summer. What changed all this, the report continued, was the US bombing of the PRC embassy in Yugoslavia, after which the PRC became more cautious about US unilateralism. The report also said that the DPRK also wanted to amend its relations with the PRC before US Coordinator for DPRK Policy William Perry releases his review. The article quoted an unnamed diplomatic source as saying, “The PRC’s high-level visit to the DPRK is about to be realized earlier than expected.” The report said, however, that due to the DPRK’s concern that it may have to announce its support for the PRC’s economic policy of “reform and opening up,” the visit by Kim Jong-il, the DPRK’s leader, to the PRC has yet to be decided. The report also said that the PRC seems to understand the DPRK’s concern and that the PRC is now considering having President Jiang Zemin visit the DPRK before Kim’s visit to the PRC if the DPRK’s domestic situation allows Kim to promise to visit the PRC. The report added that, while asking the DPRK to restrain another test-launch of ballistic missiles, the PRC may continue to value its relations with the DPRK as a counter to the New Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation and the theater missile defense (TMD) initiative.

2. Japan-DPRK Relations

The Sankei Shimbun (“KEDO AMBASSADOR TERADO TO VISIT DPRK,” 07/01/99) reported that in wake of the approval by the Upper House of Japan’s financial contribution (US$1 billion) to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) on June 30, the Japanese government decided to send Terusuke Terada, Japanese Ambassador to KEDO, to the DPRK this month. The report said that although the official objective of his visit to the DPRK is to observe the planned site for reactor construction, the government aims to link his visit to improving Japanese-DPRK bilateral relations. The government made this decision because the non-partisan delegation of Diet members led by former prime minister Tomiichi Murayama was postponed, and also because concern is growing that the DPRK is preparing another missile launch. The report quoted Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura as saying at a press conference on June 30, “KEDO is (part of) Japan’s security mechanism to deter (the DPRK) from nuclear weapons development, and it would be irrational to break such a mechanism…. (However,) in light of Japanese people’s sentiment, Japan’s contribution to KEDO would be difficult (if another Taepodong missile were launched).” Komura also said that, even if the DPRK announced the launch of a satellite in advance, “It would be a grave concern for security in Northeast Asia.” The report added that in addition to visiting the planned site for reactor construction in Kumho, Terada will also meet with his DPRK counterpart Chung Tae-hwa and others. It also said that the Japanese government has been in frequent contact with the DPRK since last year.

3. US-Japan DPRK Policy Coordination

The Japan Times (Yosuke Naito and Takashi Kitazume, “FOLEY HOPES FOR PROGRESS ON OKINAWA BASE ISSUE SOON,” 07/01/99) reported that US Ambassador to Japan Thomas Foley noted that Japan, the US and the ROK have closely coordinated their efforts in dealing with the DPRK. He warned that another missile launch would be taken as a “very negative action” by the three countries, and said that this concern has been clearly conveyed to the DPRK. Foley also noted, “There are specific interests that Japan has in respect to the DPRK that are not immediately shared in equal measure by the US and the ROK, but sympathetically understood…. One of them is the issue of abducted persons, which marks a special problem in Japanese-DPRK relations…. Whether to push forward with the normalization talks is up to Japan to decide.”

4. Japanese-US Relations

The Japan Times (Yosuke Naito and Takashi Kitazume, “FOLEY HOPES FOR PROGRESS ON OKINAWA BASE ISSUE SOON,” 07/01/99) carried an interview with US Ambassador to Japan Thomas Foley. The report quoted Foley as saying that the legislation on the US-Japan Defense Guidelines “allows the US and Japan to coordinate, very effectively, plans for carrying out the purpose of the (bilateral) security treaty, which is the defense of Japan, and responding to situations that are arising in areas surrounding Japan.” Foley also denied that the Guidelines will change the basic concept of the security alliance. As for Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi’s July 8-10 trip to the PRC, Foley hoped that the visit will not only boost Japanese-PRC relations but also help restore US-PRC ties. Foley said, “I think all three countries–the PRC, Japan and the US–have an interest in mutual improvement of our relations, and (Obuchi’s) expression of concern about US-PRC relations is appreciated.” On the issue of selecting a site for a replacement heliport in Okinawa, Foley said, “The first site selected–the so-called sea-based facility–did not receive adequate support in Okinawa…. I think it would be an important step if we could see some progress by the end of this year.” The report said that Foley reiterated his position that questions relating to defense and foreign policy should be discussed at the central government level, not by local authorities. While hinting that the US is ready to open dialogue with Japan over the US military presence, Foley stressed that the US has never received any such requests from Japan.

5. Japanese-PRC Meeting on UN

The Yomiuri Shimbun (“PRIME MINISTER TO APPEAL UN REFORM TO PRC,” 06/29/99) and the Daily Yomiuri (“OBUCHI PLANS TO DISCUSS UN REFORMS IN BEIJING,” 06/29/99) reported that Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi will seek understanding from the PRC on the need to reform the UN, including the UN Security Council, when he visits Beijing from July 8. Obuchi already said during the Group of 8 summit meeting in Cologne, Germany, that UN reforms are urgently required to help resolve and prevent conflicts such as the Kosovo crisis. Obuchi and PRC President Jiang Zemin agreed on the need to reform the UN during Jiang’s visit to Japan in November, 1998. The report said that Obuchi hopes to use the Kosovo conflict as a platform for obtaining further support from the PRC because the PRC reportedly was not satisfied with the way NATO launched air strikes against Yugoslavia without seeking a UN Security Council resolution.

6. Japanese Satellite Policy

The Asahi Shimbun (“DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE SATELLITE TO START NEXT YEAR,” 07/02/99) reported that the Japanese government on July 1 revealed a specific schedule for development of the four intelligence satellites that the government aims to launch by 2002. The schedule was reached at a meeting of the Liberal Democratic Party project team on intelligence satellites led by former Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama. According to the schedule, the development of the satellites will begin next year. It includes basic designing of the satellites, the construction of an on- ground radar reception site, and the establishment of a “satellite information center” within the cabinet to train personnel to process and analyze images.

7. Japanese Maritime Patrols

The Asahi Shimbun (“JMSDF DEMONSTRATES ITS DEALING WITH UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS AT BASE IN MAIZURU,” 06/29/99) reported that on June 28 the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) demonstrated at its base in Maizuru, Kyoto three simulated measures to deal with unidentified ships infiltrating Japanese territorial waters. The first measure is to equip the flagship Haruna with four 12.7 mm machine guns and destroy the screw of a suspected ship. The second one is to entangle the screw by a 600m rope to stop it from working. The third measure is to equip the boats carried on escort ships with 7.6 mm machine guns. A JMSDF official said, “We are studying what we can do to deal with suspected ships within (the current) maritime patrol activities, which limit the use of weapons.”

8. Japanese Self-Defense Forces Scandal

The Japan Times (“NOROTA URGES TIGHTER SDF DISCIPLINE,” 07/01/99), the Yomiuri Shimbun (“JAPANESE DEFENSE AGENCY TO PENALIZE 18 PERSONNEL FOR WRONG FIRING,” 07/01/99), and the Sankei Shimbun (“JAPANESE MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE PENALIZES 18 PERSONNEL INCLUDING COMMANDER,” 07/02/99) reported that the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) decided to penalize 18 personnel for the accidental firing in February of live shells from a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) destroyer. According to the reports, the shells fired from the Haruna flew over Fukui Prefecture and into a mountain forest on February 18, but that no one was hurt. The Japan Times said that JDA Director General Hosei Norota told some 650 agency officials at a meeting on July 1 to tighten discipline following a recent series of scandals involving Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) members. Norota said he is ashamed of the JSDF’s involvement in other wrongdoings, including cheating during JMDSF promotion exams in March and a bribery scandal revealed late last month involving construction projects at the SDF’s Komaki Air Base in Aichi Prefecture, according to the report.

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