NAPSNet Daily Report 02 January, 2001

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"NAPSNet Daily Report 02 January, 2001", NAPSNet Daily Report, January 02, 2001, https://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-daily-report/napsnet-daily-report-02-january-2001/

 
CONTENTS

I. United States

1. Clinton’s Visit to DPRK
2. US-DPRK Relations
3. DPRK Goals for New Year
4. ROK Goals for New Year
5. US-ROK SOFA Revision
6. PRC-Taiwan Trade Links
7. Taiwanese Views of “Mini-Links”
8. US Views of “Mini-Links”
9. Cross-Strait Relations
10. PRC-Russian Strategic Cooperation
II. Republic of Korea 1. ROK Foreign Policy
2. ROK Aid to DPRK
3. Alleged US Reconnaissance on DPRK
4. DPRK Goals for New Year
5. Inter-Korean Economic Talks
III. Japan 1. Japanese Policy toward DPRK
2. Pro-DPRK Credit Union in Japan
3. DPRK Population
4. Japanese-ROK Defense Exchange
5. Japanese-US Poll on Korean Peninsula
6. Japanese-US Security Relations
7. Poll on Japanese-US Relations
8. Japanese-US Poll on US, PRC and Japan
9. Prime Minister’s Visit to Russia
10. Japanese Intelligent Satellites
IV. People’s Republic of China 1. PRC Goals for New Century
2. PRC View on Clinton’s Visit to DPRK
3. Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

I. United States

1. Clinton’s Visit to DPRK

The Washington Post (John Lancaster, “CLINTON RULES OUT A VISIT TO NORTH KOREA,” 12/29/00) reported that US President Bill Clinton announced on December 28 that he will not visit the DPRK before the end of his term. In a written statement, Clinton said that he continues to believe that DPRK leader Kim Jong-il is committed to reaching such an accord, and that the US has a “clear national interest in seeing it through.” The statement said, “I have determined that there is not enough time while I am president to prepare the way for an agreement with North Korea that advances our national interest and provides the basis for a trip by me to Pyongyang. Let me emphasize that I believe this process of engagement with North Korea, in coordination with South Korea and Japan, holds great promise and that the United States should continue to build on the progress we have made.” Clinton later told reporters, “I believe the next administration will be able to consummate this agreement.” A senior administration official said that same day that the offer, while “quite far-reaching,” left unclear such questions as the means for verifying the accord and the DPRK’s plans for the missiles it already has in its arsenal. The official said, “Our view has always been that if we could do this, if we believed that there was an agreement that could be reached in Pyongyang … that would be in the national interest, the president should go. Conversely, if we weren’t confident that we would achieve such an agreement, then we shouldn’t go, we should turn this over to the new administration. … I think that essentially time has run out.” [Ed. note: This article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for December 29, 2000.]

The New York Times (David Sanger, “CLINTON SCRAPS NORTH KOREA TRIP, SAYING TIME’S SHORT FOR A DEAL,” Washington, 12/29/00, A13) reported that some White House officials and members of Congress said that it could take a year or more for the George W. Bush administration to evaluate US relations with the DPRK. An unnamed former US Defense Department official said that Secretary of Defense-designate Donald Rumsfeld “would likely be very suspicious of any deal that purported to freeze or roll back the North Korean missile threat.” Henry Sokolski, director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, said that the Clinton administration “couldn’t answer some fundamental questions about the deal. It wasn’t just the details. I think the fundamentals were unsound–it was another case of great expectations in the beginning and immense problems in the end.” However, administration officials said that they had been very close to a deal and might have concluded it if the long recount in the presidential election had not stopped diplomacy for a month. One unnamed senior official said that the DPRK had made “very serious proposals” that were “much broader than expected.” The official added that verification would have required “much more detailed discussions” but that with enough time “we could have gotten some degree of confidence” that the DPRK was living up to the agreement.

2. US-DPRK Relations

CBS News (“US-N. KOREA RELATIONS MAY COOL,” Washington, 12/31/00) reported that an ROK analyst said on December 29 that US President Bill Clinton’s decision not to visit the DPRK and President-elect George Bush’s more skeptical take on the DPRK will slow US efforts to engage the country. Few ROK experts believe the Bush administration will drastically change DPRK policy, but most expect some slowdown in US rapprochement with the DPRK. Kim Sung-han, a DPRK expert at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, a government think- tank, said, “Loss of momentum in improving U.S.-North Korea relations is inevitable.” Lee Seo-hang, an analyst at the institute, said the Bush administration “is expected to closely consult with South Korea on its North Korea policy, and engagement will remain the key word in relations with North Korea. But the pace will be slowed down and demands for reciprocity will gain strength.”

3. DPRK Goals for New Year

The Associated Press (Kyong-hwa Seok, “NORTH KOREA SEEKS TO BOOST ECONOMY, MILITARY,” Seoul, 1/2/01) reported that the DPRK outlined the country’s objectives for the year on January 1 in a joint editorial by the ruling Worker’s Party, military, and revolutionary youth group. The editorial said, “The central task of economic development for this year is to consolidate the existing economic infrastructure and display its potential to the full, while conducting a forceful campaign for refashioning the national economy as a whole with up-to-date technology.” The report said that while trying to rebuild the economy, the DPRK should strengthen its military. It also said, “A key factor in making a new advance under the red flag along the path of socialism in the 21st century is to stick to the revolutionary army-first policy.” The joint editorial also praised the summit between DPRK leader Kim Jong-il and ROK President Kim Dae-jung in June and pledged that the DPRK’s leadership will implement the summit accord “to the letter.”

4. ROK Goals for New Year

The Associated Press (“NORTH KOREA VOWS TO BUILD POWERFUL NATION IN 2001,” 1/2/01) reported that the ROK on January 1 promised to make efforts to further improve ties with the DPRK while keeping a strong security posture against a possible military threat. ROK President Kim Dae-jung said in a New Year’s address, “The government will steadily push forward its inter-Korean policies in an effort to reduce South-North tensions and promote bilateral exchanges, heralding the age of peace and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. A thorough national security posture will have to be maintained until peace is completely established on the peninsula.”

5. US-ROK SOFA Revision

The Associated Press (Sang Hun Choe, “SEOUL GETS MORE POWER IN CRIMES INVOLVING GIS,” Seoul, 12/28/00) reported that the US and the ROK agreed on December 28 on new rules in the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that give the ROK government broader jurisdiction over US soldiers accused of crimes while stationed in the ROK. A joint press statement said, “The revision will, in the long term, contribute to maintaining a stable environment for U.S. troops stationed in the Republic of Korea and to further enhancing the alliance between the Republic of Korea and the United States.” US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Frederick Smith and his ROK counterpart, Song Min Soon, initialed the revised SOFA, and the two governments will sign the accord later. [Ed. note: This article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for December 29, 2000.]

6. PRC-Taiwan Trade Links

Reuters (“CHINA APPEARS TO ACCEPT A PLAN BY TAIWANESE FOR DIRECT LINKS,” Beijing, 12/28/00) and The Washington Post (John Pomfret, “CHINA ACCEPTS TAIWAN OFFER TO OPEN ISLANDS,” Beijing, 12/28/00) reported that the PRC indicated on December 28 that it would go along with Taiwan’s plan to open two offshore islands to goods and passengers from the mainland and allow island residents to travel directly to the PRC. PRC Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue announced that the PRC will not block Taiwan’s move, but she and other PRC officials criticized the plan as a piecemeal measure. They called on the government of Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian to accept the “one-China” principle so that serious negotiations on reunification can begin. PRC’s official New China News Agency quoted an official in Fujian as saying that the plan did not go far enough and “indicates that the Taiwan authorities lack sincerity and good will in realizing direct services.” Nevertheless, the official said, “the mainland is willing to help.” The official called on nongovernmental organizations in the Taiwan islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and the PRC cities of Fuzhou and Xiamen, “to facilitate the two-way personnel and trade exchange across the strait and do everything possible to simplify related procedures.” [Ed. note: Both articles were included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for December 28, 2000.]

7. Taiwanese Views of “Mini-Links”

Agence France Presse (“TAIWAN, CHINA TENSIONS UNLIKELY TO EASE DESPITE MINI-LINKS,” Taipei, 1/2/01) reported that Taiwanese analysts said Tuesday that tensions across the Taiwan Strait are unlikely to decline significantly following the launch of direct links between the PRC and Taiwan until Taiwan embraces the “one-China” rhetoric. Chang Ling-cheng, professor of political science at the National Taiwan University, said that the sovereignty dispute appears no closer to conclusion unless Taiwan bows to the PRC’s demands and accepts that it is an inalienable part of the PRC. Chang said, “I do not think the opening will help change the negative direction of cross-strait ties for as long as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) continues in the helm.” Chang was also skeptical that the links would lead to an improvement in relations because Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian has continued to refuse to acknowledge the “one China” principle. She said, “The new government tries to tell people here and the international community that Taipei is actively working actively to thaw relations with Beijing, but I do not think Beijing is going to buy it. Taipei offered the ‘mini-links’ rather than the ‘big links’ and the ‘one China’ acknowledgement that Beijing is pushing for.” Chen Chi-mai, a member of Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party, said, “Little economic influence would stem from the voyages as trans-shipment of cargo from both Taiwan and the mainland are still prohibited. [Instead,] it should kickstart improved relations.”

8. US Views of “Mini-Links”

Agence France Presse (“BEIJING WILL WANT MORE THAN JUST MINI-LINKS WITH TAIWAN: ANALYSTS,” Beijing, 1/2/01) reported that US analysts do not believe that the new “mini-links” established between Taiwan and the PRC will satisfy the PRC which will continue to pressure Taiwan to accept the “One China” principle. However, Jean Pierre Cabestan, of the French Center for Research on Contemporary China, said that the mini-links should open the way for greater direct links by year’s end. Cabestan said, “For years China has begged Taiwan to establish direct links and now with the mini-links you would think that they would be happy. But since the election of (Taiwan President) Chen Shui-bian, they have placed the ‘One China’ principle before the three links.” Western diplomats in the PRC also said it was difficult for the PRC leadership to show any response to the opening of the mini-links by the Taiwanese government. One diplomat said, “Beijing doesn’t like Chen Shui-bian, that is clear, but with China and Taiwan entering the WTO this year, they are going to get the three links, so they have both good and bad. Tensions across the Strait have been relatively low key since August and right now it appears that Beijing is viewing the mini-links as sort of a publicity stunt by Chen Shui-bian.”

9. Cross-Strait Relations

Agence France Presse (“TAIWAN PRESIDENT CALLS FOR ECONOMIC, CULTURAL INTEGRATION WITH CHINA,” Taipei, 12/31/00) reported that Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian on December 31 delivered a call for closer economic and cultural ties with the PRC, but reiterated his opposition to reunification on PRC terms. In his New Year Message, Chen urged the PRC to give up its threats of military action against the island. He also urged PRC leaders “to openly renounce the use of force (against Taiwan) and instead use their wisdom and far-sightedness in solving the present stalemate and disputes.” Responding to this long-standing demand, Chen suggested “the two sides begin from economic and cultural integration, through which mutual trust could be gradually built and hopefully a new framework would be laid out for eternal peace and political integration.”

10. PRC-Russian Strategic Cooperation

The International Herald Tribune published a commentary by Evan A. Feigenbaum, executive director of the Asia-Pacific Security Initiative at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, (“THE UNITED STATES IS DRIVING RUSSIA AND CHINA TOGETHER AGAIN,” Cambridge, 12/28/00) which said that a new poll released this week by the Russian subsidiary of the US Gallup polling organization reveals that a majority of Russian politicians, business leaders, and journalists view the PRC as a more reliable partner than the US. Feigenbaum also noted recent statements by General Leonid Ivashov, head of the Russian Defense Ministry’s international cooperation department, who said that the PRC was Russia’s “ideological ally,” and cited common goals in rejecting “military diktat in international relations,” as well as US missile defense plans. Feigenbaum added, “Perhaps the most important strategic underpinning of the increasingly close Chinese-Russian view of international affairs is that both countries share a deepening conviction that a principled stand against certain core American strategic concepts will give them the high ground against the United States.” He noted that many Chinese argue that US statements of the national interest tend to enshrine a law of the jungle in international politics that violates norms of law and is conceptually distinct from peacekeeping. He added that NATO strategy in Kosovo reinforced the PRC and Russian perceptions that US alliances in Europe and Asia have evolved away from their original concepts of cooperative defense toward more expansive definitions of alliance roles and missions. Kosovo also demonstrated to the PRC, Russia, and other states that the US and its allies were prepared to circumvent the United Nations and the norms of international law. Feigenbaum went on to say that shared PRC and Russian perspectives on world affairs suggest the possibility of greater coordination even if the principles the two countries share are derived from very different concerns. Therefore, he concluded, “what is required is an approach by American and European states that seeks to delink the big questions of international politics, such as intervention and alliances, from a view of the world that sees many such questions through the prism of national problems and national pride. This is especially true of China, whose foreign policy on nearly every strategic issue is now inseparable from the Taiwan question. Without such an effort, Chinese and Russian perspectives will move closer together.” [Ed. note: This article was included in the US Department of Defense’s Early Bird news service for December 28, 2000.]

II. Republic of Korea

1. ROK Foreign Policy

The Korea Herald (Shin Yong-bae, “SEOUL FOCUSES ON DIPLOMACY TO SUPPORT N.K.’S OPENNESS,” Seoul, 01/01/01) reported that the ROK focused its diplomatic efforts on the four major powers surrounding the peninsula – the US, the PRC, Japan and Russia – during the past one year. The aim of their foreign policy was to help strengthen reconciliation and cooperation between the ROK and the DPRK. Now, the ROK government is planning to focus this year’s foreign policy on supporting the DPRK’s diplomatic efforts with other countries. “We have so far concentrated on engaging the North to improve inter-Korean relations. But now we should try to form a favorable atmosphere on the world stage to make it possible for the North to make inroads into the international community,” said a Foreign Ministry official. To this end, the ROK will play an active role in helping the DPRK improve relations with Western countries and join various international organizations, the official said.

2. ROK Aid to DPRK

The Korea Herald (Kim Ji-ho, “PRIVATE GROUPS PROVIDE RECORD AID TO NORTH KOREA IN 2000,” Seoul, 01/01/01) reported that private organizations made record level of aids to the DPRK last year. A government official estimated the total amount of private aid to the DPRK came to 42.07 billion won, including the 11.32 billion won extended through the ROK National Red Cross.

3. Alleged US Reconnaissance on DPRK

The Korea Herald (Kim Ji-ho, “PYONGYANG HITS U.S. AERIAL PATROLS,” Seoul, 01/01/01) reported that the DPRK claimed Saturday that the US made about 150 aerial reconnaissance missions across its territory using various strategic and tactical planes last month. Quoting DPRK military experts, the Korean Central Broadcasting Station said, “The air patrols by war- mongering U.S. imperialists showed how the Americans were intentionally raising military tension on the Korean Peninsula and bent on infiltrating the North.” In December alone, U-2 and RC-135 strategic planes made 40 aerial scouts, it said. In addition, the EH-60 helicopters and P-3 patrol aircraft and E-3 commanding ship made 10 reconnaissance missions each, the KCBS said. Moreover, such tactical patrol planes as the RC-12 and the RC-7B made three or four daily sorties each along the eastern and western borders, it said.

4. DPRK Goals for New Year

The Korea Herald (Kim Ji-ho, “NORTH GREETS NEW YEAR WITH EULOGY OF ITS LEADER,” Seoul, 01/01/01) reported that the DPRK said Saturday that all of its people would unite in spirit next year to make the 21st century as the “century of General Kim Jong-il.” Radio Pyongyang, the official media outlet, said in a commentary, “The people of North Korea and the people’s Army will keep our pledges of loyalty to our sun, General Kim Jong-il, until the end and make this century the century of North Korea and the great Kim Jong-il by uniting our spirit.” While boasting about its major economic achievements last year, including a power plant near Mt. Kumgang and an expressway linking Pyongyang with Nampo, the radio attributed these accomplishments to their leader. Touching on the inter- Korean summit in June last year and the Joint Communique, it said the events were declared to the whole world and that the Korean people could reunify their divided land by their own strength. The radio also attributed Pyongyang’s normalization of diplomatic ties with Italy and Britain as well as visits to the DPRK by Russian President Vladimir Putin and US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to successful diplomacy by Kim.

5. Inter-Korean Economic Talks

The Korea Times (“KOREAS TO SURVEY NK’S ENERGY SITUATION,” Pyongyang, 12/31/00) reported that ROK and DPRK delegates wrapped up their three-day economic cooperation committee meeting Saturday to agree on studying ways to make a joint inspection into the energy situation in the DPRK next month. During their talks here, they also agreed to seek ways to make joint inspections into Imjin River to work out anti-flood measures. The two sides agreed to hold their second meeting on February 6-8 in Seoul.

III. Japan

1. Japanese Policy toward DPRK

The Asahi Shimbun (“PRIME MINISTER SAYS THAT HE MAY VISIT RUSSIA IN FEBRUARY AND THAT HE WILL BE CAUTIOUS TOWARD DPRK,” 01/01/2001) reported that during his press conference on December 28, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori said regarding Japanese policy toward the DPRK, “(Compared to the Great Britain and Germany) Japan has security and humanitarian issues with the DPRK. We have to promote negotiations while eliminating concerns among our people.” Mori also said, “We don’t have to be urged to normalize relations with the DPRK.” The report pointed out that despite his statement, Mori placed normalization with the DPRK as Japan’s first diplomatic priority for 2001. The report also said that Mori hailed and Germany’s normalization of their diplomatic relations with the DPRK.

2. Pro-DPRK Credit Union in Japan

The Yomiuri Shimbun (“PRO-PYONGYANG CREDIT UNION DECLARED INSOLVENT,” 12/30/2000) reported that the Financial Reconstruction Commission declared on December 30 that Kobe-based Chogin Kinki Shinyo Kumiai, the nation’s largest pro-DPRK credit union, is insolvent under the Financial Revitalization Law. Chogin Kinki received a notice from the Financial Services Agency earlier this year that its liabilities had exceeded its assets by tens of billions of yen as of March 31, 2000. Financial authorities reportedly have concluded that Chogin Kinki would not be able to revive its financial state through capital injections or other rehabilitative efforts. However, the union is to be allowed to continue operations with its deposits fully protected. Chogin Kinki was established in November 1997 through a merger of five pro-DPRK credit unions in the Kansai region. In May 1998, Chogin Kinki took over the operations and assets of the failed Chogin Osaka Shinyo Kumiai credit union under the Deposit Insurance Law, making it the first financial institution to have taken over the operations and assets of a failed counterpart under the law to be declared insolvent. The Kinki Local Finance Bureau examined the finances of the union in May, finding that it had underestimated its bad debts. The bureau reportedly concluded that the credit union’s total debts exceeded its capital by tens of billions of yen. Chogin Kinki announced earlier this year that as of the end of March its capital-adequacy ratio was 4.76 percent, exceeding the 4 percent standard.

3. DPRK Population

The Asahi Shimbun (“ROK UNIFICATION MINISTRY ESTIMATES THAT DPRK POPULATION IS 22,000,000,” 12/30/2000) reported that the ROK Unification Ministry announced on December 29 that the DPRK’s population is estimated to be 22,000,000. The report said that based on the 1994 estimation of 21,210,000, the ministry considered natural increases and decreases by the effects of natural disasters and famine in estimating the figure.

4. Japanese-ROK Defense Exchange

The Asahi Shimbun (“JAPANESE-ROK DEFENSE VICE MINISTERIAL MEETING AGREED TO EXPAND BILATERAL EXCHANGE,” 12/28/2000) reported that Japanese Defense Agency Vice Director General Ken Sato met with ROK Defense Minister Jo Sung-dae and Vice Defense Minister Moon Il-soep in Seoul on December 27. They agreed to promote bilateral defense exchange and to realize the visit to Seoul by Japanese Defense Agency Director General Toshini Saito as early as possible. Regarding defense exchange especially, both sides agreed to promote student exchanges between their defense academies.

5. Japanese-US Poll on Korean Peninsula

The Yomiuri Shimbun (“POLL: AMERICANS MORE POSITIVE ON JAPAN TIES,” 12/29/2000) reported that a recent Yomiuri Shimbun-Gallup poll shows that when asked whether reconciliation of the Korean Peninsula would lead to the normalization of diplomatic relations between their country and the DPRK, 62 percent of Japanese and 56 percent of US respondents agreed.

6. Japanese-US Security Relations

The Nihon Keizai/Nikkei Shimbun (Kyodo, “JAPANESE AMBASSADOR VISITS COLLIN POWEL,” 12/30/2000) reported that Japanese Ambassador to the US Shunji Yanai on December 29 visited former US Chief of Staff Colin Powell, who would be Secretary of State under the Bush Administration, to confirm strengthening the Japanese-US alliance. Yanai said, “I hope that the Japanese-US alliance relationship, which is a basis of peace and stability in Asia-Pacific, will be strengthened under the new administration.” Powell responded, “Upon the Senate’s approval, I want to develop diplomacy while closely cooperating with Japan.”

7. Poll on Japanese-US Relations

The Yomiuri Shimbun (“POLL: AMERICANS MORE POSITIVE ON JAPAN TIES,” 12/29/2000) reported that a recent Yomiuri Shimbun-Gallup poll shows that about 64 percent of US citizens see relations between Japan and the United States at present as being very good or good, compared with about 47 percent of Japanese who think the same way. Asked about whether relations between the US and Japan will improve or worsen under US President-elect George W. Bush’s administration, 38 percent of Americans polled answered it will “get much better” or “get better,” while 15 percent of Japanese agreed. The poll also revealed that about 75 percent of American respondents trust Japan “very much” or “to some extent,” while about 45 percent of Japanese agreed. The report pointed out that one reason for the favorable view that US citizens have of Japan-US relations is the current absence of trade or other friction between the two countries as the economy in the US continues to be vigorous. Regarding the security relationship between the two countries, 62 percent of Japanese said that the Japan-US security agreement contributes greatly or somewhat to the security of the Asian-Pacific region. In the US, 80 percent of respondents agreed. In the US, 64 percent of the people polled said that they think the US military presence in Japan should be maintained at current levels.

8. Japanese-US Poll on US, PRC and Japan

The Yomiuri Shimbun (“POLL: AMERICANS MORE POSITIVE ON JAPAN TIES,” 12/29/2000) reported that a recent Yomiuri Shimbun-Gallup poll shows that when asked which country among the US, Japan and the PRC will be more politically important in the future, 49 percent of Japanese respondents said they feel the US will be more important, while about 31percent chose the PRC. Forty-nine percent of Americans said they feel the PRC will be more politically important in the future, while 43 percent favored Japan. On economic matters, however, 50 percent of American respondents feel Japan will be more important, while 43 percent chose the PRC.

9. Prime Minister’s Visit to Russia

The Asahi Shimbun (“PRIME MINISTER SAYS THAT HE MAY VISIT RUSSIA IN FEBRUARY AND THAT HE WILL BE CAUTIOUS TOWARD DPRK,” 01/01/2001) reported during his press conference on December 28, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori said that he hoped to visit Russia in February for talks on the territorial issue. Mori also confirmed Japan’s policy toward the territorial issue by saying, “We will continue to energetically promote our negotiations with Russia under our consistent policy that a peace treaty is possible only after the resolution of the territorial issue.”

10. Japanese Intelligent Satellites

The Asahi Shimbun (“SATELLITE INFORMATION CENTER TO HAVE 300 PERSONNEL IN APRIL 2001,” 12/24/2000) reported that the Japanese government decided on December 23 to set up a satellite information center within the Cabinet’s intelligence investigation in April 2001, in preparation for the introduction of four intelligence satellites to be launched by 2002. The report said that the government will also add 116 personnel to the existing 164 staff but that the government intends to have 300 personnel in the future. The center will be divided into management, analysis and control sections to receive, control, and analyze the information sent from the satellites, said the report.

IV. People’s Republic of China

1. PRC Goals for New Century

China Daily (“PRESIDENT STRESSES COMMITMENT TO WORLD PEACE AND PROSPERITY,” 01/01/01, P1) reported that on the eve of the 21st century in his New Year message televised by China Radio International, China National Radio and China Central Television, PRC President Jiang Zemin stressed peace and development in the new century. Jiang said, “We hope the new century will be a century in which people of all nations live in peace.” The new scientific and technological achievements should bring benefits to all mankind, especially to developing countries, he stressed. On the issue of civilizations, he said, “We hope the new century will be a century in which civilization of all kinds make progress simultaneously.” The civilizations of all countries are mankind’s treasures. They should be respected, and each country should learn from the others. Only by enhancing exchanges between various kinds of civilization and promoting their progress will the great causes of world peace and development be realized, said Jiang. He pointed out that the primary tasks of the Chinese people in the new millennium are to push ahead with the modernization of the country, achieve the reunification of the motherland and safeguard world peace, and make progress with other countries. Guided by the theories of Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese people will firmly promote the reform and opening-up drive and economic construction, firmly implement the principles of “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems,” and firmly pursue the independent foreign policy of peace, he added.

2. PRC View on Clinton’s Visit to DPRK

Global Times (Ren Yujun, “CLINTON WILL NOT VISIT DPRK,” 01/02/01, P2) carried a commentary on US President Clinton’s decision not to visit the DPRK. The writer said that the DPRK visit is the one of two most important agendas that Clinton had planned to focus before he leaves the White House. However, he pointed out, Clinton’s cancellation to visit DPRK is not a surprising incident but within expectation. The reasons are: 1) Clinton’s DPRK visit was aimed at reaching agreement with the DPRK on missile issues, or at least getting Kim Jong-il’s affirmed commitments. During the later half of 2000, the US and DPRK did make some “breakthroughs”, such as Jo Myong-rok’s US visit and US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s visit to DPRK. Albright’s visit was said to prepare for Clinton’s later visit. Since no progress was achieved on DPRK missile issues and there is no hope in the immediate future, Clinton is surely not going to DPRK only for sightseeing in his limited remaining time as US President. 2) Clinton’s second most important agenda— the Middle-East peace talks—attracts most of his attention and energy. Compared to the fruitless DPRK missile issue, Clinton has succeeded in bringing Israel and Palestine together for talks. 3) The newly-elected US President George W. Bush and his think tanks do not like Clinton’s DPRK visit. They criticized Clinton’s intention to visit the DPRK as unreasonable and worry that Clinton’s visit will influence the future Bush administration’s relationship with DPRK. Other countries also want to wait to talk with the new President.

3. Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Jiefang Daily (Shen Dingli, “NMD DRAGGING INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL” 12/22/00, P3) carried a survey article on arms control and nonproliferation in 2000. Dr. Shen, a professor of Fudan University, raised 6 points in his article. 1) The NPT 2000 Review Conference achieved a historical breakthrough where the P5 committed to an unequivocal obligation of nuclear disarmament. 2) The PRC and the US restored their arms control consultation and started collaboration on missile technology export control. 3) Russia made great progress in ratifying CTBT and START II. 4) The CTBT is still unable to enter into force, and FMCT negotiation has been linked to PAROS. 5) The proposal to prevent an arms race in outer space (PAROS) was blocked by the US. 6) The NMD development has made the future of the ABM Treaty uncertain. Dr. Shen also pointed out positive factors that occurred in 2000, in the arms control and nonproliferation area. However, he concluded that much of the future depends upon the further developments regarding National Missile Defense.

The NAPSNet Daily Report aims to serve as a forum for dialogue and exchange among peace and security specialists. Conventions for readers and a list of acronyms and abbreviations are available to all recipients. For descriptions of the world wide web sites used to gather information for this report, or for more information on web sites with related information, see the collection of other NAPSNet resources.
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Produced by the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development in partnership with:
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Fudan University, Shanghai, People’s Republic of China
Monash Asia Institute,
Monash University, Clayton, Australia

Timothy L. Savage: napsnet@nautilus.org
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Gee Gee Wong: napsnet@nautilus.org
Berkeley, California, United States

Robert Brown: napsnet@nautilus.org
Berkeley, California, United States

Kim Hee-sun: khs688@hotmail.com
Seoul, Republic of Korea

Hiroyasu Akutsu: akutsu@glocomnet.or.jp
Tokyo, Japan

Peter Razvin: icipu@glas.apc.org
Moscow, Russian Federation

Yunxia Cao: yule111@sina.com
Shanghai, People’s Republic of China

Dingli Shen: dlshen@fudan.ac.cn
Shanghai, People’s Republic of China

John McKay: John.McKay@adm.monash.edu.au
Clayton, Australia

 


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