Another North Korean Paradox: Divider and Unifier

Nautilus Peace and Security Weekly Report—Contributor’s blog entry for DPRK.

Isolation threats don’t seem to bother North Korea.  They are increasingly isolating themselves and yet bringing other countries together in new ways…

Extended Deterrence in the Japan-U.S. Alliance

Ken Jimbo assesses the dynamics of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence in Asia–especially on the Korean peninsula and in China–and how these relate to Japan’s “dynamic defense” policy adopted in the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines. He states that “[s]ince the strategic landscape in Northeast Asia is increasingly complex in character, it is difficult to apply the concept of deterrence in a “one-size-fits-all” manner. For extended deterrence to succeed, the Japan-U.S. alliance needs continuous updates on the assessment of the distribution of powers and threats, then to apply tailored deterrence to the regional dynamic.”

Ken Jimbo is an Associate Professor at Keio University, Japan.

This report was originally presented at the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop held on November 11, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan. All of the papers and presentations given at the workshop are available here, along with the full agenda, participant list and a workshop photo gallery.

Nautilus Peace and Security Weekly

NEW! See this week’s blog from our deterrence expert, Peter Hayes.

Circling the square of nuclear extended deterrence in Northeast Asia

Nautilus Peace and Security Weekly Report—Contributor’s blog entry for DETERRENCE.

Dhanapala argues that a Northeast Asian (NEA) NWFZ is incompatible with nuclear extended deterrence, and rejects a transitional period in which states comply fully with a NWFZ treaty…

NWFZS and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Squaring the Circle?

Jayantha Dhanapala states that a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in Northeast Asia could prove to be a reasonable solution to the complex issues in the region, but that the exceptions and ambiguities that have been allowed during past negotiations of NWFZs must be avoided. Dhanapala argues that compromising on fundamental NWFZ principles—namely that all parties must verifiably dismantle any nuclear weapons and rescind extended nuclear deterrence agreements with Nuclear Weapons States (NWS)—will only exacerbate security concerns.

Jayantha Dhanapala is a former Ambassador of Sri Lanka and a former UN Under Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs.

This report was originally presented at the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop held on November 11, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan. All of the papers and presentations given at the workshop are available here, along with the full agenda, participant list and a workshop photo gallery.

NAPSNet 26 April 2012

The Six Party Talks and Implications for a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

Chung-in Moon asserts that the Six Party Talks (SPTs) mechanism and the idea of a Northeast Asia Weapons Free Zone (NEA NWFZ) are mutually complementary and should be pursued in parallel. While the SPTs are designed to deal with the North Korean nuclear problem, they cannot address the other nuclear-related challenges the Northeast Asian region is currently facing, including enrichment, spent fuel management, waste disposal, reactor safety and emergency management. Likewise, without addressing the North Korean nuclear program, regional cooperation on these issues is unlikely.

Chung-in Moon is a professor of political science at Yonsei University and a former Ambassador for International Security Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea

The Politics of a Korea-Japan NWFZ

Leon V. Sigal provides an overview of political prospects for establishing a bilateral Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ). He notes that such an agreement necessarily raises the question of Japanese and South Korean reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence and “the outcome of any reconsideration thus depends critically on Japanese and South Korean views of North Korea’s nuclear arming, China’s rise, and their historical differences with each other.” Sigal concludes that, while an unbounded North Korean nuclear program could strengthen the nuclear radicals in Tokyo and Seoul who favor nuclear arming, nuclear conservatives in both countries might see heightened advantages in negotiating a NWFZ to help forestall a regional nuclear arms race and improve bilateral relations.

Leon V. Sigal is director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York.