Archives

Robert Dujarric, director of the Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies at Temple University Japan Campus in Tokyo, writes, “But at this point it is most unlikely that North Korea, which receives aid from China and South Korea and achieved a major breakthrough with America, will make concessions to Japan on the issue. Moreover, there is unfortunately little evidence that the unaccounted for abducted victims would be set free, assuming they are still alive. Consequently, Tokyo can use the U.S.-North Korea agreement as an opportunity to follow a more flexible strategy that will better serve its national interest.”

David C. Kang, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, writes, Although the past year has seen substantial progress in capping and ultimately eliminating North Koreas nuclear weapons program, there remain many obstacles that could derail the progress made so far, and slow or even halt continued improvement in relations. The reciprocal actions laid out in the February 13, 2007 agreement are genuinely the first step in a long process for all countries involved in the negotiations, and sustained U.S. attention at the policymaking, executive, and legislative levels will be critical for the process to continue in a manner which enhances U.S. interests.

Gavan McCormack, emeritus professor of Australian National University, a coordinator of Japan Focus, and author of the recently published Client State: Japan in the American Embrace, writes, “The final question is this: is Japan’s drive to become a nuclear super-state compatible with its “Client State” role? The US has always insisted that Japan not be a nuclear weapons state, but, given a forthcoming privileged position within the GNEP, it stands to become a de facto nuclear superpower anyway. The Bush administration may be confident that it has locked Japan in to Client State subordination for the foreseeable future, but a considerable potential ambiguity opens up.”