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Michael Hamel-Green of Victoria University and Peter Hayes of the Nautilus Institute argue that a “Korean NWFZ may be a necessary condition to achieving the full denuclearization of Korea”. As well as providing “benefits to the United States in preventing a major direct and wider proliferation threat from North Korea, and to China, Japan and South Korea in maintaining stability in the Northeast Asian Region, it would also serve to address North Korean security concerns about potential US nuclear strikes”. They point out that “the two Koreas have already negotiated a legal basis for a Korean Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the form of the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korea Peninsula.” This could form the basis of a NWFZ covering the peninsula. Alternately, they suggest, the ROK and Japan could create a Japan Korea NWFZ via a bilateral treaty.

Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, analyses developments in the system of United States nuclear hegemony in East Asia deriving from North Korea’s drive for nuclear weapons. Hayes argues that “the nuclear threat projected by the US in this hegemonic system drove the DPRK to adopt a nuclear weapons proliferation strategy that was aimed at compelling the United States to change its policies towards the DPRK. The latter’s successful nuclear breakout demonstrates that today, the hegemon has no clothes, that is, it is not capable of stopping nuclear breakout by a key adversary.” Arguing that the reinforcing of guarantees of extended nuclear deterrence will be unsuccessful and “will lead to eventual nuclear proliferation by the allies themselves”, Hayes concludes that only conventional deterrence “is likely to curb the DPRK’s nuclear threat, head off long-run proliferation by the ROK and Japan, and by realigning its legitimating ideology (“Global Abolition”) with alliance institutions and force structures, restore the now rapidly dwindling US hegemony in the region.”

See-Won Byun, Research Associate at the Asia Foundation, produced this report examining “the main issues on which the United States and South Korea would need to coordinate policies in response to possible North Korean instability at each stage of an unfolding contingency, with a focus on different functional areas of cooperation. It will highlight immediate priority areas for U.S.-ROK cooperation, identifying lead agencies and mechanisms for cooperation, and potential points of conflict in U.S.-ROK efforts to manage instability in North Korea. The assessment will attempt to provide a long-term framework for understanding U.S.-ROK contingency planning for North Korea.”

The International Crisis Group, an independent, non-profit, multinational organization, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict, writes, “While there is an ongoing debate on North Korea policy within Beijing policy circles reflective of divergent views of U.S.- China relations, overall there remains significant aversion to any move which might destablise China’s periphery. Beijing therefore views the nuclear issue as a longer-term endeavour for which the U.S. is principally responsible, and continues to strengthen its bilateral relationship with North Korea.”

Improving Regional Security and Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula: U.S. Policy Interests and Options Joel Wit, an Adjunct Senior Visiting Scholar at Columbia University’s Weatherhead Institute for East Asia and a Visiting Fellow at the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, has written a report outlining actions to be taken […]

An Independent Task Force, convened by the Asia Society’s Center on U.S.-China Relations and the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, write, “Economic engagement should be a central part of U.S. strategy in dealing with Pyongyang, and is complementary to the current focus on solving the nuclear issue. Sanctions have a role in defending the U.S. against risks of proliferation, but they have not and cannot provide a long-run solution to the North Korean problem. Combining targeted sanctions with robust engagement, as the Obama administration is attempting to do with Iran and Burma, offers the best hope of changing the motivations and the actions of states that presently take a hostile stance toward the U.S. and the international community.”

Read a discussion of this article here.

Wonhyuk Lim, Director of the Overseas Development Office of the Korea Development Institute, writes, “there appear to be basically two options for the United States, depending on what kind of relationship with China it envisions. One is to place South Korea within a hub and-spoke alliance against China, using the North Korean nuclear crisis as a catalyst. However, this policy is likely to find little support in South Korea and risks a nationalist backlash if the United States is increasingly viewed as an impediment to Korean unification and regional security…The other alternative is to deal with South Korea on more equal terms and engage it as a partner in building a new order in the region… This approach would not only strengthen the U.S. position in the Korean peninsula but also enhance its policy options in dealing with China and Japan.”

Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, writes, “There is no shortage of options, and an infinity of needs. And ways exist to work around the barriers that divide North Korea from the rest of the world. There’s no time to wait, or these enduring legacies will become unbearable, and feed into a vortex of chaos and collapse in North Korea, with unimaginable consequences for humans and nature alike.”

The International Crisis Group, an independent, non-profit, multinational organization, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict, writes, “While still preserving the Six-Party framework… the U.S. needs to talk to Pyongyang directly at the highest levels. At best this could result in a deal; at worst it might shed some light on North Korea’s motivations and aspirations. High-level engagement may seem to be rewarding bad behaviour, but it is also the only way any agreement is likely to be reached.”

ICG has also published supporting reports on North Koreans nuclear and missile program (available at: 09051BICG.pdf) and the DPRK’s chemical and biological weapons program (available at: 09051CICG.pdf).

This is the full text of United Nations Resolution 1874 which responded to the DPRK nuclear test of May 25, 2009. The text includes the full resolution as well as explanations of the statement by representatives from the United States, the People’s Republic of China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and other countries.