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Daniel H. Joyner, Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law, argues that nuclear materials and commodities smuggling is currently established in customary international law (CIL) as an international crime, but that that crime is limited in its effectiveness by its imprecise definition and its lack of an accompanying right of universal jurisdiction over the offense. He states that “a multilateral treaty further recognizing this crime and clarifying its criteria and scope and the universality of state jurisdiction over it, would be useful in addressing the limitations of a CIL-based crime, and would create a treaty-CIL mutually reinforcing relationship of a type seen in other substantive areas of international law”.

This is the Summary Report from the Nautilus Institute workshop “Cooperation to Control Non-State Nuclear Proliferation: Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction and UN Resolutions 1540 and 1373” held on April 4th and 5th in Washington DC with the Stanley Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This workshop explored the theoretical options and practical pathways to extend states’ control over non-state actor nuclear proliferation through the use of extra-territorial jurisdiction and international legal cooperation.

Other papers and presentations from the workshop are available here.

In this report Alexandre Y. Mansourov, a Nautilus Institute Senior Associate, comprehensively examines information technology in North Korea. He states that “[t]he DPRK mobile communications industry has crossed the Rubicon, and the North Korean government can no longer roll it back without paying a severe political price. The most the authorities can do now is probably to manage its rapid expansion in such a way that will ensure that the interests of the political regime and state security are taken care of first…While traditionally, the State Security Department monitored most communications on a daily basis, the implication of this explosion of mobile phone use is that communication in North Korea has transitioned from a panopticon of total control to a voluntary compliance system where the government makes an example of a select group to try and force the rest of the country to stay in line.”

This history describes US Commander in Chief Pacific Command’s actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities and his relationships with U.S. military and other governmental agencies. It records his command decisions and policy positions [in 1993]…“a year in which our national security goals for the Asia-Pacific region gained clarity, coherence, and acceptance.”

This report was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See the Institute’s FOIA Global Disclosure Project page to read more chronologies, histories and reports released to Nautilus.

This history describes USCINCPAC’s actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities and his relationships with U.S. military and other governmental agencies. It records his command decisions and policy positions [in 1992]…“The U.S. led victory in the Persian Gulf and the collapse of the Soviet Union were the defining events of 1991. They also set into motion a sea change in the strategic environment, a change that found shape and definition in 1992. During the past year, this strategic transformation was marked by events perhaps less dramatic than 1991′s, but no less profound.”

This report was released to the Nautilus Institute under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See the Institute’s FOIA Global Disclosure Project page to read more chronologies, histories and reports released to Nautilus.

Bruce E. Bechtol Jr., an Associate Professor of Political Science at Angelo State University, provides this review of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capabilities, which reveals a two-track agenda consisting of both a plutonium (proven) and a highly enriched uranium (likely) program. Scenarios involving both of these programs show that North Korea—despite rather primitive capabilities—can deliver a nuclear weapon that would cause casualties in the tens of thousands. Bechtol states, “While a preemptive strike may seem like the obvious answer to a nuclear attack, North Korea’s ability to strike back with non-nuclear forces would likely mean a full-scale conflict possibly involving hundreds of thousands of casualties. High-level officials in Washington and Seoul have placed renewed focus on planning for nuclear scenarios on the Korean peninsula—but the bottom line is that preventing and deterring a North Korean nuclear attack must be a high priority.”

Peter Hayes and Chung-in Moon analyze Park Chung Hee’s failed
1972-1978 proliferation strategy aimed at obtaining the missile, dual
use technology, and fissile material needed to develop a nuclear bomb
and establish a South Korean nuclear weapons program. The authors review
the declassified document, South Korea: Nuclear Developments and Strategic Decisionmaking,
issued in June 1978 by the CIA’s National Foreign Assessment Center.
In addition to providing useful historical insights into Park’s actions
and intentions, the 1978 report bears directly on current debates on
how to respond to the North Korean nuclear breakout, and whether South
Korea should respond in kind.

Peter Hayes, Professor, RMIT University and Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute and Scott Bruce, Director of the Nautilus Institute, San Francisco assess that North Korea’s options for a nuclear strike are severely constrained—so much so that the only credible use of the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal is to detonate a bomb within North Korea itself to slow down or to stop an invasion in the context of an all-out war with the United States and South Korea. They conclude that, “At this stage, North Korea’s outrageous nuclear threats against targets outside its borders are not backed up by actual capabilities.  Countering the North’s rhetorical threat with more nuclear extended deterrence raises tensions instead of addressing the underlying problem of nuclear insecurity.  Ultimately, the only way forward is to re-engage the North, and identify pathways that create confidence and reduce the mutual perception of the threat of massive destruction, whether by conventional or nuclear weapons.”

Sun-Jin Yun, Professor at the Graduate School of Environmental Studies, Seoul National University and Myungrae Cho, Professor, Dankook University, write “The ROK’s green growth strategy, as currently formulated, includes some impressive targets and demonstration projects, but at its heart emphasizes economic growth and national industrial competitiveness rather than being a true plan for “greening” of the Korean economy.  As such, the ROK’s current “green” policies are in effect mostly policies for further benefiting existing large ROK industries, including the nuclear and construction industries.”

Wen Bo, Senior Fellow at the Pacific Environment China Program, examines urban security issues in China and their connection to environmental sustainability. He writes, “By encouraging civil society and promoting cooperation and exchanges with other countries Dalian can address the environmental and urban security challenge that it faces and promote peace and stability in North-East Asia.”