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Jayantha Dhanapala states that a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in Northeast Asia could prove to be a reasonable solution to the complex issues in the region, but that the exceptions and ambiguities that have been allowed during past negotiations of NWFZs must be avoided. Dhanapala argues that compromising on fundamental NWFZ principles—namely that all parties must verifiably dismantle any nuclear weapons and rescind extended nuclear deterrence agreements with Nuclear Weapons States (NWS)—will only exacerbate security concerns.

Jayantha Dhanapala is a former Ambassador of Sri Lanka and a former UN Under Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs.

This report was originally presented at the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop held on November 11, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan. All of the papers and presentations given at the workshop are available here, along with the full agenda, participant list and a workshop photo gallery.

Chung-in Moon asserts that the Six Party Talks (SPTs) mechanism and the idea of a Northeast Asia Weapons Free Zone (NEA NWFZ) are mutually complementary and should be pursued in parallel. While the SPTs are designed to deal with the North Korean nuclear problem, they cannot address the other nuclear-related challenges the Northeast Asian region is currently facing, including enrichment, spent fuel management, waste disposal, reactor safety and emergency management. Likewise, without addressing the North Korean nuclear program, regional cooperation on these issues is unlikely.

Chung-in Moon is a professor of political science at Yonsei University and a former Ambassador for International Security Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea

Leon V. Sigal provides an overview of political prospects for establishing a bilateral Korea-Japan Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ). He notes that such an agreement necessarily raises the question of Japanese and South Korean reliance on US extended nuclear deterrence and “the outcome of any reconsideration thus depends critically on Japanese and South Korean views of North Korea’s nuclear arming, China’s rise, and their historical differences with each other.” Sigal concludes that, while an unbounded North Korean nuclear program could strengthen the nuclear radicals in Tokyo and Seoul who favor nuclear arming, nuclear conservatives in both countries might see heightened advantages in negotiating a NWFZ to help forestall a regional nuclear arms race and improve bilateral relations.

Leon V. Sigal is director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York.

In the following report Jong Kun Choi reviews domestic opinions concerning US extended deterrence to the ROK—including recent debates on South Korea’s nuclear sovereignty— and the diverging perspectives on the issue in South Korean society. Choi argues that the ROK and the US must shift from extended deterrence to tailored deterrence. He concludes, however, that military deterrence (extended and tailored) is not sufficient for resolving North Korea’s nuclear program and weapons. Instead, South Korea and the United States should revive traditional postures of engagement towards the DPRK and exercise strategic patience in order to induce change from within.

Jong Kun Choi is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at Yonsei University.

This report was originally presented at the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop held on November 11, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan. All of the papers and presentations given at the workshop are available here, along with the full agenda, participant list and a workshop photo gallery.

Coming in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident, which starkly reminded the world of the perils posed by nuclear materials, the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit faces a host of challenges. Sharon Squassoni lays out what is at stake, what outcomes can be expected and those that, unfortunately, cannot.

Sharon Squassoni is Director and Senior Fellow at the Proliferation Prevention Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The earthquake and tsunami of March 11, 2011 did more than just devastate Japan and unleash a local nuclear disaster. Peter Hayes notes that the events at the Fukushima nuclear plant exposed a host of design flaws in current nuclear technology whose solutions are linked to dramatically unsettling security issues.

Peter Hayes is Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability.

Hiromichi Umebayashi, President of the Peace Depot, assesses the prospects for a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ) and the applicability of lessons learned during the establishment of similar treaties in other regions of the world. He writes, “there are specific wisdoms to be found in the existing NWFZ treaties . . . One is related to the provision for the entry-into-force of the treaty. If one or more state parties have concern about others’ possible noncompliance with a hard-woven NEA-NWFZ treaty, one could invent a . . . certain kind of waiving system such as the one adopted in the Tlatelolco Treaty. Also, learning from the precedent of ABACC, it seems worthwhile to re-examine the possibility of South-North (North-South) Joint Nuclear Control Commission, which is stipulated by the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, or its modification, as the first step of confidence building measures in the region.”

This report is from the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop held on November 11, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan.
Papers and presentations given at the East Asia Nuclear Workshop are available here, along with the full agenda, participant list and a workshop photo gallery.

Thomas Graham, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador and Executive Chairman of the Board, Lightbridge Corp, reviews the status of the current nonproliferation regime and assesses the impacts that a Northeast Asian Nuclear weapons free zone could have on lessening the threat North Korea poses to that regime. He states that such a zone “could be a large step forward for peace. All avenues toward this laudable but seemingly very distant objective should be examined. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is a possible model that could be considered.”

This report is from the East Asia Nuclear Security workshop held on November 11, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan. The workshop aimed to evaluate the robustness of proposals to establish a nuclear weapons-free zone in Northeast Asia (NEA-NWFZ) and to identify pathways leading to its creation. The workshop was organized by the Nautilus Institute, the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation and Nautilus Australia – RMIT Global Studies, and co-hosted by the Asia Pacific Leadership Network.

Papers and presentations given at the East Asia Nuclear Workshop are available here, along with the full agenda, participant list and a workshop photo gallery.