

THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS AND THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE
FORCE: AN OUTLINE STUDY IN BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONS

by

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4 June 1985



PREFACE

In recent years, units of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) and the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) have begun to train together, to sponsor mutual exchange visits, and to plan for concerted action in the event of aggression against Japan. Why is this happening? Why is it important? What larger changes are involved, and how can that process of change be influenced to best effect?

This paper, prepared as part of the curriculum of the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, is not intended as a "research" paper. It is not presented as a scholarly survey of previously published works, but as an extended essay.

The author's intent in developing this document was to provide an overview of U.S.-Japan military relations; then, within that broad perspective, to consider a variety of narrower issues associated with the continuing presence of USMC forces in Japan. While outside sources are occasionally referenced, the opinions and conclusions are the author's own: they took shape over the course of several years, as the result of personal involvement in the coordination of bilateral policy and training.

This paper is intended for the consideration of fellow students in the Marine Corps Command and Staff College; of Marines assigned to, or expecting assignment to, units in Japan; and of anyone else interested in the evolution of military relations between America and its most important Pacific ally.

If the reader puts down this paper with a keener interest in the growth of USMC-JSDF ties, and a clearer idea of the complexities involved, the author's intent will have been realized.

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ABSTRACT

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Title: THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS AND THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCE: AN OUTLINE STUDY IN BILATERAL MILITARY RELATIONS

Date: 28 May 1985

This paper addresses several of the broad issues involved in the emerging relationship between U.S. Marine Forces in Japan and the Japan Self-Defense Force. Some of the dilemmas confronting U.S. and Japanese policymakers are described, and sufficient political background is provided that the general reader can gain a sense of the changes now in progress.

Information covering the organization and structure of forces, both American and Japanese, is presented. A narrative account of events leading up to the implementation of formal combined training is set forth.

Key points of the paper are that conditions in Japan are changing; that this change can be influenced in ways favorable to the United States; that the Marine Corps has a major role to play; and that for both selfish and unselfish reasons, the Marine Corps should allocate increased resources to the effort.

Three articles from Japanese publications, in translation, are appended.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Why is This Issue Important? An Overview

The attitudes of the Japanese and the role of Japan in world affairs are changing. In the economic sphere, this fact is obvious; it is less obvious but equally true in other areas.

Change is nothing new for the people or institutions of modern Japan. It could be argued that no other nation in history has transformed itself so rapidly and dramatically: from a self-enclosed feudal state to a regional military superpower in less than 80 years (1868-1941), and from a devastated shell of empire to a world economic superpower in less than 40 years (1945-1984). However, this extraordinary ability of the Japanese people to deal with change involves national values and characteristics which are often misinterpreted, underestimated, or overlooked by outsiders.

Today, Japan stands as the bastion of democracy in the Far East, and serves as the linchpin of American defense strategy in the Pacific. As her foremost trading partner and the formal guarantor of her security, the United States has in recent years been strongly urging Japan to expand her military capabilities. The American argument is that Japan

should assume a military posture in keeping with her economic might -- that is, that she should "carry her share" in the free world's defense. Within Japan's political and military establishment, there now are numerous signs that a significant growth will take place.

Nonetheless, the current situation involves a number of ironies. Article IX of Japan's constitution not only renounces war as a sovereign right of the nation, but prohibits the maintenance of land, sea, and air forces. The constitution was adopted in 1947 at the behest of the U.S. Occupation authorities; the antiwar provision reflects the concern of immediate postwar U.S. leaders that Japan's authoritarian heritage, martial ethic, and abundant national energies would lead to rearmament. Above all else, American policymakers wanted to avoid a revival of the military machine which had, in only a few decades, forced Japanese rule on most of East Asia.

Now, with Japan accepted as a loyal and democratic ally, most Americans perceive the Japanese "threat" to be economic. The complaint is frequently heard that Japan, as its economy has doubled and redoubled, has been given a "free ride" under the U.S. defense umbrella. Japan's reluctance to assume an increased military role is often characterized as economically motivated and self-serving. The per-capita defense

expenditures of the U.S. and NATO countries are held up for comparison: according to one argument, if Japan were to make proportional investments in its own defense, its "unfair" national competitive advantage would be diminished, as smaller amounts of GNP would remain for its industrial and commercial growth.

Another argument used by some Americans to urge expansion of the JSDF is the idea (usually vaguely expressed) that U.S. forces then could be shifted out of Japan, free to fight somewhere else -- their roles and missions having been assumed by Japanese counterparts.

While these and similar arguments do contain some elements of truth, the reality is more complex and less easily satisfying. They are worth considering, because they illustrate the complexity of the bilateral military partnership.

Within Japan, opposition to military growth is strongest not in business or industry, but at the grass-roots level. The primary reasons are not economic, but are associated with a widespread, lingering uneasiness with all things military. When Japanese history is considered, this popular distrust is not difficult to understand. For over two thousand years, the military caste (samurai) comprised the privileged

elite, in a feudal system which afforded no legal rights to commoners. Following the 19th Century Meiji reformation, Japan's first attempts at democracy ended with the militarization of the 1930's, military adventures on the Asian mainland, and the disastrous Pacific War. In the minds of many Japanese citizens, the prosperity and democratization of the postwar period are closely tied to Japan's renunciation of military force and its avowedly pro-peace international policies. Negative feelings toward the Self-Defense Force are still widespread. Because of such feelings, JSDF personnel in the Tokyo area, for example, routinely change into civilian clothes prior to leaving a military compound on personal business. In any consideration of the JSDF, it is essential to recognize the ambivalence with which it still is viewed by a significant percentage of Japanese society.

On another point, it is unclear what final effects a major military buildup would induce on Japan's overall position in the world economy. For example, her self-imposed military restrictions now include a ban on most military exports. Any fundamental change in her defense posture could include, as part of a national strategy for military investment, a lifting of this export ban. If Japanese heavy industry and high-technology conglomerates were to enter the world arms trade, they would be extremely well-qualified to compete: U.S. firms, which now account for approximately 30% of world arms sales, would face a severe new challenge.

Probably the most myopic argument used by Americans to urge a Japanese buildup is one which contends that U.S. forces are merely "protecting" Japan -- to the simple benefit of the Japanese and at the expense of the United States' own interests. This is greatly oversimplified.

To the extent that a territorial threat to Japan does exist, virtually all influential Japanese identify that threat with the Soviet Union. It is true that the presence of U.S. forces in Japan is a potent deterrent to Soviet invasion. It is equally true, however, that U.S. presence makes Japan an important Soviet target. In any major war between the military superpowers, whether or not its own interests were originally threatened, Japan would almost surely be drawn into the conflict. For a small, densely populated country, that is no minor consideration.

For American strategists, Japan's most important asset will probably continue to be her geography. Even if the JSDF did not exist, Japan would remain -- because of its location -- the key to America's warfighting capabilities in the Pacific against the USSR.

Vladivostok, the hub of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the USSR's single warm-water Pacific port, is accessible only through the Soya, Tsugaru, or Tsushima Straits. Soviet

aircraft transiting to Vietnam must pass between Japan and South Korea, or else travel in a wide arc to the north and east of the Japanese archipelago. From bases in Japan, American aircraft could hit Soviet air and naval bases on the Asian mainland and Sakhalin. These same Japanese bases, and a wide range of support facilities, are critical to the defense of South Korea or the Philippines.

In fact, U.S. forces are not being kept in Japan at the expense of American national interests, but as a forceful expression of those interests. Their presence is as vital to the United States as it is to Japan.

When viewed from a Japanese perspective, what exactly is the threat? If the Soviet Union undertook hostile action against Japan, what would its objectives be?

There exists a variety of opinions, of course. One key objective, almost all analysts agree, would be control of the Soya Strait between Sakhalin and Hokkaido. This could entail Soviet seizure of part or all of the island of Hokkaido.

However, the single most important strategic gain for the Soviets would be the elimination or neutralization of U.S. forces operating from Japan. This could be realized without firing a shot if the Soviets were able somehow to

split the alliance. In a sustained and serious global confrontation, deteriorating gradually to a condition of imminent U.S.-Soviet warfare, it is likely that the USSR would bring to bear on Japan every conceivable political and military pressure in an attempt to induce such a split. By offering to recognize a Japanese declaration of neutrality, the Soviets would be offering what could be an extremely attractive "way out" of all that a global war portends. If Japan's leaders were to accept such an offer, and deny to U.S. forces the continued use of bases in Japan, the strategic posture of the USSR would be improved immeasurably.

In such an extreme situation, where would Japan's own national interests lie? A persistent argument of Japanese antiwar groups is that Japan stands to lose more from its military ties to the U.S. than it would lose from an unresisting neutrality. One idealistic metaphor has represented Japan's proper role to be the "Switzerland of the Far East." Relatively moderate nationalist groups could easily coopt this slogan and alter it to "the Sweden of the Far East" -- with military power to defend its own, but only its own, interests.

As is the case in every democracy, Japanese public opinion covers the political spectrum. Vocal groups argue for everything from total disarmament to total rearmament

and the acquisition of an independent nuclear capability. But a majority of the public generally accepts the status quo. Instances of Soviet ruthlessness, such as the invasion of Afghanistan and the attack on KAL Flight 007, have reinforced general perceptions of the Soviet threat. The oil shock of 1973 left a lasting impression of national vulnerability. Defense-minded political and military leaders have repeatedly used these examples to underscore the need for increased military expenditures. In Japanese society and politics, the process of consensus-building is central to every undertaking, and the JSDF continues to make gradual gains in public acceptance and support.

Of all the possible policy options, future decisions which lead to a reduction of the JSDF and an eventual state of unarmed neutrality seem most remote. Such a policy would run counter to the pervasive Japanese sense of vulnerability, and to the increasing sense of international assertiveness.

In fact, for the near- and mid-term, it is hard to envision any drastic change at all in Japan's strongly pro-U.S. stance. Japan's current leaders are firmly and publicly committed to the continuation and strengthening of bilateral military ties. Planning is now underway with U.S. counterparts to extend JSDF sea control to 1,000 miles over the primary sea lanes leading into the home islands; this

commitment has been presented as an important form of U.S.-Japan role-sharing. Within Japan, the division of roles is frequently compared to that of shield and spear: in the event of Soviet aggression, the JSDF will serve as the shield while U.S. forces act as the spear.

Over the long term, as JSDF capabilities increase, military self-sufficiency will be closer at hand and an eventual drift toward armed neutrality -- or at least a much looser alliance -- is not inconceivable. Military policy over the long term may depend heavily on the quality and public acceptance of the evolving bilateral military ties.

Of course, these larger issues of strategic direction and national policy are only indirectly linked to the smaller question of USMC-JSDF relations. However, they are not unrelated; and strong military-to-military ties can have unforeseen, but far-reaching, positive effects on international stability.

Moreover, it is easier to agree on common strategic goals and objectives than it is to build tactical interoperability at the unit level -- especially when the units involved employ different languages, customs and weapons. Yet that interoperability is vital to the success of the alliance.

USMC forces constitute almost 45% of all U.S. forces in Japan. The presence of III MAF is a concrete indication of American commitment. The ground combat, service support, and helicopter units of III MAF are the only Japan-based American counterparts of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF). Apart from brief, fly-in exercises conducted by the U.S. Army, young officers and men in the JGSDF will meet and work with American counterparts through their exposure to Marines, or not at all.

For many reasons, closer organizational and individual ties between USMC and JGSDF forces are significant. An important step is taken by each Marine assigned to Japan who seeks a deeper understanding of the organization, aspirations, and sensitivities of his host country and his Japanese counterparts.

Chapter 2


THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCE (JSDF)

Organization and Structure of the JSDF

The origins of the Japan Self-Defense Force lie in the creation of the 75,000 man National Police Reserve in 1950. In 1952, the National Police Reserve was renamed the National Safety Force; and in 1954, with passage of the Defense Agency Establishment Law, the National Safety Force was incorporated into the present Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces.

The structure of the Defense Agency and the relationship of the three Self-Defense Forces are as shown in Figure (1). One conspicuous characteristic of the Japanese system is the fact that the nation's senior military officer, the Chairman of the Joint Staff Council (CJSC) shares a parallel relationship with the Chiefs of Staff of the JGSDF, JMSDF, and JASDF. This means that the CJSC and the Joint Staff Office (JSO) have no directive authority over the component services; joint planning and tactical coordination must be done on a basis of mutual agreement. This unwieldy arrangement was designed to help ensure the primacy of civilian leadership, and hinder any illegal consolidation of power by military leaders. In this respect, the current system is effective;

Figure One: ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS OF THE JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY (JDA) AND THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCE (JSDF)



JASDF = Japan Air Self Defense Force
 JGSDF = Japan Ground Self Defense Force
 JMSDF = Japan Maritime Self Defense Force

Acronyms:

Handwritten signature or initials.

however, it does little to overcome the country's long-standing service rivalries, or to provide coherence to overall defense planning.

The parallel relationship of the services with JSO creates significant problems in bilateral affairs as well. Unlike the CJSC, the Commander, U.S. Forces Japan (COMUSJAPAN) is vested with command authority over the U.S. subunified component commanders. Any agreement between COMUSJAPAN and JSO is final on the American side; on the Japanese side, such agreements are only tentative unless GSO, MSO, and ASO consensus is gained and formal concurrence is received.

Another complicating aspect is the close proximity of ultimate political decisionmakers on the Japanese side, and the long and circuitous route to counterpart decisionmakers on the American side. If an insuperable obstacle should arise during joint planning, CJSC and his staff must turn to the next upper level, which is the Japan Defense Agency -- the GOJ counterpart to the U.S. Department of Defense. On the American side, COMUSJAPAN (a 3-star officer) must take his position to CINCPAC (a 4-star officer with a large staff), who must prepare a position of his own. CINCPAC then goes to JCS, (a group of four-star officers with a very large staff), who must in turn agree on a common position before

any issue can be considered for presentation to the Department of Defense. Given the nature of bureaucracies, this complicated relationship almost guarantees frustration, and makes it extremely difficult to tackle major political-military issues (such as sea-lanes control and division of defense responsibilities) in a positive, step-by-step manner.

Within the JSDF, the problem of interservice rivalry is a serious one. The Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) has been -- and remains -- the most politically influential of the three branches. However, the current military buildup is oriented on the concept of expanded responsibility for sea-lanes defense. This mission is stressed by leaders in America and Japan because (among other reasons) it is most politically palatable, and most consistent with the limitations of Article IX. However, sea lanes defense is associated with air and sea control, as opposed to ground combat capability: it therefore threatens the JGSDF position in the defense budget.

To counter this threat to its funding, the JGSDF has taken the position that a strong ground defense -- especially in Hokkaido -- is essential to ensure a permissive environment for JMSDF and JASDF operations. The JMSDF and JASDF tend to disagree and push for proportionately greater funding

for their own programs. In the context of this argument, a central point of contention has been the Soviets' estimate of amphibious capability.

U.S. component headquarters are inevitably drawn into such controversies, due to close and supportive relationships with their own "green," "navy-blue," or "sky-blue" functional counterparts. The the 1985 edition of the U.S. Defense Department publication Soviet Military Power, states that

...to support a military operation against Japan, the Soviet Far East merchant fleet has an estimated capacity to transport up to seven motorized or tank divisions in a single lift operation if given appropriate conditions of sea and air superiority.¹

This large estimate of Soviet amphibious capability supports the JGSDF contention that an air and maritime buildup would be only an empty front, if it were attained at the expense of ground combat capability.

Problems of interservice "separateness" extend down to the tactical level. Currently, if deployed for actual defensive combat, JGSDF tactical units would have only one JASDF officer per regiment for purposes of air liaison and forward air control. Against integrated, well-equipped and highly trained Soviet forces, such inadequate integration of ground and air assets would prove disastrous.

A requirement for closer service relationships is fully recognized by senior JSDF officers. General Keitaro Watarabe (then just appointed as Chief of Staff, JGSDF, and now the Chairman, Joint Staff Council) told U.S. officers in May 1983 that one of his greatest goals was to increase the effective cooperation of the JGSDF, JMSDF, and JASDF. In this regard, the close air-ground-naval integration of Marine units is of particular interest for Japanese officers.

Tactical divisions of the JSDF service components are shown in Figures (2) through (4).

ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPAN
GROUND SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

I. Northern Army

Headquarters....Sapporo
2d Division....Asahikawa
5th Division...Obihiro
7th Division...Higashichitose
11th Division..Makomanai

II. Northeastern Army


Headquarters....Sendai
6th Division...Jinmachi
9th Division...Aomori

III. Eastern Army

Headquarters....Ichigaya
1st Division...Nerima
12th Division..Somagahara

IV. Central Army

Headquarters....Itami
3rd Division...Senzo
10th Division..Moriyama
13th Division..Kaitaichi



SAKHALIN (USSR)
NORTHERN TERRITORIES (KURILES) (USSR OCCUPIED)

NORTHERN ARMY

Asahi-kawa

Obihiro

Makomanai

Higashi-chitose

Sapporo

NORTH-EASTERN ARMY

Aomori

EASTERN ARMY

Jinmachi

Sendai

CENTRAL ARMY

Ichigaya (Tokyo)

WESTERN ARMY

Nerima

Somagahara

Moriyama

Itami

Kyoto

Senzo (Osaka)

Fukuoka

Kengun

Kitakumamoto

Kaitaichi

RYUKYUS (WESTERN ARMY)

Okinawa

Naha



V. Western Army

Headquarters....Kengun
4th Division...Fukuoka
8th Division...Kitakumamoto
1st Combined Brigade...Naha

FIGURE (2)

ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPAN
AIR SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

- I. Air Defense Command Headquarters...Fuchu
- II. Northern Air Defense Force
Headquarters.....Misawa
2d Air Wing.....Chitose
81st Air Group..Misawa
3rd ADef Group..Chitose
- III. Central Air Defense Force
Headquarters.....Iruma
3rd Air Wing....Komatsu
6th Air Wing....Komatsu
7th Air Wing....Hyakuri
1st ADef Group..Iruma
4th ADef Group..Gifu
- IV. Western Air Defense Force
Headquarters.....Tsuki
5th Air Wing....Nyutabaru
8th Air Wing....Kasuga
2d ADef Group...Tsuki



- V. Southwestern Composite Air Division
Headquarters.....Naha
83rd Air Group..Naha
5th ADef Group..Naha
- VI. Air Training Group
1st Air Wing....Hamamatsu
4th Air Wing....Matsushima

FIGURE (3)

ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPAN
MARITIME SELF-DEFENSE FORCE


I. Self-Defense Fleet Headquarters...Yokosuka

II. Fleet Escort Force

Headquarters.....Yokosuka
1st Escort Flotilla...Yokosuka
2nd Escort Flotilla...Sasebo
3rd Escort Flotilla...Maizuru
4th Escort Flotilla...Yokosuka

III. Fleet Air Force

Headquarters.....Atsugi
1st Air Squadron.....Kanoya
2nd Air Squadron.....Hachinohe
4th Air Squadron.....Atsugi
21st Air Squadron.....Tateyama
31st Air Squadron.....Iwakuni
Okinawa Air Group.....Naha



IV. Other Operational Units

1st Minesweeper Flotilla...Kure
2nd Minesweeper Flotilla...Yokosuka
1st Submarine Flotilla.....Kure
2nd Submarine Flotilla.....Yokosuka
Maritime Training Flotilla.Yokosuka

FIGURE (4)

Political Environment of the JSDF

Article IX of the Constitution of Japan states that:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.²

This article has been the focal point for one of the most intense and sweeping political arguments in postwar Japan. By various factions, its intent has been supported, opposed, or stretched near the breaking point. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan's long-time majority party, has traditionally supported a flexible interpretation of Article IX. The LDP also includes a number of advocates of a formal Constitutional amendment to end restrictions on Japan's military options. In 1969, the then-Chairman of the Joint Staff Council articulated the basis for this view when he declared that

The state does not exist because there is a Constitution. There is a Constitution because there is a state...If it is absolutely necessary for the survival of the state, the Constitution should be interpreted accordingly. If this cannot be done, the Constitution should be revised.³

Even today the constitutionality of the JSDF's existence continues to be hotly argued within Japan, although a declining minority of the population aspires to a completely unarmed status.

The questions raised by Article IX have been addressed repeatedly within the Japanese judiciary. In 1959, the Tokyo district court ruled that the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan was in violation of Article IX. In a landmark decision later the same year, the Japanese Supreme Court overturned that ruling. The Supreme Court held that the Japanese Constitution "does not renounce the inherent right of a sovereign nation to self-defense, nor does it demand defenselessness and nonresistance."⁴ In 1976, the Sapporo High Court ruled in another case that the existence of the JSDF did not violate Article IX. In 1977, the Mito District Court ruled that while self-defense capability is constitutional, it must not exceed necessary limits.⁵

Obviously, the question of what is necessary for adequate self-defense can lead to any number of possible conclusions. In 1978, in a written policy statement, the Japan Defense Agency declared that

The limit beyond which defense power must not be increased under the restrictions set forth in Article IX...is a relative one that can change in accordance with various conditions such as the international situation and the level of military technology at a given time.⁶

In 1979, then-Prime Minister Ohira declared that

What forms its root is the perfection and consolidation of defense power, and our country's defense power must be what can truly become deterrent power.⁷

Soon afterward, Prime Minister Ohira was reported to have gone so far as to say, during a session of the Upper House of the Diet, that "a minimum number of nuclear weapons for self-defense is not something to be prohibited."⁸

Of course, open advocates of a nuclear-armed Japan constitute a small political minority. But this position is held tenaciously by several of the extreme nationalist groups; and as early as fifteen years ago it was not unheard of for elected representatives to campaign openly on behalf of a Japanese nuclear deterrent.⁹ This has not changed, despite Japan's ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1976.¹⁰

The official policy of the Government of Japan (GOJ) toward nuclear weapons is expressed in its "three non-nuclear principles": that Japan will not possess, will not manufacture, and will not introduce nuclear weapons into the country.¹¹ This results in continual difficulties relative to the presence of U.S. forces, since these principles prohibit the possession of a nuclear warhead aboard any ship or plane entering Japanese water or airspace. The U.S., in

conformity with its policy worldwide, refuses to confirm or deny the presence of nuclear weapons anywhere; however, U.S. spokesmen issue regular public assurances that the U.S. Government "respects its obligations" under existing treaties with the Government of Japan.

When pressed on this point by domestic political opponents, GOJ spokesmen circumvent the challenge by affirming that: (1) The U.S. is obligated by treaty to make "prior consultations" with the GOJ, before any nuclear weapon is brought into Japanese territory; (2) the U.S. has not made such consultations; (3) therefore, the U.S., ipso facto, cannot have brought such weapons into Japan. In this oblique fashion the issue is kept under tenuous control; but it is the cause of frequent political demonstrations and local resolutions, and U.S. Navy ships in particular are affected by strong opposition to port calls in some of Japan's major ports.

The paradox of Japan's international security position is here particularly poignant; for strategic deterrence against the Soviet Union, Japan openly depends on the U.S. nuclear "umbrella." According to the Japan Defense Agency,

Japan's defense capability, coupled with the presence of U.S. military power involving a nuclear deterrent based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, constitutes a stance permitting the country to cope with any threat...¹²

yet its "three non-nuclear principles" prohibit the very ships and planes which maintain that deterrence from entering its territory.

Apart from the question of proper Constitutional limits to Japan's power, there are lingering questions, at a deeper level, concerning the basic validity of Article IX and -- for that matter -- the entire Constitution. Negative feelings in this regard are not confined to extremist groups. Japan's current Prime Minister Nakasone wrote in 1978, when he was the LDP general secretary, that

In the case of an independent, democratic constitution, those who draft it and those to whom it is applied must both be groups with a sense of common identification; and this in turn must be based on free will. The process by which the Constitution was drafted was dictated by the [American] GHQ.

During the occupation it was impossible not only to enact but even to submit legislation to a plenary session of the Diet without permission from GHQ. We were indirectly threatened with being purged if we made any complaints. It was under such circumstances that the present constitution was enacted.¹³

Another consideration is the Japanese attitude toward the presence of American troops in Japan. In the 1959 Japan Supreme Court case, the U.S. presence was ruled constitutional; but despite continued strong GOJ support, public opinion and opposition political positions have been

mixed. In 1970, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that

Even highly pro-United States analysts and politicians, otherwise quite concerned with Japan's security, are in agreement concerning the desirability of terminating the U.S. military presence in Japan.¹⁴

...The Japanese expect that by 1975 most American forces will be out of Japan, and it may also be expected that the Japanese will quietly press for the removal of most American bases by that date.¹⁵

Japan has an active, multi-party, parliamentary system of government, and the shifting alignments and coalitions of its parties have reflected shifts in national sentiment. The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) has traditionally advocated a status of unarmed neutrality, held the JSDF to be unconstitutional, and called for unilateral abrogation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) supports the maintenance of defense capability in some form, but also calls for abrogation of the Security Treaty and disbandment of the JSDF as it is currently constituted. The "Clean Government Party" (Komeito) has reservations as to the constitutionality of both the Security Treaty and the JSDF, but does not seek immediate change and does not support the concept of unarmed neutrality. The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) recognizes the JSDF as constitutional, and accepts the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty for the time being; the DSP has gone on record, however, as calling for "the elimination of the perpetual U.S. military presence in Japan."¹⁶

In 1979, setbacks for these opposition parties and strong gains by the ruling LDP led to realignments and to some consolidation of opposition platforms:

Under pressure from the Komeito, the JSP had to concede that it would not call for an immediate and unilateral abrogation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. It had to accept the Komeito line that the termination of the treaty has to be implemented through diplomatic negotiations with the USA.¹⁷

Since 1979, a gradual movement has continued away from radical anti-JSDF, anti-Security Treaty positions. As a result of this "rightward shift" in domestic politics, Japan is increasingly receptive to the idea of a significant role in its own defense.

The big question, which has yet to be satisfactorily answered, is: what role?

Japan's Official Defense Policy

The Government of Japan (GOJ) carefully and eloquently presents its current position on military issues in a lengthy "Boeihakusho" (white paper) published annually by the Defense Agency. Publication began in 1970. The document is translated into numerous languages for foreign distribution; its English translation bears the title Defense of Japan.

Defense of Japan attempts to provide philosophical justification and bolster public support for the existence of the JSDF and its functions. In the Japanese context, even patriotism needs to be justified:

Patriotism means attachment to our land. It is a natural human feeling -- a desire for the peaceful development of a living community -- which everyone has. What is important is how and when to display it. To do one's best to defend the country from invasion is the duty of each Japanese and the awareness that urges us to perform this duty is the expression of patriotism and the will to defend the country.

Japan's effort to improve its defense capability against emergencies presupposes such willingness of the people to defend the country. The Self-Defense Forces can be a power to defend the country only when they are supported by the people's will to defend the country. In this sense, considerations regarding the enlightening of the people in various arenas will be necessary.¹⁸

These lines convey a sense of what the GOJ feels it is up against: continuing doubt and cynicism, the legacy of prewar and wartime exhortations; and naive idealism, the product of postwar pacifism.

Currently, the Defense Agency offers the following GOJ interpretation of Article IX:

1. A necessary minimum of self-defense capability is constitutional.

2. "Minimum" limits are subject to change and are relative to the state of technology and the international situation. ("However, it is clear that Japan evidently cannot possess weapons which...are used exclusively for total destruction of other countries, such as ICBMs and long-range strategic bombers.") (Emphasis added.)

3. Three conditions must be met to justify the use of force:

a. "Sudden and unjustified aggression" has been directed against Japan;

b. There is "no other appropriate means" to deal with that aggression; and

c. Use of armed strength is confined to the necessary minimum.

4. "Minimum force" is not limited in scope to Japanese territorial land, sea, and air. Geographic scope would vary with the situation; however, it would be unconstitutional to dispatch armed forces to foreign territorial land, sea, and air.

5. Collective self-defense (armed support of a treaty partner when not under direct attack oneself) is the right of every sovereign state, including Japan, under international law. However, because of Article IX, Japan must forego this right.

6. "Exercise of the right of belligerency" is unconstitutional, but the "operation of force" has a different meaning and is permitted for self-defense.¹⁹

Basic Policy for National Defense, as formally set forth by GOJ, comprises four broad principles:

1. Support for the United Nations and promotion of international efforts for peace and cooperation;

2. Stabilization of domestic affairs as the "foundation for security."

3. Gradual improvement of effective defense capability "with due regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation.."

4. Reliance on Japan-United States security arrangements to deal with external aggression, "pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression."²⁰

Control of the military by elected political leaders is heavily stressed:

Japan gave serious thought to the state of affairs which led to and continued through World War II, and complied with a system of uncompromising civilian control similar to that maintained by other democratic nations.

Totally different from the system sustained under the old Japanese Constitution the SDF today is strictly under civilian control.²¹

But further "enlightening of the people" is required:

...in order to lead the civilian control system to bear fruit, it goes without saying that continuous efforts are necessary in both political and administrative operation of the system. At the same time, it is necessary for the entire Japanese people to display keen interest in national defense, while the SDF personnel themselves are required to show a correct understanding of civilian control and demonstrate their behavior accordingly.²²

As its basic "Concept of Defense," GOJ stresses two broad objectives: prior deterrence and, should deterrence fail, the countering of aggression. Deterrence is provided for by maintaining a defense capability of "appropriate" scale, and by "keeping the credibility of security arrangements with the United States," specifically including the American nuclear deterrent. If limited aggression should occur, Japan will drive away the invaders "without help in principle." In the event of larger-scale aggression, Japan "will continue strong resistance by every possible means until it gains cooperation from the United States in repulsing the enemy."²³

In November 1976, the GOJ declared that "in implementing the defense capability buildup, this is to be done...with the total sum of defense-related expenses in each fiscal year not to exceed for the time being...1% of the GNP of each said year."²⁴ This 1% cap has been the subject of continuous controversy ever since, both in domestic forums and in bilateral dealings with the U.S. It has acquired strong symbolic value for those opposed to expansion of the Japanese military, as well as for those trying to encourage such expansion. There are indications that the GOJ will soon -- in 1985 or 1986 -- exceed for the first time this traditional limit.

In calculations of Japan's ultimate military and foreign policies, perhaps the most important single variable is the quality of Japan-U.S. bilateral ties. As the Defense Agency declares,

Effective functioning of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements under any circumstances is an absolute necessity for surely guaranteeing Japan's security.

In order to maintain the friendly and cooperative relations between Japan and the United States, and sustain the credibility of their security arrangements, it is necessary for the two nations to seize every opportunity to hold uninterrupted dialogue, to firmly establish the relationship of mutual trust and cooperation, to fulfill their respective responsibilities, and to strive to secure a system for the effective functioning of the arrangements.²⁵

The defense ministry has committed itself to budgetary support ("cost-sharing") for the continued stationing of U.S. forces in Japan. The major expression of this is the Facilities Improvement Program (FIP); the FIP has resulted in major new construction of housing, barracks, and support facilities for use by U.S. forces. Among other projects, the GOJ is now constructing 5,000 family housing units in Okinawa. This housing, with related support facilities, will enable the USMC to transition into a policy of 3-year accompanied tours for all career Marines assigned PCS to Okinawa.

Despite such initiatives, skepticism persists in some quarters, that the United States would -- or could -- provide sufficient, timely aid to Japan in a true defense emergency. This skepticism has been indirectly increased by some U.S. efforts to bring about larger Japanese defense spending.

Recent American Pressures

In his Fiscal Year 1985 Report to the Congress, Secretary of Defense Weinberger stated that

The cornerstone of our East Asian defense policy is our defense partnership with Japan, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Prime Minister Suzuki enunciated the goal for Japanese roles and missions when he stated in May 1981 that defense of Japan's territory, its airspace, and its sea-lanes out to 1,000 miles are legal under Japan's constitution and are, in fact, its national policy. Prime Minister Nakasone has been even more forthright in expressing that Japan's responsibilities should be under a national division of labor with the United States. We will continue to encourage Japan to achieve within this decade the force levels it needs to meet its defense requirements.

We plan to base F-16 aircraft at Misawa Air Base in Japan. Once deployed, these U.S. F-16s will provide improved air-to-surface capabilities to help redress the regional force imbalance in Northeast Asia.²⁶

As Secretary Weinberger points out, Japan in fact is the cornerstone of our plans for East Asia. The "encouragement" he mentions has become a central factor in our military and foreign policy relationship with Japan. The Japanese public, and their leaders, are acutely aware that there exists in America a widespread perception that Japan is doing less than its "fair share." The military issues have been linked with overarching economic problems, and there now is a sense of pressure and urgency which did not previously exist in the defense debate. In 1983, a bilateral military study was

~~commissioned to examine specific requirements associated with~~
Japan's commitment to defend sealanes out to 1,000 nautical
miles. A surge of Japanese books, articles, and television
features began to appear, dealing variously with the Soviet
threat, the overextended capabilities of the U.S., the tech-
nical and strategic questions of sealanes defense, and the
inadequacy of the JSDF.

This American pressure -- or perceived American pressure
-- is having mixed results. Over the long term, the effect
may not be exactly what U.S. policymakers expect or hope for.

Japan's "hawks" -- whatever their feeling toward America
and the alliance -- welcome the new American emphasis,
because it shores up their own position that Japan should be
militarily responsible for her own destiny. Also, American
backing has helped greatly to legitimize, among potential
opponents at home and abroad, the idea of a revitalized
Japanese military. Prime Minister Nakasone has stressed the
American partnership in every discussion of plans to project
Japanese power beyond its own territorial waters. Among the
ASEAN nations and Korea -- Japan's former conquests -- there
has been little protest.

But it would be a mistake to overlook potential nega-
tive effects on America's own long-term interests, of this

cultivation of Japanese power. Apart from irritation at the tone and context in which the American position has sometimes been presented, some leaders on the Japanese side have begun to ask questions about the extent of actual U.S. commitment to Japan, and even more fundamental questions about the overall worth of the current security relationship.

When Secretary Weinberger's statement is examined, several assumptions are apparent: (1) that Japan should possess weapons systems of the type and amount necessary to defend 1,000 miles of ocean; (2) that Japan's "defense requirements" can be agreed upon; and (3) that U.S. offensive weapons in Japan, such as sophisticated ground-attack aircraft at Misawa, will lead to an increase in security for Japan.

When these points are analyzed, complications quickly emerge: (1) in order to unilaterally defend the sealanes out to 1,000 miles against a sophisticated Soviet threat, including Soviet Naval aviation, there will be a necessity for JMSDF or JASDF sea-based aviation. Articles in the public domain have described JMSDF aspirations to acquire its own aircraft carriers, but this is a possibility that was not envisioned in the U.S. concept of "role-sharing." Possession of adequate forces and weapons to "defend itself" and its sealanes against one of the military superpowers is by

definition enough power for an autonomous policy. (2) Any determination of Japan's "defense requirements" involves fixing two key variables: the level of threat and the level of U.S. support available. If the object of this determination is to elicit increased Japanese contributions, a clear paradox emerges: that is, if massive U.S. forces are assumed to be available, the requirement for Japanese forces will correspondingly decrease. On the other hand, if minimal U.S. forces are assumed, the challenge to Japan becomes so overwhelming that -- for many Japanese -- a basic rethinking of present security commitments seems necessary. That a "limited" war with the Soviets could be fought at all (especially one which begins on the high seas and in the air) seems a dubious proposition, and any assumptions to the contrary are difficult to support. (3) The F-16's are U.S. weapons intended for Soviet targets. They do help to offset the Soviet numerical advantage in attack aircraft; but they are a clear-cut, high-priority target themselves in any U.S.-Soviet war. Their presence at Misawa serves (among other things) to further increase the certainty of Japan's involvement.

At bottom, the unarticulated, long-term stumbling block for the U.S. is the question: would a militarily self-sufficient Japan continue in the same relationship to the U.S.? Would it permit U.S. forces to use its territory as an

"unsinkable aircraft carrier" from which to launch an offensive against the Soviet homeland, and to interdict Soviet ships inbound or outbound from the Sea of Japan?

The usual scenario for a "defense of Japan" is one in which Japanese interests are threatened: first, Japan-Soviet relations deteriorate to the point of a Soviet attack on Japan; Japan resists, holds its ground, and the U.S. then responds with sufficient force to enable Japan to repel the invaders. Sometimes the assumed Soviet attack is placed in a context of simultaneous Soviet aggression in other parts of the world. That complicates the problem, of course, because it stresses the limits to U.S. response capability, and increases the vulnerability of Japan. It is this kind of scenario which is assumed, when the U.S. argues to Japan that it must build stronger forces.

But there are other types of scenarios, which have been too little considered by some U.S. planners, and which lead to very different conclusions by the Japanese.

The Japanese islands dominate the strategic routes of Soviet power projection in the Pacific. The presence of significant U.S. air and naval forces in Japan, adjacent to those routes and within striking range of vital Soviet military facilities, is a primary consideration in both U.S.

and Soviet global strategy. Their presence virtually assures that any major U.S.-Soviet conflict will extend to Japan. U.S. and Soviet attacks and counterattacks from and against its territory involve enormous potential consequences for Japan. This would be true even if the war began elsewhere; even if Japanese interests were not originally at stake; even if the war had been started through accident or miscalculation.

At some point, Japanese self-interest may dictate a reevaluation of the present security relationship from a cost-benefit point of view. In this sense, benefits are associated with U.S. reinforcement in the event of primary aggression against Japan, and with the deterrent effect of the U.S. nuclear "umbrella" against such primary aggression. On the other hand, costs are associated with a derivative attack on Japan, as part of a global U.S.-Soviet war in which Japan might discover itself an unwilling participant. In this analysis, benefits would decrease in value as the level of expected reinforcement, or the credibility of the American deterrent, goes down; estimates of cost would increase in direct proportion to foreign policy differences with the U.S., and the likelihood that Japan might be dragged unwillingly into a confrontation.

Japan's situation is different in a number of ways from that of the NATO countries. Especially in the context of global war, the Soviet Union has little to gain from an invasion of the main islands of Japan, and much to gain from the neutralization (through military or political means) of U.S. forces based there. If its own interests were not at stake, and if it chose to do so, a militarily confident Japan could reasonably hope to "ride out" an otherwise extremely destructive global war.

For the time being, among leaders of Japan and the U.S., common interests are being served by a military buildup. Divisions of long-term national interest are not apparent. But Secretary Weinberger's policy assumes that Japan's objectives will continue to be those of the United States: should that prove not to be the case, his successors may someday gaze ruefully across the Pacific, and wistfully remember the modestly-equipped but always-supportive Japan of the 1970's and early 1980's.

Chapter 3

UNITED STATES FORCES IN JAPAN

Organization and Structure of U.S. Forces

U.S. military forces in Japan are organized around a sub-unified command, subordinate to CINCPAC in the joint operational chain. Commander, U.S. Forces Japan (COMUSJAPAN), a three-star billet, has in recent years been assigned to an Air Force Officer. He is triple-hatted as COMUSJAPAN/Commander U.S. Air Force Japan (CDR USAFJ)/Commander 5th Air Force (CDR 5AF). COMUSJAPAN's Chief of Staff, a two-star billet independent of other organizational ties, is assigned to a Marine Major General. As COMUSJAPAN's representative in Okinawa, the Commanding General, Marine Corps Base Camp Butler is designated "Okinawa Area Coordinator." In the implementation of joint matters affecting Okinawa commands, the Okinawa Area Coordinator serves as local agent for COMUSJAPAN. On single-service USMC issues, CG MCB Camp Butler is subordinate to the Naval Forces Commander.

Commander U.S. Naval Forces Japan (COMNAVFORJAPAN) is the subunified component commander for U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces in Japan. As such, he responds to taskings from COMUSJAPAN; however, he does not command any operational forces, and normally would not command forces even in wartime.

COMNAVFORJAPAN's primary role is to coordinate between Seventh Fleet operating forces and COMUSJAPAN, and between those forces and the Japan Self-Defense Force.

Seventh Fleet units are homeported and homebased in Japan, but they remain under operational control of Commander Seventh Fleet (COMSEVENTHFLT) and CINCPACFLT. Although COMUSJAPAN has no operational control over them, he is responsible -- through COMNAVFORJAPAN -- for legal and administrative matters concerning the presence of Seventh Fleet units and personnel in Japan.

The Commanding General of III MAF has two hats, and responds through two chains. In his operational role of Commander Task Force 79 (CTF 79), he is directly subordinate to COMSEVENTHFLT, and coordinates all issues of concern through Navy channels. As CG III MAF, he employs Marine Corps channels for matters not related to his Fleet responsibilities.

The Commander, U.S. Army Japan is a three-star officer with a one-star deputy. He has no operational forces assigned (although the U.S. Army is now in the process of phasing in some Special Forces units to Okinawa). His primary function is to conduct contingency planning for

U.S. Army units which would be deployed to Japan in wartime, and to maintain and develop a bilateral relationship with the JGSDF.

Basic U.S. command relationships, and their counterpart relationships for bilateral coordination with the JSDF, are shown in Figures (5) and (6).

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS OF U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN




Figure (5)
44

BILATERAL COORDINATION RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN JAPAN




Figure (6)

Development of USMC-JMDF Relations

Although U.S. forces have been based in Japan since 1945, bilateral military-to-military relations are a relatively recent development. For over 30 years, there were none at all.

Then, in 1978, a legal basis for coordinated military planning and training was established. On 27 November of that year, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) approved the "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation." Japan's National Defense Council and Cabinet gave their formal approval the next day.¹

In early 1979, ~~an organizational structure for implementing the "Guidelines" was created:~~ the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) and the Ground, Air, and Maritime Planning Subcommittees (GPSC, APSC, and MPSC) (Figure (7)). Each planning subcommittee later created subordinate, functional study panels to address bilateral needs and capabilities in specific areas such as training, logistics, communications, etc.

Membership on the Planning Subcommittees was extended to the three sub-unified component headquarters on the U.S. side, and to the headquarters of the three self-defense

Figure Four:

STRUCTURE OF JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE (JPC) AND PLANNING SUBCOMMITTEES




Figure (7)

forces on the Japanese side. When this structure was established, the question of Marine Corps forces in Japan was not specifically addressed. Records from that period indicate that USN/USMC planners did not expect Marine forces to become involved in any major way in bilateral activities in Japan.

Reasons for this initial reticence to involve USMC forces seem to stem from concerns in high-level Navy and Marine headquarters that III MAF (Task Force 79) might be drawn into planning commitments which would interfere with its primary mission: that of maintaining itself as an amphibious ready force available for commitment anywhere in the Pacific theater. There was concern that existing USMC obligations for Korea had already infringed on the Seventh Fleet Commander's freedom of action with respect to CTF 79 options; there apparently was a strong desire to avoid such entanglements in Japan.

The bottom line was that, during the 1978-79 period, little emphasis was placed by III MAF or Seventh Fleet headquarters on direct Marine involvement in the emerging military-to-military relationships. During this same period, the three "primary" U.S. services, all with headquarters close to Tokyo, gave a high priority to this kind of effort. Remaining records also indicate that -- ironically -- in the

initial days of this developing "bilateralism," the Ground Self-Defense Force representatives had high hopes for eventual USMC-JGSDF training.

The U.S. Army sub-unified component commander in Japan (Commander U.S. Army Japan) is dual-hatted in the Army chain as Commanding General, IX Corps. His title, therefore, is usually given as "CG USARJ/IX CORPS" and his headquarters is referred to as HQ USARJ/IX CORPS.

HQ USARJ/IX CORPS had once controlled a vast range of U.S. Army units and support facilities. By 1978, however, there were no Army operational forces remaining in Japan, and only a thin scattering of support personnel and facilities; HQ USARJ/IX CORPS had dwindled almost to cadre circumstances. Despite its emaciated condition, IX Corps retained its traditional status as a "major command" within the Army organizational structure, and was commanded by a lieutenant general.

When the "Guidelines for Defense Cooperation" were approved, senior officers at HQ USARJ/IX CORPS recognized a major opportunity to rebuild lost influence, while contributing in important ways to the development of bilateral relations. Army planners realized that, for the upcoming military-to-military training and planning process, there would be a very real need for an American counterpart to the JGSDF.

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For these reasons, the U.S. Army fully committed itself to making a success of the new "bilateralism." These efforts began to pay off, as the Ground Planning Subcommittee and its functional study panels took shape. In this regard the greatest, and obvious, difficulty for HQ USARJ/IX CORPS was, its complete lack of operational units in Japan. Exercises would have to incorporate U.S. Army troops flown in from CONUS or Hawaii, or else involve Marines in some capacity. Under various contingency plans, Army forces are committed to move to Japan to assist in the ground defense of the country. As tests of operational readiness, small representative units were periodically brought to Japan anyway, and conceivably could serve as the nucleus for short-term bilateral exercises coordinated by HQ USARJ/IX CORPS. This, anyway, was the plan; and although some problems were encountered, the Army was able eventually to conduct several exercises using this approach.

For command post exercises (CPX's), another approach was also used: participating Japanese officers flew from Japan to Hawaii or CONUS, where the U.S. Army counterpart units were permanently based. During the first two years, III MAF was invited to send officer participants to various HQ USARJ/IX CORPS-JGSDF meetings; on a few occasions, Marine officers did attend. This was the exception rather than the rule, however, and III MAF became increasingly left out of the expanding bilateral relationship.

One program in which III MAF did get involved was the "Junior Officer Exchange Program" (JOEP); this had been developed to provide young officers from each side with an opportunity to visit a unit on the other side for a short period (usually a week or less). This program was "sponsored" by COMUSJAPAN and JSO. The basic idea was good, and was attractive to almost everyone: selected junior officers would have the experience of first-hand contact with their counterparts; would gain professional insight into the other side's organization and techniques; and would develop interpersonal bonds, which in the future could lead to improved unit-to-unit and country-to-country ties.

However, due in large part to a tortuous chain of coordination on both sides, many problems occurred in implementation. These complications alienated some senior JGSDF officers, despite their initial enthusiasm toward the USMC. Years later, in relaxed circumstances, memories would surface: there would be hesitant descriptions of elaborate JGSDF preparations, the dispatch of a welcoming party to the arrival airport, and -- no Marine visitors would show up, or fewer would arrive than had been planned for, or word would be received that they would come on another date.

The U.S. Army had a similar program. However, because of the close proximity of HQ USARJ/IX CORPS to the Ground

Staff Office, good communications, and strong command emphasis, the Army exchanges were relatively problem-free. Thus, with the passage of time and the growth of formal structure, the Army-JGSDF ties became stronger, and the JGSDF desire for involvement with the Marines became weaker.

// This is confusing stuff.

There were several reasons for the difficulties experienced by III MAF in making a success of these exchanges. Most fundamental was the complexity of communication channels, and the absence of direct coordination. On the U.S. side, liaison from COMUSJAPAN to III MAF was being accomplished through a variety of channels, often inconsistently: some communications went to COMNAVFORJAPAN, others to COMSEVENTHFLT; yet others were sent via MCB Camp Sotler, and occasionally III MAF or 3rd Marine Division was telephoned directly. Most messages, no matter how minor in substance, were sent by hard-copy AUTODIN message, with all the delays involved in drafting, releasing, and transmission, and subsequent delays for readdressal and a formal reply. On the Japanese side, JSO would receive a message from COMUSJAPAN, formally prepare and deliver it to GSO, and GSO would then have to send it down through the field army level, division level, and regimental level, to the hosting battalion. As a result, a simple question from a JGSDF host unit about the boot size of USMC visitors would set in motion

a complex sequence of formal coordination, which could easily require a week or ten days for a reply -- if a reply came at all.

!!
↓
This is meant to
work in Washington

Other III MAF difficulties were associated with its structural turmoil and its necessary emphasis on immediate operational requirements. III MAF is a major operational headquarters, whose subordinate units are continually deployed and preparing to deploy, throughout WESTPAC. Its subordinate commanders and staff officers are preoccupied with "real world" obligations, and their priorities are heavily weighted toward current unit readiness. Flexibility is essential, because deployment dates and unit schedules frequently change, in response to changes in the world situation and variations in shipping availability. This III MAF posture is necessary and good, in every respect; but it does not make for ease of coordination with the JGSDF.

JGSDF units, having no commitments outside the country and insufficient training opportunities inside the country, operate on the basis of extremely stable schedules. Action officers make long-range, meticulous plans which -- once "blessed" -- are seldom changed. Modifications usually involve an elaborate, formal approval process and are avoided if at all possible.

Another factor in the difficulty of III MAF-JGSDF coordination has been the USMC's 12-month individual assignment policy. This constant turnover hindered the development of an effective "corporate memory" within the various USMC headquarters in Okinawa and Iwakuni. Staff officers would seldom see their own plans implemented, and action officers and commanders usually were carrying out the commitments of their predecessors. During the 1979-81 period, implementation of the new "unit rotation" policy caused additional turbulence, as "eligible" and "non-eligible" personnel were shifted between affected units.

The bottom line was that III MAF forces were largely preoccupied with their real-time operational commitments; with attaining unit stability; and (at an individual level) with learning and re-learning the basics during short 12-month tours.

The Army situation was almost entirely the opposite, and was highly compatible with JGSDF needs. Personnel assigned to HQ USARJ/IX CORPS came for 3-year accompanied tours. Their headquarters is on the outskirts of Tokyo, an easy drive from the Ground Staff Office. A large headquarters staff was available, with no operational forces to control and little to do except revise existing contingency plans. The Army could offer personal continuity,

ease of access, long-range scheduling, and -- because of different command priorities -- assured responsiveness to the JGSDF's essentially administrative concerns.

Yet another major difficulty associated with bilateral ties was the language barrier. HQ USARJ/IX CORPS employs highly qualified professional interpreters, and JGSDF officers were able to deal with Army counterparts on their own terms. However, in direct dealings with III MAF, the language problem could be overwhelming. No one with a Japanese language capability was employed at III MAF headquarters; on a few occasions, when JGSDF officers telephoned in through the commercial switchboard, the III MAF action officers had to summon a female barber from her nearby shop, to come to the telephone and make sense of the staff-to-staff "coordination." Two or three members of the 3rd Marine Division Interrogator-Translator Unit (ITU) at Camp Hansen had some Japanese capability; however, it was as a secondary or tertiary language, and they were not brought directly into the coordination process. (As late as 1984, Japanese was not a "priority language" for USMC training. Likewise, Japan is not a designated area for the USMC Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program.)

By late 1980, Seventh Fleet attitudes toward the desirability of JGSDF-USMC relations were changing substantially. In response to Soviet buildup in the Northern

Pacific, the U.S. Navy laid new emphasis on the importance of American "presence" in the area. Multiple carrier battle group (CVBG) exercises were planned and executed, with transits of the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk. Priority emphasis was also given to the development of an "amphibious presence" in northern Japan. As a basis for this, extensive bilateral ties would be needed. This recognition spurred new interest in potential JGSDF-USMC programs.

But the structure for bilateral planning was by now firmly in place, and the Marine Corps was not part of it. New openings would have to be created. The then-Seventh Fleet Marine Officer, Colonel (now Major General) E. J. Godfrey, worked persistently to establish effective relations with HQ USARJ/IX CORPS and the JGSDF.

Colonel Godfrey's efforts led to an invitation to COMSEVENTHFLT (as the operational representative of III MAF/CTF 79) to become co-chairman of one of the study panels of the Ground Planning Subcommittee. This was the Combined Ground Training Study Panel (CGTSP), which had become the most important forum for planning and discussing bilateral training issues. Colonel Godfrey also participated in the development of a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between COMSEVENTHFLT,

HQ USARJ/IX CORPS and the Ground Staff Office (GSO). These three-way agreements would have formalized a bilateral relationship and provided for USMC participation in JGSDF-US Army training cycles, and a pooling of the USMC-JGSDF and U.S. Army-JGSDF officer exchange programs. Colonel Godfrey's coordination resulted in a personal commitment by key officers at HQ USARJ/IX CORPS, especially the Army G-3, Colonel Bokovoy, to represent and support USMC interests in all bilateral dealings with the JGSDF.

Such a commitment, however, could not assure results unless a large number of other conditions were met. The heavy Japanese emphasis on person-to-person relationships; long-range, detailed planning; and adherence to schedules, once approved, all mitigated against the success of any "representative" relationship through HQ USARJ/IX CORPS.

In mid-1981, within a period of a few months, personnel changes brought in a new Commander Seventh Fleet, a new Seventh Fleet Marine Officer, a new G-3 at HQ USARJ/IX CORPS, and a new G-3 at the Ground Staff Office.

The new G-3 at HQ USARJ/IX CORPS, Colonel Weurpel, was much less personally committed than his predecessor to the growth of USMC-JGSDF ties, and (understandably) placed first emphasis on developing the U.S. Army-JGSDF relationship. On

the other hand, the new Commander Seventh Fleet (Vice Admiral Holcomb) placed an even higher priority on getting started in bilateral ground activities leading to American amphibious presence in northern Japan. The G-5 of the Ground Staff Office (Lieutenant General Inamori), who was very much aware of the problems encountered in JGSDF-USMC dealings to date, was wary of any commitments at all, unless they had been coordinated through and approved by HQ USARJ/IX CORPS.

Moreover, the entire subject of American amphibious training outside Okinawa was still very much a "taboo" on the Japanese side; a wave of public protest had swept the country in mid-1981, in connection with assertions by former Ambassador Reischauer that the U.S. had for a long period routinely brought nuclear weapons into Japanese waters despite the restrictions of Article IX. The JGSDF was also anticipating the first-ever bilateral ground training; strong opposition was expected, and JGSDF leaders wanted to keep a "low profile" in every way possible until political waters were calmer. Therefore, USN/USMC proposals for amphibious training were politely but forcefully declined.

In August 1981, the first JGSDF-U.S. forces combined ground training was conducted in the East Fuji Maneuver Area, just outside Camp Fuji. It was a very small-scale, simple

communications exercise; however, it carried great symbolic importance, politically and militarily, for the Japanese. Ironically, this exercise was conducted with communications personnel from the 3rd Marine Division; but advance planning and bilateral coordination was done mostly by HQ USARJ/IX CORPS. Apart from officer exchanges, this would be the only formal USMC-JGSDF training to occur for more than three years.

Also in August 1981, the draft three-way memoranda governing bilateral training and officer exchanges (already signed by USARJ and GSO) were rejected for legal reasons by U.S. Navy higher headquarters. This was unexpected by all; it further alienated the JGSDF action officers who had helped develop the documents, and Lieutenant General Inamori, who had signed them.

At that point, the prospects for a constructive USMC-JGSDF relationship seemed to be plummeting. Within a few months it was learned that a schedule for proposed bilateral ground training, for the next two years, had already been submitted to the Defense Ministry for final political approval. No events with the USMC were included.

This did not sit well with the Navy-Marine establishment, particularly Vice Admiral Holcomb. But this abrupt end to short-term aspirations proved to be positive, in that it

focused attention on the true complexity of bilateral issues, and led to a more realistic evaluation of what was needed and what was possible.

The New Seventh Fleet Marine Officer, Colonel R. F. Findlay, with support from COMNAVFORJAPAN staff, analyzed the overall situation and established new priorities. From that point on, first priority went to establishing effective personal relations with JGSDF counterparts. If continuity in personal relations could be achieved, simpler and more effective communications channels could be devised. Colonel Findlay and COMNAVFORJAPAN staff began to make regular visits to GSO, emphasizing the desire of the USN/USMC for more effective ties. At the same time, they decided to forego any further attempts at indirect coordination through HQ USARJ/IX CORPS.

The original implementing documents for the 1978 "Guidelines" were also studied again. One of the basic documents was a bilateral 1979 COMUSJAPAN-JSO Memorandum of Understanding which set forth basic conditions for the planning and conduct of combined training. It was apparent that the document had been signed with U.S. Army-JGSDF, U.S. Navy-JMSDF, and U.S. Air Force-JASDF relationships in mind. Nonetheless, the document would support the establishment of a direct, two-party relationship between any one of the U.S.

subunified component headquarters and any one of the Air, Maritime, or Ground Staff Offices of the JSDF. Since COMNAVFORJAPAN is the subunified component headquarters which represents all U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces in Japan, a "single-service to single-service" relationship between COMNAVFORJAPAN and the Ground Staff Office (GSO) could be justified. That approach was adopted.

Both HQ USARJ/IX CORPS and the JGSDF were opposed to this, however, and for understandable reasons. In two years, HQ USARJ/IX CORPS had, in effect, gained control over American access to the JGSDF, and did not want that control diminished. The Ground Staff Office had accumulated a solid track record in its dealings with the U.S. Army, and a dubious record, for reasons already discussed, with the Marines.

An equally important reason for GSO resistance was interservice rivalry within the JSDF. COMNAVFORJAPAN was viewed as the "blue" counterpart of the JMSDF. When JGSDF officers considered going through COMNAVFORJAPAN to deal with III MAF, they rejected the idea of "green" being forced to go through "blue" to reach "green."

Nonetheless, COMSEVENTHFLT, COMNAVFORJAPAN, AND III MAF staff officers persisted. As early as October 1981, part of

the Junior Officer Exchange Program was restructured along service lines. COMUSJAPAN and JSO had run that program in two parts: "ground," which involved the JGSDF and 3rd Marine Division; and "air," which involved the 1st Marine Air Wing, the JASDF (for fixed-wing pilots) and the JGSDF (for helicopter pilots). In October, for the first time, ground exchanges were planned for the coming twelve-month period under COMNAVFORJAPAN coordination. It soon became clear just how much detail was involved in a seemingly simple matter like a bilateral visit, and why the previous complex channels of coordination had not worked well. Over time, because COMNAVFORJAPAN was both physically close to Tokyo and easily accessible by telephone, the COMNAVFORJAPAN staff became gradually accepted as a point of contact for coordination by counterparts at the Ground Staff Office. As personal relationships began to develop between officers at GSO and officers at COMSEVENTHFLT/COMNAVFORJAPAN, a deeper understanding of mutual requirements and limitations came about.

One year later, "air" JOEP exchanges also were split off from COMUSJAPAN/JSO control. From that point onward, COMNAVFORJAPAN and III MAF handled JGSDF-USMC pilot and ground officer exchanges as a single program, and handled JASDF-USMC exchanges as a second, separate program. In both cases, the direct coordination of visits led to closer ties overall, as well as increased efficiency of management.

In 1982, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (CG FMFPAC) proposed a fundamental modification of the structure of the Ground Planning Subcommittee. He requested that CG, III MAF be included in the GPSC as an equal member with CG USARJ/IX CORPS. A proviso was that CG III MAF's planning status would be that of a fourth subunified component commander "designee": this was necessary because only under narrowly specified circumstances would Marine forces ever be engaged in Japan, in any capacity other than as CTF-79. CG FMFPAC argued that, nonetheless, adequate planning for such a possibility should be undertaken.

This was an extremely important initiative, because it would fundamentally affect the development of bilateral ties. One basic reason why GSO officers had been reluctant to consider sensitive combined training with USMC units, was that only the U.S. Army was their "official counterpart" -- because of the formal relationship provided by the Ground Planning Subcommittee. In that sense, there had been no legal basis for anything but observer exchanges with the Marine Corps. Moreover, the Marine Corps mission is world-wide and clearly offensive, while the JGSDF is statutorily defensive and restricted to Japan; the argument had been made that USMC-JGSDF ties could not be politically justified. The FMFPAC proposal would change this: it was important more for its legal and symbolic significance, than for any substantive planning which was likely to occur.

*important
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initiative*

Naturally, HQ USARJ/IX CORPS strenuously resisted the addition of III MAF to the GPSC; it stressed the potential disruption of its "counterpart" relation with the JGSDF, and emphasized its desire to represent the USMC forces in Japan. HQ USARJ/IX CORPS offered to add USMC members to subordinate study panels where required.

Many months later, after numerous possibilities had been studied, CINCPAC directed the inclusion of CG III MAF as a "Deputy Co-Chairman" of the GPSC, with authority equal to USARJ/IX CORPS on matters affecting USMC interests. In the eyes of the Ground Staff Office, this ultimately legitimized prospects for development of the USMC-JGSDF relationship.

In August 1982, the new Commanding General of III MAF, Major General R. E. Haebel, visited the Ground Staff Office for the first time. He called on the G-5 (Lieutenant General Inamori) and the G-3 (Lieutenant General Takeda), as well as on the JGSDF Chief of Staff (General Murai) and other service chiefs. While at the Ground Staff Office, he expressed his personal desire to build on existing ties and to develop an organizational relationship between III MAF and the JGSDF. Although the GSO general officers were politely noncommittal, they were impressed by his obvious interest and personal concern.

Major General Haebel soon became very deeply involved in the ongoing COMSEVENTHFLT/COMNAVFORJAPAN efforts. To, -level III MAF emphasis became a central factor in the drive to cultivate USMC-JGSDF ties. Things soon began to break open.

In September 1982, for the first time, a group of officers from the Ground Staff Office was invited to visit the Seventh Fleet Amphibious Ready Group, aboard the USS Peleliu and USS Peoria, when they made a scheduled port call in Yokosuka. The invitation was delivered to GSO directly through Navy/Marine channels, and was accepted. 43 staff officers, mostly field grade and representing all sections of GSO, received briefings on amphibious command and control and toured the ships. For most of the JGSDF officers, it was the first time that they had been around a naval vessel since cadet days at the National Defense Academy; within GSO, the visit made a significant positive impression.

Also in September 1982, COMSEVENTHFLT made a formal assertion that thenceforth COMNAVFORJAPAN, as the subunified service component headquarters, would assume COMSEVENTHFLT's place (as co-chairman and USMC representative) in the Combined Ground Training Study Panel (CGTSP). It was envisioned that the III MAF G-3 would attend each meeting with the COMNAVFORJAPAN co-chairman, so that substantive

discussions could be conducted directly with GSO counterparts. When not at sea, the Seventh Fleet Marine Officer would continue to attend as an observer.

Meanwhile, the USMC-JGSDF ground officer exchanges had gone off well during the August 1981 -- July 1982 period. For the next 12 months, GSO proposed a major expansion in the number and scope of exchanges. The acronym JOEP was kept, but its meaning was changed from "Junior Officer" Exchange Program to "Japan Observer" Exchange Program; exchanges of enlisted personnel and field grade officers were included in the new plans.

In November 1982, for the first time, GSO sent nine officers (a colonel, two lieutenant colonels, four majors, and two captains) to visit Marine Corps facilities in CONUS. This was a diversion of JGSDF funds traditionally spent on visits to U.S. Army facilities in CONUS. The visit was arranged entirely through USN/USMC channels, and was a major success. Upon his return, the senior visiting officer debriefed not only Lieutenant General Inamori, the G-5, but also General Murai, the Chief of Staff. USMC operations received high marks, especially the realism of the 29 Palms CAX; a subsequent article in the JGSDF Schools Command (Fuji Schools) Journal was devoted to an analysis of the exercise.

That same month, two other important visits occurred. In mid-November, Major General Haebel visited Hokkaido at the invitation of the Northern Army Commander, Lieutenant General Watanabe, with assistance from Lieutenant General Takeda, the GSO G-3. Major General Haebel received briefings at the Sapporo headquarters of the Northern Army, then traveled by JGSDF helicopter around almost the entire periphery of the island. Visits were made to subordinate Division headquarters, and one full day was devoted to examining the area around the Soya Strait. The JGSDF used this visit to underscore concerns of its own; carefully prepared articles appeared in major Japanese newspapers, linking Major General Haebel's interest with key areas of JGSDF budgetary and equipment inadequacy (Appendix 1).

In late November, Lieutenant General (now General) J. K. Davis, CG of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, toured USMC units in Japan. In a first-of-its-kind visit, he also called on General Murai, Lieutenant General Takeda, and Lieutenant General Inamori. Lieutenant General Davis underscored his support for Major General Haebel's initiatives and expressed his own hope that a productive JGSDF-USMC relationship could develop.

None of these visits had involved or been coordinated by HQ USARJ/IX CORPS. The Army staff had grown increasingly upset at the rapid growth of JGSDF-USMC ties.

A new Commanding General, Lieutenant General Weyand, had arrived in November, and by early December, HQ USARJ/IX CORPS was openly and strongly resisting, within high-level U.S. channels, what it perceived to be Marine encroachments on its "turf." Within the Ground Staff Office, too, there were indications of a division into "pro-Marine" and "pro-Army" factions.

The situation on the U.S. side became progressively polarized, with high-level headquarters beginning to take sides. The interservice standoff was resolved at last in late December, when Major General Haebel flew to Camp Zama and personally discussed the situation with Lieutenant General Weyand. Major General Haebel emphasized his desire to work in cooperation with the Army, the desirability of a united American front, and the validity of the direct U.S. Navy/Marine access to the JGSDF. Lieutenant General Weyand ultimately concurred, and within a week staff officers from III MAF, USARJ/IX CORPS, and COMNAVFORJAPAN had prepared and published a formal agreement to govern the future planning and coordination of bilateral ground training with the JGSDF. This agreement recognized the validity of COMNAVFORJAPAN's role as formal interface between III MAF and the JGSDF or USARJ, with bilateral coordination as required. For informal working relationships, direct liaison between III MAF and the JGSDF or USARJ was authorized and encouraged.

As part of the agreement, COMNAVFORJAPAN delegated its co-chairmanship of the Combined Ground Training Study Panel to III MAF. COMNAVFORJAPAN and COMSEVENTHFLT representatives would continue to attend as observers, but the three co-chairmen would henceforth all be "green."

By now, the key staff officers within the GSO G-5 had become strongly supportive of expanded future JGSDF-USMC involvement. In December 1982, General Murai, the Chief of Staff, authorized as policy the scheduling of bilateral training with USMC forces on a "separate but equal" basis as training with Army units. At Lieutenant General Inamori's suggestion, a meeting of the CGTSP was scheduled for January 1983 in Okinawa, to be hosted by the new co-chairman -- CG III MAF.

At that meeting, Lieutenant General Inamori formally announced GSO's new policy embracing future activities with the Marines. As a prelude to the meeting, formal honors were rendered to Lieutenant General Inamori, and after the meeting, III MAF briefings were provided. Later, Major General Haebel escorted Lieutenant General Inamori to III MAF facilities throughout Okinawa; this included a live-fire shoot at Camp Hansen and observation of a small-scale amphibious landing at Camp Schwab. The following day, Lieutenant General Inamori provided reciprocal briefings and a tour of JGSDF facilities on Okinawa. Social amenities, including

reciprocal dinners, were included in the visit. Upon his return to Tokyo, Lieutenant General Inamori debriefed General Murai extensively on the substance of the trip and on his favorable impressions of III MAF.

The following month, General Murai himself visited Okinawa, and Major General Haebel prepared a similar briefing and tour. At Camp Hansen, General Murai inspected the personnel and equipment of the Air Contingency Battalion, and at Camp Schwab he observed a small landing exercise with fixed-wing and helicopter air support. An evening reception in General Murai's honor was given by Okinawa Governor Nishime, and Major General Haebel and Major General Phillips (then CG, MCB Camp Butler) were included. Later the same month, Major General Haebel again visited Lieutenant General Watanabe at his headquarters in Sapporo, Hokkaido.

In April 1983, Admiral Yata, the then-Chairman, Joint Staff Council (CJSC) retired. General Murai was selected to replace him. Lieutenant General Watanabe was brought from the Northern Army to become JGSDF Chief of Staff, and was promoted to General.

In June 1983, the watershed event in the evolution of USMC-JGSDF relations occurred. For seven months, bilateral staff planning had envisioned Exercise Valiant Blitz 3-83, a major amphibious exercise to be conducted in Okinawa, as an

ideal opportunity to further enlarge the scope of the Japan Observer Exchange Program. Accordingly, extensive preparations had been made.

One month prior to the exercise, a group of 5 JGSDF field grade officers was sent to Okinawa under the aegis of JOEP, to study the preliminary 9th MAB rehearsal and CPX.

Then, for the actual exercise, 42 JGSDF officers were flown by USMC C-130 from Atsugi to Futenma; 25 more JGSDF officers joined them in Okinawa. These officers, representing JGSDF units all over Japan, were given comprehensive briefings and then divided into groups by occupational specialty. They were then further divided and integrated as observers into USMC operational units, from the MAB headquarters down to company and platoon level. These JGSDF officers accompanied their host units as they went through final briefings, embarked 7th Fleet ships, and put out to sea. On D-Day the JGSDF officers came ashore with the Marines in AAV's, landing craft, and helicopters. They remained with their units during maneuver ashore and the logistics exercise which ensued. For the D-Day landing only, an additional thirty officers from JGSDF units on Okinawa were invited to observe from fixed bleachers at Kin Blue Beach.

JASDF officers, also participating as observers under the aegis of the USMC-JASDF JOEP, were fully integrated into

the air command and control facilities at Futenma; there they watched Marine air controllers direct USMC, USN, and USAF aircraft which were providing air support throughout Valiant Blitz.

At Major General Haebel's invitation, General Watanabe himself came to watch Valiant Blitz. With Major General Haebel, he observed the landing from the beach, only a few hundred feet from police lines and chanting local demonstrators. He also observed the ship-to-shore movement from the air, and flew to the USS Tarawa to see helicopter and AV-8 support operations. As the guest of Admiral Hogg, the now Commander Seventh Fleet, he had lunch aboard the USS Blue Ridge. Then, with MGen Haebel, he flew to the Northern Training Area; there he saw USN and USMC aircraft being requested and controlled by a Marine forward air controller (FAC). The day ended with a tour of Marine air control facilities at Futenma.

Valiant Blitz represented a quantum leap forward in the scope and nature of bilateral activity. The highly visible presence of JGSDF officers, including its Chief of Staff, as observers in an "offensively" oriented Marine Corps exercise was a political and military "first." General Watanabe's commitment ended the hesitations of mid-level CSO staff. Most impressive of all was General Watanabe's handling of the press prior to the event. On the Friday before Valiant Blitz

was conducted, he called a press conference, openly announced his plans, and further stated that he intended to pursue full combined training with USMC forces in the future. He subsequently has reiterated that intent in various public forums. (Appendix 2)

In August 1983, almost 50 JGSDF and 50 JASDF officers were invited to participate in the USS Midway "guest cruise" -- another small step in chipping away at "green" resistance to "blue" involvement. Interest and enthusiasm were high.

Also in August 1983, Lieutenant General C. G. Cooper, the new CG FMFPAC, visited Tokyo and called on General Murai, General Watanabe, Lieutenant General Takeda, and Lieutenant General Inoue (Lieutenant General Inamori's replacement as G-5), as well as the JMSDF Chief of Staff and the JASDF Vice Chief of Staff. In his calls with the JGSDF generals, he stressed his support of Major General Haebel's initiatives and his appreciation for JGSDF efforts.

Eventual multi-service involvement in the U.S. Army-JGSDF "Yamasakura" CPX series opened up additional opportunities to develop the JGSDF-USMC defense planning relationship. Significant USMC involvement began with the Yamasakura exercise conducted at Ft. Ord, California, in June 1983. It continued with

the next iteration at JGSDF Eastern Army headquarters in Sendai in November 1983, and at Ft. Lewis, Washington, in May 1984. A remarkable aspect of USMC involvement in the Yamasakura CPX series is that originally its participation was pro forma; it was intended by the American sponsor (HQ USARJ/IX CORPS) to be more a show of U.S. solidarity than anything else. However, JGSDF representatives pressed to have a Seventh Fleet amphibious landing included in the scenario, followed by a linkup on the ground between USMC and JGSDF forces. This suggestion was strongly opposed by HQ USARJ/IX CORPS. However, the Army eventually yielded, and JGSDF and USMC participants shared the same playing boards in the actual conduct of the CPX.

In December 1983 and February 1984, two more groups of selected JGSDF officers visited USMC facilities in CONUS. The December visit was oriented around a major amphibious landing exercise at Camp Pendleton (with "counteramphibious" study objectives), and the February visit was focused on a combined arms exercise at Twentynine Palms. A total of twenty JGSDF officers participated, using one-half of GSO's budget for CONUS visits. (The balance was used for U.S. Army visits.)

In February 1984, under authority of the JOEP, a Marine infantry platoon observed cold-weather training in central

Japanese took these
changes.

Hokkaido. This evolution was designed as a preparatory step for company-level combined training to be conducted one year later at the same location.

In October 1984, the first formal USMC-JGSDF combined training in three years took place in northeast Hokkaido. This was an artillery live-fire exercise involving a battalion (minus) on each side. The exercise was extremely significant in a number of ways. As recently as January 1983, Hokkaido was considered far too sensitive for USMC combined training. Because its prefectural and local governments have been traditionally leftist, and because the island is so close to the Soviet Union, GSO had felt that public acceptance would have to be gradually cultivated. A series of precedents involving less-sensitive USMC-JGSDF combined-training in Honshu, was envisioned. This proved unnecessary: with General Watanabe's support, the artillery FIREX was planned and successfully executed without any preliminary exercises in Honshu. Moreover, it was conducted in an exercise area less than 50 miles from the Soviet-occupied Kuriles.

The second major combined exercise in JFY-85 was a company-level cold weather exercise, also in Hokkaido, which was successfully conducted in March 1985.

The foregoing history may seem anecdotal and excessively detailed in its focus. Nonetheless, some important principles are clear:

(1) In Japan, personal relationships precede and underly organizational relationships. Whether it involves a 15-minute office call or a series of meetings to discuss concrete defense plans, substantive business will not begin unless personal trust and rapport have been established. Probably more than any other factor, Major General Haebel's efforts opened the door to future JGSDF-USMC bilateral possibilities.

(2) Continuity of coordination and consistency in policy are essential. The JGSDF operates in a very different environment -- a far more politically sensitive environment -- than the USMC. When hard bargaining becomes necessary, Marine counterparts have to understand those sensitivities, and make adequate allowances. To smoothen the "bumps in the road", direct coordination, built on long-term personal relationships, is essential.

(3) Language is a major obstacle. It is probably the greatest single barrier to the continued growth of bilateral military relations. To ensure the long-term viability of its

presence in Japan, the USMC needs to place immediate emphasis on training selected officers and staff NCO's in the Japanese language.

(4) The JGSDF must plan far into the future. Bilateral training schedules are finalized for political approval two years in advance on an annual cycle. A correspondingly well-thought-out Marine plan must be maintained, managed by the permanent MAF, Division, and Regimental/Group headquarters; this plan would mesh the schedules of rotating battalions and squadrons into the almost unchanging schedules of their JGSDF partners.

(5) The location of III MAF in Okinawa is a major handicap to the development of bilateral ties. Regular, large-scale staff-to-staff involvement is simply not possible. This being the case (and not likely to change), additional Marine officers on the COMNAVFORJAPAN staff are needed. An alternative approach would be III MAF representatives working in Yokosuka or Tokyo on a permanent basis. Currently, only one USMC major is assigned to COMNAVFORJAPAN: this is not enough.

(6) Things move slowly in Japan. Consensus is essential, and emphasis must be placed on the long term. But patience, understanding, and mutual respect bring about concrete results.

CONCLUSIONS

Japan's unique social organization and disciplined energies have, in four decades, brought it from ruin to the verge of world power. There are many paradoxes associated with this almost unprecedented growth.

The country's institutions are formally democratic, but its traditions are hierarchial: the underlying principle of Japanese society is individual obligation, not individual freedom. Japanese share an intense feeling of national uniqueness; strong political movements, from pacifism to nationalism, are connected with this feeling. The cohesiveness of Japanese society would support rapid mobilization and centralized control, if a new consensus were reached. Despite its enormous industrial, technological and financial power, Japan remains extremely vulnerable: it is almost totally dependent on a huge, free flow of imports and exports for its national survival. In a real emergency, national consensus would coalesce rapidly.

The Japanese government has relied on U.S. military protection throughout the postwar period. Now it is promoting its own military buildup. The U.S. has encouraged this buildup, to the point of pressuring Japan for greater and more

immediate results. There are significant elements within Japan which question the validity and worth of military ties to the U.S. Yet for America's own interests, the preservation of the U.S.-Japan alliance -- with or without a stronger JSDF -- is absolutely vital.

Japan's military capabilities and role are certain to change. The real questions are when, how much, and in what direction. The answers to those questions are still being debated among Japanese policymakers. As the Defense Ministry says,

With its gross national product (GNP) accounting for around 10% of the global total today, Japan has become a country whose moves cause major effects on world situations. It may well be said that Japan is required to play a role matching its position in the international community, fully recognizing its responsibility as one of free nations.¹

All in all, there are powerful countervailing forces at work in our bilateral relationship with Japan. Through more extensive and more supportive military-to-military ties, we have an opportunity to significantly influence the shape of Japanese policy. The Japanese generals of the year 2000 are captains and majors now. The strengthening of personal friendships, unit-to-unit goodwill, and the commitment to a shared defense will have far-reaching effects on the strength and stability of our Pacific alliance.

More than any other American service, the U.S. Marine Corps is in a position to contribute to this "bilateralism." It comprises almost one half of total U.S. forces in Japan, and is the only effective counterpart for the largest and most politically significant Japanese service -- the JGSDF. Recent changes in USMC policy will facilitate this process. The conversion to 3-year accompanied tours in Okinawa and Iawkuni will provide an entirely new sense of continuity at the regiment/group headquarters level and above.

There are organizational and attitudinal obstacles to be overcome, but a strong beginning has been made. A determined USMC commitment can lead to almost certain results, paying ever-larger dividends, in the future.

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- 2 Yanaga Chitosi, Japanese People and Politics, p. 384.
- 3 Sinha, Radha, Japan's Options for the 1980's, p. 202.
- 4 Sinha, op. cit., pp. 199-200.
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- 13 Sinha, op. cit., p. 202.
- 14 Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 101.
- 15 Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 105.
- 16 Sinha, op. cit., p. 203.
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- 18 Japan Defense Agency, op. cit., p. 51.
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Bennet, David L. Japan's Self-Defense Forces: To What Purpose?, 1983 Prize essay on U.S.-Japan Relations U.S.-Japan Culture Center, Washington, D.C.
Brief essay with interesting approach to the question of Japanese defense imperatives.

APPENDIX A

Sankei Newspaper

20 October 1982

Page 1

Translation: Major E. G. Beinhart, III

AMERICAN MILITARY LEADER

MARINE DIVISION COMMANDER

TO INSPECT SOYA STRAITS

INDICATES SERIOUS CONSIDERATION OF "NORTHERN DEFENSE"

Government sources on the 19th made it clear that the Commander of American Marine Forces in Japan will visit Hokkaido during the middle of next month, and will inspect the area around the Soya Straits. It will be the first on-the-ground inspection by a Marine Commander of Soya Straits, which is said to be the most difficult to defend among the three straits of Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya. America, as part of its new strategy which gives serious consideration to the "North," [as indicated by] such things as Pacific Commander-in-Chief Long making, on the 21st of this month, a first-ever visit by a [CINCPAC] commander to the JGSDF Northern Army General Headquarters at Chitose, Hokkaido, is rapidly beginning to recognize the strategic importance of Hokkaido; however, this on-the-ground inspection by the Marine Commander, as part of such a trend, can be interpreted as indicating that the American military has serious uneasiness over the warfighting capacity of the JGSDF.

The visit to Hokkaido [will be made by] Major General Haebel, who is Commander of the American 3rd Marine Amphibious Force and concurrently Commander of the 3rd Marine Division. [From] approximately the 10th of November, for a period of 2 days, [he] will stay in the northern Hokkaido area. Apart from conducting an analysis of conditions with regard to the defense of the straits, and exchanging opinions at the Asahigawa headquarters of the JGSDF 2d Division, which is charged with the defense of Soya Straits, [Major General Haebel] will inspect in detail the conditions of the people, terrain, and road networks in the vicinity of Wakkanai, refining countermeasures for a situation in which, by some remote chance, Soviet forces came to make an amphibious landing.

Deploying from their central base in Okinawa, America's 3rd Marine Division (about 20,000 men) has until now mainly prepared for an emergency in Korea or the Middle East;

however, this inspection of the northern area by Major General Haebel, as part of the new strategy of "cooperating as allied countries to engage the Soviet Pacific Fleet before it can deploy extensively in the Pacific Ocean," reveals that America is beginning to give extremely serious consideration to Hokkaido.

In order to bottle up the Soviet Pacific Fleet inside the track of the Japanese Archipelago, [the question of] how to seal off the 3 straits of Tsushima, Tsugaru and Soya becomes the most important issue; however, the American military viewpoint is that it is more likely [the Soviets] will aim at the two straits of Tsugaru and Soya, rather than at Tsushima Strait, where many obstacles are stretched, such as the limit to Soviet air cover, the keenly watching eyes of both Japan and South Korea, and the presence of American military bases on Okinawa even if [the Soviet ships] slip through.

Under these circumstances, it is natural that a worst-case situation must be conjectured, in which there is a capture by Soviet forces of all of Hokkaido, or at least the capture of that portion of the area which is adjacent to the straits; however, even within this [worst-case scenario], it is the unanimous concern of [defense] specialists that it is the possibility of massive air cover employed from [Soviet] bases on Sakhalin (KARAFUTO), leading in turn to Soviet possession of Soya Straits, which presents the greatest danger.

Aircraft carrier battle group exercises, which have already been conducted 3 times this year in the northern Pacific and the Sea of Japan; the stationing of F-16 fighter-bomber aircraft at Misawa Air Base, Aomori Prefecture; Pacific Forces Commander-in-Chief Long's visit to Misawa Air Base and the Northern Army General Headquarters; the conduct at Chitose for the first time of combined air-to-air combat training; Japan-U.S. combined ground exercises in September and December--all of these things can be seen as moving to keep a strong eye on such a state of affairs; however, our vital Self Defense Forces, ground, sea, and air, have nearly zero ability to defend the straits--that is close to the actual state of affairs.

Especially with regard to the JGSDF, which is lagging farthest behind in modernization, the American side is said to have been shocked at the actual state of affairs, which became clearly understood during a series of combined exercises and related events; the viewpoint is emerging that in an untenable situation, the American forces should consider predeploying Marines to the Soya Straits, and in the remote change of a situation in which Hokkaido has been occupied, even a counter-amphibious assault.

APPENDIX B

National Defense Magazine
Japan Defense Agency
July/August 1953
Translation: Major E. G. Beinhart, III

NATIONAL DEFENSE INTERVIEW

"GROUND FORCES: THE ULTIMATE SOURCE OF NATIONAL DEFENSE"

---Shoring Up Defense Capabilities through Equipment Modernization and Sufficiency---

JGSDF Chief of Staff Keitaro Watanabe/Nihon Keizai Shimbun
Correspondent Teruhito Akiyama

The Soviet Union: Unbroken Wartime Attitude

Akiyama: Some time ago, at the Supreme Soviet, Secretary Andropov was selected as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. He seized complete control of the post; however, according to all that we know, internal and external to the Andropov regime, there are various conditions of extreme severity and it appears that a radical change in policy will not be implemented.

And if this is so, the [policy] line of increasing military power, which has been consistently carried out up to now, probably will not change now or in the future.

By extension, it is anticipated that conditions in the far east will move one step further in the direction of increasing severity. Things such as the positioning of troops and armaments in the Northern Territories, or the invasion of Afghanistan, have excited the feelings of the Japanese people toward the Soviets, and have had the effect of amplifying [their] sense of mistrust toward the Soviets; there are also indications that ultimately the Soviet Union's methods are a mistake.

General Watanabe, you have served as military attache to the Soviet Union and as Commander of the Northern Army; how do you analyze current and future trends of the Soviet Union?

Watanabe: Among the distinctive features of the Soviet nation, there are some which I think have been extremely conspicuous. One of these, as has often been said, is that from top to bottom, they are "believers in power." That also is where classical [political] analysis leads to, and it is a splendid formulation.

It is without question a militaristic society; if you live there, you really can concur in this because of such things as the severity toward rank which exists even in ordinary society, or the way of dealing with foreign policy problems which has made power its background. To put it strongly, their attitude toward the outside--but also toward the inside--amounts to an extreme sense of awe toward great strength, and it is also a characteristic when they make concessions.

Because until now there has been no strong nation other than America, [we] have come to hope for such a posture [of great strength] by America.

For example, as in the 1962 Cuban Crisis, when the Soviet Union brought missiles into Cuba, their inability to prevent a humiliating withdrawal--accepting then-President Kennedy's powerful demand for removal--was a frank manifestation of that characteristic, that they will concede to great strength. That is my theory.

The reverse [of that] is that they ridicule weakness, and they will employ oppression with absolutely no compromise. Such things as the Hungary crisis and the Czechoslovakian crisis, and today's Poland problem--those are good examples.

Again, the 1976 MIG-25 incident (in which a Soviet pilot defected to Japan): it was a deliberate landing in an independent nation, but since it was Soviet they questioned whether it had not been shot down, and in connection with Japan's examination of the aircraft fuselage, they angrily denounced (us) as an unfriendly nation.

From this viewpoint, for the Soviet Union, nothing is more important than military strength.

And they are convinced of the usefulness of military power in situations in which they cannot find political solutions for political problems. Therefore, actions associated with a reduction of military power, even though [sustained military power] is oppressive to the livelihood of the people, will not be carried out.

This is because, as America's "Committee on the Present Danger" points out, among the national objectives of the Soviet state, that which has come to receive highest priority is altering the military balance in ways that are advantageous to it.

Therefore, in that sense, the course of military expansion will not change because of the Andropov regime, and it will continue as national policy in the present and future as well.

However, to look on the bright side, it appears that [the Soviets] will have nothing else to rely on, other than military force.

Another great [national] characteristic, the Soviet constitution itself, can be viewed as a martial-law constitution; to be blunt, [the Soviet Union] is a war-time state. Our aptness to misinterpret them is due to

the fact that we persist in looking at them through the same eyes that we view the nations of the liberal camp of Europe and the West.

However, if we closely examine that system, and [take into account] the fact that the country is already a wartime state, we immediately understand.

Currently, even a low estimate of Soviet national defense forces is said to be about 3,700,000 men. Because American [forces] are just about 2,000,000, if we compare them, it can be said that the Soviet Union is a state system which has almost completed mobilization. Also, the regulation of consumer goods, and in addition, what are referred to as the human-rights issues: people who criticize the system, if they are well-known among the populace, are exiled from the country, and those persons whose presence would be advantageous to foreign nations, such as Sakharov, are imprisoned within the country.

If we think of these kinds of things as a whole, we are able to say that the Soviet Union clearly is a wartime state.

Valiant Blitz: Splendid

Akiyama: There is movement on the western side, however, especially America. It goes without my saying, that [America] is planning to strengthen its presence in the Pacific region. This will not be merely by unilateral American military exercises; there was Team Spirit '83 with the South Korean military, and since then, Japan-U.S. combined exercises also are expanding in scope.

Also, the major exercise "Valiant Blitz" was recently conducted in Okinawa by the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet and Okinawa-based Marines; in this [exercise], 117 members of the three Self-Defense Forces conducted study and observation.

From that point of departure, and encompassing the problem of actual combined ground training, which appears to have been delayed until now, in what direction will Japan-U.S. combined training go, now and in the future? If there is a concrete plan, please describe it.

Watanabe: For the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces, the history of combined exercises is a long one, but for the Ground Self-Defense Force, it ends--when the current CPX is included--at only the seventh iteration.

I think that combined ground training of the JGSDF and American [units] has very great significance, in a sense that is different from combined training of maritime and air [units].

As you know, it is an extremely serious action for a nation to commit its ground [combat] units to the

defense of a foreign country. To say that in a positive way, the commitment of ground units unquestionably demonstrates a strong national will toward the defense of that country.

To take an example, during the administration of President Carter, America was going to withdraw troops--ground units--from the Korean peninsula; however, the problem was that if [those ground units] were completely withdrawn, America unavoidably would have appeared to the world to have lost its resolve to defend South Korea. So the final outcome was that a nucleus of one division of ground troops was left behind.

In that sense, ground forces serve to demonstrate a nation's defensive resolve. Moreover, because they are inseparable from the land, they are the ultimate source of national defense: they have that meaning also.

That being the case, the implementation by Japanese and U.S. ground units of CPX's and ground field exercises, in Japan, not only develops harmony in Japan-U.S. combined operations, and increases the skills of the JGSDF, but--simply stated--it also makes clear America's resolve to actually defend Japan.

This means, I think, that [U.S.-Japan combined exercises] make an extremely important contribution as a deterrent to aggression. Therefore, as our course for the present and future, I believe that [these combined exercises] will come to be more and more substantial and [will be conducted at] increasingly higher levels.

As a first step, we are examining where and how to conduct one CPX and one FTX later this year.

Akiyama: On a related subject, what were your impressions from having observed "Valiant Blitz"?

Watanabe: An amphibious landing is said to be the most difficult type of [military] operation. That is because it is conducted by a central core of ground forces, backed up by naval and air units; the operation requires such meticulous coordination that a single false step can lead to annihilation at the hands of the enemy.

They were performing magnificently that kind of difficult operation. The Marines' ground, naval and air operations were splendidly coordinated; [they were] carried out without the slightest deviation from the time schedule; and seeing the behavior of individual Marines after the landing, I thought there was just the kind of self-confidence that you might expect, that they are the world's strongest [forces]. It gave me the impression of an extreme strength of spirit.

Akiyama: As has already come out during this conversation, the Marine Corps has become a central point of emphasis; but will the conduct of combined exercises by the JGSDF

[with the U.S. Marine Corps--on the main islands of Japan, other than Hokkaido--become the subject of future studies?

Watanabe: With regard to the conduct of regular [non-amphibious] operations on Japanese territory, as the JGSDF has done in the past: I think that there is a great significance in the conduct of combined exercises with the Marine Corps.

[Because the Marine Corps actually maintains a presence in our country, it is closely connected to the strengthening of our ability to stop [aggression].

[However, there is a problem in the conduct of combined amphibious training.

[In the event of operations to defend Japanese territory, if part of our territory has been captured by the enemy, it cannot be denied that there are circumstances in which it would be advantageous to conduct a counter-amphibious operation to recover that territory. However, the Self-Defense Forces as they exist have no amphibious role; consequently, we are not able to conduct that type of training.

Akiyama: You have indicated a policy that the content of [Combined] ground training also will become increasingly sophisticated. However, these things are still only in their beginning stages; if [experience] is not accumulated through a great many repetitions, it will never become possible to attain that high level--isn't that correct?

Watanabe: That is exactly right. Because at present, we are still at the foundation level. There is a large mountain of problems which still must be solved in order to attain that high level--things such as the problem of language study, procedural problems, and communications.

Reevaluation of the Training Cycle

Akiyama: Soon it will be the Budget season. The composition of the JFY-84 outline [budget] request is being formally developed now; [could you please discuss] the items of key importance and the basic policy [they reflect]?

Watanabe: It will be the second year in the JFY-81 mid-term plan, which is based on the [Japan Defense Agency] Director General's guidance, and [my] general intent is to achieve [those] objectives as rapidly as possible--however, of course, [viewing] the consolidation of defense assets as a balanced ground force. That is, I want to achieve a balance between increased standardization, the full development of combat power, and increased sustainability.

With regard to standardization, I want to improve the coordination between personnel [strength] and equipment increases, especially in the units of the Northern Army front.

Next, with regard to improvements in combat power and modernization, I want to strengthen [the JGSDF's] supporting firepower, [with] such [weapons] as the 203mm or 155mm self-propelled howitzers, and the FH-70; and [I want to] increase our mobility [with such weapons as] the type 74 armored personnel carrier and transport helicopters.

After that, things such as the modernization of the air defense missile system are needed; but anyway, since this is a budget-related discussion, such things as transport helicopters were included some time ago, and [those] decisions [are made] at the Defense Agency level.

Akiyama: With respect to inclusion in the budget, the modernization of the Air Defense Missile System is attracting widespread interest. Because there are negotiations with the Finance Minister, affecting the results, as a gut-level feeling, or a general idea, the introduction of the new missile system--or in other words, the Patriot--with regard to that, how...

Watanabe: The conclusion reached by the Ground Staff Office is that the Patriot is the most appropriate [system] for us; but pragmatically, I think that [we must take] as our objective the realistic pursuit of a mixed system of Patriot and Improved Hawk missiles.

Akiyama: The JASDF is also considering the same kind of re-organization of [their] Air Defense Missile System; in what ways are you promoting coordination with the JASDF?

Watanabe: The question of how [we will] share in this program is of course a big issue. But basically, because it will be a great expense, it will be as follows, taking into account the desires of both sides:

It will be in accordance with the decisions of the Director General; but in my [own opinion], I think that there will be no problem if we just adhere firmly to basic operation[al concepts]. That is, one of the important special features of the Patriot is the fact that it has mobility. If the mobility features enable us to operate effectively, I do not think [we] will have a big problem with going back to the simple [question of] "JASDF" or "JGSDF."

Rather than the absolute number [of missiles] that will be acquired, the difficult thing will be, instead, in what manner they will be deployed, and how [we] will train together [in their use].

Well--with regard to improvements in the standardization of [combat] capabilities, this will be a discussion unconnected with expenditures. However, among the several primary factors which I discussed a while ago, as a means of avoiding expenditure--because the budget is severe--my current thinking on how to improve efficiency is to try changing the training cycle.

What I mean by that is, until now [our] training has [begun] about the time the cherry blossoms are in bloom [April]; the training level gradually increased, and we accomplished the most satisfactory [training] from late autumn until early winter. For control and supervision of [that process], [we] conducted large combat-team evaluations; but if you think about it, the weather in Japan during that period--stormy seas, heavy snows falling in winter, and accumulations of ice complicating matters, especially in Hokkaido--it is a period of low probability for a large-unit amphibious landing.

In that sense, considering our primary defense [mission], summer is militarily the most dangerous [season]; so I think that from JFY-84, to conform with this, [the JGSDF] will set (its) operational schedule to shift the peak of training for all units into the summer.

Since JFY-83 is already set according to the existing schedule, we will commence with the [new] configuration as soon as feasible; beginning next year, we will take as our objective the complete transition of unit operations; we want to manage our unit operations so as to adjust the period of the highest level of training [readiness]. We can do this, because it will not take too much out of our budget.

Akiyama: Will you be able to accomplish that just by changing the training system? Personnel assignments will have to be changed--

Watanabe: For the present, I think that we will manage well enough just by changing the training system. I expect that we will be conducting individual exercises beginning in early autumn, and [we will be continuing] past [the end of] the year; [we will] move the highest-level exercises of the large units into the summertime.

Akiyama: Sufficiency of personnel--this is also an extremely difficult problem, isn't it? I'm wondering if it isn't impossible to achieve this [for the Northern Army] without [personnel] rotation from Honshu units, in order to provide 100% of requirements for the divisions in Hokkaido? If that is the case, won't it be difficult to achieve a balanced disposition of forces?

Watanabe: The present strength level is 86.33%, but 100% is desirable. Because, in order to function the way the system is designed, there must be 100%. If we could get relief for even a little of our current personnel shortfall, we would use those new personnel to complete the manning of our essential units in Hokkaido.

There is no consideration being given to the idea of bringing personnel to Hokkaido from mainland units. That is because a concentration into one powerful front would be accompanied by a great risk of excessively weakening our other fronts, due to our passive and defensive circumstances.

Therefore, all units must possess a certain level of resources.

If we take the example of the Soviet military--their divisions have categories from I to III. It is similar in other countries as well; but first, the Category I divisions are completely manned with close to 100% of personnel. Category II divisions have complete equipment and about 75% of personnel. Category III divisions have only a portion of their equipment and personnel.

Among these three, only Category I divisions are able to fight a war immediately; however, because they have many reserves, they can quickly take the Category II divisions up to Category I.

If we were referring to our Self-Defense Force, we would barely be Category II. Moreover, if resources were taken to Hokkaido, the other units could end up going down to Category III--to speak in terms of the Soviet system. This would be a big drop in combat power.

And further, because the Soviet military has close to 25,000,000 reserve troops backing it up, it can commit them if the situation requires; however, we have a Self-Defense Reserve with no more than 40,000 troops at most.

Besides, even for that, we have no legal authority for a major mobilization in the manner of the Soviet Union. On that point, if we study emergency measures, I think [we will find] that a requirement exists to somehow maintain divisions which are uniformly capable of combat operations.

For that reason, if the JGSDF as a whole were to receive a 1% increase in manpower, the units located in Hokkaido--the least-manned critical front, at present--for example the 2d or 5th Division--their tank units, rather than infantry or technical units, should be brought up close to 100% strength.

Aiming at the Organization of Divisions with Uniform Combat Power

Akiyama: In the field of research and development, if we could turn our eyes to that...

Watanabe: Among work that is now being conducted, important items include such things as a ground-fired anti-ship guided missile, a new tank, an armored personnel carrier, a mid-range anti-tank guided missile, and a new rapid-firing antiaircraft gun.

Akiyama: I think that the modernization and positioning of weaponry and equipment is indivisible from operations; is there a serious concern in the north? That is, will the emphasis be on Hokkaido, as it is now?

Watanabe: It is unchanged.

It has not changed, but--to further illustrate what I said before--we will not for that reason take the approach that only units in Hokkaido should be heavily structured, and that it is all right to lightly structure units on the mainland.

To elaborate, I believe that Hokkaido is a serious concern for us; however, in a purely defensive situation, the offensive initiative will belong to the enemy. Therefore, we will organize with uniform combat power so that we can cope with the enemy wherever he may come.

Akiyama: For that reason, even in the JFY-56 mid-term defense plan, there are a number of general expressions referring to serious concern over the Northern Army, but--there are problems with the reorganization of divisions. In that regard, in the JFY-59 mid-term plan and beyond, there will be provisions to take concrete steps.

Watanabe: I am having those studies continued. I do not know when it will be done; however, I think that we must conduct that reorganization. Since our country's divisions, if compared to the various divisions of all the countries of the world, are remarkably inferior with respect to firepower, our basic approach is that we want to move toward a functional division, somehow increasing its firepower.

But even in those cases, for example, there will be no significant distinctions in combat power between the divisions in Hokkaido and the mainland divisions.

Akiyama: To illustrate: if you are reorganizing the armored division, in effect, publishing new policy--that is, a reexamination of general principles is closely tied to the subsequent readjustment of tables of organization. Won't it be viewed in that way?

Watanabe: As for the JFY-56 mid-term plan, it would be difficult to go that far. In the outline force list, only the number of divisions is displayed, as "units deployed in peacetime regions"; but I think it is

undeniable that those divisions, through modernization, are becoming progressively better. This is essential in order to accomplish our mission of responding vigorously to other nations.

Akiyama: The other day, U.S. Army leaders went to Hokkaido and were making various statements. From that, and if the increasing number of various military exercises in the Far East are considered together--not including Valiant Blitz, however--isn't it accurate to say that there is a gradual strengthening of the U.S. Army's tendency to attach serious concern to Asia and the Far East?

Watanabe: I think it is better to say that U.S. Army policy is basically unchanged. But it is certain that recognition is becoming extremely high of the criticality of Japan, and above all Hokkaido, to the already increasingly important Northeast Asia/Western Pacific area. If the statements of former CINCPAC Admiral Long and various other high-ranking commanders are taken together, I would guess the most important reason for the concern over Hokkaido is a refusal to permit the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk to be made into "Soviet lakes."

Akiyama: Recently, sea lane defense has become a topic of conversation; what is the role of the JGSDF in sea lane and straits defense?

Watanabe: When speaking of sea lane defense, there is a tendency to immediately restrict the discussion to the defense of Japan's maritime shipping channels [on the high seas]. However, if considered from a broader perspective, the availability of resource-supply areas, the ensured safety of shipping channels [for ships] en route, and the preservation of [shipping] terminals on the Japanese mainland--these conditions are necessary.

Therefore, because those circumstances which in reality are necessary to bring about a defense of the sea lanes, are in short a national defense emergency, our country should probably make overall defense its most important concern. Accomplishment of the defense of our national territory--preserving the terminals is also included in that mission--I think that is a fundamental issue of sea lane defense.

Also, the defense of the straits is the responsibility of the JGSDF; but the most basic thing lies in the preservation of the shoulders of the strait. Because to that, solemnly and to the limits of our existence, physically and mentally, we make an immense commitment.

One more role is the function of coastal observation.

Akiyama: I think that a ground-launched antiship missile ~~will be effective in straits defense, but when will concrete operational plans be decided on, and approximately when will it actually become operationally available?~~

really??

Watanabe: I think it will be about 1988.

Defense: Painstaking Perfection in Preparations

Akiyama: This has brought up the subject of former Prime Minister Suzuki's direction to a former JDA Director, Ito, to give primary consideration to air and maritime defense--the air/sea "hedgehog" defense [in which sharp barbs would prevent an enemy's reaching Japanese territory]. Along the same line, Prime Minister Nakasone also, when he was Director General of the JDA, was arguing in favor of it in an earlier Diet session, in connection with the 4th Defense Buildup Plan [1972-76], which he managed. Among other things, I recollect he declared his opinion that "I'm what you call a Sea/Air Priority advocate." For that reason, it seemed, he emphasized high-speed ships and missiles. Basically, isn't he acting as a "hedgehog advocate" as Prime Minister also? On the occasion of his American visit in January, when he made the declaration that "Japan is an unsinkable aircraft carrier," wasn't he reinforcing that kind of consciousness?

Among Liberal Democratic Party members of the Diet who are connected with national defense, too--moreover, among people in general--sea lanes defense is given extreme emphasis; the argument exists that a priority concern for air and maritime defense is good, since Japan is surrounded in 4 directions by the ocean.

Watanabe: If the "hedgehog" theory of defense would seize upon the attitude that we will block an enemy invading our country by not yielding even one step of our nation's ground, and by then repulsing him--that attitude would be exactly appropriate to the national character of our country. That would be ideal.

However, to make provisions all around the circumference of our country for a possible defense--that would require a greatly expanded defense capability. In economic terms also, I think that would be a much greater economic burden.

Because national defense is the most fundamental thing of all, I think it is extremely important that we constantly, painstakingly try to do what is possible, to see if we can bring this kind of ideal into reality.

One more aspect of national defense, I think, is that we absolutely must not take chances. It is dangerous to entrust the safety of the country to limited

resources, and for national security we should be devoting resources up to a limit of maybe 2, 3, or 4 times [what we are giving now].

I am repeating myself; but ground forces are the ultimate source of security for the state. I am convinced that to treat this fact lightly, is to be absolutely unrealistic.

Akiyama: If we look at the "1982-83 Strategy Outline" released by England's Institute for International Strategy Research, it says that personnel costs, as a budgetary element for the British army, are increasingly expensive; there were indications that in future, their national defense will come to emphasize a maritime and air defense.

Watanabe: In simple terms, Japan and Britain are both island nations adjacent to a continent; however, their situations are entirely different. That point frequently is not understood, I think.

As you know, Britain has a buffer zone of numerous countries--West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France, separated by the English Channel; and Norway and Denmark, separated by the North Sea. Therefore, the first line of British defense is West Germany and Norway.

The main force of their active-duty ground units is stationed in West Germany, especially, which is the most important front. As is clear in British national defense reports, the defense of Britain is--to name it--a NATO collective defense. Because we have been considering a defense posture with this as its foundation, there are problems if we take Britain as a single country, and compare its defense arrangements with those of Japan.

In the case of Japan, a large buffer zone like that of Britain does not exist. Consequently, any enemy which invades Japan must be fought directly and immediately, from the commencement of the invasion. In this respect, Britain has a fundamental difference.

Even if we do not take up the example of the Falklands conflict, just because we say that our country is surrounded by the sea, an invader cannot make the occupation and rule of our country an accomplished fact through air and sea attacks alone. Ultimately, to make an accomplished fact of the occupation and rule of our country--which does have ground combat power--more is needed.

To do that, as is clear from past military history, the attacking side needs three times or more the defending side's overall combat power, plus strong naval and air support, and in order to sustain these forces, greatly expanded supply and rear-area support.

Consequently the strengthening of ground forces, that alone, demands military strength and preparations from an adversary; this in turn is closely connected with forcing him to give up ideas of an invasion. Unlike Britain, which can consider a continental defense in association with NATO's collective defense, in Japan's case--since there is no time interval--the strengthening of our ground combat power, on a continuing basis, is absolutely necessary.

Moreover, once this ground defense has been taken into account, our chances of victory will depend on "meticulousness of preparations." In particular, compensating for numerical inferiority in combat power by exploiting the military advantages of terrain is extremely critical, to the point of determining success or failure, in a defensive operation.

However, for us, with our "exclusive defense," whether there will be any margin for preparation in carrying this out--this is completely uncertain.

Normally, if it were a critical place, pillboxes would have to be built and similar preparations made in order to obstruct a landing. In addition, these defense actions would be complete at the outset.

In that respect, if there is no margin of time for preparation, what can best be done to make up for it? In the end, substitutes are needed: tanks, instead of pillboxes, will come to have extreme importance; also, instead of moveable, heavy guns in fortified positions, self-propelled howitzers will be critical. For that, the AH-1S helicopter also, which has maneuverability--we can expect to gain from its rapidly responsive operation.

In an extremity, these sorts of things will help to offset the preparation-related problems. In that sense, for us, such things as tanks, artillery firepower, and the AH-1S in particular are extremely urgent issues.

No Uneasiness About the Next Generation of Leaders

Akiyama: Last year, for the first time, major generals were promoted from among those officers who graduated in the first class of the National Defense Academy. I think from now on, the change of generations in the top leadership level of the JSDF will proceed at a rapid pace. As that occurs, a generation which has been educated and brought up under the new Constitution will come to occupy the key positions of the Self-Defense Force. It is said that the officers of the JSDF have become "salarymen." From now on, the JSDF--the "soft" part; in other words, aspects of spirit, or consciousness, things like that--in what ways will it come to change?

Then, since there are problems of civilian control which are fundamentally related problems, in your capacity as JGSDF Chief of Staff, what kind of knowledge or recognition [do you think] is necessary to defeat that kind of change in consciousness?

Watanabe: I have been observing them [the new major generals] for a very long time, and I have absolutely no uneasiness.

In the final analysis, things are different from the military preparatory school and military academy which raised us before the war; they entered the National Defense Academy from postwar families, and received their education in the cold environment of such surroundings. In our time, we were warmly welcomed when we entered the military academy; however, they entered to a different kind of reception. Moreover, the things we were taught there were things that could not be learned at other schools. In fact, when I think of those things, they were always expressed in terms of the great standard measure of national security. We received our education in the context of four, that kind of daily life.

In the system of values of today's world, it have become the man with money, and the man with high status, who are considered impressive; but at the National Defense Academy that kind of feeling is killed. What comes from learning that to work with complete dedication, for the benefit of the country, is truly important--that is what has been promoted in these most recent major generals. It is the feeling of flowers finally blooming. Looking at them, it would take a rare man to judge that he deserves to be first among them.

For this reason, the question of how Japan's defense will fare, or perhaps how the field armies under me will fare--the very first consideration is, how are the divisions? For my generation this is the most important thing, so it is something which they have acquired.

Then, one more thing: in a situation in which they have been given a mission, no matter what, they accomplish it without complaint; this includes the kind of things that are the work of my generation--even that they can accomplish.

Current situations involving actual warfare are designated; not just Japan, but various countries around the world; and are being discussed. That is because a great war is not being conducted anywhere. Also, military history from the earliest days is being studied. If we strengthen ourselves firmly by these two sources, in the end we will be able to carry on without fear.

For example, tenacity toward accomplishment of the mission--this kind of thing is acquired by a person from his daily life; and even when such a person goes to the battlefield, he is more capable of brave behavior than experienced soldiers; because this has been actually proven up to now, we do not have to worry, I think.

But they will become the leaders, and rather than them, what we should be concerned about is the young unit members. The way in which the new leaders guide young unit members after they join--from now on, I think that is an extremely big question.

That is, because the JSDF in a sense a replica of the general society, it is reasonable to expect that things which exist in society will also exist in the JSDF. For example, there are problems with stimulant drugs and borrowing from loan sharks, and the drunken driving problem; but how to deal skillfully with those problems, that is, how to demonstrate leadership--the way in which we forcefully involve ourselves in this work is coming to be an important issue.

My greatest and most important object is to prevent unit members--including National Defense Academy graduates and the leaders of the next generation--from becoming "salarymen."

Our job is to achieve the defense of our country with our lives, in an emergency, because that is our ultimate purpose. But once they have gradually become "salarymen," when the moment of need arises, they will have grown cowardly, and they will be useless for that purpose. I am providing guidance and direction now, to the utmost of my ability, so that such a thing does not occur.

Akiyama: It is hardly necessary to say so, but "civilian control" has become the dominant principle.

Watanabe: But I have confidence in that.

For example, things come out like the problem of a planned coup d'etat--the prewar military was entangled in it. To speak of the prewar military: my generation also was brought up by the prewar military, but our education concerning military officers was different than it is now. We were taught that one by one, the officers constituted the physical frame of the country. Basically, "You fellows are the central pillars supporting the country"--it was in that way that we were brought up.

Because of that, as it is often said, there came to be sporadic interference in politics.

Now, though, that is not the case. The place of defense forces within the country has been precisely fixed. After all, defense forces have come into existence for a single function, and above that, civilian control prevails.

Therefore, for us, building strong units within civilian control--that is, within the conditions bestowed by the people of the country--we will be building units which have the confidence of the people: that is our ultimate objective.

So, if someone tried to create a political movement within the present JSDF, he would be forced out; even in the severe training of the daily routine, politics must not take root.

In that regard, I am not worried.

APPENDIX C

Nihon Keizai Shimbun
April 1984

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
Translation: Joint Public Affairs Office, Headquarters,
U.S. Forces Japan

Combined Ground Forces Training

The JGSDF plans to hold substantial field training exercises with the USMC twice in JFY 84 (Apr 1984--Mar 1985), one in autumn and another in winter, as part of the Japan-U.S. combined training exercises the JGSDF has been staging with the U.S. Army since 1981. Each time, 100-200 personnel from the two parties will participate in the exercises, both of which are to be held in Hokkaido. The purpose is to elevate the proficiency of the JGSDF. No practice on landing operations which the USMC excels in will be staged. The projected autumn exercise will be staged at the Yasubetsu training grounds featuring firepower drills in which the two parties practice efficient ways of striking the "enemy" with tanks and field artillery on a job partition basis, while the winter exercise is designed for general field drills in snowy areas but place for the exercise is not decided yet. The JGSDF hopes to develop combined training exercises with the USMC regularly in the future for the following reasons:

- (1) While the U.S. Army, Japan, has no combat troops, the USMC maintains a big force of over 25,000 personnel in Japan, available for combined training exercises with the JGSDF sparing the trouble of bringing units from the States for the exercises.
- (2) The Marines far excel Army members, who come here from the States for combined training, in combat capabilities and, therefore, help better the JGSDF enhance its proficiency.
- (3) In case Japan takes joint actions with the U.S. in time of emergency involving Japan, the JGSDF is supposed to work together first with the USMC rather than U.S. Army units coming from the States in aid.

Figure One: ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS OF THE JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY (JDA) AND THE JAPAN SELF-DEFENSE FORCE (JSDF)



Acronyms: JASDF = Japan Air Self Defense Force
 JGSDF = Japan Ground Self Defense Force
 JMSDF = Japan Maritime Self Defense Force

Figure Two: COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS OF U.S. FORCES IN JAPAN

A CRONYMS

- CDR = Commander
- CG = Commanding General
- CMC = Commander Marine Corps
- CNO = Chief of Naval Office
- COM = Commander
- COMUS = Commander U.S. Forces Japan
- C/S = Chief of Staff
- CTF = Combined Task Force
- FMF PAC = ^{U.S.} Fleet Marine Force Pacific
- JCS = Joint Chiefs of Staff
- MAF = Marine Amphibious Force
- NAVFORTJAPAN = ^{U.S.} Naval Forces Japan
- NSC = U.S. National Security Council
- PACAF = U.S. Pacific Air Force
- PACFLT = U.S. Pacific Fleet
- USAFJ = U.S. Air Forces Japan
- USARJ = U.S. Army Japan
- USN = U.S. Navy
- WESTCOM = U.S. Western Command.






Figure Three: BILATERAL COORDINATION RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN JAPAN



Acronyms

- CDR = Commander U.S.
- CG FMFPAC = Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific
- CINCPAC = U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
- CINC PACFLT = U.S. Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
- COMUSJAPAN = Commander U.S. Forces Japan
- COM NAVFOR JAPAN = Commander U.S. Naval Forces Japan
- CTF = Combined Task Force
- JASDF = Japan Air Self Defense Force
- JDA = Japan Defense Agency
- JGSDF = Japan Ground Self Defense Force
- MAF = Marine Amphibious Force
- JMSDF = Japan Maritime Self Defense Force
- USAF = U.S. Air Force
- USARJ = U.S. Army Japan

Figure Four:
 STRUCTURE OF JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE (JPC) AND PLANNING SUBCOMMITTEES



Acronyms

- ASO = Japan Air Staff Office
- CDR = Commander
- CINCPAC = Commander-in-Chief Pacific Naval
- COMNAVFORTJAPAN = Commander U.S. ~~Force~~ Forces Japan
- COMUSJAPAN = Commander U.S. Forces Japan
- GSO = Ground Staff Office
- JDA = Japan Defense Agency
- JSO = ~~Japan~~ Japan Joint Staff Office
- MAF = Marine Amphibious Force
- MSO = Maritime Staff Office
- USAFJ = U.S. Air Forces Japan
- USARJ = U.S. Army Japan