Prepared for the Conference on
Peace and Security in Northeast Asia and the Nuclear Issue
East-West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii
July 17-20, 1994
The Asia-Pacific region has witnessed remarkable changes over
the past few decades; most states in the region have posted
double-digit economic growth, developed more representative
political institutions ("democracy" in Asia has its own flavour),
and have improved relations among themselves. However, the post-
cold war era, while bringing many positive developments has also
led to uncertainty, as the once familiar playing field has become
one with new and unfamiliar parameters, leaving nations to
speculate about where the primary threat to their security is
originating.
As countries in the region struggle to identify and address these
ill-defined threats, some misperceive the resultant actions as
offensive preparations, based in part on logical calculations but
often to a degree on underlying mistrust related to historical,
economic or diplomatic factors. To prevent a buildup of weapons
in a time of relative peace, it is essential for nations of the
region to begin dismantling the barriers to better understanding
of their neighbours. Although many have called for a
multilateral framework within which to undertake such confidence
building measures (CBMs), others have argued that too many
barriers exist for a multilateral framework to be effective.
Confidence building is not simply the negotiation or the adoption
of specific measures, but rather it is the relationship between
negotiation and implementation that is the key, which ultimately
leads to a transformation in threat perceptions. Although recent
history has demonstrated that confidence building measures can be
portable, it is ineffective to simply apply a blanket package of
confidence building measures to a situation and expect them to be
effective, even if they had been completely successful in
previous circumstances.
Over the past five or six years, a variety of proposals have been
tabled to transfer the structures and measures of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to the Asia-Pacific
region. However, great controversy has arisen because those
specific arrangements cannot effectively address the distinct
differences in history, culture, force structure, domestic
politics, levels of economic development, nor the intra-regional
animosities and rivalries, non-contiguous nature of states or
divergent threat perceptions. As James Macintosh notes,
"disassociated from the larger political process and purpose,
confidence building loses much of its meaning and becomes a
narrow, information enhancing activity incapable of fundamentally
altering a security relationship." However, this is not to say
that the lessons learned cannot be applied with care and
attention.
In a multilateral framework, like the CSCE, positive
developments in some areas can be held up by unrelated problems
existing between other countries. Consensus is not easily
achieved and the timing for solving these problems is critical;
the resolution of issues may be impeded if efforts are not
actively pursued at the bilateral level, where a "window of
opportunity" may exist for solving each problem. It is unlikely
that these opportunities will occur simultaneously in a
multilateral context. As an example of the difficulty of
reaching consensus on anything in Northeast Asia, the attempt by
the United Nations Security Council to agree upon and pass a
resolution on the application of sanctions to North Korea in June
1994, in response to its recalcitrance on the nuclear issue will
be examined, highlighting the challenges inherent in multilateral
problem-solving efforts and illustrating the fact that the North
Korean nuclear crisis of June was ultimately solved along
bilateral lines. Additionally, the reasons why consensus was
impossible to reach, or in other words, the individual reasons
for each country to support or not to support sanctions will be
put forth, showing the complexity of the competing interests in
the region.
For this reason, it is essential to continue to pay heed to the
importance of bilateral relationships in the region, not only to
maintain the good ones but to seek to improve those characterized
by some degree of strain. Relying only on a web of bilateral
alliances would be a regression in security thinking, but rather
active pursuit of problem solving efforts at the bilateral level,
in order to facilitate the development of a cooperative security
regime is the only way to effectively address the common problems
that exist in the Northeast Asian region. In this vein, the
second section of this paper will examine the bilateral
relationships in the region, identify the stumbling blocks to
confidence and trust, and give suggestions of modest CBMs.
Common security problems, such as environmental degradation,
migration flows, security of the sea lanes of communication,
resource claims, drug trafficking, proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, sustainable energy (nuclear), safety of nuclear
facilities, and storage of nuclear waste all require cooperative
efforts to be effectively addressed. Some can function as
catalysts in the development of a multilateral consultative
structure, while others will need to be settled within such a
structure once it develops. Although such aforementioned
problems pose a security risk to all, a conflict of interest is
likely to develop in many of the cases, between polluters and the
polluted or between proliferators and non-proliferators.
Those issues which have the potential to be catalysts in the
development of a regional regime demonstrate the necessity of
giving equal attention to both function and form, where function
should receive even more attention than form at the outset.
There is a great deal of talk about form, but not enough about
function. The terms "architecture" and "structure" receive a
great deal of ink, while practical assessments of such proposals
receive insufficient consideration. Cooperative security should
be "issue driven" and realistic. The last section of this paper
will suggest a project which could meet the criteria involved in
this line of thinking.
Confidence building measures will have to be modest at the
outset, as they were in the European context twenty years ago
when the institutionalized process began, involving primarily
information and communication military CBMs which were
implemented against the backdrop of increased cultural contacts
between adversaries. Their value will be as much in the process
of consultation that develops as in the value of the information
exchanged, laying the groundwork for a regular dialogue channel
in the event of heightened tensions in the future. However, if
the confidence building efforts are truly successful, such a
tense situation might never develop.
THE CHALLENGES OF PROBLEM SOLVING IN A MULTILATERAL CONTEXT
In June 1994, nothing has captured the attention of the world
like the mounting crisis over North Korea's suspected nuclear
weapons program and its continued intransigence regarding its
refusal to submit to inspectors from the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). Its actions had many implications: 1) it
challenged the integrity of the non-proliferation movement and
the NPT, up for renewal in 1995; 2) it threatened the security
environment of the Asia-Pacific region but especially Northeast
Asia; and most directly 3) it put the safety of 70 million people
on the Korean peninsula at great risk. Of course, this was
nothing new, for we have all been following it at least since
Pyongyang's announcement in March 1993 of its intention to
withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
For the purposes of this discussion, the events of June 1994 will
serve as an illustration of the articulation between multilateral
and bilateral processes at work in the Northeast Asian region.
From there, factors will be suggested which may have worked to
enhance or prevent the support of sanctions by each of the main
actors in the conflict, illustrating the difficulty in
establishing a effective multilateral political/military
framework in Northeast Asia.
THE CRISIS OF JUNE 1994
To set the stage, on May 27, Pyongyang refused to shut down the
refuelling of its nuclear reactor or identify the critical 89
fuel rods which replaced the broken ones in 1989, which the IAEA
needed to analyze the history of the reactor. It is suspected
that North Korea reprocessed in 1989, the last time that the
reactor was reloaded, and a time when the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors had been barred from observation.
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) warned North Korea to
cooperate with the inspectors, and cease changing fuel rods
without the presence of inspectors. A veiled reference to mild
economic sanctions was made, which North Korea rejected, refusing
to allow the United States and the IAEA to stifle [the]country.
On May 30, South Korean President Kim Young-sam ordered case-by-
case countermeasures against North Korea's possible nuclear
weapons program, noting that upon entering a serious stage in
relations, the South Korean government should prepare itself for
the possibility that the UNSC would take up the problem. It
didn't ease matters when North Korea test fired a silkworm
missile into the Sea of Japan.
By the first of June, Seoul was ready to consider sanctions,
although lawmakers were divided over their effectiveness. The
South Korean government began to consider banning trade and other
forms of contact with the North, but was still looking for a
negotiated settlement with Pyongyang. While visiting in Seoul,
China's Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan showed reluctance to
join international pressure against North Korea, emphasizing that
"a superpower like the United States should not wield its power
ruthlessly against a small power" like North Korea. Despite such
statements in Seoul, at the UNSC meeting in New York, China did
not try to tone down the strongly worded statement issued by the
UNSC May 30, which was a significant departure from its previous
performance in the security meetings. This could be viewed as a
means of demonstrating some semblance of a compromise with the
West. In cooperation, it also pledged to stop supplying food and
oil to North Korea in addition to halting border trade, a promise
which if carried out earnestly, would have significant impacts on
North Korea. Yeltsin also threw Russia's support into the
international community's camp, when he promised Kim Young-sam
that he would support sanctions if negotiations were
unsuccessful. Russia's idea of convening an eight-party
conference to deal with the nuclear issue was again floated by
Russian Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov in Seoul, but without much
response. Some degree of consensus regarding the seriousness of
the situation seemed to be taking shape and on the surface it
appeared that an agreement on sanctions might be possible.
However, in reality at this point it was quite clear that a
meaningful sanctions package would not likely get China's or even
Russia's approval.
On June 2, Washington pledged to seek sanctions and cancelled the
third round of high level talks, after the IAEA reported that it
could no longer guarantee that Pyongyang had not diverted
plutonium, given that the North had already removed all but 1800
fuel rods from the reactor. With tensions soaring, Pyongyang
reiterated its previous warning that sanctions would be
tantamount to a declaration of war. During talks with Kim Young-
sam, Yeltsin officially stated that Moscow would not extend its
military treaty with Pyongyang. This was particularly
significant as it came at a time of high tensions on the
peninsula.
One June 3 (Washington), the IAEA offered another possible route
for Pyongyang to comply, by allowing special inspections of the
nuclear waste sites, since it could not examine the used fuel
rods, now almost entirely in the cooling pond. At the same time,
the United States began intensive consultations with Tokyo,
Moscow and Seoul. Discussions touched on the option of "allied
sanctions" in the event that Beijing vetoed UN sanctions. Japan,
under mounting pressure to show its solidarity with the
international community's commitment, prepared a 10-point package
of economic sanctions that it could enforce against North Korea,
although the government was clearly apprehensive about possible
retaliation by its pro-Pyongyang Korean community. Sanctions also
posed difficulty for the shaky Hata minority government, which
was treading carefully so as not to alienate the large Japan
Socialist Party (JSP), which has significant backing from the
pro-Pyongyang Korean minority.
June 6 saw some very serious statements. US Secretary of
Defense William Perry, although not recommending such action at
the time, stated that a pre-emptive strike on North Korea's
nuclear installations was not out of the question, a reversal of
his stance two months prior. While South Korean Foreign Minister
Han Sung-joo was on his way to New York to address the UNSC,
President Kim Young-sam also came out with a stiff and terse
warning for the neighbour to the North, stating that North Korea
would face destruction if didn't abandon its nuclear program.
"We will not tolerate North Korean possession of even half a
nuclear bomb," he threatened, which was the first time that he
had retaliated verbally against the North on the issue. This
show of solidarity was underscored by a joint statement issued by
the US, Japan and South Korea, declaring that the international
community should make the appropriate responses, including
sanctions. The result was a draft for a two-stage embargo
against North Korea, beginning with limited economic sanctions
and moving to a total trade stoppage. The resolve of the
"allies" appears strong.
Not to be pushed around without a fight, the following day
Pyongyang threatened to quit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), declaring that it would no longer feel the need to be part
of the IAEA if it felt too much pressure. Conflicting sentiments
regarding Russia's eight- party conference proposal were
registered: North Korea's Foreign Minister Kim Young-nam said
that he was considering the idea, while a North Korean diplomat
in Geneva that it was not a matter for an international
conference because the issue was between North Korea and the
United States -- if it were a general nuclear disarmament matter,
it might have been possible but on this issue, it was not a
suitable approach to pursue, he stated. Russia was not on side
with its former ally either. In the recently concluded meetings
with Kim Young-sam, Russia had promised to participate in
international sanctions. Back in Seoul, President Kim Young-sam
called a National Security Council Meeting. The objectives were
threefold: to show the world, the North Korean administration and
the South Korean people the seriousness with which Seoul was
approaching this situation.
However, despite what appears to be consensus among "the
players", there was still one holdout. As Foreign Minister Han
Sung-joo was on his way to Beijing to discuss the nuclear issue,
Chinese President Jiang Zemin was pledging to Choi Gwang, chief
of the General Staff of the Korean Peoples' Army, Beijing's
unwavering friendship with Pyongyang. Without mentioning the
nuclear crisis, he proclaimed "Our two communist parties, two
countries and two armies have a tradition of friendly
relationships," . These sentiments were echoed by Choi's Chinese
counterpart, Zhang Wannian, who reportedly said:
"The traditional friendship between China and North Korea has
been formed by the
blood of the Chinese people and the military, and the heroic
people of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea who achieved a great success in
building a nation and
military under the leadership of President Kim Il-sung."
June 8 saw a significant split in the international resolve on
the sanctions, or basically between China and "the others" in the
international community. China slammed the idea of sanctions,
saying that they would aggravate the situation in Beijing's
opinion. It is possible that China was attempting to increase
its influence over Pyongyang by assuming a more sympathetic
attitude, in order to reach a negotiated settlement, and/or it
believed that the "cure" (sanctions) was more dangerous than the
"disease" (North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons capability).
Effective sanctions could have precipitated a collapse of the
North Korean regime, bringing about instability on the peninsula
which is one of China's backyards. North Korea's envoy to the
IAEA reiterated North Korea's firm stance against inspections of
the two nuclear waste sites. On the other side of the field,
South Korean officials called for joint readiness of South Korean
and American forces, increased surveillance activities and
strengthened early warning capabilities. Sanctions were seen to
be unavoidable by both South Korea and the US, who would not be
intimidated by threats. President Yeltsin, using a hotline set
up on the basis of agreements made the previous week in Moscow,
called President Kim Young-sam to reiterate his continued support
for sanctions. All for one and one for all, except China.
By June 9, the IAEA drafted up its own set of sanctions against
North Korea, to freeze about $500-600,000 worth of technical aid
a year to North Korea. After promising the visiting Foreign
Minister Han Sung-joo its "best efforts" to resolve the nuclear
standoff, China abstained during the vote on the IAEA's draft
resolution, which was significant because many might have been
reluctant to support the motion if China directly opposed. In
response, the North Korean envoy Yun Ho-jin emphatically stated
that North Korea would not allow any more inspections and
suggested that the IAEA inspectors in North Korea would have to
leave. Washington continued to talk tough about pushing forward
.on a UN resolution. Perhaps in the hope of securing Russia's
declared support for sanctions, Washington finally endorsed
Russia's eight-party conference plan. At this heightened state
of tension, the "powers" appear to have a fairly strong front,
although China is a question mark.
On June 14, in preparation for unforeseen developments at the
heightened level of tension, Seoul ordered civil defense drills
involving 6.6 million civil defense corps members, to organize
evacuations and provide first aid for air raid victims. These
beefed up drills, which had been held regularly in the past,
though on a much smaller scale, captured the attention of the
international media, which focussed on a "frenzied situation" in
South Korea, where all South Koreans were stocking up on ramyon
(instant noodles) and buying gas masks. Of course, the recent
events had been serious enough to catch the attention of the
South Koreans, who are usually quite complacent regarding any
imminent threat from the North, something that has become part of
their daily lives. Certainly many started making preparations,
but not anywhere near the level depicted in the media. That hype
combined with usual North Korean rhetoric generated North Korean
verbal attacks on the South for drumming up tension on the
peninsula. The following day, North Korea announced its
intention to pullout of the IAEA, although no mention of the fate
of the inspectors was made.
The ante was upped after that statement. North Korea called for
direct talks with the US on the 14th. Russia's Foreign Minister
Kozyrev said that he saw sanctions as only a last resort. China,
continuing to maintain its somewhat ambiguous position, made a
statement, declaring "We hearby deplore the adverse turn of
events. The Chinese government once again appeals to all parties
concerned to be cool-headed and to exercise restraint."
At this critical juncture of June 14, under great pressure, the
fissures in the multilateral effort began to grow. Pyongyang
went ahead and officially withdrew from the IAEA, the first
country to ever quit the international agency. The United States
tabled a draft at the UNSC, delineating a two-phased approach and
giving Pyongyang a month to comply with the safeguards accord and
implement the inter-Korean declaration. Reaction to the proposal
was the least supportive compared to any of the previous drafts.
The South Korean opposition objected to using neighbouring
countries to push through an embargo which could lead to war,
challenging South Korea to lead the way. China rejected the
draft, urging further negotiations. It also emphasized that
"China, in principle, doesn't subscribe to the involvement of the
Security Council in the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula or
resorting to sanctions to solve it. The only way is direct
dialogue." Russia, angry about not being consulted in advance on
the draft, withheld its support, not because it opposed the
contents but rather because it was not consulted during the
preparation. Japan, although supportive would certainly have
preferred not to have to enforce sanctions. This is the last true
test of the will to cooperate on sanctions. It failed.
The Carter visit is still something that I do not completely
understand, but although people were very sceptical of its
potential to diffuse the tension and broker some peace, in the
end it turned out to ease tension considerably. Where did the
idea of Carter come from? It is not certain, but in mid-May
during the former South Korean opposition leader/human rights
championer Kim Dae-jung's visit to Washington, he brought up a
possible role for Carter to Washington officials. To defuse the
crisis with North Korea, he suggested dispatching "an elder
statesman, respected internationally, trusted by the Chinese and
North Koreans and sharing the views of President Clinton." He
noted that face-saving is "even more important in dealing with
North Korea, a country ruled for five decades by one man with
absolute authority, Kim Il-sung." He noted that dispatching Rev.
Billy Graham in early February with Clinton's personal message
apparently increased Kim Il-sung's readiness to negotiate. He
mentioned that North Korea had long admired President Carter.
On June 16, taking a somewhat moderate approach, Washington
offered Pyongyang a grace period to settle the dispute before
sanctions would be activated and indicated it would impose
tougher measures only if Pyongyang took further steps to threaten
security. In addition, the South Korean ruling Democratic
Liberal Party (DLP) asked the government to reconsider the
denuclearization policy, which is based on the Joint Declaration
for Denuclearization of the Peninsula, given the fact that North
Korea appeared to have clearly violated it and looked unlikely to
abide in the future after its announced withdrawal from the IAEA.
After arriving in Pyongyang on the June 15, by the 17th, Carter
and Kim were making promises. Kim Il-sung authorized a joint
search for American MIAs of the Korean War, agreed to freeze
nuclear activities and to allow international nuclear inspectors
to remain in North Korea. On the other side, Carter announced
that the movement for sanctions had been suspended and that
Washington had provisionally agreed to a third round of talks and
support for acquiring a light water reactor.
Washington, however denied that sanctions were on hold and stated
its commitment to pursue them until Kim's pledges could be
measured in deeds. Reaction from Seoul was also reserved, based
on years of deep feelings of distrust and a belief that Carter's
visit was more of a photo opportunity than a chance for a
resolution to the conflict. Carter explained his opposition to
sanctions: Declarations of sanctions would be considered as an
insult to their nation, branding it as an outlaw country and an
insult to their so-called great leader, by branding him as a liar
and a criminal. Although many people would suggest that past
deeds warrant such a characterization of Kim Il-sung and believe
that you should "call a spade a spade", Carter's face-saving
treatment of Kim Il-sung earned a lot of mileage. However, it is
certain that many South Koreans and also officials in Washington
considered Carter's approach and moves naive in dealing with
someone such as cagey as Kim Il-sung. In his recommendations to
Washington to establish formal relations with Pyongyang, he
added, "Diplomatic relations are not a gift or favour or reward
to be handed out between two countries. It's a common belief
that the exchange of ambassadors and opening of relations is of
mutual benefit. My opinion is that it would be of great mutual
benefit to have open communication and better understanding
between my country and North Korea." During Carter's meeting
with Kim Young-sam June 18, he delivered a proposal by Kim Il-
sung to meet with his South Korean counterpart "anywhere, at
anytime, without any conditions," which Kim Young-sam accepted
immediately, indicating the sooner the better.
Although it cannot be determined how much Carter's visit changed
Kim Il-sung's position in the nuclear standoff or whether it was
more of a face-saving "out" of an increasingly hopeless situation
for both sides, it was later learned that days prior to Carter's
visit, China's Foreign Ministry in Beijing called in the North
Korean ambassador and warned that his government could not depend
indefinitely on Chinese support in the confrontation with the
United States over the nuclear issue and that it would be in
Pyongyang's best interests to cooperate more with international
efforts to inspect its nuclear facilities. Not only was this a
significant move on China's part after opposing the international
call for sanctions, but it also marked a big change in China's
previously stated stance that it maintained little or no
influence over North Korea.
Over the next week, while the parties involved were trying to
establish the sincerity of recent pledges, tension eased
gradually and offers for bilateral improvements in relations
began to flow in. Japan's then Foreign Minister Koji Kakizawa
offered to help Pyongyang convert its nuclear facilities to a
light water reactor in a gesture aimed at normalizing bilateral
relations, coming the day after Carter returned to Seoul. In a
possible return gesture, Pyongyang lifted a ban on Japanese
tourists, implemented in June 1993, although this cannot be seen
as purely a goodwill gesture, given that Pyongyang desperately
needs foreign exchange. Once the moves were afoot to realize the
historic North-South summit, Seoul offered to encourage phased
economic cooperation, beginning with small-sized joint ventures
in light industry, leading to cooperation in mining, agriculture
and communications fields, ultimately fostering an economic
community. The development of rail links and direct navigation
routes were also proposed. Private businesses, anxious to
implement long awaited plans for joint ventures or investment,
began to talk seriously again of the possibilities. The issue of
sanctions fell to the background, as tensions subsided. Everyone
breathed a sigh of relief. All parties were let off the hook.
FACTORS PROMOTING AND PREVENTING CONSENSUS ON SANCTIONS
In the Northeast Asian region, the circumstances that drive
policies in each country are far from homogeneous, which is one
of the reasons why the establishment of a much talked about
multilateral security forum is so challenging. Consensus is
often almost impossible to reach. The following section suggests
(the lists are not exhaustive) possible reasons for and against
supporting sanctions, illustrating the challenges to
multilateralism in the security field.
CHINA
REASONS FOR SUPPORTING SANCTIONS 1) Preserving the great strides
made over the past three years in its relationship with South
Korea. Particularly in the area of economic cooperation and
trade, China and South Korea have become valuable partners. In
order to preserve this important relationship, China does not
want to be drawn into a situation where it has to play its last
card. Although if push came to shove and it had to choose one of
the two to be partners with, it would almost certainly give the
nod to Seoul, it does have an interest in maintaining relations
with Pyongyang. China played a much greater role in cooperating
with the international community against its formerly close ally
than it would have a few years ago, although it was the main
holdout in the search for a consensus on sanctions. 2) Preventing
North Korea from going nuclear. A nuclear armed North Korea
would force both South Korea and Japan to consider their non-
nuclear pledges. 3) Preventing friction with the US, after
tensions regarding Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trading status,
human rights, arms sales and recent underground testing. China
doesn't need another flare up with the US.
REASONS FOR OPPOSING SANCTIONS
1) Preserving stability on its frontier. Nuclear weapons on the
peninsula would alter the security equation in the region however
more importantly from China's perspective, a North Korea with
nuclear weapons would not pose as much of a threat to China as a
collapsing North Korea. China has an interest in preventing a
hard landing for North Korea as it enters the international
arena. In the event of collapse, China would be forced to
consider intervention lest the United States and South Korea move
in to establish order, removing the buffer area on that Chinese
border. Whether one considers that sanctions would preserve
stability or threaten stability really depends upon one's
perspective. 2) Prevention of further feelings of isolation by
Pyongyang which could provoke a rash response. North Korea's
isolation, upon Seoul's normalization of relations with both the
Soviet Union/Russia and China has been cited as one cause for
Pyongyang's recalcitrance and pursuit of nuclear weapons as an
equalizer in the unfavourable shift in the military balance. 3)
Possibility of more leverage by being "on side" than against
Pyongyang. Beijing has continually denied any significant
leverage over Pyongyang, although it appears that its actions
behind the scenes just prior to Carter's visit may have laid the
foundation for a more receptive Kim Il-sung. 4) Feelings of
"kinship" for its comrades in arms. The octogenarian leadership
of both China and North Korea have had an enduring relationship
for over 40 years. Although not always on the best of terms, the
octogenarian set in China is likely the only group in the world
to possibly know the North Korean leadership well. Despite their
differences, they may have felt great difficulty in completely
abandoning their former comrades in arms. 5) Inability to
effectively enforce sanctions along the border. Trade along the
remote border of Jilin Province, formed by the Tumen River,
accounts for more than 40% of North Korea's trade with China.
The trade is important to the local economy on the Chinese side,
which is home to most of China's Korean minority. Attempts to
enforce the sanctions would have been difficult at best. 6)
Irritation by Washington's continued interference on human
rights. It could be said that Beijing threw its support in the
sanctions ring after Washington granted MFN privileges at the end
of May. However, if the US irritated China enough, China could
use the sanctions card to frustrate the US and demonstrate its
strength. 7) China dual role as both an emerging superpower and
as a representative of developing nations. China stated that the
United States shouldn't push around smaller nations like North
Korea. 8) China is willing to support arms control relative to
other countries but doesn't want to draw attention to its own
program or set a precedent for retaliation. Despite movements
toward the extension of the NPT and a ratification of a CTBT,
China has conducted two tests in less than a year, to the great
disappointment of other nations.
JAPAN
REASONS FOR SUPPORTING SANCTIONS (basically international)
1) Demonstrate commitment to the US-Japan relationship but also
to follow the US lead in security issues, despite trade tensions.
2) Show commitment to international security efforts, after its
hesitancy to respond during the Gulf War and international
criticism of its chequebook diplomacy. 3) Demonstrate its
commitment to the non-proliferation movement. There are
suspicions that if North Korea were proven to have nuclear
capability, Japan would entertain the thought of developing its
own arsenal. 4) Ensure that it has a place at the table regarding
issues related to Korea. If it didn't support sanctions and
contribute to solving the issue, its role in contributing to the
Korean problem in the first place as a colonial power could have
been emphasized. 5) Preserve the modest improvements made in
Japanese-South Korean political and economic relations, despite
still suffering lack of trust in military and social relations.
REASONS FOR OPPOSING SANCTIONS (basically domestic)
1) Political liquidity of Japanese domestic politics. Now on its
third Prime Minister in almost as many months, Japan is led by a
shaky coalition government, which affects consistent foreign
policy. 2) Strong influence of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP).
The current leader, Tomoiichi Murayama is the first socialist
leader in four decades. Although considered a moderate, the JSP
has not supported sanctions. 3) Difficulty in controlling
remittances to North Korea Although Murayama is seen as a
moderate, the Japan Socialist Party receives a significant amount
of support from the pro- Pyongyang Korean minority and would face
great opposition from that small but quite powerful group. 4)
Threats by Pyongyang that any actions to cut off remittances will
result in retaliation. Many people feel that Japan is a primary
target for North Korean missiles, possibly moreso than the Korean
brethren in the South. 5) Domestic opposition to participation of
the Self Defence Forces (SDF) in an international embargo.
Japan's current constitution would not allow Japan to participate
in a UN embargo. The issue of constitutional revision is a hot
topic both in Japan and within the region. 6) Fears of reprisal
for "squeezing" the Korean minority in Japan. By attacking the
pro- Pyongyang Korean community in Japan, Tokyo could have a
significant "minority" issue on its hands, if the pro-Seoul
Koreans rally behind their brethren, seeing the issue as another
slap in the face to the ever-oppressed Koreans in Japan.
RUSSIA
REASONS FOR SUPPORTING SANCTIONS
1) Demonstrate commitment to burgeoning Russian-South Korean
relations. Seoul and Moscow have made great strides in economic,
diplomatic, and military cooperation in a very short time. 2)
Demonstrate commitment to its place in "the western camp" and at
try to hold onto a role as a political power, if it cannot be an
economic power at this point. 3) Demonstrate commitment to the
NPT and prevent blame being laid for already contributing to
North Korean nuclear weapons development. 4) Keep the West happy.
Russia's reliance on western aid/support for its political and
economic survival limits its ability to take stands against those
supplying such aid.
REASONS FOR OPPOSING SANCTIONS
1) Retaliation for not being consulted on draft resolution in
mid-June. 2) Desire to demonstrate that its vote still counts and
has some clout.
SOUTH KOREA
REASONS FOR SUPPORTING SANCTIONS
1) Take an active role in drafting sanctions, rather than being
marginalized by Pyongyang 2) Reassert and maintain the co-lead in
the negotiations with North Korea, vis-a-vis the United States.
Not only did North Korea succeed in marginalizing Seoul, but also
the United States effectively marginalized South Korea as well.
3) Assure South Korea a co-lead position in any regional
negotiating forum, either during the push for sanctions or in a
post-sanctions situation.
REASONS FOR OPPOSING SANCTIONS
1) Fear of retaliation by Pyongyang if sanctions are imposed. The
"sea of fire" comment will not be soon forgotten. 2) Give
Pyongyang "a way out" by dealing with South Korea, despite
constant marginalization by Pyongyang as it dealt primarily with
the United States. 3) Fear of economic collapse and subsequent
hard landing. South Korea is keenly aware of the costs of
unification, which would be significantly higher in the event of
collapse in the North. After tasting the benefits of economic
growth and prosperity, many South Koreans do not wish to take a
step down in that standard of living, a situation sure to arise
if the North experiences a hard landing.
UNITED STATES
REASONS FOR SUPPORTING SANCTIONS
1) Show strong resolve in foreign policy which has been under
fire for being too weak and inconsistent under Clinton. 2)
Demonstrate commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region
in general and to South Korea in particular. Concerns regarding
the future of the US military presence and security guarantee in
the Asia-Pacific region has generated numerous concerns. 3) Show
strong resolve for enforcing the NPT and the global non-
proliferation regime, by demonstrating to cheaters that they
cannot avoid serious consequences. Deter threshold states from
entertaining ideas of following North Korea's lead. The NPT
extension conference and the drive for a CTBT weigh heavy on
Washington's mind.
REASONS FOR OPPOSING SANCTIONS
1) If they were not 100% certain that they could 1) get consensus
on sanctions and 2) ensure their effectiveness, sanctions should
not have been pushed for. Sanctions are better as a threat than
a reality. Once you move to sanctions and if they fail, the
bargaining leverage is lost. 2) If sanctions succeed, they could
cause either implosion (collapse) or explosion (retaliation).
Both situations are extremely dangerous. 3) Avoid conflict with
China.
LESSONS FROM THE DRIVE FOR SANCTIONS
We can see a direct relationship between the increasing
prominence of sanctions and the growing tensions on the peninsula
and among participants. However, as sanctions grew in
importance, the consensus began to wane as individual factors or
conditions affecting each individual player were brought into
starker reality. Although there was unanimity on the severity of
the situation, it was impossible to come to a consensus on the
appropriate response, due to the stark differences in the
circumstances related to their respective domestic and foreign
policies.
The "sanctions of June issue" was in reality an attempt at
alleviating the problem multilaterally but which was played out
and ultimately solved along various bilateral lines, with both
positive and negative results. As the tension reached its peak,
the exercise became one of a bilateral showdown between North
Korea and the United States, resulting fortunately in an
improvement in their very strained relationship, and subsequently
breathing new life into North-South dialogue, IAEA-North Korean
dialogue, and further US-North Korean dialogue.
The complexity of the Northeast Asian region makes it difficult
to reach multilateral consensus in a timely fashion. In this
case, the value of the multilateral effort lay in 1) its success
in defining the severity of the issue, 2) defining the priorities
of the major players, 3) maintaining pressure while bilateral
dynamics played out. In reality, despite how successfully the
international community could rally together, what Pyongyang
wanted was direct, high- level talks with the United States,
which is exactly what it ultimately got. The nuclear card
allowed the North Korean leadership attain and sustain (sometimes
off and on) high level dialogue at the international negotiating
table, most often with its desired partner, Washington.
It appears that bilateral efforts made the difference at critical
junctures, but also served to derail the process from time to
time, such as US-China tensions over MFN and both Moscow's and
Washington's infantile protests of not being consulted prior to
the tabling of their respective proposals. The Carter visit let
everyone off the hook in having to put their money where their
mouths were. With the death of Kim Il-sung, the situation has
now been frozen in time, giving all parties, including those of
us trying to keep up with the situation, some time to breathe.
THE APPLICATION OF CBM MENUS IN BILATERAL CONTEXTS
In attempting to improve relations, timing is everything, and
what can be offered or agreed upon by one party may not occur at
the same time for all involved. In general, by continuing to
strive for improvements in bilateral relationships, it is
possible to take advantage of the "windows of opportunity" that
may exist for solving a long standing problem or building
confidence, which will not occur at the same time for all parties
involved. By earnestly pursuing policies to understand and
address the individual needs and concerns of Northeast Asian
neighbours and in conjunction with efforts to establish regular
channels of mulitlateral dialogue, it is possible to work toward
an official multilateral dialogue in the future. However, it
will always be a difficult struggle.
The bilateral relationships of Northeast Asia are characterised
by an intricate blend of political/diplomatic, economic and
military stumbling blocks while different priorities (economic
growth, political reform, military modernisation) exist within
each country each year. Based on the five Northeast Asian States
(China, Japan, North Korea, Russia and South Korea, there are ten
different bilateral relationships, only two of which have any
current or previous alliance affiliation (North Korea-China and
North Korea-Russia). As a result, there are eight independent
relationships, falling at different points along the friend-
enemy spectrum, which require the development of measures to
promote trust and solve some persisting problems, so that central
decision makers will come to see that neighbours are not the
threat they once were or the threat they might become.
By initially utilising a combination of basic information,
communication, and constraint CBMs, it is possible to attempt to
negotiate, what Gerald Segal refers to as an effective menu of a
la carte measures. For the Northeast Asian region, it is also
important to include a category of non-traditional CBMs, either
quasi-military or non-military CBMs, to deal with comprehensive
security concerns, including economic, political, environmental
and cultural security issues. Although not part of the European
experience, they would prove useful in the intricate Northeast
Asian security context. The measures proposed here are very
modest in nature, like the Helsinki CBMs of 1975, yet they could
provide a starting point in developing a habit of dialogue and
allow individual pairs of countries to move at their own pace in
improving their relations and addressing issues of mutual
concern. As most of the threats at this point are not imminent,
this exercise has value in establishing avenues of dialogue
before crisis situations occur and provides a foundation for a
regional security dialogue and broader CBM regime in the future.
The following section will trace recent developments in the eight
bilateral relationships and delineate modest packages of CBMs
that form the foundation for a more comprehensive regional
security mechanism in the near future.
RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS The Northern Territories dispute serves
as a diplomatic stumbling block to building confidence as it
impedes developments in both the military and economic arenas;
consequently, many have argued for delinking the territorial
dispute from efforts to develop contacts in other areas.
However, some progress has been made recently. Indeed, Russian
President Boris Yeltsin finally visited Tokyo for a long awaited
summit in October 1993, after failing to show for two previously
scheduled summit meetings, where Yeltsin and then Japanese Prime
Minister Morihiro Hosokawa discussed a proposal for the transfer
of two of the four disputed islands. If realised, such a
development would be the most significant in Japanese-Russian
relations to date and would pave the way for greater cooperation,
particularly economic, which Japan had stated cannot be fully
realised until resolution of the dispute. Returning the disputed
Northern Territories has met with strong opposition form within
Russia for two reasons: 1) nationalist resistance to losing yet
another piece of Russian territory, and more importantly 2)
relinquishing the strategic advantages provided by the islands.
The islands screen the Sea of Okhotsk, which hosts Russian
submarine bases and ballistic-missile-firing area, serve as bases
for advanced jet fighters and signals-intelligence posts, and
bestow valuable mineral and fishing rights. Although there is
little likelihood of Russian military aggression against Japan,
the presence of Russian naval, air and ground forces within the
sight of Hokkaido coupled with uncertainty in Russia's domestic
politics is of concern to Tokyo.
An additional stumbling block in Russo-Japanese relations is
Russia's persistent dumping of nuclear waste at sea, which has
been carried out for over 20 years and which continues due to the
"lack of funds" necessary to establish suitable land based
storage. The dumping endangers both Japanese and South Korean
waters and Russia has been pressuring Japan for aid in
establishing a comprehensive waste disposal system.
Russia and Japan already signed an agreement on the Prevention of
Incidents at Sea in September 1992 and military officials have
been engaging in bilateral security dialogue. Yeltsin and
Hosokawa agreed to increase high level exchanges of officials,
promote non- proliferation, enhance the role of the United
Nations and work to make Russia a part of the Asia-Pacific
community. Further confidence building measures could include
the following:
* No first use of force declaration * Exchange of data on defence
spending, force structure and deployment. Japan is still
concerned about Russian deployments in the Far East, especially
after the conclusion of the CFE Treaty, and the fate of the
Russian Pacific Fleet. * Exchange of military officials This
should include contacts with both central and regional officials,
as authority within Russia is steadily devolving to regional
administrations and many decisions are increasingly being made by
regional commands. * Notification of airforce and particularly
naval manoeuvres and movements Japan's concern over security of
the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) makes this a particularly
vital issue. The observation of military manoeuvres could be
negotiated in the near future, after the mutual dialogue process
is underway. * Establishment of a hot line and a cool line *
Establishment of a nuclear consultative group to discuss issues
of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear waste disposal, nuclear
safety and nuclear power. These issues are of mutual concern to
both countries and could provide a focus for unofficial
discussions of concerns and strategies regarding these issues.
The findings could be communicated to respective governments,
providing an unofficial and non-confrontational dialogue channel
between administrations.
JAPANESE-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS Negotiations on normalisation
between Japan and North Korea broke off at the eighth round of
talks in Beijing in November 1992, when Pyongyang refused Tokyo's
demand for an investigation into the alleged abduction of a
Japanese national. However, when there seemed to be an easing of
Pyongyang's recalcitrant attitude toward nuclear inspections by
the IAEA early in the year, Tokyo stated in mid February that it
would seek to resume negotiations with Pyongyang, although this
was sidelined by the negative events beginning in March 1994 when
Pyongyang prevented the IAEA from completing thorough inspections
of North Korean nuclear facilities. Nonetheless, Japan is in a
good position to participate in economic cooperation with North
Korea since it has the money and is not obstructed by the
intricacies of the reunification issue. Possible confidence
building measures could include:
* No first use of force declaration Although both North Korea and
Tokyo fear the use of nuclear weapons more than conventional
weapons, the inclusion of "nuclear" in such a declaration would
imply 1) an undeclared intention of Japan to develop a nuclear
capability, and 2) the current development or existence of
nuclear weapons by North Korea. Discussion of that issue would
only serve to impede other CBMs and thus, a general declaration
covering all types of weapons (conventional, chemical, biological
and nuclear) would be more effective. * Consultation between
defence officials should be encouraged if only that it
establishes a channel for dialogue, available for use in the
event of a crisis situation. * Notification of military
manoeuvres in the Sea of Japan Although North Korea's cash-
strapped economy precludes large scale military manoeuvres at
this time, such a promise would be a good place to begin a
reciprocal agreement. Japan staged its largest military exercise
in post-war history during early October 1993, and the first
combined exercise since 1983. Observation of manoeuvres would
not be agreed to by Pyongyang, for fear of revealing weaknesses
more than strengths. * Consultations on economic cooperation and
tourism Pyongyang is appealing for foreign investment in free
trade zones, and although the conditions are not favourable for
investment due to lack of infrastructure, it is an opportunity
for Japan to encourage North Korea out of its isolation, while
the cooperative experience could be the basis for greater
developments in the political or military realms.
These measures are extremely limited but do represent a start to
the process. Basic communication measures are the only reasonable
measures that can be suggested at this time.
JAPANESE-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS Despite a continued underlying
lack of trust, relations and cooperation continue to improve.
South Korean President Kim Young Sam hosted Japanese Prime
Minister Hosokawa for a successful summit meeting in November
1993, where Hosokawa delivered a clear apology to Koreans for
Japan's aggression during the colonial period and WWII, the first
time a Japanese politician had sufficiently addressed the issue.
However, former Justice Minister Nagano did significant damage to
the goodwill that was engendered by Hosokawa's remarks.
Confidence building measures that have been agreed upon to date
include frequent meetings of defence ministers and ranking
defence officials, agreements for reciprocal goodwill portcalls
by naval vessels,which will carry Korean naval academy cadets to
Japan this autumn while a Japanese warship is scheduled to make a
return visit next year, and the exchange of flight schedules of
military aircraft to aid in avoiding collisions. During the 1994
Rimpac exercises which ended in late June, the U.S., Japan and
South Korea exercised as a team against the Canadian-Australian
team, a first but not something that was easily agreed upon.
Such agreements represent significant developments in the
military sphere, if they are indeed carried out, but compared to
bilateral economic and political cooperation, military and
cultural exchanges still lag far behind.
* Non-use of force declaration * Direct exchange of military
information, including published white papers, defence budgets,
force structures, weapon systems, and weapons system development
information. As both have mutual security treaties with the
United States, there is little threat of short term military
confrontation, but the act of exchanging information is more
important that the actual information exchanged, in establishing
the process of information sharing. * Exchange of defence
officials and defence ministers to establish communication on a
high level and provide an opportunity to clarify misplaced threat
perceptions and discuss mutual concerns. * Exchange of military
delegations of mid-ranking and lower ranking military personnel.
This would provide the opportunity for better understanding the
fundamental nature of each group. This should be conducted on
the basis of invitation, demonstrating goodwill and a desire for
better relations. The inclusion of naval cadets on warships
conducting port calls is an important step. * Establishment of
hot lines and cool lines In the short run, these may serve more
as a communication link relating to the North Korean crisis
rather than an emergency link between the two countries. *
Notification of military activities, particularly naval and air
in the Sea of Japan. * Observation of military activities This
could be undertaken by joint teams of Korean and US Forces Korea
military personnel and Japanese and US Forces Japan military
personnel, the US forces acting as a buffer between direct Japan-
South Korean activity. The US Forces, having a working
understanding of both militaries, may be well positioned to
clarify misunderstandings or aid in communication. This should
be undertaken at first by invitation, along the lines of the
Helsinki CBMs, later expanding to obligatory observation. *
Promotion of the cultural exchange high school and university
students, sponsored by both government and business groups with
commercial interests in the other country. Emphasis should be
placed on visiting a variety of historic and culturally important
sites, providing students the opportunity to better understand
the foundations of the other culture and to dispel persistent
disdain. In addition, students should be asked to identify
issues that they consider to be important on a regional or global
scale. Issues of common interest could then serve as a focal
point for an ongoing and task oriented project addressing the
concerns. Access to quality mass culture (such as movies, music
and arts) should be permitted and promoted jointly. This
unconventional measure is important to address the persistent
lack of accurate understanding about each country. Prejudices
persist and will continue to breed suspicions in the future
unless addressed now.
After implementation of these information and communication CBMs,
South Korea and Japan could move to apply constraint CBMs.
* Mutual inspection of facilities related to nuclear energy, the
nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear weapons development capability.
After employing these basic information and communication CBMs
and developing a habit of consultation, it would be useful to
discuss implementation of such an inspection regime, given that
both South Korea and Japan are concerned about future weapons
development spurred by changes in the international environment.
SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS Both China and Japan share suspicions
about one another's aspirations for economic and military
dominance in Northeast Asia in the 21st Century. However, China
and Japan have made moves to establish links between both their
foreign and defence ministries. Inaugural security talks were
held in December 1993, where Japan's defence policy and China's
rapid equipment modernisation program were discussed, providing a
good starting point from which to proceed with modest CBMs.
* No first use of force declaration * Publication and exchange of
defence budget, force structure and deployment. China recently
printed a white paper on defence, although it was a very brief
document which contained basically the same information found in
the IISS Military Balance. However, the fact that Beijing
produced one at all is a significant step in itself. China's
defence budget does not include revenue earned from the
production of civilian goods or arms sales, nor does it include
arms purchases. Efforts should be made for standardisation of
this information and subsequent direct exchange. * Continued
exchange of high level defence officials The military still has a
great deal of influence politically in China, and thus it is
important to establish positive relations with those in charge at
the higher levels. In addition, the military has become involved
in business and development projects. Economic cooperation in
general but particularly with military enterprises producing
civilian goods could establish a mutually beneficial
relationship. * Establish hot and cool lines * Notification of
naval and air manoeuvres or movements China, Japan and Taiwan all
claim the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
Beijing's recent bold reassertion of its sovereignty over the
Senkakus, the Spratly's and the Paracels and subsequent
stationing of additional troops in the Spratly's has alarmed many
in the region, fearing that Beijing may be willing to take the
islands by force. This casts suspicion over unexpected manoeuvres
or deployments and thus advance notification by both is very
important.
The Chinese have been known to value their secrecy, which
although it makes a good case for transparency, necessitates
development in a very gradual manner. China staunchly advocates
non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and
thus would resist implementation of intrusive measures, at least
in the formative stages of a relationship.
SINO-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS Seoul and Beijing have witnessed
bilateral trade soar, particularly since they normalised
relations in August 1992. Memorandums of Understanding have been
signed in telecommunications cooperation, joint development of
natural resources in the Yellow Sea, high technology, aerospace
and automobiles, cultural exchanges, fisheries concerns. On the
diplomatic front, in 1993 China returned the remains of five
Korean independence fighters to South Korea, and have agreed on a
joint public servant training program. On the military side, the
foreign ministers agreed to exchange military attaches between
embassies - four South Korean attaches were sent to Beijing last
year, while two Chinese army colonels have recently been
stationed at a military attach office in Seoul. Although most of
the developments between the two former enemies are in the
economic sphere, small steps are being made in the security
arena. This heightened interdependency certainly contributed to
China's moderating role in the sanctions debate.
* Non-use of force declaration * Publication and exchange of
defence budgets and force structure * Notification of naval and
airforce manoeuvres particularly in the East China Sea. * Hot
lines and cool lines for immediate consultation in crisis. This
could be most useful in dealing with developments in the North
Korean situation.
As Pyongyang's lone remaining ally, Beijing has been sensitive
not to alienate Pyongyang by undertaking significant steps in the
area of military confidence building and cooperation with Seoul,
lest it isolate Pyongyang further and prompt it to resort to
drastic measures. By the same token, an exceptionally weak
stance on Pyongyang's intransigence could adversely affect the
budding Seoul-Beijing relationship. For the time being, a
bilateral relationship fostered by economic and industrial
cooperation would seem more prudent than seeking far reaching
methods of military cooperation. One area slated for industrial
cooperation is in the construction, operation and management of
nuclear power plants, which could provide the foundation for a
trilateral or multilateral cooperation project with North Korea,
which is desperately in need of electricity.
SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS The current relationship between Beijing
and Moscow is one of the most active of the previously
antagonistic relationships in the region and one which has
displayed the most characteristics of traditional and successful
European style confidence building measures. Since the early
1980s significant unilateral, non-negotiated cuts in border
troops and tanks have been made by both Beijing and Moscow. The
first formal agreement was not signed until 24 April 1990, when
Li Peng visited Moscow to discuss further border reductions.
Currently senior Ministry of Defence officials exchange visits,
and officials at the political level meet regularly to discuss
issues of regional and global concern.
In December 1992, Boris Yeltsin and Chinese President Yang
Shangkun, signed a memorandum of understanding, agreeing to
accelerate work on a mutual reduction of armed forces in the
border region and building confidence in the military sphere
across the border, culminating in an agreement by the end of
1994. Until then, they agreed to reduce armed forces in the
agreed border region to a minimum level, give remaining troops a
clearly defensive nature, and commit to "no first use" of nuclear
weapons nor to use the threat of nuclear use against any non-
nuclear state. Prior to the Yeltsin-Yang meeting, the eighth
round of Sino-Russian disarmament talks was held, resulting in a
commitment to eventually withdraw their main forces back 100 km
on each side of the border to establish a 200 km stability zone
of decreased military activity. In November 1993, Russian
Defence Minister Pavel Grachev met with his Chinese counterpart
Chi Haotian in Beijing, the first Russian defence minister to
visit China since the Soviet breakup. In establishing further
confidence building measures, they agreed to send 3 additional
military attaches to each capital, exchange military delegations
(7 Chinese delegations are slated for Moscow in 1994), jointly
develop a new jet fighter for China, the Super 7, based on the
Russian MiG-21, and signed a five year agreement on military
cooperation and the promotion of friendly relations between the
two armies. The most recent agreement is the accord on the
Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (PDMA) along the
border during maneuvers, accidental missile firings or unintended
frontier violations.
Ironically, the success of these bilateral confidence building
measures can have a potentially adverse affect on other regional
players, who might view the new relationship as a little too cosy
for comfort. Pyongyang has certainly been isolated by this
evolution, as it can no longer play China and Russia off against
one another. Japan and South Korea may also be threatened by
such a development in the future. Such is the paradox of
bilateral confidence building in a regional context: confidence
building in one case can stimulate confidence erosion in another.
RUSSO-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS Russia has eyed South Korea as a
possible substitute economic partner for Japan, yet despite
surging two-way trade, which has doubled in the last five years,
the economic and political cooperation foreseen when diplomatic
relations were restored in 1990 has failed to materialize for two
main reasons: 1) Seoul's suspension of economic aid due to
Moscow's tardy servicing of interest payments on previous loans;
and 2) Russia's refusal to pay compensation for victims of the
Korean Air Lines flight shot down ten years ago. However, the
successful summit meetings between Kim Young- sam and Boris
Yeltsin held in June, look to have served to kick-start an
increasingly cooperative relationship.
Military ties have been expanding rapidly and Russia is hoping to
expand military cooperation with South Korea. In August 1993, a
Russian flotilla paid a goodwill visit to Pusan, the first since
1904, while two South Korean ships made a return port call in
Vladivostok one month later. Russia has proposed joint naval
drills but Seoul has yet to agree. An agreement for personnel
exchanges, including defence ministers and ranking military
officials has been signed. Russia envisages increased military
exchanges, leading to joint rescue exercises for fishing boats
and ultimately combined drills. They have agreed to co-produce
modern weapons, utilizing South Korean capital and marketing
expertise and Russia's technological expertise. They have
established a hot line between the Kremlin and the Blue House,
which was used one week after installation during the mounting
crisis in June. During Kim Young-sam's summit trip, he visited
the Russian Fleet in Vladivostok, a very symbolic end to their
Cold-War tensions and a strong message to North Korea.
Russia seems to have little concern for the impact that closer
relations with Seoul will have on Pyongyang. Although North
Korea still permits Russia overflight rights en route to Vietnam,
the two countries have ceased joint naval manoeuvres since 1990.
Russia has also terminated nuclear and military assistance to its
former close ally. Although the Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Military Assistance signed in 1961 remains in
effect, Article 1 which promises military intervention in the
event of conflict is essentially null and void. Of note, at the
request of the Russian Foreign Ministry, a meeting was held
between foreign ministry officials for the first time in two
years, indicating moves to restore relations. The topic for
discussion was the North Korean nuclear issue.
NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS The North-South relationship is
currently at an impasse, as Pyongyang insists on dealing directly
with the United States on the NPT issue. However, North and South
Korea had made progress in the realm of confidence building by
agreeing to The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and
Exchange and Cooperation at the sixth Inter-Korean prime
minister's talks in 1990. During the talks, Seoul indicated its
acceptance of Pyongyang's proposal for simultaneous, mutual
inspections, and went further to propose a simultaneous trial
inspection at the end of January 1992. In addition, they signed
the Joint North-South Declaration on Denuclearisation, 31
December 1991, pledging the renunciation of nuclear processing
and uranium enrichment facilities and a North-South reciprocal
inspection, to be carried out by the Joint Nuclear Control
Commission (JNCC). Disagreements over the scope of inspections
and necessity of challenge inspections prohibited progress of the
JNCC and served as a warning sign to Seoul that Pyongyang was
stalling for time to develop its nuclear weapons capabilities.
However, regardless of previous steps and agreements relating to
arms control and confidence building, it would seem that there is
little hope for the resumption of positive steps until the NPT
crisis is resolved.
There has been endless debate regarding the use of carrots and/or
sticks in dealing with Pyongyang's intransigence. The main
carrot to be offered by both Seoul and the international
community would be economic assistance while the primary stick
would be economic sanctions. However, although investment is
desperately needed, it would almost certainly be accompanied by a
foreign presence, which brings both polluting influences to North
Korean society and potential witnesses of North Korea's decay and
suspected human rights violations, turning a carrot into a
"poisoned carrot."
The challenge for Kim Jong Il is how to attract desperately
needed foreign investment and aid without allowing information
from the outside world to filter in, or permitting the
international community to truly witness the state of internal
affairs. Confirmation of reported human rights violations would
almost certainly pose barriers to valuable economic aid, and
Pyongyang must surely be sensitive to Washington's policy towards
China, which linking the renewal of Most Favoured Nation (MFN)
status with an improvement in its human rights record. There is
clearly an inverse relationship between the amount of information
that seeps in or seeps out, and the prospects for the survival of
the Kim regime. However, the situation will be even more of a
question mark until it is determined just what strategy Kim Jong
Il will utilize to hold onto power, openness or isolation, and if
indeed he survives, politically or literally.
BILATERAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES: A SUMMARY Bilateral
confidence building measures can be useful in dealing with the
issue-specific nature of relations in Northeast Asia and they
provide flexibility in circumventing stumbling blocks that would
otherwise be road blocks in a multilateral confidence building
regime. The proposals suggested here are extremely modest and
militarily insignificant, primarily utilising information and
communication CBMs, while leaving verification and constraint
CBMs for application after some barriers of mistrust and
misperception have been broken down. Verification plays a vital
role in confidence building, but at the outset it is important
for nations to get to the table and establish channels for
dialogue. There is reason for caution however. With every
improvement in bilateral relations, there is the possibility of a
counter-reaction by another regional member, who may feel
threatened when a previously adversarial or benign relationship
improves, as evidenced by North Korea's mounting feeling of
isolation.. For this reason, it is important to work
simultaneously toward enhancing a regional security dialogue
process as well.
AN EXERCISE IN REGIONAL COOPERATION
For a number of years now, there have been a host of proposals
tabled to establish a framework for a multilateral security
dialogue in Asia, at both regional and subregional levels.
Although opposed at first by the Americans, Japanese and Chinese,
there has been a gradual acceptance of the idea but difficulties
have arisen over the form. Finally, on a large regional scale,
there is now the ASEAN Regional Forum at the governmental level
and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Asia-
Pacific (CSCAP) at the non- governmental level as venues for
dialogue. Establishing a consensus on or implementing confidence
building measures on such a wide scale however, is difficult at
best due to the large number of countries involved and their
divergent interests.
The difficulty in establishing a regional security framework is
in trying to find a common, tangible interest that all states
benefit from and none suffer. As Stewart Henderson notes:
States do not base their security on altruistic, unfounded
notions of cooperation. It is
only through an appeal to national interests that the building
blocks of a cooperative
security system will be put in place. Cooperative security is
not a theory but a
practical method of dealing with important issues.
Some had stated that the North Korean NPT crisis could have
served as a focal point for regional cooperation, since it is the
greatest threat to regional and quite possibly international
security. This issue, more than any other issue, demonstrates the
perils associated with lack of trust, the absence of reliable
information and insensitivity to the fears of other states.
However, as descibed earlier in this paper, although the NPT
crisis has served as a catalyst in bringing together nations that
would otherwise not cooperate on international foreign policy, it
has also served as a divisive issue, underscoring the
difficulties inherent in the multilateral approach to problem
solving. Therefore, although it is in the interests of all to
continue to work together to improve the situation on the Korean
peninsula, it does not quite fit the aforementioned criteria as
an ideal problem solving solution to enhancing regional
cooperation.
It is a tall order to find such a common problem acceptable for
cooperation by all Northeast Asian states, but there is one that
exists now, is a threat to all in the region, and which all
states, even North Korea, can cooperate in addressing. This is
the dumping of nuclear waste (primarily and most extensively by
Russia) into the Sea of Japan.
In April 1993, it was revealed that Moscow had been dumping
nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan at least since the earliest
records were kept in 1966. Public outcry has been especially loud
in Japan, as the dumping is practically on its doorstep but both
Koreas and China have also condemned the dumping. Tokyo was
particularly enraged that Moscow would dump nuclear waste on
Japan's doorstep only days after Yeltsin visited Japan to improve
bilateral relations, seemingly without any warning.
Russia claims that it has no choice by to dump the waste at sea
because it lacks the storage capacity on land and the amount
currently stored on floating tankers is growing as submarines and
other atomic powered navy vessels are being decommissioned. In
late February, Russia said that it could not ratify the permanent
ban on nuclear dumping but would "endeavour to avoid pollution of
the sea by dumping of wastes and other matter" according to the
International Maritime Organization. However, subsequent reports
indicate that Russia sees the need to continue dumping. Japan has
recently pledged $100 million to help with the construction of
storage facilities. Japan has agreed to finance the construction
of a reprocessing plant by Japanese firms in Russia's Far East if
Russia stops the dumping, although these would take two years to
construct.
Although there are numerous multilateral environmental and
economic cooperative projects already underway and highly
successful, this situation is unique in that it is a highly
visible problem, politically significant, emotional and cuts
across political, environmental, security, and nuclear safety
concerns and thus provides a good opportunity for joint
cooperative efforts in achieving a common goal. This issue
overlaps a wide range of government agencies and officials from
departments of foreign affairs, environment, science and
technology, national security and maritime and port
administrations. Cooperation by similar ministries of the
regional members could be a prime example of non-traditional CBM,
as it would establish a channel for dialogue in which all have a
common goal. Likely 80% of the people who would be involved in
an arms control and confidence building dialogue would have to be
involved in such a project.
The issue is not only the dumping of low level radioactive waste,
which is a highly visible, political and psychological issue, but
is also dealing with the spent fuel rods upon decommissioning.
These rods, which are highly radio-active and can be reprocessed
for use in a bomb pose both a safety and a safeguards risk.
Finally, there is the issue of the reactor, which must be
physically extracted from the vessels and dealt with effectively.
In the past, they have been dumped in the ocean as well. With
100 more ships to be decommissioned in the near future, 30-40 of
which use nuclear propulsion, this issue is timely and a time-
bomb, not only in the environmental sense but as it affects
Russia's relations with its neighbours. It is critical to view
such an approach not as an opportunity to gang-up on Russia and
condemn it for what is has done, for this would be a confidence-
destroying measure. Rather, it should be viewed as a
constructive way to improve the situation for all in the region
by mobilizing finanical resources, technology and enthusiasm from
where they exist and utilize them to jointly address a problem
that affects all in thre region.
The public perception of nuclear issues, be it weapons or energy
or waste, is of great concern to the all Northeast Asian
administrations, who are all committed to nuclear energy.
Negative press on this issue could pose domestic challenges as
people question the safety of the nuclear energy option. This
could provide the Northeast Asian states with a viable, necessary
and mutually beneficial project for cooperation. Coupled with
efforts to improve bilateral relations, an issue driven framework
could be expanded into a regional security dialogue in the
future, once efforts on the bilateral side level address the
stumbling blocks to larger cooperation and facilitate the view
of a common house.
