

CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN NORTHEAST ASIA: EXAMINING MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL DYNAMICS AT WORK

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The Asia-Pacific region has witnessed remarkable changes over the past few decades; most states in the region have posted double-digit economic growth, developed more representative political institutions ("democracy" in Asia has its own flavour), and have improved relations among themselves. However, the post-cold war era, while bringing many positive developments has also led to uncertainty, as the once familiar playing field has become one with new and unfamiliar parameters, leaving nations to speculate about where the primary threat to their security is originating.

As countries in the region struggle to identify and address these ill-defined threats, some misperceive the resultant actions as offensive preparations, based in part on logical calculations but often to a degree on underlying mistrust related to historical,

economic or diplomatic factors. To prevent a buildup of weapons in a time of relative peace, it is essential for nations of the region to begin dismantling the barriers to better understanding of their neighbours. Although many have called for a multilateral framework within which to undertake such confidence building measures (CBMs), others have argued that too many barriers exist for a multilateral framework to be effective.

Confidence building is not simply the negotiation or the adoption of specific measures, but rather it is the relationship between negotiation and implementation that is the key, which ultimately leads to a transformation in threat perceptions. Although recent history has demonstrated that confidence building measures can be portable, it is ineffective to simply apply a blanket package of confidence building measures to a situation and expect them to be effective, even if they had been completely successful in previous circumstances.

Over the past five or six years, a variety of proposals have been tabled to transfer the structures and measures of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to the Asia-Pacific region. However, great controversy has arisen because those specific arrangements cannot effectively address the distinct differences in history, culture, force structure, domestic politics, levels of economic development, nor the intra-regional animosities and rivalries, non-contiguous nature of states or divergent threat perceptions. As James Macintosh notes, "disassociated from the larger political process and purpose, confidence building loses much of its meaning and becomes a narrow, information enhancing activity incapable of fundamentally altering a security relationship." However, this is not to say that the lessons learned cannot be applied with care and attention.

In a multilateral framework, like the CSCE, positive developments in some areas can be held up by unrelated problems existing between other countries. Consensus is not easily achieved and the timing for solving these problems is critical; the resolution of issues may be impeded if efforts are not actively pursued at the bilateral level, where a "window of opportunity" may exist for solving each problem. It is unlikely that these opportunities will occur simultaneously in a multilateral context. As an example of the difficulty of reaching consensus on anything in Northeast Asia, the attempt by the United Nations Security Council to agree upon and pass a resolution on the application of sanctions to North Korea in June 1994, in response to its recalcitrance on the nuclear issue will be examined, highlighting the challenges inherent in multilateral problem-solving efforts and illustrating the fact that the North Korean nuclear crisis of June was ultimately solved along bilateral lines. Additionally, the reasons why consensus was

impossible to reach, or in other words, the individual reasons for each country to support or not to support sanctions will be put forth, showing the complexity of the competing interests in the region.

For this reason, it is essential to continue to pay heed to the importance of bilateral relationships in the region, not only to maintain the good ones but to seek to improve those characterized by some degree of strain. Relying only on a web of bilateral alliances would be a regression in security thinking, but rather active pursuit of problem solving efforts at the bilateral level, in order to facilitate the development of a cooperative security regime is the only way to effectively address the common problems that exist in the Northeast Asian region. In this vein, the second section of this paper will examine the bilateral relationships in the region, identify the stumbling blocks to confidence and trust, and give suggestions of modest CBMs.

Common security problems, such as environmental degradation, migration flows, security of the sea lanes of communication, resource claims, drug trafficking, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, sustainable energy (nuclear), safety of nuclear facilities, and storage of nuclear waste all require cooperative efforts to be effectively addressed. Some can function as catalysts in the development of a multilateral consultative structure, while others will need to be settled within such a structure once it develops. Although such aforementioned problems pose a security risk to all, a conflict of interest is likely to develop in many of the cases, between polluters and the polluted or between proliferators and non-proliferators.

Those issues which have the potential to be catalysts in the development of a regional regime demonstrate the necessity of giving equal attention to both function and form, where function should receive even more attention than form at the outset. There is a great deal of talk about form, but not enough about function. The terms "architecture" and "structure" receive a great deal of ink, while practical assessments of such proposals receive insufficient consideration. Cooperative security should be "issue driven" and realistic. The last section of this paper will suggest a project which could meet the criteria involved in this line of thinking.

Confidence building measures will have to be modest at the outset, as they were in the European context twenty years ago when the institutionalized process began, involving primarily information and communication military CBMs which were implemented against the backdrop of increased cultural contacts between adversaries. Their value will be as much in the process of consultation that develops as in the value of the information exchanged, laying the groundwork for a regular dialogue channel

in the event of heightened tensions in the future. However, if the confidence building efforts are truly successful, such a tense situation might never develop.

THE CHALLENGES OF PROBLEM SOLVING IN A MULTILATERAL CONTEXT

In June 1994, nothing has captured the attention of the world like the mounting crisis over North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program and its continued intransigence regarding its refusal to submit to inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Its actions had many implications: 1) it challenged the integrity of the non-proliferation movement and the NPT, up for renewal in 1995; 2) it threatened the security environment of the Asia-Pacific region but especially Northeast Asia; and most directly 3) it put the safety of 70 million people on the Korean peninsula at great risk. Of course, this was nothing new, for we have all been following it at least since Pyongyang's announcement in March 1993 of its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

For the purposes of this discussion, the events of June 1994 will serve as an illustration of the articulation between multilateral and bilateral processes at work in the Northeast Asian region. From there, factors will be suggested which may have worked to enhance or prevent the support of sanctions by each of the main actors in the conflict, illustrating the difficulty in establishing a effective multilateral political/military framework in Northeast Asia.

THE CRISIS OF JUNE 1994

To set the stage, on May 27, Pyongyang refused to shut down the refuelling of its nuclear reactor or identify the critical 89 fuel rods which replaced the broken ones in 1989, which the IAEA needed to analyze the history of the reactor. It is suspected that North Korea reprocessed in 1989, the last time that the reactor was reloaded, and a time when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors had been barred from observation. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) warned North Korea to cooperate with the inspectors, and cease changing fuel rods without the presence of inspectors. A veiled reference to mild economic sanctions was made, which North Korea rejected, refusing to allow the United States and the IAEA to stifle [the]country.

On May 30, South Korean President Kim Young-sam ordered case-by-case countermeasures against North Korea's possible nuclear weapons program, noting that upon entering a serious stage in relations, the South Korean government should prepare itself for the possibility that the UNSC would take up the problem. It didn't ease matters when North Korea test fired a silkworm missile into the Sea of Japan.

By the first of June, Seoul was ready to consider sanctions, although lawmakers were divided over their effectiveness. The South Korean government began to consider banning trade and other forms of contact with the North, but was still looking for a negotiated settlement with Pyongyang. While visiting in Seoul, China's Vice Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan showed reluctance to join international pressure against North Korea, emphasizing that "a superpower like the United States should not wield its power ruthlessly against a small power" like North Korea. Despite such statements in Seoul, at the UNSC meeting in New York, China did not try to tone down the strongly worded statement issued by the UNSC May 30, which was a significant departure from its previous performance in the security meetings. This could be viewed as a means of demonstrating some semblance of a compromise with the West. In cooperation, it also pledged to stop supplying food and oil to North Korea in addition to halting border trade, a promise which if carried out earnestly, would have significant impacts on North Korea. Yeltsin also threw Russia's support into the international community's camp, when he promised Kim Young-sam that he would support sanctions if negotiations were unsuccessful. Russia's idea of convening an eight-party conference to deal with the nuclear issue was again floated by Russian Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov in Seoul, but without much response. Some degree of consensus regarding the seriousness of the situation seemed to be taking shape and on the surface it appeared that an agreement on sanctions might be possible. However, in reality at this point it was quite clear that a meaningful sanctions package would not likely get China's or even Russia's approval.

On June 2, Washington pledged to seek sanctions and cancelled the third round of high level talks, after the IAEA reported that it could no longer guarantee that Pyongyang had not diverted plutonium, given that the North had already removed all but 1800 fuel rods from the reactor. With tensions soaring, Pyongyang reiterated its previous warning that sanctions would be tantamount to a declaration of war. During talks with Kim Young-sam, Yeltsin officially stated that Moscow would not extend its military treaty with Pyongyang. This was particularly significant as it came at a time of high tensions on the peninsula.

On June 3 (Washington), the IAEA offered another possible route for Pyongyang to comply, by allowing special inspections of the nuclear waste sites, since it could not examine the used fuel rods, now almost entirely in the cooling pond. At the same time, the United States began intensive consultations with Tokyo, Moscow and Seoul. Discussions touched on the option of "allied sanctions" in the event that Beijing vetoed UN sanctions. Japan, under mounting pressure to show its solidarity with the international community's commitment, prepared a 10-point package

of economic sanctions that it could enforce against North Korea, although the government was clearly apprehensive about possible retaliation by its pro-Pyongyang Korean community. Sanctions also posed difficulty for the shaky Hata minority government, which was treading carefully so as not to alienate the large Japan Socialist Party (JSP), which has significant backing from the pro-Pyongyang Korean minority.

June 6 saw some very serious statements. US Secretary of Defense William Perry, although not recommending such action at the time, stated that a pre-emptive strike on North Korea's nuclear installations was not out of the question, a reversal of his stance two months prior. While South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo was on his way to New York to address the UNSC, President Kim Young-sam also came out with a stiff and terse warning for the neighbour to the North, stating that North Korea would face destruction if didn't abandon its nuclear program. "We will not tolerate North Korean possession of even half a nuclear bomb," he threatened, which was the first time that he had retaliated verbally against the North on the issue. This show of solidarity was underscored by a joint statement issued by the US, Japan and South Korea, declaring that the international community should make the appropriate responses, including sanctions. The result was a draft for a two-stage embargo against North Korea, beginning with limited economic sanctions and moving to a total trade stoppage. The resolve of the "allies" appears strong.

Not to be pushed around without a fight, the following day Pyongyang threatened to quit the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), declaring that it would no longer feel the need to be part of the IAEA if it felt too much pressure. Conflicting sentiments regarding Russia's eight-party conference proposal were registered: North Korea's Foreign Minister Kim Young-nam said that he was considering the idea, while a North Korean diplomat in Geneva that it was not a matter for an international conference because the issue was between North Korea and the United States -- if it were a general nuclear disarmament matter, it might have been possible but on this issue, it was not a suitable approach to pursue, he stated. Russia was not on side with its former ally either. In the recently concluded meetings with Kim Young-sam, Russia had promised to participate in international sanctions. Back in Seoul, President Kim Young-sam called a National Security Council Meeting. The objectives were threefold: to show the world, the North Korean administration and the South Korean people the seriousness with which Seoul was approaching this situation.

However, despite what appears to be consensus among "the players", there was still one holdout. As Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo was on his way to Beijing to discuss the nuclear issue,

Chinese President Jiang Zemin was pledging to Choi Gwang, chief of the General Staff of the Korean Peoples' Army, Beijing's unwavering friendship with Pyongyang. Without mentioning the nuclear crisis, he proclaimed "Our two communist parties, two countries and two armies have a tradition of friendly relationships," . These sentiments were echoed by Choi's Chinese counterpart, Zhang Wannian, who reportedly said:

"The traditional friendship between China and North Korea has been formed by the blood of the Chinese people and the military, and the heroic people of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea who achieved a great success in building a nation and military under the leadership of President Kim Il-sung."

June 8 saw a significant split in the international resolve on the sanctions, or basically between China and "the others" in the international community. China slammed the idea of sanctions, saying that they would aggravate the situation in Beijing's opinion. It is possible that China was attempting to increase its influence over Pyongyang by assuming a more sympathetic attitude, in order to reach a negotiated settlement, and/or it believed that the "cure" (sanctions) was more dangerous than the "disease" (North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons capability). Effective sanctions could have precipitated a collapse of the North Korean regime, bringing about instability on the peninsula which is one of China's backyards. North Korea's envoy to the IAEA reiterated North Korea's firm stance against inspections of the two nuclear waste sites. On the other side of the field, South Korean officials called for joint readiness of South Korean and American forces, increased surveillance activities and strengthened early warning capabilities. Sanctions were seen to be unavoidable by both South Korea and the US, who would not be intimidated by threats. President Yeltsin, using a hotline set up on the basis of agreements made the previous week in Moscow, called President Kim Young-sam to reiterate his continued support for sanctions. All for one and one for all, except China.

By June 9, the IAEA drafted up its own set of sanctions against North Korea, to freeze about \$500-600,000 worth of technical aid a year to North Korea. After promising the visiting Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo its "best efforts" to resolve the nuclear standoff, China abstained during the vote on the IAEA's draft resolution, which was significant because many might have been reluctant to support the motion if China directly opposed. In response, the North Korean envoy Yun Ho-jin emphatically stated that North Korea would not allow any more inspections and suggested that the IAEA inspectors in North Korea would have to leave. Washington continued to talk tough about pushing forward .on a UN resolution. Perhaps in the hope of securing Russia's

declared support for sanctions, Washington finally endorsed Russia's eight-party conference plan. At this heightened state of tension, the "powers" appear to have a fairly strong front, although China is a question mark.

On June 14, in preparation for unforeseen developments at the heightened level of tension, Seoul ordered civil defense drills involving 6.6 million civil defense corps members, to organize evacuations and provide first aid for air raid victims. These beefed up drills, which had been held regularly in the past, though on a much smaller scale, captured the attention of the international media, which focussed on a "frenzied situation" in South Korea, where all South Koreans were stocking up on ramyon (instant noodles) and buying gas masks. Of course, the recent events had been serious enough to catch the attention of the South Koreans, who are usually quite complacent regarding any imminent threat from the North, something that has become part of their daily lives. Certainly many started making preparations, but not anywhere near the level depicted in the media. That hype combined with usual North Korean rhetoric generated North Korean verbal attacks on the South for drumming up tension on the peninsula. The following day, North Korea announced its intention to pullout of the IAEA, although no mention of the fate of the inspectors was made.

The ante was upped after that statement. North Korea called for direct talks with the US on the 14th. Russia's Foreign Minister Kozyrev said that he saw sanctions as only a last resort. China, continuing to maintain its somewhat ambiguous position, made a statement, declaring "We hearby deplore the adverse turn of events. The Chinese government once again appeals to all parties concerned to be cool-headed and to exercise restraint."

At this critical juncture of June 14, under great pressure, the fissures in the multilateral effort began to grow. Pyongyang went ahead and officially withdrew from the IAEA, the first country to ever quit the international agency. The United States tabled a draft at the UNSC, delineating a two-phased approach and giving Pyongyang a month to comply with the safeguards accord and implement the inter-Korean declaration. Reaction to the proposal was the least supportive compared to any of the previous drafts. The South Korean opposition objected to using neighbouring countries to push through an embargo which could lead to war, challenging South Korea to lead the way. China rejected the draft, urging further negotiations. It also emphasized that "China, in principle, doesn't subscribe to the involvement of the Security Council in the nuclear issue of the Korean peninsula or resorting to sanctions to solve it. The only way is direct dialogue." Russia, angry about not being consulted in advance on the draft, withheld its support, not because it opposed the contents but rather because it was not consulted during the

preparation. Japan, although supportive would certainly have preferred not to have to enforce sanctions. This is the last true test of the will to cooperate on sanctions. It failed.

The Carter visit is still something that I do not completely understand, but although people were very sceptical of its potential to diffuse the tension and broker some peace, in the end it turned out to ease tension considerably. Where did the idea of Carter come from? It is not certain, but in mid-May during the former South Korean opposition leader/human rights championer Kim Dae-jung's visit to Washington, he brought up a possible role for Carter to Washington officials. To defuse the crisis with North Korea, he suggested dispatching "an elder statesman, respected internationally, trusted by the Chinese and North Koreans and sharing the views of President Clinton." He noted that face-saving is "even more important in dealing with North Korea, a country ruled for five decades by one man with absolute authority, Kim Il-sung." He noted that dispatching Rev. Billy Graham in early February with Clinton's personal message apparently increased Kim Il-sung's readiness to negotiate. He mentioned that North Korea had long admired President Carter.

On June 16, taking a somewhat moderate approach, Washington offered Pyongyang a grace period to settle the dispute before sanctions would be activated and indicated it would impose tougher measures only if Pyongyang took further steps to threaten security. In addition, the South Korean ruling Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) asked the government to reconsider the denuclearization policy, which is based on the Joint Declaration for Denuclearization of the Peninsula, given the fact that North Korea appeared to have clearly violated it and looked unlikely to abide in the future after its announced withdrawal from the IAEA.

After arriving in Pyongyang on the June 15, by the 17th, Carter and Kim were making promises. Kim Il-sung authorized a joint search for American MIAs of the Korean War, agreed to freeze nuclear activities and to allow international nuclear inspectors to remain in North Korea. On the other side, Carter announced that the movement for sanctions had been suspended and that Washington had provisionally agreed to a third round of talks and support for acquiring a light water reactor.

Washington, however denied that sanctions were on hold and stated its commitment to pursue them until Kim's pledges could be measured in deeds. Reaction from Seoul was also reserved, based on years of deep feelings of distrust and a belief that Carter's visit was more of a photo opportunity than a chance for a resolution to the conflict. Carter explained his opposition to sanctions: Declarations of sanctions would be considered as an insult to their nation, branding it as an outlaw country and an insult to their so-called great leader, by branding him as a liar

and a criminal. Although many people would suggest that past deeds warrant such a characterization of Kim Il-sung and believe that you should "call a spade a spade", Carter's face-saving treatment of Kim Il-sung earned a lot of mileage. However, it is certain that many South Koreans and also officials in Washington considered Carter's approach and moves naive in dealing with someone such as cagey as Kim Il-sung. In his recommendations to Washington to establish formal relations with Pyongyang, he added, "Diplomatic relations are not a gift or favour or reward to be handed out between two countries. It's a common belief that the exchange of ambassadors and opening of relations is of mutual benefit. My opinion is that it would be of great mutual benefit to have open communication and better understanding between my country and North Korea." During Carter's meeting with Kim Young-sam June 18, he delivered a proposal by Kim Il-sung to meet with his South Korean counterpart "anywhere, at anytime, without any conditions," which Kim Young-sam accepted immediately, indicating the sooner the better.

Although it cannot be determined how much Carter's visit changed Kim Il-sung's position in the nuclear standoff or whether it was more of a face-saving "out" of an increasingly hopeless situation for both sides, it was later learned that days prior to Carter's visit, China's Foreign Ministry in Beijing called in the North Korean ambassador and warned that his government could not depend indefinitely on Chinese support in the confrontation with the United States over the nuclear issue and that it would be in Pyongyang's best interests to cooperate more with international efforts to inspect its nuclear facilities. Not only was this a significant move on China's part after opposing the international call for sanctions, but it also marked a big change in China's previously stated stance that it maintained little or no influence over North Korea.

Over the next week, while the parties involved were trying to establish the sincerity of recent pledges, tension eased gradually and offers for bilateral improvements in relations began to flow in. Japan's then Foreign Minister Koji Kakizawa offered to help Pyongyang convert its nuclear facilities to a light water reactor in a gesture aimed at normalizing bilateral relations, coming the day after Carter returned to Seoul. In a possible return gesture, Pyongyang lifted a ban on Japanese tourists, implemented in June 1993, although this cannot be seen as purely a goodwill gesture, given that Pyongyang desperately needs foreign exchange. Once the moves were afoot to realize the historic North-South summit, Seoul offered to encourage phased economic cooperation, beginning with small-sized joint ventures in light industry, leading to cooperation in mining, agriculture and communications fields, ultimately fostering an economic community. The development of rail links and direct navigation routes were also proposed. Private businesses, anxious to

implement long awaited plans for joint ventures or investment, began to talk seriously again of the possibilities. The issue of sanctions fell to the background, as tensions subsided. Everyone breathed a sigh of relief. All parties were let off the hook.

FACTORS PROMOTING AND PREVENTING CONSENSUS ON SANCTIONS

In the Northeast Asian region, the circumstances that drive policies in each country are far from homogeneous, which is one of the reasons why the establishment of a much talked about multilateral security forum is so challenging. Consensus is often almost impossible to reach. The following section suggests (the lists are not exhaustive) possible reasons for and against supporting sanctions, illustrating the challenges to multilateralism in the security field.

CHINA

REASONS FOR SUPPORTING SANCTIONS 1) Preserving the great strides made over the past three years in its relationship with South Korea. Particularly in the area of economic cooperation and trade, China and South Korea have become valuable partners. In order to preserve this important relationship, China does not want to be drawn into a situation where it has to play its last card. Although if push came to shove and it had to choose one of the two to be partners with, it would almost certainly give the nod to Seoul, it does have an interest in maintaining relations with Pyongyang. China played a much greater role in cooperating with the international community against its formerly close ally than it would have a few years ago, although it was the main holdout in the search for a consensus on sanctions. 2) Preventing North Korea from going nuclear. A nuclear armed North Korea would force both South Korea and Japan to consider their non-nuclear pledges. 3) Preventing friction with the US, after tensions regarding Most Favoured Nation (MFN) trading status, human rights, arms sales and recent underground testing. China doesn't need another flare up with the US.

REASONS FOR OPPOSING SANCTIONS

1) Preserving stability on its frontier. Nuclear weapons on the peninsula would alter the security equation in the region however more importantly from China's perspective, a North Korea with nuclear weapons would not pose as much of a threat to China as a collapsing North Korea. China has an interest in preventing a hard landing for North Korea as it enters the international arena. In the event of collapse, China would be forced to consider intervention lest the United States and South Korea move in to establish order, removing the buffer area on that Chinese

border. Whether one considers that sanctions would preserve stability or threaten stability really depends upon one's perspective. 2) Prevention of further feelings of isolation by Pyongyang which could provoke a rash response. North Korea's isolation, upon Seoul's normalization of relations with both the Soviet Union/Russia and China has been cited as one cause for Pyongyang's recalcitrance and pursuit of nuclear weapons as an equalizer in the unfavourable shift in the military balance. 3) Possibility of more leverage by being "on side" than against Pyongyang. Beijing has continually denied any significant leverage over Pyongyang, although it appears that its actions behind the scenes just prior to Carter's visit may have laid the foundation for a more receptive Kim Il-sung. 4) Feelings of "kinship" for its comrades in arms. The octogenarian leadership of both China and North Korea have had an enduring relationship for over 40 years. Although not always on the best of terms, the octogenarian set in China is likely the only group in the world to possibly know the North Korean leadership well. Despite their differences, they may have felt great difficulty in completely abandoning their former comrades in arms. 5) Inability to effectively enforce sanctions along the border. Trade along the remote border of Jilin Province, formed by the Tumen River, accounts for more than 40% of North Korea's trade with China. The trade is important to the local economy on the Chinese side, which is home to most of China's Korean minority. Attempts to enforce the sanctions would have been difficult at best. 6) Irritation by Washington's continued interference on human rights. It could be said that Beijing threw its support in the sanctions ring after Washington granted MFN privileges at the end of May. However, if the US irritated China enough, China could use the sanctions card to frustrate the US and demonstrate its strength. 7) China dual role as both an emerging superpower and as a representative of developing nations. China stated that the United States shouldn't push around smaller nations like North Korea. 8) China is willing to support arms control relative to other countries but doesn't want to draw attention to its own program or set a precedent for retaliation. Despite movements toward the extension of the NPT and a ratification of a CTBT, China has conducted two tests in less than a year, to the great disappointment of other nations.

JAPAN

REASONS FOR SUPPORTING SANCTIONS (basically international)

- 1) Demonstrate commitment to the US-Japan relationship but also to follow the US lead in security issues, despite trade tensions.
- 2) Show commitment to international security efforts, after its hesitancy to respond during the Gulf War and international criticism of its chequebook diplomacy.
- 3) Demonstrate its commitment to the non-proliferation movement. There are

suspicions that if North Korea were proven to have nuclear capability, Japan would entertain the thought of developing its own arsenal. 4) Ensure that it has a place at the table regarding issues related to Korea. If it didn't support sanctions and contribute to solving the issue, its role in contributing to the Korean problem in the first place as a colonial power could have been emphasized. 5) Preserve the modest improvements made in Japanese-South Korean political and economic relations, despite still suffering lack of trust in military and social relations.

REASONS FOR OPPOSING SANCTIONS (basically domestic)

1) Political liquidity of Japanese domestic politics. Now on its third Prime Minister in almost as many months, Japan is led by a shaky coalition government, which affects consistent foreign policy. 2) Strong influence of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). The current leader, Tomoichi Murayama is the first socialist leader in four decades. Although considered a moderate, the JSP has not supported sanctions. 3) Difficulty in controlling remittances to North Korea Although Murayama is seen as a moderate, the Japan Socialist Party receives a significant amount of support from the pro- Pyongyang Korean minority and would face great opposition from that small but quite powerful group. 4) Threats by Pyongyang that any actions to cut off remittances will result in retaliation. Many people feel that Japan is a primary target for North Korean missiles, possibly more so than the Korean brethren in the South. 5) Domestic opposition to participation of the Self Defence Forces (SDF) in an international embargo. Japan's current constitution would not allow Japan to participate in a UN embargo. The issue of constitutional revision is a hot topic both in Japan and within the region. 6) Fears of reprisal for "squeezing" the Korean minority in Japan. By attacking the pro- Pyongyang Korean community in Japan, Tokyo could have a significant "minority" issue on its hands, if the pro-Seoul Koreans rally behind their brethren, seeing the issue as another slap in the face to the ever-oppressed Koreans in Japan.

RUSSIA

REASONS FOR SUPPORTING SANCTIONS

1) Demonstrate commitment to burgeoning Russian-South Korean relations. Seoul and Moscow have made great strides in economic, diplomatic, and military cooperation in a very short time. 2) Demonstrate commitment to its place in "the western camp" and at try to hold onto a role as a political power, if it cannot be an economic power at this point. 3) Demonstrate commitment to the NPT and prevent blame being laid for already contributing to North Korean nuclear weapons development. 4) Keep the West happy. Russia's reliance on western aid/support for its political and economic survival limits its ability to take stands against those

supplying such aid.

REASONS FOR OPPOSING SANCTIONS

1) Retaliation for not being consulted on draft resolution in mid-June. 2) Desire to demonstrate that its vote still counts and has some clout.

SOUTH KOREA

REASONS FOR SUPPORTING SANCTIONS

1) Take an active role in drafting sanctions, rather than being marginalized by Pyongyang 2) Reassert and maintain the co-lead in the negotiations with North Korea, vis-a-vis the United States. Not only did North Korea succeed in marginalizing Seoul, but also the United States effectively marginalized South Korea as well. 3) Assure South Korea a co-lead position in any regional negotiating forum, either during the push for sanctions or in a post-sanctions situation.

REASONS FOR OPPOSING SANCTIONS

1) Fear of retaliation by Pyongyang if sanctions are imposed. The "sea of fire" comment will not be soon forgotten. 2) Give Pyongyang "a way out" by dealing with South Korea, despite constant marginalization by Pyongyang as it dealt primarily with the United States. 3) Fear of economic collapse and subsequent hard landing. South Korea is keenly aware of the costs of unification, which would be significantly higher in the event of collapse in the North. After tasting the benefits of economic growth and prosperity, many South Koreans do not wish to take a step down in that standard of living, a situation sure to arise if the North experiences a hard landing.

UNITED STATES

REASONS FOR SUPPORTING SANCTIONS

1) Show strong resolve in foreign policy which has been under fire for being too weak and inconsistent under Clinton. 2) Demonstrate commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region in general and to South Korea in particular. Concerns regarding the future of the US military presence and security guarantee in the Asia-Pacific region has generated numerous concerns. 3) Show strong resolve for enforcing the NPT and the global non-proliferation regime, by demonstrating to cheaters that they cannot avoid serious consequences. Deter threshold states from entertaining ideas of following North Korea's lead. The NPT extension conference and the drive for a CTBT weigh heavy on Washington's mind.

REASONS FOR OPPOSING SANCTIONS

1) If they were not 100% certain that they could 1) get consensus on sanctions and 2) ensure their effectiveness, sanctions should not have been pushed for. Sanctions are better as a threat than a reality. Once you move to sanctions and if they fail, the bargaining leverage is lost. 2) If sanctions succeed, they could cause either implosion (collapse) or explosion (retaliation). Both situations are extremely dangerous. 3) Avoid conflict with China.

LESSONS FROM THE DRIVE FOR SANCTIONS

We can see a direct relationship between the increasing prominence of sanctions and the growing tensions on the peninsula and among participants. However, as sanctions grew in importance, the consensus began to wane as individual factors or conditions affecting each individual player were brought into starker reality. Although there was unanimity on the severity of the situation, it was impossible to come to a consensus on the appropriate response, due to the stark differences in the circumstances related to their respective domestic and foreign policies.

The "sanctions of June issue" was in reality an attempt at alleviating the problem multilaterally but which was played out and ultimately solved along various bilateral lines, with both positive and negative results. As the tension reached its peak, the exercise became one of a bilateral showdown between North Korea and the United States, resulting fortunately in an improvement in their very strained relationship, and subsequently breathing new life into North-South dialogue, IAEA-North Korean dialogue, and further US-North Korean dialogue.

The complexity of the Northeast Asian region makes it difficult to reach multilateral consensus in a timely fashion. In this case, the value of the multilateral effort lay in 1) its success in defining the severity of the issue, 2) defining the priorities of the major players, 3) maintaining pressure while bilateral dynamics played out. In reality, despite how successfully the international community could rally together, what Pyongyang wanted was direct, high-level talks with the United States, which is exactly what it ultimately got. The nuclear card allowed the North Korean leadership attain and sustain (sometimes off and on) high level dialogue at the international negotiating table, most often with its desired partner, Washington.

It appears that bilateral efforts made the difference at critical junctures, but also served to derail the process from time to

time, such as US-China tensions over MFN and both Moscow's and Washington's infantile protests of not being consulted prior to the tabling of their respective proposals. The Carter visit let everyone off the hook in having to put their money where their mouths were. With the death of Kim Il-sung, the situation has now been frozen in time, giving all parties, including those of us trying to keep up with the situation, some time to breathe.

THE APPLICATION OF CBM MENUS IN BILATERAL CONTEXTS

In attempting to improve relations, timing is everything, and what can be offered or agreed upon by one party may not occur at the same time for all involved. In general, by continuing to strive for improvements in bilateral relationships, it is possible to take advantage of the "windows of opportunity" that may exist for solving a long standing problem or building confidence, which will not occur at the same time for all parties involved. By earnestly pursuing policies to understand and address the individual needs and concerns of Northeast Asian neighbours and in conjunction with efforts to establish regular channels of multilateral dialogue, it is possible to work toward an official multilateral dialogue in the future. However, it will always be a difficult struggle.

The bilateral relationships of Northeast Asia are characterised by an intricate blend of political/diplomatic, economic and military stumbling blocks while different priorities (economic growth, political reform, military modernisation) exist within each country each year. Based on the five Northeast Asian States (China, Japan, North Korea, Russia and South Korea, there are ten different bilateral relationships, only two of which have any current or previous alliance affiliation (North Korea-China and North Korea-Russia). As a result, there are eight independent relationships, falling at different points along the friend-enemy spectrum, which require the development of measures to promote trust and solve some persisting problems, so that central decision makers will come to see that neighbours are not the threat they once were or the threat they might become.

By initially utilising a combination of basic information, communication, and constraint CBMs, it is possible to attempt to negotiate, what Gerald Segal refers to as an effective menu of a la carte measures. For the Northeast Asian region, it is also important to include a category of non-traditional CBMs, either quasi-military or non-military CBMs, to deal with comprehensive security concerns, including economic, political, environmental and cultural security issues. Although not part of the European experience, they would prove useful in the intricate Northeast Asian security context. The measures proposed here are very modest in nature, like the Helsinki CBMs of 1975, yet they could provide a starting point in developing a habit of dialogue and

allow individual pairs of countries to move at their own pace in improving their relations and addressing issues of mutual concern. As most of the threats at this point are not imminent, this exercise has value in establishing avenues of dialogue before crisis situations occur and provides a foundation for a regional security dialogue and broader CBM regime in the future. The following section will trace recent developments in the eight bilateral relationships and delineate modest packages of CBMs that form the foundation for a more comprehensive regional security mechanism in the near future.

RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS The Northern Territories dispute serves as a diplomatic stumbling block to building confidence as it impedes developments in both the military and economic arenas; consequently, many have argued for delinking the territorial dispute from efforts to develop contacts in other areas. However, some progress has been made recently. Indeed, Russian President Boris Yeltsin finally visited Tokyo for a long awaited summit in October 1993, after failing to show for two previously scheduled summit meetings, where Yeltsin and then Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa discussed a proposal for the transfer of two of the four disputed islands. If realised, such a development would be the most significant in Japanese-Russian relations to date and would pave the way for greater cooperation, particularly economic, which Japan had stated cannot be fully realised until resolution of the dispute. Returning the disputed Northern Territories has met with strong opposition from within Russia for two reasons: 1) nationalist resistance to losing yet another piece of Russian territory, and more importantly 2) relinquishing the strategic advantages provided by the islands. The islands screen the Sea of Okhotsk, which hosts Russian submarine bases and ballistic-missile-firing area, serve as bases for advanced jet fighters and signals-intelligence posts, and bestow valuable mineral and fishing rights. Although there is little likelihood of Russian military aggression against Japan, the presence of Russian naval, air and ground forces within the sight of Hokkaido coupled with uncertainty in Russia's domestic politics is of concern to Tokyo.

An additional stumbling block in Russo-Japanese relations is Russia's persistent dumping of nuclear waste at sea, which has been carried out for over 20 years and which continues due to the "lack of funds" necessary to establish suitable land based storage. The dumping endangers both Japanese and South Korean waters and Russia has been pressuring Japan for aid in establishing a comprehensive waste disposal system.

Russia and Japan already signed an agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Sea in September 1992 and military officials have

been engaging in bilateral security dialogue. Yeltsin and Hosokawa agreed to increase high level exchanges of officials, promote non-proliferation, enhance the role of the United Nations and work to make Russia a part of the Asia-Pacific community. Further confidence building measures could include the following:

* No first use of force declaration * Exchange of data on defence spending, force structure and deployment. Japan is still concerned about Russian deployments in the Far East, especially after the conclusion of the CFE Treaty, and the fate of the Russian Pacific Fleet. * Exchange of military officials This should include contacts with both central and regional officials, as authority within Russia is steadily devolving to regional administrations and many decisions are increasingly being made by regional commands. * Notification of airforce and particularly naval manoeuvres and movements Japan's concern over security of the sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) makes this a particularly vital issue. The observation of military manoeuvres could be negotiated in the near future, after the mutual dialogue process is underway. * Establishment of a hot line and a cool line * Establishment of a nuclear consultative group to discuss issues of nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear waste disposal, nuclear safety and nuclear power. These issues are of mutual concern to both countries and could provide a focus for unofficial discussions of concerns and strategies regarding these issues. The findings could be communicated to respective governments, providing an unofficial and non-confrontational dialogue channel between administrations.

JAPANESE-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS Negotiations on normalisation between Japan and North Korea broke off at the eighth round of talks in Beijing in November 1992, when Pyongyang refused Tokyo's demand for an investigation into the alleged abduction of a Japanese national. However, when there seemed to be an easing of Pyongyang's recalcitrant attitude toward nuclear inspections by the IAEA early in the year, Tokyo stated in mid February that it would seek to resume negotiations with Pyongyang, although this was sidelined by the negative events beginning in March 1994 when Pyongyang prevented the IAEA from completing thorough inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities. Nonetheless, Japan is in a good position to participate in economic cooperation with North Korea since it has the money and is not obstructed by the intricacies of the reunification issue. Possible confidence building measures could include:

* No first use of force declaration Although both North Korea and Tokyo fear the use of nuclear weapons more than conventional weapons, the inclusion of "nuclear" in such a declaration would imply 1) an undeclared intention of Japan to develop a nuclear capability, and 2) the current development or existence of

nuclear weapons by North Korea. Discussion of that issue would only serve to impede other CBMs and thus, a general declaration covering all types of weapons (conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear) would be more effective. * Consultation between defence officials should be encouraged if only that it establishes a channel for dialogue, available for use in the event of a crisis situation. * Notification of military manoeuvres in the Sea of Japan Although North Korea's cash-strapped economy precludes large scale military manoeuvres at this time, such a promise would be a good place to begin a reciprocal agreement. Japan staged its largest military exercise in post-war history during early October 1993, and the first combined exercise since 1983. Observation of manoeuvres would not be agreed to by Pyongyang, for fear of revealing weaknesses more than strengths. * Consultations on economic cooperation and tourism Pyongyang is appealing for foreign investment in free trade zones, and although the conditions are not favourable for investment due to lack of infrastructure, it is an opportunity for Japan to encourage North Korea out of its isolation, while the cooperative experience could be the basis for greater developments in the political or military realms.

These measures are extremely limited but do represent a start to the process. Basic communication measures are the only reasonable measures that can be suggested at this time.

JAPANESE-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS Despite a continued underlying lack of trust, relations and cooperation continue to improve. South Korean President Kim Young Sam hosted Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa for a successful summit meeting in November 1993, where Hosokawa delivered a clear apology to Koreans for Japan's aggression during the colonial period and WWII, the first time a Japanese politician had sufficiently addressed the issue. However, former Justice Minister Nagano did significant damage to the goodwill that was engendered by Hosokawa's remarks. Confidence building measures that have been agreed upon to date include frequent meetings of defence ministers and ranking defence officials, agreements for reciprocal goodwill portcalls by naval vessels, which will carry Korean naval academy cadets to Japan this autumn while a Japanese warship is scheduled to make a return visit next year, and the exchange of flight schedules of military aircraft to aid in avoiding collisions. During the 1994 Rimpac exercises which ended in late June, the U.S., Japan and South Korea exercised as a team against the Canadian-Australian team, a first but not something that was easily agreed upon. Such agreements represent significant developments in the military sphere, if they are indeed carried out, but compared to bilateral economic and political cooperation, military and cultural exchanges still lag far behind.

* Non-use of force declaration * Direct exchange of military

information, including published white papers, defence budgets, force structures, weapon systems, and weapons system development information. As both have mutual security treaties with the United States, there is little threat of short term military confrontation, but the act of exchanging information is more important than the actual information exchanged, in establishing the process of information sharing. * Exchange of defence officials and defence ministers to establish communication on a high level and provide an opportunity to clarify misplaced threat perceptions and discuss mutual concerns. * Exchange of military delegations of mid-ranking and lower ranking military personnel. This would provide the opportunity for better understanding the fundamental nature of each group. This should be conducted on the basis of invitation, demonstrating goodwill and a desire for better relations. The inclusion of naval cadets on warships conducting port calls is an important step. * Establishment of hot lines and cool lines In the short run, these may serve more as a communication link relating to the North Korean crisis rather than an emergency link between the two countries. * Notification of military activities, particularly naval and air in the Sea of Japan. * Observation of military activities This could be undertaken by joint teams of Korean and US Forces Korea military personnel and Japanese and US Forces Japan military personnel, the US forces acting as a buffer between direct Japan-South Korean activity. The US Forces, having a working understanding of both militaries, may be well positioned to clarify misunderstandings or aid in communication. This should be undertaken at first by invitation, along the lines of the Helsinki CBMs, later expanding to obligatory observation. * Promotion of the cultural exchange high school and university students, sponsored by both government and business groups with commercial interests in the other country. Emphasis should be placed on visiting a variety of historic and culturally important sites, providing students the opportunity to better understand the foundations of the other culture and to dispel persistent disdain. In addition, students should be asked to identify issues that they consider to be important on a regional or global scale. Issues of common interest could then serve as a focal point for an ongoing and task oriented project addressing the concerns. Access to quality mass culture (such as movies, music and arts) should be permitted and promoted jointly. This unconventional measure is important to address the persistent lack of accurate understanding about each country. Prejudices persist and will continue to breed suspicions in the future unless addressed now.

After implementation of these information and communication CBMs, South Korea and Japan could move to apply constraint CBMs.

* Mutual inspection of facilities related to nuclear energy, the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear weapons development capability.

After employing these basic information and communication CBMs and developing a habit of consultation, it would be useful to discuss implementation of such an inspection regime, given that both South Korea and Japan are concerned about future weapons development spurred by changes in the international environment.

SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS Both China and Japan share suspicions about one another's aspirations for economic and military dominance in Northeast Asia in the 21st Century. However, China and Japan have made moves to establish links between both their foreign and defence ministries. Inaugural security talks were held in December 1993, where Japan's defence policy and China's rapid equipment modernisation program were discussed, providing a good starting point from which to proceed with modest CBMs.

* No first use of force declaration * Publication and exchange of defence budget, force structure and deployment. China recently printed a white paper on defence, although it was a very brief document which contained basically the same information found in the IISS Military Balance. However, the fact that Beijing produced one at all is a significant step in itself. China's defence budget does not include revenue earned from the production of civilian goods or arms sales, nor does it include arms purchases. Efforts should be made for standardisation of this information and subsequent direct exchange. * Continued exchange of high level defence officials The military still has a great deal of influence politically in China, and thus it is important to establish positive relations with those in charge at the higher levels. In addition, the military has become involved in business and development projects. Economic cooperation in general but particularly with military enterprises producing civilian goods could establish a mutually beneficial relationship. * Establish hot and cool lines * Notification of naval and air manoeuvres or movements China, Japan and Taiwan all claim the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Beijing's recent bold reassertion of its sovereignty over the Senkakus, the Spratly's and the Paracels and subsequent stationing of additional troops in the Spratly's has alarmed many in the region, fearing that Beijing may be willing to take the islands by force. This casts suspicion over unexpected manoeuvres or deployments and thus advance notification by both is very important.

The Chinese have been known to value their secrecy, which although it makes a good case for transparency, necessitates development in a very gradual manner. China staunchly advocates non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and thus would resist implementation of intrusive measures, at least in the formative stages of a relationship.

SINO-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS Seoul and Beijing have witnessed

bilateral trade soar, particularly since they normalised relations in August 1992. Memorandums of Understanding have been signed in telecommunications cooperation, joint development of natural resources in the Yellow Sea, high technology, aerospace and automobiles, cultural exchanges, fisheries concerns. On the diplomatic front, in 1993 China returned the remains of five Korean independence fighters to South Korea, and have agreed on a joint public servant training program. On the military side, the foreign ministers agreed to exchange military attaches between embassies - four South Korean attaches were sent to Beijing last year, while two Chinese army colonels have recently been stationed at a military attach office in Seoul. Although most of the developments between the two former enemies are in the economic sphere, small steps are being made in the security arena. This heightened interdependency certainly contributed to China's moderating role in the sanctions debate.

* Non-use of force declaration * Publication and exchange of defence budgets and force structure * Notification of naval and airforce manoeuvres particularly in the East China Sea. * Hot lines and cool lines for immediate consultation in crisis. This could be most useful in dealing with developments in the North Korean situation.

As Pyongyang's lone remaining ally, Beijing has been sensitive not to alienate Pyongyang by undertaking significant steps in the area of military confidence building and cooperation with Seoul, lest it isolate Pyongyang further and prompt it to resort to drastic measures. By the same token, an exceptionally weak stance on Pyongyang's intransigence could adversely affect the budding Seoul-Beijing relationship. For the time being, a bilateral relationship fostered by economic and industrial cooperation would seem more prudent than seeking far reaching methods of military cooperation. One area slated for industrial cooperation is in the construction, operation and management of nuclear power plants, which could provide the foundation for a trilateral or multilateral cooperation project with North Korea, which is desperately in need of electricity.

SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS The current relationship between Beijing and Moscow is one of the most active of the previously antagonistic relationships in the region and one which has displayed the most characteristics of traditional and successful European style confidence building measures. Since the early 1980s significant unilateral, non-negotiated cuts in border troops and tanks have been made by both Beijing and Moscow. The first formal agreement was not signed until 24 April 1990, when Li Peng visited Moscow to discuss further border reductions. Currently senior Ministry of Defence officials exchange visits, and officials at the political level meet regularly to discuss issues of regional and global concern.

In December 1992, Boris Yeltsin and Chinese President Yang Shangkun, signed a memorandum of understanding, agreeing to accelerate work on a mutual reduction of armed forces in the border region and building confidence in the military sphere across the border, culminating in an agreement by the end of 1994. Until then, they agreed to reduce armed forces in the agreed border region to a minimum level, give remaining troops a clearly defensive nature, and commit to "no first use" of nuclear weapons nor to use the threat of nuclear use against any non-nuclear state. Prior to the Yeltsin-Yang meeting, the eighth round of Sino-Russian disarmament talks was held, resulting in a commitment to eventually withdraw their main forces back 100 km on each side of the border to establish a 200 km stability zone of decreased military activity. In November 1993, Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev met with his Chinese counterpart Chi Haotian in Beijing, the first Russian defence minister to visit China since the Soviet breakup. In establishing further confidence building measures, they agreed to send 3 additional military attaches to each capital, exchange military delegations (7 Chinese delegations are slated for Moscow in 1994), jointly develop a new jet fighter for China, the Super 7, based on the Russian MiG-21, and signed a five year agreement on military cooperation and the promotion of friendly relations between the two armies. The most recent agreement is the accord on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (PDMA) along the border during maneuvers, accidental missile firings or unintended frontier violations.

Ironically, the success of these bilateral confidence building measures can have a potentially adverse affect on other regional players, who might view the new relationship as a little too cosy for comfort. Pyongyang has certainly been isolated by this evolution, as it can no longer play China and Russia off against one another. Japan and South Korea may also be threatened by such a development in the future. Such is the paradox of bilateral confidence building in a regional context: confidence building in one case can stimulate confidence erosion in another.

RUSSO-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS Russia has eyed South Korea as a possible substitute economic partner for Japan, yet despite surging two-way trade, which has doubled in the last five years, the economic and political cooperation foreseen when diplomatic relations were restored in 1990 has failed to materialize for two main reasons: 1) Seoul's suspension of economic aid due to Moscow's tardy servicing of interest payments on previous loans; and 2) Russia's refusal to pay compensation for victims of the Korean Air Lines flight shot down ten years ago. However, the successful summit meetings between Kim Young-sam and Boris Yeltsin held in June, look to have served to kick-start an increasingly cooperative relationship.

Military ties have been expanding rapidly and Russia is hoping to expand military cooperation with South Korea. In August 1993, a Russian flotilla paid a goodwill visit to Pusan, the first since 1904, while two South Korean ships made a return port call in Vladivostok one month later. Russia has proposed joint naval drills but Seoul has yet to agree. An agreement for personnel exchanges, including defence ministers and ranking military officials has been signed. Russia envisages increased military exchanges, leading to joint rescue exercises for fishing boats and ultimately combined drills. They have agreed to co-produce modern weapons, utilizing South Korean capital and marketing expertise and Russia's technological expertise. They have established a hot line between the Kremlin and the Blue House, which was used one week after installation during the mounting crisis in June. During Kim Young-sam's summit trip, he visited the Russian Fleet in Vladivostok, a very symbolic end to their Cold-War tensions and a strong message to North Korea.

Russia seems to have little concern for the impact that closer relations with Seoul will have on Pyongyang. Although North Korea still permits Russia overflight rights en route to Vietnam, the two countries have ceased joint naval manoeuvres since 1990. Russia has also terminated nuclear and military assistance to its former close ally. Although the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Military Assistance signed in 1961 remains in effect, Article 1 which promises military intervention in the event of conflict is essentially null and void. Of note, at the request of the Russian Foreign Ministry, a meeting was held between foreign ministry officials for the first time in two years, indicating moves to restore relations. The topic for discussion was the North Korean nuclear issue.

NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS The North-South relationship is currently at an impasse, as Pyongyang insists on dealing directly with the United States on the NPT issue. However, North and South Korea had made progress in the realm of confidence building by agreeing to The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchange and Cooperation at the sixth Inter-Korean prime minister's talks in 1990. During the talks, Seoul indicated its acceptance of Pyongyang's proposal for simultaneous, mutual inspections, and went further to propose a simultaneous trial inspection at the end of January 1992. In addition, they signed the Joint North-South Declaration on Denuclearisation, 31 December 1991, pledging the renunciation of nuclear processing and uranium enrichment facilities and a North-South reciprocal inspection, to be carried out by the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC). Disagreements over the scope of inspections and necessity of challenge inspections prohibited progress of the JNCC and served as a warning sign to Seoul that Pyongyang was stalling for time to develop its nuclear weapons capabilities. However, regardless of previous steps and agreements relating to

arms control and confidence building, it would seem that there is little hope for the resumption of positive steps until the NPT crisis is resolved.

There has been endless debate regarding the use of carrots and/or sticks in dealing with Pyongyang's intransigence. The main carrot to be offered by both Seoul and the international community would be economic assistance while the primary stick would be economic sanctions. However, although investment is desperately needed, it would almost certainly be accompanied by a foreign presence, which brings both polluting influences to North Korean society and potential witnesses of North Korea's decay and suspected human rights violations, turning a carrot into a "poisoned carrot."

The challenge for Kim Jong Il is how to attract desperately needed foreign investment and aid without allowing information from the outside world to filter in, or permitting the international community to truly witness the state of internal affairs. Confirmation of reported human rights violations would almost certainly pose barriers to valuable economic aid, and Pyongyang must surely be sensitive to Washington's policy towards China, which linking the renewal of Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status with an improvement in its human rights record. There is clearly an inverse relationship between the amount of information that seeps in or seeps out, and the prospects for the survival of the Kim regime. However, the situation will be even more of a question mark until it is determined just what strategy Kim Jong Il will utilize to hold onto power, openness or isolation, and if indeed he survives, politically or literally.

BILATERAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES: A SUMMARY Bilateral confidence building measures can be useful in dealing with the issue-specific nature of relations in Northeast Asia and they provide flexibility in circumventing stumbling blocks that would otherwise be road blocks in a multilateral confidence building regime. The proposals suggested here are extremely modest and militarily insignificant, primarily utilising information and communication CBMs, while leaving verification and constraint CBMs for application after some barriers of mistrust and misperception have been broken down. Verification plays a vital role in confidence building, but at the outset it is important for nations to get to the table and establish channels for dialogue. There is reason for caution however. With every improvement in bilateral relations, there is the possibility of a counter-reaction by another regional member, who may feel threatened when a previously adversarial or benign relationship improves, as evidenced by North Korea's mounting feeling of isolation.. For this reason, it is important to work simultaneously toward enhancing a regional security dialogue process as well.

AN EXERCISE IN REGIONAL COOPERATION

For a number of years now, there have been a host of proposals tabled to establish a framework for a multilateral security dialogue in Asia, at both regional and subregional levels. Although opposed at first by the Americans, Japanese and Chinese, there has been a gradual acceptance of the idea but difficulties have arisen over the form. Finally, on a large regional scale, there is now the ASEAN Regional Forum at the governmental level and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) at the non-governmental level as venues for dialogue. Establishing a consensus on or implementing confidence building measures on such a wide scale however, is difficult at best due to the large number of countries involved and their divergent interests.

The difficulty in establishing a regional security framework is in trying to find a common, tangible interest that all states benefit from and none suffer. As Stewart Henderson notes:

States do not base their security on altruistic, unfounded notions of cooperation. It is only through an appeal to national interests that the building blocks of a cooperative security system will be put in place. Cooperative security is not a theory but a practical method of dealing with important issues.

Some had stated that the North Korean NPT crisis could have served as a focal point for regional cooperation, since it is the greatest threat to regional and quite possibly international security. This issue, more than any other issue, demonstrates the perils associated with lack of trust, the absence of reliable information and insensitivity to the fears of other states. However, as described earlier in this paper, although the NPT crisis has served as a catalyst in bringing together nations that would otherwise not cooperate on international foreign policy, it has also served as a divisive issue, underscoring the difficulties inherent in the multilateral approach to problem solving. Therefore, although it is in the interests of all to continue to work together to improve the situation on the Korean peninsula, it does not quite fit the aforementioned criteria as an ideal problem solving solution to enhancing regional cooperation.

It is a tall order to find such a common problem acceptable for cooperation by all Northeast Asian states, but there is one that exists now, is a threat to all in the region, and which all states, even North Korea, can cooperate in addressing. This is the dumping of nuclear waste (primarily and most extensively by Russia) into the Sea of Japan.

In April 1993, it was revealed that Moscow had been dumping nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan at least since the earliest records were kept in 1966. Public outcry has been especially loud in Japan, as the dumping is practically on its doorstep but both Korea and China have also condemned the dumping. Tokyo was particularly enraged that Moscow would dump nuclear waste on Japan's doorstep only days after Yeltsin visited Japan to improve bilateral relations, seemingly without any warning.

Russia claims that it has no choice but to dump the waste at sea because it lacks the storage capacity on land and the amount currently stored on floating tankers is growing as submarines and other atomic powered navy vessels are being decommissioned. In late February, Russia said that it could not ratify the permanent ban on nuclear dumping but would "endeavour to avoid pollution of the sea by dumping of wastes and other matter" according to the International Maritime Organization. However, subsequent reports indicate that Russia sees the need to continue dumping. Japan has recently pledged \$100 million to help with the construction of storage facilities. Japan has agreed to finance the construction of a reprocessing plant by Japanese firms in Russia's Far East if Russia stops the dumping, although these would take two years to construct.

Although there are numerous multilateral environmental and economic cooperative projects already underway and highly successful, this situation is unique in that it is a highly visible problem, politically significant, emotional and cuts across political, environmental, security, and nuclear safety concerns and thus provides a good opportunity for joint cooperative efforts in achieving a common goal. This issue overlaps a wide range of government agencies and officials from departments of foreign affairs, environment, science and technology, national security and maritime and port administrations. Cooperation by similar ministries of the regional members could be a prime example of non-traditional CBM, as it would establish a channel for dialogue in which all have a common goal. Likely 80% of the people who would be involved in an arms control and confidence building dialogue would have to be involved in such a project.

The issue is not only the dumping of low level radioactive waste, which is a highly visible, political and psychological issue, but is also dealing with the spent fuel rods upon decommissioning. These rods, which are highly radio-active and can be reprocessed for use in a bomb pose both a safety and a safeguards risk. Finally, there is the issue of the reactor, which must be physically extracted from the vessels and dealt with effectively. In the past, they have been dumped in the ocean as well. With 100 more ships to be decommissioned in the near future, 30-40 of which use nuclear propulsion, this issue is timely and a time-

bomb, not only in the environmental sense but as it affects Russia's relations with its neighbours. It is critical to view such an approach not as an opportunity to gang-up on Russia and condemn it for what it has done, for this would be a confidence-destroying measure. Rather, it should be viewed as a constructive way to improve the situation for all in the region by mobilizing financial resources, technology and enthusiasm from where they exist and utilize them to jointly address a problem that affects all in the region.

The public perception of nuclear issues, be it weapons or energy or waste, is of great concern to the all Northeast Asian administrations, who are all committed to nuclear energy. Negative press on this issue could pose domestic challenges as people question the safety of the nuclear energy option. This could provide the Northeast Asian states with a viable, necessary and mutually beneficial project for cooperation. Coupled with efforts to improve bilateral relations, an issue driven framework could be expanded into a regional security dialogue in the future, once efforts on the bilateral side level address the stumbling blocks to larger cooperation and facilitate the view of a common house.

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