UNITED KINGDOM: NUCLEAR WEAPON COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS

16 thoughts on “UNITED KINGDOM: NUCLEAR WEAPON COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS”

1. A Response to Admiral Gower’s assertion that UK Trident will only be used as a ‘Last Resort’ and that the Military are not involved in a decision to carry out an attack

   I am a former Royal Navy (RN) submarine officer who commanded conventional and nuclear submarines, served in the Polaris Force as 2nd in command and in command and was Commanding Officer of the rigorous UK submarine captain’s training course known as ‘The Perisher’. In recent years, alarmed by the effect that the cost of Trident and its replacement are having on the RN in both financial and operational terms, I have studied Government (HMG) policy closely to identify the rationale for retention of the ‘Deterrent’ so long after the Cold War ended, with the consequences that UK Trident missiles have not been targeted since 1994, and for over 20 years have been at “several days’ notice to fire”. In the process I have found that the Government and MoD are being less than straightforward in their response to any who question continuing with Trident for a further 40 years at a lifetime cost in excess of £150Bn. This is exhibited by an article published by Admiral John Gower (formerly Mod Nuclear Policy Department) on the Nautilus Institute website. His article gives a re-assuring air of good management and control and states, inter alia, that “…the military has no formal role in the advice or decision upon whether to launch UK SLBM.” – an assertion I challenge.

   Admiral Gower refers to the use of Trident as a ‘Last Resort’: a phrase HMG also uses frequently in almost every debate on or in reference to Trident. However, the meaning of ‘Last Resort’ is not defined anywhere and so the public, many MPs and the media take it to mean what it did in my Polaris days: that is, if the Soviets launched a nuclear attack on UK or NATO, then the UK would have retaliated with – in the Last Resort – a counter (second) strike of such magnitude that it would deter the Soviets from attacking in the first place – the aptly named policy of MAD – Mutually Assured Destruction. We knew our missiles were targeted to take out Moscow – the so called ‘Moscow Criterion’ – and that this would cause appallingly disproportionate and indiscriminate deaths to millions of the civilian population by blast and fire immediately and, for decades to come, through radiation. No other use for Polaris was envisaged. This meant that, when a Polaris submarine deployed on patrol, the CO and his 2nd in command knew exactly what they might be called upon to do: namely, to turn the Captain’s key and authorise the launch of their missiles. There was no need for a ‘Letter of Last Resort’, which came in in later years. We knew that a Second Strike like this would be well outside any accepted international humanitarian law but, if it prevented the end of the world as we knew it, then we had to be prepared to fire. Incidentally, we also agreed that we would not fire unless we had positive indications that UK was under attack. We would not carry out a First Strike. Neither of us wanted the responsibility of being instigators of Armageddon.

   I left the Navy in 1981 to work in industry and, like many people, continued to believe that this remained the meaning of Last Resort. However, when I began my search for facts in 2015 prior to the Main Gate decision to build the ‘Successor’ to the Vanguard class, I was seriously disturbed by what I found. HMG policy had unobtrusively changed (no press release or public statement that I could find) to one which one might describe as non-strategic within the existing policy of flexible response – which I term NSFR. This now included an option to launch a pre-emptive strike with a single missile with a single low yield (under 10Kt) nuclear war head into a Foreign State which was threatening UK troops in the field with chemical or biological weapons , should all other conventional measures had failed. This was a big shift in policy which remains in place today. There now seems to be a perverse circle of logic: retain Trident to protect the homeland against nuclear attack; however, as the cost of retaining it is so high that we cannot sustain adequate conventional forces to protect our homeland or our forces overseas, change the rules to use nuclear weapons to offset the lack of conventional forces. In this way the nuclear threshold bar of Last Resort becomes Next Resort.

   This policy places the CO of a Trident submarine in an impossible position. Admiral Gower states it is the Prime Minister (PM) who makes the final decision to fire and “…the military has no formal role in the advice or decision upon whether to launch UK SLBM” i.e. the CO merely has to authenticate that the order has emanated from the PM; but he is wrong to say that. Nuremberg Principle IV states “The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law…” i.e. unquestioning obedience to a superior’s order is not enough. The UK Joint Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict on Military Law (JSP383) itself states that military commanders “… have a responsibility to cancel or suspend the attack if it turns out that the object to be attacked is going to be such that the proportionality rule would be breached.”. So it is the CO himself who must make a considered and informed decision as to whether he should obey the order. The process of authenticating that the order to fire genuinely comes from the Prime Minister is undoubtedly as important as Admiral Gower states, but an even more important question for the CO is whether he is in a position to make that judgement? On patrol he has no opportunity to discuss and ask relevant questions about the justification for a First Strike on targets – the details of which he may be unaware of – or know whether his nuclear warhead(s) will have a disproportionate effect on civilian populations.
   In a presumed attempt to relieve the CO of legal responsibility, the same military law manual states “…the rules do not have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.”(1)

   I questioned the MoD as to how they could justify this statement. In a letter to myself dated 3 October 2018 the MoD responded that the Conference at which AP1 was negotiated did not proscribe nuclear weapons. This is correct because AP1 focuses on the rules, not what might breach them, but this does not mean the Conference agreed they were exempt.

   HMG lawyers are therefore relying upon a very contentious interpretation which flies in the face of the spirit of the Protocol. Nor does the military law manual mention the 1996 Advisory Opinion given by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances other than an existential nuclear threat to the homeland (not troops overseas) would generally be unlawful. Even then the International Court of Justice (ICJ) emphasised in its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, all States are bound by the rules in AP1 which are merely the expression of pre-existing customary law.

   That brings me to my final point. As previously referred to in the opening paragraph, Trident has not been targeted and has been at several days’ notice to fire for over 20 years. For all this time Trident submarines have been on patrol 24/7 ready to react to a ‘bolt from the blue attack’. Yet they are not well placed to do this if they are stood down. It also begs the question as to whether Parliament should be consulted if it is ever decided to re-target Trident missiles. It is now the convention, learned from mistakes in the lead-up to the 2003 US-UK Iraq invasion, to seek prior authorisation from the House of Commons before taking military action, subject to certain exceptions where public debate before military action would not be possible or appropriate. While the threat of use of Trident to deter nuclear attack may be political, the use of Trident to support troops deployed overseas – or in a range of other first use scenarios in which low yield war heads might be used – would be military warfighting.

   In summary, there are many aspects of UK possession of the Trident nuclear weapon system that are a cause for concern; nearly all of which stem from a policy which includes First Use. This is not clearly understood by the British public, media or even within Parliament. Clear answers to these questions are needed beyond re-assurance that the process of checking the authority of the PM’s order is reliable. Specifically, in light of the UK’s Non-Strategic Flexible Response policy, HMG needs to define what is meant by ‘Last Resort’.

   More importantly for the RN Submarine Service, current UK nuclear weapon policy which includes First Use could place the command team of the deployed Trident submarine in legal jeopardy if ordered to launch their missiles. This requires urgent review by the UK Government and MoD.

   1. Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions contains specific provisions for protection of civilians from disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks. Articles 51, 54 & 57 are relevant.

   RobertForsyth©2018

   Reply

2. I enjoyed reading Rear Admiral John Gower’s paper on the UK’s NC’s3. Thank you. I am a private citizen and I am not aligned to any organisation. As a baby of the cold war (1963) I am have been studying the impact of ‘several days to launch’. The change in posture needs to saluted and celebrated. I have submitted several papers to UK Parliament on legal processes needed when any notion of re-targeting of Trident begins. This is one of five such papers.http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/public-administration-and-constitutional-affairs-committee/the-role-of-parliament-in-the-uk-constitution-authorising-the-use-of-military-force/written/96857.pdf The Committee did take evidence on the matter but then decided not to comment on the matter in the final report.
   Rear Admiral John Gower made reference to targeting data being carried on board Trident. He stated some form of programmable mission trajectories are stored on board the SSBN, even though all missiles have been de-targeted since 1994. While for test purposes I would understand a mission trajectory is needed with some sea-borne target in international waters, I do not understand conceptually how any targets could be carried on board. There is no Tier 1 threat, so on what basis can targets be selected and mission trajectories created? If the UK deterrent is controlled by civilians, then the target selection and any targets carried on board should also be under civilian control. Rear Admiral Gower’s outline suggests the targets manifest somehow. Pre- 1994 I assumed they were a product of US/NATO planning. Post 1994, there should not be any as there is no NATO operational role for Trident. So what targets? Who is our enemy? With whom are we currently inviting to join us on a mutual suicide pact and on whose legal authority?
   I do not think this matter has been properly studied since the decision to select a number of Japanese cities for obliteration in 1945 and the subsequent selection of Soviet cities from 1948 onwards. Has the Royal Navy got the necessary legal cover for the targeting of thermonuclear weapons in a post cold war environment? If a paratrooper (soldier F) can be prosecuted for some alleged wrong doing in Norther Ireland in the early 1970’s, then what legal protections is there for MOD personnel generating targets for thermonuclear weapons presumably for a war which ended in 1991? They need to tool down. If there is anything other that a test target for the open sea, I should imagine those MOD personnel are vulnerable to a claim that they are planning acts of aggression if not planning acts of excess civilian loss which is a war crime. The UK deterrent is a domestic political weapon. The targeting of what is a doomsday machine is also a political decision and something the MOD/RN can have no legally ambiguous involvement. If the firing of Trident is a political decision, then any target selection must also be under civilian control. Why should the MOD excuse their civilian masters of this responsibility? It is then up to Parliament to force accountability into the business of planning what will be a mass suicide pact.
   I hope some discussion can occur on this point. The Royal Navy and MOD personnel need a very clear legal environment rather than assuming cold war planning assumptions are somehow sufficient for a post Chilcott world. I would imagine if any Russian or Chinese targeting data is on board any UK SSBN without the written approval of the Attorney General then it needs to removed and verifiably deleted as quickly as possible.
   I can understand the Navy’s pride in Operation Relentless, but 25 years of patrolling without targeted missiles where there is no Tier 1 threat suggests the Navy need to bring their boys home and request this doomsday machine gets some legal cover for the post Cold War era.
   Kind regards
   Mike Kiely
   Battersea.

   Reply

3. REJOINDER BY JOHN GOWER
   I feel it necessary to use this opportunity to respond to some of Cdr Forsyth’s points, even though they do not relate directly to the paper I wrote on a specific subject, which he acknowledges. This is not the first time I have responded to his particular view if UK nuclear deterrence, and I doubt it is the last. As a fellow submariner with a similar seagoing career I have respect for Cdr Forsyth’s service, excluding his admission in these comments that he conspired with either his Captain, or his 2nd in command (he is not clear which – it may have been both) to disobey his explicit orders at the heart of his patrols. I find this of concern, since if this was true, and we must take his word that this is not an example or retrospective opinion, it was a clear breach of their orders and the trust placed in them specifically by the Prime Minister for the security of the UK, following a clear – the clearest – policy decided by a democratically elected government.
   This insubordination left a gaping hole in UK and NATO security for the periods of his contribution to continuous patrols at the height of the cold war in the late 1970s and 1980s, and blatantly disregarded the honourable principle in the UK armed forces over generations – that military leaders do not subvert their democratic political leadership. He and his co-conspirator also broke the trust of his ship’s company who were taken from their families and friends for long periods of isolation and risk, which they were content to do in support of the essential national security task which their immediate leaders had privately suborned. Had it been made public at the time, it would have seriously undermined UK and NATO deterrence. Finally, other contemporary officers, with clear anti-nuclear weapon convictions that Cdr Forsyth now attests he had then, honourably resigned rather than serve with the weapons. Not to follow their example is less honourable, in my judgement.
   I’ll deal with some of the more misleading elements of his opinions and comments; if I do not comment, it should not be inferred that I agree with what he says.
   Last Resort and Ambiguity. For as long as the UK has been a nuclear -armed state it has maintained a policy, in common with its allies in NATO, of deliberate ambiguity on the circumstances in which it might employ a nuclear weapon. Throughout the period of history now known as the Cold War it was assessed by successive governments and iterations of NATO leadership that this ambiguity was beneficial to deterrence as it complicated (and thus raised the threshold) the nuclear decision process of an adversary. While I am on the record in 2018 as advocating, after continuing analysis of the newly multipolar nuclear world with increasing deployment of dual-capable weapons, that this policy would merit review, neither NATO nor the UK has yet made any move to change this policy. Phrases like “Last Resort”, therefore, are those used to describe the extremity of circumstances in which a UK PM would consider nuclear weapon launch. Whilst the policy of ambiguity exists, these will not be defined in advance.
   Application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Cdr Forsyht asserts that “we knew such a strike would be well outside any accepted International Humanitarian Law”. This is factually wrong. Although the ICRC made statements in 1945 and 1950 on the consequences of atomic weapon use, these were not legal judgments. While there was strong body of opinion that nuclear weapons were inhumane and illegal, no IHL judgement on the employment of nuclear weapons was made until the 1996 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion. This was long after Cdr Forsyth left the service in 1981 and Polaris’ last patrol was the year the judgement was delivered.
   In any case, the 1996 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion did not conclude that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be necessarily unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence in which a State’s very survival would be at stake. The International Court of Justice concluded that legality can only be determined in the light of the specific circumstances applying when such use is being contemplated and the application of the general rules of international law, including those regulating the use of force and the conduct of hostilities. Cdr Forsyth is well aware of this position as it was made clear in correspondence between him and the MoD in 2017 and 2018 (long after I had left the MoD) which he has made public.

   In his comments on the legal position of the CO of a UK SSBN, he makes several assertions. These assertions are Cdr Forsyth’s lay opinions and interpretations and he is absolutely entitled to hold them, but to aid transparency for his readers he should make it clear they are his opinions not facts. Successive Attorneys General, supported by a succession of qualified and specialist lawyers, over decades of continual assessment and challenge since the ICJ 1996 judgement, have maintained confidence in their judgement that in the extreme circumstances where the employment of the nuclear weapons might be justified, they can be so employed in ways consistent with IHL.
   Policy makers and drafters, as I was, continue to rely on these expert judgements rather than formulating their own lay opinions. In addition, as I lay out in the paper, that the SSBN command has no knowledge of the targets which the PM has ordered selected absolves them of the Nuremburg Principles, which are based on the simple fact that a subordinate subject to them has knowledge of the specifics of the order and discretion in carrying them out. Continued legal advice supports this. Cdr Forsyth may disagree with the august collection of lawyers who have formed these judgements over the years, but that doesn’t make him right.
   He introduces a concept of “Sub-Strategic Flexible Response”. Sub Strategic Trident was a brief concept between the end of the Cold War and 1994; it most certainly does not exist today. While certain commentators, including a former First Sea Lord, still refer to it they are incorrect. It was, in any case, never a flexible response – a concept alive in NATO in the 1970s but well dead by 1994. The remainder of Cdr Forsyth’s description of SST is fiction. It was never a first strike concept nor as a response to specific attacks, merely an option for a smaller response matched to limited nuclear use of an adversary. It was an attempt to replace the deterrent role of the air-launched weapons which were being phased out by 1994. Swiftly it was seen to be a fallacious concept as the SLBM deterred all NW use and was dropped.
   The “several days’ notice to fire” status is a measure of political signalling of restraint. There is no physical restriction preventing moving to a firing posture in a shorter period. Such a move would also be a political decision to the PM and could occur as part of deterrence signalling in crisis. The SSBN is maintained at CASD for all the reasons I have outlined in other papers I have written, including one in Warship World of which I know Cdr Forsyth is particularly aware. No doubt I will draft others. While the threats they deter include the currently extremely unlikely “bolt from the blue” attack that is by no means the sole purpose.
   In response to Mr Kiely’s comments
   Regarding target data held on the submarine, Mr Kiely should read carefully the whole paper, in which I make this clear. The missiles are de-targeted until a properly authenticated targeting and/or firing message is received from the Prime Minister.
   The remainder of his first paragraph mixes so many misconceptions; I have insufficient energy to unpick them beyond that which I made clear in the paper. Regarding his second two paragraphs, Mr Kiely can, but I judge most likely won’t, draw assurance from the detailed response I have already given in the paper and to Cdr Forsyth above.

   Reply

4. Thank you or the response and I will re-read and I will guess at the mis-conceptions you mention, but the current planning activity such as it is assumes everything is beyond the reach of the laws arising from Nuremberg. You may be right but that position is going against the trends identifiable in the war manuals and the working of national constitutions.

   The selection and preparation of targets for annihilation when there is no Tier 1 threat and the placing of such targets in a safe, does not appear an act of self-defence but an unnecessary threat of war. A demarcation point is needed between planning contingencies and the beginning of an operation. It is certainly worth finding a Parliamentary means to challenge current practice, not unlike Congress demanding any plan against the DRK to be approved by it. Whatever these post cold-war targets are they need proper oversight and there is nothing to suggest such oversight is occurring.

   If ‘several days’ notice is just ‘a measure of political signalling of restraint’ then who are we sending this signal too? Russia, China? What is that trying to achieve? It would make sense if this was the beginning of a formally defined and verifiable post cold-war posture.

   The ‘several days’ has been 25 years and counting. There is room to propose the next step backwards. The ‘several days’ offers hope for something more substantive, where politicians are forced to take more direct responsibility. It would be good if the UK showed leadership on this matter.

   Thank you.

   Reply

5. I was minded not to respond to Rear Admiral Gower’s reply to my comments on his article because they were so off the mark as to be difficult to comprehend. He has neither accurately read what I actually wrote, nor has he really addressed the points I made – in particular the one that prompted me to respond in the first case: namely his claim that the military are not involved in a decision to fire. However, after further careful thought and consultation,, I have decided I should take the time to respond again, if only because non-military readers of this website may otherwise be mis-led. I will also expand on some (but not all) of my earlier points.

   I would first point out that my comments were directed towards his published article, so why assert ‘…even though they do not relate directly to the paper I wrote…’? I also clearly stated I was the second in command conferring with my Commanding Officer (CO), so why is he ‘not clear which’?

   Words such as ‘conspiring’, ‘disobey’ and ‘insubordination’ are ill-chosen and intemperate, and not an appropriate way for a former submariner – now a civilian – to address another former submariner who is also a civilian. We are not on a Quarterdeck (or should one say in a Control Room) now. I was not ‘conspiring’ to do anything. Nor was I being ‘insubordinate’. Quite the opposite. My CO was correctly discussing with me all aspects of the pre-patrol brief and our patrol orders because I had been appointed as qualified to take over command – I had just completed two years as a CO myself – should he be unable to continue for any reason (as happened in practice.. Critical to both of us was to be quite clear as to the immensity of our joint responsibility and the circumstances in which we might be ordered to fire. We needed to be in total agreement as to how we would both react to a variety of circumstances. One of them was the possibility of receiving an order that varied from our clear understanding that we would only be ordered to fire if deterrence had failed, i.e. the UK had been attacked and we were responding in accordance with the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction, with a strike back (‘second strike’) – and we were not carrying out a pre-emptive First Strike.

   Though omitted from my original response, as Rear Admiral Gower knows, and as Lord Peter Hennessy recounts in his book The Silent Deep, listening to the BBC was intrinsic to cross-checking if the UK was actually under nuclear attack. If there was no sign of this – which we wryly suggested would be indicated by The Archers broadcasting as normal – we agreed we would not fire immediately, but pause for thought and might even break radio silence and phone home, lest we launched our forty-eight 200kt warheads in what would amount to a first strike for all the wrong reasons. In 1983 a relatively junior Soviet officer, Lt Col Stanislav Petrov, prevented a full-scale nuclear missile launch in reaction to a false warning of a US strategic missile launch. This is just one of 13 such incidents termed ‘Too Close for Comfort’ documented by Chatham House.

   Rear Admiral Gower states that ‘other contemporary officers …honourably resigned’ and I should have done likewise. He is wrong on two counts. As far as I am aware, no one resigned their commission, but several requested not to serve in SSBNs. Their subsequent careers varied; some prospered, some did not and eventually took voluntary retirement from the Navy. The common factor was that they were not prepared to fire at all. We, on the other hand, were prepared to fire if the circumstances were in accord with our pre-patrol brief.

   Rear Admiral Gower suggests that the COs of SSBNs are absolved of any responsibility because they do not have knowledge of the targets or other specifics of the attack nor have any discretion in carrying out the order. However, there is no reference to such words in the Nuremberg Principles. On the contrary, Principle IV states: “The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.” The CO needs to know the facts to make a moral choice; moreover, he has discretion by virtue of his Captain’s Key which must be turned to give his permission to fire. This is at the very root of my opposition to the present policy in which there are so many variables. The CO could well be placed in involuntary legal jeopardy if he obeys without question not knowing the facts.

   Furthermore, Nuremberg Principle IV needs to be read in the light of Article 33 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which became effective in 2002:

   ‘Superior orders and prescription of law
   1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless:
   (a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the superior in question;
   (b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and
   (c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.

   2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful’

   It is paragraph 2 that puts the CO directly in potential legal jeopardy. Rear Admiral Gower states that he is prepared to put his faith in the Attorney General’s infallibility, and that a Trident CO can similarly assume that any order to fire will be fully compliant with International Humanitarian Law (IHL). He suggests that as a ‘lay’ person I should not question the Government’s legally obtained position. To which I say, what about Iraq 2003 and the Chilcot Inquiry?

   As a relevant aside on his comment on my being a lay person, I have taken legal advice throughout my extensive research from a distinguished UK lawyer well known in professional circles for his deep knowledge of International Law, and also from a US lawyer who specialises in UN treaties and IHL.

   Rear Admiral Gower’s responses are the standard Ministry of Defence (MoD) replies to anyone who questions Government nuclear policy. After the exchange of several letters to which he refers between MoD’s Nuclear Policy department and myself during 2018, I realised that I would not get any real answers but only off the shelf replies. I therefore see no point in trying to debate them here again and so this is my final statement in this exchange.

   For the avoidance of doubt:
   • I respect others’ opinions on the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. My personal view with the benefit of hindsight and research, is that if it ever worked – and there are strong arguments it was never needed – then it has definitely had its day; like battleships, Trident has become obsolete.
   • The cost of maintaining Trident makes the UK militarily weaker now, not stronger. A Navy that cannot man all of its ships and only has as many escorts as the same number of all types of ships sunk or battle-damaged during the Falklands War speaks for itself. Field Marshal Bramall (sadly recently deceased) agreed with me.
   • I strongly disagree with First Use for all the reasons outlined above. Not only is it morally wrong but indisputably unlawful. There are several senior US Officers who also seriously question it. I reserve the right in a democracy to continue to do so and welcome open and measured debate on the subject.
   • I am concerned at the lack of real progress towards multilateral nuclear disarmament that all parties to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are committed to, and the fact that the five permanent UN Security Council members are all modernising their arsenals. On which score, I was alarmed to note recently that the US has announced that it is planning to deploy its Trident missiles into the 2080s. Not much commitment to disarmament there! History relates that where the US goes on nuclear matters the UK is right behind.
   • I gather that Rear Admiral Gower, with his strong views and unquestioning faith in the value of nuclear weapons and the UK Government’s legal advisers, plays a leading role in formulating UK Government policy in the 5-yearly NPT review conferences, with the next one due in May 2020. If his approach is similar to the manner in which he addressed my response to his article, then there is not a lot of hope for substantial UK steps being taken towards a nuclear weapon free world. Would it not be better if the negotiators at UN conferences had a more constructive approach to nuclear disarmament?

   Further reading: For those who would like to read and understand my position better, I am publishing a series of articles on my website http://www.whytrident.uk. Parts 1 and 2 are published; Part 3, which is very relevant to the discussion above, will follow in the New Year. My aim is to place fully researched and source-referenced information in the public domain that gives a somewhat different picture to the one the Government portrays. Each person must make up their own mind on nuclear weapons – but access to facts is a pre-requisite. I make no claim to total knowledge, but I do have an insight not available to everyone which at least allows me to broaden the debate; and I feel I should share my several years of careful research.

   I will close with words by my son: “Dad, who in their right minds can even contemplate another Hiroshima as a deliberate act? It was wrong then and is wrong now.”

   Reply

6. I was minded not to respond to Rear Admiral Gower’s reply to my comments on his article because they were so off the mark as to be difficult to comprehend. He has neither accurately read what I actually wrote, nor has he really addressed the points I made – in particular the one that prompted me to respond in the first case: namely his claim that the military are not involved in a decision to fire. However, after further careful thought and consultation, I have decided I should take the time to respond again, if only because non-military readers of this website may otherwise be mis-led. I will also expand on some (but not all) of my earlier points.

   I would first point out that my comments were directed towards his published article, so why assert ‘…even though they do not relate directly to the paper I wrote…’? I also clearly stated I was the second in command conferring with my Commanding Officer (CO), so why is he ‘not clear which’?

   Words such as ‘conspiring’, ‘disobey’ and ‘insubordination’ are ill-chosen and intemperate, and not an appropriate way for a former submariner – now a civilian – to address another former submariner who is also a civilian. We are not on a Quarterdeck (or should one say in a Control Room) now. I was not ‘conspiring’ to do anything. Nor was I being ‘insubordinate’. Quite the opposite. My CO was correctly discussing with me all aspects of the pre-patrol brief and our patrol orders because I had been appointed as qualified to take over command – I had just completed two years as a CO myself – should he be unable to continue for any reason (as happened in practice. Critical to both of us was to be quite clear as to the immensity of our joint responsibility and the circumstances in which we might be ordered to fire. We needed to be in total agreement as to how we would both react to a variety of circumstances. One of them was the possibility of receiving an order that varied from our clear understanding that we would only be ordered to fire if deterrence had failed, i.e. the UK had been attacked and we were responding in accordance with the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction, with a strike back (‘second strike’) – and we were not carrying out a pre-emptive First Strike.

   Though omitted from my original response, as Rear Admiral Gower knows, and as Lord Peter Hennessy recounts in his book The Silent Deep, listening to the BBC was intrinsic to cross-checking if the UK was actually under nuclear attack. If there was no sign of this – which we wryly suggested would be indicated by The Archers broadcasting as normal – we agreed we would not fire immediately, but pause for thought and might even break radio silence and phone home, lest we launched our forty-eight 200kt warheads in what would amount to a first strike for all the wrong reasons. In 1983 a relatively junior Soviet officer, Lt Col Stanislav Petrov, prevented a full-scale nuclear missile launch in reaction to a false warning of a US strategic missile launch. This is just one of 13 such incidents termed ‘Too Close for Comfort’ documented by Chatham House.

   Rear Admiral Gower states that ‘other contemporary officers …honourably resigned’ and I should have done likewise. He is wrong on two counts. As far as I am aware, no one resigned their commission, but several requested not to serve in SSBNs. Their subsequent careers varied; some prospered, some did not and eventually take voluntary retirement from the Navy. The common factor was that they were not prepared to fire at all. We, on the other hand, were prepared to fire if the circumstances were in accord with our pre-patrol brief.

   Rear Admiral Gower suggests that the COs of SSBNs are absolved of any responsibility because they do not have knowledge of the targets or other specifics of the attack nor have any discretion in carrying out the order. However, there is no reference to such words in the Nuremberg Principles. On the contrary, Principle IV states: “The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.” The CO needs to know the facts to make a moral choice; moreover, he has discretion by virtue of his Captain’s Key which must be turned to give his permission to fire. This is at the very root of my opposition to the present policy in which there are so many variables. The CO could well be placed in involuntary legal jeopardy if he obeys without question not knowing the facts.

   Furthermore, Nuremberg Principle IV needs to be read in the light of Article 33 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court which became effective in 2002:

   ‘Superior orders and prescription of law
   1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless:
   (a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or the superior in question;
   (b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and
   (c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.

   2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful’

   It is paragraph 2 that puts the CO directly in potential legal jeopardy. Rear Admiral Gower states that he is prepared to put his faith in the Attorney General’s infallibility, and that a Trident CO can similarly assume that any order to fire will be fully compliant with International Humanitarian Law (IHL). He suggests that as a ‘lay’ person I should not question the Government’s legally obtained position. To which I say, what about Iraq 2003 and the Chilcot Inquiry?

   As a relevant aside on his comment on my being a lay person, I have taken legal advice throughout my extensive research from a distinguished UK lawyer well known in professional circles for his deep knowledge of International Law, and also from a US lawyer who specialises in UN treaties and IHL.

   Rear Admiral Gower’s responses are the standard Ministry of Defence (MoD) replies to anyone who questions Government nuclear policy. After the exchange of several letters to which he refers between MoD’s Nuclear Policy department and myself during 2018, I realised that I would not get any real answers but only off the shelf replies. I therefore see no point in trying to debate them here again and so this is my final statement in this exchange.

   For the avoidance of doubt:
   • I respect others’ opinions on the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. My personal view with the benefit of hindsight and research, is that if it ever worked – and there are strong arguments it was never needed – then it has definitely had its day; like battleships, Trident has become obsolete.
   • The cost of maintaining Trident makes the UK militarily weaker now, not stronger. A Navy that cannot man all of its ships and only has as many escorts as the same number of all types of ships sunk or battle-damaged during the Falklands War speaks for itself. Field Marshal Bramall (sadly recently deceased) agreed with me.
   • I strongly disagree with First Use for all the reasons outlined above. Not only is it morally wrong but indisputably unlawful. There are several senior US Officers who also seriously question it. I reserve the right in a democracy to continue to do so and welcome open and measured debate on the subject.
   • I am concerned at the lack of real progress towards multilateral nuclear disarmament that all parties to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are committed to, and the fact that the five permanent UN Security Council members are all modernising their arsenals. On which score, I was alarmed to note recently that the US has announced that it is planning to deploy its Trident missiles into the 2080s. Not much commitment to disarmament there! History relates that where the US goes on nuclear matters the UK is right behind.
   • I gather that Rear Admiral Gower, with his strong views and unquestioning faith in the value of nuclear weapons and the UK Government’s legal advisers, plays a leading role in formulating UK Government policy in the 5-yearly NPT review conferences, with the next one due in May 2020. If his approach is similar to the manner in which he addressed my response to his article, then there is not a lot of hope for substantial UK steps being taken towards a nuclear weapon free world. Would it not be better if the negotiators at UN conferences had a more constructive approach to nuclear disarmament?

   Further reading: For those who would like to read and understand my position better, I am publishing a series of articles on my website http://www.whytrident.uk

   Parts 1 and 2 are published; Part 3, which is very relevant to the discussion above, will follow in the New Year. My aim is to place fully researched and source-referenced information in the public domain that gives a somewhat different picture to the one the Government portrays. Each person must make up their own mind on nuclear weapons – but access to facts is a pre-requisite. I make no claim to total knowledge, but I do have an insight not available to everyone which at least allows me to broaden the debate; and I feel I should share my several years of careful research.

   I will close with words by my son: “Dad, who in their right minds can even contemplate another Hiroshima as a deliberate act? It was wrong then and is wrong now.”

   Reply

7. Cdr Forsyth has chosen to respond, and in detail once more. He deserves my reply, particularly to his implied or explicit questions. In the interests of brevity, I will only concern myself with the more important of his points.
   His second response questions why I should have questioned whether his first comments were against the issues in the article. He now asserts they were, but his original response clearly stated:
   “Admiral Gower has focused solely on the nuclear weapon C3 process and given a re-assuring air of good management and control. My response concerns the overarching current HMG policy for the use of Trident.”
   Almost all our subsequent discourse (including my rejoinders below) has been on matters unrelated to my original NC3 paper per se. He further questions why I am in doubt about when the discussion between CO and XO about the orders to launch took place. I am grateful to him for clarifying that it was in his time as SSBN XO for his first response left that in doubt, as any re-read of the words he used clearly shows.
   He castigates me as “ill-chosen” and “intemperate” in the language I used (disobey, insubordinate, conspiracy) to describe his account of the agreement he states he reached as XO with his CO to impose a further, and unauthorised, test on the validity (or legality) of an authenticated launch order. My language is simply factual. The fact that neither of us remain serving does not alter the accuracy of their use in referring to his time as XO of that SSBN; if we were both still serving, this would be taking a quite different path.
   The agreement he states he reached with his CO to act outside the crystal-clear orders in the SSBN directions was not sanctioned, nor even informed to higher authority. If they felt that they needed these extra steps, they should have (to protect from charges including the language I used) discussed them with the next higher authority and so on up the chain. That they concealed their decision from their Captain SM, the Flag Officer Submarines and on up the chain to the Prime Minister meant not only was my characterisation correct, but also that their SSBN crew was different from the other five crews conducting patrols and – critically – separate from delivering the intended action of the political leadership of the country at the time of greatest crisis.
   Cdr Forsyth repeats that he and his CO decided that they needed, for themselves, to be sure that the UK had been attacked. Setting aside that this was outside their orders, it would have been irrelevant. There are far more factors in play than an SSBN command team on patrol would ever know. Even with today’s high data rate communications that remains the case, and the SSBNs of the 1970s did not enjoy such a weight of situational material. The key issue, however, is that then, as now, with UK’s nuclear weapons assigned to NATO defence, a launch order could be entirely possible and legitimate even if no attack had taken place on the UK. A NATO response to a nuclear attack on the Alliance might have included UK weapons, even if the UK itself had not been attacked. There was then, and there is now, no latitude for a CO (or XO) to delay or refuse a launch order on any basis, including a self-determined need to be assured that the UK had been attacked.
   Cdr Forsyth then introduces the anecdotal concept of “listening to the BBC” as a means of further checking whether they would choose to obey the launch order or not. In this, Cdr Forsyth is either being confusing or is mis-remembering. Such “checking” arose only in the event of the CO believing that proceeding to the Last Resort procedure was necessary. The Last Resort, when introduced, was commenced only if it was deemed by the SSBN CO that there was a possibility that the UK had suffered a devastating nuclear attack and was incapable of transmitting a launch order. A first sign might have been a failure to receive his regular signals broadcast. As he should recall, this possibility of “listening to the BBC” was anecdotally just one of the factors in instructions by his Commander-in-Chief to an SSBN CO in a dormant letter. As I detailed in my NC3 paper, this letter was opened if the CO believed Last Resort was appropriate. Only after all the exhaustive activity detailed in this first envelope had been completed was the CO authorised to open the Prime Minister’s sealed letter and act upon it. (Both letters were, and remain, highly classified and the PM’s letter is seen only by the PM writing it, so any documents or books purporting to state what would have been or is in them are pure constructive fiction).
   Thus, only in circumstances where the UK was incapable of transmitting a launch order was this ever to be invoked. At no time in the history of UK SSBNs has “listening to the BBC” or any other confirmatory activity been part of the response of a CO to a correctly authenticated received launch order.
   The penultimate main issue of contention remains the perceived individual liability of the SSBN CO in executing a launch. I made clear in my first response what the position of successive UK governments has been and my agreement with this has not changed in the years since I left service. I will not repeat my previous points. However, in amplification of a point made above, it has long been recognised that the SSBN CO on distant patrol cannot under any circumstances have access to the range of factors necessary in determining either the necessity or the legality of a launch of his missiles. That the decision to launch is taken by the highest political leadership, with the advice of the broad church of political and legal bodies fully cognisant of their legal responsibilities has removed, uniquely in military commands, this responsibility from his shoulders. Those who seek unilateral disarmament of the UK, having failed to convince governments to reverse their policy in the critical reviews leading up to the 2016 decision to renew the SSBN, have begun to use this personal threat against the CO as a means of undermining the moral component of the deterrent; that does not increase the veracity of the opinions one iota.
   Cdr Forsyth makes several points of opinion which I respect, as he says he does mine.
   We disagree fundamentally on the efficacy and need for strategic nuclear deterrence; I respect he holds opposing views.
   We disagree on the cost being a dominant factor once the need for deterrence is decided by the government. I respect his opinion. In any case, and as I have written separately in response to his writings, there is no guarantee any residual savings from scrapping the programme would accrue to conventional arms; indeed the Treasury made it clear when it passed the ring-fenced elements of deterrence money into the MoD in 2010 that should the decisions be made to make such savings they could not assume that that money would belong to MoD.
   He states his objection to nuclear First Use. I agree with this objection, but I also recognise that not all states with nuclear weapons feel this way. He has previously stated that the UK has a First Use policy. Not only do I disagree with this assertion, but I know it to be wrong. As a member of NATO, the UK aligns its declaratory policy with the alliance, which considers ambiguity a powerful deterrent. It therefore neither asserts First Use nor No First Use.
   I have written on two issues concerning First Use: ambiguity and caveats in the Negative Security Assurances. I judge both these 20th century tenets of nuclear policy need to be questioned in the light of a very different 21st century dynamic. I don’t believe the added deterrence value of ambiguity outweighs the increased risk of miscalculation and I characterise as “strategic laziness” the recent US decision in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review to increase the range of significant non-nuclear attacks which could merit a nuclear response (i.e. First nuclear Use). I advocate strongly for moves towards Sole Purpose (that is nuclear weapons exist only to counter other nuclear weapons). I do so, however, on an omnilateral basis for all nuclear armed states. Unilateralism in this, as in disarmament, would serve no purpose and risk more than it could gain.
   The remainder of his points on the challenges facing the tenets of the NPT are largely agreed. If he, and others, were to take the time to read the papers I have written since retiring he would find that to be the case. I have written on the need for action in the disarmament pillar and most recently a paper presented to the UN in New York on a code of responsibility for nuclear armed states as a basis for reversing the current trends of increasing risk and decreasing stability and provide a platform for the trust necessary to repopulate the currently morbid field of arms control. All these papers are available on my website http://www.mimirconsulting.co.uk
   Finally, however, I must take issue with a false assertion and accusation Cdr Forsyth makes against me personally. He states:
   “I gather that Rear Admiral Gower, with his strong views and unquestioning faith in the value of nuclear weapons and the UK Government’s legal advisers, plays a leading role in formulating UK Government policy in the 5-yearly NPT review conferences…”
   As anyone who reads my papers, with their clear and strong advocacy of change in elements of the UK’s, NATO’s and allies’ nuclear postures and polices, will realise I am far from unquestioning of anyone’s position on nuclear policy, particularly the UK. I spend all my time evaluating and questioning and this is reflected in my work and my advocacy. My positions on the necessity of strategic nuclear deterrence and the legal position of the SSBN CO continue to reflect that questioning and scrutiny.
   I am not sure how Cdr Forsyth gathers the assertion he makes. As a retired officer I have, rightly, zero role in formulating policy; I can only advocate. UK policy on the NPT (as with all treaties to which the UK is a state party) rests with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
   Over the past few years I have occasionally been invited, by both the FCO and some NGOs separately and in partnership with the FCO, including the European Leadership Network, King’s College London and BASIC, to workshops where officials listened to a range of ideas from all who attended, but to say that any non-governmental attendees have any, let alone leading, roles in formulating policy is frankly ridiculous. These included several meetings in the UN and elsewhere in New York where national disarmament ambassadors and representatives to the NPT have listened to me, amongst many other advocates and each other.
   I have also articulated my ideas in these regards (almost all of which include calling for alterations in the UK status quo) in papers written personally by me and by my acknowledged contributions to work by BASIC, the Nuclear Threat Initiative and other NGOs and think tanks, including Carnegie and the IISS.
   Any conversations with attendant FCO and other HMG officials at these gatherings would quickly show that my positions and contributions are challenging and sometimes extremely so for those officials. I think perhaps that’s why the officials might, and the NGOs will continue to invite me.
   I am happy to continue to argue these points, and others, in any other and relevant forum. I will not be responding to any further comments in this place not directly related to the points I made in the informational paper on UK NC3 published at the request of the Nautilus Organisation.

   Reply

8. knowing the facts, he cannot in reality do so. The Government Policy of ‘deliberate ambiguity’ is, therefore, not only arguably unlawful but also morally unacceptable because it could well place SSBN COs in legal jeopardy. This act, in itself, may be unlawful.

   8. If the Government is intent on retaining a nuclear deterrent, despite all the strong arguments against doing so and in the face of international condemnation, the only way it could ever be used without legally imperiling SSBN COs is to have a clear and unambiguous policy of ‘no first use’ and to deploy it solely to carry out a second strike in retaliation for a nuclear attack on UK/NATO – if such a strike would be compatible with international law.

   Reply

9. On conclusion of this extensive debate I draw the following main conclusions:

   1. Admiral Gower and I both agree on one fundamental issue: we object to first use of nuclear weapons. It is how we proceed from that point where we rapidly diverge.

   2. Adm Gower believes that the change away from first use can only be achieved through omni (multi)-lateral negotiation. However, I believe UK has a moral duty, as a self proclaimed responsible nuclear weapon State, to set an example, as China has, and unilaterally declare for ‘no first use’ now.

   3. I aver that, unless and until UK does so, SSBN COs are in danger of unwittingly committing a war crime or a crime against humanity by obeying an order to fire without knowledge of the facts. I had previously asked the MoD as to how this problem was reconciled but, in an extensive year long exchange of correspondence, I received no explanation beyond variously stating that, in MoD’s opinion, the UK always complies with international law.

   4. Adm Gower provides a more specific answer. He disagrees that this potential legal jeopardy exists because… “it has long been recognised that the SSBN CO on distant patrol cannot under any circumstances have access to the range of factors necessary in determining either the necessity or the legality of a launch of his missiles. That the decision to launch is taken by the highest political leadership, with the advice of the broad church of political and legal bodies fully cognisant of their legal responsibilities has removed, uniquely in military commands, this responsibility from his shoulders.”

   5. The crucial question is whether Adm Gower’s statement that an SSBN CO – a military commander with the responsibility and discretion to withhold fire, as defined in the Joint Services Manual of Law of Armed Conflict (JSP 383) – is, as he asserts, uniquely exempt from the provisions of the Nuremberg Principles and Article 33 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (c.f. details of these provisions in my 2nd response above). I have again written to MoD and asked if this is the official Government position and, if so, what is the legal opinion supporting it.

   6. If, as Adm Gower implies, this is the Government’s position – not yet shown to be correct – then the SSBN CO is in an impossible position. On the one hand, the Government totally absolves him from any responsibility for his actions but, on the other hand, the nuclear weapons he may be ordered to fire are capable of such massive, indiscriminate (to civilians) and long lasting destruction that it is quite possible he will be party to a war crime or a crime against humanity if the advice provided to the Prime Minister is not correct. The example of wrong advice in the case of the 2003 Iraq war demonstrates the fallibility of the Advocate General’s office. The CO is damned if he does not obey and may be damned if he does.

   7. The one thing that the Government cannot absolve the CO from is the need to make a moral decision for himself. I would argue that, in the absence of knowing the facts, he cannot in reality do so. The Government Policy of ‘deliberate ambiguity’ is, therefore, not only arguably unlawful but also morally unacceptable because it could well place SSBN COs in legal jeopardy. This act, in itself, may be unlawful.

   8. If the Government is intent on retaining a nuclear deterrent, despite all the strong arguments against doing so and in the face of international condemnation, the only way it could ever be used without legally imperiling SSBN COs is to have a clear and unambiguous policy of ‘no first use’ and to deploy it solely to carry out a second strike in retaliation for a nuclear attack on UK/NATO – if such a strike would be compatible with international law.

   Reply