Policy Forum 11-003: Should the US Put Nuclear Weapons Back in Korea?

Jeffrey Lewis Director of the Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative at the New America Foundation, writes, “Why not put U.S. nuclear weapons back into South Korea? Well, there are lots of reasons. The first reason is that the United States Air Force has absolutely zero interest in forward deploying tactical nuclear weapons.”

Policy Forum 11-002: North Korea’s Succession May Go Smoothly After All

Brent Choi and Mi Jeong Hibbitts, Washington-based specialists in North Korean issues, write, “It is possible that we will see the young Kim emerge as the next leader of North Korea. This possibility may drive Washington and Seoul to ponder new political options rather than continue current policy toward North Korea…The two allies should prepare for a scenario in which Kim Jong Un will indeed make it as regime leader, as much as for the contingencies in the case that he fails.”

Policy Forum 11-001: It is Time for a ‘Change of Thinking’ in Our Rough-And-Ready China Policy

Moon Chung-in, Professor of Political Science at Yonsei University, writes, “We have to have good relations with China. To do that we need to develop a more balanced practical diplomacy. A triangular alliance that is ‘Anti-China’ made up of South Korea, Japan and the U.S. cannot be an alternative. Relations between the U.S. and China as well as relations between Japan and China must be good to ensure the peace, stability and prosperity of the Korean peninsula. In particular, it also is necessary to put emphasis on the improvement of North-South relations.”

Engaging the DPRK Enrichment and Small LWR Program: What Would It Take?

Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, and David von Hippel, Nautilus Institute Senior Associate, write, “it may be possible to slow and even reverse the DPRK’s nuclear breakout by collaboration that assists it to develop small light water reactors (LWRs) that are safe, reliable, and above all, safeguarded, and integrates its enrichment capacity into a regional enrichment consortium, possibly as part of a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.”

Update Review of Safety Aspects of Nuclear Power Program in Republic of Korea

This report, written by S. Levy for the World Bank/UNDP in April 1982, analyzes the safety aspects of the ROK’s nuclear power program “with a special emphasis on the regulatory aspects and operational safety of nuclear power plants.” The report noted the need for a “…strong, independent, and competent nuclear regulatory function as well as associated Korean safety laws, regulations, criteria, codes, and standards.”

Read a short summary of this report here.

International Deployment of Commercial Capability in Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Power Plant Design, Manufacture, and Construction for Developing Countries

This report, written by L. J. Droutman, et al in October 1979 for Oak Ridge National Laboratory, notes that “the development of a quality control/assurance consciousness [necessary for a modern LWR] together with a cadre of qualified and experienced supervisors and skilled workers would take 15-20 years involvement and experience in nuclear plant construction… There is no short cut to gaining the needed experience”

Read a short summary of this report here.

Policy Forum 10-061: Strategic Patience Has Become Strategic Passivity

James E. Goodby, former US ambassador and special representative for Nuclear Security and Dismantlement and affiliate of the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at The Brookings Institution and Donald Gross, former senior advisor in the U.S. Department of State and former Asia policy advisor to President Obama, write, “Although a solution to the basic political and security issues in Northeast Asia is not likely to be found in the near future, we should be clear about one other thing: U.S. disengagement from talks with North Korea effectively contributes to instability in the region.  Strategic patience is no longer viable.  Diplomatic initiatives and vision must replace passivity, and soon.”

Policy Forum 10-060: Korean Peninsula at a New Juncture of War and Peace: Between Aggressive Deterrent and Escalating Risk of War

Tong Kim, visiting professor at the University of North Korean Studies and visiting research professor at Korea University, writes, “If the South Korean government were operating in the wake of the Yeonpyeong incident with the assumption that the North Koreans would not be ready for a war, it would be too risky.  President Lee said, “…a disgraceful peace achieved through intimidation only brings greater harm in the end. Only courage that defies retreat under any threat or provocation will bring about genuine peace.” The South Koreans do not have to be intimated or retreat from threats or provocation.  Yet, they should be able to find a better path to achieve “genuine peace” with confidence that they can prevent a war that nobody wants.  It will take courage to talk to the North in the current environment.  Maybe dialogue should wait until the dust settles.  Nevertheless, dialogue is the best solution.  People want peace, not war. Peace is achievable.”

NAPSNet Daily Report 17 December, 2010

Contents in this Issue: I. NAPSNet 1. DPRK on ROK Military Drill 2. Russia on ROK Military Drill 3. US-DPRK Relations 4. PRC on DPRK Nuclear Talks 5. Japan Defense Guidelines   1. DPRK on ROK Military Drill Agence France-Presse (“N.KOREA VOWS TO STRIKE BACK IF SOUTH HOLDS ISLAND DRILL”, 2010/12/17) reported that the DPRK’s […]

An Initial Exploration of the Potential for Deep Borehole Disposal of Nuclear Wastes in South Korea

Jungmin Kang, an Associate of the Nautilus Institute-ARI in Seoul and Visiting Scholar at John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, writes, “Considering its potential safety superiority compared with normal geologic disposal, deep borehole disposal could be an alternative, which could be more acceptable to local communities, for the eventual disposal of spent fuel and/or HLW in South Korea.”