CONTENTS
1. US on DPRK Nuclear Situation
2. DPRK-US Relations
3. Powell on DPRK NPT Withdrawal
4. DPRK Missile Tests
5. Japan-RF Energy Relations
6. PRC AID Humanitarian Crisis
II. People’s Republic of China 1. PRC, US Views on DPRK Issue
2. DPRK-ROK Relations
3. Global Response to DPRK Nuke Issue
4. US Role in Across Taiwan Straits Relations
5. Japan-Russia Relations on Nuclear Issue
6. ROK-US Relations on Nuclear Issue
7. PRC’s Commentary on Relations Across Taiwan Straits
United States 1. US Missile Defense The US Pentagon that is developing defenses against missile attack has decided to skip two tests of its ability to intercept mock warheads in space, saving about US$200 million, an official said Wednesday. The tests were to have been held this winter and spring. Pentagon officials have said they […]
In the essay below, Fred McGoldrick responds to North Korea’s January 10, 2003 announcement of their intended withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty by outlining what concrete steps the DPRK could take to implement a freeze of its uranium enrichment activities. McGoldrick also attempts to answer the following questions: What enrichment activities should the DPRK “freeze”? Who should verify such a freeze? How should such a freeze be verified?
CONTENTS
1. DPRK Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Withdrawal
2. DPRK on NPT Withdrawal
3. DPRK-US Diplomatic Relations
4. DPRK-ROK Diplomacy
5. DPRK-PRC Relations
6. DPRK Defectors on DPRK Diplomacy
7. Japan-RF DPRK Nuclear Concerns
8. Japan-France DPRK Condemnation
9. Japan on DPRK NPT Withdrawal
10. Global Response to DPRK NPT Withdrawal
II. Japan 1. Japan on possible US Attack on Iraq
2. Japan 2003 Budget
3. SDF’s Peacekeeping Operation
4. Japanese Spy Satellite
CONTENTS
1. DPRK-ROK Nuclear Talks
2. ROK on DPRK Nuclear Dialogue
3. Powell on DPRK Diplomacy
4. DPRK-US Relations
5. ROK Anti-US Sentiments
6. Japan-RF Relations
7. US Asymmetric DPRK / Iraq Policy
8. US Assessment DPRK Military
9. RF on US Missile Defense
10. PRC Domestic Economy
11. PRC Public Demonstration
II. Republic of Korea 1. Trilateral Cooperation on DPRK
2. Food Aid Needed to DPRK
3. Comment of ROK President on Anti US Movement
4. No Ill Will toward USFK
5. PRO USFK Rally in ROK
6. Moody’s Worries on ROK situation
7. ROK’s Efforts to Implement Tree Trade Pact
III. Japan 1. Movement of Korean Residents in Japan against US
2. Abduction Issues related to DPRK
3. Japan’s ODA Strategy
4. Japan-US-ROK Cooperation toward DPRK Issues
CONTENTS
1. ROK-Japan-US Joint Statement on DPRK
2. US on DPRK-US Relations
3. DPRK Response to US Talk Offer
4. ROK on DPRK Situation
5. Japan on DPRK Situation
6. Inter-Korean Family Separation
7. US Troops in ROK
8. PRC Call for Democratization
9. Japan-RF Relations
10. US Missile Defense
II. Republic of Korea 1. DPRK Following IAEA Directions?
2. US Stance to DPRK
3. Anti-US Sentiment in ROK
4. Inter Korean Flight Increased
CONTENTS
In this essay by Leon Sigal, Director of the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Research Council, argues that instead of trying to compel rightly reluctant allies to ratchet up the pressure on North Korea, President Bush needs to ask himself, Is the world’s only superpower tough enough to sit down and negotiate in earnest with North Korea?
Henry Sokolski, Executive Director The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, argues that now that North Korea has admitted that it has been secretly enriching uranium for nuclear weapons and insisted that it has a right to possess them, the United States and its allies are faced with three security problems. First, they limit the instability Pyongyang’s nuclear program might cause. Second, they must prevent North Korea’s example from encouraging other countries from proliferating. Third, they must encourage the current North Korean government to become one that is willing to self-disarm. Consequently, the U.S. and its allies must do all they can to encourage the tyrannical militaristic regime in Pyongyang to give way to a less hostile one by shoring up allied defenses and playing a far more active role in supporting North Korean human rights.
This essay by David S. Maxwell asserts that North Korea’s announcement of their nuclear development program may be a synchronized action among members of the U.S.-designated “axis of evil.” The announcement potentially relieves pressure on Iraq, attacks US credibility, and further erodes the focus of US anti-terrorism efforts. While not advocating direct military confrontation, Maxwell argues that a visible commitment to South Korea is necessary and could be demonstrated by the re-start of such exercises as Team Spirit. David S. Maxwell is a U.S. Army officer with service in various command and staff assignments in Korea, Japan, the Philippines, and Europe for 22 years.
