Policy Forum 03-17A: A Bad Idea in Vietnam, an Even Worse Idea Today

Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute and Nina Tannenwald of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University argue that the 1966 JASON study on the first use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam is a stark warning that using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against Iraq, North Korea or transnational terrorists would make more likely increase the risk of nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies.

Policy Forum 03-16A: Making the Case Against Calamity

In the essay below, Weinberg recounts his participation in the 1966 report that urged against the first-use of tactical nuclear weapons in the Vietnam war. Weinberg concludes that today the US should beware of moving beyond nuclear deterrence by developing low-yield weapons for attacking underground facilities. Steven Weinberg won the Nobel Prize for physics in 1979 and present teaches at the University of Texas at Austin.

NAPSNet Daily Report 06 March, 2003

 
CONTENTS

I. United States

1. DPRK Missile Test Preparation
2. ROK on the DPRK Nuclear Threat
3. ROK on US Troop Presence
4. ROK-Japan DPRK Talks
5. Russia on US DPRK Attack
6. PRC on Iraq Resolution
7. PRC Domestic Economy
8. PRC on Oil Production
9. PRC on US and Cross-Straits Relations
10. PRC on US-DPRK Diplomacy
11. PRC Internet Development
12. ROK Internet Media
13. Japan Domestic Economy
14. KCNA Call for Non-Aggression Treaty
II. Japan 1. Japan’s View on US Policy to DPRK Kyodo
2. US-DPRK Relations Kyodo
3. Castro’s Visit to Japan
4. Japan’s Position to Iraq
5. Japan’s View to Iraq Situation
6. Japan-US Relations over Iraq and DPRK Issues
7. Japan-US Relations over DPRK Abductions’ Issue

Policy Forum 03-15A: The Reagan Solution to the North Korean Puzzle: Strategic Benign Neglect and Back-breaking Arms Race

Alexandre Y. Mansourov argues that Kim Jong Il is engaged in a two-level game whereby his domestic political and economic considerations are as important to him, if not more, as the signals, which he sends to and receives from the international community. The author believes that at the current stage of confrontation, Kim Jong Il is not interested in any sort of negotiations with the United States. Kim wants the Bomb, and North Korea will do its utmost to become a nuclear state, whether it will officially declare it outright or not. On its part, Washington refuses to negotiate with Pyongyang because it pursues a Reaganesque strategy, reminiscent of the old Cold War days, of mounting international isolation and an escalating arms race that will hopefully lead to an implosion of the bankrupt North Korean state. The author argues that the real danger from such an uncontrolled escalation of tensions is an accidental outbreak of hostilities contrary to the real intentions of all the parties concerned. Mansourov outlines the initial steps to be required to jump start constructive negotiations between Pyongyang and Washington at the time of total mutual distrust, zero credibility, and personal enmity among leaders. Mansourov is Associate Professor of Security Studies Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

NAPSNet Daily Report 26 February, 2003

 
CONTENTS

I. United States

1. Powell Asia Trip
2. DPRK on US War
3. ROK New Prime Minister
4. ROK Subway Arson Attack
5. US DPRK Humanitarian Aid
6. DPRK US Air Space Intrusion
7. DPRK Chemical Weapons
8. PRC Domestic Terrorism?
9. PRC-Russia DPRK Talks
10. US on PRC-Russia Iraq Resolution Status
11. Japan on DPRK Missile Test
12. Japan on Cost of Iraq War
II. Republic of Korea 1. New ROK Presidency Begins
4. Development of Gaeseong Complex in DPRK
6. Food Aid to DPRK from US and Australia
III. Japan 1. DPRK’s Fired Ground-to-Ship Missile
2. Japan-ROK Relations
3. US-DPRK Relations Kyodo
4. Japan-DPRK Relations

Policy Forum 03-14A: Gas Fired Electrical Generation, Catalyst for DPRK Security and Development

This essay is by John Fetter, President of FSI Energy, a consulting organization specializing in energy and environmental improvement. Fetter asserts that a gas fired electrical generation strategy would benefit the DPRK for several significant reasons. Gas fired electric generation would provide the DPRK with clean, technologically appropriate, available generation capacity in a reasonable time frame. Gas would also supply industrial fuel and excellent power quality without relying on a limited transmission grid.

NAPSNet Daily Report 25 February, 2003

 
CONTENTS

I. United States

1. DPRK Missile Firing
2. Japan Response to DPRK Missile Test
3. US Response to DPRK Missile Firing
4. PRC on DPRK Missile Test
5. DPRK Nuclear Development
6. PRC-US DPRK Diplomatic Relations
7. US DPRK Humanitarian Assistance
8. DPRK-US Air Intrusion?
9. ROK New President Inaugeration
10. PRC on Iraq Resolution
11. ROK-Japan Presidential Summit
12. ROK Prime Minister Nomination
13. Japan Domestic Economy
II. CanKor E-Clipping Service 1. Issue #117