NAPSNet Daily Report Wednesday, March 23, 2005 NAPSNet Daily Report Wednesday, March 23, 2005 I. United States 1. PRC on DPRK Nuclear Talks 2. Sino-DPRK Relations 3. Inter – Korean Economic Cooperation 4. Russian Oil Exports to the DPRK 5. DPRK Economic Reforms 6. DPRK on Nuclear Talks 7. US on DPRK Nuclear Talks 8. […]
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Policy Forum 05-25A: The Folly of Forcing Regime Change
Kenneth Lieberthal is a professor of political science and of business administration at the University of Michigan, and is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution. He was special assistant to the US president for National Security Affairs and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council, 1998-2000. Kenneth Lieberthal writes: “North Korea is both morally repugnant and a maddening adversary in negotiations. But simply going through the motions of negotiation in the hope that regime change will somehow happen enhances Kim Jong-Il’s opportunity to develop and proliferate nuclear capabilities.”
Discussion of “The Folly of Forcing Regime Change”
Discussion of “The Folly of Forcing Regime Change” Discussion of “The Folly of Forcing Regime Change” PFO 05-25A: March 22nd, 2005 Discussion of “The Folly of Forcing Regime Change” Kenneth Lieberthal CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Comments on Essay by Kenneth Lieberthal Comments by Ralph Cossa Response by Kenneth Lieberthal III. Nautilus invites your responses Go […]
Discussion of “What is the Goal of the U.S. Policy toward North Korea: Nonproliferation or Regime Change?”
Discussion of “What is the Goal of the U.S. Policy toward North Korea: Nonproliferation or Regime Change?” Discussion of “What is the Goal of the U.S. Policy toward North Korea: Nonproliferation or Regime Change?” PFO 05-30A: March 22, 2005 Discussion of “What is the Goal of the U.S. Policy toward North Korea: Nonproliferation or Regime […]
NAPSNet Daily Report Tuesday, March 22, 2005
NAPSNet Daily Report Tuesday, March 22, 2005 NAPSNet Daily Report Tuesday, March 22, 2005 I. United States 1. US on DPRK Nuclear Issue 2. US, Japan on DPRK Nuclear Talks 3. Japan on DPRK Nuclear Talks 4. DPRK on Japan Role in DPRK Nuclear Talks 5. DPRK on Nuclear Talks 6. Sino – DPRK Relations […]
NAPSNet Daily Report Monday, March 21, 2005
NAPSNet Daily Report Monday, March 21, 2005 NAPSNet Daily Report Monday, March 21, 2005 I. United States 1. US on DPRK Nuclear Talks 2. US on Sanctions on the DPRK 3. US on DPRK Nuclear Program 4. US on Military Option for DPRK 5. US on PRC Role in DPRK Nuclear Talks 6. PRC on […]
Policy Forum 05-24A: The North Korean Crisis
The following is text of a speech given on March 8, 2005 by Desaix Anderson at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. Desaix Anderson writes: “Kim Jong Il has repeatedly claimed, again last week, that North Korea seeks a solution that would eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs in exchange for ending U.S. hostility. Given the stakes, the U.S. is irresponsible not to test Kim’s real intentions by serious negotiations.”
The Structure of North Korea’s Political Economy: Changes and Effects Young-Sun Lee and Deok Ryong Yoon
Young-Sun Lee, Professor of Economics at Yonsei University, and Deok Ryong Yoon, research fellow at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KEIP), write: “To make sure that North Korea does not return to its past state, more people must continue to show interest in the market system development in the North. Investment in various forms will help enlarge the basement for international cooperation as well.”
Discussion of “Pyongyang Raises the Stakes”
Discussion of “Pyongyang Raises the Stakes” Discussion of “Pyongyang Raises the Stakes” PFO 05-17A: March 11th, 2005 Discussion of “Pyongyang Raises the Stakes” by Ralph A. Cossa Copyright © 2005 Nautilus of America/The Nautilus Institute CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Comments on Essay by Ralph Cossa Comments by Rupert Atkinson Response by Ralph Cossa III. Nautilus […]
Policy Forum 05-22A: Allow Two Nukes For North Korea
Hy-Sang Lee, emeritus professor of the University of Wisconsin and author of North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress, writes: “Under a settlement allowing a two-bomb scarecrow strategy Pyongyang would be committing suicide if the bombs would be used in a first strike (inviting an obliterating retaliation), and this scarecrow strategy would be rendered precarious if one of the bombs would be sold. Hence, the two-bomb settlement is a second best option which still would respect the red line of the United States.”