The Nautilus Institute released this
report as a rapid response evaluation of the implications of the March 11, 2011
earthquake and consequent tsunami off the northeast coast of Japan, focusing on
Japan’s electricity system, its energy security and the future of the nuclear
power plants located in the earthquake- and tsunami-affected regions.
Read the executive summary.
Edward Yoon, an accountant and expert in the North Korean resource development sector, writes, “The mining subsector of the DPRK’s industry accounted 8.3% of the North Korean GDP and about 15.9% of total export revenues in 2005. The minerals production sector in North Korea has, however, been struggling because of poor central planning and a lack of modern technology and equipment, as well as a shortage of electricity … Based on a study conducted by Chung, Woo Jin, exploitation of the DPRK’s mineral resources through linkages with South Korean and overseas consumer markets is likely to be the most profitable way for the DPRK to develop its minerals sector. Strong markets for the DPRK’s gold, silver, lead, iron ore, zinc, Tungsten, copper, and other metallic minerals are likely. In additions, among the DPRK’s non-metallic minerals, magnetite, flaky graphite, and limestone are valuable products.”
Read a response from Aidan Foster-Carter here.
Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, and David von Hippel, Nautilus Institute Senior Associate, write, “Whether precipitated by war, coup, or simply continuing slow economic decline, it is incumbent on the international community to help to provide services and support to stabilize North Korea in the unlikely event of outright collapse. Fortunately, many of the measures that would be needed are the same as should be undertaken in the non-collapse pathways. Among the many likely needs of the North Korean population following a collapse—food, clean water, heath care, and economic development among them—the need to promptly provide the population with reliable and demonstrably improving access to energy services (heat, light, mechanized transportation, and so on) will be a key to stabilizing the country, meeting other post-collapse needs, and readying the North for eventual smooth (one hopes) integration with South Korea.”
Read a response from Aidan Foster-Carter here.
Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, and David von Hippel, Nautilus Institute Senior Associate, write, “it may be possible to slow and even reverse the DPRK’s nuclear breakout by collaboration that assists it to develop small light water reactors (LWRs) that are safe, reliable, and above all, safeguarded, and integrates its enrichment capacity into a regional enrichment consortium, possibly as part of a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.”
This report, written by S. Levy for the World Bank/UNDP in April 1982, analyzes the safety aspects of the ROK’s nuclear power program “with a special emphasis on the regulatory aspects and operational safety of nuclear power plants.” The report noted the need for a “…strong, independent, and competent nuclear regulatory function as well as associated Korean safety laws, regulations, criteria, codes, and standards.”
Read a short summary of this report here.
This report, written by L. J. Droutman, et al in October 1979 for Oak Ridge National Laboratory, notes that “the development of a quality control/assurance consciousness [necessary for a modern LWR] together with a cadre of qualified and experienced supervisors and skilled workers would take 15-20 years involvement and experience in nuclear plant construction… There is no short cut to gaining the needed experience”
Read a short summary of this report here.
Jungmin Kang, an Associate of the Nautilus Institute-ARI in Seoul and Visiting Scholar at John Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, writes, “Considering its potential safety superiority compared with normal geologic disposal, deep borehole disposal could be an alternative, which could be more acceptable to local communities, for the eventual disposal of spent fuel and/or HLW in South Korea.”
Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute, and David von Hippel, Nautilus Institute Senior Associate, explore the feasibility of deep borehole nuclear waste storage in East Asia. The report presents summaries of the current concept of deep borehole disposal of nuclear wastes, key unknowns and uncertainties about deep borehole-related technologies as they apply to nuclear spent fuel disposal, the status of deep borehole research both internationally and in the countries of the region, and–finally–next steps in the exploration of the applicability of the deep borehole concept to cooperative nuclear waste management solutions in East Asia.
Siegfried S. Hecker, Co-Director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) and Professor of Management Science and Engineering at Stanford University, writes “It is clear that waiting patiently for Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party talks on terms acceptable to the United States and its allies will exacerbate the problem. A military attack is out of the question. Tightening sanctions further is likewise a dead end, particularly given the advances made in their nuclear program and the economic improvements we saw in general in Pyongyang. The only hope appears to be engagement. The United States and its partners should respond to the latest nuclear developments so as to encourage Pyongyang to finally pursue nuclear electricity in lieu of the bomb. That will require addressing North Korea’s underlying insecurity. A high-level North Korean government official told us that the October 2000 Joint Communiqué, which brought Secretary Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang, is a good place to start.”
The Congressional Research Service writes, “While a full U.S. trade embargo on North Korea is not in place, the United States nevertheless has very limited trade with the country. Therefore, one option for focusing U.S. policy is to influence, or at least closely monitor, other states’ national measures to implement the sanctions under UNSCR 1874. This could be accomplished by focusing attention on North Korea’s main intermediaries, including China, as well as transshipment countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and the United Arab Emirates”.
