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Jungmin Kang, Science Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University, and Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute Executive Director, write, “Having tested and failed, the DPRK can no longer rely on opacity as the basis for having a credible nuclear force, at least sufficiently credible to threaten its adversaries with a nuclear explosion. The DPRK might believe that a half kilotonne “mininuke” still provides it with a measure of nuclear deterrence and compellence; but it could not rely on other nuclear weapons states to perceive it to have anything more than an unusable, unreliable and relatively small nuclear explosive device.”

Bennett Ramberg, who served in the State Department during President George H.W. Bush’s administration and is the author of three books on international security, writes, “Finally, give the North a greater stake in its financial future – and reduce its isolation and paranoia – by encouraging the South’s efforts at economic engagement. Economic intercourse may deliver another benefit. It could abate Pyongyang’s incentive to sell military equipment – including nuclear materials, or even weapons – to generate hard currency. However, we cannot rely on this tack.”

Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Associate Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, writes, “The day after the nuclear test, we are all somewhat less secure, worse off, and closer to the second Korean War. This notwithstanding, the international community can attempt to turn this crisis into a unique opportunity to resolve the Korean question writ large once and for all through a multinational peace-making effort aimed at extending the benefits of secure and prosperous life in a free and open society to all Koreans living on a united peninsula, while establishing the foundations for a genuine regional multilateral security architecture capable of coping with the most difficult security challenges in Northeast Asia in a cooperative, effective, and mutually acceptable manner.”

Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute Executive Director, and Tim Savage, Nautilus Institute Senior Associate, write, “The United States and China should also avoid falling into the “blame game” about who failed to prevent North Korea from testing. The Six Party Talks are now dead. As the two great powers involved directly with the North, they have to work together to develop a viable strategy to engage North Korea and restart negotiations, possibly in a new tripartite forum. If the United States baulks at engaging North Korea, then China and Russia will simply cut their own deals with Kim Jong Il in order to re-stabilize the situation.”

Dr. Strangelove in Pyongyang Dr. Strangelove in Pyongyang Policy Forum Online 06-85A: October 10th, 2006 Dr. Strangelove in Pyongyang Essay by Peter Hayes and Tim Savage CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Essay by Peter Hayes and Tim Savage III. Nautilus invites your responses I. Introduction Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute Executive Director, and Tim Savage, Nautilus Institute […]

The Korean Central News Agency issued this announcement claiming to have successfully tested a nuclear bomb on October 9th, 2006. The announcement coincided with an underground explosion in a mine in North Hamgyeong Province. The announcement notes, “the nuclear test was conducted with indigenous wisdom and technology 100%. It marks a historic event as it greatly encouraged and pleased the KPA (Korean People’s Army) and people that have wished to have powerful self-reliant defence capability.”

Mark J. Valencia, maritime policy analyst and Nautilus Institute Senior Fellow, writes, “The joint survey could relieve tension and even be a step towards joint development of resources such as fish, gas and minerals thought to be situated in the disputed area. North Korea should not be excluded from such a cooperative effort and any eventual joint development arrangement. Indeed, rather than ignore North Korea’s claims and concerns and thereby further isolate and antagonize it, the two should invite it to join the survey.”

The Stalker State POLICY FORUM ONLINE 06-82A October 4th, 2006 “The Stalker State: North Korean Proliferation and the End of American Nuclear Hegemony” By Peter Hayes CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Article by Peter Hayes III. DPRK Foreign Ministry Statement IV. Nautilus Invites Your Responses I. Introduction Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute Executive Director, writes “If as […]

The Stalker State The Stalker State POLICY FORUM ONLINE 06-82A October 4th, 2006 “The Stalker State: North Korean Proliferation and the End of American Nuclear Hegemony” By Peter Hayes CONTENTS I. Introduction II. Article by Peter Hayes III. DPRK Foreign Ministry Statement IV. Nautilus Invites Your Responses I. Introduction Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute Executive Director, […]

Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute Executive Director, writes “If as I have suggested, the DPRK has become a nuclear stalker state that seeks to redress past wrongs and use nuclear leverage to force the United States to treat it in a less hostile and more respectful manner, then the United States will have to ask itself whether continued isolation and pressure on the regime is more likely, or less so, to ameliorate stalking behaviors in time of crisis, when the risk of nuclear next-use becomes urgent. Like a repeat offender, the DPRK is likely to continue to use nuclear threat to stalk the United States until it achieves what it perceives to be a genuine shift in Washingtons attitude. Unlike an individual who stalks, there is no simple way to lock up a state that stalks another with nuclear threat.”