SOUTH KOREA'S POLICY MAKING PROCESS ON NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR ISSUE: A Random Note
Jeong Woo Kil
Senior Fellow
Research Institute for National Unification
Seoul, Korea
prepared for the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network
managed by Nautilus Institute, Berkeley, California
Introduction
The Kim Young Sam government was inaugurated with mixed blessing
in February last year. The Kim government was the first civilian
government freely elected after thirty-year authoritarian rule
and seemed to be prepared to launch a rather progressive policies
in every sector of domestic politics, economy, social and even
inter- Korean relations. Such ambitious attempt was possible
thanks to the public trust and expectation over the civilian
regime led by the former opposition leader who has devoted his
life in fighting against authoritarianism. But on the other hand
the Kim government should face a new challenge when North Korea's
nuclear problem began to draw a serious attention from the
international society.
Around the time of the Kim's inauguration the IAEA regarding
North Korea's nuclear development program found significant
discrepancies between Pyongyang's initial report to the IAEA in
May 1992 and findings after six-round inspections. Increasing
suspicion over the North's intention drove the Board of
Governors' decision to ask special inspection over the North's
two undeclared sites in Yongbyon.
President Kim's new staff working on foreign affairs, security
and inter-Korean affairs were all former college professors who
had no previous experience in public service. Among the so-called
"Gang of Four" consisting of Deputy Prime Minister of Unification
Han Wan-Sang, Foreign Minister Han Sung-Joo, President's Security
Advisor Chung Chong-Wook, and the National Security
Planning(Korean CIA)'s chief Kim Duk, the DPM Han varied in his
career from the others. Dr. Han was all-time in the side of the
oppressed and human rights activist expelled twice from the
university campus. He promoted a progressive policy in the inter-
Korean relations and in humanitarian reasons was very supportive
in the President's decision to bring back Lee In-Mo, a North
Korean journalist captured in the Korean War opposing to convert
to the South. That issue was well over-due and has often ignited
confrontation in previous North-South talks.
The Unification Minister Han became a easy target of the
conservative camp when the North announced to pull out of the NPT
just the following day Seoul officially decided to return Lee In-
Mo to the North. It was Dr. Han's misfortune to drive himself to
the setting where he would be inevitably in a defensive position
in planning and undertaking unification policy with progressive
tone.
To four former professors with no experience of public service
North Korea's nuclear problem appeared as a serious challenge and
frustration. Nuclear issue was a very new issue to South Korean
government and no official debate was allowed since former
president Park Chung Hee's attempt to develop nuclear weapons
indigenously in late 1970s. And no expertise was accumulated in
the government on how to deal with the nuclear problem and no
enough understanding was shared about the implications of nuclear
weapons in the Peninsula. Under the nuclear umbrella of the
United States South Korea had neither leverage nor voice on the
issue for the last thirty years. Such lack of understanding and
limited room of leverage made new Kim Young Sam government get
frustrated and show fluctuation in its dealing with nuclear
problem from the beginning.
Considering the position taken by each of the Gang of Four on
security issues, the Unification Minister Han is the most
progressive, Foreign Minister Han is probably the next, and Dr.
Chung at the Blue House and Dr. Kim of the NSP are representing
the conservative voice. The NSP chief Kim was not affiliated with
the conservative camp when he was professor, but as chief of the
intelligence agency he should no choice but to represent his
institution, the champion of the conservative. Dr. Chung could
enjoy his power supported by the Chief Secretary to the President
Park Kwan Yong, but became quite often blamed by his colleagues
on his indecisiveness and lack of capacity in coordination.
Following development of the nuclear issue and South Korean
government's policy decisions regarding the problem were made by
this group of gentlemen until the Unification Minister Han
stepped down December 1993 replaced by a conservative educator
Lee Yung Duk.
First Stage: Frustration of the Progressive
Nuclear problem was from the beginning the international issue
which the United States paid serious attention to every step of
its development. And in some sense North Korea's claim to discuss
the issue only with the U.S. was not unwarranted. Due to the U.S.
concern over the issue the Foreign Minister Han became in charge
of monitoring the development of debate in between Washington and
Pyongyang, and between the IAEA and North Korea.
The first stage regarding nuclear debate was until the North and
South Koreas agreed to discuss about the exchange of special
envoy in preparation of the inter-Korean summit meeting in June
22, 1993. To the proposal of the North on special envoy the Kim
administration expressed initial reluctance after assuming that
the North sought to nullify the previous mechanism of the inter-
Korean dialogue under the framework of the Basic Agreement which
was put into effective February 1992. But just after Security
Advisor Chung's trip to Washington the Kim government suddenly
changed its position to accept the North's proposal.
The UN Security Council's decision on May 11 to appeal to the
member countries to keep dialogue with North Korea for resolving
the nuclear problem by peaceful means and South Korea's
acceptance of Pyongyang's proposal provided the U.S. with excuse
to resume bilateral dialogue. This occasion reflects that the
internal debate in the South Korean government on the inter-
Korean affairs was prevailed by the Washington's voice and
difference of opinions among four key decision makers in Seoul
was almost meaningless in deciding its own fate. In the final
decision the Unification Minister Han and Foreign Minster Han
were favorable of opening new channel of dialogue with the North
while two others were rather reluctant. Security Advisor Chung
had no choice but to follow the U.S. request on the issue when he
met with many key officials in Washington, even though his
mission was to persuade the U.S. counterpart to understand and
support Seoul's assessment of Pyongyang's intention regarding the
special envoy proposal.
Second Stage: Making Two Different Voices Relieved
The first and second round of the U.S.-DPRK talks in New York
and Geneva respectively made South Korean government nervous
because these high-level meetings were unprecedented except the
January 1992 meeting in New York between Kim Yong Sun and
Undersecretary Arnord Kanter on the eve of the North's signing
the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. South Korea's Foreign
Minister's role was to justify the significance of the U.S.-DPRK
meetings in the course of resolving the nuclear problem and the
DPM Han was supportive to the agreement, and Dr. Chung could not
have reservation to that even though the conservative circle
launched a campaign of criticism that South Korean government was
dismissed in the game.
The conservatives in the South spoke up their voice when the
North violated its commitment to accept to resume inspection
talks with the IAEA and the inter-Korean dialogue before the
third round talks between the U.S. and DPRK. As the IAEA Board of
Governors' meeting and the UN Security Council were discussing
the measures against the North, Pyongyang conveyed its message of
so-called "package deal" to Mr. Ken Quinones accompanying the
U.S. Congressman Gary Ackerman's trip to Pyongyang in October
1993. In a couple of weeks North Korean government officially
proposed its position in November regarding the package deal by
Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju, a North Korean
representative of the U.S.-DPRK high-level talks.
South Korean government showed strong reluctance of the North's
package deal approach to the nuclear issue, but opinions were
divided among four key members of decision making. Two Hans
joined the side in interpreting the North's proposal as simply
reflection of Pyongyang's defensive position because the North
has very limited cards to play in dealing with the U.S.. But the
other two had different views by reading the North's intention
which is just playing for time without showing any good will to
resolve the problem, and they opposed to accept the concept of
package deal. However their complaint was a little bit pacified
by the North's acceptance, to the U.S. Assistant Secretary
Gallucci's message to the North on September 20, 1993, of working
level preparatory meeting for the exchange of special envoy
between Seoul and Pyongyang, which was held three times in
October.
The United States began seriously analyzing the North's intention
and concluded in mid-November to try a comprehensive approach
even tentatively in the course of resolving the nuclear problem.
This was a very important shift of the U.S. position and
unexpected step considering its status of the one and only
superpower in the Post-Cold War era. But this was a serious
beginning of the encounter between the North's package deal and
the U.S. comprehensive approach.
Third Stage: U.S. Prevailing over S. Korea's Policy Debate
South Korea's concern over the U.S. big shift in its previous
position ignited a serious debate and sense of urgency concerning
the lost ground of its choice in the process of discussing the
nuclear problem which threatens the security of the South.
President Kim's unexpected, bold gesture in the summit meeting
with President Clinton in Washington November 23, 1993 created a
new concept, "thorough and broad approach" to the nuclear issue.
The Kim administration made a jargon to demonstrate its own voice
in the nuclear game and tried to show to the North the U.S.-South
Korean cooperation. Since then the official position of the U.S.
and South Korea was represented by this term. When we consider
the differences remained in the U.S. interpretation and the South
Korean one, the new words were made to the initiative or urge of
some strong criticism in the Blue House on Foreign Minster Han's
soft line leaning toward the U.S. decision.
A series of working level meetings between the U.S. and DPRK were
held in New York and two parties reached an agreement on basic
framework for continuing dialogue in between on the nuclear issue
on December 29, 1993. And the inter-Korean dialogue resumed in
March this year regarding the exchange of special envoy. But the
problem came up concerning interpretation of the U.S.-DPRK
agreement on so-called Four-Point measures to be simultaneously
implemented including fixing the date of the third round high-
level talks between Washington and Pyongyang.
The point of major conflict was the terms on special envoy. South
Korea claimed that the actual exchange of special envoy should be
a precondition to the resumption of the U.S.-DPRK third round
talks, but the North argued that some basic agreement on the
details of the issue was good enough to resume the talks with the
U.S. Finally the U.S. supported the Seoul's position and the
North representative's notorious warning of "Sea of Fire" at the
working level meeting March 19 stalled the inter-Korean dialogue,
which quickly raised tension in the Peninsula.
North Korea's blunt words ignited hot debate in South Korea and
the hardliners took up their voice in the discussion and drew
broad support from the conservative camp in the political circle
and the media. Which drove the softliners, probably solely
represented by the Foreign Minister Han Sung-Joo to keep silent.
Minister Han was a lonely fighter in the government policy making
circle since the former Unification Minister Han stepped down
December last year.
Fourth Stage: Hardliners Speak up Again
In the midst the Kim administration kept tough position against
the North, the Blue House staff took the lead in most decisions
in foreign and inter-Korean affairs. They were active in
mobilizing the international support to drive the situation to
the sanctions against the North.
North Korea responded very firmly by announcing on May 13 the
replacement of the 5MW reactor core which heightened the
international concern over the North's nuclear development
program. And the debate on sanctions by the international
community led by the U.S. at the UN Security Council was
activated and South Korean government as a party directly
concerned had no choice but joining the U.S. move. And South
Korea even should take an active role in mobilizing the
neighboring countries's support from Beijing and Moscow.
It is an irony that Foreign Minister Han, softliner should take
such an awkward role to ask China's participation to the
sanctions against the North following the request of the
hardiners in the government policy making circle.
International move toward sanctions continued and intensified
until the former U.S. President Jimmy Carter's visit to Pyongyang
and meeting with Kim Il Sung in mid June this year. South Korean
government did not give significant meaning to Carter's visit and
even expressed caution in the sense that his trip might mislead
the North Korean leadership and provide Kim Il Sung a wrong
message of appeasement at a very critical moment on the eve of
sanctions.
However, the Clinton administration had many reasons to take
advantage of his trip. The U.S. could find out the passage of the
resolution at the UN Security Council to go against the North
seemed impossible considering China's reluctance and Russia's
ambivalence. And President Clinton tried to find an excuse to
shift the move of sanctions to the phase of dialogue. Especially
many experts warned the limit of effectiveness of sanctions
against the North and unpredictable military reaction from
Pyongyang. That is why President Clinton even intentionally
exaggerated Carter's visit and his accomplishment. South Korea
became once again positioned in a complicated situation, but had
only to share the U.S. interpretation by quickly accepting
President Kim Il Sung's proposal of the inter-Korean summit.
President Kim Young Sam's quick acceptance of the summit meeting
proposal amazed his staff but the decision seemed to reflect
President Kim's sentiment of worrying that Seoul might be
dismissed in the nuclear game played mainly by Washington and
Pyongyang.
In this fourth stage, what should not be ignored in the Kim
administration's policy making mechanism is the outstanding role
of new Deputy Prime Minister of Unification, Lee Hong-Koo. He was
former unification minister and established scholar --- who is
among the Gang of Four the only high ranking official with
previous experience in public service and with good sense of
politics. The Unification Minister Lee could quickly take control
of making major policies as head of the coordinating body of
unification and security policies, and he enjoyed full mandate of
the President. Minister Lee was senior professor of Foreign
Minister Han and Security Advisor Chung, and contributed to
easing policy confrontations between different voices from the
Foreign Ministry and the Blue House.
Fifth Stage: Softliners Gaining Power, but Wait
Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter provided new momentum for
Presidents Clinton and Kim Young Sam to shift their months-long
sustained policies to rather conciliatory ones and the U.S. and
South Korea could begin preparing for the third round Geneva
talks and the historical inter-Korean summit respectively. This
climate of dialogue may continue under North Korea's new leader
Kim Jong Il even after Great Leader's sudden death on July 8.
The Unification Minister Lee's role is preeminent as he
successfully drew an agreement last month in preparatory meeting
for the summit with the North's counterpart Kim Yong Sun, and is
really in charge of coordinating policies toward the North based
on full support of the President. Security Advisor Chung has
recently played a key role in preparing for the summit and
Foreign Minister is closely monitoring the upcoming U.S.-DPRK
talks in Geneva. The NSP Chief Dr. Kim was in awkward position
under the criticism by the Korean National Assembly when the NSP
exposed its limit in gathering intelligence regarding Kim Il
Sung's death.
How the role play is to be readjusted in the immediate future of
the Kim Young Sam government will be decided in the course of the
U.S.-DPRK negotiations on nuclear issue and affected by the new
North Korean regime's attitude on the nuclear problem.
Considering President Kim Young Sam is quite sensitive to the
public sentiment and the domestic media's coverage of current
affairs, we cannot underestimate the influence of the Korean mass
media over South Korea's policy making process.
In a nutshell, South Korea's policy making process has been
derailed time to time for the last 18 months when struggling with
North Korea's nuclear issue, and this fluctuation of policies
reflects without sufficient filtering lively or democratic policy
debate among the Gang of Four who has rather broad spectrum of
views. But under the Korean presidential system, President's
style and personality dominate the mind and behavior of his
cabinet ministers and the Blue House staffs regardless of their
own philosophy and ideas.
President Kim Young Sam may finally find a balanced character,
the Unification Minister Lee, a good coordinator of different
voices in the policy making circle and an effective buffer
against the public criticism from the conservative political camp
and the media.