

Executive Summary of Comprehensive Security Strategy (CSS) Concept

Nautilus Institute

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We suggest the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereafter DPRK) and the United States initiate a strategic conversation leading to a comprehensive security settlement that would reshape the strategic environment in six defining and interdependent elements. This memo outlines why we think this to be the approach most likely to produce an agreement, and our understanding of key concerns from a DPRK perspective about such an approach.

Nuclear weapons threaten the survival of all states in Northeast Asia. The three nuclear weapons states (NWSs) in the region project nuclear threats against each other, and whether intended or not, some also project nuclear threat against the DPRK, the Republic of Korea (hereafter ROK) and Japan. The threat of nuclear war has been part of the Korean conflict since 1950, and an American nuclear threat continues to be projected against the DPRK although US nuclear weapons are no longer forward-deployed in Korea or even in the region.

The DPRK's recent nuclear developments reversed the trend towards denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. The United States has increased its level of nuclear threat projection in the region, including aimed at the DPRK. China is modernizing its nuclear weapons arsenal, which is of great concern to regional non-nuclear states. Russia has declared increased reliance on nuclear weapons to offset its relatively declining conventional force. Japan has huge stockpiles of excess, weapons-grade plutonium. The ROK is trying to obtain reprocessing and enrichment capacity.

This trend towards increased emphasis on nuclear weapons in the region, including as it does the risk of war and escalation to nuclear war, is not only destabilizing and dangerous for all states. It also undermines the global non-proliferation regime, including non-proliferation commitments by non-nuclear states, and the commitment by the NPT-specified NWSs to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and reduce their nuclear arsenals. Moreover, a nuclear-armed DPRK controverts the NPT regime and distracts all states in the region from addressing other important security issues. –It also leads to increasing isolation of the DPRK and its increased dependence on China. Moreover, it is clearly not in China's security interest to have yet another nuclear-armed neighbor, which in turn provides an excuse for others in the region to strengthen alliances, interoperable militaries, and ballistic missile defenses, with resulting arms racing and disruption of economic integration in the region.

It is noteworthy that the founder of the DPRK, the late President Kim Il Sung (hereafter Kim Il Sung) himself advocated and supported “nuclear-free, peace zone” over the Korean Peninsula as well as over Northeast Asia and around the world. A review of *Kim Il Sung: Works* shows that he offered a nuclear-free, peace zone over the Korean Peninsula on as many as thirty-six occasions during the fifteen-year period from his Opening Speech at the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on October 10, 1980 to his talk with the chairman of the central committee of the Belgian Labor Party on June 30, 1994, a week before his death. The “federal-state” unification formula he offered at the Sixth Party Congress that still holds today made clear that the confederal state (federal state) “should make the Korean peninsula a permanent peace zone and nuclear-free zone” and that “our Party will strive to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone and will actively support the struggle of the world's people to create such zones in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Europe” (see Appendix 1). Kim Il Sung also offered the Northeast Asian nuclear-free peace zone from March 1981, as demonstrated in the “Joint Declaration on the Establishment of a Nuclear-free Peace Zone in Northeast Asia” with Japan Socialist Party. It was on June 23, 1986 that the DPRK government officially announced a proposal for nuclear-free, peace zone over the Korean Peninsula. In early September 1986, Kim Il Sung convened in Pyongyang an international conference for a nuclear-free,

peace zone over the Korean Peninsula. On July 13, 1987, the DPRK foreign ministry issued another statement on nuclear-free peace zone over the Korean Peninsula. In mid-October 1988, the DPRK convened another international conference on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and peace and stability in Asia-Pacific region. And on January 20, 1992, the DPRK signed the “Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” which was the first-ever official agreement with other party, the ROK, on denuclearizing the whole Korean Peninsula, a stepping stone toward the NEA-NEFZ. And Kim Il Sung repeatedly confirmed his will and DPRK policy to faithfully abide by the Joint Declaration up until his death.

First Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea Kim Jong Un’s (hereafter Kim Jong Un’s) “strategic initiative” announced in June 2013 may open a window of opportunity to resolve the “Korean Problem”—including the termination of the Korean War, the Korean Armistice, the peace regime issue, the DPRK nuclear and rocket issues, United Nations Security Council sanctions against the DPRK, inter-Korean conflicts, military and security threats and hostilities, etc. His strategic choice was to restart dialogue and negotiation to form a “peaceful environment” for economic (and cultural) development and improved living standards of the people. However, this effort to start a new era in the DPRK by Kim Jong Un—and the parallel effort by Chinese President Xi Jinping—is hampered by the US-ROK resistance to restarting the Six-Party Talks in spite of Chinese and DPRK efforts to do so.

To overcome this impasse, and to address the issue of nuclear weapons in the region in an even-handed and inclusive manner, Morton Halperin has proposed a multi-lateral comprehensive security strategy—Comprehensive Security Strategy (CSS)—with six defining and interdependent elements to address the DPRK nuclear issue in the broader regional security context. Each element has been developed with the help of a multi-national and (in the United States) bipartisan group:

- . Termination of a state of war in Korea;
- . Creation of a Permanent Council to monitor compliance and decide on violations;
- . Mutual threat reduction and declaration of no hostile intent;
- . Provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy needs;
- . Termination of sanctions; and
- . Creation of a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ).

The CSS framework would be a treaty in itself, perhaps a Northeast Asian Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (NEA-TAC), modeled in part after the Southeast Asian Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). One of the key elements—a regional NWFZ treaty—would provide non-nuclear weapons states (NNWSs) with a guarantee from NWSs that they would not be attacked with nuclear weapons. This is the *only* way whereby the DPRK can obtain a legally-binding guarantee from the NWSs to this effect. Of course, the DPRK becoming party to a NEA-NWFZ treaty is complicated by its nuclear armament. However, as is outlined below, there are various ways whereby this apparent contradiction may be resolved over time.

We anticipate that the DPRK could realize major gains in the following areas if it supports CSS and becomes party to a NEA-TOC and NEA-NWFZ. In addition to relief from nuclear threat, these include economic development, termination of the Korean War, establishment of a peace regime, inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, improved relations with the United States and Japan, and denuclearization of the whole Korean Peninsula.

Five key questions arise as to the plausibility of the CSS, all of which are related to political will and leadership. First, will the DPRK be willing and decisive enough to make a strategic decision to denuclearize itself as a *quid pro quo* for all the potential benefits? Second, how willing are the

United States and China to coordinate their policies? Third, how able are the United States, ROK and Japan to win over anti-CSS forces and overcome related problems in domestic politics? Fourth, to what extent does nuclear extended deterrence support rather than inhibit negotiations to settle the Korean conflict and create a NEA-NWFZ? Fifth, how valuable to the DPRK is a legally-binding guarantee from the NWSs of non-attack with nuclear weapons and would a NEA-NWFZ accord with the vision advanced by Kim Il Sung as early as in 1980 and the promises made by the following leaders that they will fulfill the “behest” of Kim Il Sung?

As we learned after US President Richard Nixon and China’s Chairman Mao Zedong met in 1972 and after US President Ronald Reagan met Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986, the world can change overnight. 2014 will be such a moment in Northeast Asia, if only the United States can agree to begin negotiations and China and the United States can align firmly enough in the agreed-on “new type of great power relations.” If Kim Jong Un takes bold, dramatic steps matched by the United States in the form a CSS strategy, then all parties could create and benefit from a NEA-NWFZ, the DPRK could denuclearize itself as a way of opening a new era, with the United States, the ROK, and Japan reciprocating to resolve the “war and peace” problem, realizing economic prosperity in the region, peace settlement in Korea, and a nuclear-free Northeast Asia for the interests of all parties.

THE DPRK'S POSSIBLE INTERESTS IN A COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY SETTLEMENT AND A NORTHEAST ASIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONE

Nautilus Institute

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This memo examines the possibility that the United States, the DPRK, and other parties to the Korean conflict, could establish a new, enduring framework in which to manage nuclear threats that leads to a breakthrough in US-DPRK relations by applying a comprehensive security strategy (CSS) and by creating a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ). At its core, it takes at face value long-standing DPRK demands for elimination of threatened use of nuclear weapons by the United States against the DPRK, stretching back to as early as 1980 and its replacement by a nuclear weapons-free zone, most famously, Kim Il Sung's "Opening Speech at the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea" on October 10, 1980 (see Appendix 1).

Kim Il Sung himself advocated and supported "nuclear-free, peace zone" over the Korean Peninsula as well as over Northeast Asia and around the world. A review of *Kim Il Sung: Works* shows that he offered a nuclear-free, peace zone over the Korean Peninsula on as many as thirty-six occasions (forty-four times, if a nuclear-free, peace zone over Northeast Asia is included) during the fifteen-year period from his Opening Speech at the Sixth Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea on October 10, 1980 to his talk with the chairman of the central committee of the Belgian Labor Party on June 30, 1994, a week before his death. The "federal-state" unification formula he offered at the Sixth Party Congress that still holds today—the Establishment of the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo—made clear that "the confederal [federal] state should make the Korean peninsula a permanent peace zone and nuclear-free zone" and that "our Party will strive to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone and will actively support the struggle of the world's people to create such zones in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Europe" (see Appendix 1). Kim Il Sung also offered the Northeast Asian nuclear-free peace zone from March 1981, as demonstrated in the "Joint Declaration on the Establishment of a Nuclear-free Peace Zone in Northeast Asia" with Japan Socialist Party.

It was on June 23, 1986 that the DPRK government officially announced a proposal for nuclear-free, peace zone over the Korean Peninsula. In early September 1986, Kim Il Sung convened in Pyongyang an international conference for a nuclear-free, peace zone over the Korean Peninsula. On July 13, 1987, the DPRK foreign ministry issued another statement on nuclear-free peace zone over the Korean Peninsula. In mid-October 1988, the DPRK convened another international conference on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and peace and stability in Asia-Pacific region. And on January 20, 1992, the DPRK signed the "Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," which was the first-ever official agreement with other party, the ROK, on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, a stepping stone toward the NEA-NEFZ. And Kim Il Sung repeatedly confirmed his will and DPRK policy to faithfully abide by the Joint Declaration up until his death in July 1994.

The memo also examines the necessary regional enabling conditions that would make it possible to realize such a zone, noting that this outcome would not in itself suffice to bring about a breakthrough, but rather, a comprehensive security settlement would be required. Such a concept, namely, "comprehensive security strategy" or CSS is outlined, and is advanced here for discussion with DPRK interlocutors.

The premise of this paper is that DPRK's leader First Secretary Kim Jong Un is clearly in command with solid political stability and the re-confirmed principle of the supremacy of the party over the military firmly established. He has introduced dramatic economic institutional and management development changes at home in agriculture and industry and announced as many as ten

central-level and thirteen provincial-level “special economic/tourism/agricultural/export-processing zones,” in addition to the four existing special economic/trade/industrial/tourism zones of Rason, Hwanggumpyong, Kaesong, and Mt. Kumgang. In an effort to make the economic reform and opening a success, he has sought improvement in relationship with the United States and the ROK for a “peaceful environment” for economic (and cultural) development and the improvement of people’s living standards. He has an opportunity to open a new era for the DPRK in the 21st century. However, he faces the dilemma of how to open his own 21st century era without finding solutions to the “old” issues including the war-and-peace issue, the nuclear issue, and the military threat issue in Korea.

Kim Jong Un’s cooperation and coordination with the Chinese leader Xi Jinping have enabled China to start to redefine Chinese-DPRK relations in order to make a “peaceful environment” in the region. Xi Jinping used the “denuclearization issue” as a way to express China’s determination to align closely with the DPRK within the context of the new Sino-U.S relations defined as a “new type of great power relations,” in which China facilitates win-win cooperation between conflicting parties rather than seeking to align in one direction or another. This is how we view China’s publication of an unprecedented list of dual-use items banned for export to the DPRK. In other words, China does not want to see the DPRK in confrontations with the United States or other regional states that will pose a threat to a “new type of great power relations;” nor does it want the DPRK nuclear issue to damage its new type of relationship with the United States.

Since May 2013, particularly since June 2013, the DPRK, in close coordination with China, launched an offensive of “dialogue and negotiation” for resuming the Six-Party Talks (SPTs), hinting at the ultimate abandonment of its nuclear weapons if US nuclear threat against the DPRK is terminated and the denuclearization of the whole Korean Peninsula is achieved—potentially a significant starting point of establishing a Northeast Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NEA-NWFZ). The apparent *quid pro quo* for the DPRK’s denuclearization is the United States ending its anti-DPRK policy such as sanctions, non-recognition, military threat against the DPRK, and the transformation of the Armistice into a peace regime in Korea.

Given the stalemate arising from contested positions, we suggest the DPRK and the United States initiate a strategic conversation. Morton Halperin has proposed a multilateral comprehensive security strategy (CSS) with six defining and interdependent elements to address the DPRK nuclear issue in the broader regional security context. These are termination of a state of war, creation of a Permanent Security Council to monitor compliance and decide on violations, mutual declarations of no hostile intent, provisions of assistance for nuclear and other energy needs, termination of sanctions, and a NEA-NWFZ. Once a comprehensive agreement with regard to the six elements is achieved, it envisions four parallel processes to implement it: denuclearization, peace-making, political normalization, and economic engagement. The full benefits that might flow to the DPRK—in particular a guarantee to not be attacked with nuclear weapons under the NEA-NWFZ—would occur only if the DPRK fully dismantled its nuclear capabilities under monitoring and verification by an agency agreed to as part of the treaty. Non-nuclear states could pull out of the treaty after some agreed timeframe if, by then, the DPRK had not dismantled its nuclear program.

There are five key questions: all of them related to political will, not technical issues. First, will the DPRK be willing and decisive enough to make a strategic decision to denuclearize itself as a *quid pro quo* for all the potential benefits? The benefits potentially available from the decision for the opening of Kim Jong Un’s era include: economic development, termination of the Korean War, establishment of peace regime, inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, improvement of relations with the United States and Japan, denuclearization of the whole Korean Peninsula including the removal of US nuclear threat against the DPRK and the establishment of a regional framework to manage nuclear security issues.

Second, how willing and creative can the United States and China be in coordinating their

policies in resolving the “Korean problem” so that both its root cause such as the continuation of the Korean War and the Armistice on the one hand, and its symptoms such as nuclear problem, sanctions, hostilities, etc. on the other, could be resolved in synch once and for all?

Third, how able are the United States, the ROK and Japan to overcome domestic politics including the leaders’ preferences of pressure and sanctions to dialogue and negotiation? The ROK is a severely divided society, and has a government with self-confident conservative “old guards” in key decision-making positions in security affairs, and Japan has huge anti-DPRK political forces with assertive and expanded security interests prevailing.

Fourth, to what extent does nuclear and conventional extended deterrence support rather than inhibit negotiations to settle the Korean conflict and create a NWFZ in Northeast Asia? If the DPRK accommodates a NEA-NWFZ, there would be no need for the United States to supply nuclear extended deterrence for the ROK and Japan. And it will affect hugely the nuclear and security strategies of the DPRK and China.

Fifth, to what extent are the United States, Japan, and the ROK willing and creative enough to persuade the DPRK that the guarantees provided by a NEA-NWFZ provide a legally-binding guarantee, such as non-attack with nuclear weapons against the DPRK, that is more reliable for its security and other goals than its nuclear armament? And would a NEA-NWFZ accord with the vision advanced by Kim Il Sung as early as in 1980?

The DPRK nuclear problem is an issue that only can be resolved when the DPRK voluntarily gives up its nuclear weapons programs. Therefore, it is important to understand, more than anything else, the DPRK’s policy and strategy based on Kim Jong Un’s need to open his own era for the 21st century, and to respond to them in an effective and creative way by the United States and others to achieve the goal.

For this purpose, this analysis will have six parts: a review of Kim Jong Un in power and preparation for his new era for the first two years, Kim Jong Un’s “strategic leadership” and critical choices for “peaceful environment” for economic development, imbalance in effort to resume the SPTs between DPRK/China and United States/ROK, Kim Jong Un’s pursuit of enhanced economic performance, likely benefits for the DPRK’s support of CSS, and implications and considerations for the DPRK of the CSS. This set of interpretations are the foundations of the proposed CSS and NEA-NWFZ. They are offered here for dialogue with DPRK interlocutors, because revising these foundations could entail revisions to the CSS and NEA-NWFZ concepts.

1. Kim Jong Un in power and preparation for his new era

Kim Jong Un officially assumed power in December 2011 immediately after Kim Jong Il’s death by taking command of the military and the party. He reshuffled the military, party, state organizations and took top leadership positions in those power apparatuses in April 2012. In the same month, he attempted a satellite launch to commemorate the 100th anniversary of his grandfather’s birth, although this was contrary to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions. Because of the impasse arising from this launch, the February 29 US-DPRK “Leap Day deal” collapsed.

The DPRK launched another rocket in December 2012, once Obama was reelected US President in November 2012, in an apparent attempt to put a satellite on the earth’s orbit before Year 2012—the year of 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il Sung—elapsed. The UNSC passed another harsh resolution against the DPRK following the test. In response, the DPRK immediately declared an “all-out confrontation” with the United States and conducted another nuclear test. Still another harsh sanction resolution followed. The confrontation between the DPRK and the international community was dramatically intensified by the US-ROK joint military exercises, the Key Resolve and Foal Eagle in March-April 2013, during which the United States flew B-52 strategic bombers and B-2 stealth

bombers on bombing runs in ROK airspace and publicly simulated nuclear strikes against the DPRK for the first time in decades.

These joint military exercises heightened the threat of war in the Korean Peninsula in an almost unprecedented way. The DPRK convened the plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party on March 31 and passed a "new strategic line" (sometimes referred to as "*byungjin rosun*") on "carrying out economic construction and building nuclear armed forces simultaneously under the prevailing situation and to meet the legitimate requirement of the developing revolution." The DPRK argued that nuclear armaments created new deterrence that enabled it to allocate more resources to economic development. This linkage seemed to signify that the DPRK would not give up its nuclear weapons and weapons programs. The dramatically heightened war threat in Korea during the first half of 2013 was the first of its kind in its intensity since the first nuclear crisis in the mid-1990s in Korea and before that, the August 1976 *Panmunjom* crisis. The United States and the ROK were unfamiliar with Kim Jong Un's personality and motivations and offered dialogue to ease tension in Korea and to de-escalate the crisis.

The almost unprecedented threat of war that arose in the first five months of Kim Jong Un's rule in the year 2013 was not consistent with opening a new era for Kim Jong Un. This goal requires improving relations with the outside world and resolving the inherited "old problems," such as the "war and peace" and denuclearization issues. Against this backdrop, Kim Jong Un seems to have decided to reverse the situation by taking decisive action to create a "peaceful" external environment for economic development by resolving the old, long-standing problems including the "war and peace" and denuclearization issues that have troubled the DPRK for generations, as will be seen below.

2. Kim Jong Un's strategic leadership and critical choices for "peaceful environment"

Kim Jong Un made critical choices in late May 2013 and afterwards to build a "peaceful environment" for economic development as soon as the military tension decreased by mid-May. He dispatched his special envoy Choe Ryong-hae, Director of the General Political Department of the Korean People's Army to Beijing. After the meeting with Xi Jinping, Choe announced the DPRK's willingness to "work with all sides to appropriately resolve the (nuclear and) relevant questions through the six-party talks and other forms."

Since June 2013 the DPRK conducted a strong offensive of dialogue and negotiation towards the ROK and the United States with the apparent acquiescence if not push from China in an effort to create a "peaceful environment" for economic (and cultural) development and improvement of people's life—the DPRK's "most urgent task." And the DPRK indicated that the will of Kim Jong Un is to boldly resolve the old, historic pending issues in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia by not repeating old-fashioned actions and by proposing to replace hostility with cooperation. Clearly, Kim Jong Un made a significant departure from the past to strive for a favorable external environment for economic development and improvement of security and peace.

The DPRK's media and also pro-DPRK newspaper published by General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (*Chosoren*) that faithfully represent the DPRK's positions highlighted Kim Jong Un's "strategic leadership for unification, peace and prosperity" and "firm, unswerving, innovative leadership of the Kim Jong Un era." They emphasized that this "bold dialogue offensive" was "not a simple working approach and technical concessions but a manifestation of the strategic leadership." In line with the strategic decision to open his own era, Kim Jong Un decided to engage the ROK and the United States.

Kim Jong Un agreed to normalize the Kaesong Industrial Zone (KIZ), which fell victim to the game of chicken during the US-ROK joint military exercises earlier in 2013. He also consented (but later reconsidered and postponed indefinitely as a likely response to the ROK government's apparent lack of interest in resuming Mt. Kumgang Tourism) to have the reunion of the separated families; and

offered to resume the Mt. Kumgang Tourism project.

Kim also proposed high-level talks with the United States on June 16, 2013 in the “crucial” statement of the National Defense Commission (NDC) spokesperson and clarified the key points about the denuclearization of the DPRK succinctly: the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is “an invariable will and resolve” of the army and people of the DPRK; the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was the “behests” of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and a “policy task which the party, state, army and people of the DPRK have to carry out without fail;” the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula calls for “denuclearizing the whole peninsula including south Korea” and aims at “totally ending the US nuclear threats” to the DPRK; the possession of nuclear weapons by the DPRK is the “strategic option” taken for “self-defense to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula;” the legitimate status of the DPRK as a nuclear weapons state will continue “until the whole Korean Peninsula is denuclearized and the nuclear threats from outside are put to a final end;” therefore, the United States should stop nuclear threats and blackmail and all forms of provocations including “sanctions” against the DPRK. What is potentially significant about this statement is that what the DPRK suggested may constitute a starting point of establishing a NEA-NWFZ.

The August 29, 2013 statement of the NDC Policy Department spokesperson indicated that the DPRK is “seriously examining issues for planning and realizing several constructive and bold peaceful measures while still exercising utmost patience for genuine peace and detente on the Korean Peninsula,” adding that “time has come to drop for good the hostile concept and the policy for confrontation with the fellow countrymen, leftovers of the Cold War era,” which, the pro-DPRK newspaper published by *Chosoren* argued, is the “intensive” expression of the “evaluation and judgment of the current state of affairs.” The statement also expresses the DPRK’s resolve “to stop anachronistic act of targeting the dialogue partner and take political decisions favorable for creating atmosphere for dialogue and peaceful environment,” which it says “is the demand of the times and the people.”

The DPRK also made an effort to resume the SPTs in the “Track 1.5” SPTs seminar convened by China and held in Beijing on September 18, 2013. First Vice Minister Kim Gye-gwan and Vice Minister Ri Yong-ho of the DPRK emphasized the importance of resuming the SPTs “without preconditions.” Most recently, Vice Minister Ri Yong-ho reportedly indicated that the DPRK may be prepared to restart implementation of both the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement and the February 29, 2012 agreement and to seek dialogue and negotiation with the United States in the four areas of “denuclearization, politics, the military, and economy.”

All of the above indicate that the DPRK’s “strategic line” announced on March 31, 2013 could be interpreted and applied in a flexible way so that denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is potentially achievable if the United States, the ROK, and others are ready to agree to terminate the Korean War, transform the Armistice into a permanent peace arrangement, and move to abandon enmity, with a promise to denuclearize the whole Korean Peninsula and terminate US nuclear threat against the DPRK. This strategic reorientation indicates that the DPRK may be willing to entertain reasonable proposals from the United States, its allies, and partners that overlap, supplement, and complement the DPRK’s proposals, provided sequencing issues can be overcome.

It is evident that these critical choices by the DPRK and Kim Jong Un’s “strategic” and “innovative” leadership were designed to enable the opening of the Kim Jong Un era for the 21st century. By its “bold action plan and high-caliber solutions to the problem” the DPRK aims to forge a “peaceful environment” for economic, cultural development and improvement of living standards of the people for the construction of a socialist strong state.

Will the aforementioned development provide an opportunity to find a comprehensive solution to the long-overdue “Korean problem,” however? In principle, the development we see is the

result of the interaction of the strategies and policies of the parties concerned toward one another. Thus, its success or failure will be heavily dependent on how the United States, the ROK, and other concerned parties respond to the DPRK's strategic line and on critical choices they all—including the DPRK—make on the future of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Recently, the DPRK has shown its distrust of the ROK Park Geun-hye's policies of "trust-politik"/"trust process," not least by postponing family reunions just four days before they were scheduled to happen. The DPRK criticized the Park government for "vitriolic rhetoric against the DPRK" such as "victory of principle", "common sense and international norms," and "the Policy of Trust Process" as a way of expressing its discontentment with Park's DPRK policy. At least at the moment, both Koreas appear to be in a stand-off in terms of a renewed rapprochement.

Lastly, the DPRK's initiative or offensive of dialogue and negotiation towards the United States and the ROK was closely coordinated between the DPRK and China. Xi Jinping himself tried to persuade Obama into resuming the SPTs, and Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi visited Washington and discussed with the US State Secretary John Kerry how to set a "reasonable threshold" for the resumption of the talks that would be acceptable to all the parties. It is noteworthy that Wang Yi and Wu Dawei were "confident that the parties concerned will be able to reach new, important agreement" for the denuclearization of the DPRK.

3. Imbalance in effort to resume the SPTs: DPRK/China vs. United States/ROK

The current state of affairs in the politics of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia can be characterized by separation into two camps—DPRK/China vs. ROK/United States/Japan—and their different positions with regard to resumption of dialogue and negotiation for the resolution of the Korean Problem at the 6PTs.

The DPRK and China, in close consultation, took the initiative in offering dialogue and negotiation to the ROK and the United States in an effort to resume inter-Korean dialogue and negotiation and resolve the Korean Problem including the nuclear issue. Since the visit of Choe Ryong-hae to Beijing, the DPRK pushed hard for dialogue and negotiation towards the ROK and the United States by normalizing the KIZ and by offering dialogue and negotiation for family reunion and Mt. Kungang Tourism, as already seen above. Xi Jinping personally stressed to US President Barack Obama at their meeting on September 6, 2013 in St. Petersburg, Russia that China has firmly pushed for the denuclearization process by actively promoting negotiations, urging all relevant parties to work together to restart the SPTs at an early date.

To date, the ROK and the United States responded passively and ignored the DPRK's overtures. At St. Petersburg, President Obama reiterated to President Xi that until the DPRK recommits to denuclearization, the United States is not interested in dialogue and negotiation. The ROK's response has been to reciprocate minimally with a more thought on pluses and minuses in domestic political gains, not to prepare for full-fledged cooperation with the DPRK that would lead to full restoration and development of inter-Korean relations.

4. Kim Jong Un's pursuit of enhanced economic performance

Kim Jong Un has put first priority on economic performance. Since the DPRK was devastated by famine in mid-1990s, economic recovery and development have been one of the top priorities in the DPRK at all levels. According to Vice Minister Ri Yong-ho's recent remarks, Kim Jong Un's top priority is economy, with as much as 90 percent of his on-the-spot guidance in recent times focused on economic matters. In order to recover and develop economically, the DPRK must develop strong economic institutions and deepen its relations with outside economic partners for finance, trade, and investment. The DPRK argues that possessing nuclear weapons and economic development are compatible. It rejects the argument that unless it abandons nuclear weapons, economic sanctions against the DPRK will not be lifted and that, as long as sanctions continue, its full-scale economic

rehabilitation is extremely difficult if not impossible. It also argues that its nuclear armament does not mean that the DPRK has closed its door to the international economic arena.

Rather, the DPRK argues that its nuclear weapons will lead to a breakthrough in the confrontation and subsequent revitalization of its external economic relations, leading to the lifting of sanctions against the DPRK. It suggests that the DPRK not only will be an attractive investment target for foreign businesses, but will become the gateway to China's Northeastern Provinces, Russia's Maritime Province, Northeast Asia as a whole, and finally to Eurasia. The economic logic behind this argument is rather dubious, however, as the land bridge to China, Russia, and Eurasia is easily circumvented by maritime routes, particularly under the circumstances of politico-military tension and confrontation with the outside world. It is noteworthy that the DPRK itself admits that diversification of foreign trade, establishment of tourism zones in Wonsan and Chilbosan area, and the economic development zones (EDZs)—that is, special economic zones—are “the projects that could be carried out successfully only when external relations improve.”

The DPRK began experimenting with dramatic changes in economic institutional and management development in agriculture and industry in June 2012 (often called “June 28 measures” after the date they were adopted), and reportedly will expand the changes and announce them as an official policy for the whole country. The pro-DPRK newspaper published by *Chosoren* forecast the “pursuit of a bold, aggressive policy” breaking out of the past style. And the DPRK announced on October 17 this year the change of General Department for National Economic Development into a more powerful National Economic Development Commission, which will be in charge of economic reform and opening for Kim Jong Un's era.

The new economic management system, to be called “our own style” management system and reportedly to be announced officially in January 2014 or early next year, includes a “semi-household responsibility system” in agriculture, and “independent accounting system” and “manager responsibility system” in industry. The manager responsibility system in manufacturing (except for some key industries and defense industries) will provide managers with autonomous decision making in purchasing, production, marketing, sale price, management, employment, wages, import and export, and foreign investment.

With regard to “opening” towards the outside, the DPRK reportedly made a decision to make it possible for the provinces to develop their own EDZs reflecting regional circumstances as early as the end of 2012. Kim Jong Un already instructed at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party on March 31 that EDZs should be created in every province reflecting the regional characteristics. In other words, Kim Jong Un opened an “era of special economic zones” for the DPRK. It is notable that the DPRK completed legal and institutional arrangements for foreign investment and EDZs by now: the related laws on joint venture, foreign investment, joint management, foreign business, land lease, foreign investment banking, foreign investment insolvency, foreign investment registration, financial management, foreign investment accounting, foreign investment labor, and most recently, EDZs.

The DPRK's Supreme People's Assembly decided on promoting to create EDZs on April 1, 2013 and the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly promulgated the “the DPRK law on EDZs” on May 29. The law includes fundamentals of the law, the establishment, development, and management of EDZs, economic transactions in the zones, and settlement of complaints and disputes. It specifies that foreign corporations, individuals, economic organizations, and overseas Koreans are able to invest in the EDZs, and can freely engage in economic activities including establishment of businesses, branches, and offices. The law also promises that the state will guarantee preferential terms to investors in areas such as land usages, recruitment, and tax payments. EDZs are entitled to various privileges as “special economic zones,” and provide legal safeguards to protect the rights, investment properties, and legitimate profits of foreign investors. And EDZs will be established

in all parts of the country. According to the law, the DPRK will offer a maximum 50-year lease on land for the EDZs to spur outside investment. The 50-year scheme for development zones is on par with land lease favors offered by Pyongyang to businesses operating in the KIZ and the Rason Economic and Trade Zone. In addition, companies will be able to freely buy and sell, re-lease, donate, inherit, and mortgage rights on buildings and land in the economic zones. Up until November 21, 2013, the DPRK announced as many as “ten central-level” IT, free trade, (green) economy, tourism, resources development, and high-tech science & technology zones and “thirteen provincial-level” special economic, tourism, agricultural, export-processing zones, in addition to the four existing special economic, trade, industrial, tourism zones of Rason, Hwanggumpyong, Kaesong, and Mt. Kumgang.

5. Likely benefits for DPRK support of Comprehensive Security Strategy (CSS)

Once agreed, the CSS that we envision involves four parallel processes: denuclearization, peace-making, political normalization, and economic engagement. The DPRK could realize major gains in the following areas if it supports CSS we offer: lifting of sanctions and economic development, termination of the Korean War, establishment of a peace regime, inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, normalized relations with the United States and Japan, and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. These historic achievements will help open a new era for Kim Jong Un.

Lifting of sanctions and economic development

Kim Jong Un has focused on economic and cultural development and the improvement of the living standards of the people. In the past, the Armistice and the continuing confrontation with the United States, the ROK, Japan, and others inhibited the DPRK from introducing dramatic changes and opening for economic development. Although the DPRK is undertaking domestic institutional and management development to develop the capacity needed for economic growth, expanding external economic relations necessitates the active partnership of the international economic community.

External investors have two pre-requisites before they will risk substantial funds in the DPRK. On the one hand, they need the stable business environment within the DPRK that the changes already underway are designed to create; on the other, they need a peaceful, stable geostrategic context for investment. This latter requirement means that investors must be confident that the era of confrontation with the international community is receding fast, and that the DPRK is denuclearizing and resolving the missile issue with the international community, both of which have created serious tension in recent history. Thus, economic development and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula are interconnected in reality.

As long as international sanctions remain in place against the DPRK for nuclear weapons and related programs, it would be difficult for the DPRK to achieve economic development. Therefore, the DPRK has to be willing to look for the ways and means to remove UNSC and unilateral sanctions against the DPRK for economic redevelopment in the first place. The DPRK’s pro-active support for a CSS process and creation of a NEA-NWFZ will remove economic sanctions and the twin obstacles of the nuclear and rocket issue, make it possible to release significant resources into the economy due to reduced military tension in Korea, and facilitate the DPRK’s economic development, the material basis for increased welfare, education, and cultural foundations of the dignity of the DPRK nation and state.

1) Termination of the Korean War

Legally, the DPRK and China are still at war with the United States and the ROK. The continuation of the Armistice and the state of warfare on the Korean Peninsula will not only prolong the *status quo*, but also constrain the DPRK from embarking on new domestic and international economic strategies. The Korean War could be declared over and the Armistice terminated by the

heads of state of the countries that fought the war to support a CSS process and creation of a NEA-NWFZ. If the DPRK ends the Korean War in cooperation with the United States and the ROK, it will drastically change its relationship with these and other regional states including Japan.

A peace process and improved relations among the countries involved will reduce the likelihood of deadly clashes and relieve the DPRK of the huge defense burden. It will expand the DPRK's potential for rapid economic development, providing the DPRK with the opportunity for more investment in its economy, welfare, education, etc. and also for more progress in inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation leading to national unification.

2) Establishment of peace regime

Termination of the war should be completed by transforming the Armistice into a permanent peace regime. Establishment of a peace regime will put an end to the enmity between the United States and the DPRK, and between the two Korean states, and lead to normalization of relations between the United States and the DPRK and also between Japan and the DPRK. All these will dismantle the remaining Cold War structure in the Korean Peninsula.

Bringing to a close the Cold War structure in Korea will provide the DPRK with opportunities to expand trade and attract foreign investment. It will also bring in a new international environment for the DPRK for more balanced and diverse approaches to the major powers and neighboring countries. A case in point is the DPRK's new opportunity to promote independence or "*juche*" in foreign policy by no longer being disproportionately dependent on any one big power as well as increasing its international maneuver room which has continued to shrink since it fell in confrontation with the world due to its development of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities.

3) Inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation

The DPRK's support of CSS, and its results such as termination of the Korean War and the establishment of peace regime in Korea will accelerate inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation. The whole range of exchanges and cooperation, personnel and material, will dramatically increase economic, socio-cultural, politico-diplomatic, military-security cooperation, and it will enhance national integration to an unprecedented extent.

Full-scale inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation will help Korean people overcome their identity crisis of being a "divided nation" and establish that of "one nation." The re-establishment of Korea's identity as an "undivided whole" with tangible benefits from the whole range of official, commercial, cultural and people-to-people exchanges and cooperation will help expedite the process of national unification. It will give the two Korean states a chance to agree on confederacy (or a "low stage of federation"), a form of "*de facto*" unification in Korea, the idea of which was included in the foundational Article 2 of the "June 15 North-South Joint Declaration" signed at the first inter-Korean summit in June 2000.

4) Normalized relations with the United States and Japan

One result of the continuation of the Armistice and the DPRK nuclear problem is the loss of opportunity to improve and normalize relations between the DPRK and the United States and between the DPRK and Japan. The DPRK's acceptance of CSS will eventually lead to the normalization of relations with the United States and Japan. This will signify the DPRK's achievement of a "peaceful environment" for economic development and improved standards of living for the people.

Once relations with the United States and Japan are normalized, the DPRK will be positioned to resume its "balanced approach" to China and the United States. For the DPRK, the existence of a strong China next door makes it necessary for the DPRK to engage the United States as part of its ultimate strategic design for survival and development based on a more balanced approach to the big

powers. Currently, the DPRK's external economic relations have become concentrated on China. In contrast, during the Cold War the DPRK was able to keep its distance from the Soviet Union and China. The DPRK's leaders repeatedly advocated the principle: "No forever enemies, no forever friends."

5) Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

No doubt the DPRK will benefit greatly in the aforementioned areas—lifting of sanctions and economic development, termination of the Korean War, establishment of peace regime, inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, normalized relations with the United States and Japan, and the denuclearization of the whole peninsula—from denuclearizing itself. And it has to be pointed out that the nuclear issue, in conjunction with the Korean Armistice, helped prolong the Cold War structure in the Korean Peninsula.

The DPRK, however, made clear that the denuclearization of the whole Korean Peninsula and the removal of US nuclear threat against it are preconditions for denuclearizing itself, along with the United States giving up its anti-DPRK policies—such as unilateral US and US-led UNSC sanctions, hostile military and security threats, etc.—and transformation of the Armistice into a permanent peace regime in Korea.

It is logical that "root causes" of the Korean Problem—the continuing Korean War with only an Armistice in place—should be cured first, so that the symptoms of the Korean Problem such as the DPRK nuclear and missile issues, UN sanctions against the DPRK, US-ROK joint military exercises, inter-Korean conflicts, military and security threats and hostilities, etc. could disappear. But the reality dictates that root causes and symptoms should be treated and cured simultaneously and implemented step-by-step.

It is evident that the process of curing the root causes of the Korean Problem and of removing these symptoms should not simply go hand in hand but be combined into one single process, in which peace regime and denuclearization are pursued simultaneously in tandem, step-by-step. It is noteworthy that currently the DPRK reportedly seeks a "multi-staged" process for the resolution of the pending issues in the four categories of denuclearization, politics, military affairs, and economy, where the root causes and symptoms of the Korean Problem are comprehensively resolved together. This approach appears consistent with the CSS approach.

The previous section outlines our understanding of the DPRK's positions and perspectives on critical issues that demand a comprehensive response and, in our view, the creation of a NWFZ in Northeast Asia. The next section delves into more specific implications and consideration.

6. Implications and considerations for the DPRK of a CSS: Questions

Here are specific questions about implications and considerations for the DPRK posed by the new conceptual framework of CSS. This informal note aims to facilitate dialogue with DPRK interlocutors, and to reframe and answer these questions from a DPRK perspective.

- . How does this CCS framework show that Kim Jong Un is fulfilling the "behests" of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il for peace regime and denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula?
- . How does this CCS framework help the DPRK leader open "his own era"?
- . How does this new framework accord with Kim Jong Un's strategic leadership in launching a "dialogue and negotiation" or "*byungjin rosun*"?
- . How does this new framework support Kim Jong Un's drive to improve inter-Korean relations and resume the SPTs?

. How does this new framework help improve relations with the United States and the ROK in the DPRK's effort to build a "peaceful environment" for economic (and cultural) development and improved living standards of the people?

. How does this new framework help Kim Jong Un promote economic development and obtain a significant economic performance?

. How does this new framework help terminate the Korean War and establish a peace regime in Korea?

. How does this new framework help boost inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, and unification?

. How does this new framework help the DPRK to feel secure enough to give up its nuclear weapons and weapons programs?

. How does his new framework help resolve the "imbalance" in the effort to resume the Six Party Talks between the DPRK/China and the United States/ROK?

More concretely:

. How does this CCS framework help the DPRK abide by and fulfill the "behests" of Kim Il Sung, who repeatedly proposed and advocated a "nuclear-free, peace zone" in Korea and Northeast Asia on as many as over 44 occasions for 15 years until his death, as a review of *Kim Il Sung: Works* shows?

. How would this new framework allow the DPRK to recast its relationships with the United States, the ROK, and Japan from hostile to cooperative?

. How would this new framework help the DPRK to chart a "*juche*" or new form of diplomacy independent of China and the United States?

. How does this new framework affect US-China relations in the context of a "new type of great power relations," in which cooperation is preferred over conflict?

. How does this new framework affect China-DPRK relations in dealing with the United States, the ROK, and Japan in the context of promoting a "new type of major power relations"?

. How does this new framework affect US-ROK alliance and US troops in the ROK? How does this new framework affect US troop presence in Japan which is intimately tied to troop presence in the ROK?

. How does this new framework help make and implement economic institutional and management development and opening towards the outside world within the context of "our own" style ("DPRK" style)?

. How does this new framework help make the leaders of the United States, the ROK, and China declare the ending of the Korean War?

. How does this new framework help make transform the Armistice into a permanent peace regime? Should it take the form of a Northeast Asian Treaty of Amity and Cooperation?

. How does this new framework help pursue "pro-unification" peace settlement rather than "*status-quo* consolidating" peace regime in the Korean Peninsula?

. How does this new framework help make the DPRK leadership rethink the "strategic line" announced on March 31 and revise it as alluded to in the June 16 proposal to the United States?

. How does this new framework help speed up the denuclearization of the whole Korean Peninsula?

. How does this new framework help prevent the United States from making nuclear threat against the DPRK, for instance, by flying in training strategic bombers like B-52 and B-2 stealth bombers into Korea with the DPRK as the simulated target during the Key Resolve?

. How does this new framework help prevent a nuclear arms race in Korea and Northeast Asia?

. How would a NEA-NWFZ affect the DPRK's nuclear posture?

. How would the DPRK's acceptance or non-acceptance of the NEA-NWFZ affect the neighboring countries' posture regarding the NWFZ?

. How much domestic support is required for each of the SPTs governments in order to discuss the new framework?

1) Termination of a state of war;

. Which parties have to agree and declare the end of the Korean War?

. How does this affect the Cold War structure that has been in place on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia?

. How does this help allow the DPRK to introduce new courses for the future in the areas of economic development, peace regime, inter-Korean national reconciliation and cooperation, etc.?

. How much economic relief will the termination of the war help the DPRK re-distribute in their economy and therefore available for welfare, education, culture, etc.?

How will the ending of the Korean War promote national integration and unification? How best to address "eventual" Korean unification?

2) Creation of a regional permanent council on security;

. Who writes the rules?

. What mechanisms exist or have to be created to enforce the rules?

. What kinds of new jobs and training are required to staff the new organization? Where are they trained, headquartered?

. Who funds this organization?

. Can the organization be created in ways that strengthen multi-lateral venues like ASEAN, ARF and the UN or does it necessarily dilute other multi-lateral venues?

3) Mutual threat reduction and declaration of no hostile intent;

. Why is the concept of "mutual threat reduction" (MTR)—the idea that both the United States and the DPRK recognize the threat they pose to each other and admit the need to reduce it from both sides—important in dealing with the Korean Problem and in reaching an agreement with the DPRK for denuclearization?

. Could the MTR strategy, on which the 1999 Perry Process for a comprehensive resolution of the Korean Problem and the DPRK nuclear issue was based, be still applicable to the DPRK nuclear issue?

. What diplomatic space does mutual declaration of no hostile intent open up for the DPRK?

. How does this declared absence of no hostile intent impact stated rationales of developing missile defense to defend against a DPRK missile?

. What excuses might various countries' political parties/leadership use to still resort to nationalism that emphasizes the outside threat even if there is no expressed hostile intent?

. How does this affect inter-Korean rivalry in which both Korean states try to unify the country on their own terms?

4) Provision of assistance for nuclear and other energy needs;

. Who determines what energy needs are valid in regional cooperation schemes, including those that may be related to implementation of a denuclearization process or as part of a NEA-NWFZ?

. Would the DPRK want to join a nuclear reactor/light water reactor safety evaluation and training program?

. What mechanism ensures that validated needs are fulfilled?

. What new import/export opportunities arise?

. What new programs are available for former nuclear scientists and technicians to work on?

. How is the Russian disposition in the Far East affected by a stable place for a pipeline to pass to the DPRK and the ROK if a NEA-NWFZ reduces tension and creates stability in the Korean Peninsula? Will these energy flows be in China's interest?

. Who decides which countries get contracts?

. What new ports and infrastructure are required to create a meaningful power distribution system?

. What are the benefits to creating a regional power distribution system?

. What is the best way to rationalize the power generation system?

. What confidence building measures between traditional antagonists—Japan and Korea—can create forms of inter-dependence that increase cooperation in areas such as the nuclear fuel cycle and access to space?

5) Termination of sanctions;

. What new banking facilities can open?

. How is the DPRK *won* convertibility affected?

. How will an economically vibrant DPRK affect the bordering Chinese provinces?

. How might China engage with the DPRK to encourage economic institutional and management development, and opening of external economic relations?

. What new DPRK legal and institutional guarantees, processes and courts will encourage investment in the DPRK?

. How will this affect the DPRK's special economic/tourism zones?

. How will this affect inter-Korean economic cooperation?

. What new projects can be started or completed after sanctions are lifted such as Biodiversity Corridors?

6) Creation of a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ);

- . How does a NWFZ affect the DPRK's decision to denuclearize itself and the whole Korean Peninsula and the DPRK's demand for putting an end to US nuclear threat to the DPRK?
- . How does a NWFZ influence the hitherto practices of the entry of US strategic bombers, nuclear aircraft carriers, and nuclear submarines in the Korean airspace and waters?
- . How does a NWFZ complement and affect US, Chinese and DPRK nuclear doctrine?
- . Are US and Chinese policies towards NWFZs sufficiently convergent to make a NEA-NWFZ possible (see Appendix 2)?
- . Should a NEA-NWFZ include other forms of weapons of mass destruction as under discussion in the Middle East?
- . How does a NWFZ change the legal basis for the United States' preemptive use of tactical nuclear weapons against China, Russia, and the DPRK?
- . How does a NWFZ affect the US nuclear umbrella for Japan and the ROK?
- . How does a NWFZ affect Japan's and the ROK's interest in nuclear weapons of their own?
- . What are the impacts on ability of US and China to deploy nuclear forces, such as nuclear-capable submarines, through the area covered by NWFZ?
- . How does it affect the DPRK and China if there is no need for the United States to supply nuclear extended deterrence but replaces it with "existential nuclear deterrence" (that is, residual nuclear deterrence that arises from the mere existence of nuclear weapons outside the region)?
- . What Chinese interests are served by going beyond its No First Use policy to provide a much stronger commitment not to use nuclear weapons against Japan?

7. Next Steps: Will the DPRK actively support this concept?

The DPRK's development of nuclear weapons has played a key role in bringing about the debate on how to establish a NWFZ in Northeast Asia. The DPRK's policy and role is also important in the future of Northeast Asian security management, and all steps the DPRK take will help lead to harm establishing, defining and maintaining a NWFZ, depending on the nature of these steps.

- Will the DPRK help to advance a new framework by:
 - . exploring this concept in track 1.5 dialogues with security counterparts in each country?
 - . facilitating meetings with the participation of the key DPRK decision makers and/or hosting a conference for promoting NWFZ?
 - . undertaking research and analysis on critical outstanding issues that would make or break a regional comprehensive security settlement and a NEA-NWFZ?
 - . engaging relevant media, ROK and other countries' scholars and opinion leaders as part of the overall awareness campaign?

We look forward to a productive relationship and establishing a new framework of the CSS. Please contact us for further questions and discussion.

Peter Hayes, Executive Director, The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability

APPENDIX 1: KIM IL SUNG: WORKS ON KOREAN PENINSULAR AND NORTHEAST ASIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONE

1. **“Opening Speech at the Sixth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea” (October 10, 1980), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 35* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1989), pp. 338, 343-344, 350-351.**

... The confederal state [Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo] should make the Korean peninsula a permanent peace zone and nuclear-free zone. To this end, it should ban the presence of foreign troops and foreign military bases on its territory and prohibit the manufacture, introduction and use of nuclear weapons.

... The revolutionary people of the world must not tolerate any moves of the great powers towards aggression and war, and must force them to withdraw their military bases and all their aggressor troops from foreign territories and must create nuclear-free, peace zones everywhere in the world, thus guaranteeing lasting peace and security.

... In order to guarantee lasting world peace and security, it is imperative to create nuclear-free zones and peace zones in many parts of the world and to expand them steadily. Our Party will strive to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone and will actively support the struggle of the world’s people to create such zones in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Europe. We maintain that the testing, manufacture, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons must be prohibited throughout the world and that all the existing nuclear weapons must be destroyed completely.

2. **“Talk to the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Japan Socialist Party” (March 14, 1981), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 36* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1990), pp. 38-39.**

... At present, all the peace-loving people throughout the world, the peoples of Southeast Asian countries included, are in support of the creation of nuclear-free, peace zones. I believe that the problem of creating a nuclear-free, peace zone in Northeast Asia that is now being tackled by our two Parties will elicit the sympathy of the peoples of most countries in the world. In my opinion, not only the Korean and Japanese peoples but also many other Asian peoples and the peace-loving people throughout the whole world will render active support to it.

... Since almost all countries do not want to see another world war, at present, it is very good idea that our two Parties advance the proposal for creating nuclear-free, peace zones. Of course, none of this will induce the US and other nuclear powers to remove or destroy their nuclear weapons right now, however, the advocacy of our two Parties for the creation of nuclear-free, peace zones to help maintain peace will receive the support of broad sections of the world’s people because it accords with their desire. In our view, this is the right time for our two Parties to declare the creation of a nuclear-free, peace zone in Northeast Asia which they have long been discussing.

... It is good that our two Parties put the idea of creating a nuclear-free, peace zone in Northeast Asia into practice. Of course, the people of some countries may say that our claim is unreal. But our advancing this claim will have a great impact in rousing the broad popular masses in the peace movement. Mr. Chairman Asukata, you have said that one of the main objectives pursued by your delegation on its current visit to our country is to agree upon and publish the declaration about the

creation of a nuclear-free, peace zone in Northeast Asia. I think it would be an excellent thing for our two Parties to take advantage of the present opportunity to reach an agreement and make a joint declaration.

- 3. “A Talk with the Delegation of the Japan Socialist Party” (September 19, 1984), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 38* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1993), p. 313.**

... A few years ago [in March 1981] our two Parties issued a Joint Declaration on the Establishment of a Nuclear-free Peace Zone in Northeast Asia. This is a measure in keeping with today's realities when the anti-war, anti-nuclear movement is developing so powerfully. You [Chairman Ishibashi] said that our two Parties must continue to press ahead with the struggle to create a nuclear-free peace zone. We fully support your opinion. We deem it necessary to develop a widespread campaign for the establishment of a nuclear-free peace zone in Asia through the joint efforts of the political parties and social organizations of different countries.

- 4. “Preventing War and Preserving Peace are the Burning Tasks of Mankind” (Speech at a Banquet Given in Honour of the Participants in the Pyongyang International Conference for Denuclearization and Peace on the Korean Peninsula) (September 6, 1986), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 40* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1995), pp. 160-161, 162, 163-164, 166.**

... I am very pleased to see this conference being held in our country in the International Year of Peace, and I should like to express my warm welcome to you, the delegates to the conference, who have come with a high sense of duty to the cause of world peace and with feelings of firm solidarity with our people. Easing tensions and removing the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula are burning questions that await solution in the international political arena. The present situation on the Korean peninsula is very tense, and the danger of nuclear war is growing with every passing day.

... US nuclear warheads are constantly levelled at Pyongyang, where you are now holding a conference. It is precisely here that the delegates, champions of peace and preeminent figures from many countries, are meeting in behalf of denuclearization and peace; this fact arouses a keen awareness of the danger of nuclear war and the need to fight for peace and stresses the great importance of this meeting. This Pyongyang international conference, which is attracting attention from the world's public, will be a severe blow to the imperialist nuclear maniacs and warlike elements. It will give the Korean people and peace lovers throughout the world great strength and inspiration in their struggle for peace.

... This year alone we made an important proposal for talks between military authorities to remove the tension and military confrontation on the Korean peninsula and, through a statement by the Government of our Republic, also made a positive peace proposal to convert the Korean peninsula to a nuclear-free peace zone.

... If the US troops are compelled to withdraw from south Korea and a nuclear-free peace zone is established on the Korean peninsula by the joint struggle of our people and progressive people throughout the world, one of the most dangerous sources of nuclear war in the world will be removed

and great progress will be made in preserving peace in Asia and the world. On behalf of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and the Government of our Republic, I take advantage of this opportunity to express my deep thanks to the fraternal socialist countries, non-aligned countries, and all the other progressive countries and peace-loving people in the world for their positive support and encouragement for our people's struggle for peace on the Korean peninsula and the peaceful reunification of the country and for their active support for and solidarity with our proposal to convert the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free peace zone.

... I should like to propose a toast: To militant friendship and solidarity between the Korean people and the peoples of socialist countries, non-aligned countries and other peace-loving people the world over, To denuclearization and peace on the Korean peninsula, To world peace and the prosperity of mankind, To the health of all delegates, representatives of international organizations and all the other foreign guests taking part in the conference, and To the health of all the comrades and friends present here.

- 5. “For the Complete Victory of Socialism” (Policy Speech at the First Session of the Eighth Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) (December 30, 1986), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 40* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1995), p. 227.**

... The Korean peninsula is fraught with the greatest danger of nuclear war in the world. To ensure peace and security in this part of the world, therefore, is very important for improving the situation in Asia and the Pacific region and for easing general international tension. The Government of the Republic will make every effort to get nuclear weapons withdrawn from south Korea and to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free peace zone.

- 6. “Letter of Congratulations to the International Conference on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Peace and Security in the Asian-Pacific Region” (October 18, 1988), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 41* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1996), p. 238.**

... In order to remove the danger of a nuclear war and guarantee peace in Korea, it is essential to make the US troops and nuclear weapons withdraw from south Korea, denuclearize the Korean peninsula and settle the question of Korea's reunification peacefully.

- 7. “New Year Address” (January 1, 1990), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 42* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1997), p. 213.**

... We will fight more dynamically to eliminate the danger of nuclear war and ease tension in our country and to turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone.

- 8. “Let Us Bring the Advantages of Socialism in Our Country into Full Play” (Policy**

Speech Addressed to the First Session of the Ninth Supreme People's Assembly of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) (May 24, 1990), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 42* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1997), p. 287.

... The Government of the Republic will work hard to frustrate the imperialist policy of aggression and war and to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone, and will give strong support and encouragement to the anti-war, anti-nuclear peace movement of the people in many lands.

9. "Replies to the Managing Editor of *Mainichi Shimbun*" (April 19, 1991), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 43* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1998), p. 44.

... The Government of our Republic will, as in the past, so in the future, work hard to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone and safeguard peace and security on the Korean peninsula and in the rest of Asia.

10. "For a Free and Peaceful New World" (Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the 85th Inter-Parliamentary Conference) (April 29, 1991), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 43* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1998), p. 47.

... We strongly assert that the Korean peninsula should be made a nuclear-free, peace zone. We strongly support the peace movement of the peoples of many countries for disarmament and for the creation of a nuclear-free, peace zones.

11. "Answers to Questions Raised by the President of the *Kyodo* News Service of Japan" (June 1, 1991), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 43* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1998), p. 70.

... The consistent stand of our Party and the Government of our Republic is to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone. A long time ago [in March 1981] we reached agreement with the Social Democratic Party of Japan on making Northeast Asia, including the Korean peninsula, a nuclear-free, peace zone and published a joint declaration on it.

12. "Let Us Achieve the Great Unity of Our Nation" (August 1, 1991) (Talk to the Senior Officials of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland and the Members of the North Side's Headquarters of the Pan-National Alliance for the Country's Reunification), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 43* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1998), p. 163.

... All our compatriots in the north, south and abroad must launch a nationwide struggle to compel the US to withdraw its troops and nuclear weapons from south Korea and make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-free, peace zone.

- 13. “Answers to Questions Raised by the Director of the Iwanami Shoten, Publishers, Japan” (September 26, 1991), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 43* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1998), p. 205.**

... The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a non-nuclear state. Proceeding from its noble desire to remove the danger of nuclear war from the Korean peninsula and ensure the peace and security of Asia and the rest of the world, the Government of our Republic has put forward a proposal for turning the Korean peninsula into a nuclear free, peace zone and has made a positive efforts to realize it. We have no intention to develop nuclear weapons and have no ability to do so.

- 14. “New Year Address” (January 1, 1992), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 43* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1998), pp. 252, 253.**

... The north and the south should make every effort to realize arms reduction, ease tensions and turn the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone in accordance with the spirit of the north-south agreement [Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula].

... Moreover, no one shall be permitted to put unjust pressure upon us, arguing about the nuclear inspection. It is our consistent stand that the Korean peninsula should be turned into a denuclearized, peace zone. We have stated more than once that we have no intention or capacity to develop nuclear weapons and that we are ready to accept the nuclear inspection if fair treatment is assured. We say what we mean, we do not say empty words.

- 15. “Let the North and the South Open the Way to Peace and the Reunification of the Country in a United Effort” (Talk to the Delegates to the North-South High Level Negotiations from Both Sides) (February 20, 1992), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 43* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1998), p. 261.**

... I am satisfied with and highly praise the joint efforts you have made for the “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Cooperation and Exchange between the North and the South” and the “Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” which have been effected at this time. The effectuation of these documents is an epoch-making event and landmark on the way to realizing peace and the reunification of the country.

- 16. “Answers to Questions Raised by a Journalist Delegation from the American Newspaper, *The Washington Times*” (April 16, 1994), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 44* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1999), p. 337.**

... The adoption of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula between the north and the south of Korea is an epoch-making development, which will prevent a nuclear

holocaust in Korea and ensure genuine peace and security. This is the result of our long, persistent efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. We will make every effort to implement the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

17. “Answers to Questions Raised by a Japanese Journalist Delegation from NHK” (April 17, 1994), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 44* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1999), pp. 348~349.

... The publication of the “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”, agreed upon between north and south, was an event, which opened up the good prospects of eliminating the danger of a nuclear war and ensuring peace on the Korean peninsula and realizing Korea’s peaceful reunification. However, the Joint Declaration the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is not being put into effect. The south Korean authorities engineered a rupture in the north-south dialogue for implementing the joint declaration and are increasing the threat of a nuclear war by conducting nuclear war exercises in league with foreign forces. The joint declaration on denuclearization is incompatible with nuclear war exercises.

... The Government of our Republic will make strenuous efforts to implement the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to meet the unanimous expectations and desires of the whole nation and expedite peace and peaceful reunification of our country.

18. “Answers to Questions Raised by a Journalist Delegation from CNN International” (April 17, 1994), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 44* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1999), p. 352.

... The United States is now clamouring about a “nuclear issue”, and putting pressure on us, but their clamour is totally unfounded. As everybody knows, our Republic is a non-nuclear, peace-loving country. We have no nuclear weapons, and do not have any desire or ability to make them. We have no nuclear weapons now and will not have any in the future, either. Denuclearizing the Korean peninsula is a consistent policy of the Government of our Republic. We will continue making unremitting efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.

19. “Talk with the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Belgian Labour Party” (June 30, 1994), *Kim Il-Sung: Works, Vol. 44* (Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1999), p. 430.

... Do we have to manufacture nuclear weapons just for fratricide among the Koreans? We will not do so. We have already adopted a joint declaration of denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, together with South Korea...

APPENDIX 2: US VS CHINA VS UN POSITIONS ON NWFZS

US vs China vs UN Positions on NWFZs Prepared by Nautilus Institute for East Asia Nuclear Security Workshop International House of Japan, Tokyo, November 11, 2011		
US Position on NWFZs	Chinese Position on NWFZs	The Common Characteristics Of NWFZs 1999 UN Disarmament Commission Report
We have also long supported properly crafted nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs), which when rigorously implemented under appropriate conditions can contribute to regional and international peace, security and stability. The key conditions for establishment of a NWFZ , in accordance with UN Disarmament Commission guidelines, include that:	The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is of great importance to the advancement of nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the promotion of international and regional peace and security. To this end, we believe that the following principles regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones should be observed: "	contribute to the international nonproliferation regime, world peace and security;
The initiative for the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone comes from the states in the region concerned;	Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established by relevant countries in light of the realities of their region on the basis of voluntary agreement through consultations among themselves.	are based on arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region;
All states whose participation is deemed important participate in the zone;	Treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones should be consistent with the purposes and principles of the <i>Charter of the United Nations</i> and should not be used to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries outside of the relevant nuclear-weapon-free zone.	originate from the region itself;
The zone arrangement provides for adequate verification of compliance with the zone's provisions;	The nuclear-weapon-free status of nuclear-weapon-free zones should not be subject to influence of any other security mechanism. Countries in nuclear-weapon-free zones should not refuse to fulfill their obligations under any excuses, including that of a military alliance.	should be supported by the international community;
The establishment of the zone does not disturb existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security;	A nuclear-weapon-free zone should have a clear geographical border. It should not include continental shelves and EEZs, nor the areas where there exist disputes over sovereignty of territory or maritime rights and interests between the contracting parties to the nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty and their neighboring countries.	should include all the states of the region concerned in the negotiations on the establishment of such a zone;
The zone arrangement effectively	Effective verification mechanisms,	should be respected by all states

prohibits the parties from developing or otherwise processing any nuclear explosive devices for whatever purpose;	including IAEA safeguards, should be put in place in nuclear-weapon-free zones so as to effectively prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.	parties to the treaty as well as by states outside the region, including the nuclear-weapon-states;
The zone arrangement does not seek to impose restrictions on the exercise of rights recognized under international law, particularly the high seas freedom of navigation and overflight, the right of innocent passage of territorial and archipelagic seas, the right of transit passage of international straits, and the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage of archipelagic waters; and	The arrangements of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be conducive to the international cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy among member states so as to promote the development of their economy and science and technology.	should involve the nuclear-weapon-states (NWS) in the negotiations of the treaty and protocols to facilitate their support;
The establishment of the zone does not affect the existing rights of its parties under international law to grant or deny transit privileges, including port calls and overflights to other states.	The nuclear-weapon states should respect the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones, undertake corresponding obligations and commit themselves to unconditional non-use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against nuclear-weapon-free zones.	should involve states with territory or that are internationally responsible for territories within the zone in the negotiations of the treaties and protocols;
“Ambassador Kennedy on Negative Security Assurances,” CD Plenary Discussion of Negative Security Assurances February 10, 2011, http://geneva.usmission.gov/2011/02/10/conference-on-disarmament/	"Speech by Head of the Chinese Delegation to the International Conference 'Central Asia--Nuclear Weapons Free Zone'," Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 15 September 1997.	should take into account all the relevant characteristics of the region;
		should reaffirm the commitment of the states to such zones to respect relevant international treaties;
		are legally binding;
		should be consistent with international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea;
		should provide for states parties to freely decide whether to allow foreign ships and aircraft to visit their ports and airfield, and transit their airspace and their territorial waters;
		should be implemented by the states parties in accordance with their individual constitutional requirements;
		should prohibit the development, manufacturing, control, possession, testing, stationing, or transporting by states parties of any type of nuclear explosive device. They should also prohibit the stationing of any nuclear explosive devices within the zone;

Note: A similar set of attributes could be developed for the 1992 Denuclearization Declaration between North and South Korea; and Japan's domestic Non-Nuclear Principles, to compare for consistency with the US, Chinese, and UN criteria. We were unable to find a set of Russian criteria although such may exist
Colors indicate common element or degree of consistency between US, Chinese, and UN desirable criteria