



Nuclear Posture Review

Key Issues

For Review By The Strategic Advisory Group

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Obtained Under the
Freedom of Information Act
by Hans M. Kristensen


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THIS SLIDE IS UNCLASSIFIED

Overview

- Purpose
- Organization
- Key Questions
- Schedule

Nuclear Posture Review: A Complex and Challenging Task



Purpose Of The Nuclear Posture Review

- Statement of purpose: “To examine the role of nuclear forces in the security policy of the United States in light of the new and enduring dangers of the post-Cold War era, and to recommend to the Secretary of Defense a revised nuclear posture (policy, strategy, doctrine, force structure, command and control, and supporting infrastructure) to fulfill that role.” (Terms of Reference for the Nuclear Posture Review, October 29, 1993)**

- First such review in 15 years**

- Planning horizon**
 - Look out 10 years**
 - Affect forces 20 years**
 - Cast shadow 25 years**

- Many individual “small” decisions are being made which affect U.S. nuclear posture - we need to make them in the context of a long-term plan**

Organization Of The NPR: DoD-Wide Collaborative Effort

Steering Group

- Co-Chairs →
- Dr. Ashton B. Carter, ASD Nuclear Security and Counterproliferation, Co-Chair
 - MajGen John Admire, Vice Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, Co-Chair
 - Dr Harold Smith ATSD (AE)
 - Dr. George Schneider, Dir. Strategic & Space Systems OUSD/A
 - Dr. Larry Gershwin, NIO(SP), CIA

Organization Of The NPR: DoD-Wide Collaborative Effort

Six Working Groups

- Define issues
- Analyze options
- Prepare recommendations
- Prepare implementing documents

Working Group Participants:

OASD (NS&CP)	DIA	NSS
OASD (P&P)	DNA	USAF
OUSD (A)	J-3	USA
PA&E	J-5	USN
OASD (C3I)	J-6	USSTRATCOM
ATSD (AE)	J-8	USSPACECOM

REGIONAL CINCS

Nuclear Posture Review

Working Group Participants

AGENCY WORK GROUP*	J-3	J-5	J-6	J-8	U S A	U S N U S M C	U S A F	A C O M	C E N T	E U C O M	P A C	S P A C E	S T R A T	DIA DNA	DOE NSA NSS
THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	**	X	X	X	X	***
NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	**	X	X	X	X	***
NUCLEAR FORCE OPERATIONS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		**	**	X	X	X	X	***
NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY	X	X		X	X	X	X		**	**	X		X	X	***
ALT NUCLEAR POSTURES & COUNTERPROLIFERATION	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	**	X		X	X	***
ALT NUCLEAR POSTURES & THREAT REDUCTION		X		X	X	X	X		**	**	X		X	X	***

* WORKING GROUP MEMBERS AT ACTION OFFICER LEVEL

** CINC STAFF BEING PROVIDED BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND KEY ISSUES VIA FAX

*** DOE, NSA, AND NSS WILL PROVIDE REPRESENTATIVES AS REQUIRED


Working Groups

- Group 1: Role of Nuclear Weapons in U.S. Security Strategy
- Group 2: Nuclear Force Structure and Infrastructure
- Group 3: Nuclear Force Operations and Command & Control
- Group 4: Nuclear Safety, Security, and Use Control
- Group 5: Relationship Between Alternative U.S. Nuclear Postures and Counterproliferation Policy
- Group 6: Relationship Between Alternative U.S. Nuclear Postures and Threat Reduction Policy with the Former Soviet Union

Working Groups

- Group 1: Role of Nuclear Weapons in U.S. Security Strategy**
Chairman - Franklin C. Miller, DASD (Nuclear Forces & Arms Control Policy)
- Group 2: Nuclear Force Structure and Infrastructure**
Chairman - Dr. Frank Dellermann, Director, NS&CP (Strategy, Forces and Operations)
- Group 3: Nuclear Force Operations and Command & Control**
Chairman - Col Terryl Schwaller, Chief, Nuclear Operations/Command and Control Division, J-36, Joint Staff
- Group 4: Nuclear Safety, Security, and Use Control**
Chairman - William Kahn, Director, NS&CP (Safety and Security)
- Group 5: Relationship Between Alternative U.S. Nuclear Postures and Counterproliferation Policy**
Chairman - Dr. Mitch Wallerstein, DASD (Counterproliferation Policy)
- Group 6: Relationship Between Alternative U.S. Nuclear Postures and Threat Reduction Policy with the Former Soviet Union**
Chairman - Dr. Susan Koch, Senior Advisor, OASD/NS&CP

Nuclear Posture Review: The Basic Issues

- Declaratory Policy
 - 
 - Counterproliferation
- Force Structure
 - Strategic forces
 - Non-Strategic forces and weapons
 - Basing
- Operations Policy
 - Alert
 - SSBN crews
- Relationship to Arms Control

?

Key Issues: Nuclear Force Structure and Infrastructure

1. What are our force needs in these four key categories:
 - Survivable strategic retaliatory forces in [REDACTED]
 - [REDACTED] in the same circumstances
 - Flexibly targetable prompt strategic force
 - Non-strategic nuclear forces (NSNF)
2. Can strategic forces do the military missions accomplished by NSNF?
 - If yes, are there other reasons to retain NSNF?
3. What factors would lead us to reconsider National Missile Defense (NMD)?
What implications do these factors have for our BMD program?
4. Are there new technologies/qualitative breakthroughs possible in our nuclear forces that we should develop or deploy?
5. What are the breakpoints in scale where specific force elements (and their supporting industrial, technology, and training bases) become uneconomical or unsustainable?
6. At what point must we consider replacement of our current nuclear forces?

Key Issues: Nuclear Force Structure and Infrastructure

7. Should the customer plan provided to DoE regarding DoD's future requirements from the nuclear weapons complex be changed from the existing plan (NWSM of December 1993)? E.g.,
- Maintain an [REDACTED] in subsequent years
 - Maintain the ability [REDACTED] per year
 - Support limited life components including tritium and tritium supply

Key Issues: Nuclear Force Operations and Command & Control

8. Should changes be made in the planning assumptions and operational practices of the strategic nuclear forces and C3I in the post-cold war environment? In particular, should [REDACTED] become the dominant execution policy?
9. For each of the following, what should be the planning process and assignment of responsibilities, key planning assumptions, architecture of employment plans, and mechanism for providing national and SecDef guidance?
- [REDACTED] in regional
 - [REDACTED]
 - [REDACTED] contingencies
 - Counterproliferation planning
10. What changes in U.S. nuclear operating procedures can be made to enhance stability, contribute to strategic disengagement, and avoid accidental/unauthorized use?
11. What C3I programs and structure, including those related to continuity of government, should be emphasized?

Key Issues: Nuclear Safety, Security, and Use Control

12. Is it practical and desirable for the U.S. to adopt the stated objective to make it virtually impossible, through physical means, for [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
13. Should we implement all of the safety and use control improvements recommended by the Failsafe and Risk Reduction (FARR) Committee (Kirkpatrick Panel) (save those that are not possible under a comprehensive test ban)? Are there additional improvements needed beyond those recommended in the FARR report? Are all FARR improvements on schedule and funded? What new technologies should we invest in to enable [REDACTED]
14. How should we store and [REDACTED] (in storage, transport, and deployment; in peacetime and in crisis) to deal with evolving security threats?
15. What, if any, nuclear safety, security, or use control technology should we make available to China to gain increased assurance against a nuclear incident, accident, or unauthorized launch? Are there other countries that pose no immediate threat to the United States (e.g., India) for which we should consider such technology transfer?

**Keys Issues:
Relationship Between Alternative Postures
And Counterproliferation Policy**

16. How important are various elements of the U.S. nuclear posture (e.g., aggregate numbers, forward basing, pace of modernization, "extended deterrence," declaratory policy, etc.) in affecting the motivations of nations to acquire weapons of mass destruction?
17. In regional scenarios considered, what options does the U.S. have to deter and respond to use of (a) nuclear, (b) chemical, (c) biological weapons against U.S. territory, forces, and allies? Which of these options depends on employment of U.S. nuclear forces? What changes to our posture would strengthen our capabilities to deter or respond?
18. What effect on our capability over time to deter and respond to use of WMD would each of the following declaratory policy changes have?
- [REDACTED]
 - Extended positive or negative security assurances (unilateral or in association with other nuclear weapon states)
 - Renunciation of the positive or negative security assurances currently in force
 - A pledge not to use [REDACTED] in response to use of [REDACTED]
 - Various proposed "nuclear free zones" *NW*
 - Fissile material cutoff *WMD*
19. What steps should we take (beyond our current counterproliferation policies) to deter or prevent terroristic use of weapons of mass destruction?

**Key Issues:
Relationship Between Alternative Postures
And
Threat Reduction Policy With The Former Soviet Union**

20. What cooperative measures affecting the U.S. nuclear posture could the U.S. propose to Russia that would reduce the probability of accidental/unauthorized launch, or avoid the dangers to stability of hair trigger postures?
21. What measures affecting the U.S. nuclear posture should the U.S. propose to improve control of U.S. and FSU nuclear weapons and fissile materials?
22. What should be the U.S. plans to hedge against:
 - START I not being fully implemented?
 - START II not entering into force?
 - Delayed or discontinued dismantlement of Russian tactical nuclear weapons?
23. What are DoD objectives in arms control beyond START II?



Key Issues: Policy On The Role Of Nuclear Weapons In U.S. Security

24. Logic of U.S. nuclear posture: Security environment → threats and scenarios → attributes of a stable nuclear posture.
25. Long-term goals: enduring arsenal, reduced profile, "abolition," ...
26. International presence: nuclear isolationism, nuclear "umbrella," international "coalition" deterrent, and "nuclear power projection"
27. Declaratory posture
 - First use/no first use
 - Extended positive or negative security assurances: expand/renounce
 - Use/no use of [REDACTED] in response to [REDACTED]
 - Various proposed "nuclear free zones"
28. Prompt response/no prompt response

nuclear weapons

weapons of mass destruction

Products

- Five DepSecDef/VCJCS decision briefings on Key Issues
- SecDef decision directives
- Briefings to the President
- Presidential Decision Directive to replace
 - NSDD-13 
 - PD-48 
- Revised guidance documents
 - Revised NUWEP
 - Revised JSCP, Annex C
- White Papers/Speeches

Schedule

- SecDef announced NPR start 29 October**
- Periodic progress reports to SecDef, Co-Chair briefs to other agencies, and DoD coordination of conclusions**
- SecDef final report to President in early Summer**
- Expect full implementation of any new U.S. policies within 12-18 months after NPR completion**

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW SCHEDULE
OCTOBER 1993 - FEBRUARY 1994

14 OCT

28 FEB

DoD COORDINATION	14 OCT NPR KICKOFF OSD, CINC/SERVICE REPs	2 DEC MILITARY ADVISORY COMMITTEE UPDATE	5 JAN MILITARY ADVISORY COMMITTEE UPDATE	3 FEB MILITARY ADVISORY COMMITTEE UPDATE
SECDEF CJCS			26 JAN DR. PERRY NPR INTRO	28 JAN GEN SHALI NPR INTRO
INTERAGENCY		22 DEC NPR UPDATE MR. HOLUM ACDA	22 DEC NPR UPDATE DR. REIS DOE	29 DEC NPR UPDATE BOB BELL NSC
PRESIDENT (VP/NSA)	15 OCT SECDEF NPR KICKOFF LETTER TO PRESIDENT			
CONGRESS ALLIES PUBLIC AFFAIRS OUTSIDE EXPERTS	29 OCT NPR KICKOFF PRESS CONFERENCE	8 DEC NPR INTRO TO NATO NPG/HLG	14/15 DEC NPR INTRO SASC/HASC STAFF	DEC NPR INTRO FRENCH/UK MOD REPs
				26 FEB NPR UPDATE FOUR POWER MOD REPs

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW SCHEDULE
MARCH 1994

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

DoD COORDINATION	15 MAR MILITARY ADVISORY COMMITTEE UPDATE 28 MAR DPG
SECDEF CJCS	12 MAR BRIEF TO DEPSECDEF VJCS 18 MAR WEEKLY UPDATE 26 MAR TOPIC SET #1 BRIEF TO DEPSECDEF VCJCS
INTERAGENCY	UPDATE TO DOS, NSC, ACDA, DOE
PRESIDENT (VP/NSA)	NUCLEAR INTRO FORCES, SIOP, NPR, CONTINUITY OF GOVT
CONGRESS ALLIES PUBLIC AFFAIRS OUTSIDE EXPERTS	20 MAR STATUS BRIEF TO HASC/SASC MEMBERS

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW SCHEDULE
APRIL 1994

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

DoD COORDINATION	<p>MILITARY ADVISORY COMMITTEE UPDATE</p> <p>21 APR PRELIMINARY BUDGET DECISIONS TO SERVICES</p>
SECDEF CJCS	<p>1 APR WEEKLY UPDATE</p> <p>7 APR DPG TO SECDEF</p> <p>9 APR TOPIC SET #2 BRIEF TO DEPSECDEF VCJCS</p> <p>15 APR WEEKLY UPDATE</p> <p>23 APR TOPIC SET #3 BRIEF TO DEPSECDEF VCJCS</p> <p>25 APR DPG ISSUED</p> <p>29 APR WEEKLY UPDATE</p>
INTERAGENCY	<p>UPDATE TO DOS, NSC, ACDA, DOE</p>
PRESIDENT (VP/NSA)	
CONGRESS ALLIES PUBLIC AFFAIRS OUTSIDE EXPERTS	<p>21 APR NPR BRIEF/UPDATE TO OUTSIDE EXPERTS</p> <p>NATO HLG</p> <p>DISCUSSION WITH OUTSIDE EXPERTS</p>

**NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW SCHEDULE
MAY 1994**

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

DoD COORDINATION	6 MAY BEGIN DoD COORDINATION	MILITARY ADVISORY COMMITTEE UPDATE	22 MAY COMPLETE DoD COORDINATION	FINAL BRIEF TO OSD/CINCS/SERVICES
SECDEF CJCS	7 MAY TOPIC SET #4 BRIEF TO DEPSECDEF VCJCS	13 MAY WEEKLY UPDATE	21 MAY TOPIC SET #5 BRIEF TO DEPSECDEF VCJCS	27 MAY WEEKLY UPDATE
INTERAGENCY				
PRESIDENT (VP/NSA)				
CONGRESS ALLIES PUBLIC AFFAIRS OUTSIDE EXPERTS		12 MAY NPR UPDATE TO OUTSIDE EXPERTS	19 MAY PRELIMINARY REPORT NPR RESULTS TO ALLIES	NATO HLG/NPG

NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW SCHEDULE
JUNE 1994

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

DoD COORDINATION	11 JUN SERVICE POMs DUE	AUG/SEP ISSUE PAPERS
SECDEF CJCS	8 JUN FINAL WRAP UP BRIEF TO SECDEF/CJCS BY CO-CHAIRS	21 JUN FINAL BRIEF TO PRESIDENT
INTERAGENCY	UPDATE TO DOS, NSC, ACDA, DOE	
PRESIDENT (VP/NSA)		21 JUN FINAL BRIEF BY SECDEF/CJCS
CONGRESS ALLIES PUBLIC AFFAIRS OUTSIDE EXPERTS		30 JUN FINAL REPORT NPR RESULTS TO ALLIES