THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

JAN 1 2 2000

Honorable John Warner
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Section 125 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law No. 106-65) directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the D-5 SLBM program.

Please accept the attached report in response to this requirement.

Sincerely,

cc:
Honorable Carl Levin
Ranking Democrat

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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JAN 12 2000

Honorable Floyd Spence
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Section 125 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law No. 106-65) directs the Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the D-5 SLBM program.

Please accept the attached report in response to this requirement.

Sincerely,

cc:
Honorable Ike Skelton
Ranking Democrat

Report on the D5 Missile Program
For the Committees on Armed Services
of the Senate and House of Representatives

Section 125 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law No. 106-65) directs that the Secretary of Defense submit a report on the D-5 missile program. Specifically, it provides:

D-5 MISSILE PROGRAM
(a) REPORT: Not later than October 31, 1999, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on the D-5 missile program.
(b) REPORT ELEMENTS: The report under subsection (a) shall include the following:
1) An inventory management plan for the D-5 missile program covering the projected life of the program, including (A) the location of D-5 missiles during the fueling of submarines; (B) rotation of inventory; (C) expected attrition rate due to flight testing, loss, damage, or termination of service life; and (D) consideration of the results of the assessment required in paragraph (4).
2) The cost of terminating procurement of D-5 missiles for each fiscal year before the current plan.
3) An assessment of the capability of the Navy of meeting strategic requirements with a total procurement of less than 425 D-5 missiles, including an assessment of the consequences of (A) loading TRIDENT submarines with less than 24 D-5 missiles; and (B) reducing the flight test rate for D-5 missiles.
4) An assessment of the optimal commencement date for the development and deployment of replacement capability for the current land-based and sea-based missile forces.
5) The Secretary's plan for maintaining D-5 missiles and TRIDENT submarines under the START II Treaty and a proposed START III Treaty, and whether requirements for those missiles and submarines would be reduced under such treaties.

I Inventory Management Plan

(1) An inventory management plan for the D-5 missile program covering the projected life of the program, including (A) the location of D-5 missiles during the fueling of submarines; (B) rotation of inventory; (C) expected attrition rate due to flight testing, loss, damage, or termination of service life; and (D) consideration of the results of the assessment required in paragraph (4).

Each year, the Navy develops an overall planning document that outlines the employment plan for strategic missile submarines (SSBNs) and the complementary inventory management plan for strategic missiles. The SSBN employment plan is based on various planning factors established by the many stakeholders in our strategic nuclear forces. Inputs are obtained from the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Strategic Command; Chief of Naval Operations; Commander, Submarine Force, U.S. Atlantic and Pacific Fleets; Naval Sea Systems Command; and Strategic Systems Programs. Using these planning factors, a single SSBN force employment and

inventory management plan is developed and utilized by the Navy during the development of the President's budget and the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). The plan identifies the strategic deployment periods for the entire force of 18 TRIDENT submarines, schedules refueling overhaul periods and other maintenance periods for the ships, and lays out procurement plans for missiles to support peak deployment periods. Flight test quantities and schedules for Demonstration and Shakedown Operations (DASO) and operational test and evaluation, and missile inventories ashore when submarines are not deployed are also planned. The plan covers the period from authorization of the submarine construction through its entire life until retirement. While the plan covers both TRIDENT I (C4) and TRIDENT II (D5) Strategic Weapon Systems, only the TRIDENT II (D5) system will be addressed in this report.

Figures 1 through 4 provide a summary of the TRIDENT II (D5) missile inventory plan developed to support preparation of the President's Fiscal Year 2000 budget.

Figure 1 shows the original 30-year SSBN life submarine employment plan, with deployment and maintenance periods identified, used to prepare the President's Fiscal Year 2000 budget. Subsequent to the President's Fiscal Year 2000 budget submission, the hull life of the TRIDENT SSBNs was extended to at least 42 years. Therefore, the budget submission was based on the schedule as presented below. The effect of extending the hull life of the Trident submarine will be discussed in more detail later in this report.



Figure 1 - **SSBN Schedule Baseline (Calendar Year)**

Figure 2 is a composite of missile procurement, submarine deployment and expenditures for flight tests. The D5 missile was designed to provide an expected service life of 25 years. Based on experience gained through the first nine years of D5 missile service, the Navy is planning for the D5 to serve as a reliable deterrent system for 30 years.

The inventory objective of 425 D-5 missiles just supported 12 operational SSBNs (since two will be in overhaul) at the peak program need, under the original 30-year program schedule, shown in green. The peak program need in Fiscal Year 2014 occurred, in that original program, just prior to the retirement of the first D5 configured SSBN. At that point the 425 missiles procured were to be located as follows:

288 missiles – 12 operational SSBNs (12 x 24)
(2 SSBNs in refueling overhauls)
137 missiles – cumulative flight-test expenditures (to certify weapon system reliability and safety) through FY 2014

As an SSBN prepares to enter an overhaul period (which includes refueling), its missiles are offloaded, returned to the processing facilities, disassembled, tested, reassembled and prepared for return to sea. In most instances the missiles, following recertification, are placed on SSBNs returning to operational status following completion of their own overhaul periods.

The Navy recently determined that the hull life of the Trident SSBN could safely be extended an additional 12 years, to a total of 42 years. The effects of this decision to extend the hull life of the TRIDENT SSBN are shown in figure 2 in blue. This extension will require the Navy to address life extension of the TRIDENT II (D-5) Strategic Weapon System, since, as previously discussed, the current D-5 system is only expected to serve as a reliable deterrent for 30 years. Specifically, the primary effect of extending the hull life of the Trident submarine is that submarine retirements will not occur when originally planned. Therefore, missile assets obtained from retiring a submarine will not be available in time to ensure that all operational submarines are deploying with a full complement of 24 D-5 missiles.



Figure 2 - SLBM Assets

Figure 3 provides a summary of annual D5 missile procurements to support the ship employment plan. The ultimate missile procurement quantity of 425 was developed based on the peak deployment period and expenditures to support flight-testing.

Historically, losses due to inadvertent handling damage and/or failures beyond economic repair have been small and accommodated through the logistics cycle. Some losses can be covered utilizing missiles or components being processed and/or stored ashore while the ships are undergoing maintenance, while others are covered by appropriately sizing the spares buy of individual missile components prior to the end of planned procurement. As a result, no provisions are made in the procurement quantities for losses due to damage that may be incurred during maintenance activities.



Figure 3 - **US SLBM Procurement**

Figure 4 shows the flight test program scheduled to support Demonstration and Shakedown Operations as well as operational test and evaluation for the 30-year life of the D5 missile system. Operational test and evaluation flights consist of CinC Evaluation Tests (CET) and Follow-on CinC Evaluation Tests (FCET). During the first three years of the program, a CET program consisting of 34 missiles was flown to establish the initial reliability and accuracy of the D5 Strategic Weapon System. Since then, 4 flights per year have been flown to provide a continuing measure of system performance and to provide a measure of confidence that nothing is occurring that could significantly affect that performance.



Figure 4 - **D5 Flight Tests**

Shore-based missile maintenance is accomplished at the Navy's Strategic Weapons Facilities located at Kings Bay, GA (SWFLANT) and Bangor, WA (SWFPAC). SWFLANT and SWFPAC possess the capability to process and store missiles. Missile processing includes missile handling associated with submarine offload and on-load; missile disassembly, inspection, testing, and re-assembly; and missile/re-entry body mating and de-mating operations. Missiles are periodically offloaded from deployed submarines for an engineering evaluation of their condition. While the submarine can test the missiles onboard to ensure they are ready for use, more detailed testing must be accomplished ashore to evaluate the effects of aging and environment. Missiles are also offloaded from deployed submarines to investigate and correct failures observed during deployment. Additionally, missiles may be returned to the shore facilities for incorporation of component modifications. Each missile offloaded for evaluation is replaced during the normal inter-patrol upkeep period by another recertified missile.

The time available to conduct missile turn around becomes increasingly important as the number of 'non-deployed' missiles is reduced. When no 'ready spare' missiles are available, any tests/alterations must be accomplished within the time frame of the SSBN refit, and still allow sufficient time for on-board missile testing prior to deployment. Based on experience gained through deployment of six generations of fleet ballistic missiles, the Navy has established a nominal 10-year deployment period for all D5 missiles. Using the missile assets being stored for future flight test replacement or removed from submarines entering a shipyard overhaul period, each missile is scheduled for offload and recertification after ten years onboard the submarine. This recertification plan ensures that no missile exceeds the Navy's experience base for continuously deployed missiles and is one of the reasons the Navy is able to maintain the high reliability of the TRIDENT II (D5) system. All missile evaluation and recertification activities are conducted within the inventory objective established by peak deployment of submarines and

expenditures of missiles for flight tests. No additional missiles are procured to support logistic or recertification activities.

Replacement sea and land-based ballistic missile systems: As mentioned earlier, the hull life of the Ohio-class TRIDENT SSBNs was recently extended, necessitating an extension to the life of the TRIDENT II (D5) Strategic Weapon System (SWS). While no decisions have been made concerning replacement systems for either the TRIDENT SSBN platform or the D5 missile, the Navy is currently examining various options for the life extension of the D5. Specific plans and funding requirements are planned to be made available in the Fiscal Year 2002 President's Budget submission to Congress.

The Air Force will continue to ensure that the ICBM leg of the TRIAD remains a viable force for the foreseeable future. Programs such as the Minuteman Guidance Replacement, Propulsion Replacement, Propulsion System Rocket Engine and other modifications should ensure operational capability of the Minuteman III system to 2020 and possibly beyond. Studies for replacement systems are on going in the Air Force under ICBM Long-Range Planning; however, actual dates for initial Engineering Manufacturing and Development (EMD), production and deployment are not defined at this time.

II Termination of D5 Missile Production

(2) The cost of terminating procurement of D-5 missiles for each fiscal year before the current plan.

Attachment 1 (6 pages) provides the costs associated with early termination of D5 missile production starting with the procurement planned in Fiscal Year 2001. Costs are shown in then year dollars with totals for "Within the Fiscal Year" and "Total Program". The program cost for completing the planned procurement of 425 missiles is shown on the first page for comparison purposes.

It is important to note that D5 missile production termination does not entirely eliminate the need for procurement funding, either in the year of termination or in succeeding years. Among the one-time requirements that would need to be accommodated immediately following a decision to stop production are those associated with termination and shutdown of the missile industrial base. Such costs would include those efforts connected with the planned, orderly cessation of a major weapons system's manufacturing processes, including the systematic dismantlement of the production infrastructure; the preservation, packaging, storage or disposal of Navy-owned production tooling and material; and life-of-program procurements of those parts, components and subassemblies needed to support the weapons system for the balance of its projected service life.

Moreover, even after D5 missile production has ended, there are a number of requirements, funded under Weapons Procurement, Navy (WPN) appropriations, which will continue well beyond the turn of the century. These requirements include Arms Control Treaty compliance

activities, warhead component acquisition, and procurement of instrumented flight hardware needed to support the D5 flight test program through the deployed life of the weapon system.

III Impact of Procuring Less than 425 Missiles

(3) An assessment of the capability of the Navy of meeting strategic requirements with a total procurement of less than 425 D-5 missiles, including an assessment of the consequences of (A) loading TRIDENT submarines with less than 24 D-5 missiles; and (B) reducing the flight test rate for D-5 missiles.

As stated earlier and shown in Figure 3, the current planned inventory objective for D5 missiles is 425. Through September 1999, 74 missiles have been expended in the flight test program. Three hundred sixty (360) have been procured through Fiscal Year 1999, leaving 65 to be procured through the end of the production run in 2005. Termination of D5 missile production prior to its planned completion in Fiscal Year 2005 would have several significant impacts to the program set forth in the President's Fiscal Year 2000 budget. These impacts are addressed below:

Effectiveness of the Strategic Deterrent: Termination of D5 missile production prior to its planned completion will result in deployment of submarines with less than a full complement of missiles beginning as early as 2002. This will not meet Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) commitments established by the Commander in Chief, Strategic Command to ensure that the Nation's strategic posture remains effective and without equal. Each TRIDENT submarine tube that does not contain a missile will reduce the number of warheads available to the SIOP by the number declared for that missile, currently eight. As the only leg of the strategic triad that is both survivable and alert on a daily basis, any reductions in available warheads, for example, by deploying TRIDENT submarines with empty tubes, will result in a smaller number of available survivable warheads on daily alert and impact the effectiveness of the US strategic deterrent. Termination of production as early as Fiscal Year 2001 could result in a missile outload shortfall of roughly 40 missiles, which translates to 320 warheads under current START Treaty attribution. This could result in uncovered SIOP targets under certain circumstances.

Reliability, Accuracy and Safety Assessments: The D5 flight test program, shown in Figure 4, can not be reduced or curtailed without significantly impacting the ability of the TRIDENT Program Manager to assess the performance of the entire Weapon System (Reliability and Accuracy) or to certify its safety. The flight-testing plan at the current rate is critical and the minimum required to maintain the ability to detect a significant degradation in D5 weapon system reliability. Additionally, the current level of USSTRATCOM directed flight tests are the minimum acceptable to meet weapon system reliability requirements. In fact, USSTRATCOM analysis shows that it may be necessary to increase SLBM flight test requirements in the future.

Strategic Missile Production Base: The D5 missile is the only strategic missile remaining in production. The current low-rate production plan was developed, in part, to retain critical industrial capabilities at least through 2005. Many of the industrial capabilities being exercised by the D5 production line are unique to strategic systems. Termination of D5 production,

without a plan to sustain critical industrial capabilities, will impact not only the ability of both the Navy and the Air Force to develop and field future strategic systems, but also the ability to react to aging and obsolescence concerns with existing programs.

Future Arms Control Negotiations: Upon recommendation of the Nuclear Posture Review, the President directed a strategic force posture that included 14 D-5 capable TRIDENT submarines. This is consistent with both START II and the framework for START III as laid out in the March 1997 Helsinki Joint Statement. Termination of D5 missile production before the planned completion of 425 missiles will result in a unilateral reduction of deployed U.S. strategic warheads in both the START I and START II regimes. The aggregate number of SLBM warheads counted under the START treaties is based on the number of submarine launch tubes deployed. Every empty launch tube aboard a submarine will continue to be attributed with the number of warheads associated with the type of missile that the launcher is designed to contain.

IV Replacement Capability

4) An assessment of the optimal commencement date for the development and deployment of replacement capability for the current land-based and sea-based missile forces.

The Department of Defense has made no decisions regarding a replacement SLBM or ICBM system. However, DoD has directed the Air Force and the Navy to ensure the requisite technical and manufacturing capabilities are available when needed to support future ballistic missile requirements.

To support this DoD requirement, the Air Force and Navy plan to use funding provided in Demonstration and Validation programs to explore, maintain and sustain strategic systems technology. To the extent possible, these technologies will be common to both Navy and Air Force strategic systems with the goal of lowering the cost of future replacement systems. This philosophy not only protects the limited industrial base, but also produces end items capable of extending the current life of strategic systems, improving sustainment and providing enabling technology for the replacement of both sea and land based strategic systems.

With the recently approved extension to their hull lives, the Ohio-Class TRIDENT SSBNs are currently projected to be deployed beyond 2040. The initial hull retirement is planned to occur about 2029 and subsequent retirements will proceed at a rate of approximately one per year until all 14 submarines are decommissioned. The Navy has not identified a replacement SLBM, but a range of options to extend the life of the D-5 missile to coincide with the extended hull life of the Trident submarine is under consideration.

Studies for replacement systems are on-going in the Air Force under ICBM Long Range Planning; however, actual dates for initial Engineering Manufacturing and Development (EMD), production and deployment are not defined at this time.

V. START II and START III Plans for TRIDENT

5) The Secretary's plan for maintaining D-5 missiles and TRIDENT submarines under the START II Treaty and a proposed START III Treaty, and whether requirements for those missiles and submarines would be reduced under such treaties.

Warhead Sub-limits Under START II

The START II Treaty limits the number of warheads attributed to submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to a maximum of 2160 not later than December 31, 2004 (an interim limit) and to a maximum number between 1,700 and 1,750 not later than December 31, 2007. The current Navy plan for the deployment of the Ohio class TRIDENT submarine force is compliant with these treaty obligations.

TRIDENT SSBN Force Levels Under START II

The provisions of START II allow the United States to comply with the Treaty while continuing to deploy all 18 TRIDENT SSBNs should it desire to do so. However, upon the recommendation of the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the President directed a START II force that would include 14 TRIDENT SSBNs, all equipped with TRIDENT II (D5) missiles. Subsequently, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reaffirmed the decision to deploy 14 D5-equipped SSBNs. Current Navy planning supports these decisions. Upon ratification and implementation of START II, the D5 missiles will be configured with a maximum of five warheads per missile and a notification to that effect will be made to Russia through appropriate Treaty channels. The resulting force will be attributed under START II with 1,680 warheads for Treaty counting purposes (14 SSBNs X 24 missiles/SSBN X 5 warheads/missile = 1,680 warheads). The 14 submarines will be deployed in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans from the submarine bases at Kings Bay, GA and Bangor, WA. The individual submarines will have the ability to carry a mix of D5 missiles armed with Mk4/W-76 warheads or Mk5/W-88 warheads. The START Treaties do not differentiate between the two types of warheads and their associated reentry vehicles. Therefore, all D5 missiles will be attributed for START II with five warheads without reference to the specific type of warhead deployed on an individual missile.

To attain a force of 14 D5-equipped TRIDENT SSBNs, four of the eight oldest submarines presently equipped with TRIDENT I (C4) missiles will be converted to carry the D5 starting in Fiscal Year 2000. Following conversion to D5 configuration, these submarines will no longer be capable of launching C4 missiles, as required by the START I Treaty. Under the provisions of the Treaty, the submarines will be attributed as being D5-equipped when they begin sea trials away from the shipyard at which the conversion takes place. Plans for the utilization of the remaining four TRIDENT SSBNs that will not be converted to D5 are not addressed in this report.

Consequences of Loading TRIDENT SSBNs with Less than 24 Missiles

The primary consequence of loading US TRIDENT submarines with less than 24 missiles will be a reduction in the number of survivable strategic assets on day to day alert. As the only leg of

the strategic triad that is both survivable and alert on a daily basis, these reductions will result not only in a smaller number of survivable warheads on daily alert, but will negatively impact the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent.

Additionally, the Navy's current planning will deploy all 14 D5-equipped submarines with a full complement of 24 missiles. Existing START provisions attribute all 24 launchers with missiles at all times, even if some of the launchers are empty or the submarine is undergoing overhauls. Deploying TRIDENT SSBNs with less than a full complement of 24 missiles will effectively result in a unilateral reduction of deployed warheads allowed under the Treaty. To take credit for the reduced number of missiles, the empty launchers would have to be eliminated using existing START I procedures. However, the START Treaty does not allow the selective conversion of missile tubes, but only addresses eliminating all of the launchers on an SSBN, which results in elimination of the entire submarine. To eliminate a subset of the 24 launchers on a single SSBN would require negotiating a revision to the existing Treaty language.

Changes for START III

Discussions of future SSBN deployment requirements under a contemplated START III Treaty would be premature. At Helsinki, in 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin committed to seek further reductions in accountable strategic nuclear weapons to a level of 2,000 to 2,500. Within a START III limit of 2,500 warheads and assuming entry into force of existing START II downloading provisions, a force of 14 TRIDENT SSBNs could be deployed with 24 launchers per SSBN and four warheads per missile. Such a force would deploy 1,344 warheads, slightly more than 50 percent of the total. A force of 14 SSBNs under a START III agreement is assumed here for illustrative purposes only; as the negotiations for START III begin, studies will be conducted to determine the most effective strategic deterrent force structure to be employed under the reduced warhead counts that will likely be agreed to under the Treaty. It is clear, however, that the most survivable leg of the TRIAD, the TRIDENT submarine force, equipped with the D5 missile and its Life Extension configuration, will play an essential role in ensuring our Nation's security for the next 40 years.

TRIDENT II (D5) Missile Program-of-Record

Procurement Quantities and Funding Estimates

Contained in the **FY 2000 President's Budget Request**

(Then-Year $ in Millions)

Represents program/funding *BASELINE* for purposes of determining cost of D5 missile production termination options.

Appropriation	Line Item Title	Line Item Number	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FYDP Total
WPN	TRIDENT II (D5) Missile	115000	488.9	486.3	511.8	500.3	496.2	557.2	3040.7
	Missile Procurement Quantity		*12*	*12*	*12*	*12*	*12*	*5*	*65*
O&MN	Weapons Support/Fleet Ballistic Missile	1D2D	812.6	818.5	816.9	791.0	844.9	864.1	4948.0
	Total		1301.5	1304.8	1328.7	1291.3	1341.1	1421.3	7988.7

TRIDENT II (D5) Missile

Changes to Procurement Quantities and Funding Estimates
Based on Terminating D5 Missile Production at the End of **FY 2000**

(Then-Year $ in Millions)

Assumes no cost impact before FY 2001

Appropriation	Line Item Title	Line Item Number	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FYDP Total
Baseline Program (FY 2000 President's Budget):									
WPN	TRIDENT II (D5) Missile	115000	488.9	486.3	511.8	500.3	496.2	557.2	3040.7
	Missile Procurement Quantity		*12*	*12*	*12*	*12*	*12*	*5*	*65*
O&MN	Weapons Support/Fleet Ballistic Missile	1D2D	812.6	818.5	816.9	791.0	844.9	864.1	4948.0
	Total		**1301.5**	**1304.8**	**1328.7**	**1291.3**	**1341.1**	**1421.3**	**7988.7**
Changes to Baseline Program:									
WPN	TRIDENT II (D5) Missile	115000	0.0	-132.0	-388.0	-359.0	-272.0	-138.0	-1289.0
	Missile Procurement Quantity			*-12*	*-12*	*-12*	*-12*	*-5*	*-53*
O&MN	Weapons Support/Fleet Ballistic Missile	1D2D	0.0	51.0	65.0	73.0	39.0	23.0	251.0
	Total		**0.0**	**-81.0**	**-323.0**	**-286.0**	**-233.0**	**-115.0**	**-1038.0**

TRIDENT II (D5) Missile

Changes to Procurement Quantities and Funding Estimates
Based on Terminating D5 Missile Production at the End of **FY 2001**

(Then-Year $ in Millions)

Assumes no cost impact before FY 2001

Appropriation	Line Item Title	Line Item Number	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FYDP Total
Baseline Program (FY 2000 President's Budget):									
WPN	TRIDENT II (D5) Missile	115000	488.9	486.3	511.8	500.3	496.2	557.2	3040.7
	Missile Procurement Quantity		*12*	*12*	*12*	*12*	*12*	*5*	*65*
O&MN	Weapons Support/Fleet Ballistic Missile	1D2D	812.6	818.5	816.9	791.0	844.9	864.1	4948.0
	Total		**1301.5**	**1304.8**	**1328.7**	**1291.3**	**1341.1**	**1421.3**	**7988.7**
Changes to Baseline Program:									
WPN	TRIDENT II (D5) Missile	115000	0.0	-6.0	-388.0	-358.0	-276.0	-138.0	-1166.0
	Missile Procurement Quantity				*-12*	*-12*	*-12*	*-5*	*-41*
O&MN	Weapons Support/Fleet Ballistic Missile	1D2D	0.0	39.0	51.0	65.0	39.0	23.0	217.0
	Total		**0.0**	**33.0**	**-337.0**	**-293.0**	**-237.0**	**-115.0**	**-949.0**

TRIDENT II (D5) Missile

Changes to Procurement Quantities and Funding Estimates
Based on Terminating D5 Missile Production at the End of **FY 2002**

(Then-Year $ in Millions)

Assumes no cost impact before FY 2001

Appropriation	Line Item Title	Line Item Number	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FYDP Total
Baseline Program (FY 2000 President's Budget):									
WPN	TRIDENT II (D5) Missile *Missile Procurement Quantity*	115000	488.9 *12*	486.3 *12*	511.8 *12*	500.3 *12*	496.2 *12*	557.2 *5*	3040.7 *65*
O&MN	Weapons Support/Fleet Ballistic Missile	1D2D	812.6	818.5	816.9	791.0	844.9	864.1	4948.0
	Total		**1301.5**	**1304.8**	**1328.7**	**1291.3**	**1341.1**	**1421.3**	**7988.7**
Changes to Baseline Program:									
WPN	TRIDENT II (D5) Missile *Missile Procurement Quantity*	115000	0.0	18.0	-140.0	-353.0 *-12*	-275.0 *-12*	-142.0 *-5*	-892.0 *-29*
O&MN	Weapons Support/Fleet Ballistic Missile	1D2D	0.0	0.0	39.0	51.0	31.0	23.0	144.0
	Total		**0.0**	**18.0**	**-101.0**	**-302.0**	**-244.0**	**-119.0**	**-748.0**

TRIDENT II (D5) Missile

Changes to Procurement Quantities and Funding Estimates
Based on Terminating D5 Missile Production at the End of **FY 2003**

(Then-Year $ in Millions)

Assumes no cost impact before FY 2001

Appropriation	Line Item Title	Line Item Number	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FYDP Total
Baseline Program (FY 2000 President's Budget):									
WPN	TRIDENT II (D5) Missile	115000	488.9	486.3	511.8	500.3	496.2	557.2	3040.7
	Missile Procurement Quantity		*12*	*12*	*12*	*12*	*12*	*5*	*65*
O&MN	Weapons Support/Fleet Ballistic Missile	1D2D	812.6	818.5	816.9	791.0	844.9	864.1	4948.0
	Total		**1301.5**	**1304.8**	**1328.7**	**1291.3**	**1341.1**	**1421.3**	**7988.7**
Changes to Baseline Program:									
WPN	TRIDENT II (D5) Missile	115000	0.0	98.0	-113.0	-79.0	-270.0	-141.0	-505.0
	Missile Procurement Quantity						*-12*	*-5*	*-17*
O&MN	Weapons Support/Fleet Ballistic Missile	1D2D	0.0	0.0	0.0	34.0	9.0	7.0	50.0
	Total		**0.0**	**98.0**	**-113.0**	**-45.0**	**-261.0**	**-134.0**	**-455.0**

TRIDENT II (D5) Missile

Changes to Procurement Quantities and Funding Estimates
Based on Terminating D5 Missile Production at the End of **FY 2003**

(Then-Year $ in Millions)

Assumes no cost impact before FY 2001

Appropriation	Line Item Title	Line Item Number	FY 00	FY 01	FY 02	FY 03	FY 04	FY 05	FYDP Total
Baseline Program (FY 2000 President's Budget):									
WPN	TRIDENT II (D5) Missile	115000	488.9	486.3	511.8	500.3	496.2	557.2	3040.7
	Missile Procurement Quantity		*12*	*12*	*12*	*12*	*12*	*5*	*65*
O&MN	Weapons Support/Fleet Ballistic Missile	1D2D	812.6	818.5	816.9	791.0	844.9	864.1	4948.0
	Total		**1301.5**	**1304.8**	**1328.7**	**1291.3**	**1341.1**	**1421.3**	**7988.7**
Changes to Baseline Program:									
WPN	TRIDENT II (D5) Missile	115000	0.0	98.0	-113.0	-79.0	-270.0	-141.0	-505.0
	Missile Procurement Quantity						*-12*	*-5*	*-17*
O&MN	Weapons Support/Fleet Ballistic Missile	1D2D	0.0	0.0	0.0	34.0	9.0	7.0	50.0
	Total		**0.0**	**98.0**	**-113.0**	**-45.0**	**-261.0**	**-134.0**	**-455.0**

TRIDENT II (D5) Missile

Changes to Procurement Quantities and Funding Estimates
Based on Terminating D5 Missile Production at the End of **FY 2004**

(Then-Year $ in Millions)

Assumes no cost impact before FY 2001

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	Missile Procurement Quantity		*12*	*12*	*12*	*12*	*12*	*5*	*65*
O&MN	Weapons Support/Fleet Ballistic Missile	1D2D	812.6	818.5	816.9	791.0	844.9	864.1	4948.0
	Total		1301.5	1304.8	1328.7	1291.3	1341.1	1421.3	7988.7
Changes to Baseline Program:									
WPN	TRIDENT II (D5) Missile	115000	0.0	55.0	31.0	-81.0	-12.0	-141.0	-148.0
	Missile Procurement Quantity							*-5*	*-5*
O&MN	Weapons Support/Fleet Ballistic Missile	1D2D	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	34.0	43.0	77.0
	Total		0.0	55.0	31.0	-81.0	22.0	-98.0	-71.0

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DIRECTORATE FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND SECURITY REVIEW
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155

27 March, 2001
Ref: 01-F-0956
01-017H

Mr. Hans M. Kristensen
The Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development
125 University Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94710-1616

Dear Mr. Kristensen:

This responds to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request of February 27, 2001. The enclosed documents are provided as responsive to your request. There are no assessable fees for this response in this instance.

Sincerely,

H. J. McIntyre
Director

Enclosure:
As stated