Regional Non-Nuclear Options from South Korea's Perspective by Cheon, Seongwhun The Research Institute for National Unification Seoul, Republic of Korea With the end of the Cold War, bipolar conflicts centered around the two pillars of the world politics, the Unites States and the Soviet Union, disappeared. However, various regional disputes with long traditions that previously overshadowed by the superpower competition have emerged as renewed threats to international peace and security. In the post-Cold War era, therefore, conflicts are diversified in their nature and magnitude. In Northeast Asia, problems that had been discounted during the Cold War, for example, territorial disputes among the regional powers became pending and important issues in the region. Traditional competition with war memories and undisplayed hostilities among the regional players have increased potentials for political conflicts, now mostly dominated by economic fervor. There are signs of instabilities in the future. In particular, China and Japan with their economy boom have kept increasing their military expenditures. China, having the largest army in the region, is increasing its military budget, for example, 12% in 1992. Although the Chinese have cut their troops by one million in 1985-1987, and are planning to further cut their troops to about 2 million over the next 10 years, this reduction of numbers has been offset by qualitative improvements. As one of its massive modernization program, China purchased Su-27 and MiG-29 fighter aircraft from Russia, new destroyers and frigates, and reportedly introduced new classes of amphibious assault and supply ships with which long-range operation is possible.1) Japan's expansion of conventional military capabilities and its pursuit of more active role in the international disputes are becoming particularly worrisome. Although ratio of the increases in military expenditure is shrinking, its defense budget is increasing. The year 1992's budget of US$36.2 billion was the world's sixth largest one.2) As part of its defense modernization program, Japan is planning to buy F-15s, 10 destroyers, 90 tanks, 5 conventional submarines, and to develop advanced FSX fighter aircraft with the US and improve anti- submarine warfare capability.3) In addition, both houses of the Japanese Diet passed the bill to allow Japan's armed forces to participate in the UN peacekeeping in 1992. China and the two Koreas are vocal opponents of any extension of Japanese overseas military activities. They expressed concern that PKO was the beginning of an inevitable resurgence of Japanese military might. With respect to Russia, there exist security concerns in the Northeast Asian region. In the last few months before CFE I Treaty was signed, the Soviet Union had shipped tens of thousands of weapons beyond the Urals, where they need not be destroyed or even counted. According to one estimate, a total number of tanks, armored combat vehicles, and artillery withdrawn beyond the Urals are 57,300 pieces.4) Old equipments in the Far East could be replaced with the new ones withdrawn and new units could be formed and equipped with weapons moved from Europe. Compared with Europe, a significantly different geopolitical situation prevails in Northeast Asia. There exist diverse political systems and cultures, considerable variations in the size of population, territory, and the degree of economic strength. Furthermore, there exist important inter-state conflicts such as North-South Korean confrontation and Japanese- Russian territorial dispute. Indeed, there are little changes in the Cold War mentalities of the states in the region. Security cooperation among the states is virtually nil and a regional security forum like CSCE does not exist. At the moment, regional players seem indifferent to or at least not so much anxious about enhancing military stability in the region. Under the circumstances, North Korea's nuclear problem that was first publicized in 1991 5) has been a source of concern among the states in the region. The refusal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) to accept IAEA special inspections and its announcement in March 1993 that it would withdraw from the NPT have drawn closer international attention to the Korean peninsula than any other time since the Korean War. North Korea's decision not to live up to the NPT makes a significant impact on and is regarded as a serious challenge to the international non- proliferation regime. Regional powers have held virtually identical position on the North Korean nuclear issue. That is, they strongly support the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and that the issue should be resolved through dialogues rather than imposing sanctions upon Pyongyang. Assuming that the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula signed by the two Koreas in December 1991 be effective in the future, this paper examines various measures that could facilitate and support the denuclearization status of the Korean peninsula. The first chapter reviews the history of the debates over nuclear issues between North and South Korea. Chapter two describes how the joint declaration was agreed and has been implemented. Chapter three illustrates options that can be taken by the two Koreas to facilitate denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Finally, chapter four presents regional powers' obligations to support the denuclearization of the peninsula. I. NUCLEAR DEBATES BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA 1. North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) Historically, the DPRK has strongly denounced the presence of US nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula while advocating the conversion of the peninsula into a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ). The first official record that revealed the North's anti- nuclear sentiment was the letter of 7 November 1956 from the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK to the members of the South Korean National Assembly and the general public. The letter accused the South of violating the military armistice agreement and trying to introduce nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula.6) Since then, the North intermittently raised the nuclear weapons issue in the 1960s and 1970s. Pyongyang's anti-nuclear campaign intensified with concrete proposals in the 1980s. At the Sixth Congress of the DPRK Workers' Party held in December 1980, North Korean President Kim Il-sung proposed the establishment of a nuclear weapons free/peace zone on the Korean peninsula as one of the measures to implement the North's unification formula--the "Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo" (DCRK).7) In June 1986, Pyongyang suggested a tripartite meeting among the two Koreas and the US to discuss establishing a nuclear weapons free/peace zone on the Korean peninsula. In the arms reduction proposal issued on 23 July 1987, Pyongyang called for tripartite talks at the foreign minister level to discuss a four-year process of the North-South mutual force reduction down to the level of 100,000 troops, together with the parallel withdrawal of US forces and nuclear weapons from the peninsula. The updated and more comprehensive proposal made on 7 November 1988, suggesting a three-year timetable, spelled out detailed measures which would take place at each stage of the process. According to the proposal, the US would pull back its forces and nuclear weapons to the south of 35 degrees and 30 minutes north latitude (a line running between Pusan and Chinhae in the South) by the end of 1989, and a complete withdrawal of US ground forces and nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula would be carried out by the end of 1990. The proposal also suggested trilateral talks where verification among other issues could be discussed. In the 1990s, North Korean proposals have taken more refined and concrete shape. In the "Disarmament Proposal for Peace on the Korean Peninsula" made on 31 May 1990, Pyongyang presented a ten-point proposal for confidence building and arms reduction. Concerning the nuclear problem, the North proposed the following measure: The North and the South should convert the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free zone. (A) Joint efforts should be made to get all the nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea withdrawn immediately. (B) Nuclear weapons should not be produced or purchased. (C) Foreign planes and warships loaded with nuclear weapons should be banned from entering or passing through Korea. On 30 July 1991, the North Korean Foreign Ministry proposed that the two Koreas jointly declare a NWFZ by the end of 1992, which would be guaranteed by neighboring nuclear weapon states by the end of 1993. The proposal has drawn attention in the sense that there was no request for trilateral talks, and the withdrawal of US forces was implicitly mentioned as a follow-up measure rather than a precondition for the pursuit of a NWFZ. At the Fourth inter-Korean High-Level Talks held in 22-25 October 1991,8) the North proposed a draft of "Declaration on Establishing a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) on the Korean Peninsula" and linked its acceptance of the IAEA safeguards inspection to the withdrawal of US forces and nuclear weapons from South Korea. The nine-point proposal: (1) forbids the testing, manufacturing, introduction, possession, and use of nuclear weapons, (2) prohibits the transit, landing, and visiting of nuclear capable aircraft and ships, (3) prevents any agreement guaranteeing a nuclear umbrella and does not allow deployment and storage of nuclear weapons on each side's territory, (4) bans military exercises involving nuclear weapons, (5) demands simultaneous inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities by the IAEA and South Korea's military bases by the North. It was not until signing of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula that Pyongyang suddenly changed its position and withdrew the NWFZ proposal. 2. South Korea's Denuclearization The Republic of Korea (ROK) had hardly responded to Pyongyang's nuclear initiatives. Quite contrary to Pyongyang's aggressive anti-nuclear proposals, in the mid-1970s, then President Park Chung-hee even hinted at the possibility of developing nuclear weapons in South Korea in case the United States withdrew its forces.9) No proposals concerning nuclear issues had been advanced by the South Korean government until recently. On 1 August 1991, a statement was made by the Foreign Ministry saying that the two Korean authorities could discuss military matters including the issue of nuclear nonproliferation in order to reduce tension and build confidence between the two Koreas.10) There seemed to be many factors behind the South's indecisive position. The presence of US nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula was probably the most important reason. At the Fourth High-Level Talks, South Korean Prime Minister urged that Pyongyang, without any condition, should first stop developing nuclear weapons and accept international safeguards inspection. South Korea's position on the nuclear issue, though not explicitly declared at that time, was that even if US nuclear forces were withdrawn, Seoul would need US nuclear protection and therefore allow US ships and aircraft to pass through or visit South Korean territory including sea and airspace. According to this position, the North's proposal --particularly points (2) and (3)-- was hardly acceptable. The year of 1991 was a turning point of nuclear debates on the Korean peninsula. Following President Bush's initiatives to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons on 27 September 1991, and President Gorbachev's reciprocal step on 5 October 1991, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo made a "Declaration on Denuclearizing and Building Peace on the Korean Peninsula" on 8 November 1991. The declaration was the beginning of Seoul's diplomatic campaign to deter Pyongyang from developing nuclear weapons. The declaration, the first official nuclear policy announced by the ROK government, is as follows: (1) The Republic of Korea will use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, and will not manufacture, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons. (2) The Republic of Korea will continue to submit to comprehensive international inspection all nuclear-related facilities and materials on its territory in compliance with the NPT and with the nuclear safeguards agreement it has concluded with the IAEA under the treaty, and will not possess nuclear fuel reprocessing and enrichment facilities. (3) The Republic of Korea aspires for a world of peace free of nuclear weapons as well as all weapons of mass destruction, and we will actively participate in international efforts toward the total elimination of chemical and biological weapons and observe all international agreements thereon. The most important part of President Roh's November 8th declaration was the ROK government's voluntary renouncement of its right to possess nuclear reprocessing and enrichment facilities. Although there have been sharp critique by pro- nuclearists in South Korea, Seoul's decision seemed inevitable at that time. DPRK's nuclear program was full of ambiguities and suspicions and in particular, Pyongyang was suspected of building and running a large-scale reprocessing plant at Yongbyon. Later, the suspicion proved to be true.11) South Korea seemed so desperate to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear power that it had to take an initiative to renounce its right to possess important nuclear capabilities and had to appeal to Pyongyang for forgoing its nuclear weapons program. At the Fifth inter-Korean High-Level Talks held on 10-13 December 1991, North Korea tabled its previous nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) proposal and South Korea put forward a draft of "Declaration on Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula" which was an extended version of President Roh's November declaration. At the meeting, the two sides reached an agreement on fundamental issues and goals, known as "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation." This 25-point basic agreement provides a framework for improving relations between the two sides. Acting on the belief that the two Koreas themselves should inspect each other's nuclear-related installations and materials in order to build confidence in the military area, South Korean Prime Minister proposed, at the Fifth High-Level Talks, the North-South reciprocal inspection. He also called for carrying out simultaneous pilot inspections of one military and one civilian site designated by each other by 31 January 1992, on the condition that the two sides agree first to scrap nuclear reprocessing facilities. South Korea offered to submit Kunsan airbase and one civilian nuclear facility for inspection by the North and proposed Sunchon airbase and the Yongbyon nuclear complex for inspection by the South. Pyongyang was obviously not prepared to respond to Seoul's offer and put off further discussion on the nuclear problem until the talks later. The two sides just agreed to hold an ad hoc meeting on the nuclear issue in the immediate future. II. JOINT DECLARATION ON THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA 1. Agreeing on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula The international community was concerned that the nuclear issue had not been resolved at the Fifth High-Level Talks. Responding to these concerns, South Korea took more active measures to push North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions. On 18 December 1991, President Roh declared a nuclear-free South Korea, saying that "there do not exist any nuclear weapons whatsoever, anywhere in the Republic of Korea." A practical implication of Roh's December declaration was that US nuclear weapons were completely removed from the peninsula. Seoul also urged Pyongyang to sign and ratify the IAEA safeguards agreement and accept the international inspection. South Korea even hinted that the annual Team Spirit ROK-US joint military exercises could be canceled depending on the North Korean attitude toward the nuclear problem.12) The first ad hoc meeting on the nuclear issue was held on 26 December 1991. To the South's surprise, the North withdrew its previous position insisting on a nuclear weapons free zone and proposed a draft "Joint Declaration on Denuclearizing [emphasis added] the Korean Peninsula". North Korea adopted many points of the South Korea's denuclearization proposal. For example, it forbids the possession of nuclear fuel reprocessing and enrichment facilities. It also referred to neither the prohibition of a treaty guaranteeing a nuclear umbrella nor the transit, landing, or visiting of nuclear capable aircraft and ships. There has been much speculation as to why North Korea changed its position and virtually copied that of the South. North Korean leaders were well aware of the urgent necessity for normalizing diplomatic ties with the US and improving relations with Japan to overcome their economic, political, and diplomatic difficulties. Since the US and Japan have maintained their positions that Pyongyang should settle the nuclear problem and accept international inspection first, the North presumably had to take some positive steps. After intense negotiations, the two sides finally came to an agreement on the "Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" at the third ad hoc meeting on 31 December 1991. The six-point declaration containing eight principles of denuclearization is as follows: (1) The South and the North will not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons. (2) The South and the North will use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes. (3) The South and the North will not possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment. (4) In order to verify the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, the South and the North will conduct inspections of objects chosen by the other side and agreed to by the two sides. (5) The South and the North will establish a South-North Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC). (6) The declaration will enter into force after being ratified respectively. Immediately after signing the agreement, on 7 January 1992, South Korea announced that the 1992 Team Spirit military exercises would be canceled. At the same time, North Korea promised to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement and accept its inspections. Pyongyang did sign the fullscope safeguards agreement on 30 January 1992. The denuclearization declaration has been a legal and moral basis upon which South Korea could take appropriate measures vis-a-vis North Korea to counter its proliferation attempts. The Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC), established on 19 March 1992, became an official implementing body for such purposes. 2. Inter-Korean Negotiations on the Reciprocal Inspection: Temporary Failure To verify denuclearization, the two Koreas will inspect objects or sites chosen by the state conducting the inspection, but agreed to by both sides. The JNCC was a forum for negotiating and implementing these reciprocal inspections. But the two parties could not agree on the objects and methods of the inspection, and the negotiations were stalemated. Since the beginning of the inter-Korean discussions on the nuclear matters, the two Koreas had held different views on many aspects in verifying what they would agree on. As the IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities became more visible by initialing the safeguards agreement on 15 July 1992, North Korea began to mention an asymmetrical inspection. As a condition for accepting the IAEA inspection, the North argued that military bases in the South should be inspected by the North to see for themselves whether US nuclear weapons were removed. President Kim Il-sung first raised the asymmetrical inspection issue during an interview on 26 September 1991. Regarding the international inspection on North Korea, Kim Il-sung remarked as follows:13) Therefore, we do not object to nuclear inspection. What we are against is not the nuclear inspection itself but the unreasonable attitude of some people who are trying to impose nuclear inspection on us unilaterally contrary to international justice. We have never put nuclear threat to anyone but, instead, we are exposed to nuclear threat. It is no secret that more than 1,000 US nuclear weapons are actually deployed in South Korea. Thus, if a fair inspection is to be carried out, it should be made not only on us but also on nuclear bases in South Korea. At the Fourth High-Level Talks, Pyongyang proposed simultaneous implementation of the IAEA's inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities and of the North's inspection of military bases in the South.14) On a Foreign Ministry statement issued on 25 November 1991, North Korea gave positive appreciation of President Roh's November declaration and declared as follows:15) First, if the United States begins the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from South Korea, we will sign the IAEA safeguards accord. Second, both an inspection to confirm US nuclear weapons in South Korea and an inspection of our nuclear facilities should be carried out simultaneously. Third, DPRK-US negotiations to discuss simultaneous nuclear inspection and removing the nuclear danger against us should be held. Meanwhile, North Korea welcomed President Roh's announcement on the nuclear free Korean peninsula. The North, however, argued that it could not know for sure whether the nuclear weapons had been withdrawn upon hearing the statement of South Korean authority who had no right to decide on the nuclear weapons. Pyongyang reiterated that the IAEA inspection of its nuclear facilities and its inspection of the US bases in South Korea must be conducted simultaneously. North Korea proposed negotiation with the US to discuss all pertinent issues including the removal of nuclear threat as well as the simultaneous inspection.16) At the Fifth High-Level Talks, South Korea proposed, on a reciprocal basis, symmetrical inspection of each side's nuclear facilities vs. nuclear facilities and military bases vs. military bases. Furthermore, the South, as a trial measure, suggested a pilot inspection of each side's one nuclear facility and one military base respectively.17) The South's argument for symmetrical inspection is based on the fact that an inspection object should be chosen depending on whether the object has already been opened to the outside world. The South has been adhering to the IAEA fullscope safeguards agreement since 1975. Seoul stresses that nuclear facilities already opened to the IAEA cannot be traded for military bases that have never been revealed to the outside. The ROK maintained that it should be able to inspect North Korean military bases if the DPRK wants to inspect US military bases in South Korea. The North signed a fullscope IAEA safeguards agreement on 30 January 1992. Therefore, the IAEA's inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities was de facto allowed. With these developments (the South's symmetrical inspection proposal and the North's acceptance of the IAEA inspection), the North Korean concept of asymmetrical inspection has been modified. At the Sixth High- Level Talks, Pyongyang proposed a new version of asymmetrical inspection scheme: the South inspect Yongbyon nuclear complex and the North carry out a simultaneous inspection of all US military bases in South Korea. In order to support its modified asymmetrical inspection scheme, at the first round of the JNCC meetings in March 1992, DPRK began to insist on the principle of simultaneous dissolution of suspicions. With this principle, North Korea emphasized that the two sides must dissolve mutual suspicions. But DPRK contended that in reality nuclear weapons had existed in the South and Seoul had more nuclear facilities than Pyongyang. To dissolve mutual suspicions simultaneously, therefore, North Korea argued that the South's inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and the North's fullscope concurrent inspection of US military bases in South Korea should be carried out at the same time. At the first round of the JNCC meetings, South Korea proposed a draft inspection regime based on its principle of reciprocity and equal ceilings. According to the South's proposal, a total of 56 places could be visited for each side per year through regular and special inspections. More than one visit to the same place are allowed and counted against quota. Among 56 places, 20 are military bases for which only special inspections are available. Regular inspections are performed quarterly for the places that are chosen by the other side and agreed upon between the two sides. The special inspection proposed by South Korea is to be carried out up to 12 times a year to the places designated unilaterally by the requesting party. Special inspections are also referred to as "inspections with no sanctuaries". The inspection is to be performed with prior notification period of 24 hours and the right of refusal is denied to the inspected party. Seoul has emphasized that the inspection is essential in eliminating mistrust and building mutual confidence. But Pyongyang refused to accept the South's proposal which, the North argued, violates the article four of the denuclearization declaration. Differing positions of both sides on the nuclear inspection can be summarized in the following figure. (E-mail readers: Please contact Nautilus Institute [fax 510/526- 9297, e-mail npr@igc.apc.org] to receive a hard copy version of this figure by fax.) 3. Reasons for Temporary Failure The early impasse over verification in the High-Level Talks and at the JNCC illustrates that circumstances for promoting arms control and verification on the Korean peninsula do not appear favorable. Three major reasons are identified as the failure of the bilateral inspection negotiations. The first hurdle is that virtually no trust exists between the two Koreas. Even if the basic agreement was reached and several committees and commissions were subsequently formed, the implementation of the agreement has been delayed. In May 1993, Pyongyang responded to Seoul's request of putting the agreement into practice by proposing the exchange of presidential envoys, which shows the lack of interests in implementing the agreement from the northern side. Trust is something that must be nurtured, especially between two countries scarred by a history of war, massive military counter-deployments, and harsh, threatening rhetoric. Furthermore, on 19 March 1994, the North Korean chief delegate for the special envoy exchange negotiation remarked that should a war break out, Seoul will be in "a sea of flames."18) The second stumbling block will be North Korea's traditional resistance to openness, which has spawned a passive attitude toward verification. For example, in the nonaggression section of the basic agreement, the two Koreas agreed on five measures, including mutual notification and control of major military movements and exercises. Pyongyang strongly opposed the exchanges of observers for such exercises. North Korean resistance to accept observers implies their sensitivities that have grown with the totalitarian system that has dominated North Korea for more than 40 years. The third obstacle is that the two Koreas lack extensive independent monitoring capabilities. Therefore, verification between the two countries would be fully dependent on-site inspections (OSIs). However, OSIs are the most intrusive means of verification, and the two Koreas have hardly built enough confidence to initiate such procedures. The United States and the Soviet Union were only able to engage in OSIs after years of confidence building measures, including hot-lines, notifications, and data exchanges. OSI was the culmination, not the beginning of the verification process in the East-West context. III. INTER-KOREAN OPTIONS TO FACILITATE DENUCLEARIZING THE KOREAN PENINSULA The Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the first disarmament agreement signed between North and South Korea. The North promised to abandon its illegal nuclear weapons program, and US nuclear weapons were withdrawn from the South. Although the implementation of the declaration has been delayed, not only the two Koreas but the regional powers have also fully supported the nuclear weapon-free Korean peninsula. As the DPRK-US talks continues and their relations improve, the North-South negotiation on inspection regulations is expected soon to resume. Viewing that a country's ambition to go nuclear results from the complex calculations of its national interests, a network of measures taking political, economic, and security factors into account should be devised in order to deter the country from developing nuclear weapons. That is, multi-faceted means for tension reduction, exchanges and cooperation as well as reciprocal inspection regulations need be adopted. From this perspective, the two Koreas could do more than what they have done so far for true and sustained denuclearization of the peninsula. The following measures can be taken by the two Koreas. 1. Efficient Reciprocal Inspections Raison D'etre of the Reciprocal Inspection Inter-Korean dialogues on the reciprocal inspection regime would begin only after the IAEA's ad hoc and routine inspections of the North Korean nuclear facilities are on the track. With the normalization of the IAEA inspections, the international community's concerns about the DPRK's nuclear program would weaken and its resolve to counter Pyongyang's attempt to proliferate nuclear weapons might loosen up. Therefore, following questions on the necessities of the reciprocal inspection could be raised both domestically and internationally. First, if South Korea approaches the issue of the reciprocal inspection as it was discussed in early 1992, it would bring about unnecessary tension and cause serious conflicts in the inter-Korean relations. Second, considering that the North is not in favor of the idea of the inspection itself, Seoul's urge to implement stringent reciprocal inspections would bring misfortune on the inter-Korean relations itself. Third, even if the two Koreas agree on the inspection regulations, doubts would arise as to the effectiveness and value of the inspection unless the inspection regime is stricter than the IAEA safeguards regime. In spite of all these doubts, however, the reciprocal inspection should be implemented due to the following reasons. First, the two Koreas have legal obligations to implement the inspection according to the article four of the denuclearization declaration. Without the inspection, it would be impossible to verify whether the two sides are complying with the declaration. This would mean that the declaration would end up a dead letter. It would be difficult to stick to the declaration without implementing the most important article of the declaration-- assuring compliance of the two parties. Second, the North Korean nuclear problem is both an international and an inter-Korean issue. Thus, as the IAEA inspection is needed from an international dimension, the reciprocal inspection is justified from an inter-Korean dimension. In particular, it is important for the two Koreas to maintain independent nature of the inspection and thereby make a firm precedent that problems on the Korean peninsula can be resolved by the Koreans themselves. Successful implementation of the inspection would make Korean people keep their self-reliance and avoid unnecessary interferences from other countries. In other words, it would have a significant symbolic meaning to Korean sovereignty. Third, the reciprocal inspection is also essential in strengthening bilateral exchanges and cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Without transparency of each other's nuclear program, cooperation in the nuclear industry would hardly be possible. That is, mutual opening of nuclear activities through the inspection is necessary not because one side is suspicious of the other's nuclear intentions but because increased transparency is essential in enhancing exchanges and cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Fourth, from the technical point of view, limitations inherent in the IAEA inspection system can be complemented by the North-South inspection. IAEA inspections are allowed only for facilities directly related with nuclear materials. Uranium mines and refineries are not subject to the IAEA inspection, either. It is therefore not suitable for North Korea that has accomplished a complete nuclear fuel cycle. On the other hand, even if the two different inspections are performed to the same objects, the results would not be same. In case of the reciprocal inspection, inspectors use the same language and have the same cultural background and sentiment. Thus the inspection makes it possible to obtain important information that inspectors of other nationality might fail to notice. Finally, it cannot be ignored that the US government regards the denuclearization declaration and the reciprocal inspection on the Korean peninsula as a good model that can be applied in other regions.19) Taking account of obvious limitations of IAEA inspections as revealed in the Iraqi case, the US acknowledges that inspections between the two Koreas are critical in order to complement the IAEA inspection system.20) Therefore, it is believed that the US strongly adheres to the realization of a strict bilateral inspection mechanism in Korea with a view to using the Korean case as a prototype in establishing similar inspection regimes in other regions. From this perspective, if the two Koreas do not implement the inspection, there might be conflicts in the ROK-US relations as well as in the DPRK-US relations. In fact, Washington might exert pressures on the two Koreas to carry out the inspection after the IAEA inspection issues are resolved. Some Suggestions for the Reciprocal Inspection There is no doubt that the reciprocal inspection need be more effective and stringent than the IAEA inspection. However, practicability of the inspection should not be ignored. Up until now, the two Koreas have proposed unrealistic inspection schemes that lacked negotiability. It is wise for the two sides to facilitate negotiating the inspection regime by withdrawing unacceptable demands to the other side. For this purpose, Seoul should no longer insist on the special inspection with no sanctuaries. In return, Pyongyang should forgo its attempts to conduct simultaneous inspections of all US military bases in South Korea and abandon its demand of past history of the presence of US nuclear weapons in the South. The two Koreas should also set a principle that limits inspections to nuclear materials and facilities, and in exceptional cases, to military bases. Compared with military bases, it would be easy to agree on the inspection regulations for nuclear materials and facilities because it is based on scientific and technical facts, thus minimizing room for political maneuver. In order to complement the IAEA inspection, the inspection can adopt the following measures. First, compared with that the IAEA inspectors who have limited access only to the facilities where nuclear materials are reported to be present, the access of the reciprocal inspectors can be extended to such installations as control room, annex buildings, and others which inspectors want to visit. Second, since North Korea is reported to have significant amount of natural uranium and run a uranium refinery, those facilities and yellow cakes should also be included for inspection. Third, when a reprocessing plant operates, IAEA inspectors are normally at the facility full time. As the so-called radiochemical laboratory is a reprocessing facility, continuous inspection of the plant is required until Pyongyang completely dismantles the facility. 2. Bilateral Exchanges and Cooperation North Korea's reluctance to open its system to the outside is a major obstacle that hinders eliminating confrontation on the Korean peninsula. The North's anti-openness tendencies have been revealed in various inter-Korean negotiating forums and also explain why Pyongyang is opposed to the Seoul's intrusive inspection proposal at the JNCC negotiations. The history of arms control in Europe gives a lesson that a country's willingness to accept intrusive verification measures like OSI is proportional to the degree of openness and democratization of its regime. In the late 1950s, the US and the Soviet Union negotiated on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a critical issue in the negotiation was whether OSI should be adopted. The US wanted sufficient OSI to be allowed but the USSR hoped to limit OSI, referring to its concern that OSI could infringe on sovereignty and can be used for espionage. The two countries could not reach agreement on the number of OSI and only agreed on the Partial Test Ban Treaty where the importance of OSI is much relieved.21) The discrepancies in the two sides' positions on OSI had not been narrowed down until fundamental changes were made by President Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev made a series of important arms control proposals and led to changes in the Soviet position on verification and OSI in particular. Such changes made a great contribution to the successful negotiation of the Stockholm Document in 1986.22) However, even in this negotiation, OSI was one of the two last stumbling blocks,23) which illustrates the difficulties in agreeing on OSI in an arms control treaty. Suspicions of North Korea's nuclear weapons development may not be completely removed unless Pyongyang undergoes fundamental changes in its system and subsequent changes in its position on verification as in the case of Soviet Union. For this purpose, regional powers and South Korea are encouraged to adopt a policy of engagement, which helps to induce North Korea to join the international community and get accustomed to norms and rules of the international society. A concrete action plan would involve those measures to facilitate reducing political tension, increasing economic cooperation, and promoting cultural and social exchanges. 3. Increasing Transparency of the two Koreas' Nuclear Activities Although ongoing dialogue between the two Koreas has focused on establishing a strict inspection system, it should be noted that inspection is only a first-aid measure to alleviate concerns about Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. Perhaps, more fundamental steps to enhance nuclear transparency on the Korean peninsula need be taken unilaterally as well as cooperatively. On the one hand, viewing that the two Koreas attempted to develop nuclear weapons,24) it is urgent that the North and the South take immediate and independent measures to increase the transparency of their nuclear activities to get rid of international suspicions. Such unilateral transparency measures, in combination with full cooperation with the IAEA and implementation of the reciprocal inspection, could contribute to enhance international society's confidence of peaceful intents of the two Koreas. In this context, South Korea's recent decision to establish the Technology Center for Nuclear Control (TCNC) should be appreciated. Established in March 1994, the TCNC is responsible for making South Korean nuclear activities more transparent and for developing inspection techniques and resources. The TCNC will focus on the four major areas for enhancing transparency. In the area of R&D on nuclear control policy system at state level, the TCNC will conduct studies on laws and regulations system relevant to (1) domestic inspection, (2) nuclear material accounting, (3) physical protection, and (4) import and export control of internationally controlled materials. To develop domestic safeguards inspection regime, the TCNC is charged with (1) inspection training and technical support, (2) collection and analysis of technical information, and (3) development of inspection technique. In the field of nuclear material accountancy and measurement, the TCNC will work on (1) program development and management of computer based accountancy, (2) database management of import and export of internationally controlled materials, and (3) R&D on non-destructive assay of nuclear materials and its field application. Finally, for R&D on analysis technique of environmental samples from inspection activity, the TCNC is responsible for (1) implementation of chemical analysis and verification of samples from inspection activities, (2) trace element analysis from environmental samples for tracking undeclared nuclear activities, and (3) radiological control for inspectors and health physics support. On the other hand, bilateral cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy can be another important measure to increase transparency of the two Koreas' nuclear activities. It should be pointed out that neither the joint declaration nor the agreement on the formation of the JNCC mentioned any measures for mutual cooperation. I was suggested that Seoul and Pyongyang provide the JNCC with functions to jointly control the two sides' nuclear activities and to implement cooperative measures to exchange nuclear resources and technologies.25) Such efforts will provide South Korea with a constant opportunity to monitor North Korea's nuclear activities through regular information exchanges and mutual cooperation. Thus, transparency of North Korean nuclear activities can be enhanced and its intention to develop nuclear weapons deterred. The same logic applies to South Korea as well. 4. Inter-Korean Arms Control and Reduction The joint declaration is the first disarmament agreement between the two Koreas, affirming that they will not possess a category of weapons of mass destruction. The declaration, to be effective under the circumstances of deeply-rooted distrust and tension between the two sides, should be pursued in line with other military confidence building measures. The South, being threatened by the offensively deployed North Korean forces along the DMZ, has emphasized on structuring forces defensively. On the other hand, the North has said little about defensive structuring and has taken a "force reduction first" approach. In order to lead the bilateral arms control to success, the two sides' military strategies should be adjusted in accordance with the strategy of defensive sufficiency. Accordingly, arms control talks between the two Koreas should be pursued on the basis of the doctrine of non-offensive defense.26) With respect to the object of reduction, at least until the later stage of arms reduction, it is suggested that the two Koreas focus on land forces that is an ultimate means to seize and hold terrain and thus perceived more threatening than air and sea powers. Although the two Koreas agreed to negotiate on various confidence building measures at the Joint Military Commission (JMC), talks at the JMC just started and are expected to require time- consuming and painful efforts. On the other hand, an agreement concluded multilaterally and opened for signature for other countries such as Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) provides the two Koreas with an opportunity for easy cooperation. By 1 January 1994, 154 nations signed the convention, including South Korea. Reciprocal action from North Korea is more than necessary. 5. Inter-Korean Open Skies The Open Skies Treaty was signed on 24 March 1992 by a total of 27 nations including all the NATO allies, East European members of the former Warsaw Pact, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan. Treaty parties will conduct short-notice unarmed observation overflights using aircraft equipped with sensors that have a 24-hour, all-weather capability. All territory can be overflown, even over sensitive military sites. The information from all Open Skies flights will be made available to all participants. Thus, cooperative aerial inspections will allow participants to see firsthand what their neighbors are up to, providing at once a confidence building measure and a tool for use in crisis management, should tensions arise among Open Skies signatories. The objective of Open Skies is to bring greater stability to a region undergoing dramatic political, military, and economic changes. A similar aerial observation measure on the Korean peninsula would promote openness and transparency of military forces and activities in the region.27) Open Skies would allow the two Koreas to assess the status of opposing military forces while literally and figuratively maintaining a safe distance. An Open Skies agreement is not as intrusive as inspections on the ground. Cooperative overflights need not interrupt normal patterns of military or civilian life. Indeed, unless otherwise told, citizens on the ground may not even be aware of flights taking place. Since Open Skies does require partial, but not total transparency, it would be easily accepted by North Korea. If the two Koreas with no experiences on arms control feel difficulties in negotiating a new bilateral Open Skies agreement, they could join a ready-made one in Europe. The Open Skies Treaty, six months after entry into force, is open to accession by any state all around the world, if accepted by the Open Skies Consultative Commission--the implementation body of the Treaty.28) IV. REGIONAL OPTIONS TO SUPPORT THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA The denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is the first major non-proliferation achievement in Northeast Asia. It must have had positive influence on the international non-proliferation efforts. North and South Korea have assured the world that even the two Koreas, which experienced a bitter war four decades ago and still confronted with massive military forces, can create a nuclear weapons-free regime. In this respect, the two Koreas deserve high compliments from the community of nations. Contrary to the two Koreas' efforts, regional powers' attitudes toward non-proliferation and tension reduction are disappointing. Although the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is a unilateral [emphasis added] measure of the two Koreas, it should be positively responded by the neighboring countries in the region if the declaration is to be effective and successful. Pro- proliferation and tension-increasing tendencies of the regional powers, particularly China and Japan, have given Korean people no conviction that their efforts on non-proliferation are fruitful and worthwhile in enhancing peace and security in the region. The joint declaration is only a starting point for realizing a denuclearized Korean peninsula and does not mean its completion. Under the circumstances where the regional powers are expanding their military capabilities, the two Koreas' efforts to delegitimize nuclear weapons would have little influence to curb regional proliferation attempts. Four measures that can be implemented by the regional powers to support the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula are presented in this chapter. 1. Comprehensive Security Assurance There are two kinds of security assurances currently provided by nuclear weapon states: positive and negative security assurances. Non-nuclear weapon states have asserted that the security assurances be improved. The Korean peninsula could be a model case for applying a firmer security assurance encompassing both the positive and negative. Positive Security Assurance Just before the signing of the NPT, the United States, then the Soviet Union, and Great Britain each declared to the UN Security Council:29) its intention, as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear weapon state party to the treaty on the non- proliferation of nuclear weapons that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used. This positive security assurance was adopted by the Security Council Resolution 255 on 19 June 1968, just before the signing of the NPT. A number of non-nuclear weapon states expressed their views that positive security assurance is nothing more than that already contained in the UN Charter. Furthermore, the statements made by the three nuclear powers amount to only their intentions and subject to the right of veto in the Security Council.30) Negative Security Assurance Since the first NPT Review Conference in 1975, nuclear have-nots dissatisfied with inadequacy of the positive security assurance have pressed for specific negative security assurance not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.31) Up to now, four of the permanent members in the Security Council except China have made unilateral declarations with conditions, limitations, and exceptions. At the 1978 UN Special Session on Disarmament, the Soviet Union had announced that it would never use nuclear weapons against those states which "renounce the production and acquisition of such weapons and do not have them on their territories."32) Russia recently made statements that it had backed away from its previous no-first-use pledge. The Russian Defense Ministry confirmed that the Russian military doctrine adopted on 2 November 1993 abandoned the old Soviet pledge against first use of nuclear weapons which was made in 1982 by Leonid Brezhnev.33) The United States declared that it would not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear weapons state that is a party to the NPT or "any comparable internationally binding agreement not to acquire nuclear explosive devices", except in the case of an attack on the US, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by a non-nuclear weapon state "allied to" or "associated with" a nuclear weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.34) A similar statement was made by Great Britain.35) The position of France was that it would give assurances of non- use of nuclear weapons, in accordance with arrangements to be negotiated, only to those states which have "constituted among themselves non-nuclear zones."36) The decade-old negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament have made no progress in removing the conditions contained in the four nuclear weapon states' negative security assurances.37) Only China has extended non-use guarantee in unqualified terms. Since 1964, the Chinese government has solemnly declared that at no times and under no circumstances would China be the first to use nuclear weapons. It has also undertaken not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-free zones. China strongly calls for a negotiation by all nuclear-weapon states aimed at concluding an international convention on unconditional no-first-use of nuclear weapons and non-use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non- nuclear weapon states and nuclear-free zones possibly in conjunction with the negotiation of the CTBT.38) UN Resolution of Comprehensive Security Assurance to the Korean Peninsula In spite of China's firm commitment to negative security assurance, the Chinese government has never made positive security assurance. Nor has French government taken any position on that issue. With the two remaining nuclear weapon states' joining the NPT (China in March and France in August 1992), it is possible to strengthen positive security assurance. In particular, China's commitment to positive security assurance would become a pressure to North Korea not to develop and use nuclear weapons. Furthermore, a formula needs to be devised where the nuclear have-nots' concerns be addressed over the incompleteness of negative security assurance. The Korean peninsula could be a prototype for such purposes. Probably, China could initiate other four nuclear weapon states to make a UN Security Council resolution in which they promise to: 1) never use or threat to use under any circumstances nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, 2) take immediate Security Council actions to provide support and assistance to the two Koreas in case they are threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons by the newly emerging nuclear weapon states. A Question of the Chinese Nuclear Policy on the Korean Peninsula China's sound nuclear policy of unconditional negative security assurance should be appreciated by the community of nations. There is no doubt that other nuclear weapon states should follow China. But there is an important question or an ambiguity with respect to the Chinese nuclear policy in relation to the Mutual Aid, Cooperation and Friendship Treaty signed between Beijing and Pyongyang in 1961. The article two of the treaty stipulates that "the two signatory nations guarantee to adopt all necessary measures [emphasis added] to oppose any country that might attack either nation." The question is whether use or threat of use of nuclear weapons are included in the "all necessary measures" of the article two of the China-DPRK treaty. According to a Chinese scholar, the friendship treaty was signed in 1961 and China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964. So the "all necessary measures" mentioned in the treaty did not consider the use of nuclear bomb.39) Mr. Renshi gave his personal opinion that the probability of using nuclear weapons for defense of North Korea could be completely ruled out especially in the post-Cold War era. But the Chinese government should make a clear-cut, official position on this issue. 2. Regional Nuclear Non-Proliferation Measures Regional cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation is an indispensable component for the nuclear-free Korean peninsula. Nuclear testing should be prohibited in this region and China should take initiatives on the test ban issue as it did on the security assurance for the non-nuclear weapon states. Up to now, Chinese position on the CTBT is that only after the CTBT is concluded and comes into effect, China will abide by it and carry out no more nuclear test.40) Even before CTBT is concluded, however, a regional test ban negotiation among China, Russia, Japan and the two Koreas could be launched. In addition, military activities involving nuclear weapons should be limited and the number of nuclear weapons deployed in this region be minimized. Considering the ambiguities of differences between peaceful and military uses of fissile materials, regional powers' nuclear activities in both civilian and military fields should be more transparent. Creation of a regional mechanism to control fissile materials also need be seriously taken into account. On the other hand, establishing a regional network of seismic stations to detect and identify nuclear test explosions could be an important confidence building measure in the region. Such a regional seismic network could be developed into a regional monitoring agency for verifying compliance of regional and international arms control treaties in the future. 3. Promoting Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy As a measure to convince the two Koreas that their denuclearization efforts are important and valuable not only for international peace and security but also for their own economic interests, peaceful uses of nuclear energy on the Korean peninsula should be promoted by regional states. Viewing that there do not exist plenty of natural energy resources on the Korean peninsula, it is very important that the two Koreas are fully benefitted from peaceful uses of atomic energy. For that purpose, predictable long-term supply assurances of nuclear fuels need be provided by nuclear exporting countries. The need for such assurances was confirmed in the Final Declaration of the Third Review Conference of the Non- Proliferation Treaty in 1985.41) A preferential treatment should also be given to the two Koreas over other nations, not to mention the non-NPT parties, for access to or supply of nuclear material, equipment and services as well as for transfer of scientific and technological information in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. A regional conference on the promotion of cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy could be initiated by countries with advanced nuclear technologies such as Japan. 4. Regional Arms Control and Reduction Efforts Regional nuclear non-proliferation cooperation needs to be complemented by military confidence building. Considering bilateral relationships are far more developed than multilateral ones in Northeast Asia, bilateral security dialogues should be promoted and lead to resolve existing disputes. The two Koreas' signing of a non-aggression agreement and negotiating of confidence building measures is an important precedent. Similar developments should be made in other bilateral relationships in the region. Bilateral efforts could be parallel with multilateral confidence building endeavors. An Asian version of multilateral dialogues has been proposed by several nations: for example, President Gorbachev's proposal of an "All Asian Forum" on May 1985 and Canadian proposal of "North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue" in July 1990.42) A similar forum in Northeast Asia for the purpose of military confidence building could be created with smaller number of countries and at more limited zone of application--the eastern region of China, Japan, the two Koreas, the Far Eastern region of Russia--and could be a stepping stone for establishing a broader security framework in East Asia.43) - References - 1) Wendy Lambourne, "Asia/Pacific Security Backgrounder," Pacific Research, Vol.5, No.3, (August 1992), p. 14. 2) Joong-ang Daily News, 7 August 1992. 3) Wendy Lambourne, "Asia/Pacific Security Backgrounder," p. 14. 4) Jonathan Dean and Randall Watson Forsberg, "CFE and Beyond: the Future of Conventional Arms Control," International Security, Vo.17, No.1, (Summer 1992), p. 112. 5) Seongwhun Cheon, "Countering Proliferation: South Korea's Strategic Choices," paper presented at the Eleventh Annual Ottawa Verification Symposium on Non-Proliferation and Multilateral Verification: The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 2-5 March 1994, Montebello, Quebec, p. 1. 6) Rodong Sinmun, 8 November 1956. 7) Rodong Sinmun, 11 October 1980. 8) This meeting was the first official and public occasion where the nuclear issue surfaced as a point of contention between North and South Korea. 9) Peter Hayes, Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1991), pp. 203-206. 10) During this period, the only South Korean proposal for establishing a NWFZ on the Korean peninsula was made by the president of the Unification Party, an opposition party, on 16 January 1976. 11) On 11-16 May 1992, Hans Blix, the director general of the IAEA, paid an official visit to North Korea. He was quoted as saying that the radiochemical laboratory was 80% complete in construction and 40% complete in facilities and once finished would indeed confirm to the definition of a reprocessing plant. Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Newsbrief, No. 18 (Summer, 1992), p. 9. 12) Hankook Ilbo, 17 December 1991. 13) FBIS-EAS-91-218, 12 November 1991, pp. 14-15. 14) FBIS-EAS-91-206, 24 October 1991, p. 7. 15) The North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FBIS-EAS-91- 227, 25 November 1991. North Korean Ambassador to Vienna also mentioned that while inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities would be done by the IAEA, North Korea and the US should negotiate and decide detail objects and methods for the inspection of the withdrawal of US forces in South Korea. Joong- ang Daily News, 8 December 1991. When US Congressman Stephen Solarz visited North Korea, Pyongyang made it clear that it sticked to asymmetrical inspection. Chosun Ilbo, 23 December 1991. 16) The North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FBIS-EAS-91- 246, 23 December 1991, p. 11. 17) Keynote speech of South Korean Prime Minister, FBIS-EAS-91- 238, 11 December 1991, pp. 19-20. 18) Time, 4 April 1994. p. 14. 19) For example in 1992, Ronald Lehman, then director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency remarked that "Indeed, we may see experience gained here in Korea which may provide concepts useful elsewhere such as in the Middle East and South Asia. The two Koreas have a long way to go, but there are other regions which have not even taken the steps in the nuclear area already begun by Seoul and Pyongyang. One region where the development of nuclear CBMs is less advanced is South Asia..." Ronald Lehman, "Arms Control and Disarmament on the Korean Peninsula," Four Nations Arms Control Seminar on the Korean Peninsula, Seoul, 2 June 1992, pp. 24-25. 20) Ronald Lehman stressed the importance of the inspection between the two Koreas to clear international suspicions about North Korea's nuclear program and called for South Korea's patience and persistence in working out an effective reciprocal inspection system. Korea Herald, 3 June 1992. 21) In December 1962, then Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev suggested that he might be willing to accept two or three on-site inspections a year. The United States was not willing to go down to six. Ivo Daalder, "The Limited Test Ban Treaty," in Albert Carnesale and Richard Haass (eds.), Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 12-13. 22) James Goodby, "The Stockholm Conference: Negotiating a Cooperative Security System for Europe," in George, A., P. Farley, and A. Dallin (eds.), US-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 158. 23) The other problem was to decide thresholds of notification and observation. John Borawski, From the Atlantic to the Urals (New York: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988), p. 99. 24) Seongwhun Cheon, "National Security and Stability in East Asia: the Korean Peninsula," in Darryl Howlett and John Simpson (eds.), East Asia and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Papers from the Twelfth PPNN Core Group Meeting, Keidanren Guest House, Shizuoka, Japan, 28-29 November 1992, p. 38. 25) North and South Korea already indicated a possibility of such cooperation. On 17 September 1991, South Korean Minister of Science and Technology said that if North Korea accepted the IAEA inspection, the South would be willing to provide atomic technologies for the North and to cooperate with each other. Choe U-chin, deputy director of North Korea's Disarmament and Peace Institute and co-chairman of the JNCC, also argued that if suspicions of North Korea were dissolved through IAEA inspections, the two Koreas should cooperate to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Han-Kyoreh Shinmun, 20 May 1992. 26) Seongwhun Cheon, "A Theoretical Study on Non-Offensive Defense (NOD)," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Korean Association of International Studies, December 1993. [in Korean] 27) Amy Smithson and Seongwhun Cheon, "'Open Skies' Over the Korean Peninsula: Breaking the Impasse," Korea and World Affairs, Vol.17, No.1, Spring 1993, pp. 57-77. 28) By 15 December 1993, 12 out of 27 nations had deposited their instruments of ratification. The treaty will enter into force after 20 states deposit instruments of ratification, and after all signatories with passive quotas more than eight ratify. The Arms Control Reporter, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, 1994), p. 409.A.1. 29) Lewis Dunn, Containing Nuclear Proliferation, Adelphi Paper 263, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991), p. 43. 30) Aga Shahi, "Defense, Disarmament, and Collective Security," Nonoffensive Defense: A Global Perspective (New York: UNIDIR, 1990), p. 184. 31) William Epstein, The Prevention of Nuclear War: A United Nations Perspective (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Gunn & Hain, Publishers, 1984), p. 30. 32) UN document A/S-10/PV.5. 33) Serge Schmemann, "Russia Drops Pledge of No First Use of Atom Arms," New York Times, 4 November 1993, p. A8. 34) UN document A/S-10/AC.1/30. 35) UN document A/S-10/PV.26. 36) UN document A/S-10/PV.27. 37) Aga Shahi, "Defense, Disarmament, and Collective Security," p. 184. 38) Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Nuclear Testing, 5 October 1993. 39) Personal communication with Luo Renshi, senior fellow of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies, on 24 January 1994. 40) Statement by the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Nuclear Testing, 5 October 1993. 41) United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, UN document NPT/CONF. III/64/I, Annex I, 1985. 42) Recently, former Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro insisted on the necessities of a collective security system in Asia. Joong-ang Daily News, 22 September 1992. 43) The United States, having stationed its military forces, need be a participant although its territory is not covered. Regional Non-Nuclear Options from South Korea's Perspective by Cheon, Seongwhun* The Research Institute for National Unification Seoul, Republic of Korea Paper prepared for Conference on Peace and Security and the Nuclear Issue in Northeast Asia co-sponsored by the East-West Center and the Nautilus Institute 18-19 July 1994 Honolulu, Hawaii * The views expressed in this paper are the author's own and do not necessarily represent those of the Research Institute for National Unification or the Ministry of Unification.