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FPO SAN FRANCISCO 96610

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COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY

VOLUME I

1974

Prepared by the Command History Branch
Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC, FPO San Francisco 96610

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII
1975

~~TOP SECRET~~



ADMIRAL NOEL GAYLER
COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

FOREWORD

The Pacific Command and the nation held great hopes for 1974. The year began with relative equilibrium in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The long sought detentes with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union seemed to be maturing toward increased global cooperation and stability. United States foreign policy aimed at encouraging our allies and emerging nations towards emphasizing self defense, economic development and peaceful evolution.


Unfortunately our expectations far exceeded the harsh realities of overt Communist aggression in Southeast Asia and the unsettling influences of political change at home and abroad. The year ended with government forces in both Cambodia and South Vietnam fighting for survival against vastly increased country-wide enemy pressure.

The most important lesson to be learned from the deterioration of our position in Southeast Asia and the threat to our prestige elsewhere in the world is that the United States must maintain and be willing to employ a credible deterrent against any would be aggressor. We must project a perception of peacekeeping power to both allies and potential antagonists.

The men and women of the Pacific Command are charged with the projection of military preparedness. Our mission continues to be the defense of the United States and the support of its national policy and interests throughout Asia and the Pacific.

Noel Gayler

NOEL GAYLER
Admiral, U. S. Navy
Commander in Chief Pacific



PREFACE

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) SM-247-59 of 5 March 1959 and SM-665-69 of 3 October 1969 require the Commander in Chief Pacific to submit an annual historical report that will enable personnel of the JCS to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the operations of Headquarters CINCPAC, the problems faced by the headquarters, and the status of the Pacific Command from the viewpoint of the CINCPAC. The required report also preserves the history of the PACOM and assists in the compilation of the history of the JCS, to the extent that the impact on the PACOM of major decisions and directives of the JCS may be evaluated by the JCS historians without detailed research into PACOM records. The CINCPAC Command History is prepared in accordance with the cited JCS memorandums.

This history describes CINCPAC's actions in discharging his assigned responsibilities, and his relationships with U.S. military and other governmental agencies. It records his command decisions and policy positions, but does not cover the detailed activities of his component and subordinate unified commands, which are properly treated in the histories of those headquarters. Beginning with the 1971 history, the organization of subject matter was changed from the previous geographic orientation, with emphasis on Southeast Asia, to a more functionalized format.

The 1972-1973 historical narrative of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam was the terminal history of that organization. It covered the period from 1 January 1972 until the disestablishment of the headquarters on 29 March 1973. The identification of the MACV history as Annex A to the CINCPAC history will be retained to facilitate future research. Histories of the remaining subordinate unified commands--USMACTHAI, U.S. Forces Japan, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, and U.S. Forces Korea--will continue to be identified as Annexes B through E respectively, and are included only for those copies retained at CINCPAC or forwarded to the JCS. Further distribution of those histories is a matter for the subordinate unified commanders.

For convenience of research and reference, the discussions of various PACOM reorganizations in Chapter I have been supplemented by the JCS unified action guidance contained in Appendix I. These paragraphs are pertinent to the questions of command, control and coordination routinely addressed when command structures are modified in a unified command.

The 1974 CINCPAC history is published in two volumes, consecutively paginated, with the glossary and index for the entire work placed at the end of Volume II. Comprehensive notes on sources and documentation may be found in the 1972 history. Briefly, message traffic footnoted in this history other than General Service (GENSER) is followed by the abbreviations (BOM) or (EX) as appropriate. BOM is the acronym for "by other means" and EX is used to denote "special category-exclusive" messages. Those CINCPAC messages cited as ALPHA messages are staff information transmissions to CINCPAC while he was away from the headquarters.

Chapters II, V, VII, IX and X of this history were prepared by the undersigned. Pauline K. Tallman prepared Chapters I, III, IV, VI, VIII and XI, and also supervised the physical layout of the product. The index was compiled by Mrs. Tallman and the undersigned. The glossary was compiled by Shirley A. Streck.

The manuscript was typed by Mrs. Streck, YN3 Richard J. Knepple and Roberta E. Putz. The Navy Publications and Printing Service, Pacific Division, Pearl Harbor printed and bound the volumes.



CARL O. CLEVER
Command Historian

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CHAPTER I

THE STATUS OF THE COMMAND

SECTION I--THE PACIFIC COMMAND

(C) Military strength in the PACOM was reduced again in 1974, but by a smaller annual amount than had been the case since the decline began in 1969. The greatest reductions were in Air Force and Navy personnel. A comparison of military strengths by Service follows:


	1 Jan 74	31 Dec 74	Change
Army	61,241	63,016	+ 1,775
Navy	173,352	163,647	- 9,705
Marine Corps	64,303	64,363	+ 60
Air Force	80,396	65,896	-14,500
Total	379,292	356,922	-22,370

Major areas of concentration of military personnel and their dependents and the amount of change from the year before are shown in the following table. The totals for Japan include Okinawa. The largest decrease of military strength occured in Thailand.

	Military		Dependents	
	31 Dec 74	Change	31 Dec 74	Change
Guam	10,069	+ 306	6,422	- 172
Hawaii	52,390	+10,258	78,625	- 609
Japan	53,909	+ 1,167	35,139	-3,771
Korea	40,781	+ 3,124	15,866	+8,166
Philippines	14,803	- 1,225	18,843	- 752
Taiwan	4,246	- 298	3,543	-1,004
Thailand	22,835	-12,169	6,751	+1,699

(U) The following charts and tables show PACOM command arrangements and relationships, key personnel, further details regarding personnel strengths, available forces, and the disposition of forces throughout the PACOM. The chart showing CINCPAC Staff organization is on the inside of the back cover.

THE PACIFIC COMMAND




* JOINT STRATEGIC TARGET PLANNING STAFF/STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

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COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS IN PACOM



COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPAC): CINCPAC is the Commander of a unified command comprising all forces assigned for the accomplishment of his missions. The mission of CINCPAC, in broad terms, is as follows: To maintain the security of the PACOM and defend the United States against attack through the Pacific Ocean; to support and advance the national policies and interest of the United States and discharge U.S. military responsibilities in the Pacific, Far East, South, and Southeast Asia; to prepare plans, conduct operations and coordinate activities of the forces of the PACOM in consonance with directives of higher authority. His general area of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations is the Pacific Ocean west of 92 degrees west longitude, the Bering Sea, the Arctic Ocean west of 95 degrees west longitude and east of 100 degrees east longitude, the Indian Ocean east of 62 degrees east longitude, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the countries of Southeast and South Asia (including Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and the Himalayan States of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan), and the Islands in all assigned water areas including the Aleutians (excluding air defense) but excluding the Alexander Archipelago, Kodiak, Nunivak, and Little Diomede Island.

CINCPAC exercises operational command of assigned forces through his component commanders, the commanders of subordinate unified commands, and the commanders of joint task forces (when established). CINCPAC is accredited as the U.S. Military Adviser/Representative to the following organizations:

a. SEATO Council: U.S. Military Adviser
b. ANZUS Council: U.S. Military Representative
c. Philippine-U.S. Council of Foreign Ministers: U.S. Military Representative and co-chairman of the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board
d. Japanese-American Security Consultative Committee: Member and Principal Adviser on military defense matters to the U.S. Ambassador who serves as the Chairman of the U.S. representation.

2. PACOM SERVICE COMPONENT COMMANDERS:

a. Commander in Chief U.S. Army Pacific (CINCUSARPAC)
b. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT)
c. Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF)

The PACOM Service Component Commanders are responsible for accomplishing such operational missions and tasks as may be assigned by CINCPAC. The PACOM Service Component Commands consist of the respective component commanders and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations under their command which have been assigned to the operational command of CINCPAC. Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations may operate directly under the appropriate PACOM Service Component Commander in his Service role, and contribute to the mission of CINCPAC as appropriate.

The PACOM Service Component Commanders' responsibilities for the Military Assistance Program are prescribed in the CINCPAC Supplement to the DOD Military Assistance and Sales Manual.

3. COMMANDERS OF SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS: There are four subordinate unified commands and one multi-Service headquarters in the PACOM:

a. United States Forces, Korea (USFK), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Korea (COMUS Korea), Seoul, Korea
b. United States Forces, Japan (USFJ), commanded by Commander United States Forces, Japan (COMUS Japan), Yokota Air Base, Japan
c. United States Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC), commanded by Commander United States Taiwan Defense Command (COMUSTDC), Taipei, Taiwan
d. United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMACTHAI), commanded by Commander United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI). COMUSMACTHAI serves concurrently as Chief Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand (CHJUSMAGTHAI).
e. United States Support Activities Group (USSAG), commanded by Commander U.S. Support Activities Group (COMUSSAG), Nakhon Phanom, Thailand. (A multi-service headquarters with an integrated staff.)

4. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC (CINCPACREPs): CINCPACREPs are established in certain areas where no subordinate unified command has been established and where significant forces of two or more Services are stationed:

a. Commander U.S. Naval Forces Marianas is the CINCPAC Representative Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI), Agana, Guam.
b. Commander U.S. Naval Forces Philippines is the CINCPAC Representative Philippines (CINCPACREP Philippines), Subic Bay, Philippines.
c. USAF Liaison Officer to RAAF is the CINCPAC Representative Australia (CINCPACREP Australia), American Embassy, Canberra, Australia.

5. CHIEFS OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS (MAAGs): Military Assistance Programs (including Foreign Military Sales) are administered in the PACOM under the following authorities:

a. Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group, Republic of China - Taipei, Taiwan
b. Chief Mutual Defense Assistance Office, Japan - Tokyo, Japan
c. Chief Defense Attache Office, Saigon - Saigon, Vietnam
d. Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand - Bangkok, Thailand
e. Chief Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines - Manila, Philippines
f. Chief Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia - Phnom Penh, Cambodia
g. Chief Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea - Seoul, Korea
h. Office Defense Representative India - New Delhi, India
i. Office Defense Representative Pakistan - Islamabad, Pakistan
j. Defense Attache (DATT), Vientiane, Laos is responsible for MASF functions for Laos - Vientiane, Laos
k. Chief U.S. Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia performs the MAP functions of planning and programming for Indonesia - Jakarta, Indonesia
l. DATT Malaysia is responsible for Malaysia MAP functions - Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
m. DATTs Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore are responsible for the Foreign Military Sales function for their respective countries

6. SINGLE SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES (Coordinating Authorities):

a. Korea--Commander U.S. Forces, Korea
b. Japan--Commander U.S. Forces, Japan
c. Taiwan and Penghus--Commander U.S. Taiwan Defense Command
d. Mariana Islands--Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Guam/TTPI
e. Philippines--Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Philippines
f. Republic of Vietnam--Chief Defense Attache Office, Saigon
g. Thailand--Commander U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand
h. Indonesia--Chief U.S. Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia
i. Australia--Commander in Chief Pacific Representative, Australia
j. Aleutians--Commander Naval Station Adak
k. India--Defense Representative, India
l. Pakistan--Defense Representative, Pakistan

7. CINCPAC Liaison Officer to CINCAL

SOURCE J56

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SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES

FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL

AS OF 31 DEC 74

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND/UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA

CINCUNC/USFK	GEN	Richard G. STILWELL, USA
Deputy Commander	LT GEN	John R. MURPHY, USAF
Chief of Staff	MAJ GEN	William E. McLEOD, USA
Spec Asst/ROK Mil Aff & CHJUSMAG-Korea	MAJ GEN	Oliver D. STREET III, USA
Secretary Joint Staff	COL	Franklyn S. NELSON, USA
CDR HQ UNC (Rear) /Secy UN Jt Bd & Dep UN Rep	COL	James S. MILES, USA
Chief Protocol Section	LCOL	Peter J. WARREN, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J1	COL	Louis E. HERRICK, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/J2	CAPT	Joseph W. WILSON, USN
Asst Chief of Staff/J3 Dir US/ROK Operational Planning Staff	MAJ GEN	William L. WEBB, JR., USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J4	BGEN	Emil L. KONOPNICKI, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J5	CAPT	David W. RAMSEY, USN
Asst Chief of Staff/J6	COL	Vaughn O. LANG, USA
Chief, Armistice Affairs Division and Secretary UNCMAC	COL	George M. CROSS, USA

HEADQUARTERS U.S. FORCES, JAPAN

Commander/Commander 5 AF	LT GEN	Walter T. GALLIGAN, USAF
Chief of Staff	MAJ GEN	Lawrence F. SNOWDEN, USMC
Secretary Joint Staff	COL	Daryle K. BAXTER, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J1	CAPT	Harry L. BENSON, USN
Asst Chief of Staff/J2	COL	Howard R. ROSS, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J3	COL	James P. DAVIS, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/J4	COL	James W. ABRAHAM, USMC
Asst Chief of Staff/J5	COL	Glenn M. REISLING, JR., USA
Chief Okinawa Area Field Office	LCOL	Robert N. SIMPSON, USMC
**********		
CG USARJ	LT GEN	Welborn G. DOLVIN, USA
COMNAVFORJAPAN	RADM	Paul H. SPEER, USN

U.S. TAIWAN DEFENSE COMMAND

Commander	VADM	Edwin K. SNYDER, USN
Chief of Staff	BGEN	David O. WILLIAMS, JR., USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/J1/J4	COL	Charles R. PETERS, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/J2	COL	James J. FREDRICKS, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/J3	CAPT	Charles C. CARTER, USN
Asst Chief of Staff/J6	COL	John C. NORCROSS, USA
Public Affairs Officer/002	LCDR	Jay COUPE, USN
Legal Officer/J7	CAPT	Thomas F. HAIRSTON, USN
**********		
Commander, 7th Fleet Patrol Force	RADM	Wycliffe D. TOOLE, JR., USN
Commander, 327th Air Division	BGEN	Lynwood E. CLARK, USAF

U.S. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES GROUP

Commander	LT GEN	John J. BURNS, USAF
Deputy Commander	MAJ GEN	Ira A. HUNT, JR., USA
Chief of Staff	MAJ GEN	Earl J. ARCHER, JR., USAF
Asst Chief of Staff Intelligence	COL	Robert A. STEFANIK, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff Operations	MAJ GEN	Earl J. ARCHER, JR., USAF
Asst Chief of Staff Logistics	COL	Delbert E. SMITH, USAF
Asst Chief of Staff Personnel	COL	Robert NELSON, USA
Asst Chief of Staff Communications-Electronics	LCOL	Donald L. WHALEN, USAF
Chief Fleet Coordination Group	CAPT	Delbert W. NORBERG, USN
Chief SACADVON	LCOL	Dennis E. HOYE, USAF

SOURCE: J133A

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SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMANDS AND CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVES

FAR EAST REGION - KEY PERSONNEL

(continued)

AS OF 31 DEC 74

JOINT CASUALTY RESOLUTION CENTER

Commander	COL	John P. VOLLMER, USA
Deputy Commander	COL	Eugene L. HOLLIS, JR., USAF

DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE, SAIGON

Defense Attache	MAJ GEN	Homer D. SMITH, JR., USA
Deputy Defense Attache	BGEN	Richard M. BAUGHN, USAF

U.S. DELEGATION, FOUR-PARTY JOINT MILITARY TEAM

Chief	COL	John H. MADISON, JR., USA

OFFICE OF THE DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE, PAKISTAN (ODRP)

USDRP	COL	Adrian S. CLONINGER, USA

OFFICE OF THE DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE, INDIA (ODRI)

USDRI	COL	Harry J. BROCKMAN, USA

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, GUAM/TTPI

COMNAV Marianas and CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI	RADM	George S. MORRISON, USN
Chief of Staff and Aide	CAPT	William C. DOTSON, USN
Commander, 3rd Air Div	MAJ GEN	Charles F. MINTER, SR., USAF
Vice Commander, 3rd Air Div	BGEN	Robert H. GAUGHAN, USAF

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, AUSTRALIA

CINCPACREP and USAF Liaison Officer	COL	Jack T. DETOUR, USAF

CINCPAC REPRESENTATIVE, PHILIPPINES

Commander U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay/COMUSNAV Phil/ CINCPACREP Phil	RADM	Doniphan B. SHELTON, USN
Chief of Staff and Aide	CAPT	Robert J. CARDILLO, USN
Commander 13th AF	MAJ GEN	Leroy J. MANOR, USAF
Chief of Staff	COL	William H. LANDIS, USAF

DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE, VIENTIANE

DATT	BGEN	Roswell E. ROUND, JR., USA

SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY ORGANIZATION

U.S. MILADREP, SEATO	COL	Kenneth R. EBNER, USA

CINCPAC SINGLE SENIOR MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE (SSMR), ALEUTIANS

CO, NAVSTAADAK/SSMR	CAPT	John R. SWADENER, USN

SOURCE: J133A

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U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUPS
FAR EAST REGION
AS OF 31 DEC 74

JOINT U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, PHILIPPINES

Chief	BGEN	Jack R. SADLER, USA
Chief of Staff		Vacant
Chief, Ground Forces Division	COL	Kenneth T. TRINKLER, USA
Chief, Navy Division	CAPT	Bruno MUSSETTO, USN
Chief, Air Force Division	COL	David S. MELLISH, USAF
Chief, Joint Plans and Programs Division	COL	James D. BATES, USA
Advisor, Philippine Marine Corps	LCOL	Michael David CERRETA, JR., USMC
Chief, Personnel and Admin Division/AG	LCOL	Harry L. WISE, USA

JOINT U.S. MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP, KOREA

Chief	MAJ GEN	Oliver D. STREET III, USA
Chief of Staff	BGEN	Leland C. SHEPARD, JR., USAF
Asst Chief of Staff/Services	COL	Wiley McGARITY, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/Plans	COL	Richard C. ROGERS, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/Industrial & Technological Development	COL	George M. MONTGOMERY, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/Logistics	COL	Taylor R. FULTON, USA
Secretary Joint Staff	LCOL	William C. COSGROVE, USA
Chief, Army Section	COL	Daniel K. BYRNE, USA
COMNAVFORKOREA & Chief, Naval Section	RADM	Henry S. MORGAN, JR., USN
Chief, Air Force Section	COL	Daniel G. McINTOSH, USAF
CO, Marine Corps Component	COL	C. Robert BURROUGHS, USMC

MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP CHINA

Chief	MAJ GEN	Slade NASH, USAF
Chief of Staff	CAPT	Wick R. HARLAN, JR., USN
Senior MND Advisor	COL	Hugh R. BUMPAS, USMC
Secretary Joint Staff	LCOL	Charles D. HODGE, USA
ACofS Plans & Programs	COL	Freddie W. GRAMLING, USA
ACofS Operations & Training	COL	Robert I. PLATENBERG, USAF
ACofS Resources Management	COL	Jared B. SCHOPPER, USA
ACofS Comm/Elec	CAPT	Carl F. SOLTERER, USN
Staff Judge Advocate	LCOL	Bruce E. STEVENSON, USA
Chief, R&D Section	COL	William H. GOODWIN, USA
Sr Advisor (Chinese Army)	COL	Paul B. SNYDER, USA
Sr Advisor (Chinese Navy)	CAPT	Robert E. BODAMER, USN
Sr Advisor (Chinese Marine Corps)	LCOL	Stanley J. MICHAEL, USMC
Sr Advisor (Chinese Air Force)	COL	John P. STREIT, SR., USAF

MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE OFFICE, JAPAN

Chief	CAPT	Charles W. COLE, USN
Deputy Chief	MR.	C. Lawrence O'NEILL

MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERY TEAM, CAMBODIA

Chief	BGEN	William W. PALMER, USA
Deputy Chief	COL	Richard J. SCHIMBERG, USAF
Chief, Spec Asst for Coord & Spec Act Br	COL	Reginald T. LOMBARD, USA
Chief, Army Division	COL	William A. MALOUCHE, USA
Chief, Air Force Division	COL	Ellwood E. JOHNSON, USAF
Chief, Navy Division	CAPT	Charles H. DAVIDSON, USN
Chief, Ammo & Svc Division	COL	Louis A. DAIGNEAU, USA
Chief, Joint Liaison Office	LCOL	William L. MAZYCK, USA

USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI

Commander/Chief	MAJ GEN	Robert C. HIXON, USA
Deputy Commander	BGEN	Harry C. ADERHOLT, USAF
Chief of Staff	COL	Robert A. CARTER, USAF
Secretary Joint Staff	LCOL	Albert C. WALDACK, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J1	COL	Frederick B. BOWLING, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J3	COL	Raymond H. BEATY, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J4	COL	Everett W. RACKLEY, USA
Asst Chief of Staff/J6	COL	Carl C. CAMERON, USAF
Program Management Division	LCOL	Dean A. RODEMAN, USA
Comptroller	COL	John K. ELAM, JR., USA
Staff Judge Advocate	LCOL	Bryan S. SPENCER, USA
Chief, Army Division	COL	John G. HAYES, USA
Chief, Navy Division/ CINCPACFLTREPTHAI	CAPT	Charles R. ANDERSON, USN
Chief, Air Force Division	COL	Charles K. ROSE III, USAF
Senior Marine Advisor	COL	Byron T. CHEN, USMC
CO, USMACTHAI Support Group	COL	Paul F. BRAIM, USA

U.S. DEFENSE LIAISON GROUP INDONESIA

Chief	COL	Angelo GRILLS, USA
Deputy Chief	COL	Robert E. GARDNER, USAF
Executive Officer	LCOL	Robert F. STERNAT, USA
Chief, Army Branch	LCOL	Douglas O. FINGLES, USA
Chief, Navy/Marine Branch	CDR	Tom A. LEWIS, USN
Chief, Air Force Branch	COL	Eugene T. ADAIR, USAF
Chief, Plans & Programs Branch	LCOL	George F. WARREN, USMC
Chief, Comm & Elec Br	LCOL	John D. WAKELIN, USA
Chief, Personnel & Admin Br	MAJ	Donald E. CUKJATI, USA

SOURCE: J133A

UNCLASSIFIED

PACIFIC COMMAND PERSONNEL - SERVICE - CATEGORY - COUNTRY

ASSIGNED AS OF 31 DEC 74

COUNTRY	GRAND TOTAL	MILITARY					U.S. CIVILIANS					LOCAL HIRE CIVILIANS					DEPENDENTS				
		TOT	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	TOT	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	TOT	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	TOT	USA	USN	USMC	USAF
ALASKA	2555	1492		1403	89		151		151								912		898	14	
AUSTRALIA	1448	637	2	386		249	14		13		1	239		239			550	5	545		
CAMBODIA	68	65	39	13								2		2			1	1			
FIJI IS																					
GUAM	19944	10069	93	5501	336	4139	3448	1	3447			5		5			6422	158	6167	97	
HAWAII	150079	52398	18486	18418	7866	7628	19064	4842	10989	516	2717						78625	18069	39212	8652	12701
HONG KONG	66	25	7	12		6											41	20	21		
INDIA	23	4	2	1		1	1		1			5		5			13	7	3		3
INDONESIA	107	59	22	15	3	19	4		4			20		20			104	47	27	7	23
JAPAN	52283	17452	1683	3655	5829	6285	1920	591	316	13	1080	15892	3874	6781	1026	3411	17819	3750	6227	698	7152
JOHNSTON IS	208	206	74			132	2	2													
KOREA	73264	40781	33798	227	38	6718	1418	1068	86		264	15199	13524	193		1482	15866	13973	235	38	1620
LAOS	34	11	7			4						5		5			18	18			
MALAYSIA	16	2				2											14	14			
MARSHALL IS	381	32	32				69	69									280	280			
MIDWAY IS	1554	917	5	911		1	65		39		26						572		572		
NEW ZEALAND	230	104	2	50		52						16		16			110	6	112		
PAKISTAN	29	8	5			3						5		5			16	11			5
PHILIPPINES	48990	14803	34	4198	626	9953	1096	2	308	71	715	14248	4	11037		3207	18843	108	6188	372	12175
RYUKUS IS	67222	36457	4811	2526	20753	8367	2856	1122	38		984	11389	7938	484	1256	1791	17320	7491	585	953	8291
AMERICAN SAMOA	6																6		6		
SINGAPORE	69	25	1	16		8	3				3	16		16			25	6	19		
TAIWAN	10811	4246	594	497	28	3127	537	398	49		90	1605	212	600		873	3543	809	763	23	1868
THAILAND	32455	22835*	3292	321	45	19177	132		51		81	2737		228		2517	6751	2274	185	33	4339
VIETNAM	964	52**	27	7	3	15	774		774			134		134			4		4		
WAKE IS	5	5				5															
WESTPAC	922	922		922																	
MIDPAC	675	675		675																	
EASTPAC	3947	3947		3947																	
7th FLEET	30298	30298		30165	133																
DIEGO GARCIA	1097	1094		1094			3		3												
SUB TOTAL	499030	239813	83016	74952	35749	45096	30757	8095	16261	600	5081	69797	25552	19682	2282	13281	167863	47118	61689	10879	48177
CONUS	117309	117309		88695	28614																
GRAND TOTAL	616339	356922	63016	163647	64363	45096	30757	8095	16261	600	5081	69797	25552	19682	2282	13281	167863	47118	61689	10879	48177

SOURCE: J133

*As of 2 Jan 75 (military)

**Total in-country does not exceed 50

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CINCPAC COMPONENT AND SUBORDINATE UNIFIED COMMAND STAFF PERSONNEL

ASSIGNED AS OF 31 DEC 74

STAFF	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MIL		U.S. CIV	LOCAL HIRE CIV	TOTAL MIL AND CIV
	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL	OFF	ENL			
CINCPAC	114	82	108	128	22	17	113	85	357	312	132	0	801
CINCUSARPAC	51	21	0	0	0	0	0	0	51	21	71	0	143
CINCPACFLT	0	0	153	238	11	10	0	0	164	248	44	0	456
CINCPACAF	0	0	0	0	0	0	528	774	528	774	349	0	1651
COMUSJAPAN	12	6	6	4	7	2	9	7	34	19	23	8	76
COMUSKOREA	87	118	27	28	7	1	39	33	160	180	40	15	380
COMUSTDC	12	8	20	24	4	2	15	6	51	40	11	6	102
COMUSMACTHAI/ JUSMAGTHAI	107	74	17	15	10	6	73	73	207	168	21	75	396
COMUSSAG	22	25	6	7	2	0	65	161	95	193	2	2	290
JCRC	16	60	5	6	1	4	8	11	30	81	3	11	114
GRAND TOTAL	421	394	342	450	64	42	850	1150	1677	2036	696	117	4409

SOURCE: J133A

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP AND SEATO PERSONNEL

PACIFIC COMMAND AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTHS BY SERVICE AND CIVILIAN CATEGORY

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1974

CATEGORY	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MIL		US CIV		TOT US PERS		LOCAL HIRE	
	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD
MAAG CHINA	19	40	10	14	4	6	13	23	46	83	4	15	50	98	11	19
MDAO JAPAN	2	2	3	3	0	0	2	2	7	7	5	5	12	12	5	5
CHJUSMAG KOREA	82	100	22	29	10	14	45	47	159	190	41	45	200	235	53	83
CHJUSMAG PHIL	26	19	9	8	1	1	15	11	51	39	9	9	60	48	6	6
CHJUSMAG THAI	SEE COMUSMACTHAI															
SEATO	62	44	0	0	1	1	1	1	64	46	0	0	64	46	3	1
MEDT CAMBODIA	57	50	15	14	0	0	15	14	87	78	0	1	87	79	5	6
DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI	33	32	0	0	0	0	22	21	55	53	10	7	65	60	29	26
DLG INDONESIA	21	19	11	9	3	3	21	19	56	50	5	4	61	54	22	20
ODR INDIA	2	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	4	4	1	1	5	5	5	5
ODR PAKISTAN	4	5	1	0	0	0	3	3	8	8	0	0	8	8	6	5
DAO SAIGON	25	24	7	7	3	3	15	15	50	49	789	774	839	823	0	0
TOTAL	333	337	79	85	22	28	153	157	587	607	864	861	1451	1468	145	176

SOURCE: J133A

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MILITARY PERSONNEL ASSIGNED STRENGTH IN PACOM

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1974

	ARMY	NAVY	MC	TOTAL NAVY & MC	AIR FORCE	TOTAL
TOTAL FORCES ASSIGNED *	57,083	154,462	62,139	216,601	47,150	320,834
OTHER OPERATIONAL FORCES IN PACOM**	5,933	9,185	2,224	11,409	18,746	36,088
TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL IN PACOM	63,016	163,647	64,363	228,010	65,896	356,922

* FORCES ASSIGNED PACOM COMPONENT COMMANDERS

** FORCES PHYSICALLY LOCATED IN PACOM AREA BUT NOT ASSIGNED PACOM COMPONENT COMMANDERS

SOURCE: J133A

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
AVAILABLE FORCES

AS OF 31 DEC 74

CINCUSARPAC	CINCPACFLT	CINCPACAF
Assigned to CINCPAC		
1 Army Headquarters 2 Corps Headquarters 2 U.S. Army Support Headquarters 2 Infantry Divisions (-) 1 Missile Command (AT) 1 Artillery Brigade Headquarters (AD) 1 Corps Artillery 1 Engineer Group (Const)	2 Numbered Fleets 8 Attack Carriers 3 Cruisers 74 Destroyer Types 2 Patrol Ships 47 Submarines 33 Amphibious Warfare Ships 64 Auxiliary Ships 9 SOSUS Stations 8 Carrier Air Wings 3 Patrol Wings 3 Helo Utility Squadrons (HC) 5 MMCS 1 Antisubmarine Warfare Wing 1 Fighter Air Early Warning Wing 1 Light Attack Wing 1 Medium Attack/Tactical Electronic Warfare Wing 1 Fleet Marine Force (Consists of 2 MAFs)	3 Numbered Air Forces 4 Air Divisions 1 Composite Wing 1 Special Operations Wing 1 Tactical Airlift Wing 6 Tactical Fighter Wings 1 Operation Squadron, C-9 3 Tactical Air Support Squadrons, OV-10/O-2A 2 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons, RF-4C 3 Special Operations Squadrons, AC-130/CH-53/C-130 11 Tactical Fighter Squadrons, F-4/C/D/E 3 Tactical Airlift Squadrons, C-130 2 Airborne Command & Control Sq, C-130/EC-135 3 Tactical Fighter Squadrons, 2 F-111A, 1 A-7D
In PACOM but not assigned to CINCPAC		
USASA Units in Pacific Army National Guard Units 1 Infantry Brigade 1 Field Depot 1 Army Band 1 PI Detachment 1 HHD National Guard 1 Service Co (Aircraft Maintenance) Army Reserve Units 1 Infantry Battalion 1 CA Group 1 Engineer Construction Battalion 1 Corps Headquarters (AUG) 1 MI Detachment 1 Admin Service Detachment 1 Finance School 1 USAR School	14 Naval Reserve Training Ships, Group 1 16 Mine Warfare Ships - Reserve Naval Security Groups, Pacific	1 Air Division (SAC) 3 Strategic Wings (SAC) 1 Air Refueling Squadron (KC-135) (SAC) 1 Air Refueling Squadron (KC-135) (Provisional) (SAC) 1 Bomber Squadron (Heavy) (B-52) (SAC) 2 Strategic Reconnaissance Squadrons (SAC) 1 Fighter Interceptor Squadron (HANG F-102 Hickam) 1 Weather Reconnaissance Sq (WC-130/WB-57) (MAC) 1 Test Squadron (C-130, HC-130, CH-3) (AFSC) Air Force Security Service Units (AFCS) Air Force Communications Service Units (AFCS) Air Weather Service Units (MAC) Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Units (MAC)
Major augmentation forces which may be available in emergency		
SEE JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITY PLAN (JSCP), PART I, ANNEX A		SEE JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITY PLAN (JSCP), PART I, ANNEX A

SOURCE: J31

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS




SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 20.

AS OF 1 JUL 74


DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR GROUND UNITS

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1974



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
DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR AND SHIP UNITS



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 22.

AS OF 9 JUL 74

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR NAVAL AIR UNITS




SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 21.

AS OF 9 JUL 74

SECRET

DEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL AIR AND SHIP UNITS

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1974




SECRET

SECRET

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE


FLYING AND MISSILE UNITS



SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 24.

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE UNITS

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1974




NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT INDICATE U.E. AUTHORIZATION.

*INDICATES CONSTANT GUARD AUGMENTATION UNITS/AIRCRAFT.

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE

FLYING AND MISSILE UNITS




Numbers of aircraft indicate U.E. authorization.

*Indicates Constant Guard augmentation units/ aircraft.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p.23. AS OF JUN 74

DEPLOYMENT OF MAJOR AIR FORCE UNITS

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1974



UDORN	
13 AF ADVON	
432 TFW	
14 TRS	18 RF-4C
13 TFS	27 F-4D
421 TFS	24 F-4E
25 TFS	24 F-4E
4 TFS	24 F-4D
40 ARRS, DET 5	2 HH-43B

NAKHON PHANOM	
7 AF HQ	
56 SOW	1 EC47
21 SOS	10 CH53
23 TASS	40 OV-10
40 ARRS (MAC)	10 HH-53
	3 HH-43F

DON MUANG	
635 CSG DET 1	

U-TAPAO	
40 ARRS, DET 12(MAC)	2 HH-43F
307 SW (SAC) (PROV)	15 B52D
	22 KC-135

KORAT			
388 TFW		347 TFW	
34 TFS	24 F-4D	428 TFS	18 F-111A
16 SOS	17 AC-130	429 TFS	18 F-111A
3 TFS	24 A-7D		
		56 ARRS (MAC)	5 HC-130

NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT INDICATE U.E. AUTHORIZATION

SECRET

SECRET

AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS OF CINCPAC STAFF DIRECTORATES

	1 January 1974				31 December 1974				Percent
	OFF	ENL	CIV	Total	OFF	ENL	CIV	Total	Change
CINCPAC	8	25	1	34	8	25	1	34	-
Inspector General	5	3	1	9	5	3	1	9	-
Chief of Staff	3	2	6	11	3	2	6	11	-
Deputy Chief of Staff	3	-	1	4	3	-	1	4	-
Joint Secretariat	6	33	9	48	6	33	9	48	-
Personnel Directorate	18	18	11	47	18	18	11	47	-
Intelligence Directorate	42	76	8	126	42	76	8	126	
Operations Directorate	76	53	15	144	76	53	15	144	-
Logistics Directorate[1]	50	24	22	96	48	24	20	92	- 4
Plans Directorate	54	26	11	91	54	26	11	91	-
Communications-Electronics Directorate	32	16	10	58	32	16	10	58	-
Comptroller	5	3	7	15	5	3	7	15	-
Staff Judge Advocate	4	3	1	8	4	3	1	8	-
Public Affairs	11	7	5	23	11	7	5	23	-
Protocol Office	3	3	1	7	3	3	1	7	-
Medical Office	3	2	1	6	3	2	1	6	-
Security Assistance Directorate	41	27	25	93	41	27	25	93	-
Liaison Officer to CINC Alaska	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	-
Administrative Specialist to DAO Singapore	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	-
Total	365	322	135	822	363	322	133	818	- 4
Airborne Command Post	33	13	1	47	33	13	1	47	-
PACOM ADP Systems Support Group	28	54	28	110	23	51	28	102	- 7
PACOM ELINT Center[2]	20	91	6	117	-	-	-	-	
Intelligence Center Pacific[2]					104	130	58	292	
Management Control Detachment Pacific	19	12	0	31	19	12	0	31	-
Grand Total	465	492	170	1,127	542	528	220	1,290	+14

1. Reductions from deletion of PATMA spaces and transfer of PURA function to DSA.
2. PEC deleted on approval IPAC, August 1974.

SECTION II--THE CINCPAC STAFF

Key Personnel Changes in 1974

(U) Admiral Noel Gayler continued to serve as Commander in Chief Pacific throughout 1974, as did his Chief of Staff, LT GEN William G. Moore, USAF, and his Deputy Chief of Staff, MAJ GEN John R. Guthrie, USA. As Executive Assistant and Senior Aide to CINCPAC, COL Maurice O. Edmonds, USA, replaced CAPT Thomas L. Dwyer, USN, on 12 August.

Director for Intelligence

(U) BGEN Doyle E. Larson, USAF, replaced MAJ GEN Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF, on 23 August. General Tighe was assigned as Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Director for Operations

(U) MAJ GEN Frank C. Lang, USMC, replaced MAJ GEN Ralph H. Spanjer, USMC, on 15 May as Director for Operations. As his deputy, BGEN Fred A. Treyz, USAF, on 16 March replaced BGEN James A. Young, USAF, who had departed on 4 March.

Director for Logistics

(U) RADM Hugh A. Benton, USN, replaced RADM Richard E. Fowler, Jr, USN, on 27 June. Admiral Fowler had departed on 21 June.

Director for Plans

(U) RADM William R. McClendon, USN, replaced RADM Earl Yates on 13 June. BGEN John F. Stannard became Deputy Director for Plans on 7 January, replacing BGEN Willard W. Scott, Jr., USA.

Director for Communications-Data Processing

(U) MAJ GEN Howard E. McCormick, USAF, departed on 19 August. He had been promoted effective 1 March. He was replaced by BGEN Charles E. Williams, Jr., USAF, on 20 September.

Director for Security Assistance

(U) BGEN Charles A. Jackson, USA, departed on 24 September; he was replaced by MAJ GEN Clarke T. Baldwin, Jr., USA, on 9 October.

Public Affairs

(U) COL Sheldon I. Godkin, USAF, became Public Affairs Officer on 19 April, replacing COL A. J. Lynn, USAF, who retired.

Protocol

(U) On 10 June LCOL John L. Thatcher, USMC, replaced COL W. R. Kephart, USMC.

Political Adviser to CINCPAC

(U) Mr. Roger W. Sullivan became CINCPAC's Political Adviser on 19 September, replacing Mr. Morton I. Abramowitz, who had departed on 25 July.

KEY CINCPAC STAFF PERSONNEL



WILLIAM G. MOORE, JR
LT GEN USAF
Chief of Staff



JOHN R GUTHRIE
MAJ GEN USA
Deputy Chief of Staff



ROY F LINSENMEYER
GS-16 CIV
Director Review and
Analysis Office



ALAN H BIRDSALL
COL USAF
Joint Secretary



ROGER W SULLIVAN
FSO-2 CIV
Political Adviser



RICHARD H DuBOIS
PL 313, GS-17E CIV
Director AROP



ROBERT W GARRITY
FSIO-3 CIV
USIA Adviser



LESLIE R FORNEY, JR
BGEN USA
Director for Personnel
and Inspector General



DOYLE E LARSON
BGEN USAF
Director for Intelligence



FRANK C LANG
MAJ GEN USMC
Director for Operations



FRED A TREYZ
BGEN USAF
Deputy Director for Operations



HUGH A BENTON
RADM USN
Director for Logistics



WILLIAM R McCLENDON
RADM USN
Director for Plans



JOHN E STANNARD
BGEN USA
Deputy Director for Plans



CHARLES E WILLIAMS, JR
BGEN USAF
Director for Communications-
Data Processing



CLARKE T BALDWIN, JR
MAJ GEN USA
Director for Security Assistance



WILLIAM M WEISSKOPF
CAPT SC USN
Comptroller



HARLAND B COPE
CAPT JAGC USN
Staff Judge Advocate



SHELDON I GODKIN
COL USAF
Public/Legislative Affairs



JOHN L THATCHER
LCOL USMC
Protocol



ROBERT C LANING
RADM MC USN
Surgeon

Inspector General

(U) The position of Inspector General had been established at the CINCPAC headquarters in April 1973, and the first incumbent of that position, MAJ GEN Lawrence F. Tanberg, USAF, had arrived in June of that year. In response to a subsequent JCS inquiry as to why the Inspector General was not dual-hatted, as was the case with other commands, CINCPAC had replied that the PACOM was somewhat unique for reasons including the great distances in the command, the requirements to be away from the headquarters for extended periods, and the potential for conflict with other functions.[1]

(U) In August 1974 General Tanberg departed for retirement earlier than had been anticipated, but the Air Force Chief of Staff did not provide a replacement. The Deputy Chief of Staff, MAJ GEN John R. Guthrie, USA, assumed interim Inspector General tasks as an additional duty pending resolution of the matter of a replacement. On 18 September 1974 the JCS approved a change to the Joint Table of Distribution for the Inspector General billet to become dual-hatted with the Director for Personnel billet. As a result, the Director for Personnel, BGEN L. R. Forney, USA, became the Inspector on the same date.[2]

Special Assistant to CINCPAC and Legislative Affairs Positions Established

(U) Prior to March 1971 there had been no particular staff agency assigned overall responsibility for legislative affairs or congressional correspondence and visits. Certain recurring responsibilities had been assigned to designated staff agencies (the Military Assistance Program to the Security Assistance Directorate; budgetary matters to the Comptroller; and protocol, escort, and coordination matters to the Protocol Officer), but until a study of the matter by the Public Affairs Office, there had been no other centralization of responsibility. The Public Affairs Office was subsequently renamed the Public/Legislative Affairs Office (J74).[3]

(U) In April 1974, however, a new position was created in the executive offices: a Special Assistant to CINCPAC, staff code J003. He was designated coordinator for congressional matters. Additionally, he controlled all congressional correspondence for the headquarters, designating the staff agency for action. He also reviewed such correspondence from the headquarters before

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 65-66.
2. CINCPAC 211616Z Aug 74; CINCPAC 192034Z Sep 74.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, pp. 34-35.

it was sent for the signature of CINCPAC, his Chief of Staff, or Deputy Chief of Staff. (There were rigid controls on the suspense for correspondence of this type; if complete replies could not be prepared within the time required, interim replies were mandatory.)[1]

(U) In June the J74 staff office was renamed the Public Affairs Office, with all legislative affairs handled by the office of the Special Assistant.[2]

Review and Analysis Office Established

(U) A new Review and Analysis Office was created under the Deputy Chief of Staff on 11 November. The office and its director were to provide advice and counsel on scientific and technical matters relating to CINCPAC's missions and functional responsibilities, and to conduct a review and analysis program for CINCPAC and his staff, and, when required, for subordinate unified commanders and Military Assistance Program activities. The functions previously performed by the Research and Engineering Consultant (RAEC) to CINCPAC and certain of the functions previously performed by the Scientific Analysis Group were assumed by the new office.[3]

(U) The first civilian billet that had been established on the CINCPAC staff had been that of a dual-hatted Chief Analyst and Science Advisor, established at the GS-15 level in 1960, and upgraded to executive level (GS-16) in 1964. Mr. Roy F. Linsenmeyer had held that position since its establishment. With the buildup of U. S. Forces in Southeast Asia, both the analytical effort and the research, development, test and evaluation related functions for the CINCPAC staff had expanded to approximately 25 Civil Service and contractor support personnel.

(U) In 1967 the first Research and Engineering Consultant to CINCPAC was accredited by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering; that executive level billet was subsequently transferred to CINCPAC. With cutbacks that followed the drawdown of forces, the Department of the Navy withdrew the allocation of one of those executive level billets.[4]

(U) In a CINCPAC review of executive level positions, it was determined that the RAEC billet had first priority for retention, and the analysis billet

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1. J01/Memo/20-74, 25 Apr 74, Subj: Congressional Correspondence.
2. CINCPAC Bulletin, 17 June 74.
3. CINCPACNOTE 5401, 14 Nov 74, Subj: Review and Analysis Office; establishment of.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. I, pp. 23-24; Point Paper, 20 Sep 74, enclosed with J3 HistSum Dec 74; CINCPAC 110301Z Oct 74.

second priority. As the RAEC billet was vacant, it was considered appropriate to again consolidate the analytical and scientific/technological advisory functions under Mr. Linsenmeyer, as they had been in the pre-Vietnam era. He was to work closely with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Representative to provide research, development, test and evaluation support to the PACOM, and also work in close liaison with Defense Department, JCS, and Service research and development elements.[1]

(U) The new organization was formed effective 11 November 1974. The new Director of Review and Analysis was responsible to the Deputy Chief of Staff (J02). His staff consisted of five analysts (two military and three civilian), drawn from the former Scientific Analysis Group. Three civilian analysts remained in the Directorate for Operations. This Operations Analysis Group, J35, headed by Mr. Roy E. Metcalf, Jr., reported to the Deputy Director for Operations.[2]

(U) The matter of consolidating all billets on the staff that could be considered analytical was studied, but these were determined to be of special interest to the various directorates they served, and they remained where they were in the organization.[3]

Executive Control Division Established

(U) A new Executive Control Division became operational on 19 December. Organized in the Joint Secretariat as J043, the division consolidated administrative activities supporting CINCPAC, his Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff, and their immediate offices. Located in proximity to the executive offices, the new division performed a quality review of all documents routed to the executive offices to assure completeness and appropriateness of presentation, to make recommendations concerning the level of approving authority, and to assure that coordination was completed. Another task was operation of a consolidated suspense system, which entailed the screening of all incoming communications to assess action requirements, assignment of the action with recommendations regarding suspense and method of reply, and management of the Daily Digest that controlled on-going actions. This division provided all administrative support for the executive offices, managing correspondence flow, and assisting the executive staff as required. The Executive Administrative Office that had been part of the J00 staff was incorporated in this new division.[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. J3 HistSum Oct 74.
3. J3 HistSum Dec 74.
4. CINCPACNOTE 5400, 18 Dec 74, Subj: Executive Control Division.

Exercise and Force Status Division Established

(U) In October a new Exercise and Force Status Division was established in the Operations Directorate to allow for more efficient management of an expanding program. The division was a consolidation of personnel in those functions in other divisions of J3; the new organization was assigned the staff code J36.[1]

CINCPAC Management Control Detachment-Pacific Relocated

(SFRD) The CINCPAC Management Control Detachment-Pacific had become operational in November 1972 at Yokota Air Base, Japan to manage and control the expanded Permissive Action Link program throughout the PACOM. It was a joint agency responsible to the Nuclear Operations and Safety Branch in the Directorate for Operations.[2]

(S) On 7 September 1974 CINCPAC directed movement of the unit to Hawaii because of the sensitivity of its mission. The move was completed on 15 November. The 27-person unit occupied space in CINCPAC's Alternate Command Facility at Kunia (in central Oahu, about 18 miles from CINCPAC's Camp Smith headquarters). The MCD-P continued to be responsible to the Nuclear Operations and safety Branch.[3]

Data Administration/Information Management Office

(U) The organizations of the Directorate for Communications-Electronics and the PACOM ADP Systems Support Division had been combined on 1 July 1973 into the Communications-Data Processing Directorate, but budgeting and other considerations continued to require that the former Systems Support Division be covered by a separate Joint Table of Distribution from that of the CINCPAC staff. Within the PACOM ADP Systems Support Division (J63) of that directorate, three changes in organization were made in 1974 to provide more effective ADP support. A new branch was created, the ADP Plans Branch (J635). The Analysis and Programming Section within the Analysis and Programming Branch was disestablished, but in the Requirements and Technical Support Branch a new Data Administration/Information Management Office was established. (See the Command and Control section of this chapter for further information on the ADP Plans Branch and its activities.)[4]

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1. J36 HistSum Oct 74.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol, I, p. 256.
3. J320 HistSum, Nov 74; Fleet Operations Control Center, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Command History, CY 1974, Ser C11, 10 Apr 75.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 35-36; J631 HistSum Nov 74.

Security Assistance Directorate Reorganized

(U) Effective 5 August the Security Assistance Directorate (J8) was reorganized to establish a division primarily responsible for the management of the Defense Assistance for Vietnam (DAV) in-country program, to include identification of requirements and establishment of PACOM priorities. This new division was separated as J87, the Vietnam Plans/Programs Division. Members of the new division had been part of the South and East Asia Country Plans/Programs Division (J83), which continued to retain purview of programs for Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand. On 15 August a further redefinition of responsibilities moved Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka under direction of J82.[1]

CINCPAC Representative to Naval Weapons Laboratory

(U) In 1969 a billet had been established by the CINC Atlantic Command to handle the extensive liaison required with the Naval Weapons Laboratory at Dahlgren, Virginia to coordinate the transition from the POLARIS Fleet Ballistic Weapon System to the POSEIDON system. This transition was essentially complete by mid-1974, and CINCLANTFLT had identified this billet for deletion in a staff reorganization. During a June meeting of the Fleet Ballistic Missile Long Range Planning Group the loss of this billet was discussed. At that time several new requirements were identified that strongly supported continuation of unified command representation at Dahlgren, particularly the scheduled deployment of the new TRIDENT weapon system. It was the consensus that such representation would continue to be required. Accordingly, CINCLANT recommended that CINCPAC establish a billet for a CINCPAC Representative to the Naval Weapons Laboratory at Dahlgren, with billet qualifications and responsibilities similar to those of the former CINCLANTREP. He further recommended that the proposed CINCPACREP report to CINCLANT and the CINC of the European Command for additional duty. He recommended that the billet be established effective 1 July 1975, to coincide with anticipated detachment of his representative.[2]

(U) On 3 December, however, CINCPAC advised that the billet would not be created. He noted that PACOM TRIDENT transition support at Dahlgren would not be required earlier than 1 July 1976, and it appeared that billet responsibilities were largely operational. Recent emphasis on reducing substantially the number of headquarters personnel had also resulted in a stringent policy concerning staff additions. Therefore, he could no longer support the original

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1. CINCPAC 130306Z Aug 74; J81/Memo/151-74, 15 Aug 74.
2. CINCLANT N01300/261856Z Jul 74.

approach. He recommended, as an alternative, that on the detachment of the CINCLANT incumbent the Naval Weapons Laboratory appoint a point of contact for POSEIDON coordination. He also asked CINCPACFLT to request that the Chief of Naval Operations establish a "CINCREP" billet at Dahlgren as an operational requirement to support TRIDENT effective 1 July 1976. He advised that these alternative recommendations had been discussed and informally agreed upon at the Fleet Ballistic Missile Long Range Planning Group meeting held in November.[1]

General/Flag Billets Studied

(U) One matter that remained under continuing study was the number of general/flag officer billets and the grade levels of certain positions. In June CINCPAC requested that the position of his Deputy Director for Intelligence be upgraded from Navy Captain to Navy Rear Admiral (07). The JCS did not approve this recommendation, noting that continued congressional interest in the number of high ranking officers and recent action by the Secretary of Defense to reduce flag/general officer strengths by 63 positions during FY 75 made it necessary to not favorably consider such requests without compensation.[2]

(C) In November the JCS advised that the Secretary of Defense had called for Service revalidation of all general/flag officer positions. An Air Force review had led to recommendations to downgrade a number of positions worldwide, with two in the PACOM: the Director for Intelligence on CINCPAC's staff (from O-8 to O-7), and the Chief of Staff of the Taiwan Defense Command (from O-7 to O-6). The JCS advised that they recognized that final action on revisions to the Unified Command Plan (then under study) would influence the status of several of the listed billets, but they solicited comments, regarding both the downgrading and whether positions should be immediately downgraded or upon completion of tours by incumbents.[3]

(U) The JCS considered recommendations from CINCPAC and the other commanders involved. It was decided that neither of the PACOM positions would be downgraded at that time.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 032302Z Dec 74.
2. JCS 8945/052122Z Jul 74.
3. JCS 2701/192019Z Nov 74.
4. JCS 1170/241932Z Jan 75.

Intelligence Center Pacific Established

(S) In December 1973 the JCS had directed CINCPAC to establish an Intelligence Center Pacific. It was to be a joint organization established by CINCPAC in conformance with instructions from the Secretary of Defense and the JCS. Various intelligence arrangements had been under study, and on 1 December 1973 the JCS directed several actions:

> ...In PACOM: A manpower reduction in existing organizations within the PACOM intelligence community; transfer of selected functions and resources to CONUS; establishment of four common function centers for photo processing/exploitation operated by CINCPACAF, ocean surveillance operated by CINCPACFLT, MC&G operated by CINCARPAC, and foreign intelligence personnel training operated by CINCARPAC; and the establishment of the joint PACOM Intelligence Center.[1]

The JCS continued that this course of action would maintain essential intelligence effectiveness if implementation was phased as recommended. Just four days later the JCS directed that implementation of these decisions should proceed without delay.[2]

(U) The mission of the IPAC was:

> To prepare and maintain an all-source intelligence data base for use by the CINCPAC, theater Service Component and Sub-unified commands, and those military Attaches, MAAGS and JUSMAGS in PACOM, and national authorities, and to produce and disseminate that intelligence required by these commands, organizations and authorities which is within the scope of the functions charged to the Center.[3]

(U) The IPAC was established on 7 January 1974. The first task was implementation planning. CAPT Earl C. Bowersox, Jr., USN, the first IPAC commander, was assisted by a planning staff composed of personnel from the CINCPAC Directorate for intelligence, the component commanders, and the PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center. This group produced a draft Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) and a mission and functions outline, which included creation of an operational model displaying sources of requirements, sources of information,

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1. JCS 7743/010156Z Dec 73.
2. JCS 1745/051727Z Dec 73.
3. Joint Manpower Program, Intelligence Center Pacific, FY 74, (with Change 1 of 16 Aug 74).

operational functions, and products. The JTD draft updated an earlier draft submitted in July 1973.[1]

(U) One problem that surfaced early was adequate space for the new IPAC. On 12 February CINCPAC submitted his recommendations to the JCS. A large concrete building (40,000 square feet of floor space) at Camp Smith was considered the most feasible site because of its central location and moderate estimated rehabilitation costs. The Public Works Center at Pearl Harbor had estimated that the cost to rehabilitate and renovate this building (Building 20) to meet security, air conditioning, electricity, communications, electronic data processing requirements, and working space would amount to $2.25 million. CINCPAC advised that no other facility at Camp Smith would provide suitable accommodations without much higher cost. If the request was approved, he requested an immediate authorization of $150,000 for design costs. CINCPAC advised that earlier estimates had specified $14.5 million in personnel savings resulting from the establishment of IPAC with an additional electronic data processing savings from consolidation estimated at $1.2 million per year. CINCPAC recommended the use of Secretary of Defense Section 402 funds (MILCON contingency funds) for these costs.[2]

(U) On 24 March, however, the JCS requested justification and documentation to support the request for funds. It was learned that such funds would be available only after a review of alternative locations considering on-going reorganization actions, the forwarding of appropriate documentation to the JCS, and recommended use of USN funding as executive agent.[3]

(U) The on-going reorganization actions referred to concerned the announcement to disestablish CINCPAC's Army component command, CINCUSARPAC. IPAC had been slated to absorb 32 USARPAC civilian spaces, but civilians employed there had appealed to Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D.-HI) to seek accomodation of 65 additional employees scheduled for RIF or transfer as a result of the closure. The Senator expressed his concern to the Secretary of Defense. USARPAC civilians would comprise over 60 percent of the total 52 spaces; further civilianization of the center would limit the 25 percent deployability level to support contingencies. CINCPAC advised of the command position on this matter on 19 March.[4]

(U) An IPAC Implementation Plan was initiated in March, with emphasis placed on the development of pertinent command relationships, terms of

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1. IPAC HistSum Mar 74.
2. CINCPAC 120046Z Feb 74.
3. IPAC HistSum Mar 74, which cited JCS 241618Z Mar 74 and DIR DIA 231617Z Mar 74.
4. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 192353Z Mar 74.

reference, and operational milestones for the IPAC as well as the CINCPAC Intelligence Sub-Centers. It was forwarded to the JCS and the CINCPAC component commands for information in May.[1]

(U) On 1 May CINCPAC advised the JCS regarding ADP support, and requested an exception to normal policy regarding procurement of equipment. He noted that existing support was provided at five locations, with three of those IBM oriented; these accomplished the bulk of intelligence processing requirements. Two of the three (Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific and the PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center) were host systems in the Intelligence Data Handling System Communications/Community On-Line Intelligence Network System network, and the third, CINCPACAF, was scheduled for such host operations in the first quarter of FY 75. The CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC intelligence applications had been oriented to the Honeywell Information System 6060 hardware, or were in conversion status. CINCPAC recognized that system procurement had to follow established procedures and documentation prepared to support acquisition of the final IPAC system, but he noted that these systems were lengthy and time consuming and could require from 18 to 36 months from document preparation to hardware installation. He recommended the interim lease of an IBM/370/158 system to provide significant operating savings during the time necessary to fully document, staff, and procure the final system.[2]

(U) Also in May the IPAC Executive Board was established, to be chaired by the IPAC commander with representatives from the component commands. Subordinate unified commands might be represented at any time, but attendance at regular meetings was not mandatory. The board was charged with reviewing IPAC intelligence activities and programs, making recommendations to the commander concerning the establishment and validation of requirements, adoption or modification of products and procedures, and the elimination of unnecessary duplication of effort among IPAC, the component commands, and other agencies or activities.[3]

(U) In June there were also delays in approval of the Joint Manpower Program. On 19 June the JCS informed CINCPAC that although the Army and Navy had approved the JMP, the Air Force had placed a hold on approval pending approval of the Unified Command Plan, revision of which was then under study. This withheld approval continued until 10 July when it was withdrawn. As finally approved, the 268-person authorization was as follows:

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1. IPAC HistSum May 74; CINCPAC ltr Ser 0306-74, 28 May 74, Subj: Implementation Plan for Establishment of Intelligence Center Pacific, Functions, Support Centers.
2. CINCPAC 010132Z May 74.
3. CINCPACINST 3810.31 of 7 May 74, Subj: Executive Board, Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC).

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officers	29	29	35	4	97
Enlisted	30	36	53	0	119
Civilians	0	52	0	0	52
Total	59	117	88	4	268

All civilians were Navy employees (as was the case with civilians on the CINCPAC staff). The 10 July message also disestablished the PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center. Additionally, a Unit Identification Code, N68389, was assigned to IPAC on 19 June. Accounts had been prepared at the Naval Supply Center at Pearl Harbor to permit payment of IPAC obligations once FY 75 funds and the approved JMP were received.[1]

(U) On 11 July, the day after JMP approval had been received, CINCPAC advised all concerned commands that IPAC would achieve full operational capability by 12 August. The first elements to transfer to IPAC in July were the former PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center (which had also been known variously as the ELINT Center and the PEC) and CINCPAC J24 Targeting personnel. The date selected for the official morning report/journal date was 1 August, the date CAPT Bowersox assumed operational command.[2]

(U) By the end of August there were 265 personnel assigned. The date for transfer of functions was 12 August, as follows: from CINCPAC Directorate for Intelligence, targeting, current, and estimative intelligence; from CINCUSARPAC Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, ground order of battle data base processing, targeting, and estimative intelligence; from CINCPACAF Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, targeting, and estimative intelligence; and the PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center, complete functional transfer. Functions assigned to the CINCPACAF-operated PACOM Air Defense Analysis Center were transferred on 28 August.[3]

(U) IPAC's primary current intelligence product, the Daily Intelligence Summary, was first transmitted on 26 August. This summary was dispatched by general service message channels with a Special Intelligence supplement. It was to be supplemented by spot reporting, as required, for perishable information.[4]

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1. JCS 3196/102005Z Jul 74; NAVACCTGFINCEN WASH DE N05602/191554Z Jun 74; IPAC HistSum Jun 74.
2. CINCPAC 112056Z Jul 74; IPAC HistSum Jul 74.
3. IPAC HistSum Aug 74.
4. Ibid.

(U) At the end of August, an out-of-cycle change to the IPAC JMP resulted from a transfer of the area analysis function from USARPAC. As approved by the JCS, the authorization was for 234 military and 58 civilians, for a new total of 292.[1]

(C) On 25 October CINCPAC sent a message to all major commands and agencies, worldwide, and to all operational commands in the PACOM defining the relationship of IPAC to CINCPAC and the proper channels of communication for tasking and intelligence interface. After outlining the IPAC capabilities and functions, CINCPAC advised that the effectiveness of the IPAC depended on rapid communication with other information centers and supported organizations on substantive intelligence matters. The IPAC commander, CINCPAC continued, was authorized direct communication with all such activities at technical exchange and analyst-to-analyst level to effect intelligence interface. Normally, requests for information would be submitted to IPAC through CINCPAC's component commands, but when urgency was a primary concern, direct communication was authorized. CINCPAC and all others in the chain of command were to be advised of such direct communications, however. All tasks requiring action by operational collection assets were to be forwarded through the operational chain of command. Communications concerning the establishment of policy, exceptions to policy, production of unusual scope or duration, and personnel or budgetary matters were to be communicated through CINCPAC.

(C) CINCPAC concluded that the IPAC commander was to prepare and maintain a 25 percent mobility capability to meet contingencies that in the judgement of CINCPAC could not be satisfied on a contingency basis from internal resources. IPAC assistance was to be tailored to meet specific contingencies on a temporary basis pending availability of other resources. Requests for assistance were to be forwarded to CINCPAC (with IPAC an information addressee). The IPAC commander was authorized direct communications and liaison to assess requirements.[2]

(U) New unit identification codes were established in October. The production element kept the UIC assigned earlier, B6838900. The Defense Analysis Division was assigned B6513400, the Intelligence Data Handling System was assigned B6529400, and the Special Security Office was assigned B3569200.[3]

(U) By September, IPAC was developing a Systems Architectual Group (SAG) that concerned itself with IPAC's automated systems. CINCPAC's Director for Intelligence had requested assistance from the Defense Intelligence Agency.

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1. J13 HistSum Aug 74, which cited JCS 8195/291903Z Aug 74.
2. CINCPAC 250327Z Oct 74.
3. IPAC HistSum Oct 74.

On 22 October the Director of that agency had advised that he concurred in the concept of establishing a working relationship in essential areas of mutual concern. Accordingly, he had named a computer scientist, Mr. Jerry Larson, for duty with the SAG for two years. Representatives from the National Security Agency also worked with the SAG.[1]

(U) Membership in the IPAC Executive Board was broadened in November when full membership was extended to the Intelligence (G2) Section of the Fleet Marine Force Pacific, and as membership in observer status to the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, Pacific Area Headquarters (NCPAC).[2]

(C) The matter of a home for the IPAC remained under study at the end of the year. In November, as a result of a visit by a member of his staff, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Dr. Albert C. Hall, recognized that there was an urgent requirement to get IPAC under one roof. In a phone call to Admiral Gayler, he expressed his desire not to support the MILCON for the renovation of Building 20 because the resultant 30-month delay did not satisify the urgency of the situation. CINCPAC's Director for Intelligence, therefore, organized a task force to develop a viable alternative to the anticipated two and a half year delay for use of Building 20. On 13 December CINCPAC advised the host command at Camp Smith that congressional action on FY 75 Navy military construction programs was not yet final. Should the project funding be deleted, however, CINCPAC intended to consider several alternatives for the project, including FY 76 Navy Military Construction funding.[3]

(U) At the end of 1974 the IPAC organization was as follows:

Commander

Executive Board

Operations Center

Defense Analysis Division
- Analysis Branch
- Production Branch

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1. IPAC HistSums Sep, Oct 74; DIA 7917/221506Z Oct 74.
2. IPAC HistSum Nov 74.
3. IPAC HistSum Nov 74; CINCPAC 131936Z Dec 74.

Intelligence Applications Division
- North Asia Branch
- South Asia Branch
- Production Branch
- Transportation and Geographic Branch

Support Division
- Administrative Branch
- Automatic Data Processing Branch
- Budget Branch
- Supply and Maintenance Branch
- Systems Architectual Group

Target Analysis Division
- Nuclear Branch
- Conventional Branch

(U) Physically, the IPAC was located in various parts of the Honolulu area. The Commander and part of the Support Division were at CINCPAC's Camp Smith headquarters in Building 3B. The Operations Center, Intelligence Applications Division, North and South Asia Branches, Ground Order of Battle, Nuclear Targets and Special Security Office were in the CINCPAC Command Center, Building 80. The Defense Analysis Division was located both at Hickam Air Force Base (Building 1102) and Hospital Point at Pearl Harbor (Building 324). Also at Hospital Point was the rest of the Support Division, the Tactical Targets (Conventional Branch), and Transportation and Geographic Branch. Computer support was located with the Defense Analysis Division at Hickam (IBM 360/50); Hospital Point (IBM 360/40); Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific (IBM 360/30 and 360/50); Camp Smith (HIS 6060); and Kunia (CDC 1604). Nuclear target support was provided by the Camp Smith and Kunia equipment.

(U) For a discussion of on-going functions and activities of the IPAC, see Chapter IX, Intelligence Activities.

SECTION III--COMMAND AND CONTROL

(U) A number of major reorganizations were under way in the PACOM in 1974. In Washington the Unified Command Plan was being reviewed. Throughout the PACOM, forces were being reduced with attendant organizational changes. CINCPAC's Army component command was disestablished and such action for the Air Force component was being considered. These actions, as well as continuing requirements for command and control, are discussed in the material that follows.

PACOM Reorganizations/Reductions and Unified Command Plan Actions

(U) The Unified Command Plan was the basic charter for unified and specified commands. It was the JCS document (based on Presidential and Secretary of Defense decisions) that outlined the areas and responsibilities of the various unified commands. Revisions of the Unified Command Plan, therefore, were the means by which commands were formed or disestablished, and by which basic missions were assigned. (More specific tasking occurred in such other JCS documents as the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.) The last revision to the Unified Command Plan had become effective 1 January 1972. In 1974 a possible revision of the plan was again under study.

(C) At such a time the very existence of the PACOM comes under review. It was determined that the requirement for the command continued, although in 1974 there were dramatic changes in some component and subordinate command concepts. CINCPAC's Army component, the U. S. Army Pacific, phased out through the last half of the year and was disestablished on 31 December; a proposal to disestablish the Pacific Air Forces headquarters had been announced. USARPAC functions were transferred in some cases to other Army headquarters, but some were assumed by a newly formed U. S. Army CINCPAC Support Group at the old USARPAC headquarters. New concepts concerned possible formation of regional commands in the PACOM. The Secretary of Defense had directed that plans be drawn to form a Northeast Asia Command and a Southwest Pacific Command, to be activated by direction of the Secretary if conditions warranted. All of these actions accompanied the on-going reductions of forces throughout the theater. The actions reducing the number and size of PACOM headquarters and the revisions of organizations throughout the command are addressed in the material that follows. Reorganization of Army and Air Force components and Korea and Thailand headquarters are addressed in greater detail elsewhere in this chapter.

(U) In December 1973 the Secretary of Defense had directed a review of headquarters staffs with the aim of making sizeable reductions as early as

possible. He explained that it was clear that if the Defense Department didn't undertake this, "the Congress will do it for us."[1]

(U) CINCPAC had long sought ways to more effectively organize and manage his resources, particularly with continuing reductions of forces and funds. His philosophy regarding structure in the PACOM had been outlined in a message on 22 December 1973 to both the JCS and to CINCUSARPAC, whose proposal regarding disestablishment of the PACOM had led to this reply:

> ...I believe the Pacific basin is a strategic entity which must be integrated by and under one command....[to] provide one voice in representing the United States military forces in the PACOM. In fulfilling the peacetime portion of this role, our Pacific headquarters have developed long-standing relations with the military leaders in the Pacific countries. This carefully developed mutual understanding, respect and cooperation cannot be discarded.[2]

CINCUSARPAC had proposed, first, creation of a new unified command in Northeast Asia with three components (Eighth Army, 5th Air Force, and Naval Forces Northeast Asia); secondly, a headquarters in Southeast Asia (primarily Air Force but with some Army); and thirdly, activation of a specified command from CINCPACFLT resources with responsibility stopping at the water line, at which time CINCPAC headquarters would be deactivated and responsibility for the three commands would be shifted to the JCS. CINCPAC commented that this USARPAC concept appeared to fractionalize the PACOM at precisely a time when the decrease in assigned forces argued for integrated direction. He noted that while there was strategic merit in the idea of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia unified commands, the political climates in those areas militated against these arrangements--in the northeast even agreement on a location would be nearly impossible, in the southeast the forces remaining for the long-term did not warrant such an arrangement. He noted that the United States should be careful in establishing headquarters in locations that "we might be asked to leave." He concluded, "I know that our staffs can work together in developing a PACOM organization with unity and coherence, minimum layering, that is responsive to war requirements and efficient."[3]

(U) As the major new study got under way, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, William K. Brehm, was directed by

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1. Ltr, James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, to Admiral Gayler, 5 Dec 73.
2. CINCPAC 220416Z Dec 73.
3. Ibid.; for other on-going studies see also CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 41-44.

the Secretary to visit the PACOM and conduct "full and candid" discussions in this area.[1]

(S) CINCPAC informed the Chairman of the JCS of Assistant Secretary Brehm's scheduled January 1974 visit to the PACOM and stated that he would develop conceptual views into specific alternatives for consideration by Mr. Brehm. The Chairman requested that CINCPAC provide an outline of the alternatives he planned to discuss. On 22 December CINCPAC responded with a summary of organizational priorities, principles, and concepts for the PACOM. On further request of the Chairman, on 5 January CINCPAC furnished these priorities, principles, and alternative courses of action in expanded form.[2]

(U) A CINCPAC Organization Task Group, made up of representatives from staff directorates and agencies and chaired by the Plans Directorate, was formed. Its purpose was to coordinate staff inputs regarding all reorganization actions and requirements.

(U) Mr. Brehm and LT GEN Louis T. Seith, USAF, the JCS Director for Plans, accompanied by members of their staffs, arrived in Hawaii on 15 January. They met with Admiral Gayler and selected members of his staff, and later with the individual Army, Navy, and Air Force component commanders and their staffs. The party left on 19 January to make similar visits to major PACOM theater headquarters.[3]

(S) On 28 January, the JCS (in two messages) provided CINCPAC and his Service components with drafts that would be the basis for Mr. Brehm's trip report and subsequent study. These contained the basic criteria for the command structure, policy and planning guidance, policy issues raised by command structure alternatives, and a summary of those command structure alternatives.[4]

(U) On 1 February CINCPAC received an alerting message from the JCS regarding alternative military command structures. They advised that the Unified Command Plan was under review, and that separate, detailed studies of the various geographic regions were being undertaken. They clarified specific points and issues and provided tentative terms of reference, developed

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1. Ltr, James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, to Admiral Gayler, 5 Dec 73, n.s.
2. J563 HistSum Dec 74, which cited CINCPAC 110414Z Dec 73, JCS 8486/181257Z Dec 73, CINCPAC 220415Z Dec 73, CJCS 4492/262231Z Dec 73, and CINCPAC 050508Z Jan 74 (all EX).
3. J563 HistSums Feb, Dec 74; SECDEF 7589/022212Z Jan 74.
4. J563 HistSum Dec 74, which cited JCS 9107/282107Z and 1265/292336Z Jan 74 (both EX).

with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, that would be the basis of regional studies. These included objectives, basic criteria for the command structure, and tasks. The JCS advised that the Joint Staff and Service staffs were developing alternatives as outlined, and suggested that CINCPAC, along with the other addressees, study the subjects and submit proposals for consideration in the development of initial Joint Staff positions.[1]

(U) The JCS had assumed for purposes of this study that overall defense force levels and manpower strengths had been established and were not at issue. What was at issue was the portion of those resources that should be allocated to the command structure function and how that structure should be configured and deployed. The objectives were to reduce headquarters and headquarters personnel, remove redundancy and ambiguity, and strengthen the command structure by improving the individual headquarters retained. They outlined the criteria being used tentatively in evaluating command structure alternatives:

> ...The chain of command should be unambiguous through all levels.
>
> ...The responsibilities and authorities of command at each level should be clear and sufficiently comprehensive to give the commander control over the functions necessary to make his decisions meaningful.
>
> ...The chain of command should be free of unnecessary layering or duplication.
>
> ...Transition from peace to war should be facilitated by command arrangements and by specific contingency plans.
>
> ...Wartime arrangements should be exercisable in peacetime with a minimum of preparation.
>
> ...Command decision authority at each level should reflect certain practical necessities [which were outlined].
>
> ...Command should be carefully structured consistent with the needs for operational command. The staff should be formed from the several Services in such a manner as to insure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs and limitations of the component parts of the force.

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1. JCS 4066/011740Z Feb 74.

> ...Design of the support structure should be determined primarily by such factors as flexibility and span of control. Unnecessary intermediate levels in the support chain of command should be eliminated. Through modern communications and computer technology, field data is often available to all levels in the chain of command.[1]

(U) CINCPAC's initial reply of 5 February was followed on 16 February by additional details. These responses consisted of the selection of one of the options proposed in Assistant Secretary Brehm's trip report, with certain modifications. They were described as an initial "fleshing out" of the concepts with additional study to follow.[2]

(C) On 12 March CINCPAC provided further amplification of his previously submitted organizational concepts. He provided rationale for a Pacific Command properly supported by subordinate uni-Service commands to handle Service-unique matters. He defended the retention of a unified commander, as opposed to eliminating the command and dividing the Pacific region into three separate commands. (This had been the subject that had been raised by CINCUSARPAC in late 1973 with CINCPAC's comments having been forwarded on 22 December as noted above; this appeared to be a key issue at the Joint Staff level.)

(C) CINCPAC noted that two concepts for U. S. military organization of the Pacific Basin were at issue. "One, which I favor, retains a Pacific Command encompassing the entire basin." The other eliminated the PACOM and divided the command into three regions. This other concept, he said "fails to recognize the Pacific Basin as a strategic entity requiring integrated command and control in peace as well as war." CINCPAC continued:

> ...In peacetime, PACOM provides the advantage of one-voice representation of U. S. military forces in the Pacific -- a powerful lever in our dealings with U. S. Missions and other nations. This command has developed long-standing relations with military leaders of other countries of the Pacific Basin and serves as the common link in U. S. collective defense arrangements in the area. A single U. S. military voice in the Pacific is more important today than ever before. There are few if any purely military problems out here. Practically everything we do has its political or diplomatic side which we must consider, weigh and coordinate with our

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1. Ibid.
2. J563 HistSum Dec 74, which cited CINCPAC 050346Z Feb and 161647Z Feb 74 (both EX).

Embassy colleagues. We see no way U. S. can achieve meaningful regional cooperative security efforts that would make the "tri-command concept" practical in the foreseeable future. Therefore, U. S. efforts to stabilize the area must recognize the economic and political play that extends from Japan to Australia encompassing everything in between....

...A significant and often-overlooked role of PACOM is that of the honest broker between a variety of PACOM nations who have difficulty in dealing with each other in security matters, yet are to some degree dependent on each other in the military field. A case in point is the Japan-Korea-Taiwan triangle. Another is SVN-GKR-Thailand-Taiwan. Another is Japan-Australia-New Zealand. The nature of this problem does not permit fragmentation amongst a number of U. S. commands.

...In response to contingencies, PACOM, with its Pacific-wide view of the threat and its control of total U. S. Pacific resources, has flexibility to shift forces while remaining prepared to meet further developments. Doubt the National Command Authority, with its worldwide responsibilities, would be able to concentrate on supervision and coordination of efforts of three Pacific commands to extent that PACOM, whose responsibilities are limited to Pacific area, can.

...In a general war situation, orchestration of all forces in the Pacific also dictates unity of command. The Pacific Ocean area contains vital maritime and air LOCs [lines of communication], essential to the security of the United States in wartime and to the economic prosperity of the U. S. and all its Pacific allies in peace.

.....

...Finally, a significant disadvantage of the "tri-command" concept is the surrender of command and control capability of a trained staff and costly facilities on U. S. territory for headquarters located on foreign soil at the mercy of changing international situations.[1]

CINCPAC 120013Z Mar 74.

(C) CINCPAC continued outlining his objectives. He noted, however, that there would remain a definite requirement for regional headquarters units to supervise Service-unique functions that were either reserved to the Military Departments by statute or were best performed by the Services. He would leave it to the Services to decide the ranks of the commanders of those residual elements. He continued:

> ...On the basis of fundamental requirements and statutory powers, the Services have developed complex, Service-unique systems of personnel, training and logistics management. Each Service develops and defends the budget which supports its force level, force posture, equipment and technical development. Each of these functions requires the special expertise of the individual Services and together form the foundation of unified command operation.
>
> ...Consolidation of these functions at the unified command level would require a significant increase in the unified command staff (which I am trying to avoid), infringe upon Service prerogatives, and unnecessarily involve an operational headquarters in Service support activities.
>
> ...The unified commander should be involved in Service functions only in enough detail that he is assured cohesive effort and support of his plans.
>
> ...With direct operational control over forces and sub-unified commands, he must be able to ensure these forces are administered and supplied. Any arrangement which transfers responsibility for exercise of these functions outside PACOM erodes the unified commander's authority and degrades the required interface between operations, operational planning, and administrative and logistical support.
>
> ...In summary, we require a single headquarters to provide unity of command to US forces in this strategic area. We can reduce the component headquarters through consolidations in areas such as intelligence, operations, planning, security assistance and some longline communications functions. However, we need residual supporting Service elements, subordinate to the unified commander, to provide Service-unique functions.[1]

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1. Ibid.

(U) In April Admiral Gayler wrote to Secretary Schlesinger, estimating the potential staff and support manpower savings under the PACOM organization he had proposed. CINCPAC advised:

> ...There can be some confusion between those reductions associated with programmed force cuts or redeployments and those that stem from reorganization, so I am providing you a breakdown of the total non-combatant force reduction picture through FY 77.[1]

The Admiral noted that the information would include reductions from a number of actions: "Your direction to reduce headquarters in Thailand....Unilateral Service reductions throughout PACOM....The Army's elimination of USARPAC.... Consolidation of headquarters in Korea....Other consolidations and reductions I have proposed including a 35% reduction in total of Hawaii Headquarters." CINCPAC advised that as this had been an on-going program, he used November 1973 as his starting point. He continued:

> ...Under my proposal to consolidate planning, communications, operations, intelligence, and security assistance staff functions, I would expect to eliminate about 2,100 manpower spaces in Hawaii....Except for USARPAC, whose disestablishment you have already approved, this retains Service headquarters of sufficient strength to handle those statutory Service responsibilities on which I must rely for support. I am not convinced that the Army will be able to discharge their responsibilities with the 161 man staff they propose on Oahu. Some other people in CONUS and elsewhere will no doubt be needed. Also, Army has not yet identified the headquarters they propose to substitute for ARPAC.[2]

(U) CINCPAC next outlined other reductions to be obtained, including about 6,000 headquarters and headquarters support personnel space savings in forward areas; an additional 900 spaces saved by consolidation through automation of telecommunications centers; and about 8,000 additional support spaces that the Army had proposed for elimination or redeployment to CONUS. Admiral Gayler noted, "These figures should give you a general idea of what I am shooting at. These are ball park estimates, good to say ± 20%." He emphasized that the figures were approximations of varying hardness, and

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1. Ltr, Admiral Gayler to Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, 25 Apr 74, n.s.
2. Ibid.

that requirements were fluid and largely unknown. "I would expect to see changes as we study in greater depth and as the situation evolves, and I will communicate them to the JCS and to you." CINCPAC concluded, "I am convinced that war readiness and manpower savings at any required level of effort can best be achieved through unity of command, coherent organization and unambiguous responsibility."[1]

(U) CINCPAC enclosed a number of charts in his letter to the Secretary. Certain of these follow.

(C) The Secretary of Defense, acting on the recommendations of the JCS, made his decisions regarding revisions to the Unified Command Plan and manpower reductions within the unified and specific commands. These were announced to the JCS in a memorandum of 3 September.[2]

(C) The Secretary outlined his goals for the PACOM. These were to improve the command and control relationships among the National Command Authority, PACOM, and subordinate commands, and to reduce substantially all headquarters and headquarters support units by consolidating functions where appropriate and eliminating redundant activities and units. His intention was to maintain an austere PACOM headquarters in peacetime that had the potential for rapid augmentation in wartime circumstances. CINCPAC would be responsible for overall contingency planning in the PACOM area, coordinate military operations, but to the maximum extent possible delegate tactical operations and planning to the subordinate commands. As had been previously planned, a Joint Intelligence Center would be established within PACOM headquarters to carry out theater-wide intelligence functions. (This Intelligence Center Pacific was established in 1974; see the discussion earlier in this chapter.) The Secretary also directed that redundant joint and Service command, control, and communications facilities be identified for elimination, and that CINCPAC maintain the minimal staff necessary to perform the functions of logistics and personnel administration and discipline.[3]

(C) On 6 September the JCS outlined the main points of the Secretary of Defense's decisions. The JCS advised that the Pacific, European, Readiness, and Atlantic Commands would continue as unified commands with some realignment of responsibilities. For the time being, responsibilities for the Middle East

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1. Ibid.
2. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to The Secretaries of the Military Departments, The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others, 3 Sep 74, Subj: Unified, Specified and Subordinate Command Structure.
3. Ibid.

Hawaii Headquarters

Organization	April 1974	Proposed	Change
PACOM Headquarters	1,082	1,169	+ 87
USARPAC	1,340*	161**	-1,179
PACAF	1,476***	997	- 479
PACFLT	468	232	- 236
FMFPAC	542	440	- 102
Direct Intelligence Support Activities	1,209	996	- 213
Total	6,117	3,995	-2,122****

*Includes Headquarters Support Activities that support USARPAC.
**Current Army estimates; subject to review.
***Includes assessed part of 615th Support Squadron that supports Hq PACAF.
****Military and U. S. civilian spaces.

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Consolidation Through Automation--Telecommunications Centers
(Communications Center Operational Personnel)

Location	April 1974	Proposed	Change
Oahu, Hawaii	1,977	597	480
Japan	634	434	200
Korea	577	477	100
Okinawa	516	416	100
Philippines	190	170	20
Taiwan	167	152	15
Total	3,161	2,246	915*

*Total savings would be between 800-1,000 military and U. S. civilians.

Manpower Savings (by Country)

	Savings	End Position FY 77
Australia	25	839
Canberra - 11; Amberly - 14		
Cambodia		
Military Equipment Delivery Team	92	0
Defense Attache Office	0	45
(Phaseout of MEDTC dependent on resolution of the Cambodian issue.)		
Laos		
Defense Attache Office (including Project 404)	163	45
Vietnam		
Defense Attache Office	120	867
Four-Power Joint Military Team	0	51
Thailand		
Ko Kha/Chiang Mai	0	188
Ramasun	346	1,147
MACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI	402	153
Joint Casualty Resolution Center	99	100
USSAG/7AF	434	0
(Savings on above four units assumes phase down)		
Other Defense Department elements	1,060	76
(Savings are from consolidation, reduction, and elimination, and were outlined in CINCPAC 032047Z and 052216Z Apr 74 to JCS.)		
Philippines		
JUSMAG	3	57
13th Air Force	358	246
COMNAVFORPHIL/COMNAVBASE	6	522
CINCPACREP Philippines	0	9
(CINCPACREPPHIL assumes functional support formerly provided by U. S. Army element)		

Manpower Savings (by Country)(cont'd)

	Savings	End Position FY 77
Japan		
Mutual Defense Assistance Office	0	17
U. S. Forces Japan/5th AF/U. S. Army Japan/NAVFORJ	300-400	450
(Saving is conceptual estimate based on streamlining headquarters; needs further study and refinement. Savings would be between 300 and 400.)		
Korea		
UNC (joint spaces)	83	0
JUSMAG	361	187
NAVFORK	2	157
Taiwan		
327th Air Division (Hq)	51*	0
6213th Air Base Sq (Taipei Air Station)	413*	0
6214th Air Base Sq (Tainan Air Base)	406**	100
6217th Consolidated Support Gp (Ching Chuan Kang Air Base)	1,144**	150
Taiwan Defense Command/MAAG China	168	133

* Estimated reduced to zero depending on programming actions and redeployments.
** Ching Chuan Kang and Tainan Air Bases to "caretaker status." (TS)

India, Indonesia, and Pakistan afforded little potential for savings, but would continue to be examined.

Total savings: 6,086 military and U. S. civilian spaces.

and Indian Ocean areas remained unchanged, but the JCS would study alternatives and submit recommendations to the Secretary. The Strategic Air Command was also to continue as a specified command. Subject to Presidential approval, it was planned to disestablish the Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD) and designate the Aerospace Defense Command (ADC) as a specified command with ADC assuming responsibilities that had been assigned to CONAD. Subject to Presidential approval, it was tentatively planned to disestablish the Alaskan and Southern Commands as early as the end of FY 75. The JCS were tasked to submit a draft Unified Command Plan revised to reflect these decisions, which was to form the basis for recommendations to the President.[1]

(C) Certain portions of the JCS message pertained specifically to the PACOM:

> ...In contingencies operational control of forces assigned to PACOM may continue under CINCPAC or be transferred to joint task forces or to regional unified commands. In the latter event, strategic direction of the regional commands or JTFs [Joint Task Forces] could be provided from Washington, with CINCPAC responsible for support of those forces. Accordingly, CINCPAC will prepare contingency plans for the activation and support of a Northeast Asia Command (NEACOM), a Southwest Pacific Command (SWPACOM), and other regional commands, as necessary. The Secretary of Defense would activate such commands.
>
> ...The intention is to maintain an austere PACOM headquarters in peacetime that has the potential for rapid augmentation in wartime. Accordingly, plans for PACOM will include alternative proposals for reducing PACOM headquarters by 30 percent and 50 percent by end FY 1976 from the planned end FY 1974 President's budget authorization of 1,117 people. A reduction of at least 20 percent will be achieved by end FY 1975.
>
> ...The Service components should achieve substantial reductions in their management headquarters and support units, and should restructure command and control requirements to reflect the guidance of the preceding paragraphs.
>
> ...Substantial economies will be made in headquarters and headquarters support units in Japan, Okinawa, and Korea, and other PACOM headquarters, and changes reported in the plans.[2]

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1. JCS 5220/061930Z Sep 74.
2. Ibid.

(C) On 19 September the JCS passed applicable portions of the Secretary's memorandum for action, with a suspense to the JCS of 15 November. CINCPAC recognized the need for early submission of plans for headquarters reductions, but he requested that the deadline for contingency plans for the regional commands be extended to 1 February 1975. Other planning was to be completed by 1 December 1974. The JCS approved the request for extension.[1]

(C) In a separate but related action, the JCS requested that CINCPAC provide his views and recommendations on future U. S. command relationships for the Middle East/Indian Ocean region. To be included were views and recommendations regarding the future command of and support for Security Assistance activities in the Middle East and Africa. These recommendations were requested by 18 October.[2]

(C) In a series of directive messages, CINCPAC requested certain data from his Service component and subordinate unified commanders to assist in the preparation of the plans and responses required by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. Manpower reduction plans, organizational alternatives, and a list of Defense Department activities and manning within 20 miles of CINCPAC's headquarters were requested. At the same time CINCPAC directed COMUS Korea to prepare a conceptual plan for the establishment of a Northeast Asia regional contingency command, and directed CINCPACAF to prepare a similar conceptual plan for a Southwest Pacific Command. All agencies were asked to study their command, control, and communications facilities for redundancies.[3]

(S) Additional CINCPAC guidance for the preparation of conceptual plans for the Northeast Asia and Southwest Pacific commands was forwarded in mid-November. The mission of the NEACOM, CINCPAC said, was:

> ...In conjunction with allies, defend NEACOM area against aggression by North Korea, Peoples Republic of China (PRC), or U.S.S.R. singly or North Korea in combination with PRC or U.S.S.R. (should not plan for war with PRC and U.S.S.R. in combination).

The NEACOM area of responsibility, for planning purposes, was the airspace, territorial waters, islands and land masses of the Korean Peninsula and Japan. (CINCPAC was responsible for the surrounding sea areas in peace and war.) The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/U. S. Forces Korea was to be

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1. JCS 7421/192154Z Sep 74; CINCPAC 212025Z Sep 74; JCS 4456/262021Z Sep 74.
2. JCS 6323/182219Z Sep 74.
3. CINCPAC 250115Z Sep 74; CINCPAC 171931Z Oct 74; CINCPAC 190329Z Oct 74.

the CINCNEA designate. CINCUNC/CINCNEA would exercise operational command of assigned U. S. Forces through his Service component commanders; exercise operational command control over all U. S. and allied forces assigned or attached for the execution of the assigned mission; when directed by the JCS to act as supported commander in accordance with the Joint Operational Planning System (JOPS) definition; and to assume additional authorities and responsibilities of a unified commander as listed in JCS Publication 2. When directed by higher authority, CINCNEA was to conduct military operations to counter overt Communist aggression against the NEACOM; to assume responsibility for and coordinate air defense for the assigned area with appropriate national forces; support evacuation of U. S. noncombatants and selected foreign nationals in the event of war or emergency; coordinate intelligence activities in his assigned area; and coordinate and plan with other unified and specified commands for support of the NEACOM.

(S) In matters of support, CINCPAC, when directed by the JCS, was to act as a supporting commander (in accordance with the JOPS definition); defend sea and air lines of communications and sea approaches to the NEACOM; and coordinate and plan with other unified and specified commands for support of the NEACOM.

(S) CINCPAC requested that the NEACOM concept plan outline in detail a concept of operations, the proposed organization of major commands, and command relationships. In this regard, options to be considered included consideration of COMUS Japan as NEACOM deputy; a subordinate unified command in Japan or Korea under NEACOM; organization and location of the headquarters of NEACOM and its components (to include people, communications, automatic data processing, facilities, and support); identity and comparison of existing versus required resources for rapid activation of major commands and the capabilities necessary for adequate peace to war transition; the source of resources for headquarters organizations; estimated times to activate; costs involved; and an estimate of the support required from CINCPAC and other unified and specified commanders. CINCPAC requested that COMUS Korea take the lead and, with the assistance of COMUS Japan, submit a concept plan by early January 1975.[1]

(S) For the Southwest Pacific Command, CINCPAC stated that the mission was to defend the area in conjunction with allies. The area, for planning purposes, included the airspace, territorial waters, islands and land masses of Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippine Islands, Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand. CINCPAC, again, was responsible for the surrounding sea areas in peace or war.

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1. CINCPAC 132302Z Nov 74. Portions of JCS Publication 2 are quoted in Appendix A.

(S) The Commander 13th Air Force was the COMSWPACOM designate; upon activation of that command, he would be dual-hatted as COMSWPACOM/13AF, with the Taiwan Defense Command subordinate. The commander was to exercise operational command of assigned U. S. Forces through his Service component commanders; exercise operational command over all U. S. and allied forces assigned or attached for the execution of the assigned mission; when directed by the JCS to act as supported commander in accordance with the JOPS definition; and to assume additional authorities and responsibilities of the unified commander as listed in JCS Publication 2.

(S) When directed by higher authority, he was to conduct military operations to counter overt aggression against the SWPACOM; assume responsibility for and coordinate air defense for his assigned area with appropriate national forces; support the evacuation of U. S. noncombatants and selected foreign nationals in the event of war or emergency; coordinate intelligence activities in his assigned area; and coordinate and plan with other unified and specified commands for support of the SWPACOM. CINCPAC's support function, as outlined, was the same as that for the NEACOM.

(S) CINCPAC asked that the concept plan outline in detail a concept of operations; proposed organization (major commands); command relationships; organization and location of the headquarters of SWPACOM and its components; identity and comparison of existing versus required resources for rapid activation of major commands and the capabilities for adequate peace to war transition; identity of the source of resources for headquarters organizations; estimated times to activate; costs involved; and the estimated support required from CINCPAC and other unified and specified commands. This plan was also requested by early January 1975. All addressees were authorized and encouraged in matters of coordination and liaison. Addressees were CINCPAC's component commands, COMUSSAG, U. S. DAO Saigon, COMUSTDC, CINCPACREP Philippines, and COMUSMACTHAI.[1]

(U) Thus, the basic studies were under way throughout the PACOM. The plans, recommendations, and data requested by the Secretary and the JCS would be prepared and submitted to the JCS in three increments. All of these actions were coordinated with, and contained data from, the PACOM subordinate headquarters. There were three main areas under study: the Middle East/Indian Ocean recommendations; PACOM organizational structure and manpower reductions; and contingency plans for the activation and support of Pacific regional commands. The first two of these would be completed by CINCPAC in 1974.

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1. CINCPAC 140419Z Nov 74.

(C) On 17 October CINCPAC forwarded his comments and recommendations on unified, specified, and subordinate command structure in the Middle East and Indian Ocean areas.

(C) The 3 September Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense had asked that the JCS submission consider various alternatives proposed. CINCPAC believed that the first alternative presented was the most suitable. Under this alternative the responsibilities for security assistance plans and programs as well as contingency planning for the Middle East and Africa would remain in Washington. The European Command area of responsibility would be bounded on the south by the north coastline of Africa, the eastern Mediterranean coast, and the southern and eastern borders of Turkey.

(C) The PACOM area of responsibility would be bounded in the west by approximately 17° East, the eastern coast of Africa, the southern coasts of the Arabian Peninsula and the southern and eastern borders of Iran including the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, but excluding littoral countries in these areas. Current area responsibility boundaries with the Atlantic and European Commands would be shifted accordingly. The mission of the Middle East Force would be assigned to PACOM. European Command responsibilities in the Middle East/Indian Ocean area would be retrenched to European Command boundaries reflected above. Atlantic Command area responsibility in the Indian Ocean would be terminated and the PACOM area of responsibility would be expanded somewhat.[1]

(C) CINCPAC's reply noted the U. S. Government's policy to continue the practice of periodic port visits, transits, and naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, and to make more regular and frequent deployments to that area from other areas. He believed that this policy was an important factor in assessing future command relations. He noted that three unified commands were assigned responsibilities for the Indian Ocean and contiguous waters. CINCPAC advised that since November 1973 he had periodically deployed task groups for operations in the Arabian Sea and adjacent area. He expected these deployments to continue and increase in frequency. Units of these task groups operated in the waters of all three commands. The MidEastForce also operated in the waters of all three commands. While the role of that force was primarily one of maintaining U. S. presence, there was a continuing and expanding need to insure that MidEastForce operations were coordinated with PACFLT operations in such matters

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1. Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and others, 3 Sep 74, Subj: Unified, Specified and Subordinate Command Structure.

matter of ADP support, CINCPAC advised that the concept of a regional ADP support facility to serve Headquarters PACOM, the components, and the CINCPAC Support Group, in addition to the planned support for COMUSTDC, COMUSMACTHAI, and the Alaskan Command, could accomplish substantial manpower and ADP resource savings. This concept had been under study and required further examination. Action was already under way, however, to consolidate CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT ADP resources. Further definition of responsibilities and required capabilities to support contingency commands (the proposed Northeast Asia and Southwest Pacific Commands) would depend on finalization of concept plans, and the matching of existing command, control, and communications facilities against projected requirements.

(C) As the final subject addressed, CINCPAC provided a summary of Defense Department units, with manning, within 20 miles of unified, subordinate, and component headquarters. Because 20-mile arcs encompassed all but a small portion of Oahu, Hawaii, the island was considered in its entirety. Data was also provided for Korea, Taiwan, Thailand (MACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI only, as USSAG/7AF was scheduled for disestablishment), and Japan. A disclaimer was included with the Japan listings, however. Units within 20 miles of Yokota Air Base, Camp Zama, and Yokosuka were listed, but with the caution that applications of mileage criteria for proximity of units did not consider time factors for travel by road in Japan. Congestion of traffic on narrow, secondary (by U.S. standards) roads extended actual measurable distance. The number of units listed was as follows: Oahu, 354; Korea, 119; Japan, 124; Thailand, 51; and Taiwan, 26.[1]

(S) In summary, the requirement for CINCPAC to provide organizational alternatives, associated manpower savings, and improved command, staff, and support arrangements was generated by the Secretary of Defense through the JCS. The Secretary provided alternative organizational options for comments by the JCS and CINCPAC. CINCPAC concepts for the PACOM were forwarded. Similar actions were under way concurrently in the other unified commands. The JCS position on command arrangements worldwide was provided to the Secretary, and formed the basis for his decisions. One decision was to retain the Pacific Command, but with substantial manpower reductions in the PACOM headquarters and PACOM management headquarters.[2]

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1. Ibid.
2. J563 HistSum Dec 74.

Army Reorganization in the Pacific Command

(U) In the autumn of 1973 the Headquarters of the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) recommended, within Army channels, the elimination of the headquarters. Other reorganization plans had also been under study at that time, and CINCUSARPAC had also recommended the disestablishment of the PACOM headquarters. (See "PACOM Reorganization and Unified Command Plan Actions" elsewhere in this chapter.)

(U) Public announcement of USARPAC disestablishment was rather precipitate, however. Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, in a presentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 5 February 1974 on the "first post-war, post hostilities budget," announced, inter alia, important headquarters changes and reductions in the Army. He had noted, "we must maintain those options other than suicide or surrender, and part of our management task is to convert, not swords into plowshares, but fat into swords. And we are proceeding to do so." The Secretary continued, "We plan to take the Army resources that result from a reduction in headquarters and convert them into additional combat capability, which is the direction Congress has said it would like us to follow." When details were released in Washington to the press, the six headquarters were identified as U.S. Army Alaska; U.S. Army Forces, Southern Command; Theater Army Support Command, Europe; Engineer Command, Europe; U.S. Army Intelligence Command (Fort Meade); and USARPAC. The Army Intelligence Command was to be phased out by 30 June 1974, the others during FY 75.[1]

(U) According to the Honolulu Advertiser the next day, "News of Shafter's [Fort Shafter, at which USARPAC was based] dismantlement took both civilians and military people at the Army headquarters by surprise."[2]

(S) On 14 February the JCS advised CINCPAC that the Army Chief of Staff had advised of his proposals to restructure the size and form of Army component headquarters, including that in the PACOM. In connection with this and other actions, the JCS advised, the implications relative to the National Security Act, DOD Directove 5100.1 (Functions of the Defense Department and Its Major Components), and the Unified Command Plan were under study. CINCPAC was to be afforded the opportunity to offer his comments and recommendations.[3]

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1. J561 HistSum Dec 74; SECDEF 4116/131631Z Feb 74; SECDEF 8695/071635Z Feb 74.
2. Honolulu Advertiser, 7 Feb 74, p. 1.
3. JCS 4936/141326Z Feb 74.

(S) Planning for the eventual disestablishment continued within Army channels, and two basic plans were developed. The first was the WESTPAC Plan of 8 May, which dealt with resources management in the western Pacific area. The second was the ROSE Plan (Reorganization of Overseas Elements) revised on 15 June, which addressed Army elements in Hawaii, Guam, and Johnston Island.[1]

(U) In the 8 May plan, a summary noted that the headquarters had been established in Hawaii in 1957. This was part of a major organizational change that disestablished the post-World War II Far East Command, and relocated Army and Air Force elements from Japan to Hawaii to become components of the PACOM. The threefold role of the Army component to CINCPAC had been to provide necessary ground Army combat forces, to support those forces administratively and logistically, and to provide reserves and contingency plans to meet any ground threat to U.S. interests in the Pacific. The disestablishment of this headquarters was to occur not later than 31 December, the Department of the Army had directed.

(U) Two main sections of the plan were those dealing with resource management, which provided an in-depth analysis of functions being performed that were to be transferred or terminated, and theater manpower and cost savings, which were to portray the projected space and dollar savings to be realized. There were approximately 730 major and subfunctions identified in the WESTPAC plan; 420 of those were to be transferred by 1 July 1974 and the remainder were to be transferred by 30 December. Functional transfers, it was noted, did not imply manpower space transfers in most cases. Selected samples follow:

Date in 1974	Event	Actions By
1 July	Manpower/Funding	Department of the Army (DA) to Major Commands (MACOMS)
1 October	Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency (PURA)	CINCPAC
1 July	Family Housing Management	DA to MACOMS
1 July	Supervision of Medical Operating Policies in WESTPAC	The Surgeon General to MACOMS

1. Ltr, CINCUSARPAC to HQDA, 8 May 74, Subj: United States Army Pacific, WESTPAC PLAN; the ROSE plan was revised by an Addendum to Hq USARPAC PROJECT ROSE Headquarters Elimination Plan, Hq USARPAC, 15 Jun 74.

31 December	Assumption of WESTPAC Munitions Management	Army Materiel Command (AMC)
1 July	Race Relations/Equal Opportunity Program Direction	DA/Military Personnel Center to MACOMS
1 July	PACOM Whole Blood Management	CINCPAC
10 July - 10 November	Military Personnel Requisitioning	MACOMS to DA
1 September	Installation/Real Estate Management Reports	MACOMS to DA
1 October - 30 November	Army Authorization Documents System/Manpower Survey	MACOMS to DA
1 January 1975	Mapping, Charting, Geodesy and Base Development	CINCPAC Support Group

(U) During early planning certain designations were used that were subsequently changed. What had been termed "U.S. Army Forces Hawaii (USARFH)" came to be called "U.S. Army Support Command Hawaii (USASCH)"; this was the old U.S. Army Hawaii (USARHAW). The designation "Army Element Pacific (AEP)" was replaced by the name "CINCPAC Support Group (CSG)"; these units will be discussed in more detail below.

(C) The only major substantive problem that arose from CINCPAC's point of view during the early planning phase had to do with the operational command/control of the 25th Infantry Division, which was stationed at Schofield Barracks (central Oahu, Hawaii). The Army Chief of Staff (in CSAM 56-74 and 57-74) had proposed that operational command be transferred from CINCPAC to the CINC of the Readiness Command, at Macdill Air Force Base, Florida. The JCS asked CINCPAC to comment on the matter.[1]

(C) CINCPAC replied to the JCS on 12 June. He provided comments on the Army reorganization in general as well as on relationships with the 25th Division. "I do not concur with recommendation...that operational command of 25th Infantry Division and its support elements in Hawaii be transferred from CINCPAC to USCINCRED," CINCPAC said, noting:

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1. J561 HistSum Dec 74, which cited CSAM 57-74, CSAM 56-74; JCS 8775/122146Z Jun 74.

...The 25th Div is a major ground element in PACOM with vital role as readily available strategic reserve. Transferring it to USCINCRED would eliminate one-quarter of the already limited ground strength of this command and seriously hamper my strategic flexibility. The present assignment, location, and orientation of the 25th Div to CINCPAC enhances joint planning and training and expedites rapid, effective employment in contingencies. Assignment to FORSCOM would diminish that focus and reduce effectiveness. (I am aware the division would continue to be available for approved contingency operations and that I would continue to have circumscribed authority to assume command in the event of an emergency. These are not new authorities.)

CINCPAC continued:

It simply is not logical to assign this division, located in the midst of PACOM, adjacent to my headquarters, to another headquarters, thousands of miles away. I know of no precedent for such an action, and it is inconsistent with the command relationships of other unified commanders such as USCINCEUR, CINCSOUTH, and CINCAL. Approval of the recommendations...[of the Army Chief of Staff] would place an unreasonable restraint upon execution of my responsibilities as CINCPAC. Furthermore, I believe our allies could perceive assigning operational command of the 25th Div to a headquarters in Florida as an indication of further US withdrawal from the Pacific and perhaps of reduced US interest in the region.

...The JCS should consider serious implications of introducing another unified command into the PACOM. After years of developing unity of command, coherence, and unambiguous responsibility in the Pacific we propose to reverse our course. Hawaii, a prime historical example of the implications of divided command, is also a unique state in its geographical isolation and the density of its Armed Forces population and installations. This adds to the case for one unified military commander for Hawaii.

...In sum I see no advantage to the recommendations contained in CSAM 57-74 and many disadvantages. I believe the Army can and should arrange their command responsibilities

in Hawaii in accordance with national policy and joint doctrine without transferring OPCON of the 25th Div and support elements to USCINCRED. My recommendation follows:

a. Combine proposed CINCPAC Support Group with Headquarters of US Army Support Command, Hawaii. I understand latter is proposed to be senior remaining Army headquarters in Hawaii after disestablishment of USARPAC Headquarters. Combining these two elements should provide additional manpower savings.

b. Department of Army designate this "dual-hatted" headquarters as "Major Army Command," under operational command of CINCPAC.

c. This new headquarters exercise command over 25th Div and its supporting elements, provide Army unique support to PACOM headquarters and coordinate with other Services.[1]

(C) CINCPAC provided additional comments on specifics in the two Army memorandums, as follows:

...My views on need for residual headquarters elements to supervise Service-unique functions in PACOM are contained in my 120013Z Mar 74 message to the JCS. [See PACOM Reorganization and Unified Command Plan Actions elsewhere in this chapter.] I do not understand why Army component function is redundant only in PACOM and not in other unified commands ....Do not agree that removal of 25th Div from CINCPAC operational command and assignment to USCINCRED command will provide CINCPAC with greater flexibility to meet contingency requirements. The opposite effect will occur since less rather than more commitment to CINCPAC plans results.... Functions and relationships of CINCPAC Support Group to CINCPAC must be spelled out precisely. Army support of CINCPAC involves more than contingency planning requirements and coordination of other Army matters. Planning and information input to CINCPAC and other Services on entire range of Army responsibilities to unified command is necessary....Concur no reductions should take place that would impair Department of Army ability to meet its Service-

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1. CINCPAC 152124Z Jun 74.

unique responsibilities to CINCPAC.[1]

(C) CINCPAC cautioned, "However, I have serious reservations about capability of the proposed Army structure, as I understand it, to transition from peace to war as well as to discharge those responsibilities. He continued:

> ...Army reorganization plans should be carefully reviewed to assure sufficient capability to fulfill responsibilities is maintained in PACOM....In short, while I support Service reorganization to promote efficiency and save overhead manpower, I have many questions about Army reorganization in PACOM. I hope this headquarters soon will be further informed of details of Army plans for the Pacific....I assume that the JCS will address changes to the Unified Command Plan and other appropriate documents to reflect the pending disestablishment of the Army component in PACOM.

CINCPAC concluded that he had just learned that public announcement of details of the Army headquarters disestablishment was scheduled for 26 June. He requested a delay of this announcement until the JCS had had opportunity to consider the thoughts he was providing.

(U) On 20 June the JCS advised that the Army Chief of Staff had withdrawn from consideration by the JCS his recommendation regarding the 25th Division. It was the Joint Staff understanding, however, that the proposed public announcement would pertain to unilateral Army decisions and plans. Although the announcement was delayed only one day, it was revised after coordination with the JCS and the Office of the Secretary of Defense and, as noted below, it did address relationships of Army commands with CINCPAC.[2]

(U) The press release stated that reduction and elimination of headquarters and support activities would total more than 10,000 military and civilian spaces. Spaces, funds, and material resources resulting from these actions were to be reallocated to combat units and their support forces. "The majority of the support activity reductions occurred in the Western Pacific," the Army noted, citing as examples a reduction in Okinawa headquarters and the termination of depot maintenance and retrograde operations to reduce the U.S. Army Japan; Army Support Command Thailand had been reduced and redesignated the

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1. Ibid.
2. JCS 6546/202211Z Jun 74.

Military Assistance Command Thailand Support Group[1]; and consolidation of headquarters signal activities of the Eighth U.S. Army in Korea. "By streamlining management functions and employing modern communications, the Army is able to disestablish...six headquarters and increase management efficiency." The parts of the press release pertaining to USARPAC are quoted below:

> ...In the fall of 1974, FORSCOM [the U.S. Army Forces Command] will assume command of Army troop units in Hawaii now commanded by HQUSARPAC....Army non-tactical medical units and facilities ...will transfer to the US Army Health Services Command at Fort Sam Houston, Texas...Selected training and doctrine functions...will be managed by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia....
>
> Foregoing changes concern unilateral Army responsibilities previously performed by Army headquarters and do not alter operational jursidiction of unified commanders with respect to Army forces. After USARPAC is disestablished, Army commanders will report directly to Headquarters, Department of the Army for Army matters.[2]

(C) When the JCS had advised CINCPAC about the revised press release, they also requested that the Army Chief of Staff, in coordination with CINCPAC, develop specific command relationships to insure the provisions of JCS Publication 2 were met, with particular attention paid to the disposition of the authorities and responsibilities of component commanders as specified in paragraphs 30231, 30232, and 30233 of that publication.[3]

(U) In the material that follows there are many references to paragraphs in JCS Publication 2. Those cited are quoted in Annex A to this history for the convenience of the reader.

(U) The CINCPAC staff began a detailed review of the ROSE and WESTPAC Plans to insure that all staff and command functions were provided for after USARPAC was disestablished. Also, about this time, the CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC staffs began working closely as the plans were studied. CINCPAC's Director for Plans, RADM William R. McClendon, USN, and COL Donald M. Dexter, Jr., USA,

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1. Upon disestablishment of USARPAC, Army uniservice responsibilities in Thailand were to be satisfied in Thailand as indicated by JCS 162128Z Aug 74 in response to CINCPAC 030222Z Aug 74.
2. HQDA 262245Z Jun 74, which revised DA 212200Z Jun 74; JCS 2136/262059Z Jun 74.
3. JCS 2136/262059Z Jun 74.

of USARPAC (and the new CINCPAC Support Group) were the principal staff officers for this activity. Problems that arose during the CINCPAC review of Army plans, however, were first tackled by the concerned directorate or action agency and its USARPAC counterpart. If agreement could not be reached it was brought to the McClendon-Dexter level for arbitration. The next higher level for these matters was CINCPAC's Deputy Chief of Staff, MAJ GEN John R. Guthrie, USA, and for the Army, MAJ GEN Donnelly P. Bolton, who was to become USARPAC Chief of Staff and subsequently the first commander of the CINCPAC Support Group. If it had been necessary, the problem could have eventually reached Admiral Gayler and General Donald V. Bennett, CINCUSARPAC, but this was never necessary. Admiral McClendon and Colonel Dexter did get together many times during this period, and the command arrangements finally agreed upon were the result of final meetings attended by Generals Guthrie and Bolton, Admiral McClendon, Colonel Dexter, and other representatives of the two staffs.

(U) In a 17 August message, General Bennett sent to the Department of the Army the command relationships that had been jointly agreed upon. General Bennett advised of CINCPAC concurrence, and the command relationships that evolved reflected precisely those agreed upon. (General Bennett concluded, however, by advising the Department of the Army that the CINCPAC staff had expressed concern on the adequacy of manning for certain functions of the CINCPAC Support Group.) On 17 September the Army Vice Chief of Staff forwarded to the Chairman of the JCS these same command relationships, without modification.[1]

(U) On 5 November the Department of the Army sent CINCUSARPAC the terms of reference for the CINCPAC Support Group; the next day these were forwarded to CINCPAC. The CINCPAC staff reviewed them and found no major problem areas.

(U) The mission and command relationships statements were as agreed earlier by CINCUSARPAC and CINCPAC. Exerpts follow:

> ...Mission statement. The CINCPAC Support Group (CSG), as a Headquarters, Department of the Army Field Operating Agency (FOA):
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> a. Provides liaison, advice and assistance to and has coordinating authority (coordination authority defined in JCS Pub 2, para 30281-30283) with Headquarters, Pacific Command (PACOM) and the PACOM Service components on Army matters concerning PACOM.

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1. CINCUSARPAC 170135Z Aug 74; VCSA 171446Z Sep 74.

b. Assists Headquarters, PACOM in the preparation of plans and prepares the primary Army supporting plans for areas not within the geographical area of a Pacific major Army command.

...Command Relationships.

1. Relationship with CINCPAC. Eff[ective] with the disestablishment of HQ USARPAC, there will be no single Army component or Army component commander in PACOM in the context of para 30231, JCS Pub 2. The CDR, CSG will discharge Army responsibilities to CINCPAC that must be performed in Hawaii. The following command relationships pertain:

a. For PACOM-assigned Army forces [JCSM-366-74 of 1 July 1974, Annex C, was the source document for determination of Army forces assigned to the PACOM] that are assigned to Army components of sub-unified Cmds, CINCPAC will exercise OPCOM through the Cdrs of sub-unified Cmds. Para 30234, JCS Pub 2, applies as pertains to the authorities and responsibilities of component commanders of sub-unified commands.

b. For PACOM-assigned Army forces that are not further assigned to Army components of sub-unified Cmds [such as the 25th Infantry Division], CINCPAC will exercise operational command through CDR, CSG. CDR, CSG will, for such forces, exercise the Army responsibilities to CINCPAC that are outlined in para 20232, JCS Pub 2, although CDR, CSG is not designated a component commander.

c. For Army operating elements of the Defense Communications System, CINCPAC will have operational command authority (para 30813B(2), JCS Pub 2) through CDR, CSG.

d. Except as otherwise provided for by this TOR and explicit in the MACOMS [Major Army Commands] reporting to subunified commands for operational control, the CDR, CSG will maintain the staff relationship with CINCPAC that had previously existed between CINCPAC and CINCUSARPAC.

e. CDR, CSG will:

(1) Provide liaison, advice and assistance to CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT and CINCPACAF concerning Army matters in PACOM within assigned functional responsibilities.

(2) Act as coordinating authority for DA and PACOM stationed Army organizations, as required, to CINCPAC and the PACOM Service components "for matters which transcend one MACOM area."

(3) Be responsive to CINCPAC's directive authority in the field of logistics, when such direction involves more than one Army organization/command and which transcends the responsibilities of one MACOM.

(4) Be CINCPAC's Executive Agent for operation of the Pacific Intelligence Training Center (PITC) [formerly the Foreign Intelligence Training Center] and the Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G) Center of Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC).

(5) Provide Army participation on various CINCPAC boards/committees as required.

(6) Act as DA coordinating authority during development of new functional relationships between CINCPAC and US Army forces in PACOM, as required following reorganization.

2. Relationship with MACOMS and other Army organizations and activities: The CSG, a HQ DA FOA, provides a representative cross-section of the Department of the Army staff in close proximity to HQ PACOM and the PACOM Service component headquarters. The following command relationships pertain:

a. For PACOM-assigned Army forces that are assigned to Army components of subordinate unified commands (MACOMS), CINCPAC will exercise operational command through commanders of subordinate unified commands. Para 30234, JCS Pub 2, applies as pertains to the authorities and responsibilities of component commanders of subordinate unified commands.

b. For Army operating elements of the Defense Communications System, operating communication links within a subordinate unified command (MACOM) geographic area, the

MACOM (Army component) commander will be responsive to the subordinate unified command, operational command authority (para 30813B(2), JCS Pub 2).

c. Army component commanders of subordinate unified commands (MACOM CDR) will be responsive to CINCPAC's directive authority in the field of logistics through the commander of the subordinate unified commands, when such direction is peculiar to one subordinate unified command geographic area and when CINCPAC exercises this channel.

d. Army uniservice responsibilities as delineated in para 30232 and 30233, JCS Pub 2 will be satisfied in Korea and Japan by the commanders of the Army component commands (MACOM).

e. The CDR, CSG will:

(1) Not be in the Army chain of command nor act as a component commander for Army forces stationed in the PACOM area.

(2) Communicate directly with the MACOMs (and other Army organizations) to secure information, advice and recommendations required to accomplish assigned tasks.

(3) Act as DA coordinating authority for Army matters of CINCPAC concern which transcend one MACOM area.

3. Relationships with US Army Support Command Hawaii (USASCH): A host/tenant relationship between USASCH (host) and CSG (tenant) will be established. In addition, to accomplish required Army functions in Hawaii, Guam, Johnston Island, and TTPI:

a. For PACOM-assigned Army forces that are not further assigned to Army components of subordinate unified commands, CINCPAC will exercise operational command through CDR, CSG. CDR, CSG will, for such forces, exercise the Army responsibilities to CINCPAC that are outlined in para 30232, JCS Pub 2, although CDR, CSG is not designated a component commander.

b. CINCPAC has coordinating authority in his role as the senior DOD representative in Hawaii.

c. CDR, CSG will:

(1) Coordinate matters of common interest between CINCPAC and CDR, USASCH.

(2) Act as CINCPAC's Executive Agent for operation of the MC&G Center of IPAC.

d. CDR, USASCH will:

(1) As a subordinate of CDR, FORSCOM, exercise command of assigned Army forces, less operational command, of PACOM assigned forces, stationed in Hawaii, Johnston Island, Guam, and TTPI.

(2) In those functional areas in which previous staff relationships have been established between CINCPAC and CDR, USASCH or have been transferred from USARPAC to CDR, USASCH, these relationships will be maintained between CINCPAC and CDR, USASCH.

.....

...Section III. Planning in the Pacific.

1. For areas not within the geographical area of responsibility of a Pacific MACOM, the CDR, CSG will:

a. Assist HQ PACOM in the preparation of plans in accordance with the current CINCPAC Planning Guidance Manual.

b. Prepare primary Army supporting plans required to support HQ PACOM plans.

c. Direct, for HQ DA, the development and preparation of all Army plans in support of the primary Army plan, and approve, for HQ DA, uniservice aspects of these plans.

2. For areas within the geographical area of responsibility of a PACOM MACOM, the MACOM commanders will:

a. Assist HQ PACOM in the preparation of plans in accordance with the current CINCPAC Planning Guidance Manual.

b. Prepare primary Army supporting plans required to support HQ PACOM plans.

c. Direct, for HQ DA, the development and preparation of all Army plans in support of the primary Army plan. Approve, for HQ DA, uniservice aspects of these plans.

3. For areas within Hawaii, Johnston Island, Guam, and the TTPI, the CDR, CSG will review and approve all Army plans prepared under the direction of the CDR, USASCH in support of CINCPAC contingency plan requirements. Strategic planning for these areas will be the responsibility of the CDR, CSG.

4. The CSG will coordinate and prepare a Time Phased Force and Deployment List for all plans as required by CINCPAC. MACOMS will perform this function for plans within their respective geographical areas of responsibility consistent with available computer capability. CSG will continue to provide this service in non-MACOM areas when required.

5. In response to requests from HQ PACOM, CSG will review plans pertaining to the Pacific area.

6. If problem areas, disagreements or nonconcurrences surface during the CSG/MACOM review/approval of plans, attempts will be made for resolution within the definition of a coordinating authority (JCS Pub 2). When consultation does not result in resolution, the problem will be forwarded to HQ DA for decision.

...Section IV. Functional responsibilities of the CSG.

1. Represent HQ DA in relations with HQ PACOM and the PACOM Service components headquarters in Hawaii.

2. Perform as the DA Executive Agent for the accomplishemnt of Army responsibilities regarding CINCPAC's:

a. Operational command of PACOM-assigned Army Forces not further assigned to Army components of subunified commands.

b. Operational command authority over Army operating elements of the Defense Communications System in PACOM....

c. Directive authority in the field of logistics... of PACOM-assigned Army forces not addressed through subordinate unified command channels.

.....

6. Arrange and coordinate Army Support for CINCPAC requirements, outside of MACOM geographical areas or when requirements transcend one MACOM area, in the following functional areas:

a. Personnel: Provide DA established policy information concerning military and civilian manpower and personnel, education, welfare, morale, and other personnel functions....

b. Intelligence: Coordinate CINCPAC tasking of Departmentally controlled intelligence elements, as required.

c. Operations:

(1) Provide DA established policy information and coordinate requirements concerning Army aviation, civil affairs, psychological operations, unconventional warfare, air defense, and nuclear, chemical, and electronic warfare as required.

(2) Provide advice to CINCPAC concerning readiness of those Army organizations not reporting through sub-unified command channels, to include information for the CINCPAC semi-annual readiness report.

(3) Undertake tasks for and represent the Chief, Military History in the Pacific area, as required.

(4) Coordinate Army participation in joint training and exercises outside of MACOM areas.

(5) Provide advice on Army Service doctrine and review Service and joint doctrine.

d. Logistics. Provide DA established logistic policy information concerning war reserves, supply, transportation, maintenance, engineering..., subsistence, petroleum, field service and defense interservice support.

e. Communications-electronics. Provide, within regulations, DA established C-E policy, plans, standards, programs, operational procedures, and/or concepts, as required....

f. Medical services.

(1) Provide DA established policy concerning the Army's health care delivery system....

.....

(3) Provide liaison, advice and assistance to CINCPAC and PACOM Service components concerning medical matters in WESTPAC MACOMs involving more than one MACOM, and act as the Army medical coordinating authority to CINCPAC and Service components in this regard.

(4) Provide liaison and advice to CINCPAC in the preparation, review, coordination and interface of the medical portion of logistics plans, policies, and procedures.

.....

g. Security assistance:

(1) Function as operating agency (OA) 82 for the distribution of security assistance MAP training and MAP funds throughout WESTPAC.

(2) Provide liaison, advice and assistance and has coordinating authority to include policy, plans, procedures and programs concerning ground forces of participating foreign countries in PACOM; the Army security assistance training program, and Army-supported materiel portions of security assistance programs to include logistic services, supply support, standardization, modernization, and maintenance of equipment.[1]

(U) JCS-SM-25-75 of 22 January 1975 officially recognized the command relationships and arrangements that had been worked out between the Army and CINCPAC.

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1. DA WASH DC 051805Z Nov 74, retransmitted as CINCUSARPAC 062248Z Nov 74.

(U) Meanwhile, with the retirement of both CINCUSARPAC and his deputy on 31 August, General Richard E. Stilwell was named CINCUSARPAC. He served in this capacity from Seoul, Korea, where he was already triple-hatted as CINC, United Nations Command, COMUS Korea, and CG, U.S. Eighth Army until the end of 1974 and the disestablishment. MAJ GEN Donnelly P. Bolton became USARPAC Chief of Staff and directed activities from Fort Shafter. Periodic meetings continued between the CINCPAC and USARPAC staffs to assure a smooth transition toward the USARPAC disestablishment.[1]

(S) The consolidations and reductions in PACOM headquarters throughout the command are summarized below as they pertain to Army matters. On 1 July the U.S. Army Support Command Thailand was reorganized, redesignated the MACTHAI Support Group, and placed under command of COMUSMACTHAI. The MACTHAI headquarters was being reduced in relation to the planned general drawdown of U.S. Forces. At the end of 1974 it was planned to disestablish MACTHAI by the end of FY 76 (although it was planned to retain JUSMAGTHAI). Also on 1 July the United Nations Command, U.S. Forces Korea, and Eighth Army were consolidated into a single headquarters (although this was still awaiting final JCS approval of the Joint Manpower Program at the end of 1974). COMUS Korea, as a subordinate unified commander under CINCPAC assumed operational command/operational control of all PACOM-assigned U.S. Army forces in Korea effective 160001Z December 1974. The CINCUNC/COMUS Korea had Service component commanders for purposes of the operational control of assigned forces. The Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army served as the Army component commander for both CINCUNC and COMUS Korea. (General Stilwell commanded all of these organizations.) After the phaseout of USARPAC headquarters (General Stilwell was also CINCUSARPAC at this time), the Eighth Army commander would be under the command, less operational control, of the Department of the Army, and under the operational control of CINCPAC. As the UNC Army component commander, the Eighth Army commander exercised control over Republic of Korea ground forces as directed by CINCUNC.[2]


(S) In Japan, the principal Army headquarters was U.S. Army Japan. The Commander of that organization had been a brigadier general until the May 1972 reversion of Okinawa, at which time a lieutenant general billet had been transferred to Tokyo for that command. On 7 November representatives of CINCUSARPAC and COMUS Japan met with the CINCPAC staff at the PACOM headquarters to develop revised terms of reference, which were subsequently submitted to

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1. Honolulu Advertiser, 31 Aug 74, p. A-12
2. J511 Point Paper, 17 Aug 74, Subj: Command Relationship - Republic of Korea; J565 Point Paper, 26 Dec 74, Subj: PACOM Command Structure - Impacts of Headquarters Reorganizations/Reductions (U); J5111 Point Paper, 2 Jan 75, Subj: Command Arrangements in Korea (U).

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS IN PACOM

(1 JANUARY 1975)



Source: J565 Point Paper, 26 Dec 74, Subj: PACOM Command Structure - Impacts of Headquarters Reorganizations/Reductions (U).

CINCPAC for approval on 18 November, and approved on 7 December. Operational control of IX Corps was assumed by COMUS Japan on 16 December. The U.S. Forces Japan headquarters was small and minimally staffed; impact of assumption of OPCON would be assessed before additional reorganizations or reductions would be studied.[1]

(U) In summary, CINCPAC no longer had an Army component commander in Hawaii. The Commander of the CINCPAC Support Group was, instead, in command of a 145-man field operating agency of the Department of the Army, which was to provide liaison, advice, assistance, and coordination authority on PACOM

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1. J5113 HistSum Nov 74; COMUSJAPAN 182315Z Nov 74; CINCPAC 072155Z Dec 74; J565 Point Paper, 26 Dec 74, Subj: PACOM Command Structure - Impacts of Headquarters Reorganizations/Reductions (U); J511 Point Paper, 27 Dec 74, Subj: U.S. Forces Japan (U).

Army matters to CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCPACAF. He was responsive to CINCPAC's directive authority in the field of logistics. CINCPAC would exercise operational command of the 25th Infantry Division, located on Oahu, through the Commander, CINCPAC Support Group.

(U) The U.S. Army Support Command Hawaii continued most of its functions, but it became a subordinate unit of the U.S. Army Forces Command. The Commander of the Support Command exercised command, less operational command, of JCS-assigned Army elements in Hawaii, Guam, Johnston Island, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Dual-hatted as commander of both the U.S. Army Support Command, Hawaii and the CINCPAC Support Group was MAJ GEN Donnelly P. Bolton.[1]

Headquarters and Manpower Reductions in Pacific Air Forces

(C) On 13 November the Air Force provided the JCS the details concerning their reorganization concept for the Air Force structure in the Pacific. Various aspects of the plan remained under study through the end of the year, but implementing actions were delayed, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, until a review of the Unified Command Plan scheduled for the spring of 1975.

(C) The Air Force proposal called for the disestablishment of Pacific Air Forces headquarters, although the concept of an Air Force component commander to CINCPAC was retained (unlike the Army reorganization, discussed elsewhere in this chapter). The plan provided for a small Air Force staff group to support this component commander, who was designated Commander Air Forces Pacific (COMAFPAC), and the transfer of command, less operational control, of USAF forces in the PACOM to major Air Force commands: the Tactical Air Command, Military Airlift Command, and Aerospace Defense Command. Potential savings in manpower authorizations were considered to be 3,000 spaces in Hawaii, including 650 civilians; 881 in PACOM numbered Air Forces headquarters and above; and 2,375 manpower authorizations that were excess to USAF requirements in the Pacific.[2]

(C) On 25 November the JCS advised that they had received the memorandum from the Air Force Chief of Staff announcing the Pacific reductions. (Details of the plan were in JCS 1259/765-1 of 13 November.) One aspect of the proposal, the JCS advised, was the establishment of a Deputy Commander in Chief Pacific billet. That officer would serve concurrently as COMAFPAC, commander of the USAF component to CINCPAC. CINCPAC's comments were requested.[3]

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1. J561 HistSum Dec 74.
2. J562 Point Paper, 2 Jan 75, Subj: Headquarters and Manpower Reductions in Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) (U).
3. JCS 7223/252308Z Nov 74.

(S) From the time of the first proposed Service force and base reductions in the PACOM following the start of the withdrawal of forces from Vietnam, CINCPAC had frequently reiterated his views on the fact that these individual actions were part of a larger whole. CINCPAC addressed some of these larger issues in his reply of 28 November. He said:

> ...I am concerned with tendency to treat Service organizations in PACOM as independent variables rather than as part of a unified fighting force. Operations in PACOM are joint operations embracing, in addition to military, political, intelligence, planning and assistance functions, which must not be fragmented by unilateral Service actions. Fundamental to my view is firm belief that retention of PACOM as unified command, supported by sub-unified command structure is essential to accomplishment of US interests throughout area. While I would prefer continuation of Service headquarters in PACOM to support CINCPAC and to fulfill statutory functions reserved to Services, I am open to alternative solutions. My objectives are organization assuring unity of command; one which recognizes both Pacific and Indian Ocean basins as strategic entities and the politico-military aspects of military presence in the Pacific; one that can transition to contingency or general war without disruptive changes in headquarters or command and control; and one which retains Service identity.
>
> ...I supported and continue to support an Air Force four-star billet in PACOM, but I do not believe establishment of DEPCINCPAC dual-hatted as COMAFPAC is a good solution. DEPCINC cannot function effectively as component commander and fulfill CINCPAC responsibilities. I am not aware of any clear cut overriding advantages justifying an arrangement so awkward.
>
> ...Support retention of USAF component commander with reduced staff...[as had been proposed by the Air Force]. However, the unified commander must maintain flexibility to exercise his command as the situation may dictate, either through the sub-unified commander or component commander.... [The Air Force] proposal to carry out USAF statutory functions in TAC, MAC and ADC vice AFPAC concerns me but acceptable in principle subject to coordinated review with CINCPAC. I must be sure no needed functions slip

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1. JCS 7223/252308Z Nov 74.

through the cracks, and that it is responsive in fact as well as in theory.

...Major Air Force headquarters seen best located nearer postured force. Good solution locating USAF component commander in Philippines dual-hatted as Commander, 13th AF. Recognize political problems both American and Filipino and problems of timing. Action accents U.S. presence, signals continued U.S. resolve SEASIA during USSAG/7th AF drawdown, maintains direct operational command line from CINCPAC to operational forces in that area.

...Let me now state two matters which should always be kept in mind.

One. We don't have the chance of a snowball in hell of a truly efficient and effective military unless we support and mature unified command. This is particularly true in the Pacific.

Two. We must be careful in our enthusiasm for teeth vs tail that we do not phase out essential combat related military specialties whose early availability is essential to effective operations as well as competent military planning.[1]

(C) Ongoing JCS action on the Air Force proposal addressed only the matter of establishment of a Deputy CINCPAC, dual-hatted as COMAFPAC; they "noted" other aspects of the plan.[2]

(U) Early in December news of major Air Force base and force realignments began surfacing in the press. Official announcement of the disestablishment of PACAF was made on 10 December, following approval by the Secretary of Defense. It was announced that the result would be a reduction of about 2,400 military and civilian positions in Hawaii and a reduction of annual headquarters and support costs for the Air Force of approximately $34 million. "Overall operational control of USAF units in the Pacific will remain the responsibility of an Air Force component commander. The Air Force relationship as a component of Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command will be unchanged."[3]

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1. CINCPAC 282205Z Nov 74.
2. J563 Summary Paper, 12 Dec 74, Subj: Reorganization/Reductions Plans (PACOM/PACAF) (U).
3. SECDEF 3147/030047Z Dec 74; SECSTATE 072242Z Dec 74.

(S) Implementation of the Air Force proposal, however, was delayed pending Congressional review of the plan for the Defense Department unified command structure, which was scheduled to be submitted to Congress on 1 March 1975. Meanwhile specific points of the Air Force proposal were being developed by the Air Staff. Among items that remained under study, some of which were discussed above, were retention of a 93-man staff in Hawaii to assist the commander; consolidation of appropriate Hickam Air Force Base activities under the Military Airlift Command; assignment of numbered Air Forces and units to the Tactical Air Command; assignment of the 326th Air Division (Hawaii) to the Aerospace Defense Command; retention of the 5th and 13th Air Forces and the 314th Air Division (in Korea); disestablishment of USSAG/7th AF and the 313th Air Division (on Okinawa) by the end of FY 75; and the proposal that the Air Force not continue to fill the position of CINCPAC Chief of Staff, an Air Force lieutenant general billet.[1]

(U) This matter of Air Force reorganization was not resolved, however, and in January 1975 the original proposal was rescinded.

U.S. Defense Representatives in Foreign Countries (USDR)

(C) Throughout many countries in the PACOM there were a large number of semi-independent Defense Department organizations--not PACOM agencies--that reported directly to parent organizations outside the host country and that were without any mechanism for in-country coordination. The result of this situation was redundancy, and confusion to host governments and other U.S. agencies. Study of this matter had been begun in 1973 with the Greater Manila area the first for CINCPAC review. In a longer-range view, CINCPAC believed that it was desirable to have the Defense Department authorize a single U.S. military coordinator in each country.[2]

(C) Early in 1974 CINCPAC provided his views to the JCS. He believed that a single point of contact for all Defense Department elements in foreign countries was essential to eliminate unnecessary duplications, provide a coordinated DOD/PACOM voice to the Ambassador and host country military, and to assure the degree of awareness and responsiveness required by unified commanders. He recommended designation of the senior U.S. officer in a country as the Senior U.S. Military Representative for all DOD activities, responsible to the JCS through the unified commander. His functions, CINCPAC proposed, would include: serving as senior military advisor to the Ambassador, reporting significant CINCPAC/DOD activities to CINCPAC, directing all U.S.

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1. J563 Point Paper, 23 Jan 75, Subj: Reorganization of U.S. Air Force in PACOM (U).
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol I, p. 45.

in-country military activity except mission accomplishment, exercising directive coordination to eliminate redundant administrative and support functions, recommending through CINCPAC changes in mission assignment for DOD activities, and insuring in-country compliance with CINCPAC and higher directives. The activities would retain direct access to their parent organizations, however, relative to personnel, administrative, and technical matters. The new guidance to be provided by the JCS, CINCPAC recommended:

> ...must explicitly define the responsibilities of this office, its functions, and the related tasking of all other DOD organizations and agencies. There should be no military organizations located in the PACOM which do not come under CINCPAC authority. On a case by case basis we can determine the degree and source of control needed to insure both coherent PACOM action and unit mission accomplishment.
>
> ...We need to maintain a direct and open line from CINCPAC to the senior country agent. CINCPAC should be responsible for preparing the fitness reports and efficiency rating of the senior officer in each country. By careful detailing we can handle the problem of seniority....[1]

(C) The JCS presented their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on 11 June (in JCSM 240-74). Their proposal was that CINCPAC would designate the DOD position in each country for additional designation as U.S. Defense Representative. The position designated would normally be occupied by the senior military officer assigned to permanent duty and responsibility in that country. The duties of the USDR were in addition to his primary duty assignment. The proposals would not change the military chain of command, authority of the military department or DOD agencies to exercise technical control over internal administration of their elements, normal direct access of military attaches to host government military and other officials, relationships and responsibilities between Service attaches and the chiefs of their Services and Secretaries of their military departments, or the attache's role as adviser to the Ambassador or Chief of Mission. The reporting channel would be from the USDR, to CINCPAC, to the JCS, to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. When a Defense Attache was assigned as USDR, his attache title, responsibilities, and reporting channels through the Defense Intelligence Agency were unchanged. He would report through CINCPAC and the JCS to the Office of the Secretary, however, for discharge of his USDR responsibilities.

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1. CINCPAC 050507Z Jan 74. CINCPAC provided the JCS with a list of offices or positions he believed should be responsible for performing senior Defense representative functions in 060127Z Mar 74.

CINCPAC may provide a letter of evaluation for inclusion as part of his rating concerning his USDR performance.

(C) The USDR would act as the focal point for coordination of general data concerning Defense Department elements in a country. He would provide advice and information to the Ambassador. He would keep CINCPAC and the JCS informed of DOD in-country activities. Also, he would take the initiative to improve the interface between Defense Department elements, the Ambassador, and the host government defense establishment. He would act as DOD Coordinating Authority to eliminate redundant administrative and support functions. (In connection with the definition of "Coordinating Authority" CINCPAC had recommended a change to JCS Publication 2, as discussed below.) This authority permitted him to require consultation among all Defense Department elements, but no authority to compel agreement. Disagreements were to be referred to CINCPAC. The USDR was also to perform representational responsibilities to the host government defense establishment and the Ambassador that were not otherwise assigned. The USDR would not exercise mission tasking authority over DOD elements that did not normally report through the position he occupied as his primary duty assignment. The Services, Defense Department agencies, and activities would insure that the USDR was kept informed so that he could fulfill his responsibilities.[1]

(C) The Office of the Secretary of Defense reviewed the JCS proposals, adding a paragraph that gave the USDR directive authority over all DOD elements in a country in emergency situations. The thrust of the JCS paper was retained.

(C) The Defense Intelligency Agency did not concur in these proposals and recommended that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs delay approval and implementation pending results of a study of Military Assistance Groups and Missions expected to be completed in February 1975.[2]

(C) The USDR, it appeared, would not have the directive authority CINCPAC had hoped for. Earlier he had sought ot revise JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, regarding "directive authority" to enlarge the scope of such authority to all Defense Department elements. The Senior U.S. Military Authority (SUSMA, as this title was then styled), CINCPAC believed, "must be the in-country representative of Secretary of Defense thru JCS and unified

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1. J563 Point Paper, 4 Sep 74, Subj: Senior Defense Representatives in Foreign Countries.
2. J563 Point Paper, 12 Jun 74, Subj: Senior Defense Representatives in Foreign Countries (U); J563 Point Paper, 25 Jan 75, Subj: U.S. Defense Representatives in Foreign Countries (U).

commander with directive authority except for mission accomplishment over all DOD personnel, military or civilian, regardless of Service/command/agency affiliation. He proposed that JCS Pub 2, paragraph 30202A(5) be modified to read as follows:

> ...Exercise directive authority over all elements of his command and all other DOD agencies in his area, in accordance with policies and procedures established by higher authority, in relationships with foreign governments including the armed forces thereof, and the U.S. Country Team.

CINCPAC noted that the existing text was unclear in defining the concept of support in situations short of open hostilities.[1]

Alaskan Command Responsibilities

(C) On 1 January 1972 the Unified Command Plan was revised. At that time it had been determined to retain the Alaskan Command as a unified command. That command continued to be assigned responsibility for U.S. Forces on the continental land mass of Alaska as well as the islands of the Alexander Archipelago and Kodiak, Nunivak, and Little Diomede Island. CINCPAC, however, assumed responsibility for the Aleutian Chain and the islands in the Bering Sea (except for air defense responsibilities which were retained by CINC Alaska acting in his capacity as the North American Air Defense Command Alaskan Region Commander). The Commander of the Naval Station at Adak was designated the Single Senior Military Representative in the Aleutions in order to provide a point of contact for coordination of routine administrative matters in the Aleutions requiring interface with CINCAL.[2]

(C) Study of further revision of the Unified Command Plan took place in 1974. (See "PACOM Reorganizations/Reductions and Unified Command Plan Actions" elsewhere in this chapter.) On 2 July the JCS advised of deliberations on possible changes to the plan, and indicated that geographic responsibility for the Aleutions might become an issue. They asked for the views of CINCPAC and CINCAL on this responsibility, considering either the existing assignment to CINCPAC or considering that the Aleutions be geographically assigned with the remainder of the State of Alaska.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 050024Z Apr 74.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, pp. 41-49.
3. JCS 6406/022144Z Jul 74.

(S) CINCPAC replied on 20 July. He advised that the Aleutions were utilized to support PACOM forces involved in antisubmarine warfare (Sound Surveillance Underwater and P3) operations, PONY EXPRESS operations (supplementary collection operations against foreign missile and space activities), the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program, and ocean surveillance air patrols, and were important to protection of critical CINCPAC air and sea lines of communication to Northeast Asia. He concluded that the Aleutions were an important part of the Pacific Basin, and recommended that responsibility for this area continue to be assigned to CINCPAC.[1]

(S) CINCAL did not agree. He recommended that on the next revision of the Unified Command Plan the Aleutions and all U.S. islands in the Bering Sea be returned to the control of the Alaskan Command or its successor. He said that while the two commands had worked out basic agreements, "arbitrary splitting of State of Alaska unnecessarily compounds problems of coordination." He listed a number of areas of mutual concern, and recommended that the Aleutions be returned to ALCOM and that the PACOM continue to be responsible for the seaward defense of the State of Alaska.[2]

(C) On 6 September the JCS advised that, subject to Presidential approval, they planned to disestablish the Alaskan Command as early as the end of FY 75.[3]

(C) The Unified Command Plan and the assignment of responsibility for the Aleutions was under study in Washington at the end of the year.

CINCPAC-CINCLANT Command Arrangements Agreement

(S) In December 1973 CINCPAC had proposed amending the CINCPAC/CINCLANT Command Arrangements Agreement (of 12 July 1972) to cover the situation in which PACOM Naval forces transited LANTCOM's area of responsibility to augment the European Command. CINCLANT agreed to the proposal and indicated that a revised agreement would be forwarded to CINCPAC for signature. This was done on 26 December.

(S) As proposed, PACOM Navy and Marine augmentation forces would pass to CINCLANT's operational command upon entering LANTCOM's geographic area of responsibility as defined in the Unified Command Plan. They would then pass to USCINCEUR's operational command in accordance with CINCLANT/CINCEUR agreements. CINCPAC was to be responsible for the completion of all movement

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1. CINCPAC 202026Z Jul 74.
2. CINCAL 291802Z Jul 74.
3. JCS 5220/061930Z Sep 74.

planning required by the Joint Operation Planning System; CINCLANT was to be responsible for planning the receipt of PACOM Navy forces and for planning and coordinating their onward movement to destinations specified by CINCEUR. CINCLANT was to be responsible for the onward movement of PACOM Marines only to the extent that unforeseen difficulties mught require unplanned delays or holds of personnel while in the LANTCOM. Military Sealift Command shipping transporting Marine equipment would be integrated into LANTCOM Naval control and protection of shipping procedures at Unified Command Plan "chop" [Change Operational Control] points.[1]

(S) CINCPAC signed the agreement on 26 March 1974 and directed that it be routed back to CINCLANT through the JCS. The purpose of such routing was to advise the JCS formally that CINCPAC questioned the principle of redeployment of PACOM forces to NATO. Planning to move troops to support NATO from the PACOM had begun in 1968, and CINCPAC had provided his views on this subject from time to time. His letter of 26 March 1974 noted that redeployment of forces from Asia to NATO was very hazardous and could reslut in unacceptable losses in forces and shipping. Also, forces might not be able to disengage and redeploy rapidly enough to meet NATO requirements. The process of redeployment itself, CINCPAC noted, resulted in forces that could not contribute effectively in either theater for extended periods. Also, planning to do such redeployment gave a false impression of real capabilities. The JCS responded that "CINCPAC" comments are noted," and forwarded the agreement to CINCLANT.[2]

CINCPAC-CINCEUR Command Arrangements Agreement

(S) On 16 April the Commander in Chief of the European Command forwarded a proposed draft of a USCINCEUR-CINCPAC Command Arrangements Agreement. He noted the contiguous areas of responsibility of the two commanders, and recognized the possible situations in which the employment in proximity of forces of both unified commands might be required or beneficial to U.S. objectives. The purpose of establishing command arrangements was to promote effective mutual support between the forces of the two commands, he said. He then listed possible arrangements in regard to the authorization of direct liaison for planning, cooperative measures for intelligence matters, and particularly with regard to exchange of operational command for the Mid-East Force and Indian Ocean task forces.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 070311Z Dec 73; CINCLANT 102207Z Dec 73.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. I, pp. 104-106; CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I. p. 44; J5221 HistSum Nov 74, which cited CINCPAC ltr Ser J51/00244 of 26 Mar 74 and DJSM-598-74 of 26 Apr 74.
3. USCINCEUR Vaihingen Germany 6822/161632Z Apr 74.

(C) Action on the proposal was suspended when review of the Unified Command Plan was initiated in Washington, as changes to the UCP would impact on the proposed agreement. On 11 November CINCPAC advised that he had held his response pending the outcome of UCP deliberations. Even with such revisions completed and forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, however, he noted that the command structure for the Middle East and Indian Ocean areas remained under review. (This is discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this chapter under the title "PACOM Reorganizations/Reductions and Unified Command Plan Actions.") CINCPAC, therfore, believed it prudent to hold in abeyance consideration of such a Command Arrangement Agreement.[1]

Command and Control Facilities

(U) Actions continued in 1974 to improve the command and control facilities at CINCPAC's headquarters, although no major upgrading actions were entirely completed. In plans to upgrade the Command Center at Camp Smith, research had delineated alternatives in fulfilling requirements for ADP and information display support. The basic recommendation was for a dedicated Command Center Support Subsystem with minicomputers interfacing with hardware of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System. On 23 November CINCPAC requested assistance from an expert from the Naval Electronics System Command headquarters, as planning had reached the final definition phase for specifications.[2]

(TS) In plans to upgrade CINCPAC's command administrative aircraft to Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) configuration, the Operations Directorate had been tasked early in the year to identify the concept that would best provide a survivable ABNCP command and control element at least cost. After a study of capabilities, CINCPAC on 27 March decided to proceed with a recommendation that his aircraft be upgraded with additional communications equipment that would allow it to also perform the mission of the ABNCP fleet would be reduced from four to three aircraft when this was accomplished, but that those aircraft would be augmented by the command administrative support aircraft when a continuous airborne posture was required. It was expected that this arrangement would result in an annual saving of $200,000, in addition to providing a standardized fleet of aircraft. It was first necessary to obtain JCS approval and funding, however.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 111417Z Nov 74.
2. J3352 HistSum Sep 74; J3352 HistSum Nov 74, which cited CINCPAC 230117Z Nov 74.
3. J335 HistSum Mar 74.

Computer Support

(U) Significant improvements were made in 1974 in the computer support available. By 26 June the bulk of the support was being provided by the New Standard System Honeywell 6050, and the IBM 360/50 had been discontinued and removed. This new equipment was part of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS), long awaited by CINCPAC. Work continued on conversion of those nuclear support applications still running on the CDC 1604 system. A few programs on the old IBM equipment, not yet replaced by the WWMCCS system, were run on Fleet Marine Force IBM 360/50 equipment until the standard systems arrived. In order to provide better service, the Honeywell was upgraded to a 6060 in March, and in November the core was expanded to 256K words.[1]

(U) With the introduction and installation of the WWMCCS and associated ADP systems, more large, complex, integrated data bases had emerged to support CINCPAC staff functions. To insure the most effective and efficient use of ADP resources in support of those requirements and applications, it was believed that centralized management was essential. For this reason, a Data Administration/Information Management office was established in the Communications-Electronics Directorate with the following goals: (a) insure that data bases implemented on the CINCPAC WWMCCS ADP system would interface properly with those of higher authority; (b) insure the proper degree of standardization and coordination of CINCPAC-developed systems and related documentation; (c) minimize duplication of reporting requirements and redundant systems as well as ease the burden on subordinate organizations whenever possible; (d) design data bases and accesses that would improve the timeliness, ease of use, and validity of information for use consistent with disclosure and need-to-know considerations and safeguards; and (e) use fully the best available technology pertaining to structuring, accessing, and maintaining data base integrity to satisfy existing and projected information requirements on a cost-effective basis.[2]

(U) Also during 1974, the CINCPAC headquarters provided support on the new WWMCCS computer to the Intelligence Center Pacific, the Navy Public Works Center, the Naval Shore Electronics Engineering Activity, and the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group. Discussions were held about providing support to the Taiwan Defense Command, the Alaskan Command, and the proposed Southeast Asia ADP facility in Thailand. The Thailand facility was under study; in November a System Development Notification was being staffed to seek approval from the JCS and Chief of Naval Operations on plans for a Honeywell remote computer

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1. J6316 HistSum Nov 74; J6/Memo/0006-75, 11 Aug 75, Subj: 1974 CINCPAC Command History; Review of Draft.
2. J631 HistSum Nov 74.

terminal at Camp Samae San that would be interconnected with the Camp Smith Honeywell 6060. In Hawaii, on-going reorganizations and reductions caused plans to be initiated to develop a Regional Computer Service Center on Oahu to provide support to all of the WWMCCS commands on the island. Within the existing system, in August a Common ADP Users Area was established in the basement of the CINCPAC Command Center building (where the hardware was kept); this collection of remote data terminals allowed all users access to the computer system via the terminals, and at the same time promoted efficient utilization of the terminal equipment.[1]

(U) In the matter of WWMCCS standard software applications, one valid measure of progress achieved during the year was believed to be an increased reliance on the ADP system as an aid to planning and decision making. This was reflected in the sophistication of specific applications, some of which are described in the material that follows.

(U) The PACOM SIOP Following System (SIOP - Single Integrated Operation Plan) determined the status and followed the progress of the SIOP in an actual or exercise environment. Through the use of the Single Integrated Data Base (SIDA), it maintained a current world-wide capability and received daily updates from the National Military Command System. In an actual or exercise environment, it became an on-line system and processed incoming Coordination of Atomic Operations Standard Operating Procedures (CAOSOP) messages and provided, through staff reports, the necessary information for decisions.

(U) The Nuclear Strike Planning System provided CINCPAC and his components with an automated method of planning SIOP and contingency nuclear plans. Major functional areas included weaponeering, force applications, route planning, and conflict resolution/sortie timing. Inputs were provided from the PACOM Automated Target File and staff inputs to generate contingency plans and required input to the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff for SIOP planning. The JSTPS Multi-Purpose Strike Timing Tape was processed against the data base and SIOP weapons tape to produce the final SIOP documents for distribution.

(U) The PACOM Automated Target File provided the PACOM intelligence staffs with installation, Desired Ground Zero and weapon data, plus a ranging capability on targets in the CINCPAC area of responsibility. It extracted appropriate information from the National Strategic Target Data Base, the Automated Installations File, and the SIOP weapons tape. It received required staff inputs, and formatted the data into a master file for PACOM use. It also maintained the PACOM portion of the National Strategic Reconnaissance List. The output capability provided for the production of target and weapon data by any combination of Operation Plan or selected data, provided for the

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1. J631 HistSums Nov, Dec 74; J6316 HistSums Nov, Dec 74.

intelligence input to the Nuclear Strike Planning System, had a daily update capability, and could generate special one-time reports from the data base.

(U) The Balanced Force Requirements Analysis Methodology (BALFRAM) was a general purpose computer war gaming model that permitted the sequential interaction of ground, air, naval, and specialty forces, and a sensitivity analysis subroutine to measure effects of uncertain or variable model inputs. Given an enemy level of force, this helped planners estimate friendly force levels and mixes required for any given probabilities of success, or probabilities of success for given friendly force levels and mixes.

(U) The Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) Interim Software (JIS) was the initial automated data processing support system that provided the capability to develop force requirements, to develop movement requirements, and to determine the transportation feasibility of those movements.[1]

Joint Operation Planning System Interim Software

(U) The planning system continued to grow in sophistication, requiring increased use of computer applications. An interim ADP system was designed and used pending availability of a baseline system, the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) III. JOPS III was scheduled for delivery by the office of the JCS in 1975.

(U) The interim ADP system was called JOPS Interim Software (JIS) and was developed through a coordinated effort among USCINCEUR, CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCRED, and the JCS. Development of modules and their associated programs was accomplished by the designated developing commands: CINCRED produced a Force Requirements Generator, CINCLANT a Transportation Feasibility Estimator, CINCPAC a Movement Requirements Generator, and USCINCEUR an Interface/Utility Subsystem Program. JIS was an intergral part of the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).

(U) Phase I testing of JOS was completed in April 1974 at CINCPAC headquarters. This automated support system was the logical progression from the punch-card oriented, manually interfaced, Deployment Reporting System (DEPREP), which conveyed data between the unified commands, the Services, Service components, the transportation operating agencies, and the JCS. CINCPAC used both JIS and DEPREP extensively.

(U) In 1974 a team from European Command headquarters completed installation of and training of the Interface/Utility Subsystem. This newly installed

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1. J631 HistSum Nov 74; J5/Memo/00036-75, 7 Aug 75, Subj: 1974 CINCPAC Command History; review of draft.

JOPS software package provided an interface among the several existing data files resulting in increased authomation of the joint operations planning process. This subsystem became operational and available to the staff. Reciprocally, during the period 30 September-11 October, CINCPAC installed the Movement Requirements Generator at the European Command headquarters.

(U) With the several computer programs available, there was increased emphasis on training planners in the JOPS. The Office of the JCS sponsored a DEPREP training course that had been developed by the USAF Air Training Command and was presented by a traveling team from that command. The 5-day course was presented at Camp Smith from 31 October to 6 November. Representatives of the Army and Navy components attended in addition to CINCPAC staff officers.

Automatic Message Generator System

(U) In February, an Automatic Message Generator System was successfully tested in the Command Center. It was designed to allow the Command Center to prepare, edit, and initiate transmission of messages. It generated messages on the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) computers and transmitted them to the AUTODIN (automatic digital network) by means of a Local Digital Message Exchange (LDMX) computerized message handling system in the Camp Smith Communications Center. The Command Center could generate messages on the form used by the Optical Character Reader in the Communications Center using the keyboard/cathode ray tube device on the WWMCCS computer. The Duty Director of Operations could edit or approve the message, either on the TV-like cathode ray tube screen or on the remote printer. Any changes to text, or additions or deletions could be made quickly. The message generator system had been designed for simplicty of use, as well as to maintain the security and integrity of the data.

(U) At first the system used a magnetic tape to transfer messages from the WWMCCS computer to the LDMX computer, but subsequently a direct electronic interface was available.

(U) Personnel of all using directorates were trained on the message generator, so that information could be entered directly into the WWMCCS for Situation Reports, Force Generation messages, etc. The daily Command Center Briefing Notes were also entered, reviewed, and edited on the automated message generator.[1]

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1. J333 HistSums Feb, Apr 74.

All-Source Information Centers

(S) Command Centers at certain locations in the PACOM served as All-Source Information Centers (ASIC). As the year opened, they were located at the headquarters of CINCPAC, CINCUSARPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, the 5th and 13th Air Forces, COMUSMACTHAI, COMUS Korea, and COMUS TDC. The mission of an ASIC was to gather, correlate, and display on a near-real-time basis all-source information on land, sea, and air activities and, in an emergency, to pass that information vertically and laterally to commanders as soon as possible. ASICs were linked to one another in the PACOM by voice and teletype command communications systems to include as ASICOM teletype system for special intelligence information. Some of the 1974 actions concerning PACOM ASICs are described below.[1]

(S) On 8 March, COMUSMACTHAI informed CINCPAC that as a result of a CINCPAC manpower study, Special Intelligence billets for the command center had been deleted and the ASICOM would be moved to the Special Security Office area, which would not have been in accordance with the ASIC mission. In view of the proposed drawdowns in Southeast Asia and the fact that the only long-haul communication then available from MACTHAI to the Fleet was through San Miguel, in the Philippines, CINCPACAF was asked to examine the feasibility of incorporating MACTHAI ASIC functions into the 13th Air Force facility, at Clark Air Base in the Philippines, to include the MACTHAI area of responsibility in that assigned the 13th Air Force. A conference to discuss this was held at CINCPAC headquarters 10-12 June. As a result, 13th Air Force was directed to assume the MACTHAI responsibilities on 1 July. This was actually accomplished on 11 July.[2]

(S) The requirement for a CINCUSARPAC ASIC came under study as plans continued to disestablish that headquarters. On 12 August CINCUSARPAC asked CINCPAC to be relieved of responsibility for 24-hour operations, with a phasedown to stand-by status on 1 September and with closing of the terminal effective with the disestablishment of that headquarters, as the CINCPAC Support Group, the follow-on organization, would control no forces and thus would require no entry into the ASIC net. On 6 September CINCPAC directed CINCUSARPAC to disestablish the ASIC immediately and close the communications terminal.[3]

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1. J332 Point Papers, undated, Subj: All Source Information Centers (ASIC) and MACTHAI ASIC Reorganization.
2. Ibid., J333 HistSum Jun 74; CINCPAC 112359Z Jul 74.
3. CINCUSARPAC 121942Z Aug 74; CINCAPC 060125Z Sep 74.

* Emergency Action Procedures

[redacted]

1. J331 HistSum Feb 74.
2. J33 HistSum May 74.

[redacted]

(S) Another conference was held in Washington 10 and 11 September to discuss revised procedures to be effective 1 October and 1 January 1975. Topics included operations security, improvement of the WHITE PINNACLE System based on real-world experience, the Permissive Action Link unlock system, World-Wide Military Command and Control System requirements and Emergency Action Message handling, and nuclear weapons employment policy.[1]

(S) A CINCPAC staff assistance visit was conducted 8-19 October to review and discuss emergency action procedures. The team visited Guam, Japan (and Okinawa), Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. Areas of interest were the PACOM command and control communications systems; the PACOM alert notification systems and procedures; the use, control, and storage of Sealed Authenticator Systems, emergency action procedures, and All-Source Information Center procedures. Units of interest were SIOP units, Emergency Action Message relay stations, command centers, and ACEs.[2]

PACOM Missile Tactical Warning

[redacted]

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1. J334 HistSum Sep 74.
2. J33 HistSum Oct 74; CINCPAC 180252Z Sep 74.

[redacted]

CINCPAC Political/Military Group

(U) The CINCPAC Political/Military Review Group (PMRG) was established on 15 May 1974 to review military activities in the PACOM that might have an adverse impact upon political/diplomatic events occurring during the same time frame. The group was chaired by a CINCPAC officer, with CINCPAC staff and Service component membership. Potential problem areas surfaced by the group were forwarded on a continuing basis to the Chief of Staff, with an analysis of the impact of military activity in regard to political-diplomatic considerations, to include recommendations regarding revising, postponing, or cancelling such military activities. The first monthly meeting was held in June. Automatic Data Processing support was provided; immediate development of Phase I of such support provided a data base and programs to automatically generate a monthly message to announce the next meeting of the group and provide a list of events to be considered at that time.[2]

Airborne Command Post Activities

(S) CINCPAC's Airborne Command Post (ABNCP), called BLUE EAGLE, continued in a ground alert status as it had since 1 January 1970 when continuous airborne alert was cancelled. New in 1974, however, was a deployed ground alert concept, in which the CINCPAC ABNCP initiated random 24-48 hour ground alert watch periods in conjunction with bi-monthly WESTPAC deployments. Also, as noted below, while BLUE EAGLE continued its series of no-notice alert exercises to prepare for or to actually launch the aircraft, the results of operations with selected nuclear ballistic submarines, aircraft carriers, Naval Communications Stations, and TACAMO aircraft are reported in more detail in the material that follows. (TACAMO was the nickname for airborne Very Low Frequency radio broadcasting done from Navy C-130 aircraft.)

(C) In the alert timing exercises for the aircraft to taxi to a runway hold area or to actually launch on a local flight, average response times for

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1. J335 HistSum Jun 74; CINCPAC 090215Z Jul 74.
2. J33 HistSum May 74; J335 HistSum Jun 75; CINCPACINST 5820.2, 15 May 74, Subj: Recognition of Potential Conflicts of Political and Military Events Within PACOM.

the year 1974 were well within the prescribed 15 minutes. In the first type of exercise, called BLUE EAGLE #2, the average time for the 64 exercises was 7 minutes, 24 seconds; for the launch, called BLUE EAGLE #4, the 24 exercises had an average time of 8 minutes, 39 seconds.[1]

(S) The concept of ground alert had been developed to augment TACAMO Pacific's declining Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) alert role in 1974-75 when the TACAMO resources were temporarily reduced. ABNCP ground alert periods were randomly scheduled among Clark Air Base in the Philippines; Ching Chuan Kang Air Base, Taiwan; and Kadena (Okinawa) and Yokota in Japan. From those locations, which bordered the submarine partol areas, the ABNCP could rapidly enter an operational orbit within Very Low Frequency (VLF)/Low Frequency (LF) and High Frequency (HF) range with the capability to relay SIOP emergency action messages to the submarines. By April 1974 the ABNCP had performed deployed alert at the bases selected. By the end of 1974, 20 such deployments had been conducted to assume periods of deployed ground alert, as well as to provide CINCPAC with a survivable command center while airborne and to exercise the PACOM Command and Control System.[2]

(S) Testing of the ABNCP VLF/LF operations had begun in February 1973. In March 1974 the results of tests to PACOM SSBNs from the commencement of the program through January 1974 were presented to CINCPAC. There had been 21 total test missions flown, but only 16 reports had been received from the submarines at the time of this study. The 40 SSBN reports analyzed indicated that they had received and could copy 21 emergency action messages (receiving on either continuous wave (CW) or teletype). The overall success rate from the ABNCP to the submarines was 52.5 percent. Best reception was in a range up to 1,200 nautical miles.[3]

(S) Throughout the year testing continued, usually with about three operations a month to selected SSBNs, aircraft carriers, and Naval Communications facilities in Guam, Japan, and the Philippines. Operations usually included CW and secure teletype transmissions. Throughout the year the success rate stayed about the same as it had in the earlier test.[4]

(S) The ABNCP participated in various other tests throughout the year. For example, the Operations Facility on the ground at Hickam Air Force Base and a deployed airborne team enroute to the Western Pacific monitored an

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1. J3310 HistSum Dec 74.
2. J3310 HistSums Sep, Dec 73; Apr, Nov, Dec 74.
3. J33115 HistSum Mar 74.
4. J33115 HistSums Apr-Dec 74.

operational test of the Emergency Rocket Communications System (ERCS) nicknamed GIANT MOON 6 on 23 October. The missile had been launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The test was monitored on two frequencies. The ground facility at Hickam maintained valid (5"x5") reception of the JCS WHITE DOT ONE message for 22 minutes and on the other for 14. Both of these frequencies were also 5x5.[1]

(U) During the summer of 1974, certain newly assigned personnel arrived without proper security clearances, which reduced the number of active Battle Staffs from five to four for a period.[2]

(S) The Alternate Command Authority program consisted of a series of briefings and an optional orientation flight. It was designed to prepare designated general and flag officers to assume interim command of the PACOM for SIOP operations during an airborne alert posture. The program had been temporarily discontinued, and was resumed in November. By the end of the year four CINCPAC staff officers (the Directors for Security Assistance and Communications-Electronics and the Director and Deputy Director for Operations), two CINCPACAF officers, and the 5th Air Force Vice Commander had completed the program. It included briefings on ABNCP staffing and operations, the CINCPAC Continuity of Operations Plan, the PACOM Alert System, and the General War Plan.[3]

Inspector General Activities

(U) Throughout the year the Inspector General conducted surveys, investigations, and other studies in the PACOM.[4] Conclusions or findings were retained in reports in that office. In 1974 the following occurred:

- On 4 January a report of the Review of Defense Department Activities in the Greater Manila Area, which had been conducted during December 1973, was submitted to the Deputy Chief of Staff.[5]

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1. J3310 HistSum Oct 74.
2. J3310 HistSum Jun 74.
3. J3310 HistSum Dec 74; CINCPAC 220115Z Aug 74.
4. IG HistSums Jan-Dec 74.
5. These studies of Defense Department activities were part of a CINCPAC-sponsored plan to have the Department authorize a single U.S. military coordinator in each country. See Chapter I of this history, "U.S. Defense Representatives in Foreign Countries (USDR)."

- 11-22 February, a review of Defense Department activities in the Taipei area was conducted. The U.S. Ambassador and COMUSTDC were briefed on findings and tentative recommendations on 22 February.

- From 28 March through 20 April a survey was conducted of Defense Department activities in the Bangkok area. On 19 April the Deputy Chief of Mission and COMUSMACTHAI were briefed on findings and tentative recommendations.

- During part of that same period, from 28 March through 6 April, other members of the Inspector General's staff conducted a survey of Defense Department activities in Canberra. On 5 April findings were briefed to the U.S. Ambassador, the Defense Attache, and the U.S. Air Force Liaison Officer to the Royal Australian Air Force, who was CINCPAC's Representative in Australia.

- From 8 through 29 July Defense Department activities on Okinawa were surveyed, with COMUS Japan briefed on findings and recommendations on 30 July.

(CFRD) From October through the end of the year, the Inspector General inspected the physical security of nuclear weapons in the PACOM. From 21 to 25 October the physical security of weapons transiting and stored on Oahu was studied. Sites visited were the Waikele and West Loch Branches of the Naval Magazine at Lualualei, the Naval Air Station at Barbers Point, and Hickam Air Force Base. The team observed actual movement of nuclear weapons between the Waikele and West Loch Branches, a weapons transit of Hickam, and the simulated movement of Army weapons from Waikele to Barbers Point.[1]

(SFRD) From 10 to 21 November the physical security of nuclear weapons in Korea was inspected. The following sites were visited: Osan, Kunsan, and Kwang Ju Air Bases, Camp Ames and Camp Colbern, and Batteries A through F of the 2d Battalion, 44th Air Defense Artillery.

(TSFRD) From 4 to 7 December nuclear weapons stored in the Philippines were the subject of study. The Naval Air Station at Cubi Point and Clark Air Base were visited.

(SFRD) Next, from 8 to 11 December, the team visited Guam and the nuclear weapons stored and transiting there. Andersen Air Force Base, the Naval Air Station at Agana, the Naval Magazine at Guam, and USS PROTEUS (AS-19) were visited.

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1. See also Chapter IV, "Nuclear Weapons Deployment and Security."

Note: Previously exempted by USCINCPAC

SECRET

SECTION IV--U.S. FORCES AND BASES OVERSEAS

(U) A great many changes occured in the basing of U.S. Forces overseas in the PACOM in 1974, principally as bases were closed or consolidated. Many of these actions are discussed in the material that follows, by country.

(U) The annual revision of the JCS "U.S. Base Requirements Overseas" was completed by CINCPAC for the PACOM and forwarded on 9 April (for the 1973 edition). The submission was in IBM punched card format, and reflected only those pages with revised validated information.[1]

Thailand Headquarters, Forces, and Bases

(U) For Thailand in 1974 there were many on-going actions concerning plans for the drawdown of forces and residual force posture, and the reduction and consolidation of elements and headquarters. Many of the subjects were interrelated, but for convenience, specific sub-headings that follow concern the phasedown of U.S. Forces, reduction in headquarters and support elements, establishment of the MACTHAI Support Group, and long-term U.S. military force levels in Thailand (FY 76 and beyond).

(S) An action in progress as the year opened followed a December 1973 direction by the JCS for CINCPAC to establish a detachment for training and logistics under the command of MACTHAI using the assets of Detachment 1, 56th Special Operations Wing, [redacted] 4e AF [redacted] and to provide direct training and maintenance support in the interim. A secondary mission was to foster common support arrangements in the region for like air force systems that were supported by U.S. MASF/MAP in order to increase the effectiveness of such programs. The JCS provided guidance to revise the COMUSMACTHAI Terms of Reference. New terms were prepared and the JCS approved CINCPAC's recommendations on 10 January. On 1 February the JCS established a MACTHAI Deputy Commander for Training and Logistics and also redesignated Detachment 1, 56th SOW as the MACTHAI Training and Logistics Detachment, subordinate to the Deputy for Training and Logistics, who was located in Bangkok.[2]

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1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 00290, 9 Apr 74, Subj: Annual Revision to U.S. Base Requirements Overseas (USBRO); forwarding of.
2. JCS 3160/062212Z Dec 73; JCS 6595/142319Z Dec 73; CINCPAC 290415Z Dec 73; JCS 3860/101500Z Jan 74; CINCPAC 120056Z Jan 74; USMACTHAI 071329Z Feb 74.

SECRET

(S) A subsequent proposal for disestablishment of this detachment by the end of the first quarter FY 75 was not approved by the JCS. It was preferred to retain the detachment through FY 75. "It seems prudent to retain the T&L Detachment through the current rainy season and assess prospects for the next dry season before taking any further action...."[1]

Phasedown of U.S. Forces

(S) Planning in 1973 had developed a concept for incremental redeployments from the approximately 40,000 personnel authorized as 1974 began to a residual force of 6,100, with the timing for the six planned increments dependent on the military and political climate in Southeast Asia over a one to three year time frame. The proposed increments and the capabilities remaining in Thailand were outlined in the 1973 Command History. On 27 April 1974 the Secretaries of State and Defense outlined an April to October drawdown, reducing both forces and bases. The forces listed below include both the 15 April and 31 October decisions by the Secretaries. Following on, the JCS provided planning guidance to maintain that 31 October force level through 30 April 1975, and then a further reduction by 30 June 1975. These force goals follow:[2]

Air Units

15 April 1974	31 October 1974	30 June 1975
15 Fighter Sq	8 Fighter Sq	4 Fighter Sq
1 Reconnaissance Sq	1 Reconnaissance Sq	1 Reconnaissance Sq
1 Gunship Sq	1 Gunship Sq	1 Gunship Sq
50 B-52s	17 B-52s	15 B-52s
1 P3 Detachment	1 P3 Detachment	1 P3 Detachment

Bases

15 April 1974	31 October 1974	30 June 1975
U-Tapao	U-Tapao	U-Tapao
Udorn	Udorn	Udorn
Nakhon Phanom	Nakhon Phanom	Nakhon Phanom

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1. JCS 9009/031624Z Jun 74.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 182-184; Point Papers, J5123 of 6 Jun 74, J5122 of 12 Aug 74, and J532 of 26 Nov 74, Subj: Current Thailand Drawdown (U).

Bases - Continued

15 April 1974	31 October 1974	30 June 1975
Korat	Korat	Korat (minimum readiness)
Ubon	Ubon (minimum readiness)	Ubon (minimum readiness)
Takhli	Takhli (returned to Royal Thai Government)	

Military Personnel (authorized spaces)

15 April 1974	31 October 1974	30 June 1975
38,000	28,000	24,700

Military Personnel (estimated net in-country strength)

15 April 1974	14 November 1974	30 June 1975
33,895	24,800*	18,900

*Does not reflect approved reduction of 650 SAC support personnel from U-Tapao.

Drawdown Phasing (April to October 1974)

April:	1 A-7 Squadron
May:	1 A-7 Squadron; 9 B-52s; 8 EC-121s; 11 C-130s
June:	1 F-4 Squadron; 9 B-52s; 22 EC-47s; 29 OV-10s
July:	1 F-4 Squadron; 9 B-52s; F-111s move from Takhli to Korat
August:	1 F-4 Squadron; 6 B-52s
September:	1 F-4 Squadron
October:	Takhli returned to Thai Government; Ubon to minimum readiness

(U) Specific redeployments through the year that came to CINCPAC attention are summarized briefly. Most of these involved Air Force forces.

(S) EB-66 redeployment from Korat to Clark Air Base had been directed by the JCS on 24 December 1973. This concerned the entire fleet assigned to the 42d Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron. The aircraft were to be withdrawn from the USAF inventory and reclaimed at Clark. CINCPAC directed CINCPACAF to accomplish the movement, provide all concerned with redeployment

planning data, and insure coordination was accomplished with the Embassys and Chiefs of Mission concerned. (Due regard was to be given to the impact on personnel during the holiday season.) Public affairs guidance was provided by the Secretary of Defense and CINCPAC. First movements began on 2 January 1975 and the final aircraft closed at Clark on 17 January, without incident. When reclamation was completed the EB-66 would be completely withdrawn from the Air Force inventory. About 600 personnel redeployed with the move.[1]

(C) Army Special Forces were redeployed in the spring. The Thai government announced on 22 February that the forces would be withdrawn by 1 March. About 350 persons were involved. In the announcement it was noted that the U.S. Forces had been providing training assistance to Royal Thai Special Forces, and also some Laotian and Cambodian troops with the concurrence of the Thai government because it was more economical to offer the training there rather than in the United States.[2]

(S) In April the JCS directed the rotation of one temporary duty A-7 squadron from Thailand to CONUS without replacement. CINCPAC was directed to insure, through his representatives, that the Embassy in Bangkok was fully aware of the proposed movement prior to the departure to insure that Thai desires were accommodated.[3]

(S) On 3 May the JCS advised that higher authority had approved the further withdrawal of air assets from Thailand, commencing 15 May. Accordingly, CINCPAC directed the following withdrawals between the 15th and the end of May: eight EC-121s of Detachment 1, 552d Airborne Electronic Warfare & Control Wing; 16 C-130s; and 18 A-7Ds of the 358th Tactical Fighter Squadron. At the same time the JCS directed CINCSAC to withdraw 9 B-52Ds and to redeploy 14 KC-135s commensurate with the overall redeployment and in-theater refueling requirements. (As the year began, there had been 75 B-52s left in the PACOM: 25 at Andersen on Guam and 50 at U-Tapao.)[4]

(S) These JCS-directed moves continued in June, with 25 OV-10s moved from Nakhon Phanom (12 to Osan Air Base, 6 to the Tactical Air Command, and 7 to USAF Europe); 26 F-4Es were transferred to Osan; and the 361st Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadron with 22 EC-47s was inactivated at Nakhon Phanom. Moves within Thailand consisted of 13 F-4Ds from Ubon to Udorn, and 13 F-4Es from Korat to Udorn. CINCSAC withdrew another 9 B-52s.[5]

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1. JCS 3890/241803Z Dec 73; CINCPAC 242350Z Dec 73; CINCPAC 280418Z Dec 73; J315 HistSum Jan 74.
2. CINCPAC PA LNO BANGKOK 221225Z Feb 75; CINCUSARPAC 150902Z Feb 74.
3. JCS 5648/181754Z Apr 74.
4. J311 HistSums Mar, May 74; USCINCRED 061318Z May 74; JCS 8800/032318Z May 74.
5. J311 HistSum Jun 74.

(S) In July the withdrawals continued; 20 F-4Ds were redeployed from Udorn to USAF Europe and CINCSAC withdrew still another 9 B-52s. A number of in-country relocations were made: 22 F-4Ds from Udorn to Korat; 14 F-4Ds from Ubon to Udorn; 36 F-111s from Takhli to Korat, and 17 AC-130s from Ubon to Korat.[1]

(S) The relocations based on the 3 May JCS directions were completed in August, with 9 F-4Ds moved from Ubon to USAF Europe and two F-4Ds from Ubon to the Tactical Air Command. Additionally, 14 F-4Ds were transferred from Ubon to Udorn.[2]

(S) On 29 September the JCS directed redeployment of one F-105G squadron as soon as feasible; accordingly, on 30 October the 12 F-105Gs of the 17th WILD WEASEL Squadron departed Korat for CONUS.[3]

(S) As planned, Takhli Air Base was returned to the Thai government. In August CINCPAC had learned that it might be possible to close the base earlier than had been planned, upon completion of property screening, disposition, and turnover. CINCPACAF and MACTHAI concurred, and CINCPAC so advised the JCS. COMUSMACTHAI reported that the return to the Thai Government was completed on 12 September, and CINCPAC conveyed a "well done" to all concerned for their teamwork and support in the complex closure operations.[4]

(S) On 4 November CINCSAC proposed further reductions in manpower and accelerated redeployment from WESTPAC; the JCS asked CINCPAC for his views. CINCSAC had noted that January 1974 guidance from the Secretary of Defense no longer contained a restrictive phrase that required that SAC's sortie capability in terms of both people and aircraft had to be located in WESTPAC. He was confident that SAC would make good the existing sortie tasking within seven days from total SAC resources without the necessity for retention of 13 B-52s and 750 manpower spaces that had not been scheduled for redeployment until May-June 1975. After consulting COMUSSAG/7AF, COMUSMACTHAI, and CINCPACAF, CINCPAC concurred on 15 November, providing that contingency requirements were assured and that advance consultation with the Thai government and coordination of public announcement were accomplished in accordance with established procedures.[5]

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1. J311 HistSum Jul 74.
2. J311 HistSum Aug 74.
3. JCS 2683/290216Z Sep 74; J311 HistSum Oct 74.
4. CINCPAC 020455Z Aug 74; CINCPAC 170054Z Aug 74; COMUSMACTHAI 170235Z Sep 74; CINCPAC 190422Z Sep 74.
5. CINCSAC 042230Z Nov 74; USSAG/7AF 131145Z Nov 74; MACTHAI 140300Z Nov 74; CINCPACAF 142055Z Nov 74; CINCPAC 151305Z Nov 74; CINCPAC 150425Z Nov 74.

(S) In mid-December, during a visit to CINCPACAF by a delegation headed by Senator Samuel Nunn (D.-GA) of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the answers to several questions relating to the Thailand withdrawal were provided. When asked how many squadrons were left and were there definite plans for their withdrawal, the delegation was advised that there remained eight tactical fighter squadrons, one tactical reconnaissance squadron, two special operations squadrons, and one tactical air support squadron. The existing program called for withdrawal to two tactical fighter squadrons by the fall of 1975. When asked what were the driving factors behind withdrawal plans, the delegation was told that the force was to maintain a sortie capability as directed by the Secretary of Defense--the force was sized to sustain this capability. The Thai had not been advised of these plans, it was explained, and it was necessary to await execution authority to further reduce the force.[1]

Reduction in Headquarters and Support Elements

(C) The numerous headquarters in Thailand came under extensive study in 1974 to reduce their number, and ultimately to plan for restructuring or deactivation of some of the principal headquarters. CINCPAC's Inspector General visited the Bangkok area as he had several other PACOM metropolitan areas to review redundancies in the military establishment. The CINCPAC team visited the area from 28 March through 20 April; on 19 April they briefed the Deputy Chief of Mission and COMUSMACTHAI on their findings and recommendations.[2]

(S) On 12 February, in a message associated with the visit to the PACOM by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, William K. Brehm, the JCS advised that the Unifed Command Plan was under review. Until such review was completed, alternative supporting command structure changes for the PACOM that might be affected by a change in the plan were not to be considered in detail. There were, however, the JCS noted, a number of such changes that would not necessarily impact on that review, and that should continue to be actively studied. In Thailand, these were the deactivation or restructuring of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (MACTHAI) and the deactivation of the U.S. Support Activities Group (USSAG)/7th Air Force. The JCS requested that CINCPAC provide a detailed plan for these actions, to include gross manpower requirements and reductions generated, lines of operational command and logistic support, and the approximate time phasing from time of decision. Comments on political ramifications were also desired.[3]

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1. CINCPACAF 010400Z Jan 75.
2. IG HistSum Apr 74; CINCPAC 200101Z Mar 74; CINCPAC 270213Z Mar 74.
3. JCS 3396/122143Z Feb 74; For a more extensive discussion of Secretary Brehm's visit see "PACOM Reorganizations/Reductions and Unified Command Plan Actions" elsewhere in this chapter.

(S) COMUSMACTHAI's 15 February comments advised that continuation of MACTHAI as an entity was "essential." The many functions performed by MACTHAI, particularly the single coordination interface between Defense Department elements, the U.S. Embassy, and the Royal Thai Government, "must be continued not only until the US presence in Thailand is significantly reduced but as long as there is a requirement to maintain reentry capability. These functions are essential to continuous operations from Thailand and also to support for Laos and Cambodia." He noted that a CINCPAC manpower study in November 1973 had recommended continuing existing organizational concepts and relationships, but with reduced manpower authorizations. COMUSMACTHAI noted that the Thailand command structure could be streamlined (to include restructuring of MACTHAI), but "a major consideration in any restructuring should be that it is MACTHAI which over the years has acted as the focal point for coordinating all agreements and authorities concerning the considerable US presence in Thailand. This coordination is critical to continued US presence and operations from Thailand. Since the RTG has, on numerous occasions, expressed strong preference for this arrangement, we recommend this single point coordination authority remain with MACTHAI (or a residual MAAG element) at least through FY 75, dependent upon withdrawal decisions." A key issue, COMUSMACTHAI continued, was that control of logistic support to U.S. Forces Thailand was vested in the host government. The only country-to-country agreements in existence that permitted duty-free entry and tax exemption were the Military Assistance agreement and the agreement with the Officer in Charge of Construction. The Thai had not been amenable to a Status of Forces Agreement or other special arrangements. Thai procedures for controlling logistics imports, etc., were "complex, antiquated and not subject to revolutionary change." He anticipated that the headquarters structure could be consolidated and still retain the MACTHAI or Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group Thailand (JUSMAG) title and single point coordinating authority and remain acceptable to the Thai government.[1]

(S) CINCPAC forwarded his thoughts on 3 March to the JCS. CINCPAC repeated a recurring theme: It was difficult to assess the impact of MACTHAI disestablishment by the end of FY 75 in a vacuum--he believed that an organization could not be considered independently without studying other considerations, such as what would happen to USSAG/7AF, the level of support to Cambodia and Laos, U.S. Force levels, and resurge requirements.

(S) CINCPAC commented on the fact that there was no Status of Forces Agreement. Most arrangements pertaining to U.S. Forces, he explained, were in the form of memos of understanding and verbal agreements. "This has

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1. COMUSMACTHAI 150505Z Feb 74.

resulted in a special relationship between MACTHAI and RTG. MACTHAI is the keystone to US/Thai coordination and cooperation." Early removal of this keystone, he said, would "seriously degrade communication with the Thai and adversely affect our FY-75 capability and future options." He concluded, "In short, we ought to disestablish MACTHAI after the great bulk of our forces are withdrawn - not concurrent and certainly not before."[1]

(S) COMUSSAG/7AF provided his comments on his organization on 15 February. He noted that the military situation in South Vietnam was uncertain and in Cambodia still serious. He believed that as long as those conditions existed and tactical forces were in Thailand for contingency purposes, a joint headquarters was required for effective planning and command and control. He believed that if linear drawdowns of forces were directed and if something was to be done to reduce/disestablish/relocate USSAG/7AF, it should be done during the summer of 1974 to permit resulting command arrangements a few months of operation before the onset of the new dry season in December 1974. His recommendations follow:

> ...Recommend USSAG be relocated and redesignated and that Hq 7AF be deactivated. A joint Hq reporting to CINCPAC and responsible for the Southwest Pacific/SEA area should be formed to provide those functions currently performed by USSAG, contingency planning and coordination; and command/control/coordination of US Forces should they be recommitted to combat operations. Added functions might be supervision and management of MAP/MASF/DAO programs in the countries in this area.
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> ...It is suggested that such a headquarters be established in the Philippines with the commander thereof to be dual hatted as Commander 13AF. This would provide the commander day-to-day command and administration of AF Forces, which is not the case now, thereby clean up organizational lines with substantial reduction in manpower at HQ levels.
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> ...It is also recommended that the command and control facilities at NKP [Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base] be retained as a forward operating location for the joint/13AF Hq in order to preserve responsiveness to operational/surge requirements...manned at minimum level from current resources....[2]

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1. CINCPAC 030005Z Mar 74.
2. USSAG/7AF NKP 150915Z Feb 74. The subject of a southwest Pacific headquarters had surfaced in 1973; see "PACOM Reorganizations/Reductions and Unified Command Plan Actions."

(S) The study of Thailand organizations took a more urgent turn with a message from the JCS on 26 March. They noted that a State Department message had provided a plan for reduction and consolidation of headquarters and support elements and the withdrawal of certain forces between 15 May and 31 December 1974. Higher authority, they said, had directed the following:

> ...Reduce USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI manpower spaces by 30 percent by the end of FY 74 (exclusive of the T&L [Training and Logistics] detachment). Manpower reductions previously submitted in the proposed FY 1975 manpower program can be counted as part of the 30 per cent.
>
> ...USARSUPTHAI [U.S. Army Support Command Thailand] will be reduced to a level of 1,400 authorized US military personnel and consolidated under COMUSMACTHAI by the end of first quarter FY 75.
>
> ...USARSUPTHAI will be redesignated as the Military Assistance Command, Thailand Support Group, to be commanded by an Army colonel who will report to and be under the command of COMUSMACTHAI to be effective 1 July 1974.
>
> ...Plan for the disestablishment of USSAG/7AF by the end of FY 75.
>
> ...That a review of all DOD organizations in Thailand be conducted with the objective of eliminating all except those that are absolutely essential. In this regard it is expected that some eliminations or reductions can be accomplished in the near term while others can be achieved as US Force levels are reduced....
>
> ...That during FY 1975 the command alignment of the USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI organizations be addressed.

The JCS then listed 55 Defense Department elements to be studied. On 28 March, CINCPAC tasked appropriate agencies to take the requested action. On 30 March CINCPAC advised the JCS that 13 of the listed elements were not under CINCPAC or CINCPAC subordinate commands or closely affiliated with his components. He asked that the JCS secure and provide the required information.[1]

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1. JCS 8488/262258Z Mar 74; CINCPAC 280400Z Mar 74; CINCPAC 300711Z Mar 74.

(U) CINCPACPAC's component commanders, COMUSMACTHAI, COMUSSAG/7AF, and the DAO Vientiane forwarded their comments to CINCPAC in March and early April and CINCPAC provided his recommendations to the JCS on 3 and 5 April. CINCPAC's summary for each of the organizations studied was in six parts: location, the organization to which it reported, its mission, its authorized strength, a discussion, and a recommendation. He noted that time constraint had precluded visits to activity sites for the purpose of this report, and also that reductions or eliminations were mainly event rather than time oriented with withdrawal of USAF forces a determining factor.[1]

(S) Thus, of the 55 Defense Department elements listed by the JCS, 13 were addressed at the Washington level and CINCPAC's review addressed 42. Of those, it was recommended that 12 be eliminated, six by the end of FY 74 and another six by the end of FY 75. CINCPAC recommended that 15 units be reduced in size, but 10 units were to be retained at their existing strength. Further review was required for five units. Six unit consolidations were included in these recommendations. Identifiable reductions in authorized strength figures were considered to be approximately 1,000 by 30 June 1974, an additional 300 by 30 September, and an additional 500 by 30 June 1975. Significant additional strength reductions were anticipated but were not yet identifiable.[2]

(S) The JCS submitted their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense in April and received approval in June.[3]

(S) Another subject addressed in the matter of reductions was the possibility of further civilianizing Defense Department elements, particularly in the Bangkok area. CINCPAC advised that units planned for elimination should not be relocated or civilianized. Any relocation or civilianization actions should be coordinated with the Thai to avoid adverse reaction. The degree of civilianization should be defined as a percent of authorized military strength, not in absolute numbers, thus declining as military strength declined. Civilianization, it was noted, would reduce flexibility to respond to contingencies. Other problem areas were considered to include security clearances, labor disputes, increased civilian dependents, and increased costs.[4]

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1. CINCPACAF 302045Z Mar 74; CINCUSARPAC 010515Z Apr 74; CINCPACFLT 012207Z Apr 74; COMUSMACTHAI 011330Z Apr 74 and 030910Z Apr 74; USSAG/7AF 010510Z Apr 74; USDAO Vientiane 030938Z Apr 74; CINCPAC 032047Z and 052216Z Apr 74.
2. J5142 Point Paper, 3 Apr 74, Subj: Reduction in Headquarters and Support Elements in Thailand (U).
3. CINCPAC 212106Z Jun 74, which cited JCSM-133-74 of 18 Apr 74 and JCS 9009/031624Z Jun 74.
4. CINCPAC 291924Z May 74. MACTHAI's opinions on civilianization and relocations had been furnished in MACTHAI 160310Z May 74.

(S) As the year ended, a great many of the relocations and reductions planned had been executed. Planning for disestablishment of USSAG/7th Air Force continued into 1975.

MACTHAI Support Group Established

(S) On 26 March the JCS advised that higher authority had directed, among other actions, that the U.S. Army Support Command Thailand would be reduced to a level of 1,400 authorized military personnel and consolidated under COMUSMACTHAI by the end of the first quarter of Fiscal Year 1975. It was to be designated as the MACTHAI Support Group, to be commanded by an Army colonel who would report to and be under the command of COMUSMACTHAI to be effective 1 July 1974.[1]

(S) The commander of the Army Support Command forwarded his comments on 29 March. He considered the future missions of MACTHAI and the disestablishment of Headquarters USARPAC when he stated that he believed it appropriate to designate USARSUPTHAI a major Army command (MACOM) under command and operational control of the Department of the Army. (See also "Army Reorganization in the Pacific Command" elsewhere in this chapter.) The relationship he envisioned was parallel to that of the 13th Air Force, respecting and following the policy and guidance of COMUSMACTHAI for those operations within or affecting Thailand. With the designation as a Major Army Command, it would continue to exercise court martial jurisdiction. "It must be recognized that the USARSUPTHAI mission in logistic and administrative support extends across international boundaries." He believed the command could continue operations if three assumptions were made: "(1) becoming MACTHAI Support Group is principally a name change, (2) that MACTHAI Support Group would be considered a MACOM with its commander being the Army component commander in Thailand, (3) that general courts-martial jurisdiction would continue." Under those assumptions he could continue logistic support, funding, and personnel support as a uni-Service function under the provision of JCS Publication 2. If these assumptions were not correct, however, he anticipated problems in areas of courts-martial jurisdiction and related claims approval across Service lines, the management of construction requirements and real property, the supervision of local procurement activities, and the provision of supplies for both local support and support in third countries.[2]

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1. JCS 8488/262258Z Mar 74.
2. CDR USARSUPTHAI SAMAE SAN THAI 291215Z Mar 74, retransmitted as CINCUSARPAC 010044Z Apr 74.

(S) CINCUSARPAC commented on this message on 1 April. He advised that although the recommendation regarding designation of a Major Army Command was desirable, he did not consider it essential. The existing operational control situation, following JCS Publication 2 guidelines, was working satisfactorily and provided all required authority over USARPAC Army elements in Thailand. Uni-Service responsibilities and channels were clearly defined, and CINCUSARPAC didn't believe there was a need to depart from existing patterns.[1]

(S) On 11 July the JCS, who had requested submission of command reorganization plans, provided amplification and clarification to assist in development of the plan. USMACTHAI Support Group administrative and support activities, the JCS explained, would be staffed, as required, on a joint Service basis, but no unit/detachment/activity need be reorganized into a joint activity. (For example, if the 70th Avn Detachment and the Army ammunition and port operations should properly remain units staffed with Army personnel, they may be retained as Army-staffed units). The Department of the Army could continue to fund uni-Service activities of the MACTHAI Support Group if it was demonstrated that funding could not be provided through administrative agency channels prescribed by Defense Department directive. Administrative and operational functions of USMACTHAI that could be absorbed by the Support Group headquarters would be transferred to further assist in the reduction of personnel assigned to MACTHAI, as well as U.S. military presence in the Bangkok area. Any duplication of functions between MACTHAI and the Support Group would be eliminated. The Military Departments would communicate through COMUSMACTHAI for all uni-Service matters. In this regard, realignment of command arrangements resulting from the consolidation would insure that provisions were made for interface of Support Group Service elements with their respective departments for resources management control.[2]

(U) Effective 1 July the redesignation of U.S. Army Support Command Thailand to USMACTHAI Support Group became effective.[3]

(C) On 26 July COMUSMACTHAI submitted to CINCPAC the proposed concept plan that had been requested. Objectives expressed were to streamline command operations, reduce personnel spaces, consolidate Security Assistance related functions, and place policy planning and Thai Government-Embassy liaison functions in the MACTHAI headquarters staff element in Bangkok, and operational functions in the MACTHAI Support Group at Samae San. COMUSMACTHAI planned to designate the Deputy COMUSMACTHAI as Deputy Commander for Security Assistance

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1. CINCUSARPAC 010515Z Apr 74.
2. JCS 4378/112228Z Jul 74.
3. CDR USMACTHAI SPT GP SAMAE SAN 230430Z Jul 74.

as an additional duty, a Deputy Commander for Support, and realign the MACTHAI headquarters and Support Group staffs. The Deputy for Security Assistance would be an Air Force brigadier general dual hatted as Deputy COMUSMACTHAI. He would be responsible for the existing Army, Navy, and Air Force Advisory Groups; the Training and Logistics Activities Section; the MAP Section responsible for plans, programs, excess, and sales; and the Joint Training Liaison Section to perform military industrial and technological functions, and the logistics advisory function.

(C) The Deputy for Support (an Army colonel dual hatted as Commander, MACTHAI Support Group) would have responsibility for all support activities. MACTHAI Support Group subordinate elements would include the Central Identification Laboratory; the 70th Aviation Detachment; Bangkok, Sattahip, and Udorn Detachments; and the Medical Activity.

(C) The MACTHAI staff in Bangkok, under the Chief of Staff, would provide command policy and maintain liaison with the Thai Government and the U.S. Embassy. The special staff would include the headquarters commandant, secretary joint staff, staff judge advocate, public affairs office, political-military/military advisor's representative, and Supreme Command Headquarters (forward) liaison. General staff would consist of assistant chiefs of staff for personnel, operations, logistics, communications-electronics, and comptroller. Public Affairs support was provided by the CINCPAC Public Affairs Liaison Officer Bangkok, and was to continue to be so provided until the disestablishment of USSAG/7AF.

(C) Activities consolidated under the MACTHAI Support Group at Samae San were those of the adjutant general, provost marshal, engineer, and civilian personnel. Activities consolidated under the USMACTHAI staff at Bangkok were the comptroller, information office, Thai customs, staff communications, and staff judge advocate. Activities that would be jointly staffed were the MACTHAI and Support Group headquarters, finance and accounting, personnel and administration, U.S. Customs, supply procurement and services, maintenance, the Bangkok and Sattahip Detachments of the Support Group, military police, and procurement. Uni-Service activities were the Central Identification Laboratory; the Army ammunition and transportation activities; 70th Aviation; the Army Communications Command, Thailand; and the medical activity. Activities funding would be Navy Operations and Maintenance funds, except for mission funds for three Army activities (effective 1 July the Secretary of Defense had designated the Department of the Navy to provide budget and funding support for COMUSMACTHAI/MACTHAI Support Group).[1]

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1. COMUSMACTHAI 260745Z Jul 74.

(S) CINCPAC provided the concept plan on 3 August and on 16 August the JCS approved the CINCPAC-proposed plan.[1]

(S) MACTHAI intelligence functions were further studied, and the JCS concurred in realignment of functions, as proposed by CINCPAC. The JCS also requested that CINCPAC keep them informed of the progress of efforts to establish cross-servicing agreements and memorandums of understanding with other agencies, such as with Department of State agencies, needed to insure continued military intelligence support in Thailand.[2]

(U) On 20 December COMUSMACTHAI forwarded to CINCPAC his concept plan for organization of MACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI/MACTHAI Support Group in FY 76. The plan was under study at the end of the year.[3]

Long-Term U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand (FY 76 and Beyond)

(S) Still longer range planning for force levels in Thailand was in progress throughout the year at all levels in the military establishment. On 13 February the JCS provided planning guidance for Southeast Asia force and activity levels for FY 74-80. Then, on 19 April, they requested recommendations for force levels for FY 76 and beyond. CINCPAC requested comments and recommendations from his component commanders, MACTHAI, USSAG/7AF, and the National Security Agency. He considered comments from all of these agencies in preparing his recommendations, which were provided to the JCS on 4 May. CINCPAC provided three alternative long-term force levels and outlined essential long-term U.S. requirements in Thailand. The first, Alternative A, was to maintain indefinitely the end FY 75 force and resurge capabilities that had been outlined earlier by the JCS; Alternative B provided for a straight line reduction from the end of FY 75 to the end of FY 76 and then maintenance, as a minimum, of the force level required to support essential intelligence, Security Assistance, Joint Casualty Resolution Center, Embassy, DAO Laos, MEDT Cambodia, and Indian Ocean/Diego Garcia operations; and Alternative C, straight line reduction from the end of FY 75 to a reduced JUSMAG only by the end of FY 76. The three alternatives are briefly outlined below.[4]

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1. J5122 Point Paper, 22 Aug 74, Subj: USMACTHAI Support Group Consolidation Under USMACTHAI, which cited CINCPAC 030222Z Aug 74; JCS 7220/162128Z Aug 74.
2. JCS 051611Z Oct 74.
3. COMUSMACTHAI 200816Z Dec 74; CINCPAC 242116Z Dec 74.
4. JCS 4025/131453Z Feb 74; JCS 6918/192210Z Apr 74; CINCPAC 200352Z Apr 74; NSACSS FT MEADE 251825Z Apr 74; COMUSMACTHAI 260941Z Apr 74; USSAG/7AF 270200Z Apr 74; CINCPACFLT 272133Z Apr 74; CINCUSARPAC 292105Z Apr 74; CINCPACAF 300310Z Apr 74; CINCPAC 041856Z May 74.

(S) Alternative A would require 4 fighter squadrons, 1 RF-4 squadron, 1 AC-130 squadron, 15 B-52 aircraft, and a P3 detachment. The resurge capability would be to 7,000 USAF tactical air sorties per month within 14 days. Active bases would be U-Tapao, Udorn, and Nakhon Phanom; standby bases would be Ubon and Korat. The personnel requirements for this alternative included 3,350 Army, 550 Navy and Marines, and 15,000 Air Force, for a total of 18,900, of which 1,625 were cryptologic spaces. Ramasun and Ko Kha facilities were to be retained. Command and control arrangements would remain essentially unchanged.

(S) Alternative B envisioned one major base, U-Tapao/Sattahip with no bases in stand-by status. Ramasun and Ko Kha would be retained. Forces would consist of 6 F-4s, 6 C-130s, 4 U-2s, an RF-4 detachment, and 3 P3 aircraft. The 6,200 personnel (2,950 Army, 450 Navy and Marines, and 2,800 USAF) would include 1,554 crypto spaces.

(S) Alternative C provided for the reduction of U-Tapao/Sattahip from January to June 1976, with the phaseout of MACTHAI and Bangkok activities and a reorientation of appropriate functions under a reduced JUSMAG with a reduced support activity at U-Tapao/Sattahip, political events permitting. The DAO would establish in-country intelligence facilities criteria after future requirements were addressed by the National Security Agency. The Integrated Communications System would phase to Thai control, except that provision would have to be made for continued communications support of U.S. intelligence activities. An estimated 300 personnel would be required for a reduced JUSMAG, plus 3,000 personnel for Ramasun Station, Ko Kha, a support detachment at U-Tapao/Sattahip, and continuation of Indian Ocean operations support from U-Tapao.

(S) In a statement of long-term requirements, CINCPAC said:

> ...U.S. needs access for indefinite period in future to strategic location offered by Thailand. This is important to strategy of deterring or defending against actions threatening important interests in SEA--Indian Ocean areas, and will offer some stabilizing influence in region. Approach to Thais should seek assurance of meeting minimum needs on basis mutual advantage to both nations.

(S) The minimum needs, CINCPAC noted, included access for intelligence and communications functions, an ocean surveillance base, overflight and transit air access, combined strategy and exercises to retain close exchange with the Thai, and logistics air/port access to U-Tapao and Sattahip.

(S) CINCPAC recommended that the drawdown continue, military and political events permitting, to the posture stipulated in Alternative B. He noted that continuation of operations at U-Tapao and Sattahip at reduced levels was vital to a future capability to support Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Indian Ocean/Diego Garcia operations. Accordingly, for discussions with the Thai government, he recommended Alternative B as the minimum long-range posture.[1]

(S) On 23 May the JCS recommended Alternative B to the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary recommended the same alternative to the National Security Council in October 1974.[2]

(S) On 19 November the JCS advised that the National Security Council had indicated that two of four options presented to them remained viable alternatives. The Council had also, however, requested that an additional option be provided. In what was now being called Alternative A, the plan would be to reduce military manpower spaces from 21,300 (at the end of FY 75) to 12,000 (by the end of the 1976 dry season--1 May 1976), and to 7,000 by 30 September 1976. The intermediate force level could be based at Udorn and U-Tapao. Ramasun, Ko Kha, and Chiang Mai were to be retained. In the new Alternative B, military manpower spaces were 7,000 (2,850 Army, 3,650 Air Force, and 500 Navy/Marines). U-Tapao would house all aircraft with no standby bases. MACTHAI would be disestablished by the end of FY 76, the Integrated Communications System would be phased to Thai control over a four year period, if the Thai government agreed. Intelligence activities would continue at Ramasun, Ko Kha, and Chiang Mai, with cryptologic spaces (included in the 7,000) at 1,554 by the end of FY 76 and 1,483 by the end of FY 77.

(S) The JCS asked that CINCPAC provide an additional option that would fall between the existing force level and the 7,000-man level proposed in these two options. They requested that CINCSAC provide necessary input to assist CINCPAC in development of this option.[3]

(U) CINCPAC again requested and considered the comments and recommendations provided by his component commanders, CINCSAC, COMUSMACTHAI, USSAG/7AF, and the Embassy in preparing his reply of 22 November.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 041856Z May 74.
2. J5122 Point Paper, 5 Nov 74, Subj: Long Term U.S. Military Force Levels in Thailand (FY 76 and Beyond)(U), which cited DJCS 9645/231850Z May 74.
3. JCS 2660/191950Z Nov 74.
4. CINCPAC 192250Z Nov 74; JCS 4665/212322Z Nov 74; CINCPACFLT 210122Z Nov 74; CINCUSARPAC 210321Z Nov 74; MACTHAI 210345Z Nov 74; AMEMB BANGKOK 18334/210415Z Nov 74; USSAG/7AF 211300Z Nov 74; CINCSAC 211400Z Nov 74; CINCPACAF 212215Z Nov 74.

(S) When the Ambassador presented his view, he emphasized that the Thai expected to commence consultations, possibly as early as December, on the next withdrawals. He noted that 1975 was of the most immediate interest to the interim government, and he would not be able to discuss longer-term force levels and deployment until a new government came to power and after the attitudes of the principal members of that new government were ascertained regarding U.S. presence. "Obviously during Calendar Year 1975 our forces here should provide a deterrent against any inclination on the part of Hanoi to resume full scale conflict, and enable us to continue SCOOT [Support Cambodia out of Thailand] as well as man national intelligence installations." He observed that the question of re-entry rights and periodic redeployments to bases in Thailand was not addressed in the JCS message of 19 November, but this, however, "is key question for planners and for discussion with Thai. Our ability to make further cutbacks after July 1, 1976, will require stand-by basing arrangements. If we want to retain any real surge capability, we must recognize that there will be costs attached to this, such as an arrangement under which we pay the Thai to maintain physical facilities."[1]

(S) CINCPAC presented the third option on 22 November. Forces would consist of 4 tactical air squadrons, 6 reconnaissance aircraft, 4 U-2R aircraft, 8 gunship aircraft, 9 B-52s, 14 KC-135s, and 3 P3s, with support aircraft as required. The 16,500 spaces would be 3,100 Army, 12,900 Air Force, and 500 Navy/Marine. Bases at Korat and U-Tapao would be open, and facilities at Ramasun and Chiang Mai retained. Control of the Integrated Communications System would be transferred to Thai control over a four-year period, if that government agreed. USSAG/7AF headquarters would be disestablished by the end of FY 75, with exercise of command and control of air units through a PACAF/13th Air Force element in Thailand. MACTHAI was to be disestablished following drawdown to the 7,000 level, which was assumed to be early in FY 77. CINCPAC concurred in the recommendation of the JCS and the Secretary of Defense regarding Option B for the long-term force level; he recommended an early decision in this matter.[2]

Headquarters and Command Arrangements in the Republic of Korea

(S) Four major areas were under study in 1974 regarding U.S. Forces in Korea (and in some instances Korean forces): the reorganization and combining of the staffs of the CINC United Nations Command, COMUS Korea, and the Commanding General, Eighth U.S. Army (with all three positions held by General Richard G. Stilwell, USA) and attendant force reductions; alternative command

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 18334/210415Z Nov 74.
2. CINCPAC 222032Z Nov 74.

arrangements if the United Nations Command were disestablished; the revised command arrangements resulting from an Army reorganization in the PACOM; and the status and future of the I Corps (U.S./ROK) Group. The Army reorganization is discussed separately, elsewhere in this chapter. The other subjects are addressed here.

Merger of the CINCUNC/COMUS Korea/Eighth Army Staffs

(S) On 16 February a message from the CINCUNC provided a proposal for integration of the several headquarters. CINCUNC explained that a joint task force had been organized to study the realignment of the functions of the three headquarters and the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea (JUSMAG-K). They recommended combining the headquarters, and also concluded that certain support functions in JUSMAG-K (i.e. supply, motor pool, personnel, administration) could be performed by support elements servicing the integrated headquarters. An integrated joint Service staff capable of performing essential peacetime functions was designed. Integration was actually only required in the J/G1 through 6 areas, as the special staff had already been integrated. It was envisioned that the CINCUNC would continue to maintain identification as COMUS Korea and CG, EUSA. Second in command was to be an Air Force lieutenant general as Deputy COMUS Korea. The Chief of Staff UNC/USFK would be an Army major general, who could also act as Chief of Staff, EUSA. This command was expected to allow purely Army matters to be acted upon by the EUSA Chief of Staff, or passed by him directly to the CG, EUSA. Joint matters were to be acted upon by the Chief of Staff UNC/COMUS Korea, or passed by him to the Deputy COMUS Korea. The study group had been mindful of the JCS guidance that the wartime role, and therefore the essential structure to discharge that role, should be preserved. The headquarters was expected to be able to function effectively from M or D day for ten days without significant augmentation. The proposal did not eliminate any headquarters, but it was expected to achieve significant integration of the staffs and a sizeable reduction in the number of operating staff elements. Gross manpower requirements were expected to be about 1,100, for a savings of about 350 spaces.[1]

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1. CINCUNC SEOUL 160500Z Feb 74. Reduction and merger plans had been accelerated following a visit by members of the Subcommittee on Defense of the House Appropriations Committee and Congressional Research Services of the Library of Congress. Their report to the House Appropriations Commitee resulted in certain items being incorporated into the FY 75 Military Appropriations Bill. One was consolidation of the UNC/USFK/EUSA headquarters, reducing spaces by one third. (J5111 HistSum Nov 74.)

(C) CINCPAC's comments followed shortly. He was in general agreement. He noted that the proposal to augment the headquarters with ROK staff prepared for a successor command in the event the UNC was dissolved. It should also be viewed that integration of ROK personnel into the staff was a potential means of subsequently further reducing the requirement for U.S. military. Lines of operational command and logistics support remained unchanged: for UNC matters the chain was from the JCS to the UNC; for U.S. Forces Korea matters it was from the JCS to CINCPAC to U.S. Forces Korea; for EUSA matters it was from the JCS to CINCPAC to (CINCUSARPAC to) EUSA. It was believed that the proposal would have minimal political impact on U.S.-ROK relations, and would be interpreted by the People's Republic of China, Japan, North Korea, and other nations as continued U.S. interest in the Korean Peninsula.1

(S) The Secretary of Defense approved the merger proposal on 1 May. On 3 May CINCPAC advised COMUS Korea and asked for additional information that would be required in Washington. Specific replies follow. The duties, responsibilities, and lines of authority of the three headquarters would in nowise be changed by the merger. Headquarters functions that had been consolidated by the proposed merger were those performed by the command group and by the principal (numbered) joint and general staff. The integrated headquarters was, among other things, the Army component command, and would perform all of its functions. The integrated headquarters would not assume any of the management functions performed by Headquarters, 5th Air Force (in Japan) for its subordinate unit, the Korea-based 314th Air Division. Should the 5th Air Force ever displace to Korea, it was visualized that it would merge with the integrated headquarters and the senior airman would be both overall deputy and air component commander. THere were no U.S. Naval forces, as such, in Korea. In war, the integrated headquarters would exercise operational command of the major combatant forces, direct in the case of the field armies and ROK fleet, and through the Tactical Air Control Center in case of air. If it had not already been accomplished, the Headquarters 5th Air Force would displace and merge as noted above. Manpower savings were outlined, as was a schedule for the merger. The effective proposed date for the changeover was 1 July with the majority of major actions expected to be completed by 1 October. For proposed terms of reference it was noted that effective with the disestablishment of Headquarters, USARPAC, the CG, EUSA would report directly to the Department of the Army for Army matters.2

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1. CINCPAC 191830Z Feb 74
2. CINCPAC 040430Z May 74; JCS 5022/101618Z May 74; COMUSK/CINCUNC SEOUL 281735Z May 74; J5121 Point Paper, 5 Jun 74, Subj: Political/Military Situation in ROK (U).

(C) The proposed merger took place as planned. In certain communication matters some confusion became apparent after the merger. CINCPAC noted that it was possibly from the use of the multiple addressee CINCUNC/USFK/EUSA. He advised his principal PACOM commands to insure that messages were addressed according to their content. UNC matters should be addressed to CINCUNC, who reported directly to the JCS, and from whom he received strategic guidance and direction. COMUS Korea was the subordinate unified commander under operational command of CINCPAC, and responsible for coordination of U.S. matters of joint concern and the appropriate authority for high-level bilateral U.S.-ROK military matters in Korea. The plan to place the operational control of EUSA under COMUS Korea would mean that EUSA reported directly to the Department of the Army for uni-Service matters, such as administration, logistics, and training. Correspondence or messages that denoted matters possessing a combined aspect for more than one of the headquarters designations should be so noted.[1]

(S) On 6 May CINCPAC had forwarded recommended changes in the Terms of Reference for COMUS Korea to the JCS. These changes had been held in abeyance by the JCS, however, until the Secretary of Defense made decisions affecting the Unified Command Plan. In early December, COMUS Korea made a final evaluation of the terms. CINCPAC concurred and forwarded the changes to the JCS. Considering the synonymous meaning of the terms "operational command" and "operational control" as contained in JCS Publication 2, CINCPAC recommended that the Terms of Reference for COMUS Korea contain "authority to exercise operational command/operational control over assigned U.S. forces."[2]

Alternative Command Arrangements to United Nations Command

(S) Late in 1973 the JCS had requested comments from CINCPAC and CINCUNC on alternative command arrangements in the event the UNC was disestablished. The JCS proposed three alternatives: (1) designate COMUS Korea as a successor to the CINCUNC with operational control of ROK forces; (2) establish a combined U.S.-ROK command, under CINCPAC; and, (3) continue Headquarters U.S. Forces Korea as a unilateral headquarters for command and control of U.S. Forces in the ROK with ROK forces under control of ROK senior headquarters.[3]

(S) CINCPAC comments were provided on 4 January 1974. CINCPAC noted that over the next year or two the United Nations was likely to debate the continued

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1. CINCPAC 151845Z Nov 74.
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser 00354, 6 May 74, Subj: Terms of Reference for the Commander, U.S. Forces, Korea; CINCPAC 100110Z Dec 74; CINCPAC 270409Z Dec 74; J5111 HistSum Dec 74.
3. JCS 3018/061930Z Dec 73.

existence of the UNC in Korea and perhaps even end it. He advised that it should be recognized that conditions on the peninsula had radically changed, with an overall balance between the North and the South, with a welcome dialogue begun between the two bitter enemies. "We must also acknowledge that the South Koreans have grown up after 20 years of US political, economic and military tutelage. In short, the environment in which the US has maintained OPCON of the ROK armed forces has almost completely changed," CINCPAC noted. Any successor arrangement to the UNC, CINCPAC believed, should insure that our national command authorities had maximum decision making flexibility in contingencies and that ROK internal stability was not seriously damaged.

(S) The JCS had indicated a preference for alternative 2, but CINCPAC did not believe that this moved the United States toward the ultimate objective of disengagement from U.S. direct involvement in ROK defense planning in a timely manner, as outlined in the Nixon Doctrine. Our real and most meaningful influence over the ROK, CINCPAC said, was a function of our logistical support arrangement. Continued defense of UNC-U.S. preponderance in Korean affairs would be increasingly difficult in the future.

(S) CINCPAC proposed a fourth alternative: a time-phased transfer of operational control of U.S. and ROK forces in Korea when the UNC was terminated, first from UNC to a ROK-U.S. combined headquarters under CINCPAC (with the United States to retain OPCON of ROK forces); subsequently to U.S. Forces, Korea as a sub-unified command under CINCPAC dependent upon the size of residual U.S. Forces (with command and control of ROK forces reverting to the ROK government); and ultimately to withdrawal of all U.S. Forces from Korea. Armistice responsibilities would gradually transfer to ROK cognizance a step at a time or to another instrumentality when the UNC was terminated. CINCPAC cited advantages in the gradual reduction of U.S. direct involvement in the defense of the ROK and possible automatic involvement against the will of the U.S. Government; provision of greater flexibility in the use of forces; and encouragment of the ROK in various ways. Among disadvantages were the possibly lessened U.S. influence over ROK armed forces and the view others might take of such a move--China and the U.S.S.R. might view the arrangement as having a destabilizing effect on the Korean Peninsula and U.S. allies might view it as a move toward total disengagement in Asia and a lessening of our commitment to the Koreans.

(S) CINCPAC believed that planning among the State and Defense Departments, the Country Team and ROK government representatives should start at the earliest practical date, as the "handwriting appears to be on the wall regarding long term retention of UNC." The United States should focus on an optimum quid pro quo if it acquiesced to UNC dissolution. "Priority should be US national interest which recognizes importance of forward base posture in Asia and

specifically recognizes our mutual security interests with South Koreans. We should focus on what is lost if U.S. gives up OPCON of ROK forces."[1]

(S) CINCUNC also provided his views to the JCS. He stated a "clear preference" for the activation of a combined U.S.-ROK command "when and if" the UNC was disestablished, noting that the ground work for establishment of such a command "must be meticulously prepared, and especially in the political sphere." He noted that for some time he had been examining ways and means of introducing ROK officers into Headquarters UNC/USFK. He thought that the combined command should not be subordinate to CINCPAC, however, because he thought the ROK government would not accept an arrangement that involved a less direct channel to the U.S. JCS than they had under existing arrangements, although there could be a provision for subordination to CINCPAC in time of war. CINCUNC also addressed the armistice agreement and commission and requirements in that regard, noting that any successor organization to the UNC would "confront real difficulties in the assumption and discharge of MAA/MAC responsibilities." He believed it was incumbent upon the UNC to give this matter much additional study and report pertinent results.[2]

(TS) In April the Secretaries of State and Defense provided authority and guidance for U.S. representatives to discuss post-UNC command arrangements with the South Korean government. Subsequently the ROK representatives provided the United States with their views on arrangements and on operational control of ROK forces upon termination of the UNC. Again the JCS requested the views of CINCPAC and CINCUNC, and these were provided. They were expected to provide the JCS with a basis on which to develop a U.S. Government position on military command arrangements. Message traffic in this last sequence was closely held, as noted below.[3]

(U) Later in the year the matter of the UNC in Korea was addressed by the United Nations, both in the Political and Security Committee and in the General Assembly. Two resolutions were simultaneously introduced. (The "friendly" resolution was contained in document A/C.1/L.676 (which was subsequently adopted as revised); A/C.1/L.677 was the "hostile" resolution.) The U.S. Representative, commenting on the resolution that suggested that peace might be maintained and peaceful reunification might be expedited by the removal of U.S. troops from Korea, noted that history had not supported that view. When U.S. troops were completely removed after World War II, North Korea launched

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1. CINCPAC 040624Z Jan 74.
2. CINCUNC SEOUL 090040Z Jan 74.
3. J5111 HistSum Nov 74, which cited SECSTATE 070270/071955Z Apr 74 and 090222/021739Z May 74 (both EX), JCS 221636Z May 74 Eyes Only, CINCUNC 101901Z May 74 Eyes Only, and CINCPAC 252023Z May 74 Sensitive.

an all-out military attack. The "friendly" resolution, on the other hand, reaffirmed the consensus reached a year before in the General Assembly to urge the two Koreas to continue the dialogue that had begun and sought to have the parties directly concerned discuss how peace and security on the peninsula were to be maintained before existing arrangements were changed. The U.S. Representative noted that both the United States and Korea had made it clear that they were willing to consider alternative arrangements, but not at the expense of military stability on the Korean Peninsula, which those arrangements had brought about and helped maintain. The adopted resolution reiterated the goal of peaceful reunification, noted that tension had not been totally eliminated, and recognized that the UN had a continuing responsibility. The General Assembly, the resolution concluded:

> ...Expresses the hope that the Security Council, bearing in mind the need to ensure continued adherence to the Armistice Agreement and the full maintenance of peace and security in the area, will in due course give consideration, in consultation with the parties directly concerned, to those aspects of the Korean question which fall within its responsibilities, including the dissolution of the United Nations Command in conjunction with appropriate arrangements to maintain the Armistice Agreement which is calculated to preserve peace and security in the Korean peninsula, pending negotiations and conciliation between the two Korean Governments leading to a lasting peace between them.[1]

I Corps (U.S.-ROK) Group

(S) Following a May 1970 decision to reduce the number of U.S. military personnel in Korea, the Korean government had proposed retaining a combined Korean-U.S. Corps (Group) Headquarters to assume temporarily the functions of similar U.S. elements until the Koreans were capable of unilaterally assuming responsibility. The JCS approved the concept in November 1970, but instructed COMUS Korea to insure the Koreans understood it was temporary. The phase-out of U.S. participation had been studied ever since, and on 1 May 1974 was approved in concept by the Secretary of Defense.[2]

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1. Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXII, No. 1856, 20 Jan 75, pp. 82-85.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp.46-47; J5121 Point Paper, 5 Jun 74, Subj: Political/Military Situation in ROK (U).

(S) On 16 February 1974 CINCUNC had proposed a concept that envisioned time-phased actions to pass operational control of ROK Army units (11 division equivalents) from the I Corps (U.S./ROK) Group to the Third ROK Army (TROKA), to pass EUSA operational control of TROKA, and to replace I Corps Group with a Combat Support/Coordination Team (CS/CT). Completion of these actions was contemplated by 30 June 1976. He noted that timing was critical, and that the initial approach had to be keyed to and mindful of internal political and military situations. He outlined proposed U.S. manpower savings.

(S) CINCUNC assessed the pros and cons of the revised structure as follows. On the "pro" side, from the U.S. viewpoint, reduce one headquarters and use space savings for other EUSA requirements, and push professional development of the ROK Army at field army level. Conversely, the defense of critical avenues of approach to Seoul would be degraded, particularly in the near time frame, and the change could raise doubts in the mind of the ROK government as to the U.S. commitment to defense of Korea, with similar questions in the minds of other Asian nations. He concluded that it was imperative that the initial approach to the Koreans allayed fears, asserted continued U.S. support for defense of the ROK, and provided adequate time for an orderly changeover.[1]

(S) CINCPAC, on 19 February, generally concurred, but he noted that some mechanism to coordinate ROK and U.S. elements concerned with ground/air battle was required, although the CS/CT might be the appropriate mechanism. He believed additional study was required to clarify the concept. He believed that in order to reduce internal confusion with headquarters and consequent temporary degradation of defensive capability, the disestablishment of I Corps Group should follow the proposed merger of the UNC/USFK/EUSA headquarters. CINCPAC noted that the change might require establishment of separate channels for nuclear matters and special intelligence for the 2d Infantry Division, and might require the commitment to combat under other than U.S. operational control. He observed that the ROK, other allies, and North Korea, China and the U.S.S.R. could view the move as U.S. disengagement from defense of the Korean Peninsula and reduced U.S. interest in the security and stability of Northeast Asia.[2]

(S) Planning continued and on 26 May CINCUNC provided a more detailed concept of operation. Upon authorization, the United States and Korea would coordinate to pass the I Corps Group operational mission to the TROKA with a target date the end of FY 75. Not later than that date, CINCUNC/COMUSK/CG EUSA would activate two CS/CTs to coordinate combat support for the First and Third ROKAs

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
1. CINCUNC 160410Z Feb 74.
2. CINCPAC 191830Z Feb 74.

in peace and initial stages of war. Two CS/CTs would accomplish the mission by positioning the majority of personnel at the UNC/USFK/EUSA alternate command post (Tango) to capitalize on communications facilities; conduct continuing liaison and planning with Headquarters of the FROKA and TROKA; and collocate with supported field armies at Defense Readiness Condition 3 and during exercises. He again stressed that the approach to the ROK government should be made as soon as possible. He outlined some proposed procedures for disclosure of intelligence, some communications requirements, and other particulars.[1]

(S) On 25 June, in response to a CINCPAC request, he provided still additional details, principally on intelligence and communications matters, and on the peacetime Joint Tables of Distribution for the CS/CTs. The Army was to provide personnel for the 40-man CS/CTs.[2]

(S) Informal information was received by the CINCPAC staff in mid-December that prior to the end of 1974 a joint State-Defense Department message would provide instructions to proceed with disestablishment.[3]

U.S. Bases and Facilities in Japan



1. CINCUNC/COMUSK/CDR EUSA SEOUL 260330Z May 74.
2. CINCUNC/COMUSK/CDR EUSA SEOUL 250615Z Jun 74. J5121 Point Paper, 5 Jun 74, Subj: Political/Military Situation in ROK (U) citing CINCPAC 030922Z Jun 74.
3. J5111 Point Paper, 11 Dec 74, Subj: I Coprs (US/ROK) Group (U).
4. J536 Point Paper, 19 Dec 74, Subj: U.S. Base Requirements in Japan (U); CINCPAC 291946Z Jun 74. In August the JCS asked for a complete list of bases and facilities as of 30 Jun 68 and 30 Jun 74 for response to a Congressional request. Replies were contained in COMUS Japan 280730Z and 280740Z Aug 74.

(S) U.S. Forces were already down to a "lean posture."[2]

- Intelligence, fleet air wing training, and surveillance operations from Misawa Air Base.

- COMUS Japan and 5th Air Force headquarters and an aerial port at Yokota.

- Homeport for an aircraft carrier at Yokosuka and ship repair facilities there and at Sasebo.

- Marine Air Wing activities at Iwakuni and Futema Marine Corps Air Stations.

- Tactical Air Command fighter wing, Military Airlift Command channel traffic, TAC airlift, and Strategic Air Command tanker/reconnaissance at Kadena Air Base.

- P3 surveillance from Naha Air Base.


- Army depot/repair/support facilities at Sagami and Machinato Depot.

- Marine Division at Camp Butler.


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
1. J512 Point Paper, 7 Mar 74, Subj: Reaction Capability of Moving Out of Japan/Okinawa - General Concept (U).
2. J511 Point Paper, 15 Aug 74, Subj: U.S. Policy Toward Japan.



Misawa Air Base



1. CINCPAC 190230Z Sep 74; CINCPAC 052216Z Sep 74.
2. COMUS Japan 14101Z Mar 74; COMUS Japan 080620Z May 74; J5113 HistSum Nov 74.




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1. CINCPAC 182140Z May 74; CINCPACFLT 050057Z Jun 74; CINCPACAF 120139Z Jun 74.
2. J5113 HistSum Nov 74, which cited COMUS Japan 270130Z Jun 74 (EX); COMUS Japan ltr to CINCPAC dtd 1 Jul 74.
3. CINCPAC ltr Ser 00613, 16 Jul 74, Subj: Misawa Air Base Study; CINCPACAF 181900Z Sep 74; CINCPACFLT 012301Z Oct 74; J5/Memo/0136-74, 7 Oct 74, Subj: Misawa Air Base (U).

other, they believed that the people of Aomori had a right to get some benefit from them.[1]

(U) After informal notification in April 1974, the Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) formally requested, through the Joint Committee, use of Misawa for three commercial flights per day. The request was discussed by U.S. military representatives in Japan, but no agreement was reached. COMUS Japan forwarded the problem to CINCPAC in August for resolution; he proposed a choice between two memorandums, one approving and one disapproving the request.[2]



1. COMNAVAIRPAC San Diego 060715Z Jun 74 retransmitted as COMUS Japan 090755Z Jun 75.
2. COMUS Japan 050447Z Jul 74; Ltr COMUS Japan to CINCPAC, 26 Aug 74, Subj: Civil Use of Misawa Air Base.
3. J4/Memo/686-74, 13 Sep 74, Subj: Civil Use of Misawa Air Base; CINCPACAF 270332Z Sep 74; J3 Memo/744-74, 17 Sep 74, Subj: Civil Use of Misawa Air Base.
4. CINCPACFLT ltr to CINCPAC Ser 61/C 665, 17 Sep 74, Subj: Civil Use of Misawa Air Base.

(U) According to JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, no reassignment of existing facilities as between Services, or assignment action affecting the owning Service's utilization, would be effected without the concurrence of the Services concerned. CINCPAC therefore submitted the matter to the JCS for resolution.[1]

(U) On 1 November the JCS approved joint use of Misawa by the Japanese Civil Air Bureau subject to the execution of a Joint Use Agreement. CINCPAC tasked COMUS Japan to negotiate the agreement in concert with the JCS resolution.[2]

Japan Facilities Adjustment Program

(U) The Japan Facilities Adjustment Program (JFAP) was a program formerly known as the Revised Okinawa Reversion Related Construction Program (RORRCP), which was a series of construction projects related to the relocation of flying activities from Naha, in Okinawa Prefecture. The Japanese hoped U.S. Forces would be out of Naha by July 1975 for the opening of OCEAN EXPO 75, when they desired to use the airfield for civilian purposes. The relocation of Navy and Marine flying activities from Naha to Kadena involved construction at other bases, including Misawa Air Base and Iwakuni and Futema Marine Corps Air Stations. In addition to airfield facilities, housing facilities for families and officer and enlisted bachelor quarters were required. Some of the money was to be provided by Japan.[3]

(C) The principal subjects CINCPAC was involved with in 1974 related to construction of bachelor enlisted quarters and the requirements for air-conditioning. In the matter of enlisted quarters, on 16 April the District Engineer in Japan advised COMUS Japan that the Air Force desired to resite the seven BEQs at Kadena, and reconfigure them as a single highrise dormitory. CINCPACAF concurred in this position, but the Navy (both COMNAVFORJAPAN and CINCPACFLT) did not concur with either the resiting or the highrise concept, and believed that any costs related to such revisions should be borne by the Air Force. CINCPAC requested COMUS Japan's position and was advised that he recommended the originally-proposed siting and configuration. On 24 May CINCPAC directed COMUS Japan to notify the Japanese Defense Facilities Administration Agency

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1. J73/Memo/330-74, 30 Sep 74, Subj: Civil Use of Misawa Air Base; CINCPAC 020420Z Oct 74; CINCPACFLT 050422Z Oct 74.
2. JCS 7807/012253Z Nov 74; CINCPAC 022036Z Nov 74.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp. 77-83; CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, pp. 73-80; CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 57-75; CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 75-87.

(DFAA) that the Kadena BEQs would be resited to avoid demolition of existing family housing, but that they would retain the original three-story configuration.1

(C) The requirement for air-conditioning and thermal insulation became such an issue it reached the Washington level. The Japan DFAA took the position that air-conditioning would be provided in their construction for use by U.S. Forces only when the United States would demonstrate a special requirement, such as computer rooms, and that thermal insulation would be provided only when called for by the Japan Government's building code. The agreement that had been signed by the DFAA and U.S. Forces Japan on 27 July 1973 was ambiguous as to the requirement for air-conditioning. On 25 June 1974, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS and Secretary of Defense that the United States "hold firm" on the requirement to insulate all air conditioned spaces, and to install air-conditioning in all new facilities eligible under Defense Department guidance.2


(U) Although the Secretary of Defense concurred in this CINCPAC recommendation, COMUS Japan advised that at a 28 June meeting of the JFAP Special Working Group, the DFAA reiterated their opposition to providing air-conditioning across the board. They contended it should only be provided in special places (requiring temperature and humidity control), or as replacement for existing capabilities. They did indicate a willingness to provide partial systems, to include ducting or fan coils, but not the chiller units. COMUS Japan, therefore, recommended that the U.S. position be modified to accept direct quid-pro-quo replacement where air-conditioning already existed and the Japanese proposal to provide ducting but not chiller units. Also, that COMUS Japan, in concert with Service commanders, be authorized to negotiate U.S. air-conditioning requirements with the Japanese on a case-by-case basis considering local requirements and environmental conditions.3

(U) At this time, however, both sides required written statements of requirements. Also, the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the U.S. Embassy got involved in the air-conditioning question. The Embassy's position was that the Japanese proposal was fair and reasonable. The Embassy also commented on CINCPAC's view that the Foreign Office-Embassy channel was improper for these negotiations. They considered this neither unusual or unacceptable. "We do this ourselves...and we value the right to do so and the beneficial effects it

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1. DISTENGR JAPAN CPZAMA 260350Z Apr 74; CINCPACFLT 300454Z Apr 74 which retransmitted COMNAVFORJAPAN 260814Z Apr 74; CINCPACAF 292100Z Apr 74; CINCPACAF 160220Z May 74; COMUS Japan 230647Z May 74; CINCPAC 240317Z May 74.
2. DISTENGR JAPAN CPZAMA 240720Z Jun 74; CINCPAC 250241Z Jun 74. Guidance was in DOD 4270.1M.
3. SECDEF 2622/271604Z Jun 74; COMUS Japan 060304Z Jul 74.

sometimes produces...." The Embassy noted that the Japanese believed the deadlock on this issue could delay the JFAP program, at an inopportune time when they were anxious to get the use of Naha. The Embassy said that they expected that if the DFAA, despite best will and effort, proved unable to meet the internal Japanese deadline for completion of JFAP construction that would permit the United States to move, both governments would come under "very substantial political pressure to execute the move anyway." In the Embassy view, it was unwise for the U.S. side to attempt to use the acute time pressure the Japanese felt by holding out for construction criteria "which obviously go beyond replacement and in come cases are patently excessive (air conditioning at Misawa)."[1]



(U) Earlier, on 10 July, COMUS Japan had reported a Japanese funding shortfall for Misawa and Iwakuni projects; he recommended a proposed U.S. position on priorities. CINCPAC requested the comments of using agencies, all of whom agreed with CINCPAC's proposed position. On 3 August CINCPAC advised COMUS Japan of the position to take on the Misawa and Iwakuni projects. CINCPAC noted that completion of nine projects at Iwakuni and Misawa in Japan

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 9175/111041Z Jul 74.
2. SECSTATE 155953/182104Z Jul 74.

FY 74 was in consonance with Washington-level concern. As a fallback position, he listed early completion of operations projects at Misawa instead of BEQ construction at Iwakuni.[1]

(U) On 6 August COMUS Japan's Chief of Staff called on the Director General of the DFAA to discuss actual or potential trouble areas in the JFAP, especially those that were seen impacting on the move of flying activities from Naha to Kadena. Because of the number of projects underway, and the small, confined "Charlie Area" where additional construction was scheduled, the Chief of Staff expressed concern that there might be insufficient physical space for the remaining Program I projects under simultaneous construction. There were also delays in obtaining construction material and contractors. He asked for a sequential schedule for Programs I and II indicating how the DFAA proposed to meet the target date of 31 March 1975. In conversations that followed the U.S. briefing, the Director offered a "prudent view" that "major projects" would be completed but that perhaps "ancillary or minor projects" might not be fully completed by 31 March. General Snowden replied that the U.S. need was for usable facilities that would support operational flying activities, and that the term "minor project" might not be a useful term, in that the project might be minor in size or cost but in fact essential to support operational requirements and could not therefore be viewed as minor. The Director agreed, and stated that he would instruct the Okinawa DFAA people to coordinate at the local level to insure agreement on projects that were essential for the support of operational requirements.[2]

(U) On 19 September the Japanese DFAA provided a bar chart construction sequence schedule for all projects in Program I; it was anticipated that no projects would extend beyond 31 March 1975. The DFAA also defined "progress" as it related to Program II: "they interpret progress to mean completion of design, successful bidding and commencement of construction." COMUS Japan considered the DFAA response "encouraging and evidence of GOJ intention to meet current program commitments."[3]

(U) From time to time throughout 1974, specific construction requirements were modified or deleted as operational requirements were altered. These included an administrative facility at Camp Sukiran, a fire station at Torii, and several other Army projects. CINCPAC advised the JCS and Secretary of

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1. COMUS Japan 100510Z Jul 74; CINCPAC 251929Z Jul 74; CINCPACFLT 272321Z Jul 74; COMMARCORBASESPAC CAMSMH HI 292027Z Jul 74; USAFSS KELLY AFB TX 302000Z Jul 74; CINCPACAF 312100Z Jul 74; CINCPAC 030035Z Aug 74.
2. COMUS Japan 060730Z Aug 74.
3. COMUS Japan 300653Z Sep 74.

Defense that the on-going Army reorganization and personnel reductions were not unnoticed by the Japanese, and that JFAP program review was mandatory to insure validity and maintain credibility. He recommended a number of specific actions.[1]

(U) The JFAP closed 1974 with the first solid progress of its over three years of existence. The Japanese government had completed three facilities at Futema Marine Corps Air Station, had two projects at Iwakuni MCAS and one at Misawa Air Base under construction, and at Kadena Air Base had completed four projects with 28 more under construction. The total cost of construction completed by 31 December was approximately $26 million. The Japanese were pressing for a 31 March 1975 completion of Program I to allow relocation of the Naha activities to Kadena prior to OCEAN EXPO 75.[2]

Relocation Programs and Procedures

(U) The matter of standard criteria packages to standardize designs for barracks, housing, schools, and warehouses was studied by both Japan and the United States in 1974, as well as the requirement for a single-point-of-contact to coordinate matters relating to such design and proposed relocations.

(U) In April a team of Japanese officials visited Hawaii to discuss methods of improving procedures. They proposed that the United States establish a single point of contact to coordinate all relocation programs. CINCPAC requested that his component command commanders attend a conference to begin development of standard design packages. The Services were tasked to take the lead, as follows: the Marine Corps for quarters, working with the Navy on enlisted quarters and with the Army on officer quarters; the Army for warehouses; and the Air Force for schools and housing. These CINCPAC requests had been in anticipation of tasking in this regard by the Secretary of Defense; such tasking to develop standard designs was provided on 25 April.[3]

(U) On 24 May CINCPAC forwarded the standardized designs to COMUS Japan for presentation to the Japanese government.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 301905Z Mar 74; J42 HistSum Feb 74; CINCPAC 050331Z Apr 74; SECDEF 8988/111409Z Apr 74; SECDEF 9845/161718Z May 74; SECDEF 7243/220028Z Oct 74; CINCPAC 230457Z Nov 74; SECDEF 4089/032341Z Dec 74.
2. J42 HistSum Dec 74; DISTENGR JAPAN CPZAMA 080702Z Jan 75.
3. J42 HistSum Apr 74; CINCPAC 230244Z Apr 74; SECDEF 1729/250203Z Apr 74.
4. CINCPAC ltr Ser 1591, 24 May 74, Subj: Standardized Design Criteria for Relocation Construction in Japan and Okinawa.

(U) On 5 June the Secretary of Defense proposed that the procedures and organization used for the Japan Facilities Adjustment Program (JFAP) be used for execution of all Japanese-funded relocation construction in Japan and Okinawa. COMUS Japan concurred with the desirability and necessity of establishing a single point of contact, but he did not agree with the organization and concept of organization proposed by the Secretary. He strongly recommended that the point of contact be retained within the COMUS Japan/Service headquarters and Joint Committee/Facilities Subcommittee structure. He proposed establishment of a "Relocation Panel" under the Facilities Subcommittee, with membership specified. The co-chairmen would be the Chief of the Relocation Branch, U.S. Forces Japan and the Director of the Office of Facilities Relocations Projects of the Japan DFAA. After a few minor recommendations, CINCPAC recommended adoption of the organization and procedures proposed by COMUS Japan. The single point of contact would be the Relocation Branch, created in COMUS Japan's Logistics staff; that office would interface with the DFAA's relocation branch.[1]

(U) On 9 August the Secretary of Defense concurred in the concept; CINCPAC proposed the composition of the branch and received concurrence from his Air Force and Navy components. The branch was to be headed by an Air Force colonel, with a Navy lieutenant commander and two Navy civilians, a GS-12 and GS-4. It was expected that the organization would be functional in February 1975.[2]

Okinawa Base Consolidation

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1. COMUS Japan 180616Z Jun 74; CINCPAC 190322Z Jun 74; COMUS Japan 210035Z Jun 74; CINCPAC 262134Z Jun 74; CNO 111640Z Jul 74; DA 291235Z Jul 74.
2. SECDEF 9833/090438Z Aug 74; CINCPAC 150356Z Aug 74; CINCPACAF 160215Z Aug 74; CINCPACFLT 170431Z Aug 74; CINCPAC 210429Z Aug 74; CNO 281604Z Aug 74; CSAF 302347Z Aug 74; SECDEF 4022/162055Z Sep 74; COMUS Japan 270735Z Sep 74; JCS 7561/011920Z Nov 74; J42 HistSum Dec 74.
3. COMUS Japan 250248Z Jan 74; CINCPAC 250600Z Jan 74; SECSTATE 018244/282245Z Jan 74; COMUS Japan 290732Z Jan 74.


(U) On 11 December COMUS Japan reported that seven of the total release and four of the partial facility releases had been consummated. The remaining were in various stages of negotiation. On 17 December, COMUS Japan reported results of discussions with the Director General of the DFAA. The Director reported that a new memorandum being drafted on Okinawa facilities would not apply any new pressures. It was obvious, however, that the Japanese were concerned with the impact of U.S. Forces reorganizations in Japan as well as the heavy financial burden of major relocation construction programs (costs for these relocations were to be borne by the Japanese). The draft memorandum might be used as a vehicle to reopen negotiations on major relocation programs, COMUS Japan advised.[1]

440L System

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1. J42 HistSum Dec 74; COMUS Japan 170441Z Dec 74.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 9592/220940Z Jul 74; AMEMB Tokyo 9540/200120Z Jul 74.
3. AMEMB Tokyo 9759/241040Z Jul 74.



U.S. Forces and Bases on Taiwan

(S) Command arrangements on Taiwan received considerable attention in 1974, as did continuing force drawdowns. Principal subjects discussed in the material that follows are a proposed merger of the Taiwan Defense Command and the MAAG, which the President decided should not take place; reductions of certain Army and Air Force strengths and facilities; and plans for further phasedowns. Plans to merge headquarters in Taiwan had almost reached fulfillment in 1958, and off and on, the subject had surfaced ever since.

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1. COMUS Japan 270729Z Nov 74.
2. CINCPAC 282255Z Nov 74; SECDEF 4893/042129Z Dec 74; CINCPACAF 050600Z Dec 74.
3. CINCPAC 090132Z Feb 75; J5113 HistSum Nov 74.

(U) With President Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972 came plans for drawdowns of U.S. Forces in Taiwan. In the "Shanghai Communique" issued by the President and Premier Chou En-Lai, the United States reaffirmed its interest "in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves" and the "ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. Forces and military installations from Taiwan." The communique continued, "[the United States] will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as tension in the area diminishes." Although the actions discussed below are often interrelated, they are discussed separately for the convenience of the reader.[1]

Command Arrangements on Taiwan

(S) There were two major joint commands on Taiwan subordinate to CINCPAC in the military chain of command. CINCPAC's subordinate unified command was the Taiwan Defense Command, commanded by a Navy vice admiral. The Military Assistance Advisory Group was commanded by an Air Force major general. (Service affiliation of the flag and general officers in Taiwan had received considerable study; see the CINCPAC Command History 1973 for a discussion of this matter. It was determined in 1973 that the position of MAAG Chief would rotate between Army and Air Force; the position of Deputy COMUSTDC would continue to be an Air Force officer.)

(S) COMUSTDC was responsible for all activities of U.S. forces and military agencies on Taiwan in all matters of joint concern, and represented CINCPAC in joint U.S. matters, except the Security Assistance Program. Except for such security assistance matters, he functioned as CINCPAC's single U.S. spokesman on Taiwan for U.S. military policy, planning, and contemplated U.S. force employment. He was CINCPAC's Single Senior Mililitary Representative in the Republic of China. (See "U.S. Defense Representatives in Foreign Countries" elsewhere in this chapter for a discussion of plans for a single U.S. military coordinator in each country, worldwide. CINCPAC had voiced his concern on this matter repeatedly. There were, for example, 44 separate Defense Department activities in Taipei alone, with only 13 in the PACOM chain of command.)

(S) COMUSTDC was to plan for and be prepared to conduct operations as directed by CINCPAC. He coordinated development of bilateral defense plans with the Republic of China. He prepared and developed, in coordination with the MAAG Chief, the annual submission for the Free World portion of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. He coordinated all U.S. military intelligence activities on Taiwan.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 89-92.

(S) The MAAG, which had been established in 1950, was to "influence the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) to maintain and utilize its armed forces in support of U.S. objectives." The CHMAAG China was the representative of the Secretary of Defense to the Government of the Republic of China. He was under the military command of CINCPAC, but he was also under the supervision of the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission to the extent provided by law. He was charged with keeping COMUSTDC informed of pertinent plans and programs of the MAAG; he was required to coordinate security assistance objectives, force development objectives, and security assistance plans and programs under development with COMUSTDC prior to submission to CINCPAC. He performed the normal MAAG functions.[1]

(S) The discussion that follows includes an account of some of the events of recent years and the attitudes of those concerned. In 1970 consolidation planning had stopped when President Chiang Kai-shek had said that he viewed the abolition of the MAAG as a matter of "serious concern" and asked that the subject and his feelings on the matter be brought to the attention of the highest U.S. officials. The decision not to consolidate at that time had been announced by CINCPAC to the U.S. Ambassador, COMUSTDC, and the MAAG Chief during a visit to Taiwan in November 1970. During discussions at CINCPAC's headquarters, then Ambassador William P. McConaughy had stated that he considered that any plans to "fuze" the two staffs would be contrary to his responsibilities to keep up Chinese morale and confidence in U.S. support.[2]

(S) The COMUSTDC during this period, Vice Admiral Walter H. Baumberger, USN, had contended, however, as previous COMUSTDCs had, that his Terms of Reference were inadequate because his authority to coordinate peacetime functions as Single Senior Military Representative (SSMR) did not provide authority to compel unified action and because his authority to influence Security Assistance did not provide adequate authority to insure Chinese readiness for executing the bilateral defense plan, ROCHESTER. Three possible alternative solutions were considered: consolidation of the TDC and the MAAG, subordination of the MAAG Chief to COMUSTDC, and expansion of coordinating authority. At the conclusion of his tour in September 1972, Admiral Baumberger had stated that consolidation was the only solution for improving command relations, and that the Chinese officials were more conditioned to accepting consolidation than they had been two years before.

(S) Expansion of coordinating authority had also been recommended by COMUSTDC in September 1972. He had recommended:

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1. J5123 Point Paper, 7 Jan 72, Subj: Command Relations on Taiwan (U); CINCPACINST S3020.2G, Command Relationships in the Pacific Command (PACOM)(U).
2. CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, pp.52-54.

> ...It is anticipated that only major matters will be forwarded to CINCPAC for resolution; under emergency conditions, or in minor, routine matters which do not adversely affect an organization's mission capability, CINCPAC Coordinating Authorities are authorized to make decisions on disputed matters, then promptly report to CINCPAC the circumstances and the action taken.

This change was not approved. The change recommended would have exceeded the scope of authority authorized in JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, which stated that a Coordinating Authority "does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement, he shall refer the matter to the appointing authority."[1]

(S) It was decided to pursue the third alternative, subordination of the MAAG to the TDC. CINCPAC believed that such a course of action would shift U.S. interest from Military Assistance to defense, giving support to the Taiwan government; improve coordination between mutual defense and Security Assistance functions; provide CINCPAC with a single senior military voice on Taiwan on all joint matters; and be the first step toward eventual consolidation. COMUSTDC prepared new Terms of Reference. Under these COMUSTDC would become the Secretary of Defense's Representative for Military Assistance; the CHMAAG would come under military command of COMUSTDC (the MAAG organization was to remain unchanged under the command of the CHMAAG and succession of command within the MAAG was to remain internal); the MAAG was to be the COMUSTDC agency for administration of Military Assistance with the CHMAAG retaining access to the Ambassador and the Ministry of National Defense and with lines of communication between the MAAG Service sections and their parent Services unaffected. At the end of 1972 those draft Terms of Reference were under study by CINCPAC before being released for review and comment by the Service component commands, COMUSTDC, the CHMAAG, and the U.S. Ambassador. After regional approval was obtained, approval by the JCS and the State and Defense Departments would be necessary.[2]

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1. J5125 Point Paper, 12 Oct 72, Subj: U.S. Military Command Relations on Taiwan (U).
2. Ibid; J5273 Point Paper, 26 Dec 72, Subj: Subordination of CHMAAG China to COMUSTDC (U). A CINCPAC Joint Manpower Survey Team in September 1972 had recommended the designation of the USTDC Chief of Staff billet (an Air Force brigadier general) for dual functions as TDC Chief of Staff and MAAG Chief. COMUSTDC had not concurred in this recommendation; the proposed subordination plan would not require such double hatting.

(C) In 1973 the CINCPAC Staff continued examining both possible Terms of Reference and organizational structure on Taiwan. A manpower management team visited in August of that year; a survey team examined all U.S. military organizations on Taiwan in August also; and the CINCPAC Inspector General, during an inspection of COMUSTDC Headquarters in November, addressed the organizational relationships of CHMAAG and COMUSTDC. The possibility of merger of the TDC and MAAG headquarters was under consideration throughout the year, but no recommendations had been made by the end of 1973.[1]

(S) Alternative military command structures in all of the subordinate unified command headquarters were addressed early in 1974. Regarding a possible TDC-MAAG merger, CINCPAC again advised the JCS about the number of different military organizations having vertical reporting lines outside TDC channels, with no mechanism to require non-PACOM forces to keep COMUSTDC informed. The possible merger of TDC-MAAG would constitute, CINCPAC believed, a realistic first step forward in much needed integration and control of all military elements in Taiwan. The merger would simplify CINCPAC lines of operational command; logistic support would continue in accordance with existing procedures. Among possible adverse implications were the possible loss of ROC assistance-in-kind to the MAAG, a reduction in MAAG status that could reduce rapport and communications with the ROC military, some readjustments in MAAG diplomatic privileges and immunities could occur, and both Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (and others) could interpret the merger as a lessening of U.S. presence and interest in Taiwan.

(S) There were other political considerations. The proposed merger involved organizations authorized under substantially different agreements. The TDC was a Status of Forces Agreement organization with personnel deriving status and benefits from that document. The MAAG was considered an element of the Embassy pursuant to the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, with privileges and immunities of personnel flowing from that bilateral agreement. Taiwan could consider the merger as an abrogation of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, which might require renegotiation of a new agreement for Security Assistance functions. Direct merger might also require new understandings with the Chinese and consultations with the Ambassador and the Departments of State and Defense. In the event lengthy delay was encountered, CINCPAC recommended moving forward by subordinating the MAAG to the TDC "soonest," but continuing to maintain two separate headquarters. This initial step would place the Commander TDC/MAAG in a position to further analyze redundancies in the two organizations and design a Joint Manpower Program for implementation upon merger.[2]

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1. J5122 Point Paper, 29 Nov 73, Subj: Command-Control Arrangements in Taiwan(U).
2. CINCPAC 191830Z Feb 74.

(S) In subsequent communications CINCPAC elaborated on specific points. He advised the JCS of guidelines he had provided the two organizations in order for them to work jointly on preparation of details for the merger. One consideration here, CINCPAC had noted, was the desirability of a senior Army officer subordinate to COMUSTDC to perform Army planning and liaison for Operation Plan 5025 and ROCHESTER planning. (This function was subsequently assumed by the U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group in Hawaii.)[1]

(S) On 11 July the JCS advised of Presidential decisions that had been provided through the National Security Council. No change was to be made in the separate identity of the MAAG and TDC or the status of flag/general officers without prior approval of the President. Additionally, the size of both headquarters was to be further reduced. A proposed Joint Manpower Program merging the headquarters that had been submitted by CINCPAC would not be processed. The MAAG was to be reduced to approximately 50 U.S. personnel by the end of FY 75, and the USTDC was to be reduced to 83 U.S. personnel.[2]

Reduction in U.S. Forces and Bases

(S) As stated above, U.S. Forces in Taiwan had been under continuing study. A CINCPAC staff survey team in 1973 had listed by priority the agencies and functions the team believed should be considered for retention in planning further reductions. In Priority I, for longest retention, were the Taiwan Defense Command and the 9687th Security Group (an intelligence agency); in Priority II were the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command, the 6214th Air Base Group-Taiwan (weapons storage), and Ching Chuan Kang Air Base; in Priority III were the MAAG, the 327th Air Division (air defense), and the 6213th Air Base Group-Taipei Air Station; and in Priority IV were other activities.[3]

(~~TS-FRD~~) In the spring of 1974 National Security Decision Memorandum 248 directed various changes in the U.S. presence in Taiwan. One F-4 squadron was to be withdrawn by 31 July 1974. The F-4s had been provided to the Republic of China during the ENHANCE PLUS buildup of the Republic of Vietnam to maintain an air defense capability when Chinese F-5s were sent to Vietnam. The 20 PEACE BASKET F-5s were to meet the first part of the U.S. obligation to replace the F-5s that had been forwarded to Vietnam. A second F-4 squadron was to be withdrawn by 30 May 1975. Diversions of F-5Es earmarked for Korea and Taiwan-produced F-5Es were to be used to replace the remaining 28 ENHANCE PLUS F-5As

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1. CINCPAC 050025Z Apr 74 (EX).
2. JCS 3895/111300Z Jul 74.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp.89-92.

with F-5E aircraft. All nuclear weapons were to be withdrawn during the last half of calendar year 1974. Authority was discontinued to station Quick Reaction Alert aircraft on alert status on Taiwan. Upon removal of nuclear weapons Tainan Air Base was to be placed on a caretaker basis.[1]

(S) As required, on F-4 COMMANDO DOMINO squadron and nuclear weapons were withdrawn by July 1974, and the last F-4 squadron was scheduled to be withdrawn by 30 May 1975.

(S) Several Army elements were also disestablished. On 30 June 1974 the U.S. Army Forces Taiwan headquarters, the China Detachment of the 7th Psychological Operations Group, and the First Special Forces Group Detachment were disestablished and withdrawn.

[redacted]

(S) In March 1974 CINCPAC's Inspector General had recommended deactivation of the 327th Air Division and closure of Taipei Air Station as soon as practicable, with earlier elimination or reductions of functions, if possible. On 25 May, when the JCS directed major reductions of USAF military deployments on Taiwan, CINCPACAF advised CINCPAC of his proposed actions and requested concurrence. COMUSTDC had advised CINCPAC that he had no objections, provided that consideration was given to existing Interservice Support Agreements and personnel/finance support for residual Air Force personnel in the Taipei area (at the MAAG, TDC, etc.). Commenting on the political sensitivity of the matter, he noted that the Chinese seemed to understand and tacitly accept the restructuring and drawdown of U.S. military forces in the PACOM. It seemed

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1. J5122 Point Paper, 24 Apr 74, Subj: NSDM 248; J537 Point Paper, 28 May 75, Subj: Taiwan Drawdown (U).
2. J5112 Point Paper, 24 Sep 74, Subj: Future Use of Tainan Air Base (U); J536 Point Paper, 27 Dec 74, Subj: Reduction of U.S. Military Presence in Taiwan (U); J537 Point Paper, 28 May 75, Subj: Taiwan Drawdown (U).

doubtful to him that a cutback of the magnitude proposed would spark significant adverse reaction or seriously affect U.S.-Republic of China relations.[1]

(S) There were considered to be no adverse implications for CINCPAC in the planned actions. While the PACAF proposal addressed phasedown rather than phaseout of the 327th, it reaffirmed plans to phase out upon deployment of the last F-4 squadron.


(S) Problem areas generated by the proposed actions fell into four categories: support functions covered by Interservice Support Agreements; tenant/facility arrangements; USAF personnel and finance arrangements; and an Air Force component commander/planning requirement in support of COMUSTDC, but only when the 327th was phased out. All of these involved Service prerogatives or Interservice Support Agreements and would involve PACAF action and coordination with the affected organizations or Services in Taiwan to resolve. Defense Department Directive 4000.19, "Basic Policies and Principles for Interservice Interdepartmental and Interagency Support" governed such agreements and insured that such agreements were not unilaterally reduced or terminated. CINCPACAF would be responsbile for continuing agreed-upon support until new agreements could be negotiated.[2]

[redacted]

Further Reduction Studied

[redacted]

1. COMUSTDC 090445Z Nov 74; CINCPACAF 302130Z Oct 74.
2. CINCPAC 280305Z Nov 74; J536 HistSum Nov 74.
3. J536 Point Paper, 27 Dec 74, Subj: Reduction of U.S. Military Presence in Taiwan (U).
4. J5112 Point Paper, 11 Dec 74, Subj: CINCPAC Trip to Taiwan (U); see also CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, pp. 81-82 and 1972, Vol. I, pp. 76-77.



Coordination of Defense Department Agency Activities--Philippines

(U) Under continuing study was the possiblity of establishing U.S. Defense Department Representatives in foreign countries. One of the first areas studied in this regard had been the Greater Manila area. With the 30 June 1974 disestablishment of the U.S. Army Support Element, Manila, a number of the common service functions identified as having been performed by that unit were placed in a proposed Joint Services Element, Manila, on a proposed Joint Manpower Program under the Deputy CINCPAC Representative Philippines. Terms of Reference for the Deputy CINCPACREPPHIL (Greater Manila Area) were forwarded by CINCPAC to the JCS on 8 July. Under the TOR proposed, he was to be a senior military officer residing in the Greater Manila area; he would be selected by CINCPACREPPHIL. His functions and responsibilities would be to formulate policies for general operation of staff personnel assigned; to direct and integrate the work of the Director, Joint Services Element, Manila; to serve as single point of contact for all Defense Department activities in the Greater Manila area; and to coordinate actions concerning all Defense Department activities located in the Greater Manila area except matters affecting mission

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1. JCS 5392/182133Z Oct 74; CINCPAC 240331Z Oct 74; J537 HistSum Nov 74.
2. J536 Point Paper, 27 Dec 74, Subj: Reduction of U.S. Military Presence in Taiwan (U).

accomplishment. (If unable to obtain agreement, he would refer the matter to the CINCPACREP.) He was to perform as liaison officer between the CINCPACREP and the U.S. Ambassador, and represent the CINCPACREP on all matters except those that affected policy changes or that required the presence of the CINCPACREP. An early response was requested to enable employment of former Army Support Element employees who had significant levels of expertise to provide continuity of services.[1]

(U) The JCS advised that they appreciated the concern relative to disestablishment of the Army Support Element, but they noted that several of the proposed functions and responsibilities of the Deputy CINCPACREPPHIL fell in the same category as responsibilities and authority of possible U.S. Defense Representatives in foreign countries being considered by the Secretary of Defense. Upon receipt of a response from the Secretary to establish such Defense Department representatives worldwide, recommendations should be reevaluated and resubmitted.[2]

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

(U) The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands--Micronesia--included the Marshall, Caroline, and Marianas Islands (except Guam) and had been acquired from the Japanese in World War II and placed under the United States as a United Nations strategic trust territory in 1946. The trusteeship agreement allowed the United States to fortify the islands. It also obligated the United States to develop Micronesia "toward self government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances and the freely expressed wishes of the people," but no time limit was established. The TTPI encompassed an area of 3 million square miles, with about 105,000 persons living on about 64 of the 2,100 islands.[3]

(C) Although negotiations continued throughout 1974, it appeared the Micronesians had chosen two separate courses toward self-government. The people of the Marianas appeared to be ready to formalize agreements that would make them a commonwealth of the United States. By the end of the year it appeared firm agreement had been reached concerning political status and military requirements for land. The other five districts of the TTPI, it appeared, would follow a more distant relationship, called "free association."

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1. CINCPAC 082010Z Jul 74. See also "U.S. Defense Representatives in Foreign Countries (USDR)" elsewhere in this chapter.
2. JCS 3184/041945Z Sep 74.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 94-102.

(S) Highlights of the "free association" agreement were that Micronesia would have full responsibility for internal affairs, be self-governing under its own constitution, with its own laws and courts. The United States would be responsible for foreign affairs and defense, and would have exclusive rights to establish and maintain certain military installations. The United States would provide financial assistance for an initial period of 15 years; support would total $47.5 million annually initially, and decline gradually over the period. The United States would provide postal, meteorological, and commercial aviation services and U.S. currency would be used. Both parties would enjoy most-favored-nation status, and appropriate representation would be established in each other's capital. The compact could be terminated unilaterally by either party at the end of 15 years, but the association could continue in effect indefinitely in the absence of such action. With Congressional approval, the United States would continue additional financial aid (with a $75 million ceiling) during the five-year period between approval of the agreement and the end of trusteeship. This period was to be used to phase in the new government. Major undecided issues in the on-going negotiations concerned the return of public lands and the cost (to lease or buy) to obtain military contingency lands.[1]

(C) By the end of 1974, it appeared that in the Marianas talks, agreement had been reached on the leasing of land. The United States had wanted to buy land outright, but settled for a 50-year lease with an option to renew for another 50 years. Agreement provided for 18,182 acres of land, including nearly two-thirds of Tinian (17,799 acres), including the airport and harbor, the target island of Farallon de Medinilla (206 acres), and a portion of Tanapag Harbor on Saipan (177 acres). The United States was to pay slightly over $19.5 million for the lease period, including the optional renewal period, plus $26,600 for the use of Farallon Island and provision of a $2 million trust fund to earn income to develop and maintain a memorial park on the Tanapag Harbor defense area. An additional 482 acres adjacent to Isley Field on Saipan was dropped in negotiations, because of the exhorbitant price placed on it by Marianas. Moreover, it had not appeared in the Presidential orders for Ambassador Franklin Haydn Williams (the President's representative in TTPI negotiations) as a requirement, and was therefore considered expendable in negotiations. The United States would probably establish a Joint Commission on Transition with U.S. financing of $1.2 million. There were also plans for an intial seven-year U.S. financial assistance program totalling approximately $16.5 million a year. Funds had not been Congressionally budgeted, however.[2]

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1. J5132 Point Paper, 15 Nov 74, Subj: Political Status Negotiations - TTPI (U); SECSTATE 175664/121921Z Aug 74.
2. J5132 Point Paper, 15 Nov 74, Subj: Political Status Negotiations - TTPI (U); SECDEF 3044/032206Z Oct 74; CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI 260001Z Dec 74.

(U) Principal subjects in the material that follows concern the Tinian Base Development Plan, the Civic Action Teams in the TTPI, a civil-military relations seminar, and civil defense.

CRESTED ISLE

(S) CRESTED ISLE, the Tinian Base Development Plan, had been originated in 1971, and further developed since then in conjunction with Project GATEWAY (Guam Assessment to Ensure Westernmost Appropriate Yield). (Project GATEWAY was by 1974 considered "dead," although the Defense Department and many other agencies continued to study land use requirements on Guam.) By late 1972 CRESTED ISLE had been planned in seven phases: I, planning and land acquisition; II, site preparation; III, bare base capability; IV, dispersal base; V, main base; VI, logistic support base; and VII, dependent support. The prime requirement for development of Tinian had been based on a Strategic Air Command (SAC) requirement for an alternate airfield to support Andersen Air Force Base on Guam. CINCPAC, however, had seen no immediate requirement for Tinian. While CINCPAC believed that the option to use the island should be preserved, he believed that the United States should go no further than Phase III of the plan, to achieve a joint-use, bare base capability.[1]

(S) The JCS validated CRESTED ISLE operational requirements on 30 January 1974. They recommended that the seven-phase development of Tinian proceed. The validation included CINCPAC-validated changes for the joint training area, contingency location for Army munitions stocks and reduced Navy patrol squadron requirements, but it did not include proceeding only through Phase III development.[2]

[redacted]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 94-102; CINCPACREP GUAM 172155Z Sep 74.
2. JCS 2043/302004Z Jan 74.
3. CINCPAC 140035Z Feb 74; JCS 6963/281901Z Feb 74.

(S) On 15 February CINCPAC advised the JCS that Ambassador Williams had been briefed on land survey plans and the technical feasibility of an alternate ammunition handling site. The one port, San Jose, was considered best from both an economic and operational viewpoint. The Ambassador stated that he had not given up on achieving the relocation of villagers there. On 6 May, however, the Deputy Secretary of Defense advised that relocation of the San Jose villagers was not longer required, that an alternate harbor facility would be used for ammunition handling.[1]

(S) Carrier air wing training on Tinian was validated by CINCPAC, and revalidated so that all concerned would consider the impact on future base operations, training scheduling, Service coordination, and sharing of base support early in CRESTED ISLE planning. On 14 June the JCS validated the requirement.[2]

(S) The whole matter of near- and long-term requirements for Tinian came under study following a 13 September message from the JCS. They advised that the Secretary of Defense had added funds in FY 76 for facility design, but had directed joint review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS of mission and facility requirements. The JCS extended "near term" to 1982, and requested that CINCSAC and CINCPAC review requirements. CINCPAC's 24 September reply revalidated his near-term requirements, again recommending proceeding no further than Phase III. He stated his requirement to preserve options on Tinian as a multi-Service joint-use base. He noted that the existing forward base structure in the Western Pacific in Japan, the Philippines, and Korea provided PACOM operations support bases that could not be reproduced or replaced by Tinian, and that "Tinian development must not jeopardize" such basing. The CRESTED ISLE plan did not provide a substitute for other Western Pacific bases. PACOM near-term needs supported only a minimum amount of construction as a basis for future expansion when requirements were more precisely defined and to fulfill negotiation concessions.[3]

(S) On 1 October, the JCS requested that CINCSAC and CINCPAC conduct a coordinated review of long-range Tinian requirements. Assumptions provided for the review were: the United States would continue to have strong interests in the Pacific that must be supported credibly by a U.S. military presence; major increases in basing of U.S. Forces on foreign soil were not politically feasible; the United States would have full and flexible basing rights on Tinian; the United States would have the responsibility for the defense of

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1. CINCPAC 150236Z Feb 74; SECDEF 1255/062248Z May 74.
2. CINCPAC 040224Z May 74; CINCPAC 250442Z May 74; JCS 1618/141612Z Jun 74.
3. JCS 1804/131312Z Sep 74; CINCPAC 240023Z Sep 74.

Micronesia. Guam was to be considered as a potential basing site for additional forces, but consideration was to be given to increasing urban encroachment, economic pressures, and other factors that might constrain major expansion of Defense Department activities there. CINCPAC was asked to appraise the likelihood that the United States would be denied basing rights in either Korea, Japan, Taiwan, or the Philippines, and to address the impact on Tinian requirements of the loss of rights in those countries.[1]

(S) In preparing his response, CINCPAC learned that SAC no longer supported a near-term requirement for B-52 (Single Integrated Operation Plan) alert on Tinian, the prime reason for initially commencing the CRESTED ISLE plan. SAC did advise, however, that the modification in requirements should not be considered as negating an alternative need. The various base denial alternatives study that led to the initial identification of a need for the Tinian facility were still valid. CINCSAC noted that Kadena "for all practical purposes has been lost as a bomber operating base and as a weather evacuation base for WestPac bombers." The unrestricted status of Clark Air Base (in the Philippines) and Taiwan bases, considering restrictions imposed during Southeast Asia operations, was questionable at best. U-Tapao, Thailand also fell into the "uncertain" category. "Thus, we still see a need for the Tinian facility to be capable of supporting B-52 and KC-135 operations and enhance flexibility and redundancy in the Western Pacific area." Under conditions in which Andersen's capacity might be exceeded or become unusable, SAC presented a statement of requirements for Tinian.[2]

(S) On 26 October the JCS advised of a revised Navy position that no longer supported near-term development. They asked whether this required any adjustments in CINCPAC's position, which had been submitted on 24 September.[3]

(S) CINCPAC's response had considered the new CINCSAC and Navy near-term positions. He supported near-term development only through Phase I (planning and land acquisition) to preserve the near-term requirement for an option to use Tinian as a multi-Service base. This would permit the use of acquired military land for maneuvers.[4]

(S) On 14 November CINCPAC submitted a coordinated long-term requirement response that included further development of training areas as the only long-term requirement not generated by contingencies arising from base denial assumptions. On 19 November the JCS forwarded the revised near-term

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1. JCS 3524/010316Z Oct 74.
2. CINCSAC 012130Z Oct 74; CINCSAC 151500Z Oct 74.
3. JCS 2984/260038Z Oct 74.
4. CINCPAC 300430Z Oct 74

recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and recommended that the Department provide them to Ambassador Williams. The revised recommendations included only planning for future development and land acquisition, and appropriate upgrading of the existing harbor and airfield, similar to that which had been included in Phase II (site preparation).[1]

[redacted]

(C) A press release of 11 December on the subject was forwarded by the Secretary of State to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo to keep them informed of altered plans because of Japanese interest in Tinian and the TTPI. Ambassador Williams' press release advised of various necessary adjustments in U.S. defense programs including adjustments in the plans and timetable for a military base on Tinian, in part because of the impact of inflation on the U.S. defense budget. It would still be necessary for the United States to acquire land, but the major planned use for Tinian would be for ground, sea, and air training exercises. It would be an important site, the Ambassador said, for keeping U.S. forward amphibious forces in a high state of readiness. Although there would be less local income from construction and continuous military presence, other improvements would be made, and more land would be available for agriculture and grazing.[3]

Civic Action Teams

(S) Military civic action programs had been begun in 1969 with the introduction of U.S. Navy Seabee teams into the TTPI. CINCPAC believed that such efforts would create much good will and at the same time provide needed facilities and improvements. By the end of 1970, both Army and Air Force teams were also in the TTPI.[4]

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1. J539 HistSum Nov 74, which cited CINCPAC 142049Z Oct 74 and JCSM-448-74 of 19 Nov 74.
2. CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI 090726Z Dec 74.
3. SECSTATE 1911432/022235Z Jan 75.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, p. 93.

(U) A review of the program took place in a meeting held 18 and 19 March 1974 among representatives of the Department of State, the TTPI Government, the CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI, the 30th Naval Construction Regiment (on Guam), the component Services, and CINCPAC. This was the first formal review of the program since its inception.[1]

(U) In October members of CINCPAC's Plans Directorate spent several days in the TTPI observing the program. The following is taken from a report of that 20-30 October trip. The five teams there (3 Navy, 1 Army, 1 Air Force) were the only military presence on the islands, except for Kwajalein Missile Range. The Civic Action Teams were there primarily to retain a visible military presence in an area where U.S. near and far-term requirements were not clearly defined. They provided a hedge for the future and a potential vehicle for expanding our military activities, if necessary. They were making a significant contribution to the development of the islands, particularly in the eyes of local people. Composition and equipment for the teams appeared about right, with the possible exception of a need for more road-building capability. The CINCPAC team thought this type of construction would have more long-term payoff, particularly if the military ever needed to go back into the TTPI. The officers in charge of the teams, however, believed that high impact projects like water catchments and dispensaries should be emphasized. The CINCPAC team believed this was arguable, with pros matching the cons. "It all depends on the perspective and what we assess as our ultimate objective for CAT activities - a big question in itself." The CINCPAC team believed that the CAT deployments should be continued, but that improvements could be made in administering and managing the program. The need for better coordination of team projects on both the local and TTPI Government level was discussed with officials in the TTPI.[2]

(U) On 20 December the CINCPAC Representative Guam/TTPI reported on an inspection visit in the Ponape District, where he found the results "gratifying" and the SeaBee team performing in "outstanding fashion." He assessed the benefits being derived from the Civic Action efforts to be exactly in accordance with the basic objectives and "worthwhile in all respects."[2]

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1. J5112 HistSum Mar 74.
2. J5132 HistSum Nov 74; J51/Memo/68-74, 11 Nov 74, Subj: Trip Report - Guam and TTPI.
3. CINCPACREP GUAM 200500Z Dec 74. The CINCPACREP noted the enthusiastic reception accorded the CINCPACFLT band at dedication ceremonies of completed projects; attendance was greater than it had been for a visit by the Honolulu Symphony, the only other significant musical program in the entire year. The band greatly enhanced the positive side of the military presence.

(C) In a message to the Department of the Army, CINCUSARPAC on 24 December outlined the personal attributes beyond technical competence that were desirable in personnel sent in the Civic Action Teams; these teams conveyed U.S. Government concern with local welfare, which greatly outweighed in importance the value of the local training provided or of the engineering projects accomplished, CINCUSARPAC said.[1]

Civil-Military Relations Seminar

(C) CINCPAC hosted a small low-key civil-military relations seminar at the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School, Monterey, California, 29 July to 2 August. A dozen civilian and academic authorities and military leaders met to discuss certain aspects of civil-military relations in the Pacific Ocean area. There were no political invitees as one goal was non-interference with status negotiations for Micronesia and the Marianas and the National Security Council's Under Secretaries Committee Study on Guam. The seminar was chaired by CINCPAC's Representative in Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.[2]

(U) At the time this seminar was held, planning had continued in the CRESTED ISLE concept, for a military base on Tinian and for certain land options in the Palau district. In Admiral Gayler's remarks opening the seminar on 29 July, he commented first on the strategic situation in the Pacific. In short, he said, the situation was one where our forces were barely adequate, given optimum deployment, to meet the contingent problems we might have to handle involving the defense of the United States, the defense of our allies, and the enhancement of stability and peaceful evolution as opposed to warlike evolution in the Pacific. The U.S. presence tended to prevent the domination of the Pacific Ocean and therefore its littoral by a single power. He reminded the seminar participants that the Soviet Union had twice formally offered to organize the Pacific and Indian Oceans under their aegis. They had gotten very little political support, but if it were to be perceived that they were militarily dominant, CINCPAC believed that the situation would be a very different one for the United States.

(U) Our bases related to this situation in two ways, CINCPAC said. They made it possible for our forces to be effective. Also, by their presence they sent political signals that were very helpful in insuring stability, in deterring aggression, and in letting the smaller countries get on with their nation-building and their regional associations without concern for outside interference. They were particularly valuable in the protection of the long air and sea lines

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1. CINCUSARPAC 240252Z Dec 74.
2. J5112 HistSum Apr 74.

of communication that were absolutely vital to many countries of the Pacific, such as Japan and the Philippines, and which were enormously important to even the continental countries such as Australia and the United States. The island bases, particularly in the Marianas and Micronesia, were an integral part of the system that enabled us to deter, to make our presence felt, and in case of necessity to be effective.

(U) CINCPAC noted that it had been rare for military leaders and academic experts to sit down together and discuss military problems such as the garrisoning of troops on small Pacific islands, but he was hopeful that a good deal of insight would come from it. Seminar findings would not be considered a U.S. military or CINCPAC position, but he believed that the results of the seminar would be a valuable source of information for use in the creation of any future Pacific bases and for helpful guidance to commanders in the field. One thing he stressed, however, was the constraint with respect to costs. "I will tell you that this is now the principal constraint on our military position in the Pacific: not politics, not anything else, but costs." He also noted the enormous complexity of political considerations, noting the limitations on freedom of action that were moral, political, and legal. "We must pick our way among them so as to get the best combination of base effectiveness, welfare of the island peoples, their political and economic development, and the welfare and rights of our own military people and their families."[1]

(U) In following remarks, RADM G. S. Morrison, CINCPAC Representative to Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, who had provided the initiative for the seminar originally, outlined some of his thoughts on the region under study. He said, "to me, this deep water basin [the Philippine Sea] is much like the Mediterranean many years ago. The sea provides the communications that bring together enormous economic, social and political forces which have brought this area today to the forefront of the civilized world and, in my view, will be a most important geographic area in the near future." On the northern shores of this "Pacific Mediterranean" was the industrial might of Japan, and in the south were island archipelagos with undeveloped natural riches second to none in the world. Between these extremes were the city states of Singapore and Hong Kong, like "brokers" between the resources and industrial might. Looming in the background was the great continental power of China, with Taiwan and Korea adding spice to the rich mixture with their special character. Admiral Morrison described Guam as America's "toehold" in the new Mediterranean. The military, however, had no intention of trying the prescribe or even lead any island population toward

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1. Opening Remarks, Admiral Gayler to the Seminar on Civil-Military Relations in the Pacific Ocean Area, Monterey, California 29 Jul 74.

specific political, social, or economic systems; that would be the work of other agencies, guided by men of other disciplines. The seminar was to start with the premise that the military had been lawfully directed to construct naval, air, and land operating and support facilities on the Pacific islands. The question was, how to accomplish that military mission to the greatest benefit and least harm to the local environment.[1]

(U) The final report on the seminar was not completed and forwarded to the JCS until 27 January 1975. As the transmittal letter to the JCS noted, because of the freewheeling nature and "academic freedom" enjoyed by seminar participants, the report contained sharp commentary toward some Pacific nations and our own federal departments. For that reason, it had been marked "For Official Use Only" and no outside distribution was made. It was believed, however, that the group advanced some thoughtful recommendations and created a good base for future civil-military seminars on similar issues.[2]

(U) CINCPAC staff review resulted in the following specific issues being evaluated:

- More open association of the U.S. military with Civic Action Teams.

- Efforts to minimize anti-United States and anti-military sentiment through information and public affairs programs.

- Political, military, and civilian interface and the role of U.S. Defense Representatives in a "Country Team" concept.

- U.S. military enlistment program for TTPI residents.

- Review of the U.S. Information Agency's mandate as it pertained to operating in the TTPI.[3]

Civil Defense

(U) In 1972 the JCS had directed CINCPAC to plan, conduct, and control civil defense operations in Hawaii, American Samoa, and Guam; in 1974 that guidance was expanded to include the TTPI. In December 1974 CINCPAC advised the JCS that he was revising CINCPAC instructions on the subject, and that a

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1. Remarks by RADM G. S. Morrison, USN, CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI, to Seminar on Civil-Military Relations in the Pacific Ocean Area, Monterey, California, 29 Jul 74.
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser 211, 27 Jan 75, Subj: Civil-Military Relations Seminar.
3. J5131 HistSum Jan 75, which includes a copy of the complete report.

major new CINCPAC policy principle to be included in that revision was that conditions and military priorities attendant to a nuclear exchange dictated that military support of civil defense in PACOM was primarily dependent upon available in-place resources. Planning for intra-theater movement of forces for civil defense under those circumstances appeared unrealistic and unwarranted. CINCPAC planned to delete it from his instruction and provide specific tasking only for Hawaii and Guam. He requested that the JCS modify their tasking when guidance on these subjects was revised, and the JCS replied that they would take into consideration the thoughts and rationale provided in revision of pertinent directives.[1]

Defense Department Presence in Australia

(C) In November 1973 the JCS had requested recommendations on Defense Department presence and organization in Australia. On 24 April, CINCPAC advised CINCPACAF of his proposed recommendations, which were based on a survey made by his Inspector General. He proposed to designate the Defense Attache at Canberra as his CINCPAC Representative; his representative at the time was the USAF Liaison Officer to the Royal Australian Air Force, also with the Embassy in Canberra. He believed that this action would provide a single senior military voice in that country, consistent with previous CINCPAC proposals. He also recommended the merger of the United States Sending State Office (USSSO) and the USAF Liaison Office's legal office. CINCPAC noted that excluding the Naval Communications Station at Northwest Cape, the Air Force was the predominant Service in Australia. He proposed that the Air Force Chief of Staff designate the Air Attache as the USAF Liaison Officer and provide support from the existing Liaison Office staff for administrative functions. He also proposed to request that the Army standardization group be reduced.[2]

(C) CINCPACAF interposed no objection, but he advised that the Air Force Liaison Officer performed primary liaison functions for Headquarters, USAF, not CINCPACAF. He therefore deferred in the matter of assessing the compatibility of dual hatting the Liaison Officer and the Air Attache. He advised that deletion of the Liaison Officer position would eliminate the USAF requirement for a T-29 aircraft that was assigned, and it would be reassigned. Retention of an aircraft for the Ambassador's use would require State Department justification; assignment of an aircraft to the Defense Attache would require Defense Intelligence Agency justification. Neither of these alternatives was within the PACAF realm of responsibility. The matter remained under study throughout the year.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 060402Z Dec 74; JCS 9860/111352Z Dec 74. CINCPACINST 3025.1A was promulgated 6 Dec 74.
2. CINCPAC 242305Z Apr 74; J5113 HistSum Apr 74.
3. CINCPACAF 250320Z Apr 74.

Aleutian Wilderness Proposal

(U) For some time CINCPAC had believed that steps should be taken to reserve military use rights in the Aleutian Island National Wildlife Refuge. Public Law 88-577 of 3 September 1964, the Wilderness Act, required the Department of Interior to study all of their roadless lands, which occurred in blocks of more than 5,000 acres, for possible inclusion in the National Wilderness System. The findings were to be reported to the President and recommendations made to Congress within 10 years. The Department subsequently recommended that a major portion of the Aleutians become a wilderness area. They recommended, however, that Nunivak Island not be so designated because snowmobiles were used there during the reindeer herding season, but Congress could change this. Designation as a wilderness area would cancel existing military rights.

(U) Late in May CINCPAC sent his thoughts on the matter to both the JCS and the Alaska Area Director of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, the Department of Interior agency concerned. CINCPAC advised the JCS that both the Aleutians and Nunivak Island occupied a strategic position. Statutory restrictions on military use of those areas and operations there could prejudice the interests of national defense. Accordingly, he urged JCS action to attain certain wording in any legislation that designated those areas wilderness areas:

> ...The establishment of the wilderness area shall not interfere with the use of the lands or any waters included therein for navigational aids, military, or naval purposes, nor shall the use restrictions in Public Law 88-577, as amended, be applicable to such use. The President shall determine what navigational aids, military, or naval uses of areas within this wilderness area are appropriate, giving due regard to navigational and national defense needs and environmental protection considerations.[1]

(U) In his letter to the Alaska Area Director of the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, Admiral Gayler noted the interest the entire military structure maintained in our national environment. "As you know, during the past few years we have made great strides in preserving our global ecology and we are proud of this achievement. Let me assure you, we do not plan to curtail in any way our quest for an ecologically sound environment." He noted that while the Aleutian Islands had many features suitable for a wilderness area, his concern stemmed from the area's strategic location. He quoted from Executive

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1. CINCPAC 232235Z May 74

Order 1733, of 3 March 1913, which had established the Aleutian Islands National Wildlife Refuge. That order stated, "...the establishment of this reservation shall not interfere with the use of these islands for lighthouse, military, or naval purposes...." CINCPAC found the intent and spirit of the 1913 order "disturbingly missing" from the 1974 proposal. "The location of this area and applicable future technological developments require the retention of these military rights. I urge that these needs be incorporated into the Aleutian Islands Wilderness Proposal."[1]

(U) CINCPAC also sought the support of the CINC of the Alaskan Command in this matter. As a result, CINCAL wrote to both the Governor of Alaska and the Alaska Congressional delegation, soliciting support. In June, CINCPAC learned from the JCS that the General Counsel of the Office of the Secretary of Defense had been requested to take steps to insure than any Administration-sponsored legislative proposals on this subject protect essential military use and operations. The provision recommended by CINCPAC had been included in the request.[2]

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1. Ltr, CINCPAC to Gordon Watson, Alaska Area Director, Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, 25 May 74, n.s.
2. CINCPAC Liaison Officer to CINCAL Memo for CINCPAC Chief of Staff, 13 Jun 74, Subj: Alaska Items of Interest, which cited CINCPAC 291923Z May 74; J42 HistSum Jun 74; CINCAL ltr to Governor Egan, 10 Jun 74, n.s.; JCS 7452/212012Z Jun 74.

CHAPTER II

THE THREAT

The Strategic Threat

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> I report to you today that aggressive modernization programs, which could place the United States in a position of strategic inferiority in the foreseeable years ahead, now are being undertaken by the Soviet Union.[1]

(U) The foregoing quotation was the prelude to a comprehensive description by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer of the strategic and general purpose force posture of the Soviet Union. The thrust of Moorer's statement emphasized his assessment of the previous year that relative strategic parity existed between the United States and Russia. He warned, however, that new strategic offensive programs initiated by the Soviet Union could easily upset this balance in the future. Nevertheless, his statement in 1974 was somewhat muted compared to 1973, when he stated that, "...the relative military power of the United States in the world had clearly peaked and was declining. The United States no longer had substantial strategic superiority which, in the past, had validated a clear-cut margin of overall military power."[2]

(U) No such reticence was evident when Secretary of the Navy J. William Middendorf II addressed the Unified Seapower Symposium at Treasure Island on 3 December 1974. Middendorf stated that the United States must rebuild its aging Navy or face "unilateral naval disarmament" before a powerful and growing Soviet fleet. He characterized the growth of Soviet naval forces as "one of the most significant developments since the atomic bomb." He noted that Russia had 546 major combat vessels compared to 291 for the United States, and that the ratio in favor of the Soviet fleet was 5:1 in cruisers and 2:1 in submarines. He also pointed to the Soviet merchant marine as "a carrier of cargo, people, naval stores and ideas" which had surpassed the cargo hauling capability of the United States merchant marine.[3]

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1. Commanders Digest, Dept. of Defense, Vol. 15, No. 15, 11 Apr 74; "The Dynamic Balance of Strategic Power", Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, extracted from annual posture statement to Congress; hereafter cited as Moorer Posture Statement.
2. Ibid.; CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 103.
3. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 4 Dec 74, Associated Press article, "Soviet Fleet Far Outbuilding U.S."

(U) This assessment was supported in the 1974-1975 edition of Jane's Fighting Ships. The editors stated that the Soviet navy had achieved supremacy in several areas of naval weaponry and had begun to challenge the U.S. Navy in other areas. The Jane's editor stated that the Soviet navy led the world in seaborne missile armament, both strategic and tactical and both ship and submarine launched. It had large mine warfare forces and considerable amphibious capability, and had launched more than 60 ballistic missile submarines, including the Delta-class ship which "reportedly" had the capability to launch 12 missiles with a range of over 4,000 miles. The Kiev aircraft carrier was also cited as a new anti-submarine capability.[1]

(S) The Jane's assertion of capability for the Delta-class nuclear submarine was close to the mark. The six operational Delta's as of November 1974 each carried 12 long-range SS-N-8 SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistics missiles) with a range of 4,200 nautical miles. The single warhead on the missile was thermo-nuclear, and weighed approximately 1,100 pounds. Deployment, which began in 1974, was limited to the Barents Sea; however, a Delta-class submarine was under construction in the Pacific which, by cruising only 1,300 nautical miles from Petropavlovsk, could target the entire United States except Florida.[2]

(U) The emergence of Russian seapower as a dominant factor in the overall threat to the United States was predictable. In the final chapter of an eleven-part series entitled "Navies in War and in Peace," cleared for publication in the Soviet Union on 2 November 1972, Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union S.G. Gorshkov stated:[3]

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> The need to have a powerful Navy corresponding both to the geographical position of our country and to its political importance as a great world power has already long been understood.... However, this question became particularly acute in the postwar years, when as a result of the alignment of forces in the world arena, the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries found themselves surrounded on all sides by a hostile coalition of maritime states posing the serious threat of a nuclear missile attack from the direction of the sea.

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1. CNO 062047Z Sep 74, CHINFO newsgram.
2. IPAC 31 Point Paper, 15 Nov 74, Subj: New Soviet Long Range SLBM.
3. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Nov 74, pp. 55-66.

> At the same time the imperialists, headed by the U.S.A., having created a situation for the Socialist countries in which they were surrounded from the direction of the sea, did not experience a similar danger. Could the Soviet Union reconcile itself to such a situation? Could it agree to an age-long domination of the seas and oceans by the traditional western sea powers, especially under the conditions when vast areas of the oceans had become launching pads for nuclear-missile weaponry? Of course not!

(C) In addition to the quantum increase in the Russian fleet, improvements were underway in other weapon systems. Russian air power was being strengthened by two new aircraft. The FENCER A was a two seat, twin-engine, variable-geometry-winged fighter-bomber. It was expected to enter the Soviet tactical aviation force early in 1975, and would be the first modern Soviet fighter designed specifically as a fighter-bomber. It was capable of carrying a large mix of air-to-ground ordnance, including conventional and nuclear bombs. BACK-FIRE B was the follow-on model of the BACKFIRE A prototype, with variable geometry wings, mach 2 speed and an unrefueled range of almost 6,000 nautical miles.[1]

(U) Russia also was developing four new intercontinental ballistics missiles (ICBMs) with multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and ranges of more than 5,000 nautical miles. The new ICBMs were credited with greater accuracy than the ones they were replacing, and were likely to pose a greater threat to the hardened targets in the United States.[2]

(S) The size of the Russian Armed Forces, as assessed by U.S. Intelligence, also increased during 1974. The command and general support portion of the armed forces was estimated at 1,553,250 people, assigned to services, supply, research and training. This was an increase of about 800,000 over the 1973 estimate, and brought the total estimated strength of the armed forces to almost five million men.[3]

(U) The Soviet Union continued, in 1974, to be the only strategic nuclear threat to the United States. Military research and development and weapons production continued at a moderate pace in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and military capabilities continued to improve. The limited-range ICBM which

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1. IPAC 03 Point Paper, 15 Nov 74, Subj: New Soviet Aircraft.
2. IPAC 03 Point Paper, 15 Nov 74, Subj: Soviet ICBMs Under Development.
3. COMIPAC 012211Z Jan 75.

COMMUNIST NAVAL STRENGTH

FAR EAST & PACIFIC

CATEGORY		USSR #	COMMUNIST CHINA *	NORTH KOREA *	NORTH VIETNAM **	TOTAL
SUBMARINES	NUCLEAR					
	BALLISTIC MISSILE	11	0	0	0	11
	CRUISE MISSILE	16	0	0	0	15
	TORPEDO ATTACK	10	0	0	0	9
	DIESEL					
	BALLISTIC MISSILE	11	1	0	0	10
	CRUISE MISSILE	6	0	0	0	6
	LONG RANGE ATTACK	28	0	0	0	28
	MED RANGE ATTACK	23	60	6	0	89
	SHORT RANGE ATTACK (OLD)	0	0	8	0	0
	UNDETERMINED TYPE	0	1	0	0	1
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS	LIGHT CRUISERS (COMMAND AND CONTROL)	1				1
	LIGHT CRUISERS (MISSILE)	4	0	0	0	3
	LIGHT CRUISERS (GUN)	2 [a]	0	0	0	2
	DESTROYERS (MISSILE)	9	6	0	0	14
	DESTROYERS (GUN)	13 [b]	1	0	0	14
	ESCORTS (DE, MISSILE)	0	4	0	0	3
	ESCORTS, (DE-GUN)	26 [c]	6	2		33
MINOR SURFACE COMBATANTS AND SUPPORT SHIPS	MINOR SURFACE COMBATANTS	194	899	282	37	1,261
	MINE WARFARE TYPES	69	43	0	0	161
	AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE TYPES	64	496	31	0	588
	NAVAL AUXILIARY TYPES	202	212	0	0	462
	SERVICE CRAFT TYPES	[g]	805[h]	93	50	939
PERSONNEL STRENGTH		96,000 [d]	310,000 [e]	17,600 [f]	3,000	


\# AS OF 1MAY 73
* AS OF 1APR 74
** AS OF 1 JUL 74

a. One in reserve (Total 3)
b. Six in reserve (Total 19)
c. Two in reserve (Total 28)

d. Does not include personnel in Naval Aviation(11,000), Coastal Defense(10,000), or training(10,000).
e. Does not include 32,000personnel of Naval Air Force
f. Possibly includes Naval Infantry and Coast Defense personnel
g. Included in Auxiliary Count
h. Includes 175 Patrol Boats (PB & PBR)

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 28.

COMMUNIST NAVAL FORCES
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION



*. AS OF 1 JUN 74
** AS OF 1 JUL 74
*** AS OF 1 JUL 74

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 27.

had been under development in 1973 was operationally deployed in 1974. This missile was capable of reaching all of Russia and part of Alaska. However, the PRC was not expected to have an operational full-scale ICBM until late in the decade.[1]

The Threat in the Pacific[2]

(S) In reviewing the threat to peace in the Pacific theater, there were four major powers to consider: the Soviet Union, China, North Korea, and the Communist countries and movements in Southeast Asia.

(S) The Russians presented both a strategic and a tactical threat. Strategically, about 250 ICBM launchers in the Far East could be launched against Pacific targets. Any portion of their remaining 1400-plus ICBMs could also hit Pacific targets. Some 340 long and medium range bombers, based in the Far East and armed with conventional or nuclear weapons, could be directed against fixed targets (such as Subic Bay, Guam, or Hawaii) or against U.S. ships. There were 11 Polaris-type Yankee ballistic missile and 14 older ballistic missile submarines in the Pacific. A new Delta-class nuclear submarine, undergoing sea trials in the Sea of Japan, probably would be operational in early 1975. Two Yankees were on patrol; the remaining SLBM-capable subs could hit strategic targets in the Western Pacific (Guam, Subic, Japan). The Soviets could use their Far East bombers, missiles, more than 80 attack subs or 50 surface warships to go after nuclear capable U.S. warships. In addition, Soviet naval forces posed a considerable tactical threat to U.S. naval units and operated regularly in the East China Sea, Philippine Sea, and South China Sea.

(S) Soviet ground forces in the Far East were oriented almost entirely toward China, and capability to transport these troops for amphibious assault was limited.

(S) Tactical air capability against U.S. assets was limited due to the distances involved, but point air defense against a U.S. strike was considerable.

(S) An indication of Soviet policy was manifest in their Indian Ocean activities. From all indications, the Soviets were in the Indian Ocean to stay, and were fully aware of the world's dependence on the Persian Gulf oil

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1. Op. Cit., Moorer Posture Statement; CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 104.
2. IPAC briefing to CINCPAC staff on 27 Dec 74, microfilm file, CINCPAC history archives.

SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST AIR FORCES

	USSR[1] #		CHINA #		NORTH KOREA #	NORTH VIETNAM $	TOTAL
	AIR FORCE	NAVAL AIR	AIR FORCE	NAVAL AIR	AIR FORCE	AIR FORCE	
COMBAT AIRCRAFT[2]							
Jet Fighter (Day)	270		3359	460	562 (Day & A/W)	234 (Day & A/W)	4861
Jet Fighter (A/W)	1246		450	53			1749
Piston Attack	392		30				30
Jet Attack	76		426	16			858
Jet Light Bomber	136	114	388	123	76	6	663
Jet Medium Bomber			60	3			313
Piston Light Bomber	40		88	18			106
Piston Medium Bomber	44		11				11
Jet Heavy Bomber							40
Turboprop Heavy Bomber		53					44
Anti-Submarine Warfare[5]							53
TOTAL	2204	167	4812	673	632	240**	8728
SUPPORT AIRCRAFT[3]							
Piston Transport, Light	124	7	370[6]	39	139	56	735
Piston Transport, Medium		1					
Jet & Turboprop Transport, Light		2	5	1	3	7	17
Jet Transport, Medium	24	10	5				
Turboprop Transport, Medium	*	*	22		4	3	63
Jet Trainer	*	*					
Piston Trainer							
Helicopter	797	91	296	28	28	31	1271
Recce	250	56	11	26			343
Troop Transport[7]	162						162
TOTAL	1357	167	709	94	174	97	2598
TOTAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT	2371		5482		549	240	8730
TOTAL COMBAT SUPPORT	1524		803		174	97	2598
GRAND TOTAL	3895		6285		723	337**	11,326
PERSONNEL STRENGTHS	78,000	11,000	365,000[4]	32,000	23,200	(Est.) 10,000	

1 Includes aircraft within the Far East, Transbaikal, Siberian, Central Asian and Turkestan Military Districts which are athreat to PACOM.

2 COMBAT AIRCRAFT: Fighter & Bomber aircraft only, which are used in fighter, ground attack, bomber/tanker roles or ASW roles.

3 COMBAT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT: All other aircraft assigned to operational units in support of the combat mission, including light and medium transports, helicopters, all types of reconnaissance aircraft, all types of utility/liaison aircraft, & jet fighter trainers.

4 Includes 180,000 personnel assigned to AC&W, SAM & AAA units.

5 Includes 73 ASW Helicopters.

6 Includes 122 Colts used for liaison.

7 Does not include general transportation units.

* Not Estimated

** Does not include 22 Jet Fighters located in China

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 30.

1 #As of 1 Jan 74
#As of 1 May 74
$As of 1 Jan 74

routes. A permanent Soviet naval force was not only a military threat to the oil lifelines, but also represented political pressure to move oil-rich nations away from pro-western policies. The re-opening of the Suez Canal, expected in 1975, would simplify Soviet Indian Ocean operations by reducing logistics problems. A re-opened canal did not, in itself, mean an increase in the Soviet Indian Ocean forces, but only quicker and more flexible access to the area. The level of Soviet interest in the area was evidenced by the visit, in December 1974, of the Commander in Chief, Soviet Navy, Admiral Gorshkov, to Aden and Somalia.

(S) Major combatants in the Indian Ocean at the end of 1974 included a cruiser, two destroyer escorts, one diesel and one nuclear-powered attack submarine. The initial deployment of surface intelligence collectors and hydrographic research ships by the Soviet Union to the Indian Ocean occurred during the Indian-Pakistan war in December 1971. Regular operations have continued since.

(S) Compared to the Pacific deployments, Soviet activity in the Indian Ocean was highly visible and multi-purpose. There was more to be gained militarily, economically, and politically, and with relatively less competition, in the Indian Ocean than in the Pacific.

(S) The second great Communist power, the PRC, which was believed to consider the Soviet Union as its major adversary, nevertheless, posed a threat to the Pacific Command. The Chinese Army was designed and deployed to repel invasion and maintain internal security. The Chinese Air Force was large and well trained, but had a limited variety of modern aircraft and was heavily oriented toward defense of the homeland. The Chinese Navy, for many years a poor third to the Army and Air Force, had become the fastest growing of the services. Although restricted by doctrine and capability to coastal defense, a blue ocean capability was under development, and the intent of a future high seas capability was in evidence.

(S) The nucleus of the PRC strategic threat in the Pacific was its medium and intermediate range launchers. They could cover Soviet Far East targets or strategic U.S. bases in the Western Pacific. Three ICBM sites were under construction, but problems with the program indicated that a full range ICBM would not be operational before at least 1977.

(S) Instead of military dominance, China's long range goal was apparently to supplant the influence of the Soviet Union and the United States in the Third World. The PRC policy was to play off the U.S. against Russia, with the dominant factor being distrust and fear of the Soviets. This explained China's advocacy of NATO, its support of Pakistan against India, its encouragement of splits in the Warsaw Pact, and its toleration of the U.S. presence (military,

SUMMARY OF COMMUNIST FAR EAST MISSILE FORCES

AS OF 1 MAY 73 USSR		
TYPE	SITES	LAUNCHERS
SURFACE TO SURFACE *		
ICBM	220	244
IRBM	0	0
MRBM	0	0
TOTAL	220	244
SURFACE TO AIR **		
SA-2	524	3144
SA-3	103	412
SA-4	3	9
SA-5 [c]	24-40	144
SA-6	1	4

AS OF 1 OCT 73 CHINESE COMMUNIST		
TYPE	SITES	LAUNCHERS
SURFACE TO SURFACE		
ICBM	3	5
IRBM	21	35
MRBM	14	17
UNK/VARIOUS	6	6
COASTAL DEFENSE	7	24
TOTAL	51	87
SURFACE TO AIR		
SA-2	70	162 270
SA-3		

AS OF 1 JUN 74 NORTH KOREA		
TYPE	SITES	LAUNCHERS
SURFACE TO SURFACE		
ICBM		
IRBM		
MRBM		
COASTAL DEFENSE	3	6
TOTAL	3	6
SURFACE TO AIR		
SA-2	64 sites 40 OCC	
SA-3		

AS OF 1 JUL 73 NORTH VIETNAM		
TYPE	SITES	LAUNCHERS
SURFACE TO SURFACE		
ICBM		
IRBM		
MRBM		
COASTAL DEFENSE		
TOTAL		
SURFACE TO AIR		
SA-2 [b]	84	132
SA-3 [d]	16	52

a. 54 occupied; CHI Com SA-2 sites may consist of 3-5 launchers.

b. Only a few are occupied; battalions frequently move between prepared sites. 25-35 sites est. to be photo occupied at one time.

c. 8 SA-5 complexes may consist of 3 to 5 launch sites of 6 launchers each.

d. Only a few are occupied; battalions frequently move between prepared sites. 12 sites est. to be photo occupied at one time.

* East of 100° E

** In Taskuent, Transiberian & Far East Air Defense districts

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 32.

economic, and political) in Asia. On the other hand, China continued to insist on the reversion of Taiwan, and stood ready to defend itself against perceived threats on the landmass of Asia.

(S) North Korea was a less far-reaching threat. It was, nonetheless, in a position to menace the Republic of Korea, destabilize the peninsula, threaten Japan, and involve the United States.

(S) North Korea had a well-trained conventional army, plus several unconventional warfare units. The Air Force was oriented primarily for air defense, but had concentrated on ground attack and tactical bombing training during 1974. The North Korean Air Force would be a substantial problem to an attacking nation, but probably would not or could not conduct a sustained offensive campaign against targets in the South. The Navy was developing its offensive capability, especially for amphibious assault and support. Minor clashes with the South Korean Navy around the islands off the west coast of Korea occurred in 1974. However, the Navy's primary wartime role was defensive; i.e., anti-shipping, anti-sub, and anti-air operations in North Korean waters.

(S) The North was capable of launching a major attack with little warning, but could not carry on sustained large scale operations without an increased flow of Chinese and/or Soviet weapons, POL and ammunition. Such support would not be automatic, since China was unlikely to turn from detente with the U.S. to support a war on the Korean peninsula unless the North was invaded or facing defeat. The Soviet detente with the U.S., and the Sino-Soviet border tensions, would influence the U.S.S.R. not to support a North Korea offensive. Ergo, the North was unlikely to launch an all out attack against South Korea. North Korea would, however, continue to seek concessions from the South or the United Nations and continue efforts to increase its international prestige and influence. Consequently, the possibility of a serious belligerent incident remained high.

(S) Mainland Southeast Asia had dominated U.S. Pacific thinking for over a decade. Although U.S. Forces, by the end of 1974, remained only in Thailand, the United States retained an interest in the economic and political stability of the area. North Vietnam continued to pursue a war in the south, and although the South Vietnamese had held their own, it was only because of substantial U.S. aid. The same was true of Cambodia, where the Lon Nol Government and the Khmer Communists had fought to a stalemate. Both sides were dependent upon outside aid, and the status quo would rapidly be destroyed by the unilateral withdrawal of the benefactors of either side. The coalition in Laos survived despite factional disputes and increasing Communist domination. Overall, U.S. influence with the Southeast Asian nations (and all of Asia) depended on their perception of U.S. willingness to fulfill its commitments.

COMMUNIST FAR EAST GROUND STRENGTH

USSR* AS OF 1 APR 74

MAJOR FIELD UNITS OF SOVIET ARMY
1 Combined Arms Army Hqs
1 Corps Hqs
28 Motorized Rifle Divisions . . . . . (TO 10,535)
5 Tank Divisions . . . . . (TO 8,506)
2 Artillery (Gun) Divisions
2 Motorized Rifle Brigades
3 Artillery Brigades
5 SS-1 (SCUD) Brigades
PERSONNEL: 310,000**

* Includes Transbaikal FE Military Districts & Mongolia
** Does not include: (a) ground units assigned to territorial air defense (PVO); (b) coastal defense forces of Soviet Navy; (c) ground crews & support elements of the air forces; (d) Internal Security Forces and Border Guard Troops (33,259) (8,759)

NORTH KOREA AS OF 1 APR 74

3 Army Group Hqs
22 Infantry Divisions . . . . . (TC 9,297)
1 Tank Division . . . . . (TC 4,783)
3 Antiaircraft Artillery Divisions . . . . . (TC 3,507)
1 Missile Division . . . . . (TO 6,100)
3 Infantry Brigades . . . . . (TO 8,315)
2 Artillery Regiments (Reinforced) . . . . (TO 1,053)
2 Mortar Regiments . . . . . (TO 858)
7 Rocket Launcher Regiments . . . . . (TO 975)

1 Reconnaissance Brigade
6 Tank Regiments
3 FRCG Battalions (TO 146)

9 Artillery Regiments
9 Army Group AAA Regiments
PERSONNEL: . . . . . .
Current Est Strength 386,000
Paramil/Sec Forces 38,000

CHINA AS OF APR 1974

36 ARMIES:

117 Infantry Divisions (TOE 12,606)

32 ARTILLERY DIVISIONS:

16 Field Artillery . . . . . (TO HOW-6,471) (TO GUN-6,183)
3 AT . . . . . (TO 3,347)
*13 AAA . . . . . (TO 4,006)

6 ARMORED DIVISIONS . . . . . (TO 9,549

4 CAVALRY DIVISIONS (Security) . . . . (TO 5,710)

4 AIRBORNE/AIR TRANSPORTABLE DIVISIONS . . . . . (TO 10,263)

29 BORDER DEFENSE/MIS DIVISIONS . . (TO 8,538)

18 GARRISON DIVISIONS . . . . . (TO 7,993)

11 RAILWAY ENGINEER DIVISIONS . . . (TO 11,012)

196 INDEPENDENT REGIMENTS**

PERSONNEL (Army) **2,835,000

* 3 additional AAA divisions subordinate to Air Defense Command of the CCAF.

**Includes approximately 22,000 - 24,000 PRCA Troops believed to be in Laos; several hundred PRC troops in Burma and a few hundred military advisors and technicians in NVN.

NORTH VIETNAM AS OF 1 APR 74

REGULAR FORCES (Note 1)

7 Inf Dive	TO	10,400
3 Tng Dive	TO	10,000-15,000
1 Tng Group	TO	6,000
9 Arty Regts	TO	1,200
1 Sapper Command (9 Bns)	TO	5,000
7 Indep Inf Regts	TO	3,000
2 Armed Regts	TO	1,500
33 AAA Regts	TO	1,000
12 SA-2 Regts**	TO	2,100
10 Indep Engr Regts	TO	2,000

MILITIA:
Class I - Full Time Militia Members Armed with Semi and Automatic Weapons and Med Caliber Arty Weapons.

SECURITY FORCES:
Armed Peoples Security Forces 16,500

PERSONNEL:
Regular Army . . . . . 300,000-320,000 (Note 1)
Militia . . . . . (Note 2)

NOTES:
1. Strength does not include approximately 250,000 deployed outside of North Vietnam.

2. Estimated to consist of 1,600,000 people's militia/self defense forces and 3,000,000 reserve forces.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 25.

(S) The threat to the U.S. in the PACOM area was relative not only to the strength of opposing powers, but also to the vulnerability of the U.S. Force posture. For example, access to the Malacca Strait was critical to U.S. and allied lines of communication. These and other straits were vulnerable not only to Soviet naval interdiction, but also to closure by the littoral countries. To maintain lines of communication, United States alliances and a credible, viable force structure in the Pacific and Indian Oceans were imperative. Particularly vital were forward bases and support areas such as those in Japan, Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines. However, these critical installations were subject not only to strategic or terrorist attack, but to the political interest of the host nations and area-wide or world-wide disturbances, such as the oil embargo. The drawdown of U.S. Forces in Asia has led to increased reliance on the economic and political cooperation of friends and allies in PACOM, and to greater coordination and complementarity between their military forces and those of the United States.

(S) In summary, the U.S. faced a strategic threat from only one nation in the Pacific--the Soviet Union. China could develop strategic capability, but there was more to fear in the short term from her political and economic influence. PACOM theater stability was threatened by the belligerence and conventional war capabilities of North Korea and North Vietnam. Finally, the U.S. role of supporting national objectives through seapower and airpower was vulnerable not only to hostile action, but also to the possible loss of effective diplomatic influence over friendly and non-aligned nations.

Pressure Points in the PACOM

(S) The preceding sections of this chapter have discussed the threat in somewhat clinical, or detached, terms. There were, nonetheless, signals in two specific areas--the Korean peninsula and Indochina--that portended radical changes in 1975.

The Korean Peninsula[1]

(S) Relations between the two Koreas during 1974 were characterized by a return to bitter polemics. Propaganda warfare became heated as North Korea continued to provoke isolated incidents. South Korean ships were sunk and captured (in February and June), and a civilian airliner was fired upon (in July) when it strayed too close to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Also on the DMZ, a North Korean tunnel across the military demarcation line was discovered on 15 November. Because of increasing North Korean operations along the

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1. COMIPAC 012211Z Jan 75, Subj: Selected PACOM Area 1974 Highlights.

northern limit line, South Korea began, in coordination with the United Nations Command, a staged buildup of the five U.N.-controlled west coast islands to preclude a sudden seizure by the North. Reinforcements, including tanks, artillery, and 2,300 troops were deployed to the islands without incident by May 1974.

(S) North Korea continued the systematic improvement of its offensive capability during the year. Naval additions included three submarines and three new types of indigenously-constructed patrol craft-Komar class patrol gunboat, a fire support motor gunboat, and a sub-chaser. Also, North Korea was building a 140-ft. submarine. The navy and the air force both exhibited a high degree of readiness, and both extended their area of operation.

(S) A reassessment of the North Korean Army order of battle raised its strength from 386,000 to 408,000.

Indochina

(S) During 1974, intelligence estimates of the military situation in Indochina acknowledged the steady pressure against government forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia. Occasional phrases, such as, "...heightened level of combat..." and, "...heavy fighting in scattered locales..." were used in September. In October, the North Vietnamese army had, "...cleared ARVN from northern Kontum...", and had, "...secured the important LOC from the central highlands to the coastal lowlands...". In Cambodia, increased enemy pressure was expected at the provincial capital level in addition to, "...rocket attacks on Pochentong Airfield and Phnom Penh." By November, the Communists in Vietnam were, "...now stronger militarily than at any time during the war." In Cambodia, enemy gunners were, "...generally out-of-range..." of Phnom Penh.[1]

(S) Other indicators of increasing communist capability and pressure could be found in various randomly-selected message traffic. In July 1974, the commander of the U.S. Support Activities Group in Thailand noted the deployment by North Vietnam of MIG-21s to the southernmost areas just north of the former demilitarized zone. In August, the same headquarters voiced concern about the increase in the number of reported SA-7 anti-aircraft missile launches, and a correspondingly improved success rate, against aircraft operating within the Republic of Vietnam. In September, the Defense Intelligence Agency authorized CINCPAC to inform the RVN authorities about a buildup of North Vietnamese

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1. IPAC 321 Point Papers, 23 Sep 74, 25 Oct 74, 26 Nov 74, Subj: SVN Situation, Southeast Asia Estimate, Current Tactical Situation in Cambodia, SVN Situation, resp.

naval activity in the Gulf of Tonkin which was believed to represent a threat to all allied forces operating in the Gulf.[1]

(S) By the end of December, the communist threat in South Vietnam was recognized by CINCPAC as the greatest in the history of the war. Enemy strength had increased by 91,000 troops since the 1973 cease-fire; combat battalions had risen from 344 to 565; and armor, artillery and air defense had vastly improved. The communist logistics system had been enhanced by the construction or improvement of 1,000 miles of roads; Dong Ha had been developed into a major port; and the logistical stockpile had been increased by 68,000 tons. In Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge launched a dry season offensive in the Phnom Penh area on 1 January 1975 simultaneously with attacks on provincial capitals and an interdiction campaign on the Mekong River to isolate Phnom Penh.[2]

(S) Perhaps the most cogent assessment of the Indochina pressure point in 1974 came during a meeting between Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements and Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew on 28 September. Lee referred to the reduction in military assistance funds for Vietnam and Cambodia by the U.S. Congress, and said, "...it is clear that Congress is tired of providing support for Vietnam.... If Congress could regain its perspective...maybe the situation can be saved, but once confidence in the U.S. is gone, it is the beginning of the end."[3]

(S) As reported by the U.S. Embassy in Singapore, the Lee-Clements exchange continued:[4]

* * * * *

> 2. At the time of the Paris Peace Accords, which Lee called a master stroke, he thought there was a 50-50 chance for peace in Vietnam, then, he said, Watergate came along and the tide turned. The situation in Thailand deteriorated, the bombing was halted and people in the region began to lose confidence in the United States. The essential problem is to restore confidence and to demonstrate that we still have the nerve, will and wherewithal to play an effective role in the region.

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1. AFSSO NKP 170446Z Jul 74 (BOM); USSAG/7AF 240115Z Aug 74; DIA 5085/061713Z Sep 74.
2. IPAC 321 Point Papers, 26 Dec 74, Subj: RVN Situation and 3 Jan 75, Subj: Cambodia Situation.
3. AMEMB Singapore 300405Z Sep 74.
4. Ibid.

3. Secretary Clements referred to the cut in the aid appropriation for Indochina from $1.4 billion to $700 million and assured the prime minister that the administration would seek a supplemental appropriation early next year. He was hopeful that this would be approved. He assured Lee that "We are not going to abandon Indochina and are going to try to fulfill our responsibilities in SEA."

4. Lee said that the PRC and Russia are going to continue to be involved in the region. There must be, he said, a countervailing force which can only be the U.S. Security of the entire region depends, Lee said, on a continuing American interest and visible presence and that presence must be credible. He referred to our development plans for Diego Garcia and said this was essential if our Indian Ocean position was to be stable and credible. The Secretary told Lee that we intend to go ahead with our plans for Diego Garcia. Lee said he was glad to hear this.

CHAPTER III

PLANNING

SECTION I --NATIONAL LEVEL PLANNING

FY 76 Posture Statement

(S) In 1973 the Chairman of the JCS had asked CINCPAC (and the CINCs of the other unified and specified commands) for the first time for input for his annual posture statement. These were to be used for more detailed discussion of regional problems by the Chairman than had been the case in the past. In 1974 the Chairman's request was forwarded on 9 September. In the input for his statement to Congress on the U.S. military posture in support of the President's FY 76 budget, he specifically asked for Admiral Gayler's appraisal of the nature and extent of the threat, recent accomplishments, unique capabilities, and perceived deficiencies, with emphasis on mobility, deployments, and readiness. The Chairman requested Admiral Gayler's analysis of the need for forward deployments in the Pacific and viable alternatives and associated risks involved in withdrawal from forward deployments.[1]

(S) CINCPAC forwarded a detailed appraisal of the PACOM situation and an analysis of the need for forward deployments. This 14 October input was acknowledged with appreciation two days later.[2]

(S) Briefly, CINCPAC advised that the Pacific held the key to a significant part of our future. In turn, the United States should have a major part in the development of the Pacific's future. We are, and should be, involved. The most important need in the PACOM today was for the various nations to feel secure and free to develop according to their individual desires and capabilities. They needed to develop both economically and politically in ways that improved the life styles of all segments of their populations. The most significant condition for development was region-wide political stability. Nationalism and resultant inter-regional differences were growing in the PACOM. CINCPAC was not optimistic that regional cooperation would soon replace this wave of nationalism as a way of life. He was certain, however, that PACOM's major achievements had been the deterrence of war and support for peaceful evolution. U.S. force presence and forward deployments were

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 125; J533 HistSum Oct 74, which cited JCS 5624/091512Z Sep 75 (EX).
2. J533 HistSum Oct 74, which cited CINCPAC 142210Z Oct and JCS 3352/161959Z Oct 74 (both EX).

effective. The United States must retain major influence in Asia and military presence was necessary to that end. To insure that winds of change blow fair, we needed to continue our forward deployment strategy and security assistance. Those were positive steps promoting growth and suitable evolutionary change, and were in our best national interest.

Joint Strategic Objectives Plan

(U) One major document in military planning was the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, the JCS mid-range planning vehicle. In two volumes, one concerned with strategy and the other with force levels, CINCPAC provided input for the period FY 1977-1984 in 1974.

(TS) On 9 January the JCS asked for CINCPAC's input for Volume I, Strategy. CINCPAC prepared a proposed version of this document that incorporated CINCPAC's views on PACOM strategy but in a more active style, more direct and concise than had been the case in previous editions of that document. Highlighted were the stress on security of lines of communication, revised PACOM strategic concepts, the downplay on importance and use of tactical nuclear weapons, and the use of more realistic planning factors and assumptions in force planning guidance.

(C) CINCPAC's submission was forwarded on 22 February. The final version of JSOP Volume I, dated 6 May, had little change in style from previous editions, but also had only minimal change in PACOM strategic concepts.[1]

(TS) A summary of the contents of the Strategy volume follows. The National Security objective was to preserve the United States as an independent nation and leading world power. The basic military objectives were to deter armed conflict, to terminate conflicts on terms advantageous to the United States, to assist in self-defense of selected countries, to maintain freedom of lines of communication, and to employ military forces as required. Elements of the U.S. strategic concept were collective security, credible deterrence, flexible response, and the additional considerations of full-spectrum planning, forward deployment and defense, the total force concept, force presence, mobilization and arms limitation.

(TS) A global appraisal highlighted the trend toward multiple power centers and regional power balances. Relaxation of tension had been very slight; competition between the U.S.S.R. and China continued with increasing


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1. J533 HistSum Nov 74, which cited JCS 091422Z Jan 74, CINCPAC ltr ser 00046 of 22 Feb 74, and JCS SM-249-74 of 6 May 74.

Chinese influence; and the potential of Japan was noted.

(TS) Defining the nature of the threat, the U.S.S.R. strategic nuclear forces were considered the most dangerous threat. Also noted was the increasing willingness of the U.S.S.R. to employ general purpose forces. The general purpose forces of the People's Republic of China were seen as the major threat to the Asian mainland and Taiwan, with Chinese strategic nuclear forces a growing threat in the mid-range period.

(TS) In matter of PACOM military strategic concepts, in the South Asia-Indian Ocean areas reliance was primarily on indigenous forces. The United States would respond, as necessary, to counter Soviet/Chinese influence. In the Pacific and East Asia, the concept was to assist allies to deter aggression. If deterrence failed, to defeat aggression. Self-sufficiency among allies was to be encouraged. The general U.S. goal was no involvement in a land war in Asia.



(U) Volume II concerned force levels. On receipt of guidelines from the JCS, CINCPAC promulgated Free World Force Guidelines and U.S. Force Guidelines to component commanders and to those commanders in the PACOM who would be preparing inputs.

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1. J533 HistSum Nov 74.

(C) For the Free World Forces, the primary CINCPAC goals in developing recommended force levels for countries in the Pacific area were to recommend forces based on existing U.S. objectives and strategy, recognition of the realities of the PACOM situation, realistic needs of the individual country, and reasonable attainability. CINCPAC also sought to reduce time and expense for JSOP preparation by updating rather than complete revision.[1]

(U) For Volume II, Books II, III, IV, and V, which concerned U.S. Forces, CINCPAC's guidelines were promulgated on 15 May.[2]

[redacted]

(U) The Balanced Force Requirements Analysis Methodology (BALFRAM), a computer model, aided in developing force levels and in determining sensitivity of scenarios and strategy to variations in type, number, and effectiveness of forces.[4]

[redacted]

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1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 0269, 13 May 74, Subj: CINCPAC Guidelines for submission of recommendations for Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1977 through FY 1984 (JSOP FY 77-84), Volume II, Analysis and Force Tabulations, Book VII, Free World Forces (U).
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser 00382, 15 May 74, Subj: Preliminary Guidance for Development of Submissions for Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1977 through FY 1984 (JSOP FY 77-84), Volume II (U.S. Forces)(U).
3. CINCPAC ltr Ser 000134, 14 May 74, Subj: Threat Assessment and Targets for Use in Preparation of JSOP FY 77-84, Volume II, U.S. Forces.
4. J53 HistSum Aug 74.

a period three to ten years hence in an international environment that changes daily."[1]

(S) In addition to providing the required forces for the specified cases, CINCPAC noted that he had provided an assessment of the sufficiency of this force. "The assessment includes my recommendations for minimum peacetime force levels, of major force types, we maintain as an objective level for PACOM forces. I will continue to analyze this force and forward any significant developments."

[redacted]

(S) For the Free World Force Country Annexes, which were enclosed with CINCPAC's input, the more significant changes from the previous year's JSOP had occurred for Cambodia, Korea, and Vietnam. For Cambodia, in line with State and Defense Department guidance for preparation of the FY 76-80 Security Assistance Program Objectives Memorandum, the objective force levels for Cambodia assumed that active hostilities ceased prior to the end of FY 75 through a negotiated settlement that allowed both the Government of the Khmer Republic and the Khmer Communists to retain their identities. The revised force structure permitted coping with the remaining internal threat, sporadic fighting between the major factions, and control of key waterways. Generally, this was an approximate 50 percent reduction in ground and air force units and personnel.

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1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 000202, 29 Jul 74, Subj: PACOM Recommended Force Levels for Volume II, Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1977-1984 (JSOP FY 77-84) (U).
2. Ibid.

[redacted]

(S) The objective force levels for Vietnam represented a planned scaling down of forces that could occur in the unlikely event that the threat diminished, "or in the more likely event that reduced funding forced structure reductions and acceptance of higher degree of risk." The cuts, CINCPAC said, were made in areas such as VNAF squadrons and aircraft unit equipment, where the greatest cost savings could accrue with the least detriment to capability and efficiency. Total forces were reduced from 910,000 to 640,000.[1]

Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

(U) The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) was the near-term planning document in the JCS Joint Program for Planning. Its purpose was to provide a statement of military strategy to support national security objectives based on capabilities during the next fiscal year, FY 75 in this case. It was published in two volumes. The first expressed strategic objectives, concepts, assumptions, and tasking. The second identified specific combat force levels available for planning for specific contingencies, in order to accomplish the tasks and conduct the operations that are prescribed in Volume I.

[redacted]

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1. Ibid.

[redacted]

(U) Earlier, in 1973, CINCPAC had notified the JCS that he was preparing a completely revised JSCP text. This project had been undertaken because CINCPAC did not agree with certain strategic concepts, planning requirements, and unclear language in the FY 74 edition.[2]

[redacted]

(U) In a 1 May message, CINCPAC also recommended that a distinction be made between types of plans supporting major contingency tasking in the JSCP.

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1. J521 Point Paper, 5 Feb 74, Subj: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).
2. CINCPAC 212121Z Sep 73.
3. J521 HistSum Apr 74, which cited CINCPAC ltr Ser 000113 of 1 May 74; J521 Point Paper, 3 Jan 74, Subj: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).

What he called "Illustrative Plans" would use mobilized forces (constrained only by U.S. capability). They would illuminate concepts, but would not be used for basing arrangements, force deployments, facilities, or war reserve materials. A second type, which he called "Contingency Plans," would use only active duty forces with concepts most likely to represent real-world plans the United States would execute in specific contingencies.1

Southeast Asia Planning

[redacted]

(TS) On 10 July the JCS advised that CINCPAC's recommendation had been considered in the development of Volume I of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 77-84. It was appreciated that, in the absence of government-to-government agreements, combined planning for the defense of Southeast Asia areas could not be accomplished with the desired degree of realism. Nevertheless, the JCS stated that it continued to be national policy that the United States would plan to have the capability to provide the forces and resources necessary to conduct, with its relevant allies, the defense of Southeast Asia, in the event of a conventional attack by China. The JCS concluded that although U.S. national policy concerning support of U.S. allies stated that the United States would look to the nations directly threatened to assume primary responsibility for providing manpower for their defense, it did not preclude planning for the use of significant U.S. ground forces in scenarios that were of particular U.S. national interest.3

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1. J521 Point Paper, 17 Jun 74, Subj: Strategic Concepts vs Contingency Plans (U).
2. J521 Point Paper, 17 Jun 74, Subj: Strategic Concepts vs Contingency Plans (U), which cited CINCPAC 080513Z Mar 74.
3. JCS 3195/102005Z Jul 74.

SECTION II--CINCPAC PLANS

CINCPAC Operation Plans


(U) The CINCPAC staff was continuously in the process of preparing, revising, or studying the continued requirement for planning for many contingencies and operations. A complete list of CINCPAC plans at the time was included in the 1973 CINCPAC Command History and will not be repeated here. In the material that follows, specific plans that came under special study are addressed in numerical order. See also Chapter I, Command and Control, for a discussion of a new generation of computers in the World-wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). These had accelerated the changeover to a uniform Joint Operation Planning ADP support system. Also, a change in deployment reporting instructions provided for new planning procedures and more detailed planning during the plan development and review process. It was expected that a substantial staff effort would be required to adapt to the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) Interim Software (JIS) system.[1]

[redacted]

(S) CINCPAC prepared a proposed response and forwarded it to the JCS for a determination in the matter. The briefings would be authorized, but it was cautioned that in no case should operation plans be made available to the team. Also, briefings were not to include unified or specified command designations, plan numbers, references, specific force requirements, or specific geographic information of a tactical nature. CINCPAC recommended that briefing of the Coordinated Joint Outline Emergency Plan not be authorized because of its sensitivity.[3]

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
1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 133-134; JCS 3760/281728Z Jun 74.
2. COMUS Japan 080139Z Feb 74.
3. CINCPAC 111956Z Feb 74.




SIOP (P. 731)

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1. CINCPAC 201835Z Mar 74; CINCPAC 211952Z Mar 74.
2. J5221 Point Paper, 23 Dec 74, Subj: CINCPAC OPLAN 5001 - General War Plan (U).
3. J5221 HistSum Jun 74, which cited JCS SM-94-74 of 14 Feb; CINCPAC 040111Z Jun 74; CINCPACAF 062223Z Jul 74.




1. COMUS KOREA 280904Z Jun 74; CINCPAC 230226Z Jul 74.
2. J4 HistSum Apr 74; COMUSTDC 060950Z Dec 74.



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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 142-146.



1. CINCPAC 030502Z Jan 74.

(U) On 10 January, however, the JCS sent the plan back to CINCPAC for revision. The revision, dated 19 August 1974, was forwarded as Change 1 to CINCPAC Operation Plan of 28 June 1973.

[redacted]

(U) The JCS comments of 10 January were also reviewed by CINCPAC's Logistics Directorate in matters relating to the Base Development Plan.

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
1. CINCPAC Ser 000217, 19 Aug 74, Subj: CINCPAC OPLAN 5027 (U).

Availability of surface transportation had been identified as a limiting factor for delivery of materials for construction of facilities for forces during early phases of execution of the plan. Necessary adjustments were made.[1]

[redacted]


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1. J42 HistSum Jan 74.
2. J5231 HistSum Dec 74; CINCPAC 120410Z Dec 74; J5 Memo/592-75,30 Jul 75, Subj: 1974 CINCPAC Command History; review of draft.
3. J524 HistSum Apr 74; CINCPAC 101904Z Apr 74.




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1. J5231 HistSum Dec 74; CINCPAC 262357Z Dec 74.
2. J524 HistSum Jun 74; CINCPAC 242320Z Jun 74.



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
1. CINCPAC 170046Z Aug 74.
2. JCS 5879/271418Z Aug 74.



(TS) This approach, CINCPAC continued, would permit the loss of considerable territory and might not preserve the existing governmental structure in Southeast Asia. "However, I believe this strategy is consistent with current realities, and it will buy time for negotiations and possible mobilization. If this is not acceptable, we will need to resolve apparent inconsistencies between current SEASIA strategy and national policy prior to developing an expanded plan requiring major ground forces."[1]

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1. CINCPAC 080513Z Mar 74.



OPLAN 5125

(U) In the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan the JCS tasked CINCPAC to be prepared to provide forces to other unified commands for specified contingencies. The Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS) further directed supporting plans be prepared as directed by the "supported" unified commander.[3]

(U) CINCPAC's planning staff studied means to simplify and improve planning through the so-called omnibus plan approach. The JCS had encouraged this technique, and several unified commands already had such plans. OPLAN 5125, Augmentation/Support of Other Unified Commands (U), was the first CINCPAC

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1. J5232 Point Paper, 26 Dec 74, Subj: CINCPAC OPLAN 5083 - Defense of SEASIA (S).
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol 1, p. 153; J523 HistSum Apr 74; JCS 3932/162356Z Apr 74; CINCPAC 300103Z Apr 74.
3. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 75, Vol. I.

effort to produce such a plan. It consolidated the requirements for eight separate supporting plans required by the JCS into one plan. Such consolidation resulted in reductions in redundance and sizeable savings in preparation, administration and review, security, storage, and printing resources.[1]


[redacted]

(U) During preparation of the plan, it was determined that command relationship agreements with the CINCs of the Atlantic and Readiness Commands needed modification in order to reflect adequately the control of transiting PACOM forces over vast distances. Those new arrangements were included in the plan.[2]

(U) Publication of the plan marked the first time that the PACOM had formally fulfilled the "supporting plan" task levied by the JCS and other commands. As a supporting plan, OPLAN 5125 was not reviewed by the JCS for approval, but by the supported unified commander. CINCPAC requested that pertinent commands review and approve the plan.[3]

[redacted]

1. J5221 HistSum Nov 74, which cited Ltr Chief, Planning Systems Branch, General Operations and Plans Div, J3, OJCS, to RADM Yates, CINCPAC J5, 8 August. Examples of plans in other commands were USCINCEUR CONPLAN 4200 and USCINCRED 7500 and 7600.
2. CINCPAC OPLAN 5125, Ser 000268, 18 Oct 74.
3. CINCPAC 020224Z Nov 74.
4. J5221 HistSum Nov 74; CINCPAC 252025Z May 74.



(S) After review of a draft plan by CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT, CINCONAD submitted a final plan to the JCS on 1 October. That plan required CINCPAC to prepare a supporting plan that included two PACOM augmentation units, the

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1. CINCLANT 202039Z Nov 74;CINCPAC 212301Z Nov 74; CINCPAC 272040Z Nov 74.
2. J5221 HistSum Nov 74, which quoted CINCLANT 202039Z Nov 74; JSCP FY 75, VOL. II.
3. J5221 HistSum Nov 74, which cited MJCS-211-74 of 3 Jul 74.

Navy's VF-121 (12 F-4B/Js) from the Naval Air Station at Miramar, California, and the Marine Corps' VMFAT-101 (8 F-4B/Js) from the Marine Corps Air Station at Yuma, Arizona. The supporting plan, which was to be included as Option 5125J in the CINCPAC plan to support other commanders, was expected to be completed early in 1975.[1]

GARDEN PLOT

[redacted]

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1. J5221 HistSum Nov 74, which cited CINCONAD/COMADC OPLAN 3003, dated 1 Oct 74, and CINCPAC ltr Ser 00810 of 14 Nov 74; CINCPAC 040109Z Sep 74.
2. CINCUSARPAC 040234Z Jul 74; CINCPAC 160219Z Jul 74.

SECTION III-PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PLANNING

Program and Budget Development

(S) The funds authorized for Psychological Operations (PSYOP) support in the PACOM were reduced drastically in 1974 compared to the budgets for previous years. The program approved for FY 75 was less than a fourth of the amount that had been initially estimated as required. Also, as some funds were programmed for contingencies that did not occur, actual expenditures were only a third of the amount available. Based on field and staff inputs, in March 1974 CINCPAC consolidated and approved the projected PACOM Support Program for FY 75 and the estimated FY 76 requirements. He requested that CINCUSARPAC (CINCPAC's coordinating authority for PSYOP matters) take Operations and Maintenance, Army funding action to fund the approved FY 75 programs. The approved FY 75 program for implementation and planning was as follows:[1]

PACOM Strategic Programs:		
Leaflets - Southeast Asia Contingency		$ 828,800
Leaflets - FREEDOM CARE		252,400
Foreign Military Communication Program -		
Military Journal		12,000
Video Tape Recordings		1,200
	Total	1,094,400
COMUS Korea	Total	14,400
Cambodia (BIG SHOW support)		
Magazines		20,000
Pamphlets		34,000
Educational Material Kits		20,000
Health Kits		21,250
	Total	95,250
	Grand Total	$ 1,204,050

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1. CINCPAC 010247Z Mar 74.

(S) CINCUSARPAC was not required to actually fund the Southeast Asia Contingency Leaflets ($828,800), but was required to assure that funds would be made available in the event that operations resumed. Combined with savings from CINCUSARPAC's realignment of PSYOP efforts, the funded program requirements were only $375,250 for FY 75.

(C) In April, CINCUSARPAC indicated that PACOM programs were funded with the exception of the Southeast Asia leaflet program, and that funds would be sought from the Department of the Army for that program if the need should arise.[1]

(C) In June, because of a realignment of PSYOP efforts in the PACOM by CINCUSARPAC, and a change in funding channels, funds to support BIG SHOW and the 24th Detachment operations were transferred to Commander, U.S. Army Japan and Commander, U.S. Eighth Army, respectively. (See Chapter I of this history for a discussion of U.S. Army reorganizations in the PACOM.) CINCPAC's point of contract on PACOM PSYOP fund support remained with CINCUSARPAC through the end of 1974. At that time, the Commander, U. S. Army CINCPAC Support Group was to assume that responsibility.[2]

Realignment of PSYOP Efforts in the PACOM

(S) Major reorganizations of U.S. Army activities in the PACOM were in progress during 1973 and 1974. On 19 December 1973 CINCUSARPAC forwarded to CINCPAC a proposal to realign PSYOP efforts in the PACOM. CINCUSARPAC first outlined the development of the PSYOP program in this command. He noted that PSYOP planning and programming at the national level was the responsibility of the U.S. Information Agency. During a declared war or national emergency, the theater commander was responsible for PSYOP within his command, with the U.S. Information Service supporting the military PSYOP effort. In situations short of declared war or national emergency, overseas PSYOP were a USIA function under the policy direction of U.S. Ambassadors and executed by the Embassy USIS staff. The military PSYOP role was supportive of this civilian effort.

(S) Before the Korean conflict, CINCUSARPAC continued, no significant PSYOP structure had existed in the PACOM. To provide an operative military PSYOP capability during the Korean hostilities, a radio broadcasting company and a reproduction company were activated in CONUS and sent to Japan; these

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1. CINCUSARPAC 060034Z Apr 74.
2. CINCUSARPAC 071906Z Jun 74; CINCUSARPAC 190544Z Jun 74; CINCUSARPAC 062248Z Nov 74; J553 HistSum Nov 74.

were deactivated after hostilities. (One broadcasting effort, the Voice of the United Nations Command was begun at this time (29 June 1950) and continued until 30 June 1971, at which time it was replaced by a USIA Voice of America operation.) As U.S. interest in Southeast Asia grew, in 1958 a PSYOP planning staff from Japan and a radio broadcasting and leaflet battalion from Hawaii were moved to Okinawa to form the U.S. Army Broadcasting and Visual Activity; in 1965 this unit grew into the 7th PSYOP Group (headquartered on Okinawa), affording CINCPAC a theater-oriented PSYOP operating force. The existing PACOM arrangements carried over, although U.S. participation in hostilities in Southeast Asia had terminated. CINCUSARPAC believed that PSYOP missions being performed in support of Ambassadors should be reassigned to the USIA. He requested immediate relief from tasking to support the Cambodian PSYOP programs (BIG SHOW and FREEDOM CARE leaflet operations); strategic PSYOP responsibilities in Southeast Asia, as the coordinating and executing agency for CINCPAC strategic PSYOP; radio-relay of Voice of America to North Korea; printing support for the Joint Personnel Recovery Center; and coding support for the PSYOP Automated Management Information System. If the request was approved, CINCUSARPAC would ask the Department of the Army to inactivate the 7th PSYOP Group and its off-shore detachments located in Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, and to provide support for the residual PACOM PSYOP mission from CONUS assets.[1]

(S) CINCPAC solicited comments from appropriate subordinate commands and Embassies throughout the PACOM. Either minor impact or no impact at all was the response from all of these queried except the U.S. Ambassador in Saigon and CINCUNC/COMUS Korea. The Ambassador in Saigon replied that in the light of the growing need to dissuade North Vietnam from stepping up its offensive activities in the RVN, the requirement was for strengthening, not weakening, PACOM PSYOP in Southeast Asia.

(S) On 22 February, CINCPAC advised the JCS that while he concurred in principle with the USARPAC proposal, he had serious doubt that the USIA had the responsibility or the capability to assume the missions indicated by CINCUSARPAC. Prior to approval of such a request, CINCPAC would need substantial modification of JCS PSYOP tasking.

(S) CINCPAC advised the JCS that CINCUSARPAC had raised a basic issue regarding military responsibilities for PSYOP (in situations other than open hostilities) that had been tasked in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. CINCPAC believed that the military had a role to play in coordination with and in support of Ambassadors in communicating with foreign military audiences.

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1. CINCUSARPAC 190506Z Dec 73.

That was the purpose of the on-going development of a military foreign communications program. The role of the military in that endeavor, however, had been a long-standing question. He recommended interagency resolution of responsibilities, organizations, doctrine, and strategy for PSYOP, but he believed that the question of inactivation of the 7th PSYOP Group should not await such resolution.[1]

(S) Based on comments from the JCS and the field, on 22 March CINCPAC gave qualified approval to CINCUSARPAC's proposal, except for the radio-relay mission, which was to be subject to interagency review.[2]

(S) In April, the Department of the Army provided preliminary guidance for redeployment of the PSYOP units, and in May authorized the redeployment and inactivation of the 7th PSYOP Group not later than 30 June 1974, except the 3d Detachment in Thailand and the 24th Detachment in Korea. Subsequent guidance from the Army called for inactivation of the 3d Detachment effective 21 June 1974, but inactivation of the 24th was again postponed. On 25 June the 7th PSYOP Group departed Okinawa for inactivation at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.[3]

(S) To complete the realignment of PSYOP efforts, USARPAC, in coordination with CINCUNC, transferred the required personnel and funds to operate the Voice of America relay mission to the U.S. Army garrison, Yonson, Korea, and inactivated the 24th Detachment effective 1 December 1974. The decision on the radio-relay mission was still pending an interagency decision at the end of the year.[4]

PSYOP Support for the Joint Casualty Resolution Center

(U) The Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) was the principal agency after the cease-fire in Vietnam with the mission of resolving the status of U.S. and allied personnel missing in action and to recover the not-yet-located bodies of the dead. In 1973 CINCPAC had developed a PSYOP support program for the JCRC called Public Communications (PUBCOM) in support of those operations. (This program was discussed in considerable detail in the 1973 CINCPAC Command History.)


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1. CINCPAC 220213Z Feb 74.
2. CINCPAC 221810Z Mar 74.
3. DA 301910Z Apr 74; DA 081215Z May 74; DA 291507Z May 74; CDRUSARBCO ZUKERAN JAPAN 250656Z Jun 74.
4. J553 HistSum Nov 74; USARPAC General Order 261, 15 Oct 74.

(U) On 12 March 1974 the Embassy in Saigon granted permission for country-wide implementation of the PUBCOM program on a phased basis. Phasing on a bi-weekly and military region basis began on 18 March, and nation-wide implementation was achieved in mid-June. The JCRC subsequently indicated that PUBCOM-attributable information had been reported. The JCRC commander advised of successes of the PUBCOM program, noting that South Vietnamese indigenous personnel had recovered skeletal remains in part of the continuing program to attempt to account for all of those missing in action.[1]

[redacted]

1. J553 HistSum Nov 74; CDR JCRC 041030Z Apr 74, 020933Z Jul 74, and 031100Z Sep 74; CINCPAC 090255Z Apr 74.



SECTION IV--MISCELLANEOUS PLANNING ACTIVITIES

PACOM Lines of Communication Study

(U) As a result of discussions in Washington concerning PACOM Lines of Communication (LOC), CINCPAC began a study to define the meaning and implications of the term "PACOM LOC." As air and sea LOC were essential to economic vitality, national security, and political viability throughout the PACOM, U.S. strategy required continuing emphasis on the security of those LOC. Principal study objectives were to identify specific air and sea LOC important to PACOM strategy in peacetime and during execution of contingency plans, and to analyze problem areas inherent in the use of LOC. The study was to contain background information useful in developing or updating the strategy and forces portions of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. Although an initial draft was completed by 3 April, the paper was still under review at the end of the year.

(TS) It was noted that the strategic importance of the PACOM was growing and that LOC were vital to the PACOM and to U.S. allies and friends in peace and war. Both air and sea LOC were necessary to support the PACOM strategy, air LOC for rapid reaction to move personnel and critical itsms, and sea LOC to move bulk and to sustain combat operations. Major restrictions on the use of air LOC included the enemy, weather, lack of overflight rights, and limited enroute support facilities. For sea LOC the restrictions included the enemy, weather, and choke points. In peacetime, LOC usually coincided with merchant shipping and commercial air routes. In contingencies, specific routing would depend on the type and availability of carriers, the threat, weather, and political considerations. The most serious military threat to PACOM sea LOC was considered to be the Soviet submarine.

(TS) The following conclusions were reached:[1]

- PACOM geography is a major determinant of PACOM strategic concepts and resultant deployment and employment of assigned forces.

- Vastness of PACOM area makes continuous availability of LOC and timely flow of commerce/forces/support along them vital to PACOM strategy. CINCPAC strategy requires continuing emphasis on the security of LOC.

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1. J533 HistSum Nov 74; J533 Point Paper, 4 Sep 74, Subj: PACOM LOC Study (U).

- Choke points are critical strategic locations. National efforts necessary to assure they remain in friendly hands.

- Choke point restrictions on LOC are limiting factors which can adversely affect implementation of CINCPAC strategy.

- Political threat to LOC can develop rapidly as in Middle East crises.

- U.S.S.R. is primary military threat to LOC.

- Primary military threat to PACOM sea LOC is cruise missile and attack submarines. ASM /air-to-surface missile/ is lesser threat.

- Primary military vulnerability of PACOM air LOC is loss of/ damage to enroute support facilities and forward bases.

- A major military vulnerability of transportation systems is the danger of air/missile attacks on terminals.

Panama Canal Study

(C) In 1973 the JCS had asked the commanders of unified and specified commands and transportation operating authorities (the military airlift and sealift commands) for comments regarding the strategic military importance of the Panama Canal. A study group was formed among members of the CINCPAC and component command staffs. The group examined CINCPAC's ability to implement selected war plans in the event of canal denial. Four scenarios were addressed: peacetime, minor contingency, major contingency, and full mobilization. The study was forwarded to the JCS on 28 January 1974.[1]

(TS) CINCPAC's study of the strategic military importance of the canal reached the following conclusions. Closure of the canal impacted on the PACOM and its ability to implement war plans and sustain military actions with varying degrees of severity. Peacetime closure would require some adjustments in logistic planning and create inconveniences of a minor and temporary nature. Contingencies that required PACOM augmentation of the Atlantic or European Commands would be affected in direct proportion to the alert lead-time and required response time. Minor contingencies within the PACOM had little

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1. JCS 6102/092243Z May 73; CINCPAC ltr Ser 00025, 28 Jan 74;, Subj: Strategic Military Importance of the Panama Canal (U). A summary message had been forwarded to the JCS as CINCPAC 262350Z Jan 74.

dependence on the canal with regard to responsiveness of forces or subsequent support.

(TS) Concern centered on the full mobilization scenario, or the major contingency with the potential for escalation. Availability of the Panama Canal was considered essential in meeting the time-phased and logistical requirements necessary to implement an operation plan such as the Defense of the Republic of Korea. Denial of the canal would impact severely on current planning. While the United States had enjoyed the use of the canal throughout its existence, its political and military vulnerability required that alternative plans of action be ready so as to minimize operational degradation in the event of such denial.

(TS) CINCPAC recommended treaty negotiations that insured continued U.S. participation in the canal's operation and defense, and realistic planning at all levels that recognized the vulnerability of the canal. He recommended the use of all available resources to guarantee canal availability, but the ability to successfully and vigorously prosecute our military actions without it.

Cambodia Policy and Progress

(TS) In June the JCS requested CINCPAC's views on a statement of policy regarding Cambodia. CINCPAC advised that the United States should continue economic, military, and political support to the Government of the Khmer Republic, strengthening it as much as possible within fiscal, political, and legal constraints, and should intensify worldwide political efforts to resolve the Khmer problem, focusing on scaling down foreign communist support to the Khmer Communists.[1]

(S) CINCPAC continued to measure the progress toward U.S. goals and objectives in Cambodia through means of quarterly reports. The reporting program had been initiated in 1971. Quantitative measurements included the status of training, force levels, end item use inspections, and the size and number of trained units. Narrative reports described the progress in training, personnel losses, and programs designed to improve overall Khmer effectiveness, such as construction, logistics, etc.[2]

Bilateral Planning

(S) Due to the sensitivity of bilateral planning with Japan, a summation

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1. J532 HistSum Nov 74, which cited CINCPAC 190217Z Jun 74 (EX).
2. J532 HistSum Nov 74, which cited CHMEDTC 151205Z Jul 74.

of planning activities is not found in this document. More detailed information is contained in the messages listed below.[1]

Security Assistance Force Asia (SAFASIA)

(S) In December 1973 CINCUSARPAC had forwarded to the Department of the Army and CINCPAC a concept to remove the Security Assistance Force Asia (SAFASIA), formerly called the Special Action Force Asia, from the PACOM. The concept proposed that the whole SAFASIA, including one battalion of the 1st Special Forces Group, which was in Thailand, be moved to the Continental United States. Continued support of advisory, training, and humanitarian requirements were to be provided from other in-theater assets or Mobile Training Teams from CONUS.[2]

(S) The SAFASIA was composed of the 1st Special Forces Group (the other two battalions were on Okinawa), the 539th Engineer Advisory Detachment, the 441st Military Intelligence Detachment, and the 400th ASA Special Operations Detachment. They had provided CINCUSARPAC with tailored teams for security assistance type missions. The SAFASIA had also been CINCUSARPAC's principal force for the conduct of unconventional warfare and to fulfill the CINCPAC requirement for Army UW forces. The organization had been heavily engaged during the Indochina conflict providing training and advisory assistance to the RVN, training for Special Guerrilla Units in Thailand and training assistance for Cambodia in both Thailand and the RVN. Also the unit had provided Mobile Training Teams and Advisory Training Task Forces to five other PACOM countries. In the transition to peacetime orientation, however, with reduced operational missions, there were severe restrictions on the ability of the unit to conduct meaningful training. The Thai had indicated that they were self-sufficient, and on Okinawa training was severely limited, principally because training for "offensive operations" was so sensitive politically.

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1. CINCPAC 070810Z Feb 74; COMUSJAPAN 130130Z Feb 74; CINCPAC ltr Ser 00056, 14 Mar 74; COMUSJAPAN 030100Z May 74; CINCPAC 232240Z May 74; COMUSJAPAN 290005Z May 74; COMUSJAPAN 050716Z Jun 74; CINCPAC 120057Z Jul 74; CINCPAC 280131Z Aug 74; COMUSJAPAN 100726Z Sep 74; COMUSJAPAN ltr of transmittal, 13 Sep 74; COMUSJAPAN 172300Z Sep 74; COMUSJAPAN 300710Z Sep 74; CINCPAC 050140Z Oct 74; COMUSJAPAN 100544Z Oct 74; COMUSJAPAN 210147Z Oct 74; CINCPAC J521 Point Paper, 30 Oct 74; MJCS-378-74 of 6 Dec 74; COMUSJAPAN 120530Z Dec 74; COMUSJAPAN 160606Z Dec 74; CINCPAC 181922Z Dec 74; COMUSJAPAN 222340Z Dec 74. See CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 162-167 and Chapter X of this history for more information on this subject.
2. CINCUSARPAC 210027Z Dec 73.

Only in the Republic of Korea could training be accomplished with any degree of openness, and even the most basic UW related training (High Altitude, Low Opening and rough terrain parachute training, SCUBA, etc.) was a sensitive and politically volatile issue in all other countries.

(S) CINCPAC queried the organizations that had received support from SAFASIA in the preceding year as he considered the impact CINCUSARPAC's request would have. Increased Military Assistance Program training cost, due to transportation, was a primary consideration. Removal of SAFASIA personnel also impacted on CINCPAC personnel recovery and casualty resolution activities.

(S) CINCPAC approved the request on 7 February 1974. The JCS also approved the redeployment. By 30 June the 1st Civil Affairs Battalion had been reduced to a color guard detachment on Okinawa and redeployed to Fort Bragg, North Carolina for inactivation. The 1st Special Forces group also redeployed to Fort Bragg for inactivation. The 539th Engineering Detachment and the 400th ASA Detachment returned to Bragg to support other units. The 441st Military Intelligence Detachment redeployed to Fort Devens, Massachusetts.

(S) CINCPAC had requested that CINCUSARPAC identify the units that would support CINCPAC requirements, including CINCPAC CONPLANS 5100 and 5119, other CINCPAC operations plans, PACOM unconventional warfare exercises, Disaster Assistance Relief operations, and ongoing civic actions in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and Indonesia. The U.S. Army Forces Command was tasked to assume PACOM support requirements that had been assigned to the SAFASIA.[1]

(S) CINCUSARPAC requested CINCPAC approval to redeploy and inactivate the U.S. Army Special Forces Thailand by 31 March 1974. Because of a Secretary of State restriction on removal of forces from Thailand, CINCPAC requested and received approval from the JCS for the move. The organization was inactivated as scheduled with only a small number of personnel remaining after that date to assist in closing facilities and turning in equipment. The unit colors were returned to Fort Bragg.[2]

Security of Military Installations

(U) NICKEL PLATE 74 was a worldwide command post exercise sponsored by the JCS in May. (It is addressed in greater detail in the Operations chapter of this history.) Following review of the exercise, the CINCPAC Directorate for Plans was given the responsibility for conducting a workshop on installation

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1. J5521 HistSums Jan-Mar 74; CINCPAC 070126Z Feb 74.
2. J5521 HistSum Feb, Mar. 74.

security and anti-sabotage measures. The workshop was held on 8 August, with CINCPAC staff and Service component participation. At the workshop it was noted that guidance from the components to subordinates on installation security was inadequate in certain areas. Also, CINCPAC guidance was published for Defense Readiness Conditions but not for emergency situations.

(U) As a result, CINCPAC Instruction 5510.12, 5 Nov 74, "Base/Installation Security During Defense Readiness Conditions and Other Emergency Situations" was prepared. This instruction required the Service components to establish procedures for the development and review of installation security plans for installations under their jurisdiction. Additionally, each Service/joint installation commander was to prepare an installation security plan that provided for increased security during emergencies or higher Defense Readiness Conditions (DEFCONS); such plans should include the identification of key facilities and priorities for their defense. Each installation was to exercise its security plan at least once a year.[1]

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1. J5242 HistSum Nov 74.

CHAPTER IV--MILITARY OPERATIONS

SECTION I--OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Casualty Resolution

(U) Attempts to resolve the status of Americans and allies who were still missing in action, and to recover, if possible, the bodies of the dead still in Southeast Asia were the tasks of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, which operated under the operational control of COMUSSAG/7AF; the JCRC was located at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, with an associated Central Identification Laboratory/ Graves Registration facility located at Camp Samae San, Thailand. Actions of the agency implemented CONPLAN 5119 for Casualty Resolution.

(U) Early in 1974 the mission and organization of the JCRC came under study. By the end of the year, force reductions and changed location would be effected. On 12 January CINCPAC advised COMUSSAG that a review of JCRC activities was appropriate. The tactical situation in the RVN and Cambodia, the political situation in Laos, the December 1973 ambush of a JCRC team, the limited number of sites available for investigation, and experience gained since activation of the JCRC were all factors.[1]

(U) The JCRC mission, described by CINCPAC was:

> ...To assist in resolving the status of United States missing...and body not recovered...personnel by:
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> 1. Conducting analysis of available data on unresolved cases to facilitate an accurate assessment of the circumstances surrounding such loss.
>
> 2. Initiating casualty resolution operations throughout Indochina to locate and investigate crash/grave sites for the purpose of removing and subsequently identifying remains.

(U) The concept of operations remained valid, but CINCPAC stated that increased emphasis should be placed on the utilization of indigenous personnel to assist in the conduct of operations wherever possible. (This is addressed in greater detail below.) The JCRC procedure of providing appropriate U.S. experts should be continued and leadership of teams should be by U.S. personnel

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1. See CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 212-225 for details of the formation of the JCRC and of the December ambush.

when possible. The size of the teams should be the minimum required, especially those comprised of U.S. personnel. The purpose of this was to minimize risk and to recognize the political sensitivities inherent in U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia, even for humanitarian purposes. The JCRC was to continue to emphasize the development of a complete and accurate data base, compiling all data concerning missing and body-not-recovered U.S. personnel. The JCRC's analysis of data, with a view toward recommending changes in status to the Services, was to be intensified. The continued exchange of all pertinent casualty resolution data among the JCRC, the Ambassadors, and the Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Four-Party Joint Military Team (FPJMT) was considered essential. The public affairs aspects of JCRC operations were addressed: it was important to promote the positive aspects of casualty resolution efforts, emphasizing efforts to resolve each case, but with U.S. efforts increasingly stalemated by the lack of North Vietnamese/People's Revolutionary Government (Viet Cong) cooperation.

(C) CINCPAC did not recommend a specific change in force structure at that time. The JCRC commander was to analyze the situation and make recommendations after recognizing the importance of the U.S. Government image and obligation to the next of kin, balanced, however, with the realities of the situation. Any significant changes in organization would have to have national level approval.[1]

(C) On 9 May CINCPAC outlined plans for reduction and relocation of the JCRC effort. He noted the dim prospects of renewed casualty resolution activities involving large numbers of JCRC field teams and the necessity for a reduced U.S. presence in Thailand. He proposed certain changes with a target date in the first quarter of FY 75, subject to JCRC and USSAG recommendations and JCS approval. The staff was to be reduced; organic field teams were to be reduced from 11 to 3; control teams from 2 to 1. The augmentation capability was to be increased from 10 to 20 field teams. He proposed the transfer of the Central Identification Laboratory Joint Table of Distribution from the U.S. Army Support Command Thailand to the JCRC, with a major reduction. He proposed moving the JCRC to the U-Tapao area in conjunction with the closure of Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base (NKP); computer support after the NKP closure might come from expansion of JUSMAGTHAI computer facilities, construction of facilities at U-Tapao, or from the CINCPAC computer. This remained under study. CINCPAC recognized the highly sensitive nature of the JCRC mission. Announcement of the moves and personnel reductions to the families of the missing and the press would have to stress that the United States was not abandoning the effort, that it was part of the overall reduction in Thailand and the size was to be reduced until the other side would permit us to continue our work.[2]

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1. CINCPAC 120334Z Jan 74.
2. CINCPAC 092220Z May 74.

(U) On 20 June CINCPAC provided his recommendations to the JCS, essentially as outlined above. The billet of commander was to be reduced from Army brigadier general to colonel upon departure of the incumbent, to maintain credibility and acceptable public image. Field teams were to be reduced to four and control teams to one. Augmentation capability, however, was to be increased to four control and 26 field teams. The CIL was to be attached to the JCRC. Computer support would come from COMUSSAG. Concurrent with the relocation to U-Tapao, the JCRC should report directly to CINCPAC.[1]

(C) On 26 June the JCS advised that changes would be premature because of the high level of interest in the prisoner of war/missing in action issue by the Government, the public, the next-of-kin organizations, and the Congress. The JCS advised that it would be more appropriate to address the JCRC issues in the second quarter of FY 75. Planning for eventual changes in the JCRC organization, however, was encouraged.[2]

(U) Parenthetically, on 3 June the House of Representatives had unanimously adopted a resolution (with the Senate concurring) that as a result of the failure of the communist organizations in Southeast Asia to live up to the agreements that had been reached, it was the sense of the Congress that the policy of the United States would be to cease forthwith all consideration of aid, trade, diplomatic recognition, or accommodation with North Vietnam and the People's Revolutionary Government until those agreements were complied with. They authorized and called on the President to encourage local officials and civic leaders across the nation to dedicate and mark suitable individual trees in local ceremonies as living commemoration to former residents who were still missing as a result of the fighting in Southeast Asia, as well as to all those who served and died there. Also a national commemorative tree or grove of trees at an appropriate location was to be dedicated; these ceremonies, to the extent possible, were to be coordinated for implementation on Memorial Day, 1975.[3]

(U) In the matter of the reorganization, CINCPAC directed involved agencies to take planning action to relocate in the second quarter of FY 75. He wanted to preclude complications and facility shortfalls because of program compression.[4]

(U) Because of the volume of message traffic concerning the proposed relocation, it was possible that news media would learn of the move before any

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1. CINCPAC 200046Z Jun 74; CINCPAC 222126Z Jun 74.
2. JCS 2019/261904Z Jun 74.
3. SECSTATE 117308/042208Z Jun 74
4. CINCPAC 310210Z Jul 74.

announcement was made. COMUSSAG, CINCPAC, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs coordinated responses.[1]

(U) On 13 December the JCS approved the move, noting that no public announcement would be made until consultations with the Thai Government had been completed. Accordingly, after such coordination, it was announced to the press that the JCRC would relocate to U-Tapao/Samae San on 1 January 1975. Personnel were to be reduced from approximately 160 to approximately 105. The mission remained unchanged. The revised JTD was approved on 23 December.[2]

Use of Indigenous Forces

(U) On 31 January the JCRC commander advised the Department of the Army that the center was studying the feasibility of using field investigation teams composed entirely of indigenous Vietnamese to conduct casualty resolution operations in the RVN. The JCRC commander outlined the two types of operations generally performed. Grave site investigations normally consisted of a JCRC team being taken to the site by a knowledgeable Vietnamese local, disinternment of the remains and transfer to the Central Identification Laboratory in Thailand, and subsequent identification if possible. Crash site investigations were more complex. A team or teams had to first locate the site, which might involve a several-day search through the jungle. Then the aircraft had to be identified and the area searched and sifted for remains and personal effects. If the proposal were adopted, U.S. personnel would only be involved in evaluating evacuated remains and effects.[3]

(U) It should be noted that site perishability assumed continuingly more serious proportions. Crashed aircraft stripping by local inhabitants for valuable metals had made identification of an estimated one in eight aircraft most difficult. Destruction of remains by plants, termites, animals, and weathering caused major identification problems. The RVN government's reconstruction and resettlement program, which was aimed at clearing areas for cultivation, was disturbing and destroying grave and crash sites.[4]

(U) The specific question the JCRC commander had had for the Department of the Army, however, had been regarding whether Vietnamese investigators

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1. COMUSSAG 190830Z Aug 74; CINCPAC 231941Z Aug 74; CINCPAC PA LNO BANGKOK 230435Z Dec 74.
2. JCS 3158/132018Z Dec 74; CINCPAC PA LNO BANGKOK 270405Z Dec 74; JCS 9213/231508Z Dec 74.
3. JCRC 310930Z Jan 74.
4. J318 Point Paper, 20 Jun 74, Subj: Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC).

might be required to testify in court proceedings as witnesses in the United States. The Army had referred the question to the Defense Department, which had advised, "The proposal discussed in your message is not acceptable and should not be pursued further."[1]

(U) CINCPAC was able to determine that the Defense Department response had been solely to the legal aspects of the proposal. Appropriate action officers at the JCS and in the Office of Secretary concerned with JCRC policy had not been aware of or approved the response. CINCPAC advised the JCS that the proposal provided the greatest opportunity for conducting casualty operations in areas where the U.S. presence was either precluded or had to be minimized.[2]

(S) The JCS supported the concept, provided there was no degradation in the effectiveness of search operations. Caution was to be exercised to preclude creating the impression that U.S. efforts at casualty resolution were being reduced.[3]

(U) By the end of March, three casualty operations had taken place with indigenous personnel in the field and JCRC and Embassy personnel in a safe area.[4]

(S) In response to a CINCPAC message, the Ambassador in Saigon discussed options ranging from all-U.S. teams to all-indigenous teams. He recommended the use of U.S.-trained and technically assisted teams under Government of Vietnam control. CINCPAC agreed. He also agreed it was desirable to reexamine the policy of prior notification of the Four-Party Joint Military Team and the press on all casualty resolution operations. He recommended to the JCS that the Ambassador's proposals be implemented and that the FPJMT be given prior notification for all-U.S. teams only.[5]

(S) The JCS also stated that all-U.S. or U.S.-led team operations should continue to be reported to the FPJMT prior to the operation. The Ambassador in Saigon did not agree, however, and so advised the Secretary of State. He did not believe it was either legally necessary or necessarily the best negotiating stance to secure future cooperation from the communist side. "We do

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1. CDR JCRC 090545Z Feb 74.
2. CINCPAC 252031Z Feb 74.
3. JCS 8936/021717Z Mar 74.
4. CDR JCRC 301338Z Mar 74.
5. J3181 HistSum May 74, which cited CINCPAC 182355Z Apr 74 and AMEMB SAIGON 131040Z May 74 (both EX); CINCPAC 240037Z May 74.

not oppose this position, but wish it clearly understood that there will be no repeat no wholly US or US-led operations as long as it remains in effect."[1]

(S) In view of the Ambassador's position, CINCPAC recommended that the JCS position be reevaluated. JCRC operations, he advised, fell within approved operating authorities and were legitimate according to the Paris Protocols; only host country approval was required. The self-imposed requirement for prior FPJMT notification was for information purposes, and he did not believe it warranted jeopardizing the future of all U.S. or U.S.-led operations. The Departments of State and Defense advised that while they continued to support the principle of prior notification, the safety of U.S. and friendly personnel was paramount, and under existing circumstances, the decision to notify the communist side rested with the Ambassador.[2]

(U) By August, indigenous teams had participated in 15 recovery operations (36 remains had been recovered, of which 5 had been identified as U.S. personnel), but the JCRC Commander believed the teams needed a higher degree of expertise than was available with on-going ad hoc training methods. He proposed a more formal training program for up to one team (of eight men) per military region in the RVN, which would require 60 hours maximum, but which would involve possible visits to Thailand. Informal consultation had indicated this was not a problem if they were under JCRC sponsorship. CINCPAC saw no political or legal barriers and approved the concept for planning, requesting specifics.[3]

(S) The proposal that followed indicated that the training would be conducted at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. One class of about 20 students would require about eight U.S. personnel. CINCPAC and the JCS approved the plan, provided costs were met within the JCRC budget. The training was conducted from 7 to 18 October with 10 JCRC personnel instructing 45 Vietnamese Army personnel from all four military regions in matters of crash site resolution, search team equipment and techniques, central identification techniques, and explosive ordnance techniques. The JCRC Mobile Training Team consisted of five Special Forces search team personnel, two explosive ordnance disposal personnel, two Thai Central Identification Laboratory personnel, and one crash site investigator. All instruction took place in the Joint General Staff compound in Saigon.[4]

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1. AMEMB SAIGON 140508Z Jun 74.
2. CINCPAC 210449Z Jun 74; SECSTATE 139700/272326Z Jun 74.
3. COMUSSAG/CDR JCRC 020732Z Aug 74; CINCPAC 070131Z Aug 74.
4. COMUSSAG/JCRC 220200Z Aug 74; CINCPAC 230242Z Aug 74; JCS 5940/271547Z Aug 74; CDR JCRC 050931Z Nov 74.

Miscellaneous JCRC-related Activities

(S) In January, in order to assure close coordination among the JCRC, the Defense Attache, and the Services on the analysis and filing of prisoner of war and missing in action intelligence reports, the DIA requested that JCRC initiate a special periodic summary on all intelligence reports received that would state which had been correlated to specific individuals, which could not be equated to known individuals, and which remained in suspense awaiting further action or analysis. The summary could be prepared weekly or bi-monthly. The JCRC and CINCPAC concurred; the report would be monthly. CINCPAC advised the DIA on 7 February, noting that the JCRC did not have an extensive intelligence analysis capability. The report, therefore, was intended to assist the DIA in its continuing responsibility for detailed analysis and intelligence production pertaining to prisoners of war and those missing in action. He proposed that the DIA, in conjunction with the Services, provide CINCPAC and the JCRC with a detailed evaluation and analysis of all data received on this subject, to include information submitted by the JCRC. This report was also to be monthly.[1]

(C) In another matter, to assist the JCRC in improving its capability to identify crashed aircraft, the JCRC asked for CINCPAC assistance to get the Services to establish a single point of contact for aircraft identification matters, to be responsible for research of parts information forwarded by crash site investigators. The JCRC also suggested that in the future, when an aircraft was lost in a combat theater, regardless of the reason, that all records be forwarded to the appropriate Service Safety Center or other appropriate facility, where they should be retained until all crash and casualty data was no longer required. CINCPAC requested the assistance and comments of the Services. The Services eventually all named a single point of contact, but not all requested records would be retained because they were so voluminous.[2]

(S) In the matter of U.S. Army Special Forces support, preparations for redeployment had progressed by the end of February to the state where COMUSMACTHAI would soon lose the capability to provide provisional contingency force support for CINCPAC CONPLANS 5100 (Personnel Recovery) and 5119 (Casualty Resolution). COMUSMACTHAI requested that they be relieved of support responsibilities. CINCPAC relieved COMUSMACTHAI on 12 March, assigning the responsibilities to CINCUSARPAC. COMUSMACTHAI transferred operational control of the Special Forces to the U.S. Army Support Command Thailand effective 16 March.[3]

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1. DIA 161644Z Jan 74; CDR JCRC 050035Z Feb 74; CINCPAC 070105Z Feb 74.
2. CDR JCRC 230402Z Feb 74; CINCPAC 282201Z Feb 74; CNO 071544Z Mar 74; CSAF 300210Z Apr 74; DA 151930Z May 74.
3. COMUSMACTHAI 280159Z Feb 74; CINCPAC 120137Z Mar 74; USMACTHAI 120734Z Mar 74; CINCUSARPAC 130520Z Mar 74.

(S) CINCPAC CONPLAN 5100 had been developed to provide quick reaction, personnel recovery operations in Southeast Asia. On 14 November CINCPAC advised the JCS that troop withdrawals and relocations and other changes in the military and political situation in Southeast Asia had made the CONPLAN invalid for existing peacetime conditions. Previous experience in personnel recovery operations had indicated that operations of such a nature in Southeast Asia would be extremely close hold and would require interagency coordination and approval at the highest level of the National Command Authority. The high priority accorded such a mission once it had been approved would enable the Defense Department to direct planning and execution of those actions necessary to accomplish that mission. Basic planning could be more realistically accomplished at the Washington level. CINCPAC requested permission to cancel the plan, and the JCS granted authority to do so on 27 November, although the plan and all supporting plans were to be maintained on file for two years in accordance with the Joint Operation Planning System.[1]

(C) On 27 September the Commander of the JCRC reported to CINCPAC that a denial of a request to make classified material available to a visiting group of families interested in prisoners of war and missing in action had led to dissatisfaction and complaints by some members of the group. As a result, the JCRC Commander recommended that a major effort be made to declassify such files. CINCPAC concurred, noting however that the cost of such a massive effort in terms of manpower had to be weighed against the benefits to be derived. Further, the scope of such a project would have to be limited to make it manageable. He forwarded the matter to Washington. In reply the JCS noted that the State and Defense Departments and the Services would continue their existing practice of advising next of kin of the historic futility of their trips to Southeast Asia in search of additional information about their missing relatives, and would continue to inform those next of kin of the difference in the roles and case file content between the JCRC and respective Service casualty headquarters. The Office of the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs advised that, although appropriate declassification was being accomplished on a case-by-case basis, a general declassification program was deemed impractical at the time, and was not considered to be a solution to the problems at the JCRC in connection with past or future visits of next of kin there.[2]

Reduction of Gunship Sorties in Southeast Asia

(S) Planning guidance for Southeast Asia from the Secretary of Defense had required maintaining a generation capability of 400 AC-130 gunship sorties per month. On 19 December CINCPACAF advised CINCPAC that this requirement was

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1. CINCPAC 140404Z Nov 74; JCS 5782/230034Z Nov 74; CINCPAC 270227Z Nov 74.
2. CDR JCRC 271410Z Sep 74; CINCPAC 041833Z Oct 74; JCS 7675/012058Z Nov 74.

no longer realistic. Over the previous year the aircraft had experienced unusual maintenance and supply problems, particularly the older "A" models. There had been chronic fuel leaks and a high rate of cannibalization. He requested CINCPAC's assistance in obtaining approval to reduce the sortie requirement to 200 per month and to redeploy some AC-130s from Thailand to the CONUS when maintenance was required. CINCPAC concurred with this recommendation and so advised the JCS. He noted that the phased withdrawal of five AC-130s would be on a schedule consistent with CONUS programmed depot maintenance output, which equated to one aircraft per month beginning in February 1975. This withdrawal would insure 200 sorties per month through FY 75. COMUSSAG/7AF also concurred. No word had been received from Washington by the end of the year.[1]

Southeast Asia Tactical Data System Interface

(S) The requirement for compatible tactical air control systems among the Services in Southeast Asia had been fulfilled when those systems were interfaced in 1969. Subsequently, however, with the drawdown of forces, the interface had been terminated. In November 1973 CINCPAC had recommended to the JCS that the Southeast Asia Tactical Data System Interface contingency equipment, which was in storage, be replaced with operational USAF-USMC equipment using computer programs that were being developed in the Tactical Air Control System/Tactical Air Defense System (TACS/TADS) interface program. The Southeast Asia interface equipment was obsolete, one of a kind, and involved response time in excess of 90 days. If the TACS/TADS programs could be used on an interim contingency basis in conjunction with current operational equipment, response time could be reduced to a matter of days (depending on transportation) and all stored equipment could be released. CINCPAC recommended that if a scheduled test of the TACS/TADS verified the compatibility of the USAF-USMC equipment, the stored contingency equipment could be released and replaced by current USAF-USMC equipment using the TACS/TADS program.[2]

(S) In August the JCS disapproved release of the stored equipment (except for the IRON HORSE intelligence processing system) because of the limited traffic handling capacity of the interim TACS/TADS program, and because of the lack of a secure data link between Service equipments. In addition, the JCS reaffirmed the requirement to maintain a contingency interface capability.[3]

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1. CINCPACAF 192115Z Dec 74; CINCPAC 242045Z Dec 74; J311 HistSum Dec 74.
2. CINCPAC 152021Z Nov 73.
3. JCS 6812/060102Z Aug 74.

(S) CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT, FMFPAC, and COMUSSAG/7AF of this decision and directed them to maintain the Southeast Asia Tactical Data System Interface in contingency status.[1]

Cambodia Air Drop Operations Effectiveness

(S) In April CINCPAC staff members studied the effectiveness of airlift operations in Cambodia, from the viewpoint of the air commander. These operations had been first requested in April 1972 by the Chief of the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia for the air drop of munitions and food to isolated FANK units. The capability created to accomplish this, from U-Tapao, still existed. Air drops had been considered more feasible militarily because adequate runways were not readily available and the threat of AAA and surface-to-air missiles was prominent. The Air Force C-130E had been used for these air drops. The aircraft maintained an altitude of 11,000 feet or more, out of range of the AAA and unmodified SA-7 missiles (and carried two Very Pistols with MK-50 high intensity flares as an SA-7 deterrent). Even under adverse conditions, March 1974 statistics revealed that 98 percent of the loads were on the drop zone and recoverable. Some of the limitations of the air drop program were the use of little-trained FANK ground control teams, adverse weather, and logistic problems with the recovery of parachutes. It was concluded that the air drop strategy was sound and much more feasible under existing Rules of Engagement pertaining to acceptable risks by U.S. Forces. It was recommended that increased emphasis be placed on timely return of parachute assets, that additional FANK drop zone ground control training be provided, and that thorough crew briefings concerning potential threat areas be continued prior to each operation.[2]

Mekong River Security

(S) The value of river-borne resupply of Phnom Penh had been recognized when Routes 4 and 5 were closed by enemy activity late in 1973, leaving the Mekong as the lifeline of the Cambodian Republic. In August of that year COMUSSAG had noted that effective river security was one of the critical factors that would determine whether the Cambodian government could survive.[3]

(S) Approximately 57,000 metric tons of supplies were needed each month. In December 1973 CINCPAC had addressed the vulnerability of ships and barges on the river, and highlighted the need for experts to survey the situation,

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1. CINCPAC 130254Z Aug 74.
2. J3342 HistSum Apr 74; J3/Memo/00342-74, 26 Apr 74, Subj: Red Dragon.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 235-237.

devise improved methods of static protection, provide local installation assistance, and to provide such recommendations on an urgent basis. CINCPACFLT was tasked to study the situation.

(S) CINCPACFLT formed a Technical Assistance Team for these purposes. Various protective devices were considered, but the concept of escort barges mounting two lengths of stand-off chainlink fence mounted on smaller escort barges strapped to the main ammunition barge was the concept accepted, and design studies began immediately. The concept was approved and successfully tested on 28 February. By July, 16 barges had been so constructed, and 8 of them had flotation foam applied to their hull voids.[1]

(S) Late in 1973 the Mekong Special Zone had been created. The concept placed all BFM and territorial units using and generally within 5 kilometers of the river under the operational control of the Cambodian Navy. (BFM-Battalion Fusiler Marine, the Naval Infantry Battalion of the Cambodian Navy.) The concept also initiated coordination of artillery and air strikes and created a fire support coordination center in Neak Luong. During 1974 the concept was fully implemented on the lower Mekong. An ambitious special zone was created for the Tonle Sap between Phnom Penh and KG Chhnang, but this was implemented only with existing Cambodian Navy troop units in November 1974. As a result of renewed emphasis on protective measures, losses due to enemy attacks by fire in 1974 were minimal. There were approximately 97 attacks by fire on convoys during the year, but only one ammunition barge (MOUNT HOOD), a hatch barge not employing stand-off fencing, was lost on the lower Mekong.[2]

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
1. CINCPACFLT 230041Z Dec 73, which cited CINCPAC 170407Z Nov 73; CINCPAC 122355Z Jan 74; CINCPACFLT 292328Z Jan 74; USSAG 130321Z May 74.
2. J312 HistSum Dec 74; CHMEDTC 010021Z Mar 74; for detailed discussion of logistics support to Cambodia, see Chapter V.

SECTION II--RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES

Southeast Asia Reconnaissance

[redacted]

1. J311 Point Paper, 25 Mar 74, Subj: SEASIA Operating Authorities (U), which cited JCS 2474/142336Z Aug 73. A map of BARREL ROLL operating areas is in the CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol II, p. 167.
2. SECDEF 3955/221528Z Jan 74.



1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 242; J314 HistSum Dec 74, which cited JCS 07471/251129Z Jul 74 (BOM) and SSO PACOM 240312Z Aug 74 (BOM).
2. J314 HistSum Dec 74, which cited JCS 09023/061809Z Sep 74 (BOM); JCS 9567/092213Z Jan 75.
3. JCS 6066/240040Z Feb 74; CINCPAC 240300Z Feb 74.

Vietnam except as directed by the JCS on a case-by-case basis; CINCPAC also passed this restriction to appropriate PACOM activities.[1]

(S) Gulf of Tonkin operations by surface vessels came under study in 1974. With the exception of one less-than-48-hour presence of USS RANGER (CVA-61) and four escorts on 9-10 August, there had been no U.S. reconnaissance presence in the Gulf of Tonkin since a MIDWAY (CVA-41) task group operated there in December 1973. During the interim the People's Republic of China had increased its influence in the area including expansions in the Paracel Islands. Additionally, PACOM intelligence collection efforts had been degraded by restricting air surveillance to operations south of 17°-30'North, and the additional loss of collection efforts associated with fleet operations.[2]

(S) On 15 January CINCPAC advised the JCS that expansion of Indian Ocean requirements, reduction of theater assets, and restrictions on operations because of fuel constraints had reduced PACOM electronic warfare capabilities, especially in the Tonkin Gulf. Since airborne collection there was dependent on radar warning support provided by U.S. Navy PIRAZ ships (Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone), frequent incursions of carriers and the PIRAZ force were necessary to assess the North Vietnamese threat. On 30 January CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that monthly CVA/PIRAZ support of four to six days duration would allow increased collection opportunity by VQ-1 and COMBAT APPLE airborne platforms. In March CINCPAC again recommended such carrier operations to the JCS, with the intention of deploying USS ORISKANY (CVA-34) and escorts on or about 14 April. On 9 April the JCS advised that these actions were being staffed by higher authority and that surface and carrier air operations in the Gulf of Tonkin and vicinity (above 17°-30'North) were deferred until further notice.[3]

Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program Restrictions

(S) PARPRO operations continued elsewhere in the PACOM. In the Sea of Japan, in February, CINCPAC restricted PARPRO operations east of 133°-33'East between 40° and 42°North because of an increased threat from North Korean MIG-21 aircraft. On 24 May the Director of the National Security Agency reevaluated

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1. JCS 3799/281719Z May 74; CINCPAC 300047Z May 74; JCS 6252/301943Z May 74; CINCPAC 312255Z May 74.
2. J313 Point Paper, 24 Sep 74, Subj: Gulf of Tonkin (GOT) Operations (U).
3. J315 HistSum Mar 74; CINCPAC 152031Z Jan 74; CINCPAC 302151Z Jan 74; CINCPAC 290302Z Mar 74; JCS 6834/091722Z Apr 74. A December deployment by USS ENTERPRISE is discussed elsewhere in this chapter.

the threat and determined that it no longer existed. On 30 May CINCPAC removed the PARPRO restriction.[1]


(S) Certain restrictions were also directed in conjunction with a visit by President Ford to the U.S.S.R., Japan, and the Republic of Korea. The JCS directed a restriction on aerial reconnaissance operations against the U.S.S.R. from 0001Z on 12 November until 0001Z on 26 November. Restricted (no fly) areas included the Soviet Arctic littoral, the Northern Pacific from the Bering Strait to Japan within 100 nautical miles of the U.S.S.R., the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Sea of Japan north of 42°-17'North. From 0001Z on 18 November until 0001Z on 23 November no reconnaissance aircraft were allowed to launch or recover from Japanese bases. From 0001Z on 22 November until 0001Z on 24 November no reconnaissance aircraft were allowed to launch or recover from South Korean bases.[2]

(S) Additionally, reconnaissance operations against the People's Republic of China were not authorized from 0001Z on 22 November until 0001Z on 1 December because of Secretary of State Kissinger's visit to that country.[3]


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1. J314 HistSum May 74, which cited SSO PACOM 270206Z Feb 74 and DIRNSA 241953Z May 74 (both BOM); CINCPAC 300345Z May 74.
2. J314 HistSum Nov 74, which cited JCS 11417/082340Z Nov 74 (BOM); JCS 6847/251457Z Nov 74.
3. J314 HistSum Nov 74, which cited JCS 11649/160001Z Nov 74.
4. J314 HistSum Aug 74, which cited CINCPAC 071901Z Dec 73, CINCPAC 071900Z Dec 73, and JCS 092010Z Jul 74 (all BOM).




1. J313 HistSum Jan 74; CTG 30.2 310554Z Dec 73; JCS 6977/311806Z Dec 73; CTU 30.2.5 060216Z Jan 74; DEFSMAC 120432Z Jan 74. (DEFSMAC was the Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center, Fort Meade, Maryland.)
2. DEFSMAC 240153Z Jan 74; CSAF 051517Z Feb 74; FBIS London 271520Z Jan 74; CTG 30.2 290502Z Jan 74.




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1. CINCNORAD 210035Z Feb 74; CINCPACFLT 220801Z Feb 74; CINCPACFLT 240821Z Feb 74; CIA 270323Z Feb 74; CINCPACFLT 010501Z Mar 74; CINCNORAD 010200Z Mar 74; JCS 9963/042257Z Mar 74.
2. JCS 7075/191715Z Sep 74; COMTHIRDFLT 062209Z Apr 74; J5232 HistSum Apr 74; CINCPAC 302001Z Sep 74.
3. JCS 5544/271919Z Sep 74; J3141 HistSum Sep 74.



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1. CINCPAC 240126Z Sep 74; CTE 30.2.0.4 030920Z Oct 74; CTE 30.2.0.4 031114Z Oct 74; DEFSMAC 032037Z Oct 74; CINCPAC 170243Z Oct 74; CINCPACFLT 230800Z Oct 74; CINCPACFLT 231153Z Oct 74.
2. JCS 1669/122330Z Apr 74; CINCPAC 200302Z Apr 74; COMTHIRDFLT 290326Z May 74; HQ DNA 091604Z Jul 74, retransmitted as CINCPACFLT 112331Z Jul 74; J313 HistSum Sep 74; SAC 122000Z Sep 74.



1. J313 HistSum Sep 74.

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1. CTU 30.2.6 261400Z Sep 74.

SECTION III--EXERCISES

(U) PACOM participation in various kinds of exercises is described below. There were world-wide exercises, command and control exercises, and monitoring of joint and combined exercises. To allow for more efficient management of an expanding program, a new Exercise and Force Status Division was established in the Operations Directorate in October. Political implications of the exercises were often a consideration, as noted below. In some cases, such as CINCPAC participation in the CENTO Exercise MIDLINK 74, political implications were more significant than operational matters and the subject is addressed in the Political-Military Relationships chapter of this history.

(U) CINCPAC policy regarding the commitment of the United States to friendly countries in combined exercises was the subject of a 27 July message to the component commands. CINCPAC advised that combined training exercises were used to demonstrate American capabilities and determination, and to assist in the exercising of other nations' forces. When such an exercise had been planned, coordinated, and scheduled, it should be regarded as a commitment, especially those exercises involving participation of foreign nations. CINCPAC recognized that unforeseen exigencies could sometimes occur, but if matters of operational necessity, fuel or fiscal limitations, political considerations, or other reasons required cancellation or postponement, CINCPAC expected to be notified of the situation in a timely manner in order to issue or coordinate appropriate notifications.[1]

(C) On 10 June CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS the schedule for PACOM military exercises for the 12-month period beginning 1 July 1974. On 19 September the JCS approved the CINCPAC schedule for planning purposes, subject to certain comments received from the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for International Security Affairs and Public Affairs, the U.S. Information Agency, the Department of State, and the White House. The comments were forwarded for information or appropriate action, and are discussed below.[2]

(S) For a DART/CAX exercise, the White House requested further justification as U.S. Special Forces were no longer in the PACOM. These were the Disaster Assistance Relief Team/Civil Affairs Exercises. CINCPAC's further justification was provided on 4 October; the exercises were to be conducted using CONUS-based forces. The JCS advised that they recognized the advantage to be gained from the exercise series, but the exercise had been used as a

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1. CINCPAC 271924Z Jul 74.
2. JCS 7425/192154Z Sep 74.

substitute for Special Forces unconventional warfare training, which could be obtained under more favorable conditions elsewhere. There were other factors, such as funding and political sensitivity, that weighed against the use of CONUS-based Special Forces, and the use of Special Forces in future exercises on Taiwan should be discontinued.[1]

(S) For Korean exercises, the JCS advised that BLTEX 2-75, FREEDOM TORCH II, and FOAL EAGLE FY 75 would be carefully examined in terms of their possible impact on the sensitive Korean political situation. In view of the disestablishment of Psychological Operations and Special Forces units in the PACOM, the continuing requirement for FOAL EAGLE should be reviewed. FOAL EAGLE, CINCPAC believed, was the most significant means of maintaining area orientation for CONUS-based Special Forces units designated to support CINCPAC plans. CINCPAC, therefore, requested the comments of the CINCUNC regarding the possibility of increasing Army, Navy, and Air Force Special Forces participation in the field training exercise. (The CINCUNC had earlier advised that the high level of professional competence demonstrated by the ROK Army Counterinfiltration Operations Command reflected their preparedness to assume the leadership role in planning, support, and execution of future FOAL EAGLE exercises, but assumption of such a leadership role did not imply that they had no requirement for U.S. assistance or that the exercise would eventually become unilateral.) Although planning continued throughout the year, "higher authority" had disapproved conduct of the exercise as scheduled from 25 November to 14 December, the JCS advised. It was planned to conduct the exercise in 1975.[2]

(S) FREEDOM TORCH II was cancelled as a result of problems with airlift support, as discussed below. BLTEX 1-75, a combined ROK/USMC training and amphibious exercise was not held.[3]

(S) Regarding Philippine exercises in the CINCPAC schedule, the JCS advised that SPECWAREX 2-75, MABLEX 1-75, READEX 1-75, and MAFLEX (Reduced) should be conducted well away from the area of Muslim insurrection in the South so as to reduce any risk of alleged U.S. interference. SEATO SMPO PX 51 should be structured in such a manner as to preclude interpretation as support for any party's position in the various island disputes taking place in the area.[4]

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1. JCS 3753/031751Z Dec 74, which cited CINCPAC 040233Z Oct 74. See CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, pp. 228-230 for details of the development of this program.
2. CINCUNC 081101Z Jul 74; CINCPAC 170414Z Jul 74; JCS 6669/312142Z Oct 74.
3. See CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 261-262 for a discussion of FREEDOM TORCH postponements in 1973.
4. JCS 7425/192154Z Sep 74.

(U) The CINCPAC Exercise Schedule was automated by December 1974. This completed months of effort; the automated system allowed for faster, more accurate exercise control, with complete interface with the JCS for data transmission.[1]

(C) Airlift for PACOM exercises became a matter of concern. In August, when they requested submissions for the JCS-directed/coordinated exercise schedule, the JCS advised that the scope of the FY 76 exercise program was dependent in a large part on the plan to apply Military Airlift Command "enhancement" flying hours to the Joint Exercise Program, and the outcome of the proposal to eliminate industrial funding for MAC C-141/C-5 aircraft in FY 76. The program was dependent on Congressional action. Congress disapproved the airlift enhancement program, the JCS advised on 1 November. They asked CINCPAC which exercises would require cancellation if MAC airlift was not provided, and the impact on joint training and force readiness if MAC airlift support was not available for the rest of FY 75.[2]

(C) CINCPAC replied on 8 November that the DART/CAX, CAPTIVE LIGHTNING II, and COMMANDO ELITE PHASE II would require cancellation if MAC airlift support was not provided. The 25th Infantry Division would receive required close air support from Navy and Marine Corps resources, but none from the USAF, for the remainder of 1975. There would be no U.S. Army Special Warfare training in the PACOM either joint or combined, impacting on PACOM, CONUS, and allied unconventional warfare readiness. Force readiness would decline. (Both CINCPAC and CINCUNC had already expressed grave concern regarding the loss of CONUS-based Special Forces readiness by cancellation or postponement of the DART/CAX and FOAL EAGLE.) CINCPAC advised that the political impact of airlift nonavailability should not be overlooked.

> ...This consideration especially operative in case of Australia and New Zealand who appear to be switching military exercise participation from SEATO to ANZUS and who should be encouraged from PACOM view. Cancellation of CAPTIVE LIGHTNING II will upset Australian planning of long standing. Cancellation of DART/CAX will be regarded as another step in certain disengagement of US relationship with Taiwan, which may not be intended, timely, nor desired. Cancellation of FOAL EAGLE after ROKA has assumed primary responsibility for planning, supporting, and conducting the exercise casts doubt on the credibility of our support for self sufficiency, in the minds of both South and North Korea.

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1. J361 HistSum Dec 74.
2. JCS 1616/212259Z Aug 74; JCS 7750/012200Z Nov 74.

> ...PACOM forces require proportionally more military exercises as forces are reconstituted and realigned from combat to peacetime posture. We cannot replace live maneuver with CPX's for obvious reasons. This present funding problem added to an already reduced exercise program, and heightened political sensitivities is a major setback to PACOM exercise program.[1]

(C) At the end of the year it appeared that only two significant exercises would be affected in the FY 75 schedule. FREEDOM TORCH (a UNC-sponsored field training exercise scheduled for February 1975) in Korea would be cancelled; a modified smaller-scale exercise was being planned utilizing 25th Infantry Division forces in lieu of Readiness Command forces. CAPTIVE LIGHTNING (a USARPAC-sponsored field training exercise scheduled for June 1975) in Australia was being reevaluated based on smaller force levels utilizing C-130 support. The tactical air detachment would definitely be cancelled. The MAFLEX in the Philippines (an exercise designed to train combined Marine Amphibious Forces in amphibious warfare) had been successfully supported by PACAF C-130s with no degradation of exercise objectives.[2]

Soviet Perception of Military Capability Resulting from Military Exercises

(TS) On 6 November the JCS advised of recent studies by the Central Intelligence Agency concerning Soviet perception of U.S. capabilities based on their assessment of U.S. exercises. The JCS directed a review of our on-going exercises with a view to rejuvenation of our scenarios, with less of a defeatist attitude. CINCPAC concurred with the JCS concern, citing on-going improvements in the PACOM and setting forth required action for overall improvement of scenarios.[3]

(TS) As a result of replies from the various CINCs to the JCS, they directed early in January that all significant exercise briefs contain an assessment of what perception of U.S. and allied strategy and military capability the exercise would portray. CINCPAC's guidance to his components and subordinate unified commands noted that they should consider the desirability and feasibility of affecting foreign perceptions of U.S. and allied strategy in a manner advantageous to the United States. In cases where it was deemed appropriate, exercise scenarios were to insure that our strengths and advantages were reflected.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 080026Z Nov 74.
2. J361 HistSum Dec 74; CINCPACAF 070100Z Dec 74.
3. J361 HistSum Dec 74, which cited JCS 1941/062302Z Nov 74 and CINCPAC 270424Z Nov 74 (both EX).
4. JCS 7781/072244Z Jan 75; CINCPAC 141941Z Jan 75.

JOLLY ROGER

(S) JOLLY ROGER was a PACOM Command Post exercise designed to exercise the CINCPAC staff in anticipation of a series of worldwide exercises sponsored by the JCS. JOLLY ROGER 74 was held 15-19 April. (It had been scheduled for 25-29 March, but was postponed in order to avoid any possible problems in connection with Secretary of State Kissinger's visit to Moscow at that time.) The exercise depicted a worldwide deteriorating political/military situation between the Communist and Free World nations. The participants were exercised in policies and procedures during a period of crisis development, general war evolving from use of conventional forces, through a strategic nuclear exchange. JOLLY ROGER 74 emphasized reporting procedures, status of forces, increase in readiness procedures, continuity of command and control, emergency action procedures, relocation procedures, and Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) execution and monitoring.

(S) Shortly after exercise commencement, Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON) TWO (FAST PACE) and A-Hour were declared. Exercise play for the CINCPAC staff was conducted at Camp Smith for the first two days of the exercise. The player staff relocated to the Alternate Command Facility at Kunia (in central Oahu, about 18 miles from CINCPAC's Camp Smith headquarters) on the third day. DEFCON ONE (COCKED PISTOL) was declared on the second day of play with SIOP execution occuring thereafter, following a simulated Soviet attack on the United States. The CINCPAC Airborne Command Post acted as the primary command center for the SIOP execution message (after having been on continuous alert) following a simulated power outage at the Kunia facility prior to E-Hour.

(S) After-action reports from various subordinate commands indicated that the exercise provided valuable training for player personnel. Recommendations and comments concerning procedural deficiencies were reviewed and corrective action initiated.[1]

NICKEL PLATE

(S) NICKEL PLATE, a JCS-sponsored worldwide procedural command post exercise, was conducted during the period 20-24 May 1974. It was planned to hold exercises in this series every other year, alternating with the JCS exercise series called HIGH HEELS. NICKEL PLATE was designed to exercise senior government officials, civilian and military staffs, and appropriate plans and procedures during a rapidly escalating international crisis situation, culminating in a

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1. J3 HistSum Apr 74; J3321 HistSum Mar 74; J3310 HistSum Apr 74; J24 HistSum Mar 74; J6221 HistSum Dec 74; CINCPAC 240224Z Jan 74.

strategic nuclear exchange. One of the main objectives was to test execution of the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) under conditions of simulated maximum communications system degradation.

(S) Other broad objectives of the exercise were to:

> ...Evaluate the tactical warning system performance in terms of the ability of sensors and communication systems to provide adequate warning and attack assessment information to the National Command Authority....
>
> ...Evaluate command center and communication system performance through measurement of times required to transmit accurate SIOP execution messages from the NCA to strategic nuclear force components.
>
> ...Evaluate the capability of survivable airborne Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) links to execute the SIOP force in a maximum command, control, and communications degradation mode.
>
> ...Evaluate the SIOP-following potential of the National Military Command System (NMCS) under simulated conditions of severe systems degradation.[1]

(U) CINCPAC established a Joint PACOM Exercise Control Group (JPECG) to insure that exercise play was conducted within the bounds established in the exercise control scenario.[2]

(S) For the first time, automatic data processing support for a worldwide command post exercise was used at CINCPAC headquarters to accomplish tasks that had been previously done manually. Computer applications included preparation and transmission of the Situation Report (SITREP) and Force Generation (FORGEN) messages, a system to log the Command Center status of actions, a system to log DEFCON attainments by all commands and agencies, and a system to control play of the exercise through automation of the Master Scenario Events List (MSEL). The MSEL was continually updated during the exercise and a series of queries was available for various printouts both during the exercise and for post-exercise analysis. These efforts at automation were considered very

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1. J3 HistSum May 74.
2. CINCPAC 040145Z May 74.

successful and were to be the first steps toward an increased command and control capability and manpower savings in the Command Center.[1]

(S) For these purposes, it was necessary to train additional personnel in the use of the message generator system on the computer. In addition to Command Center users, the ADP files were made available on cathode ray tube and teletype printers used by the Exercise Control Team.[2]

(S) The Airborne Command Post was an active participant in the exercise, flying five sorties that included a continuous airborne posture for a period of almost 24 hours.[3]

(U) A two-day critique of the exercise was held in the Pentagon beginning 25 June. The purpose of the conference was to focus on the exchange of information and the making of recommendations on critique items derived from working committees. Emphasis was placed on the adequacy of the exercise in testing and exercising participants, accomplishing exercise objectives, examining procedures, and analysis of systems.[4]

Command Post Exercises

(S) Throughout the year, various other command post exercises were held, some under CINCPAC auspices, some as directed by the JCS. In November, in a major departure from previous concepts, CINCPAC proposed to the JCS a new plan for no-notice command post exercises to replace existing planned exercises. He believed it could provide impetus for increased readiness worldwide, provide for the realistic exercise of existing operation plans, and insure maintenance of continuous crisis management capability at all headquarters. These exercises could be designed to accomplish specific objectives or procedures, or to measure readiness and force posture. They could meet existing exercise objectives, while at the same time eliminating the months of preparation being done for scheduled exercises. He noted that a concept of this type could be implemented with a proposed exercise for the fall of 1975, called IVORY HUNTER. It could be designated a no-notice exercise, to be conducted between 1 July and 31 December 1975. The exercise scenario could be covertly developed by a very limited number of CINCPAC and JCS staff personnel and approved by CINCPAC and the JCS. The Office of the JCS, the Readiness Command, and other supporting CINCs, commands, and agencies would not be forewarned as to scenario or timing of the

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1. J335 HistSum May 74.
2. J333 HistSum May 74.
3. J3310 HistSum May 74.
4. J3321 HistSum Jun 74.

exercise. Timing would be in coordination with the JCS, however, to avoid external conflicts insofar as possible.[1]

(S) At the end of the year the JCS were still working on the matter, having received generally universal concurrence from the other unified and specified commands and the Services. Informal liaison indicated, however, that while IVORY HUNTER would be a no-notice exercise, the JCS would develop the scenario independently of any command.[2]

FREQUENT RIDER

(S) FREQUENT RIDER was a two-day command post exercise conducted by CINCPAC on 6 and 8 February to train the CINCPAC staff in command and control procedures, test and evaluate CINCPAC Alternate Command Facility activation and relocation procedures, and execution of the Single Integrated Operation Plan/general war plans as well as other operation and contingency plans. The first day was spent at CINCPAC's Camp Smith headquarters; the second at the Alternate Command Facility at Kunia (in central Oahu, about 18 miles from the Camp Smith headquarters). Participants included Command Center Watch Teams and representatives from each staff directorate.[3]

VECTOR THRUST


(S) Two exercises in the VECTOR THRUST series were conducted by CINCPAC in 1974, the first on 15 February and another on 24 October. Both were designed to test the PACOM Alert System by announcing a simulated increase in the Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCON). PACOM commands and units reviewed applicable plans and checklists and simulated personnel recall procedures. Each exercise lasted about 4 hours. In the first, no scenario was provided; in the second a simulated intelligence scenario created a situation of increased tension.[4]

PORT ARMS

(C) PORT ARMS was a JCS-conducted command post exercise to test the PACOM Alert System by announcing a simulated increase in DEFCON. The 7 November exercise lasted approximately 5 hours. This was similar to the VECTOR THRUST exercise series.[5]

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1. CINCPAC 271930Z Nov 74, which cited CINCPAC 270424Z Nov 74.
2. J361 HistSum Dec 74.
3. J331 HistSum Feb 74.
4. J33 HistSum Feb, Oct 74.
5. J332 HistSum Nov 74.



(TS) In training for the fourth POLO HAT exercise, the CINCPAC ABNCP had participated in a World-Wide Airborne Command Post exercise named SILVER EAGLE on 23 October. The objective was to establish communications by all methods and develop mutually satisfactory netting and traffic handling techniques and procedures.[3]

Mobility Training Exercises

(TS) A significant departure regarding the status of U.S. Forces in Korea was addressed by CINCPAC in a 26 October message to COMUS Korea. The message had been prepared in response to Congressional interest in finding ways to remove U.S. combatant forces from Korea. CINCPAC noted that a review of plans

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, pp. 224-225.
2. J331 HistSums Feb, Apr, Aug, and Nov 74.
3. J3310 HistSum Oct 74.

in support of PACOM defense revealed that there were many options available insofar as force commitment was concerned. These options required a high degree of mobility on the part of all our forces. Exercises were already scheduled to test the mobility of the III Marine Amphibious Force and the 25th Infantry Division, but none for the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea. CINCPAC believed it was time to review those exercise possibilities. He envisioned starting with smaller units (up to battalion size), working up to near brigade size units, in field training/mobility exercises to areas other than Korea. The best alternatives appeared to be Alaska or the Philippines, or possibly Australia in conjunction with on-going combined exercises such as KANGAROO or CAPTIVE LIGHTNING. The options were many, CINCPAC continued, and he asked for COMUS Korea's comments. He hoped to get the first exercise under way before the end of FY 75. Funding, he noted, would be a problem and relief would be sought through the JCS.[1]

(S) COMUS Korea concurred with the military desirability of exercising the strategic mobility of the 2nd Division, but he believed that the exercises suggested by CINCPAC might signal a changing mission that could be politically sensitive to the Koreans. He recommended delay in participation until after FY 75, and until there had been full opportunity to study the political ramifications. If it was decided to conduct such training, consultation should be undertaken beforehand with the Koreans.[2]

(S) CINCPAC's reply proposed that COMUS Korea begin planning for in-country exercises right away. He proposed that out-of-country exercises be included in the CINCPAC submission to the JCS worldwide planning conference. COMUS Korea again stressed the political sensitivity of the issue and the need for early consultation with the Koreans. CINCPAC's reply restated the requirement for early exercises and left open the decision on talks with the Koreans until after the early 1975 JCS conference.[3]

ADORN PACE II

(S) PONY EXPRESS operations were supplementary collection operations against foreign missile and space activities. (See Reconnaissance elsewhere in this chapter.) On 9 May the CINC of the Alaska Command expressed a desire to exercise the plan designed to evaluate the capability of ALCOM forces to respond to a situation involving a ship conducting PONY EXPRESS operations,

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1. J36 HistSum Nov 74; CINCPAC 260105Z Oct 74.
2. COMUS Korea 230840Z Dec 74.
3. CINCPAC 311905Z Dec 74; J361 HistSum Dec 74, which cited HQ UNC/USFK/EUSA 070412Z Jan 75; CINCPAC 101811Z Jan 75.

similar to an exercise that had been conducted in November 1973. Objectives of the exercise were to establish coordination channels with other commands, including USNS H.H. ARNOLD, to exercise aircrew alerting and briefing procedures, and to coordinate the launch of P3, fighter, and tanker aircraft. CINCPAC was invited to participate, as was CINCSAC. CINCPAC agreed and in order to preclude any undesired Soviet reaction, recommended that the exercise area be limited to within 100 nautical miles of Adak, Alaska.[1]

(S) ADORN PACE II was conducted on 1 June. All exercise objectives were accomplished, CINCAL reported, and the exercise was determined to be an unqualified success.[2]

Tactical Air Control System/Tactical Air Defense System Interface

(S) In the summer of 1974 Atlantic Command representatives visited CINCPAC to request support for a procedural exercise to be held on the West Coast to test the TACS/TADS interface. CINCLANT believed that without this exercise, the operational effectiveness demonstration scheduled for July 1976 might not prove successful. CINCLANT stated requirements both for CINCPAC ships and aircraft and for operational planning to set up the exercise. CINCPACFLT, as the principal organization that would be involved, expressed concern about supporting such an effort because of scarce resources. The JCS asked for CINCPAC's comments.[3]

(U) CINCPAC's reply outlined the problems that were foreseen in participating in the exercise. He suggested that Atlantic Fleet vessels be involved in the test rather than PACFLT. CINCPAC also advised that if the PACOM was obliged to participate in the exercise, additional support would be required in the form of personnel, training, and funding.[4]

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1. CINCAL 091918Z May 74; CINCPAC 110313Z May 74.
2. Details are in CINCAL 012116Z Jun 74.
3. J3351 HistSum Jul 74.
4. J3351 HistSum Aug 74.

SECTION IV--RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT/OPERATIONS ANALYSIS

CINCPAC Review of Research Projects and Systems Analysis

(U) By Defense Department directive, unified commanders were required to review, at least annually, the status of projects conducted in the theater by the Department's Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). In 1973 in the PACOM this review had been expanded to include not only ARPA projects but research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) efforts, operations research/systems analysis (OR/SA) activities, and certain other studies in which CINCPAC had an interest.[1]

(U) The fifth annual review was conducted 4-6 February at CINCPAC's headquarters. A summary of the conference activity follows. In a change from previous years, private sessions between top ARPA and PACOM officials were held in lieu of an executive session. Consequently, some material normally heard only by attendees at the executive session was included in the open sessions to be benefit of all attendees.

(C) The most significant on-going ARPA projects in the PACOM were addressed. These included:

- Cooperative R&D with Australia. An ARPA field office had been established in Canberra in November 1973. Most projects were just getting under way. Projects included: Project BOOLEE, a Long Towed Array Concept, collection of ocean background data; sensor evaluation; small arms evaluation; HI-STAR SOUTH, a Long Wavelength Infrared background data study; Project JINDALEE, feasibility of Over the Horizon radar (under consideration); and Hi-Power Laser technology (also under consideration).

- Consolidation of Telecommunications Centers on the Island of Oahu (COTCO).

- Evaluation of the tactical intelligence experience in Southeast Asia.

- PACOM Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C^4) study.

- Integrated Counterinfiltration System in Korea. The Phase II field test had been completed. The test had been planned and directed by the ROK Counterinfiltration Operation Center and supported by an ARPA-sponsored technical team.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 264.

- There were also joint ARPA-Navy efforts, mostly ASW related, taking place in the PACOM.

(U) The review provided the CINCPAC staff and subordinate PACOM agencies with a picture of those ARPA efforts either being conducted in the PACOM or of interest to the command. CINCPAC endorsed the continuation of on-going projects and planned to explore with ARPA several areas in which ARPA might desire to provide additional assistance.

(U) Presentations by the CINCPAC staff concerned R&D implications of LINEBACKER II operations; the CINCPAC Combat Information Center; CINCPAC's PACOM Analytical Support Program; RDT&E Support to South Vietnam; the Combat Developments Test Center; and the "circuit rider" to South Vietnam concept.[1]

Pacific Military Operations Research Conference

(U) The first of a proposed series of meetings of the Pacific Operations Research/Systems Analysis (OR/SA) community was held at Camp Smith on 11 and 12 February. Sponsored by the Scientific Analysis Group, the conference was attended by over 80 military and civilian analysts representing 16 PACOM agencies and 10 supporting contractor agencies. The meetings served to improve the informal analyst-to-analyst lines of communication within the command, and to provide a greater awareness of the problems and capabilities of other analytical groups. It was contemplated that CINCPAC would sponsor similar conferences in the future, with another tentatively scheduled for early 1975. The Office of Naval Research, which supported twice-yearly Military Operations Research Symposium (MORS) meetings in CONUS offered to handle administrative arrangements for future Pacific meetings through a small contract to the Pacific Analysis Corporation, a Honolulu-based analysis contractor who provided support to the Commander, Third Fleet.[2]

(U) In another MORS project, two CINCPAC analysts were invited to attend a special working group of the 33rd MORS held at West Point from 24 through 28 June. The committee reviewed combat lessons learned through operations analysis during the Southeast Asia conflict, and developed a three-year program to collect, review, and publish illustrative examples of the uses of military operations analysis during Southeast Asia combat operations. The program proposal was to be submitted to the MORS board of directors early in 1975.[3]

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1. CINCPAC ltr 0183, 26 Mar 74, Subj: Report of Fifth Annual Review of Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) Projects within the Pacific Command (PACOM) (U).
2. J35 HistSum Feb, Aug 74.
3. J35 HistSum Dec 74.

Research and Development Support for Vietnam

(U) In 1973 CINCPAC began sending a staff officer periodically to Vietnam as a "circuit rider" to assist the Combat Development Test Center, particularly after the proposed departure in January 1974 of the R&D Coordinator on the USDAO staff. The coordinator did not leave when scheduled, and his duties were to be assumed by another civilian, but CINCPAC's "circuit rider" visited Saigon periodically to provide for continuity of projects during the transition. It was anticipated that the "circuit rider" representative would be required to continue to assist the USDAO R&D effort for the foreseeable future.[1]

Joint Operational Test and Evaluation Programs

(S) On 19 November the JCS requested nominations for a listing of Joint Operational Test and Evaluation Programs to be initiated in FY 76, in connection with planning for the FY 76 budget. CINCPAC's reply was based on responses from his component commands. He submitted the following recommendations:[2]

- Joint Aerial Resupply. Optimize effectiveness of currently available equipment in various type resupply missions and determine suitability of newly developed equipment for integration into aerial resupply systems. (USA/USAF)

- Electronic Warfare. When actual equipments or threat simulators became available, extend the existing EW joint test effort to develop optimum tactics against Soviet surface-to-air missiles not found in Southeast Asia (e.g. SA-4, SA-6). Determine probability of hit against different U.S. aircraft and tactics. (All Services) Also determine realiability of airborne radar warning equipment to provide warning of advanced Soviet threat radars (USAF, USN, USMC). Also, determine effectiveness and develop tactics to employ forward firing chaff rockets for protection of tactical aircraft. (All Services)

- Air Combat Maneuvering. Expand several-on-several combat engagement assessment to include one-on-several and one-on-one engagements. (USAF, USN)

- Tactical Air Control System/Tactical Air Defense System. Describe real-time data handling systems/hardware for mutually supportive anti-air warfare. (All Services)

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1. J3 HistSum Aug 74.
2. JCS 2740/192059Z Nov 74; CINCPAC 030323Z Dec 74.

- Anti-Mine Methods and Equipment. Determine effects of various mixes of land mine countermeasure methods and equipment on casualties and readiness of U.S. operating forces. (USMC, USA)

- Infrared Countermeasures. Determine optimum countermeasures and counter-countermeasures for IR weapons by type aircraft. (All Services)

- HARPOON Tactical Interface. Determine joint combat tactics/procedures. (USAF, USN)

- Airspace Management. Validate new doctrine and procedures for airspace management recently developed. (USAF, USA)

- Radar Bombing Accuracy. Determine F-111/A-6/F-4 radar bombing accuracies under realistic conditions to include designation of target by unconventional warfare ground forces using TPN-23 and/or SST-201X. (USAF, USN, USA)

- Airborne Target Acquisition. Determine aircrew ability to acquire targets on the ground day or night, aided or unaided. Aided to include use of hand-held laser by unconventional warfare ground force and remotely activated designator previously emplaced by a UW ground force. Also, successful detection, location, and destruction of hostile mortar and artillery weapons. (All Services)

Scientific Analysis Group Papers

(U) In 1974 the Scientific Analysis Group published reports or working papers on four subjects, as listed below. Additional information on the interest areas is included here for the reader's convenience.

Infrared Countermeasures

(TS) The SA-7 infrared homing missile had been a highly effective enemy weapon in Southeast Asia following its introduction in April 1972. Lack of countermeasures (IRCM) for this weapon on aircraft in the PACOM was a matter of continuing CINCPAC concern. In 1973 CINCPAC had queried his components on the percentage of aircraft protected by such IRCM as flares, suppression kits, paint, etc.; plans to provide additional CM; and Service philosophy on the use of SA-7 CM. At that time the Army had no IRCM capability of any type. CINCPACAF had no passive capability except for kits on three AC-130s. Most other aircraft had at least one flare system. CINCPACFLT also had no passive capability, and also relied on flares. It was believed that the PACOM could not

meet reaction times contained in existing contingency plans without exposing its aircraft, particularly slow movers, to unacceptable risk.[1]

(S) On 30 January 1974 CINCPAC reiterated to the JCS his belief that high priority should be given within the Defense Department to providing additional funds for immediate production of on-the-shelf devices to equip PACOM aircraft. "For the present, I would be satisfied to have PACOM aircraft equipped with the same countermeasures (suppression kits, low reflecting paint, flares) we gave to the VNAF [Vietnamese Air Force]."[2]

(S) In July CINCPAC advised the JCS that his staff had reviewed the Services' required operational capabilities (ROC), advanced development objectives (ADO), and funding plans for procurement of developed Air Force and Navy jammers and flares, suppression kits and paint for the Army. The ROC/ADO's he considered comprehensive and provided for a variety of active and passive devices for aircraft assigned to the PACOM components, and initial operational capabilities were considered reasonable. Procurement funding plans for the Air Force and Navy through FY 75 and the Army for FY 76, however, still did not provide sufficient funding to the PACOM to meet contingencies. "I am disappointed in the lack of support for Army requests...and I am not convinced that prepositioning stocks for emergency reaction answers the mail." CINCPAC said that his concern over the SA-7 threat had not diminished. In the past year 17 aircraft had been lost in Southeast Asia in spite of countermeasures provided to the Vietnamese and Cambodian Air Forces. "Aircraft and pilot losses will require replacements, and I wonder if we have weighed cost of replacements against cost of procuring and installing CM devices." He continued,

> ...My concern is heightened when I review PACOM assets. For immediate reaction, we are almost totally dependent on flares for PACAF and PACFLT aircraft. ARPAC has only a few Very Pistols...Though funding climate is a tough one, I again request that high priority be given increased production and installation of developed devices.[3]

(TS) A Scientific Analysis Group Working Paper on "Cost Effectiveness of Infrared Countermeasures for Aircraft" was prepared in the summer and revised twice before it was published as Working Paper #6-74 of 16 December. Staff

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 265-266. The SA-7 was also known as the STRELA or STRELLA missile, Russian for "arrow," and by it's NATO designation, GRAIL.
2. CINCPAC 300400Z Jan 74.
3. CINCPAC 201955Z Jul 74.

interest in the earlier editions of the study prompted expansion and added a requirement for a review of the consequences of the SA-7 missile threat to our operating forces. The study surveyed the IRCM available for fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, the measures already available in the PACOM, the cost-effectiveness levels at which IRCM could pay for themselves in reduced attrition, the costs of changing tactics designed to counter the IR missile threat, and some notes on future IR missile threats. The results noted the following. IRCM systems paid for themselves even in a very low threat/loss environment. To escape the SA-7 IR missile threat, operating aircraft had increased delivery altitudes, thereby reducing delivery accuracy and increasing weapon and sortie requirements. The cost of an effective IRCM system was insignificant compared to the costs of increased weapon requirements caused by the IR missile threat. Potential improvements in IR missile developments required close attention if we were to preserve the survivability of our operational aircraft.

(U) Because of increased losses to the SA-7 in Southeast Asia, Admiral Gayler personally delivered copies of the study to the JCS. It was believed that the study had helped prompt increased Service interest in the development of IRCM systems for tactical and support aircraft.[1]

(U) In one other IRCM matter, in a September message to COMUS Korea the Army Aviation Systems Command cited Army guidance to remove heat suppressor kits from retrograde VNAF UH-1 helicopters and store them in CONUS. (Fifteen such craft had been received from Vietnam with the kits installed.) They cited the incompatibility of the kits with cold weather heaters and the fact that the kits had not been subjected to cold weather testing. COMUS Korea requested that the kits be retained and used in Korea. CINCPAC strongly supported such retention and use. He advised the Department of the Army that cold weather testing of a problem of interface between the suppressor and an auxiliary heater should begin immediately. The Army approved the request to retain the kits.[2]

LAZY DOG Weapon System as an Aircraft Area Munition

(C) Scientific Analysis Group Report No. 1-74 on the LAZY DOG system was requested by the Defense Attache in Saigon as part of his effort to cut down on the costs of the continuing war in Vietnam. He was specifically looking for items that RVN industry could produce at lower cost than comparable U.S. items. Air delivered munitions, all produced in the United States, were one of the single items of greatest expense. LAZY DOG was believed to be a highly

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1. J35 HistSum Dec 74.
2. CDR AVSCOM STL MO 241317Z Sep 74; CINCUNC/USFK/EUSA 270652Z Sep 74; CINCPAC 272330Z Sep 74; DA 041917Z Oct 74.

effective but unsophisticated anti-personnel weapon. It had been purged from both USAF and Navy systems, but there remained many "assets," missiles, dispensers, drawings, studies, etc., located in the Air Force and Navy R&D community that were considered useful. Further assessment was to be made to determine the feasibility of developing a LAZY DOG manufacturing capability in the RVN, and a capability for the VNAF to deliver it.]

[redacted]

Analytical Evaluation of Selected Topics in Exercise FOOD CHAIN V

(S) Operation Plan ROCHESTER was a U.S.-Republic of China plan supporting the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, which provided for the conduct of operations in defense of Taiwan and the Penghus, and, subject to U.S. Presidential decision, the islands in the Kinmen and Matsu groups. From 13 to 17 May COMUSTDC and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense conducted the Command Post Exercise FOOD CHAIN V in a play of the plan. COMUSTDC had requested operations analysis assistance from CINCPAC, and CINCPAC staff representatives and contractor analysts assisted the Chinese in documenting, de-bugging, and testing the BALFRAM computer program (Balanced Force Requirements Analysis Methodology). CINCPAC provided additional analysts from the Center for Naval Analyses and the Army to assist in data collection during the exercise and to support post-exercise evaluation and reconstruction.

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1. J35 HistSum Aug 74; Scientific Analysis Group Report No. 1-74, 25 April 74, Subj: A Review of the LAZY DOG Weapon System as an Aircraft Area Munition.
2. J35 HistSum Aug 74.

(S) CINCPAC also provided an analyst to support Chinese use of the BALFRAM computer during the exercise. This computerized analytical model was operational on a Chinese computer and was used in evaluating general purpose force requirements and capabilities, and as a training device to assist the Chinese in making general use of the model. Although the basic scenario to be analyzed with BALFRAM was that for FOOD CHAIN V, the BALFRAM analysis and the exercise were not directly connected. The function of BALFRAM was to analyze the basic scenario, not to measure the usefulness of the exercise. The analysis was intended to examine possible improvements in scenario design for subsequent exercises and to evaluate the sensitivity of force effectiveness and operational decisions that could not be examined within the context of a rigid exercise event sequence. The value of analyses of this type had been demonstrated when the results of BALFRAM analysis of FOOD CHAIN IV had been incorporated into the scenario for FOOD CHAIN V.[1]

Other Scientific Analysis Group Activities

(C) Analytical support was provided to both the CINCPAC staff and other commands by Scientific Analysis Group (SAG) personnel in 1974. Some examples follow. The Commander Third Fleet was aided in data collection and analysis of FLEET EX 1-74, an exercise conducted off the California coast in March. Data was collected concerning air, airborne early warning, antisubmarine warfare, and guided missile operations aboard USS LONG BEACH (CGN-9) and RANGER (CVA-61). The analysts later aided in the reconstruction and analysis of Fleet effectiveness at the San Diego headquarters. An analyst also assisted that command after FLEET EX 2-74, in July. He reduced and analyzed data to test a Third Fleet plan for evaluation of ship defensive effectiveness.

(C) The SAG served as data collection managers for the JCS in the worldwide command post exercise NICKEL PLATE in May. Collected data was forwarded to the JCS Exercise Analysis Office. The SAG also provided an analysis of communications message precedence/classification statistics and a review of the effectiveness of the Battle Staff and other command and control agencies. These functions had also been performed for the JOLLY ROGER 74 exercise.[2]

(U) Support to COMUS Korea consisted primarily of obtaining a number of computerized models for use in analyzing logistics, air defense, and air strikes; staff visits; and arranging financial assistance to the U.S.-ROK Operational

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1. J35 HistSum Sep 74; Scientific Analysis Group Working Paper No. 3-74, 20 Jun 74, Subj: Analytical Evaluation of Selected Topics in Exercise FOOD CHAIN V (U).
2. J35 HistSum Aug 74.

Planning Staff to provide computer time used in computerized model testing and development.[1]

(U) The SAG had begun a project to preserve Southeast Asia combat data in 1973, calling attention to the potential loss of valuable data files as commands and units were disestablished. These were to be maintained in a central CINCPAC repository. Advanced Research Projects Agency support for the program had been obtained and contracts had been made with the RAND Corporation and the Batelle Memorial Institute to identify machine-readable data sources both in CONUS and the PACOM. CINCPAC staff representatives conferred with the component commands and Southeast Asia units to identify and earmark files. CINCPAC would arrange to retain data sources of value held by other agencies that wished to dispose of them. In the summer of 1974 a users symposium at RAND attended by a CINCPAC staff representative discussed a draft Data Users Guide to be prepared by RAND; also considered was the option for further efforts to identify data sources to be preserved.[2]

BALFRAM Analysis Support

(S) The Balanced Force Requirements Analysis Methodology computer program was CINCPAC's war-gaming capability, manned by an analyst from the Stanford Research Institute (SRI). In 1974 the program had come to be used extensively in support of the CINCPAC staff, and also had generated requirements outside the headquarters.

(C) From 1 March through July assistance was provided to the Plans Directorate to analyze the major Joint Strategic Objectives Plan scenarios to assess the sufficiency of required forces and to assist in developing objective force recommendations for Volume II of the JSOP for FY 77-84. (See also Chapter III of this history). As a result of the JSOP analysis, the CINCPACAF staff requested assistance in developing an operational BALFRAM capability at that headquarters. The program software was made available to them and installation was completed in September. User training had been provided since that time by the SRI representative to CINCPAC.

(C) In April and May support was provided to the Republic of China in connection with FOOD CHAIN V, as discussed earlier in this section.

(S) In September, COMUS Japan requested support to develop a BALFRAM evaluation of the U.S.-Japan force structure mix for the defense of Japan. The combined study, called KEEN STANDARDS, conducted with the Japan Staff Office,

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1. J35 HistSum Dec 74.
2. J35 HistSum Aug 74; CINCPAC 180155Z Apr 74.

was considered to be materially assisted by the BALFRAM, and such support continued into 1975. The JSO use of BALFRAM provided a ready means for CINCPAC to illustrate the advantages of "complementary" force structures in the Japan Self-Defense Force "on-shore" and U.S. "off-shore" supporting forces in the Northeast Asia theater of operations.

(U) In December the CINCPAC SRI representative visited the Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency (SAGA) of the JCS. Descriptive presentations on the BALFRAM were given and the JCS requested computer tapes and full documentation on the system. These were assembled and forwarded early in 1975.

(U) Two additional analyses were on-going at the end of the year. One was support for the Logistics Directorate to study the sufficiency of War Reserve Munitions stocks for Korean operations; the other was an analysis of the capability of the Republic of Korea to defend against a unilateral attack by North Korea.[1]

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1. J3 HistSum Dec 74; COMUS Japan 100726Z Sep 74; COMUS Japan 200715Z Nov 74; JCS 1985/121553Z Dec 74.

SECTION V--MISCELLANEOUS OPERATIONS ACTIVITIES

Fuel Impact on Readiness

(C) The POL crisis of late 1972 and early 1973 had been carefully studied with the purpose of assessing the impact of fuel availability on force readiness. By July 1974, however, CINCPAC advised the JCS that fuel availability was no longer an inhibiting factor on PACOM readiness, and requested relief from quarterly reports required to measure readiness. The JCS discontinued the quarterly requirement, but requested that the subject continue to be reported in the semi-annual situation reports.[1]

(C) In December the JCS expressed their concern that decreased fuel consumption might be causing ill effects on force readiness that might be cumulative and thus go unrecognized and unreported. They noted that since October 1973 the Armed Forces had used appreciably less fuel than in preceding years. In FY 74 use was 25 percent below the FY 73 level. Thus far in FY 75, the rate had been between 25 and 30 percent less than in FY 73. In spite of this reduction, which had resulted in almost a billion dollars in cost avoidance, no readiness reduction had been reported. This subject--fuel consumption to readiness--would be reviewed during the FY 76 budget cycle. They asked for a one-time report on both the short and long-range impact of reduced fuel consumption.[2]

(C) CINCPAC provided his response early in January 1975. Although readiness decreases due to fuel reductions did not show, he did not believe that this picture was accurate. The difficulty in precise assessment lay in the inability to isolate and measure fuel contribution relative to numerous other resource contributions within the existing reporting system. By components, short and long-range impact statements were submitted.

(C) For the Army, fuel reductions had not had an adverse effect on readiness and no serious near-term impact was foreseen. Fuel savings had been effected through fuel oriented planning and by reductions in various administrative areas. The long-range impact was difficult to assess and quantify. The imposition of restrictions had had many favorable effects: wasteful practices had been eliminated, nonessential activities discontinued, and unnecessary use of fuel-consuming equipment curtailed. Positive fuel management had resulted at all levels. The continuation of conservation measures

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1. CINCPAC 160331Z Jul 74; JCS 8734/262113Z Jul 74. See also CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 315-332 for particulars on the 1972-1973 crisis.
2. JCS 2934/022030Z Dec 74.

should permit sustaining a high readiness posture as long as fuel levels were not further reduced and as long as energy savings continued to be prorated to avoid a severe impact on selected critical commodities such as JP4. Cumulative effects could eventually result in readiness deterioration and should be monitored. Reduction of training exercises, flying hour training, and certain support functions could have an effect eventually. The availability of Military Airlift Command airlift was of continuing concern for its effect on realistic training activities. It was cautioned that this assessment based on fuel reductions alone might present a misleading or oversimplified forecast. Other factors, such as reduced funding levels, had to be considered.

(C) CINCPACFLT determination of the impact of fuel reduction was considered extremely difficult primarily because of the existence of factors other than fuel that exerted equal or greater influence on unit readiness. These factors included the reduced number of fleet exercises and fewer participants in those being conducted, lower aircraft availability rates, generally less than desired material condition of ships and aircraft, personnel shortages, and continuing and expanding commitments in the face of programmed force level reductions. For the short-term, a continuation of already less-than-optimum readiness and more probably a gradual decline in training readiness throughout the fleet was foreseen. In the longer term this would lead, especially when combined with other adverse funding decisions, to an accelerated downward trend leading to an inability to meet fleet commitments in peace or war.

(C) For the Air Force in the PACOM, cessation of combat operations and reductions in force levels had significantly reduced PACAF fuel consumption. Emphasis on flying training had increased as combat and combat support flying had been reduced, with a slight decrease in fuel consumption per flying hour. Indications were that PACAF was obtaining a higher state of readiness due to maximized training accomplished on each sortie. There had been no adverse impact on readiness as a result of decreased fuel consumption within PACAF, and none was projected.[1]

Indian Ocean Operations

(S) As the year opened, USS ORISKANY (CVA-34), four destroyer types, two submarines, and various logistic ships were operating in the Indian Ocean. It was the policy of the United States to continue its past practice of transits and exercises in that area. (See Chapter X of this history for a discussion of the political implications of U.S. operations in this part of the world.) Late in December 1973 USS BAINBRIDGE (DLGN-25) was directed to relieve the task

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1. CINCPAC 080413Z Jan 75.

group, which was to depart the Indian Ocean via the Malacca Strait on 15 January. On 12 January the Commander MIDEASTFOR directed USS KOELSCH (DE-1049) to join the BAINBRIDGE Task Group and operate with it from 24 to 30 January. The United Kingdom authorized a further extension of the use of Diego Garcia for P3 staging through mid-February to cover the deployment of BAINBRIDGE. Task Unit 75.5.4, which consisted of BAINBRIDGE and the guided missile escort ship USS SCHOFIELD (DEG-1), conducted operations in the Indian Ocean throughout February. On 27 February, Task Group 77.7, consisting of USS KITTY HAWK (CVA-63), USS KIRK (DE-1087), USS BRONSTEIN (DE-1037), and USS SOMERS (DLG-34) transitted the Malacca Strait on 27 February en route to relieve BAINBRIDGE.[1]

(S) This task group operated in the Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea area until 21 April. During Arabian Sea operations the Shah of Iran, accompanied by the U.S. Chairman of the JCS and the U.S. Ambassador to Iran, visited KITTY HAWK and toured the ship, observing the varied and sophisticated systems and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet's first multi-purpose aircraft carrier.[2]

(S) On 24 June a task group consisting of USS CHICAGO (CG-11), USS FANNING (DE-1076), USS MACKENZIE (DD-836), and USNS PASSUMPSIC (T-AO-107) departed Subic Bay for a 60-day deployment in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. The group conducted normal fleet operations, including LAMPS flights (Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System), in addition to surveillance of Soviet naval units that were operating in the area. During the deployment, routine port visits were made to Karachi, Colombo, Bandar Abbas, Djibouti, Bandar Mah-Shahr, Mombasa, Port Louis, and Rodrigues Island.[3]

(S) The next deployment was a task group led by USS CONSTELLATION (CVA-64) that entered the Indian Ocean on 10 November. CONSTELLATION was accompanied by USS COCHRANE (DDG-21), USS BERKELEY (DDG-15), USS STEIN (DE-1065), and USS CAMDEN (AOE-2). USS PLUNGER (SSN-595) joined the task group in the Indian Ocean. The group participated in the Central Treaty Organization's exercise MIDLINK 74. CONSTELLATION, BERKELEY, and COCHRANE were detached from the MIDLINK 74 forces, however, to conduct operations in the Persian Gulf on 24 and 25 November. The task group began their transit out of the Indian Ocean area on 30 November.[4]

1. J313 HistSums Jan, Feb 74; JCS 6025/282242Z Dec 73; SECSTATE 002984/072215Z Jan 74; CTU 75.5.4 121001Z Jan 74; CINCPACFLT 150208Z Jan 74. The oiler SACRAMENTO also accompanied the Task Group 77.7.
2. J313 HistSum Apr 74; CTG 77.7 211141Z Apr 74; CINCPACFLT 110051Z Apr 74.
3. CINCPACFLT 312047Z May 74; CINCPACFLT 070054Z Jun 74.
4. J313 HistSum Nov 74; ODRP Islamabad 250320Z May 74; CINCPACFLT 231901Z Nov 74; CINCPACFLT 251854Z Nov 74; CTF 7.7 251520Z Nov 74; CTF 7.7 252001Z Nov 74; CINCPACFLT 272301Z Nov 74. See Chapter X for further information on MIDLINK 74.

Indian Ocean Air Patrols

(S) The complex political implications of a decision by the Royal Thai Government to curtail U.S. Navy P3 flights over the Indian Ocean that orginated at U-Tapao are discussed in Chapter X of this history. On 13 July the JCS directed a standdown of such flights, and CINCPAC so advised CINCPACFLT. Discussions in diplomatic channels resulted in a Thai decision that "food and material" flights could be flown and on 29 July the JCS authorized resumption of P3 Indian Ocean logistics and administrative flights. Reconnaissance operations into the Indian Ocean from Thai bases continued to be prohibited until such flights had landed at a base outside Thailand. CINCPAC so advised CINCPACFLT on 30 July.[1]

(S) Earlier, on 19 March, the CINC of the European Command had proposed the occasional deployment of NAVEUR Maritime Patrol Aircraft (two P3s from the Sixth Fleet) to the Middle East in support of Sixth Fleet/MIDEASTFOR units and to augment PACOM P3 aircraft. He believed it would provide valuable training in coordinated operation and also share some of the workload carried completely by PACFLT units.[2]

(S) The JCS stated that it was not necessary to provide support for routine operations nor for support of CINCPAC task group operations unless CINCPAC had requested assistance. CINCPACFLT advised that sufficient P3 aircraft assets were available in the PACOM to provide the requisite maritime surveillance support for Indian Ocean operations, including periods when a task group was operating. Additionally, CINCPACFLT recommended that any joint effort (Pacific and European Commands) should be fully coordinated with the Defense Attache in Tehran with particular attention to the question of Iranian sensitivity to base loading at Bandar Abbas.[3]

(S) CINCPAC concurred with the JCS and CINCPACFLT positions and informed the JCS that should future assistance from the European Command be required, CINCPAC would so advise.[4]

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1. JCS 5828/131149Z Jul 74; CINCPAC 132102Z Jul 74; JCS 1615/292244Z Jul 74; CINCPAC 300130Z Jul 74.
2. USCINCEUR 191515Z Mar 74.
3. JCS 1127/281425Z Mar 74; CINCPACFLT 090137Z Apr 74.
4. CINCPAC 122151Z Apr 74.

Task Group Deployment to Gulf of Tonkin

(TS) As directed by the JCS, a task group headed by USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN 65) entered the Gulf of Tonkin on 9 December. Others in the group were USS ROBISON (DDG-12), USS JOHN PAUL JONES (DDG-32), and USS ENGLAND (DLG-22). USS RICHARD B. ANDERSON (DD-786) joined the task group on 10 December. Originally scheduled for seven days, operations were continued until the JCS directed their cessation. The ENTERPRISE group departed the Gulf on 22 December and arrived at Subic Bay on 24 December. (ANDERSON was detached and directed to proceed to her homeport in Yokosuka, also to arrive by Christmas Eve.) Despite adverse weather throughout the 9-22 December excursion period, the ENTERPRISE air wing flew 748 fixed wing and 59 helicopter sorties. All flights remained over water within the assigned operating area (which was south of 17°30'North) and no aircraft approached within 25 nautical miles of land. In support of this excursion, one EP3 reconnaissance mission was flown from Cubi Point in the Philippines every other day.[1]

Operation BEARD BITE (C)

(TS) Operation BEARD BITE was a CINCPACFLT plan to use the deployment of a task group headed by USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65) from the West Coast to Subic Bay in the Philippines to test Soviet satellite ocean surveillance and targeting capability. (ENTERPRISE carried the first deployment of the Gruman F-14A "TOMCAT" fighter aircraft to WestPac; Fighter Squadrons 1 and 12 with 12 aircraft each were embarked.) With both the F-14s and the EA-6B (EXCAP) on board, Soviet interest in the carrier was expected to be high.

(TS) Operation BEARD BITE used carefully controlled emission control (EMCON) procedures, deception, and circuitous routing during the transit to stimulate Soviet surveillance reactions. This was an attempt to gather data to determine the ability of the Soviets to discriminate targets based on electronic emission and/or radar return; reaction time, the extent to which passive surveillance augmented or influenced radar satellites when aloft; and Soviet emphasis on continuous U.S. carrier location.

(TS) The task group arrived at Pearl Harbor on 23 September and at Subic on 16 October. The task group had been divided into two sub-groups. The ALPHA group consisted of USS ENTERPRISE, USS AGERHOLM (DD-826), AND USS STEIN (DE-1063). The BRAVO group consisted of USS CAMDEN (AOE-2), USS LYNDE McCORMICK (DDG-8), USS REASONER (DE-1063), and USS JOHN PAUL JONES (DDG-32). The BRAVO group acted as a decoy unit and simulated a normal PACOM carrier transit, while the

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1. J313 HistSum Dec 74; JCS 7799/072218Z Dec 74; CINCPAC 072330Z Dec 74; CINCPACFLT 082245Z Dec 74; CTG 77.0 221730Z Dec 74.

ALPHA group transited using circuitous routing and Emission Control Alpha (total silence) procedures.

(TS) The group commander reported that the operation was considered highly successful from a surface operations standpoint. The Soviets apparently attempted two TU-95 (BEAR) reconnaissance missions against the task group on 6 and 10 October. Neither BEARD BITE group was overflown, although the 10 October mission came within 100 nautical miles of the BRAVO group. The TU-95s, however, did overfly USS RANGER (CVA-61) on 6 October and Destroyer Squadron 33 on both 6 and 10 October.

(TS) The BEARD BITE commander reported that valuable training was accomplished in emission control procedures, including EMCON launch of aircraft, and that renewed confidence was gained in the effectiveness of EMCON tactics and surface operations using passive sensors and intelligence support from ashore. He recommended EMCON training during all PACOM transits.[1]

B-52 Maritime Operations

(S) On 8 February the JCS advised CINCSAC and CINCPAC that they had ageed to develop and evaluate alternative military courses of action in connection with an on-going study on military strategy and options in the Indian Ocean region. To this end, they had further agreed that CINCPAC and CINCSAC, in coordination, should explore the operational feasibility of conducting Indian Ocean surveillance missions using B-52/KC-135 aircraft. They requested that the two commanders submit a conceptual plan. In order to sharpen considerations, CINCPAC asked the JCS for further information on the intended meaning of surveillance. In the interim, CINCPACFLT provided a description of the nature and purpose of Navy surveillance as practiced; it was a coordinated multi-platform, multi-sensor operation in which air platforms such as the P3 played a part.[2]

(S) The JCS advised CINCPAC that he was to "consider all capabilities to locate and identify naval surface forces."[3]

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1. J315 HistSum Sep 74, which cited CINCPACFLT 310215Z May 74 and JCS 2480/132319Z Sep 74; J315 HistSum Dec 74, which cited COMCARGRU SEVEN 161700Z Oct 74; J311 HistSum Sep 74; CINCPACFLT 031945Z Jul 74.
2. JCS 9880/081944Z Feb 74; CINCPAC 091947Z Feb 74; CINCPACFLT Memorandum to Admiral Gayler, 11 Feb 74, Subj: B-52 Maritime Operations.
3. JCS 2869/121218Z Feb 74.

(S) On 11 February CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT representatives visited SAC headquarters to assist in plan development. On 15 February, the draft CONPLAN 8888 was forwarded for CINCPAC review. On 20 February, the draft, with minor changes, was concurred in by CINCPAC, and the final draft was submitted to the JCS on 22 February.[1]

Reporting

DAO Saigon Monthly Assessment

(C) On 30 September the JCS proposed the initiation of a monthly report from the Defense Attache Office in Saigon that highlighted South Vietnamese war fighting capability as a result of reduced funding. It was to be the only single source of information that was timely, comprehensive, and meaningful; it was hoped to flag areas within the RVNAF that were deteriorating while there was still time to rectify them. CINCPAC developed a proposed format and outline of content in association with CINCUSARPAC, the Commander USSAG/7AF, and the DAO, Saigon. CINCPAC's proposal was forwarded to the JCS on 12 October.[2]

(C) Particulars, as recommended by CINCPAC, included a brief statement of the threat and general security situation, which would provide the background against which the importance or criticality of problems could be judged. Next was to be a statement of RVNAF fighting capability with emphasis on perceived trends, upward or downward, with identification of factors that had deteriorated, for whatever reasons, to the point where a critical situation was developing. These factors included morale; command and control; combat intelligence; employment of artillery; close air support; air mobility; ground mobility; navy operational status; communications; air defense; the operational impact of cancellations or deferrals of major projects; and the adjustment of priorities, tactics, or force structure.

(C) The JCS approved the format CINCPAC recommended, noting that it was not necessary to report on every item every month if it was considered insignificant or inappropriate. The JCS found the first monthly assessment of 5 December most useful.[3]

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1. J315 HistSum Feb 74; CINCPAC 120025Z Feb 74; CINCSAC 150020Z Feb 74; CINCPAC 201822Z Feb 74; CINCSAC 221430Z Feb 74.
2. J334(A) HistSum Oct 74; J334 HistSum Nov 74; JCS 3097/301626Z Sep 74; CINCPAC 120323Z Oct 74.
3. JCS 9979/052255Z Nov 74; JCS 7108/062315Z Dec 74, which cited DAO 050100Z Dec 74.

PACOM Military Damage Assessment

(U) A CINCPAC automatic data processing project on PACOM Military Damage Assessment was reinstated in February after four months of staff reappraisal of requirements. The project had originally been scheduled for completion in February 1974, but this was to be delayed about a year. On 6 September a new CINCPAC Instruction on Nuclear Detonation (NUDET) reporting was promulgated. It provided a new format for reports to enable them to be automatically processed by the automated program, which was called the Residual Capabilities Assessment (RECA) Program. The CINCPAC Instruction also provided guidance for the exercise scripting of NUDETs.[1]

Air Automated Reporting System

(U) In August 1974 CINCPAC advised his Air Force and Navy component commanders that the requirement for development of an air operations automated reporting system to support contingency operations in any area of the PACOM remained a valid requirement. The matter had been under study since early 1973. CINCPAC tasked CINCPACAF to develop such a system.[2]

(U) CINCPACAF's initial status report was provided on 3 October; it contained a concept that had been developed among CINCPACFLT, USSAG/7AF, the 5th and 13th Air Forces, and CINCPACAF. It proposed a computer-oriented system, similar to the Southeast Asia Data Base of Air Activities (SEADAB), to be developed by PACAF for use with the World-wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Honeywell 6060 series computer. The SEADAB had proved effective, reliable, and responsive to requirements placed on it for entering, transmitting, and retrieving data and would be used as the basis for the new system. As it seemed to have significant potential value to other commands, PACAF planned to attempt to develop it as a WWMCCS Standard System.

(U) The system would be operated under the single-manager concept by PACAF to serve all PACOM components that conducted air activities during contingency operations. The prime reporting center was to be PACAF headquarters; a center there would code and process reported data and transmit information to lateral and higher headquarters. During contingency operations, the center was to be relocated to the theater commander and his staff who would be primary users of reported data for planning and directing air activities. The basic system and seven subsystems were outlined; the subsystems were: Target Imagery Management,

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1. J3341 HistSum Mar 74; J334 HistSum Sep 74.
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser 2432, 19 Aug 74, Subj: PACOM Air Operations Automated Reporting System; development of.

Target Installation Management, Force Status, Munitions Inventory, Operations Planning, Analysis and Reporting, and Supporting Systems.[1]

(U) It was learned, however, that Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces Europe had under development a similar system that was being considered as a candidate for the WWMCCS Standard System. It was in the development stage while the CINCPACAF plan was still in the conceptual state. It was believed that the USAFE system contained numerous improvements over the SEADAB. Its implementation in the PACOM as well as in Europe would be a significant step toward a worldwide standard. CINCPAC, therefore, advised CINCPACAF of the Europe program and that he believed it was appropriate to discontinue further development by CINCPACAF. Information on the USAFE system would be provided as it was obtained.[2]

Search and Rescue Facilities

(C) In 1973 the drawdown of search and rescue forces had been addressed by CINCPAC, particularly in the Guam sector. Earlier, in June 1972 the Coast Guard had removed their aircraft from the area as a result of an agreement with the Commander Naval Forces Marianas in which civil SAR was transferred to that commander. In 1973, however, the Air Force had inactivated the 79th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron (ARRS) at Guam and in that same month Navy HU-16s were restricted from water landings. While the Defense Department had not been specifically tasked to provide either SAR or medical evacuation in all of the TTPI, they had given not only emergency, but general humanitarian support as well, ever since World War II. CINCPAC had attempted to reposition Air Force assets at Guam, but CINCPACAF had advised that post-Southeast Asia rescue forces and capabilities would be combat oriented and centered around two long-range combat SAR squadrons, at Kadena on Okinawa and Hickam in Hawaii.[3]

(C) Although CINCPAC had been searching for ways to expand this effort throughout 1973, there were further reductions in 1974. CINCPAC voiced his concern to the JCS on 4 May. He noted the declining capabilities in the Guam sector over the previous 24 months. "We have a dangerous and politically unfortunate situation." As assets and SAR support were unavailable from either CINCPACAF or CINCPACFLT, he recommended return of the Guam Sector to the 14th

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1. CINCPACAF ltr, 3 Oct 74, Subj: PACOM Air Operations Automated Reporting System.
2. J6 Memo/1273-74, 18 Nov 74, Subj: PACOM Air Operations Automated Reporting System; CINCPAC ltr Ser 3380, 2 Dec 74, Subj: PACOM Air Operations Automated Reporting System.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 295.

Coast Guard District from Commander, Naval Forces Marianas as the most cost-effective solution. The Coast Guard could presumably combine logistical support to their two LORAN stations, TTPI support, and SAR readiness posture. CINCPAC believed they would require two C-130B aircraft to provide round-the-clock coverage. The JCS interposed no objection to this recommendation, and on 22 June CINCPAC requested that the Coast Guard resume responsibility for the Guam sector. He directed CINCPACFLT to insure transfer on an orderly, time-phased basis.[1]

(U) One of the two remaining Air Force ARRS in the PACOM was subsequently scheduled for phaseout. On 22 November CINCPACAF announced that the 76th ARRS at Hickam Air Force Base would inactivate in the fall of 1975. The four HC-130s and the four HH-53s assigned to the unit would be reassigned to fill worldwide Military Airlift Command and air reserve force requirements. This was the result of a study of combat rescue force requirements that resulted in a world-wide restructuring of assets. The capability of air reserve forces to accomplish part of the air rescue mission being performed by regular forces was considered. With the reduction of combat forces in the Pacific, the heavy lift helicopter and air refueling capability at Kadena, Okinawa, and McClellan Air Force Base, California, was considered by the Air Force sufficient to meet residual rescue requirements. Reductions of 190 military and 7 civilian spaces were expected to result in annual savings of $3.3 million.[2]

Nuclear Weapons Deployment and Security

(TS ~~FRD~~) Deployment of nuclear weapons outside the Continental United States, and the continuing requirement to assure the security of such weapons, were matters of CINCPAC interest in 1974. In the summer, the JCS requested that requirements for nuclear weapons deployment be reevaluated in the context of special concern for the security of those weapons. CINCPAC provided the following proposals. First was the phase out of nuclear antisubmarine warfare, antiair warfare, and atomic demolition munitions, retaining air launched and surface-to-surface weapons. He also proposed to limit the forward deployment of remaining weapons to Korea, Hawaii, Guam, Alaska, and forces afloat. He proposed to plan for phasing the weapons out of Korea as the Korean security situation permitted.[3]

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1. CINCPAC 040406 May 74; JCS 8787/122156Z Jun 74; CINCPAC 222125Z Jun 74; J311 HistSum Jun 74.
2. J311 HistSum Nov 74; CINCPACAF 292300Z Nov 74.
3. J320 HistSum Aug 74.

(S) In September, the Chairman of the JCS expressed his concern that extensive media coverage of statements by public figures concerning security of stored nuclear weapons could trigger some act, possibly by come irrational individual or individuals, against a nuclear weapons storage site. He believed it prudent to recognize this potentially increased risk and take appropriate precautionary measures. "We should be particularly careful that our discussions with the media and with visitors do not add fuel to the fire."[1]

(S) CINCPAC advised his component and subordinate unified commands, as well as Washington agencies, that he shared the concern expressed by the Chairman. "PACOM has its share of irrational people as shown by recent destruction of airliner in flight in RVN and murder of Mrs. Park. Commanders should review procedures and precautions to protect against terrorist threat of type represented by above actions."[2]

(S-FRD) Following a tour of the PACOM by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, CINCPAC advised the Chairman of the JCS of the results of that trip. The Assistant Secretary had found no immediate problems with physical security, but he raised several significant questions concerning nuclear posture. He believed that nuclear weapons stored ashore in WESTPAC were well in excess of requirements. He also suggested reducing the number of nuclear storage sites in use. He cited differences in threat perception and/or response by component security guards, indicating that the Services lacked uniform threat specifics in training and governing directives. The emphasis was on procedures to prevent unauthorized access rather than the ability to defeat or repulse a carefully planned, aggressively executed terrorist attack. CINCPAC advised the Chairman that he had suggested that the Assistant Secretary discuss these matters with the JCS. While the staff was working on the entire nuclear weapon deployment problem, CINCPAC advised, he had tasked his Inspector General to inspect nuclear storage sites throughout the PACOM, emphasizing site security against violent attack.[3]

(TS-FRD) Certain specific movements of nuclear weapons occurred in 1974. All nuclear weapons from Tainan Air Base, Taiwan, were relocated to Clark Air Base in the Philippines. Permissive Action Link (PAL) recode had been completed by 19 July. On 18 December CINCPACAF completed movement of 81 non-PAL weapons from Clark to CONUS. This action completed implementation of Category II of

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1. JCS 6490/281717Z Sep 74.
2. CINCPAC 290120Z Sep 74. The wife of the President of Korea had been killed in an assassination attempt on her husband on 15 August.
3. CINCPAC 020436Z Oct 74; J320 HistSum Sep 74. See also Chapter I, Inspector General Activities, and Chapter VI, Communications Security and Nuclear Weapons Storage.

the PAL Program in the PACOM, in which all nuclear weapons in the Philippines were to be PAL-equipped and locked.[1]

~~(C-FRD)~~ Certain Army weapons were also moved. On 19 November CINCUSARPAC initiated movement of 36 HONEST JOHN and 8 MADM from the Naval Magazine at Lualualei, Oahu, departing from Barbers Point to CONUS. Weapon movements were scheduled at night to preclude the crew duty day being exceeded, which, in turn, necessitated a crew rest of 15 hours and additional security forces to secure the aircraft during this period. Four logistic movements were programmed with 11 weapons per aircraft. The remaining 147 nuclear weapons were to be returned to CONUS not later than 30 June 1975.[2]

~~(U)~~ The PACOM Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine force was augmented by two in 1974 with the arrival of USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN (SSBN 602) on 26 August and USS ETHAN ALLEN (SSBN 608) on 23 September. Both joined Submarine Squadron FIFTEEN, and would make POLARIS deterrent patrols from Guam.[3]

~~(S)~~ On 5 February 1974 USS GEORGE WASHINGTON (SSBN-598) conducted a PACOM POLARIS A3 Follow on Test (FOT). Five missiles were successfully launched and impacted at the aimpoint. On 9 June 1974 USS PATRICK HENRY (SSBN-599) conducted a PACOM POLARIS A3 FOT. Five missiles were successfully launched. Missiles #1, #2, #3 and #5 impacted at the aimpoint. Missile #4 failed during first stage flight.[4]

~~(S)~~ On 15 October USS ROBERT E. LEE (SSBN-601) conducted a POLARIS A3 FOT. Five missiles were successfully launched, but #2 and #3 experienced in-flight failures. The other missiles impacted at the Midway Missile Impact Locating System aimpoint.[5]

~~(S-FRD)~~ Unit designations were changed for certain PACAF forces on 16 September. The 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) at Kunsan and Osan became the 8th TFW at Kunsan and the 51st Composite Wing at Osan. The 405th TFW at Clark Air Base became the 3rd TFW. The unit designation change had been directed by the Air Force Chief of Staff following phaseout of 8th TFW operations at Ubon, Thailand. The designation of the 8th TFW had been moved to Korea because of its long historical association there. On 1 October, a realignment of the

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1. CINCPAC 201900Z Jul 74; J322 HistSum Dec 74. See CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 251-256 for particulars of the PACOM PAL program.
2. J320 HistSum Nov 74.
3. J321 HistSum Aug 74; J3211 HistSum Oct 74.
4. J3/Memo/00503-75, 14 Aug 74, Subj: 1974 CINCPAC Command History; review of draft.
5. J3211 HistSum Oct 74.

PACAF Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) forces occurred. The 18th TFW increased its SIOP commitment while the 3rd and 8th TFWs reduced their commitment. The total PACAF commitment remained unchanged. As of that date, the PACAF SIOP Quick Reaction Alert commitment was made up of four F-4Ds from the 8th TFW at Kunsan. The 3rd, 8th, and 18th TFW continued to play a major SIOP non-alert role.[1]

Operations Security

(U) Operations Security (OPSEC) was defined as "those actions that are necessary and appropriate to deny the enemy information concerning planned, on-going, and completed operations." The fundamental objective of OPSEC was to preserve the advantage of tactical surprise and thereby enhance the probability of successful mission accomplishment. As it had evolved in the PACOM, OPSEC involved both staff cognizance over OPSEC matters and the conduct of OPSEC field surveys.[2]

(U) Additionally, CINCPAC participated in national level OPSEC programs. The first worldwide OPSEC conference was held by the JCS from 29 January to 1 February at the Headquarters of the Readiness Command. From the PACOM, representatives of CINCPAC's Army and Air Force components, the Fleet Marine Force Pacific, COMUSSAG, COMUSTDC, and COMUS Korea attended. The goals of the conference were to assist in developing near and long-term goals in OPSEC for the JCS, the unified and specified commands, and the Services; to promote a general understanding of OPSEC; to improve skills in OPSEC evaluation techniques; to address major areas of OPSEC concern and recommend actions; and to discuss OPSEC objectives. There were four individual working groups: Doctrine, Education and Training, Operational Planning, and OPSEC Surveys. CINCPAC OPSEC personnel participated in each of the groups, and chaired the OPSEC Survey working group. In addition, CINCPAC staff conducted a seminar for all conference attendees on techniques in conducting OPSEC surveys.[3]

(C) As a result of the conference, the JCS cancelled the semi-annual requirement for an OPSEC report from the unified and specified commands, and levied a requirement for an annual report to arrive by 31 July of each year. The CINCPAC report was forwarded on 31 July.[4]

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1. J3212 HistSum Oct 74.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. I, pp. 249-257.
3. J319(A) HistSum Feb 74; J319 Point Paper, 3 Jan 74, Subj: Worldwide OPSEC Conference.
4. J319 HistSum Apr 74; J3191 HistSum Jul 74.

(U) Also as a result of the conference, the JCS directed CINCPAC to prepare a draft OPSEC Survey Guide for worldwide use. The draft of the guide was forwarded to the Office of the JCS on 24 July.[1]

(U) Throughout the year CINCPAC continued to conduct OPSEC surveys in the PACOM. Among operations so studied were VAGABOND CLIPPER, Cambodian airlift and resupply, movement and storage of nuclear weapons, Arabian Sea operations, Airborne Command Post/TACAMO, PONY EXPRESS, and naval operations in general.[2]

War Gaming

(TS) Because of resource and fiscal constraints, CINCPAC did not maintain an extensive war gaming capability. Periodically, however, war game briefs were presented at the PACOM headquarters by others. In December a brief was presented by a Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff briefing team. The game concerned the Single Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP) versus the Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan (RISOP) for FY 74. RISOP was a hypothetical Warsaw Pact plan for general nuclear war that the JCS revised annually. In the first scenario briefed, a surprise worldwide attack was launched with both forces in a normal daily posture. In response, SIOP forces retaliated. In the second scenario the attack was initiated after both sides had generated to a maximum posture and again the SIOP was executed in retaliation. In the third scenario, the SIOP preempted the impending Soviet first strike.[3]

FIRST STRIKE

BONUS PRIZE

(S) On 4 March the CINC of the Readiness Command requested that CINCPAC provide nominations of specific items of hardware or techniques to enhance the mutual support capabilities of tactical and strategic aircraft/missile and unconventional warfare forces. The name BONUS PRIZE was assigned to this project; the specific request was considered to be Phase II, data identification. CINCPAC's input was forwarded on 1 May. CINCPAC noted that unconventional warfare forces normally operated in small units and carried with them the equipment required to accomplish the specified mission and effect their survival. Such equipment had to be man-portable, shock-resistant, and have a high degree of immunity to adverse climatic conditions. Target attack systems doctrine

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1. J3191 HistSum Jul 74.
2. J319 HistSums Jan-Dec 74; J319 Point Paper, 10 Dec 74, Subj: Operations Security Aspects of Naval Operations.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. I, p. 32 and p. 43; CINCPAC 291900Z Nov 74; J321 HistSum Dec 74. Activities associated with the Balanced Force Requirements Analysis Methodology are discussed elsewhere in this chapter.

pertaining to demolition attack of a major installation target should be given further study in view of the bulk explosives sometimes required vice increased accuracy of air delivered/missile ordnance. It was recommended that techniques and equipment should be developed to utilize complementary capabilities of aerial delivery and ground target designation, and certain specifics in this regard were outlined. He noted that infiltration, resupply, and exfiltration techniques should be continually reviewed because of the increasing sophistication of enemy aircraft detection and antiaircraft defense systems.[1]

Command and Control for Iranian Armed Forces

(S) In April the JCS advised that it was desirable to develop interoperability between U.S. and Iranian tactical command and control systems to the maximum extent feasible. This decision had been based on recent purchases by Iran of two U.S. destroyers equipped with Naval Tactical Data Systems (NTDS) equipment, and possible procurement of four NTDS patrol frigates. Additionally, Iranian P3F aircraft were to be NTDS compatible, and future procurements (the F-14 Airborne Warning and Control System) were expected to have NTDS compatibility. The JCS requested CINCPAC comments on the degree of interoperability needed between the U. S. and Iranian forces.[2]

(S) CINCPAC requested CINCPACFLT's comments, which were provided directly to the JCS. CINCPACFLT recommended that in addition to hardware NTDS compatibility between U.S. and Iranian naval equipment, communications links (both secure and uncovered) should be established for coordination and for passing time-sensitive tactical information during joint exercises and tactical operations.[3]

(S) On 28 May CINCPAC forwarded comments to the JCS concerning potential problems in releasing crypto equipment to foreign countries.[4]

(C) The JCS planned to review inputs from the field and then define and develop guidance on the degree of interoperability and compatibility required between U.S. and Iranian command and control systems.[5]

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1. USCINCRED 042058Z Mar 74; CINCPAC 010130Z May 74; J3181 HistSums Mar, May 74.
2. JCS 8388/110032Z Apr 74.
3. CINCPACFLT 010357Z May 74.
4. J315 HistSum May 74, which cited CINCPAC 280730Z May 74 (BOM).
5. Ibid.

Tropical Cyclone Conference

(U) The 1974 PACOM tropical cyclone conference was held 12-15 February at the Sanno Hotel in Tokyo. A CINCPAC Operations Directorate officer chaired the conference. All major commands in the PACOM were represented. The purpose was to review the past season's tropical cyclone activity as it related to the warning system and to find means to improve the system. The keynote address was delivered by the Commander U.S. Naval Forces Japan; the Deputy Director for Operations (Environmental Services) from the Office of the JCS also addressed the group.[1]

Environmental Data Acquisition and Distribution Conference

(C) An Environmental Data Acquisition and Distribution conference was held 15-17 May at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. This was a joint Service conference to study and update Pacific weather intercept operations as they related to the worldwide weather intercept plans and to prepare plans for insuring optimum weather data acquisition from the Indian Ocean area.[2]

Disaster Relief

(U) PACOM forces provided assistance throughout the theater as the need arose, again in 1974. Principal efforts in the summer concerned floods in Bangladesh and the Philippines, and at Christmas the cyclone that hit Darwin, Australia.

(U) With the redeployment of the Security Assistance Force Asia (SAFASIA) (for more details see Chapter III of this history), it was necessary to reappraise capabilities to provide Disaster Assistance Relief Teams (DARTs) to foreign disaster areas upon request. It was believed that the provision of teams with the same high degree of skill and responsiveness as that provided by the SAFASIA was essential. CINCPAC asked CINCUSARPAC to designate units for DART missions and appropriate response times for planning purposes. He requested that particular attention be given to medical skills and provision of teams that, although comprised of a composite of individuals, could function effectively as a team. He also suggested creation of disaster assessment/survey teams to determine requirements. The revision of disaster plans was to include the conduct of exercises or command post exercises to test procedures; this was considered particularly essential in view of the changes taking place within the PACOM. CINCUSARPAC's reply of 10 June indicated that survey teams could

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1. J317 HistSum Dec 74.
2. Ibid.

be provided by the headquarters tasked to deploy DARTs. ARPAC was analyzing the possibility of DART exercises; that command, however, envisioned no problem in continuing to provide the same high caliber personnel as had been evidenced in past DART operations.[1]

(U) The summer brought a series of disasters. On 17 August the JCS directed the Air Force Chief of Staff to execute a disaster relief airlift for Bangladesh, which was experiencing floods. Emergency supplies from the Agency for International Development/PACOM disaster relief stockpile on Guam included approximately 600 tents, 15,000 cotton blankets, and 60 water jugs carried on three Military Airlift Command C-141 aircraft. Again in December relief was provided to that country. There were 51 airlift missions flown with 1,000 tons of civil defense survival foodstuffs airlifted.[2]

(U) In the Philippines operations began on 18 August, when the U.S. Ambassador authorized expenditure of funds to start a "nutribun" baking program and for the purchase of medical and other supplies. In the food delivery program about 1.5 million nutribuns were delivered by 243 sorties of U.S. helicopters. The military airlift of food and other relief supplies terminated on 24 August.[3]

(U) Burma also needed assistance in August. In response to a request from that government, the United States sent two C-141 aircraft with 3 million doses of penicillin and half a million doses of tetracycline. These supplies reached Rangoon by 27 August. In addition, the U.S. Ambassador pledged his $25,000 disaster fund to assist in the shipment of other requested medical supplies. The total value of U.S. Government assistance was over $337,000.[4]

(U) Cyclone TRACY hit Darwin, Australia on 25 December, destroying about 90 percent of the buildings in town. At the request of the Australian government, the United States flew 10 C-141 missions carrying 500,000 pounds of cargo and 900 passengers in support of relief operations. U.S. support ended 3 January.[5]

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1. CINCPAC 070359Z Jun 74; CINCUSARPAC 102050Z Jun 74.
2. J3 HistSum Aug 74; JCS 7861/171615Z Aug 74; AMEMB Dacca 4036/221005Z Aug 74; CINCPACAF 240515Z Dec 74.
3. J3 HistSum Aug 74; AMEMB Manila 6106/182332Z Aug 74; CINCPACREP PHIL 191330Z Aug 74; CINCPACREP PHIL 241147Z Aug 74.
4. JCS 261025Z Aug 74.
5. J3182 HistSum Dec 74; MAC SCOTT AFB 032343Z Jan 75.

CHAPTER V

LOGISTICS

SECTION I - PLANS/POLICY

JOPS Interim Software Program

(U) The advent of the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS) brought the need for major changes in the development of operations contingency plans, especially in the logistics portions. The four major unified commands (Pacific, Atlantic, European and Readiness) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) each had adopted separate automated data processing (ADP) systems, and each possessed unique hardware to match unique planning requirements. In January 1973, the JCS initiated action to develop common ADP systems in support of JOPS and the Deployment Reporting System (DEPREP). Four JOPS interim software (JIS) modules for a common ADP system were assigned to the four major unified commands. The sub-system assigned for CINCPAC development was declared to have achieved complete operational capability by representatives of the National Military Command System Support Center in March 1974. The Movement Requirements Generator (MRG) sub-system was found to be a completely functional sub-system of the JOPS.[1]

(U) The Pacific Command (PACOM) MRG module was successfully tested and accepted by the JCS on 15-16 August. From September through November, a PACOM installations team installed and provided training on the use of the MRG to the JCS, European Command and Readiness Command. Meanwhile, in July, the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM) training team conducted planner and technician training for the Transportation Feasibility Estimator (TFE) module at CINCPAC. Attendance included Base Development Plan (BDP) personnel from the CINCPAC staff and PACOM component services. Using the programs developed by the LANTCOM, a hypothetical BDP and two BDPs from CINCPAC operations plans were computed on the World-Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Honeywell 6060 computer. Facilities requirements were derived from the Force List and forces, destinations and time frames were successfully computed. On 23 November, CINCPAC's evaluation of the TFE sub-system agreed with the JCS that automated BDP and medical planning

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 297; J41 HistSums, Jan, Mar, Apr 74; Memo, NMCSSC (Systems Analyst) to NMCSSC (JOPS Project Mgr), 10 Apr 74, Subj: Reports of Complete Operational Capability, Sub-system Movement Requirements Generator.

should be included in the JIS terms of reference, but that automated preparation of construction materials transportation requirements into the TFE was not yet feasible.[1]

RVNAF Logistic Support

(S) Logistic support to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Armed Forces (RVNAF) was rendered within the framework of authorized levels of security assistance funds. In February 1974, CINCPAC was advised, in a joint State/Defense message, that the legislative ceiling of $1.126 billion for military assistance service funds (MASF) for Vietnam and Laos was legally binding and could not be exceeded. During February and March, CINCPAC and the U.S. Defense Attache Office (DAO) Saigon provided assessments of the impact of the congressional ceiling on the Fiscal Year (FY) 1974 MASF program for the RVNAF. Particular logistic shortfalls were apparent in ammunition, petroleum-oil-lubricants (POL), repair parts and sealift. On 29 March, the JCS requested CINCPAC to develop logistic plans to meet the contingencies created by inadequate FY 74 MASF funding. Two plans were requested -- one for the then-current combat conditions, and one for the possibility of a major North Vietnam offensive on the scale of the 1972 Easter offensive.[2]

(S) On 27 April, CINCPAC submitted both plans to the JCS. In the "current situation" plan, CINCPAC noted that the most significant impact of the restricted funding situation was in the areas supported by the Army Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds. The impact was not only on Army of Vietnam (ARVN) operations, but also the RVN navy, marines and air force because the U.S. Army had common item support responsibility. The suspension of most requisitions in December 1973 had disrupted the supply of long lead time items, and the level of Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) for FY 75 would be critical to recovery and continued supply support after 1 July 1974. FY 75 would begin with a seriously depleted stockage position and no established pipeline for most items.[3]

(S) The second plan, entitled "RVNAF Contingency Logistics Plan No. Two", contemplated the provision of increased logistic support to enhance and maintain RVNAF capability for self-defense within the limitations of the cease-fire accords. The plan anticipated that the RVNAF would suffer significant

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1. J41 HistSums, Aug, Nov 74; J42 HistSums, Jul, Aug, Nov 74; CINCPAC 230411Z Nov 74.
2. J41 HistSum, Apr 74; JCS 2736/292246Z Mar 74, which cited SECSTATE 029839/132251Z Feb 74, CINCPAC 140316Z Feb 74 and 160058Z Mar 74; JCS 1364/151544Z Mar 74; Also see Chapter VII, Security Assistance.
3. CINCPAC 270310Z Apr 74.

losses of major end items of equipment with a concurrent increase in consumption/loss of consumable items. Computations were based on a time duration of 90 days, on the premise that the North Vietnamese offensive would stabilize by the end of that period or other major policy decisions would have been made to alter the level of U.S. support and/or involvement. In the figures provided for Plan Two, sustaining costs ($883.9 million), prior year short fall ($359.7 million), and CRA quarterly estimate ($364 million) totaled $1.6076 billion.[1]

(S) On 5 November 1974, the JCS requested CINCPAC to update the RVNAF Contingency Logistics Plan Two because of the funding constraints embodied in the new single source Defense Assistance to Vietnam (DAV) congressional legislation. The JCS specified that, under the tight budget, the revised plan should provide options for assuring minimum response time while remaining essentially oriented to surface transportation. The plan was to contain detailed procedures for emergency resupply when selected key commodities reached a dangerously low level. Emergency levels for Class V (Munitions) were to be monitored on a line item basis, not total tonnage. Emergency resupply procedures were to provide for visibility of all critical classes of supply, considering quantities of off-shore reserve and contingency stocks as well as in-country stocks. The procedures specified in the plan were to be able to sustain intense combat-level consumption rates until normal resupply procedures could be instituted.[2]

(S) CINCPAC's revised Plan Two was submitted to the JCS on 19 December 1974. It incorporated the views of DAO Saigon and the Service component commands, with the same concept as in the original plan -- 90 days to stabilization of the offensive. CINCPAC noted that, if North Vietnam launched a general offensive with the goal of total RVN capitulation, an infinite number of scenarios could be devised as to enemy strategy. The costs of the plan were estimated at two levels -- one with maximum attrition incurred by the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) and Vietnamese Navy (VNN); the other with minimum VNAF/VNN attrition and non-replacement of VNN losses (in $ millions):[3]

	Maximum Attrition	Minimum Attrition
Army	494.9	494.9
Navy	33.2	21.8
Air Force	196.1	179.9
POL	43.2	43.2
Transportation	60.3	60.3
Total	827.7	800.1

1. Ibid.
2. J41 HistSum, Dec 74; JCS 9121/050001Z Nov 74.
3. CINCPAC (Three Part Msg) 190430Z, 190431Z, 190432Z Dec 74.

Long Term Logistics Support Planning - Thailand

(C) In conjunction with the on-going and planned U.S. force reductions in Thailand discussed elsewhere in this history, the CINCPAC Directorate for Logistics (J4) initiated action, on 5 October 1974, to plan for long-term logistics support for residual U.S. forces in that country. The Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) was requested to develop a long-term plan which would support U.S. Forces remaining in Thailand even after the disestablishment of USMACTHAI. The first draft submitted by MACTHAI seemed to be oriented primarily toward an organizational and support structure which emphasized operational control of in-country U.S. Forces by COMUSMACTHAI. CINCPAC noted that some portions needed clarification or modification, and specifically non-concurred on several points in the draft; COMUSMACTHAI was requested to resubmit the plan. Meanwhile, on 4 December CINCPAC advised the JCS that a long-term logistics support plan for residual U.S. Forces was in development and recommended that no major changes in logistic support functions be initiated at JCS level until the force structure to remain in Thailand had been determined and a long-term logistics support plan had been staffed and approved. The year ended with the revised MACTHAI plan scheduled for submission to CINCPAC on 13 January 1975.[1]

Interservice Support

Defense Retail Interservice Support (DRIS) Program

(U) The former Defense Retail Interservice Logistics Support (DRILS) program was changed to DRIS in 1973 to emphasize the applicability of the program to all facets of interservice support at the retail level, and not only to logistics. Under DRIS, such functions as personnel, administration, family housing, real estate, commissary, exchange and troop support were included. In January 1974, a revised CINCPAC Instruction governing the implementation of DRIS in the PACOM was published. The revised instruction (CINCPACINST 4000.2H) also changed the name of the CINCPAC implementing body from Joint Interservice Logistic Support Board to Joint Interservice Support Board (JISB), and renamed the former overseas Coordinating Groups to Sub-Zone Groups (SZGs). During the January 1974 JISB meeting, the Chairman (Interservice Support Division, CINCPAC J43) reviewed a 1972 General Accounting Office (GAO) report to Congress entitled "Opportunities to Consolidate Support Functions in the Pacific to Reduce Military Costs." The major recommendations in the GAO report were:[2]

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1. J41 HistSums Nov, Dec 74; CINCPAC 050439Z Oct 74; USMACTHAI 011020Z Nov 74; CINCPAC 140415Z Nov 74, 042330Z Dec 74, and 282120Z Dec 74.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 310, 311; J43 HistSum Jan 74.

- Establish a full-time CINCPAC staff which would be responsible for interservice support.

- Develop procedures to ensure that the CINCPAC staff was aware of and evaluated potential interservice support consolidation opportunities.

- Provide clear-cut authority for CINCPAC to direct interservice arrangements, without compromising military missions, in those instances where the Services disagreed but economies were available.

(U) A follow-up visit by the GAO to CINCPAC, in December 1973 and January 1974, addressed the specific consolidation studies recommended in 1972 and other potential areas of interest. In February, the GAO team visited selected PACOM areas, and, as a result, the SZGs were tasked by the JISB to study the feasibility of consolidation in such activities as procurement, civilian personnel, real property maintenance, calibration, motor pools, medical and dental supplies, post operations, administrative aircraft, and various operations and maintenance activities. During the balance of 1974, the CINCPAC JISB monitored the progress of the SZG efforts in these areas.[1]

Consolidation Problems

(C) Although CINCPAC had instituted a strong and positive program in support of DRIS objectives, the third point in the foregoing GAO recommendations of 1972 was the key to substantial progress -- directive authority by CINCPAC. The mechanics of the CINCPAC DRIS program had been adopted by the Defense Department as a model for DRIS worldwide. However, service objections to specific GAO reports inhibited action in some areas. In April 1974, the Commander, U.S. Forces, Japan (COMUSJAPAN) provided comments relating to GAO Interim Memo Number Two. The GAO had questioned the need for two general cargo ports in Japan -- Yokosuka, under U.S. Navy control, and Yokohama, under U.S. Army control. The U.S. Army, Japan (USARJ) objected to the relinquishment of Yokohama, although the Navy tended to concur. The Navy concurred with the proposal to consolidate procurement offices at Yokosuka, while the Army suggested further study to determine the most feasible service to perform the procurement function. The Air Force was non-committal. Neither the Army nor the Navy concurred in the consolidation of civilian personnel offices. The Air Force, because of precedent for such on Taiwan and its administration of the Defense Department teachers' program, agreed that the matter was a legitimate subject for DRIS study.[2]

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1. J43 HistSums, Feb-Dec 74.
2. Ibid.; COMUSJAPAN 150815Z Apr 74.

(C) COMUSJAPAN also passed comments pertaining to the GAO report on duplication of administrative aircraft support. The Army took issue with criticism of its aircraft utilization rates, while the Marines advised that their aircraft were mission-oriented and any joint usage would degrade mission accomplishment. In May, the Department of the Army (DA) advised the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific (CINCUSARPAC) that tentative agreement had been reached between the Air Force and Army on procurement consolidation in Japan and Korea. Also in May, CINCPAC advised COMUSJAPAN that the SZG should insure that positive steps were taken to initiate joint studies in all areas of service disagreement.[1]

(C) In June, CINCPAC indicated support for the USARJ position against closure of Yokohama, since the USARJ computations on monetary costs appeared to be more valid than those of the GAO. In response to a CINCPAC request, CINCUSARPAC confirmed his support for the retention of Yokohama, not only on monetary grounds, but because of the major strategic/contingency value of the Yokohama port. CINCUSARPAC also concurred that termination of Yokohama's port operation would inevitably lead to the loss of the total installation, including its 20 tenant units and activities.[2]

(U) Meanwhile, the GAO Interim Report Number Four on Okinawa recommended consolidation of procurement offices, calibration activities, personnel offices, industrial gas production, real property maintenance, and on-base housing and household furniture management. COMUSJAPAN advised that studies would be undertaken on all of the recommendations, but noted service opposition on the grounds that monetary savings had been overstated by the GAO and that service-peculiar procedures and interests would detract from efficiency.[3]

(C) In addition to the legitimate reservations expressed by the Services regarding GAO-proposed consolidations, the movement represented by the DRIS program -- to increase areas of interservice support -- was complicated by unilateral supply actions in the opposite direction. The U.S. Army had initiated earlier unilateral measures to reduce and change the flow of its logistics activities in the Pacific. In April 1974, CINCUSARPAC had issued extensive instructions to Army units in the PACOM on unilateral reductions and reorganizations of supply activities. Relating to common supply support, USARPAC directed a review of such support being provided to other military services and Federal agencies. Coordination by Army commanders with supported

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1. COMUSJAPAN 180319Z Apr 74; CINCUSARPAC 040216Z May 74, which cited DA 301135Z Apr 74; CINCPAC 090216Z May 74.
2. CINCPAC 180247Z Jun 74; CINCUSARPAC 210301Z Jun 74.
3. COMUSJAPAN 290700Z Apr 74, 170133Z May 74, and 310742Z May 74.

agencies was to be aimed toward elimination of the major supplier role of the Army in the Pacific.[1]

(S) Subsequent guidance to the same effect in September 1974 was cited in a November message from the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). The CNO invited the attention of all Navy units worldwide to the joint regulation which stipulated that support provided by a DOD component to another DOD component under an agreement shall not be terminated or reduced unilaterally. A minimum of 180 days advance notice of proposed termination/reduction was normally required. The CNO noted Army projections of early 1975 for final support reductions, and requested all units to advise of all proposed Army support terminations. No agreements were to be made to terminate, transfer or reduce support being received under existing arrangements with Army elements until a Navy-wide policy had been established. On 13 December, the DA provided additional guidance to Army field units pertaining to interservice support reductions by Army components. The DA interpretation of "unilateral withdrawal" of support was withdrawal without notice and negotiation. Army units were directed to give formal notification to supported units and to attempt negotiation at the lowest possible level within the 180 day notification period. Disagreements were to be forwarded to DA for resolution within 30 days of the expiration of the 180-day period. "...Unified commanders will be kept informed through the unified commanders' interservice support representative of all Army actions with respect to interservice support reductions...."[2]

(C) On the day following the Army guidance to the Field, the CNO modified his previous direction that no agreements were to be made by Naval units. He directed that, for DRIS purposes, the disagreement procedures outlined by the DA also applied to Navy units -- that is, they were to refer such disagreements, jointly signed by the parties concerned, to the CNO for resolution if necessary. For support agreements outside the purview of DRIS, the CNO reiterated that no reductions or cancellations would be executed without specific CNO guidance. On 18 December, USARPAC instructed subordinate commands that, if a clear impasse was reached at operating level, problems were to be referred upward through service channels immediately. It was not necessary to wait a full 180 day period.[3]

DOD Consolidation - Manila

(U) In late 1973, the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines had expressed his desire to lower the profile of U.S. military presence in the Manila area.

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1. CINCUSARPAC 150908Z Apr 74, passed to CINCPAC by CDR USMACTHAI Spt Gp 130955Z Aug 74.
2. CNO 122106Z Nov 74; DA 131610Z Dec 74.
3. CNO 132207Z Dec 74; CINCUSARPAC 180305Z Dec 74.

CINCUSARPAC had initiated a study of the missions, functions and tasks of the U.S. Army Support Element, Philippines. The USARPAC mission analysis had concluded that the Army Element could be discontinued and the essential missions and functions transferred to other component services. In early 1974, the CINCPAC Inspector General (IG) recommended the reduction, disestablishment or elimination of the U.S. Army Manila port operations; the DOD motor pools; DOD dependent school transportation; Navy and Air Force procurement activities; and the leasing of office and quarters space. On 14 February 1974, CINCPAC directed the closure of the Manila port effective 30 June 1974, and tasked Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) to develop a concept of operations to assume port liaison responsibilities for residual DOD cargo. On 27 April, PACAF provided CINCPAC with a comprehensive management survey of proposed port logistics liaison, motor pool operations and procurement operations which reduced service manpower and vehicle numbers significantly. All of the CINCPAC IG recommendations were in effect by 30 June 1974.[1]

HASZG Actions

(U) In mid-1974, the study by the Hawaii Area Sub-Zone Group of calibration facilities consolidation in Hawaii was passed to the Joint Logistics Commanders (JLC) for comment. In November, representatives of the Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Metrology and Calibration (JTCG-METCAL) visited Oahu to discuss the need for additional cost and operational data as a basis for concluding the study. During a December meeting with the HASZG, criteria were established for completion and evaluation of the study, along with study milestones. As a result of this determination, the CINCPAC Interservice Support Division passed the criteria and milestones to all PACOM SZGs for use in reevaluation of prior decisions concerning calibration facility consolidation.[2]

(U) Also in mid-1974, the HASZG study of medical and dental supply consolidation was forwarded to component commanders and the CINCPAC Staff Surgeon requesting comment, evaluation and recommended action. A majority of the HASZG members believed consolidation was feasible. Component replies revealed several areas of contention, and the study was returned to the HASZG by CINCPAC's Interservice Support Division with instructions to negotiate the parochial objections. The HASZG was directed to obtain all component command concurrences or objections before resubmission of the study. No further action on this consolidation occurred during the year.[3]

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1. CINCUSARPAC 180440Z Jan 74; CINCPACAF 271910Z Apr 74, which cited CINCPAC 140150Z Feb 74; J411 Point Paper, 20 May 74, Subj: Consolidation of DOD Logistics Activities in Greater Manila Area.
2. J43 HistSums, Jun, Nov, Dec 74.
3. J43 HistSums, Jun, Jul 74.

(U) Component replies were received in July on the HASZG study of military confinement facilities consolidation in Hawaii. The components, except the U.S. Marines, concurred in consolidating Oahu's military confinement facilities into one facility at Pearl Harbor under Marine operation. The facility would be jointly staffed except for Air Force, which did not confine prisoners on Oahu. The HASZG recommended the elimination of two confinement facilities at Kaneohe Marine Air Station and Schofield Barracks. The joint confinement facility at Pearl Harbor would have a utilization rate of 62 percent, compared with 29 percent for three facilities, with an estimated 53 fewer manpower spaces. Two buildings would be made available for other uses, and about $300,000 would be saved. The HASZG was requested by CINCPAC to generate a formal interservice support agreement.[1]

(U) Service approval to consolidate on-island lumber procurement at the Navy Lumber Yard, Pearl City Peninsula was reported by the HASZG in November 1974. This consolidation was formalized by an interservice support agreement, thus eliminating local procurement and saving about $45,450 per annum.[2]

Environmental Protection

(U) In January 1974, CINCPAC notified the component commands on Oahu that the Interservice Support Division would chair an environmental protection committee consisting of a senior representative from each of the components and the Fleet Marine Force Pacific. The committee objectives included the development of format and methodology to be used in the coordination, identification, reporting, and publication of worthwhile environmental protection projects with civil impact which would improve the military image in Hawaii.[3]

(U) The first Environmental Protection Committee meeting was held at CINCPAC on 7 February, during which the members were requested to provide comments on past, present and future military participation in Hawaiian civic programs for possible public affairs action. Follow-up actions or suggestions were to be accomplished through component members of the HASZG.[4]

(U) Meanwhile, on 7 February 1974 CINCPAC had issued an instruction which implemented DOD policy in support of the National Environmental Policy Act. The instruction required semi-annual reports from PACOM units on progress toward improvement of environmental quality. Reports submitted in March and September assisted the CINCPAC staff in maintaining currency on environmental

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1. J43 HistSums, Jul, Oct 74.
2. J43 HistSum, Nov 74.
3. CINCPAC 242005Z Jan 74.
4. J43 HistSums Jan, Feb 74.

programs throughout PACOM.[1]

(U) In June, CINCPAC issued a second environmental instruction in support of DOD policy. This instruction required quarterly reports on the status of actions in PACOM which were environmentally significant and/or controversial and thus required preparation of Environmental Impact Statements. Beginning with CY 2/74, consolidated PACOM reports were submitted by CINCPAC through the JCS to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment. DOD-wide reports were then submitted to the President's Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ).[2]

(U) During the second half of 1974, the CINCPAC Facilities Engineering Division provided representation at bi-monthly meetings of the Environmental Committee of the Honolulu-Pacific Federal Executive Board (FEB). The FEB was composed of all Federal agencies, including military services, on the island of Oahu. The major effort of the Environmental Committee during the latter half of 1974 was to coordinate Federal input to the State's first annual report to the people of Hawaii on "Progress Toward Hawaii's Environmental Goals."[3]

Management of Wholesale Subsistence Stocks

(U) The Department of Defense approved, in 1973, a time-phased plan for worldwide integrated management of wholesale subsistence stocks (WIMS) by the Defense Personal Support Center (DPSC). The plan provided for overall policy direction and control by the Defense Supply Agency (DSA). Inventory management of non-perishable items was centralized at the DPSC. Inventory management of perishable stock was decentralized to regional subsistence offices to be established in the Continental United States (CONUS) and overseas. Excluded from DSA ownership and management were military Service stocks for satellite end-use customers at posts, camps, stations, bases or ships. Also excluded were pre-positioned war reserve stocks (PWRS), which remained the responsibility of the Services. The scheduled activation of the Defense Subsistence Region - Pacific (DSR-P) occurred on 1 February 1974, concurrently with assumption by DPSC of control over non-perishable subsistence stocks in Hawaii.[4]

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1. CINCPACINST 11000.2B of 5 Feb 1974.
2. CINCPACINST 11000.4A of 17 Jun 1974.
3. Excerpt from "Progress Toward Hawaii's Environmental Goals", First Annual Report to the People of Hawaii in Compliance with Act 248, SLH 1974 of January 1975.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 274, 275; CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 310; J46 HistSum, Feb 74.

(U) Phase I, wholesale, of the WIMS was directed for implementation by June 1975. In May 1974, DSA advised that the Implementation Planning Group (IPG) for WIMS would visit the PACOM to observe subsistence operations and to consider a potential system interface with DPSC and the Defense Supply Regional Office at Alameda, Calif. Another purpose of the visit was:[1]

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> C. To evaluate military service contention that certain storage activities should not be included in Phase I (wholesale) implementation: Army-Okinawa and Thailand, claimed to be Army commissary consolidated resale/retail operation. Navy-NSD Guam, Subic Bay, and Yokosuka, claimed to be retail not wholesale operation.

(U) Referring to the IPG visit, CINCUSARPAC requested CINCPAC to arrange an opportunity to discuss the IPG observations of the PACOM areas. Most urgent concerns were expressed by the Army component regarding DSA's concept and capability to support PACOM forces under wartime conditions. USARPAC also expressed a need for a logical sequence of planning and implementation of WIMS; i.e., wartime consideration before peacetime, total conceptual planning before implementation, and a total systems approach rather than piecemeal. CINCPAC thereupon requested the JCS to provide a brief outline of DSA plans for subsistence support in wartime. The JCS advised CINCPAC that a copy of the DSA concept for subsistence management in a contingency/wartime situation had been mailed. However, the JCS also noted that the concept had not yet been staffed with the Services, did not yet incorporate Service views, and was, therefore, subject to substantive change.[2]

(U) Later in 1974, a joint U.S. Navy/DSA team visited the Naval Supply Depot (NSD) Guam to review computer systems for simultaneous implementation of WIMS and mechanization of stock management. On 23 November, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) concurred in the implementation of WIMS at NSD Guam on 1 February 1975. Both perishable and non-perishable subsistence was to be capitalized in the Defense Stock Fund - Subsistence. Manual accounting would be used until satisfactory computer programs were developed. CINCPACFLT was to establish stock level policy, and NSD Guam was to act as DSA agent for wholesale subsistence support at Guam. A Defense Subsistence Office (under DSR-P) would not be established. CINCPACFLT also agreed to implement WIMS at NSD Subic (Philippines) by June 1975 for both perishable and non-perishable items.[3]

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1. DSA 172053Z May 74, which cited DEPSECDEF Memo, 1 May 73, Subj: WW Integrated Mgmt Wholesale Subsistence Stocks.
2. CINCUSARPAC 290507Z May 74; CINCPAC 300132Z May 74; JCS 9118/031840Z Jun 74.
3. J46 HistSum, Nov 74; CINCPACFLT 230133Z Nov 74 and 232351Z Nov 74.

(U) On 6 November, the DSA reviewed tentative execution plans for other PACOM locations in a letter to, inter alia, the JCS and CINCPAC. In Japan, where the Air Force had assumed bilateral support for Army and Air Force procurement, an agreement on procedures for local procurement of subsistence was needed. Agreements were also needed for on-site subsistence management, ADP support, service resource transfers and storage facility requirements to support emergency/contingency plans. On Okinawa, plans by the Army to transfer ADP equipment to Japan needed to be reviewed to determine alternative means of support if needed. In Korea, automated digital network capabilities required examination to insure maximum use for transmitting documentation. Responsibility for the operation of milk plants in the PACOM needed to be reviewed to determine whether any change was required under WIMS, and the funding of overseas transportation, PWRS procedures and billing matters relating to accountability were being coordinated.[1]

Procurement Actions/Policy

U.S. Invited Contractors in Thailand.

(U) The status of U.S. invited contractors in Thailand became an increasingly sensitive issue to the RTG during 1974. In January, MACTHAI advised CINCPAC that the RTG was scrutinizing and approving all DOD contracts with U.S. invited contractors, and that increased RTG pressure could be anticipated toward more contract awards for local Thai firms.[2]

(U) The basic problem was the lack of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the RTG. By informal agreement, U.S. invited contractors had not been required to register and pay taxes to the RTG. In March 1974, the RTG notified MACTHAI that U.S. invited contractor personnel would no longer be permitted access to U.S. exchange, commissary or locker fund facilities. In April, the RTG informed MACTHAI that the tax exemption for U.S. invited contractors had been withdrawn by cabinet decree.[3]

(C) On 31 May, the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) was advised by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA) that Defense was concerned with the turn of events, and recommended

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1. J46 HistSum, Mar 74, Ltr, DSA to JCS, CINCPAC, et.al., 6 Nov 74, Subj: World Wide Integrated Management of Subsistence (WIMS) Implementation - Guam.
2. J45 HistSum, Jan 74.
3. J45 Point Paper, 7 May 74, Subj: U.S. Invited Contractor Status in Thailand.

that MACTHAI postpone attempts to negotiate the issue pending DOD guidance. On 1 June, CINCPAC so advised MACTHAI, and on 4 June, OASD/ISA advised the SJA that the State Department would take the lead in attempts to resolve the issue. CINCPAC urged Defense to press for expedited action, and, on 11 June, the State Department issued guidance to the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, the gist of which was to take a strong position regarding the tax exemption issue. The Ambassador was instructed to contact the highest levels of the RTG to negotiate the tax exemption issue.[1]

(C) Embassy contacts with the Thai military hierarchy were not encouraging. The acting Thai Supreme Commander advised that, since the RTG decision to rescind tax exemptions had been made by the Thai cabinet, any change favorable to the United States would have to be kept secret, which was impossible. Two of the three major facilities engineering and operations and maintenance (O&M) contracts were renewed for one year, pending further negotiations, and the RTG agreed that technical representatives would continue in an invited status. The visas of the U.S. citizen employees of these firms were extended for six months.[2]

(C) On 27 June, Ambassador Kintner proposed four optional approaches to the RTG: force the tax exemption issue back to the Thai cabinet; stall by "involuted discussion"; accept that U.S. contractors register as Thai firms and pay Thai taxes, but obtaining agreement that technical representatives and specialized contractors retain existing privileges; or, evolve to the use of Thai firms or joint ventures. He concluded that the best course was for the U.S. contractors to register and pay taxes according to Thai law. Almost one month later, he recalled the four options provided to the State department and the lack of further guidance from the State Department. He discussed the reaction of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Thai Supreme Command, to the contractor situation, citing General Kriansak's conviction that the U.S. Government would save money, "...if we went all the way to Thai contractors as desired by the RTG...." Kriangsak also warned that no good would come of referring the question back to the Thai cabinet, and stated emphatically that the status of the contractors must be resolved by 30 September. He implied that failure to do so could jeopardize the standing of the technical representatives. Based on these discussions, the Ambassador recommended that arrangements be pursued

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1. J73 WEB Memos 00176-74, 0182-74, 0189-74 of 3 Jan, 10 Jun, 17 Jun 74 resp., which cited CINCPAC 010312Z Jun 74 and 080326Z Jun 74; also, SECSTATE 122742/110036Z Jun 74.
2. J45 HistSum, Jun 74; J4 WEB, 1 Jul 74; J73 WEB Memos 00196-74 and 0206-74 of 24 Jun and 1 Jul 74 resp.; J45 Point Paper, 1 Jul 74, Subj: U.S. Contractor Status in Thailand.

for Thai (registered) firms to perform the base facilities and communications maintenance support contracts which were the bones of contention. CINCPAC agreed, with the proviso that any arrangement must not jeopardize the invited status of the tech reps.[1]

(C) The State Department replied on 26 July, advising that the issue be returned to the RTG cabinet for decision, and provided detailed examples of the political realities on the U.S. domestic scene which were at least as significant to the RTG as their own political scene. Specifically, State noted the possibility that, by GAO recommendation or Congressional initiative, the costs of Thai taxation on DOD contracts in Thailand could be deducted from the military assistance program (MAP) which, in FY 74, had been $30 million. If the RTG had levied taxes on the U.S. invited contractors for the $100 million in FY 74 contracts, the Thai MAP balance after deductions for taxes levied would have ranged from $18 million to zero. State suggested an agreement covering tax exemption, with language locking the United States into a policy of shifting contract business to Thai firms and personnel.[2]

(C) The Ambassador, on 4 August, informed State that he did not intend to discuss the matter with the Prime Minister, but would report the, "current status of the question" to the Deputy Foreign Minister. He again proposed for approval a combination of requiring U.S. contractors to register as Thai firms, paying Thai taxes, and the transfer of contracts to Thai firms.[3]

(C) In a strongly worded message on 24 August, the State Department replied to the Embassy:[4]

> ...there continues to be a certain amount of confusion over what we view as the primary issue before us with regard to U.S. military contracts in Thailand. Simply stated, it is this: We do not believe U.S. funds appropriated for the common defense should be subject to taxation by governments of countries which benefit from their expenditure. In our dealings with RTG we are not rpt not prepared to disregard this principle....

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1. J73/Memo/0206-74 of 1 Jul 74, Subj: WEB, 24-30 Jun 74 which cited AMEMB Bangkok 10553/271032Z Jun 74; also AMEMB Bangkok 11953/231224Z Jul 74; CINCPAC 260400 Jul 74; J4 WEB, 29 Jul 74.
2. SECSTATE 162559/1/261446Z Jul 74; J45 HistSum, Jul 74; J73/Memo/0245-74 of 29 Jul 74, Subj: WEB, 22-28 Jul 74.
3. J4 WEB, 5 Aug 74; J73/Memo/0256-74 of 5 Aug 74, Subj: WEB, 29 Jul-4 Aug 74.
4. SECSTATE 18660/1/241745Z Aug 74.

(C) State signified willingness to advise U.S.-invited contractors to begin the registration process immediately, but:[1]

* * * * *

> We regard registration as Thai firms as an issue distinctly separate from our policy of seeking tax exemption for U.S. contractors....
>
> We are opposed to the payment of taxes on U.S. defense expenditures whether the contracts are with Thai firms, Thai registered firms, or U.S.-invited contractors....

(C) Urging the Ambassador to seek avenues of approach other than the Thai military, the State Department view was that, "From our standpoint it will be preferable to have tried and failed than to have made no concerted effort to gain Thai acceptance of our position on tax relief....":[2]

* * * * *

> ...Finally, you should make clear that while we will certainly abide by whatever decision the RTG ultimately makes, if it is negative we will pay the taxes under protest and cannot be expected to defend the RTG's action to Congress.

(C) The Embassy reply to the foregoing State guidance was that the central issue from its viewpoint was U.S. Air Force operational readiness. Therefore, the proper Thai element with which to discuss the issue continued to be the Thai-Allied Coordinating Committee, chaired by General Kriangsak. In September, MACTHAI advised that Kriangsak's committee had approved the continuation in tax-free status of the three major service contractors through their contract terms--mid-1975 for two, and 1 September 1975 for the third.[3]

(C) The issue had not been settled, however. In November, the Ambassador reported that the Thai Supreme Command had presented an ultimatum, in writing, to COMUSMACTHAI to transfer all service contracts to Thai companies by 31 December 1974. MACTHAI was also advised by the RTG that the visas of the U.S. citizens employed by current invited contractors would not be extended beyond that date. The Ambassador requested, "urgent authority" for DOD procurement

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.; J73/Memo/0284-74 of 26 Aug 74, Subj: WEB, 19-25 Aug 74.
3. J45 HistSum, Aug 74; CINCPAC ALPHA 012/170321Z Sep 74.

agencies to initiate procurement action "to obtain the services performed by the current services contractors from Thai-registered firms." He did not mention whether the Embassy had taken the steps directed by the State Department in late August.[1]

(C) This omission was apparently noted by State, which told the Ambassador:[2]

* * * * *

> ...you should at the earliest opportunity formally approach the RTG at the ministerial level (Prime Minister Foreign Minister) and present our case as strongly as possible.... Given the time constraint involved, you should report the results of the above mentioned ministerial-level approach no later than December 2, 1974....

(C) On 3 December, the U.S. Embassy Charge' de Affairs outlined the dimensions of the problem to Acting Foreign Minister Chatchai. The Charge' informed Chatchai that the U.S. Government was willing to deal with registered firms on major service contracts, but the no-tax position of the United States had not changed. Chatchai agreed to discuss the matter with the Supreme Command and the Ministry of Finance.[3]

(C) During the dialogue between the U.S. Mission and the RTG, the need to maintain operational readiness regardless of the political decision was also addressed by the U.S. Air Force. On 9 December, Thirteenth Air Force (13AF) advised COMUSMACTHAI that contingency plans had been prepared to operate the Thailand bases in the event that the U.S. supervisors of contractor personnel could not remain in country. The 13AF plan provided for Air Force O&M chiefs to replace the site superintendents; 35 Air Force contract monitors; 136 Air Force military augmentees to replace the contractors' U.S. supervisors; and, direct hire by the Air Force of the contractors' local national employees. The contractors themselves notified the PACAF Procurement Center in Thailand of plans to give notice to their U.S. citizen and Thai citizen employees of employment termination in view of the end-of-year deadline imposed by the RTG. Short of an immediate decision by State/Defense on the tax issue, MACTHAI informed CINCPAC, there was no legal option available other than termination

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1. CINCPAC 160416Z Nov 74; J73/Memo/00382-74 of 18 Nov 74, Subj: WEB, 11-17 Nov 74, which cited AMEMB Bangkok 17861/121135Z Nov 74.
2. J45 HistSum, Nov 74; SECSTATE 258522/222223Z Nov 74; J73/Memo/0390-74 of 25 Nov 74, Subj: WEB, 18-24 Nov 74.
3. J4 WEB, 10 Dec 74; J73/Memo/0407-74 of 9 Dec 74, Subj: WEB, 2-8 Dec 74, which cited AMEMB Bangkok 19047/041141Z Dec 74.

of the contracts effective 1 January 1975. MACTHAI noted that if the contracts were terminated, the U.S. Air Force personnel were needed to replace the contractor employees by 16 December to assure an orderly transition.[1]

(U) On 19 December, COMUSMACTHAI advised CINCPAC of verbal notification by the Thai Supreme Command of the decision concerning U.S.-invited contractors and technical representatives. Visas for contractor employees would be extended until the contract expiration dates, and could be extended an additional 90 days on individual request. The technical representative contracts and visas of U.S. employees would be approved. MACTHAI added that it was clear the RTG expected Thai-registered firms to receive follow-up contracts. Five days later, on 24 December, the other shoe fell. Effective on 1 January 1975, all new contracts and any modifications to existing contracts would delete all reference to duty free privileges for U.S.-invited contractors in Thailand. This included duty free importation of automobiles and household goods, and purchases through Army/Air Force Exchange systems and military commissaries. The U.S.-invited contractors then in Thailand would continue to receive privileges until contract expiration. The U.S. Mission had agreed to withdrawal of these privileges for future contractors in order to preserve them for U.S. military personnel.[2]

Thai-Am Aircraft Maintenance Contracts

(U) In July 1974, COMUSMACTHAI proposed a single contract for all MAP work being done by the Thai-American Aircraft Company. MACTHAI would control contractor operations, including work acceleration, location and contractor capabilities. The contract would be a basic ordering agreement with users submitting individual orders for MACTHAI action. In September, CINCPAC concurred in principle for centralized management of the Thai-Am aircraft maintenance contracts, with MACTHAI assuming the contract responsibilities assigned to the Deputy Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (DEPCHJUSMAG) Thailand at Udorn. Under the proposal, MACTHAI would become a centralized agent for collecting Thai-Am maintenance requirements, but the contracts would be negotiated and administered by the Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC), which would delegate AFLC responsibility to Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) for the Udorn facility. Part of the concept was the transfer from the Thai-Am Don Muang facility to Udorn of four high priority programs amounting to 16,600 manhours per month. This transfer would enable better use of the Udorn facility, but

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1. 13AF 030045Z Dec 74; COMUSMACTHAI 120051Z Dec 74; J73/Memo/00415-74 of 16 Dec 74, Subj: WEB, 9-15 Dec 74.
2. CINCPAC ALPHA 060/200327Z Dec 74; J45 HistSum Dec 74; COMUSMACTHAI 140620Z Dec 74, 190912Z Dec 74, 240620Z Dec 74; J73/Memos/423-74 and 429-74 of 23 Dec 74 and 30 Dec 74 resp., Subj: WEBs, 16-22 Dec and 23-29 Dec.

would require additional funds of about $1.5 million because of the higher overhead rate at Udorn.[1]

(U) On 20 December, CINCPAC directed COMUSMACTHAI to assume management responsibility of the Udorn facility by 1 January 1975. Meanwhile, on 24 October, the Defense Security Assistance Agency authorized the use of Laos and Cambodia MAP funds to support total basic O&M costs of the Udorn facility regardless of which country program was the source of the workload. The authorization was for the balance of FY 75, and only for those two countries. Any incremental O&M cost increase generated by other country program workloads was to be pro-rated among the users.[2]

Vietnam Procurement/Contracts

(U) Concurrently with the reduction and withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Vietnam, a concerted effort was begun to promote Republic of Vietnam (RVN) economic development by local purchase of military supplies (In-Country Procurement-ICP). The Defense Department initially had authorized DOD procurement offices to purchase items locally so long as the price was not more than 25 percent over U.S. prices, including transportation from the United States. The reduced funds for Vietnam for FY 75, however, had forced a change in that policy. Local purchase was authorized only if items were equal to or cheaper than basic U.S. prices plus 15 percent transportation charge. Items purchased locally included rations, such as dehydrated rice and canned food, pharmaceuticals, construction materials, wire, chemicals, textiles and utilities. During FY 71 through FY 74, obligations amounted to $8.9, $18.3, $44.4 and $35 million respectively. For FY 75, projected local procurement was $18.8 million.[3]

(U) Funding reductions to support the RVNAF resulted in reductions in numbers and dollar values of in-country contracts and in contractor personnel strengths. On "X"-Day, 27 January 1973, the number of DOD contracts in force was 383, in October 1974, only 113 (72 construction-41 ICP). The value in January 1973 was $255 million; in October 1974, only $67 million (of which $35.8 million was FY 75 funds). Total contractor personnel had dropped from 16,307 in January 1973 to 4,940 in October 1974.[4]

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1. J45 Point Paper, 19 Jul 74, Subj: MACTHAI Proposed Concept for Centralized Control of Thai Am Contract; J4 WEB, 16 Sep 74; J45 HistSum, Sep 74.
2. J45 HistSums, Oct, Dec 74; J4 WEB, 29 Oct 74; CINCPAC 200246Z Dec 74.
3. J45 Point Paper, 26 Nov 74, Subj: RVN Economic Development Program (In-Country Procurement-ICP); for discussion of reduced MAP Funds, See Chapter VII.
4. J45 Point Paper, 25 Nov 74, Subj: Contracts Supporting RVNAF.

DOD Procurement Information Office, Australia

(U) In 1967, the DOD Procurement Information Office, Australia was established under USARPAC to provide a greater opportunity for Australian vendors to participate in U.S. defense procurement. This office developed data on capabilities of Australian industry and instructed Australian firms interested in bidding on the procedures for placing offers on U.S. purchases. In March 1973, CINCPAC had recommended to the Defense Department that the office be consolidated with the Defense Attache Office (DAO) Foreign Military Sales Section in Canberra. On 5 February 1974, the DOD authorized the transfer of function and CINCPAC so directed the DAO. In May, the Procurement Information Office advised CINCPAC that actions to consolidate were on schedule, and that the consolidation would be effective on 30 June 1974.[1]

Deactivation of Army Taiwan Purchasing Office

(U) In early 1974, arrangements were completed to deactivate the U.S. Army Taiwan Branch Procurement Office effective 30 June 1974. PACAF agreed to accept the transfer of utility service and communications contracts for Taiwan; by CINCPACFLT agreement, the Headquarters Support Activity, Taipei was to assume the purchasing functions for fresh fruit and vegetables, packing and crating, and other general commodity items. Funds and spaces for FY 75 costs were to be transferred from USARPAC.[2]

USSAG Coordinating Role - Cambodia

(C) The complexity of supporting Cambodia out of Thailand (SCOOT) pointed to the need for a single on-the-scene planning-coordinating agency. On 30 January 1974, CINCPAC delegated the following responsibilities to the Commander, U.S. Support Activities Group (COMUSSAG), located at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base on the banks of the Mekong in Northeastern Thailand:[3]

- Coordinate efforts of all activities involved in SCOOT.
- Coordinate daily air/surface transportation to minimize airlift.

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1. J45 HistSum, Feb 74; OICUSDODPIO Australia 210130Z May 74; J4 WEB, 4 Feb 74.
2. J45 HistSum, Mar 74.
3. J41 HistSum, Jan 74; CINCPAC 302330Z Jan 74; J41 Point Papers, 7 Feb 74 and 25 Mar 74, Subj: Coordination Role of USSAG.

- Approve CHMEDTC calls forward for airlanded ammunition.
- Plan emergency delivery of critical items.
- Provide SCOOT management information.
- Monitor ammunition stock levels in Thailand. Report impending shortages.
- Plan/coordinate physical security of material, both stored and in transit.
- Monitor/control airlift operations into Cambodia.

SECTION II

PETROLEUM, OIL, LUBRICANTS (POL)

Impact of Arab Oil Embargo

(U) The phrase used by a previous CINCPAC historian to describe the 1967 Mid-East war and Arab oil embargo -- "No one knew how long the Arabs would sit on their oil" -- also described the situation at the beginning of 1974. The oil embargo invoked by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on 21 October 1973 was still in effect, and Secretary of State Kissinger was mediating the disengagement of Egyptian and Israeli forces along the Suez Canal. The disengagement agreement was reached on 18 January 1974, and two months later, on 18 March, OPEC announced the lifting of the oil embargo. However, the POL conservation programs initiated by CINCPAC in the closing months of 1973 continued into 1974, and the impact of the embargo and OPEC price-setting policies was felt throughout the world.[1]

(C) In Chapter X of this history, it is related that the Republic of the Philippines had initiated overtures to the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) which resulted in a trade agreement involving PRC oil. The Arab oil embargo had squeezed the Philippines from two directions. The first involved its need for oil and its role as an ally of the United States. The second pertained to the Muslim rebellion in the South and the need to placate those Arab nations in OPEC which had shown interest in the outcome of the rebellion. On 14 October 1974, the Philippines took a giant step away from such dilemmas in the future when the first delivery of crude oil from the PRC was made at Bataan. President Marcos and his wife took active roles in the celebration of the delivery, which Marcos stated meant, "lessening of threats from many sectors." Both agreed that the arrival of 125,000 barrels of Shengli crude was a "historic moment" which marked the adoption by the Philippines of an independent foreign policy.[2]


(C) The reaction in Indonesia to the Arab oil embargo and OPEC had been independent. Indonesia had not supported the embargo, nor had its oil prices been set in consonance with those of OPEC. Nevertheless, by mid-1974, the nationalized oil producing and exporting company, Pertamina, had announced oil increases which brought Indonesian low-sulphur oil prices to the level estab-

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1. CINCPAC Command Histories, 1967, Vol. I, pp. 157-160 and 1973, Vol. I, pp. 315-332; for chronology of events, see Chapter X, this history.
2. AMEMB Manila 12295/150909Z Oct 74.

PACOM POL CONSUMPTION

(IN MILLIONS OF BARRELS)



lished by OPEC. A Pertamina official informed a U.S. Embassy official that OPEC was a true cartel which would act to control future prices and levels of production. Indonesia's prices, on the other hand, would be set according to the international oil market. On that score, the Indonesians could not understand why Japan had agreed to pay the PRC $14.00 per barrel when Indonesian oil was selling (before 1 July 1974) at $11.70. Historically, Japan had been Indonesia's principal export market. In 1973, about 70 percent of Indonesia's exports (723,211 barrels per day) had gone to Japan (about 15 percent of Japanese crude oil imports), while about 20 percent (207,796 barrels per day) had been shipped to the United States (about five percent of U.S. imports).[1]

(C) The Arab oil embargo caused worldwide repercussions, but perhaps none so enlightening as its effect on Japan. As early as late November and December 1973, Japanese officials began to press the United States for cessation of fuel procurement in Japan. They cited increasing pressure on the Government from the Japan Communist Party, which accused the Government of permitting the U.S. military to draw heavily on the dwindling supply in the Japanese private sector.[2]

(C) Effective 30 January 1974, announcement was made that the U.S. had halted oil deliveries from Japanese sources to U.S. terminals. When the embargo was lifted on 18 March, the Government of Japan was approached to allow resumption of U.S. Forces fuel purchases. The response was negative. Finally, during a joint POL committee meeting of Japanese and U.S. military officials on 9 May, the Government of Japan authorized resumption of local procurement of POL.[3]

(U) Prior to the embargo, the U.S. military procured a substantial amount of fuel from Japanese sources, primarily Okinawa. At peak periods, some 425,000 barrels of sundry POL, mostly JP-4, were used. This represented about 18 percent of the PACOM JP-4 usage and over half of the JP-4 consumed by U.S. Forces in Japan. About nine percent of theater JP-5 usage was also procured from Japanese sources. The DFSC made other contractual arrangements to replace the Japanese POL sources, and, when these sources again were available, only a refinery on Okinawa was reinstated, at about half of the former rate of supply. When Japan succumbed to Arab and internal domestic pressure to stop U.S. procurement, the above-stated U.S. usage represented less than one-half of one percent of total Japanese national consumption -- some 180 million barrels per month.[4]

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1. AMEMB Jakarta 8197/030917Z Jul 74.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 16289/180810Z Dec 73 and 0285/091100Z Jan 74.
3. AMEMB Tokyo 0778/181120Z Jan 74; J4 WEB, 18 Mar 74; J4 WEB, 14 May 74.
4. J44 Point Paper, 30 Apr 74 and 21 Aug 74, Subj: POL Procurement Ex-Japan Sources for U.S. Forces.

Military Gasplan

(U) On 22 January 1974, a Honolulu newspaper article was headed, "Driver Attacked in Gas Lineup." Two motorists who had waited in a service station line for about an hour got into a fight when they reached the pumps. One driver had objected when an old man attempted to cut into the line. The other attacked the first with a tire iron. Although this civilian reaction was not typical, the nation-wide shortage of gasoline in early 1974 was critical in the State of Hawaii because of its isolation from normal supply sources and its limited public transportation. There were also long lines at service stations on military bases. Although the Defense Production Act (DPA) had assured sufficient POL allocations to maintain military operations, there was no legal provision to allocate DPA automotive gasoline (MOGAS) to military post exchange (PX) gasoline stations for sale to authorized patrons. Military retail gasoline sales outlets were dependent upon a share of the State allocation based upon a percentage of previous consumption.[1]

(U) In an attempt to achieve a uniform policy for the operation of PX service stations on the Island of Oahu, CINCPAC convened a meeting of component service representatives in January. As a result, Admiral Gayler announced that, beginning concurrently with the State of Hawaii Gasplan, a military Gasplan would be effective on 28 January 1974. The two plans were similar, but not identical. The Hawaii Gasplan required a one-quarter tank level before fill-up; the military Gasplan required a one-half tank level, but authorized only 10 gallons per purchase in compliance with Federal Energy Office regulations. Both plans adopted the license plate number odd-even day concept.[2]

(U) Subsequent to the civilian and military Gasplan implementations, the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) was queried as to the legality of discrimination against military personnel by civilian service stations. The SJA stated that, under FEO regulations, such discrimination was illegal. At the same time, the SJA commented on the legality of servicing only uniformed military personnel during certain hours in PX service stations. This practice had been the subject of a complaint by a retired military member, but was considered by the SJA to be a reasonable action designed to insure that active duty personnel were available for duty during normal working hours.[3]

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 22 Jan 74, p. 1, "Driver Attacked in Gas Lineup"; J73/Memo/26-74 of 22 Jan 74, Subj: Defense Production Act of 1950.
2. Camp Smith Bulletin, The Splinter, Special Edition, 24 Jan 74; CINCPAC ALPHA 123/290338Z Jan 74; J73/Memo/68-74 of 22 Feb 74, Subj: IG Complaint, Major Clayton C. Breitenstein (R).
3. Ibid.; J73/Memo/69-74 of 25 Feb 74, Subj: WEB, 19-24 Feb 74.

1974 POL CONSUMPTION

(in thousands of barrels)

BY PRODUCT

	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Total
AVGAS	54.2	45.0	42.4	37.3	43.1	45.9	44.3	52.6	56.7	51.0	34.7	44.6	551.8
JP-4	1,260.1	1,156.2	1,238.9	1,915.6	2,131.0	1,706.5	1,512.5	1,870.5	1,422.8	1,944.4	1,398.3	1,594.1	19,150.9
JP-5	325.2	383.4	291.1	317.7	420.4	336.6	416.6	482.6	413.9	371.7	288.4	171.3	4,218.9
MOGAS	113.9	111.5	244.5	109.8	112.2	110.2	188.7	94.1	97.1	104.3	108.7	239.6	1,634.6
DIESEL	531.5	458.9	664.5	332.4	262.0	278.7	232.2	270.1	257.2	255.1	342.0	402.1	4,286.7
NSFO	541.4	466.8	482.7	426.0	527.6	341.0	614.6	267.5	268.9	251.1	391.3	358.4	4,937.3
NDF	570.0	502.7	1,122.5	365.4	781.3	572.0	763.9	588.0	629.1	592.5	578.0	645.4	7,710.8
Total	3,396.3	3,124.5	4,086.6	3,504.2	4,277.6	3,390.9	3,772.8	3,625.4	3,145.7	3,570.1	3,141.4	3,455.5	42,491.0

BY AREA

Guam	224.7	253.6	243.9	681.7	822.7	683.1	576.0	589.1	517.8	880.6	268.8	399.4	6,141.4
Hawaii	515.9	518.4	532.9	719.1	816.4	549.2	895.3	891.9	642.4	722.2	462.2	671.3	7,937.2
Japan	1,212.9	680.6	1,066.9	767.4	756.7	621.3	765.4	666.2	643.9	646.7	647.5	816.9	9,292.4
Korea	233.6	191.7	199.8	156.4	100.5	104.8	87.9	94.9	114.3	153.1	266.3	267.7	1,971.0
Philippines	687.1	978.1	1,464.5	502.6	1,086.6	714.9	928.6	862.4	732.3	678.9	1,030.0	859.5	10,525.5
Taiwan	53.3	45.4	59.3	70.2	65.8	44.5	44.1	51.2	42.5	30.8	24.2	20.4	551.7
Thailand	468.8	456.7	519.3	606.8	628.9	673.1	475.5	469.7	452.5	457.8	442.4	420.3	6,071.8
Total	3,396.3	3,124.5	4,086.6	3,504.2	4,277.6	3,390.9	3,772.8	3,625.4	3,145.7	3,570.1	3,141.4	3,455.5	42,491.0

(U) As the shortage of MOGAS in Hawaii became more acute, the State of Hawaii was approached in an effort to alleviate the situation for military sales outlets. The acting Governor initially suggested that Admiral Gayler authorize or request the release of military MOGAS stocks for resale by the exchanges. It was explained that such action was neither feasible nor legal. When, in March, the State received an additional allocation of gasoline, it was distributed only to civilian service stations. The State rationale was that U.S. military personnel could purchase from civilian stations, but civilians could not purchase from military stations. The CINCPAC SJA conclusion was that this was legal unless, under FEO regulations, the military could prove hardship or an emergency situation.[1]

(U) In April, the acting Governor authorized the release of 220,000 gallons of gasoline to the PX system from Standard Oil, and Shell raised the percentage allocation so that the military outlets received an increase of 110,000 gallons. The overall PX service station situation had vastly improved. On 3 May 1974, following the State of Hawaii's "temporary" suspension of Gasplan, all restrictions on the retail sale of gasoline at PX stations were lifted except for Sundays and holidays. Thus ended the gasoline crisis of 1974 in Hawaii.[2]

Allocation of MOGAS in PACOM

(C) On 15 December 1973, CINCPAC directed the establishment of a formal system of MOGAS allocation throughout the PACOM. The allocation was based on a rate of 80 percent of the March-June 1973 usage, and consumption was measured by the net drawdown on terminal tankage, which allowed close control without undue extra workload. On 17 April 1974, CINCPAC rescinded all MOGAS allocations and consumption restrictions in the PACOM. Compared to the March-June 1973 base, MOGAS consumption in January-March 1974 dropped by 33 percent, or 12 percent more than the conservation target.[3]

Lead-Free Gasoline


(U) In July 1974, COMUSJAPAN asked whether lead-free gasoline would be made available through military sources for retail sales to PX customers with 1975 automobiles. The Defense Fuels Supply Center (DFSC) replied that no plans

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1. CINCPAC ALPHA 074/020210Z Mar 74; J73/Memo/81-74 of 6 Mar 74, Subj: Hawaii Allocation of State Set-Aside Motor Gasoline; J73/Memo/084-74 of 11 Mar 74, Subj: WEB, 4-10 Mar 74.
2. CINCPAC ALPHA 29/140357Z Mar 74; CINCPAC ALPHA 5./150450Z Mar 74; COMFOURTEEN 031831Z May 74 and 040248Z May 74.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 330, 331; J44 HistSum, Apr 74; CINCPAC 172129Z Apr 74; J4 WEB, 22 Apr 74.

BULK POL DATA, PACOM

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1974



CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

existed to include a lead-free product on the bulk POL distribution system. Further, lead-free gasoline would not be available in any bulk military system in the near future. There was, however, a joint working group chaired by the DA to review the problem of automobiles equipped with catalytic converters.[1]

PACOM POL Management

(S) CINCPAC and the component commands imposed stringent controls over POL consumption throughout the Command after the Arab oil embargo began. The embargo denied to the PACOM about 90 percent of its POL supply, of which 80 percent was procured from refineries and storage areas within the theater. Operations were reduced and operational procedures were modified to use POL more efficiently while flying, steaming or driving. The Command drew on its PWRS initially, but, after the DPA and the Federal Mandatory Allocation Program were invoked, POL inventories stabilized. By March 1974, the CINCPAC POL planners were aware of an operational constraint imposed by the allocation programs of the Federal agencies. Both the Defense Energy Office and the Federal Energy Office operated without a direct CINCPAC input for allocations. The PACOM relied on the Services headquarters to submit data sufficient to support CINCPAC operations. The approved allocations were not widely published, nor was the PACOM share clearly identified. The Command, therefore, was forced to weigh operating tempo against probable POL resupply rates without reliable information upon which to base a decision.[2]

Bulk Petroleum - PWRR/PWRS

(S) On 24 December 1973, a review and evaluation, in collaboration with CINCPAC's Service components, was conducted regarding in-theater Service-prescribed prepositioned war reserve requirements (PWRR) for bulk POL. As a result, it was recommended to the JCS that PWRR in the PACOM provide 30 days of supply for the Air Force and 45 days for the Navy at rates required to support LINEBACKER operations. A 30-day POL PWRR was specified for Army support of CINCPAC Operations Plan 5027 (Korea).[3]

(S) A CINCPAC assessment of the impact of fuel shortages and/or shortage of funds because of POL price increases on operational readiness was passed to the JCS on 17 February 1974. The net assessment was that operational readiness had been maintained, but only at the expense of normal training, exercises, flying times and ship underway times. PWRS were protected, but some exercises

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1. J4 WEB, 22 Jul 74.
2. J44 Point Paper, 6 Mar 74, Subj: Effect of POL Problems on PACOM Operations.
3. J4 WEB, 7 Jan 74.

were cancelled while others were reduced in scope. Training for combat air crews was reduced to 60 percent of normal (12 flight hours per combat crew per month versus 20 required). Ships at sea were slowed to the most efficient/economical speeds commensurate with operations, and logistical airlift was authorized only for select categories of material. By February, also, the JCS guidance to CINCPAC which allowed the application of average commercial inventories in the Pacific Basin to PWRR was cancelled.[1]

PWRR and JP-4

(S) By June 1974, the PACOM JP-4 jet fuel inventory position had improved to the extent that PACAF petitioned to remove its flying hour limitations. CINCPAC concurred that PACAF should resume its approved flying program. Meanwhile, however, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (CSAF) had submitted planning data for the DFSC Inventory Management Program reflecting a 65 percent increase in JP-4 PWRR for FY 75 over FY 74. The increase was based on potential consumption for offensive air operations against the PRC from bases in Thailand and elsewhere. This resulted in an uncovered PWRR for JP-4 equal to 8.4 million barrels. Informal dialogue between CINCPAC and CSAF indicated Air Force intention to test the philosophy behind the determination of the PWRR planning base (note previous selection of LINEBACKER for planning base). CINCPAC noted that product availability was no problem (in September 1974), but that the price had risen 213 percent from the mid-1973 level (May 73-11 cents per gallon; August 74-35 cents per gallon). Storage capacity was the major limiting factor -- less than 50 percent of the requirement of 17.8 million barrels. Storage capability was 7.9 million barrels, and the deficit of 9.9 million barrels equated to 56 percent uncovered. The CINCPAC Logistics Staff considered the Air Force requirement inflated and questioned the wisdom of PWRR linkage to such "unlikely events." Moreover, there was little hope of approval for such massive tank construction, and no PACOM tank construction plans were underway. In November, the Air Force decreased its PACOM JP-4 PWRR by 1.6 million barrels, but a storage deficit existed for 7.4 million barrels at the end of 1974.[2]

(U) Late in 1974, the DFSC initiated a worldwide survey for additional military and/or commercial POL storage for DFSC contract use. Some potential storage was found in Guam, Thailand, the Philippines and Korea -- approximately

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1. J44 HistSum, Feb 74; CINCPAC 170337Z Feb 74; J44 Point Paper, 22 Feb 74, Subj: Energy Crisis in the Pacific.
2. J4 WEBs, 20 May 74, 10 Jun 74, 18 Nov 74; J44 HistSum, Sep 74; J44 Point Paper, 19 Sep 74, Subj: PACOM JP-4 War Reserve Deficiency.

one million barrels. CINCPAC advised the DFSC of the survey results, noting that cleaning and modifications would be required in almost all locations.[1]

Bulk POL Prices

(U) The increase in the JP-4 price previously noted was not an isolated item. Based on the following figures, the most serious constraint on military operations was anticipated to be Service budgets rather than fuel availability (in cents per gallon):[2]

Product	1 May 73	1 Jul 73	1 Feb 74	1 Jul 74	1 Nov 74
MOGAS I	13.00	17.50	24.50	33.50	38.10
AVGAS	20.00	26.40	26.40	36.70	43.70
JP-4	11.30	14.90	27.70	35.40	37.70
JP-5	12.30	16.20	26.70	34.00	35.50
DFM	12.00	16.30	20.00	34.70	33.90
NSFO	07.21	09.16	24.17	35.58	31.35
NDF	10.00	13.20	28.67	36.91	33.90
Kerosene	-	-	-	20.20	33.90

Navy Multi-Purpose Surface Fuel Program

(U) On 2 August 1974, the Navy Petroleum Office advised CINCPACFLT of CNO approval to change from Navy Distillate Fuel (NDF) to Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM) as the single surface propulsion fuel. Delivery of DFM to bulk terminals in the PACOM was scheduled to begin during the FY 75 contract period. The transition was expected to be completed by 1 July 1976.[3]

POL in Southeast Asia

(U) On 10 January 1974, the Secretary of Defense directed CINCPAC and all component and subordinate unified commands in the PACOM to comply with the recently enacted Defense Appropriations Act and Foreign Assistance Appropriations (FAA) Act for FY 1974. Section 746 of the Defense Appropriations Act and Section 604 of the FAA contained identical limitations on the supply of POL to Southeast Asia: "None of the funds contained in this Act shall be used to furnish petroleum fuels produced in the Continental United States to Southeast Asia for use by non-United States nationals." All shipments from military

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1. J4 WEB, 23 Dec 74.
2. J4 WEBs, 15 Apr 74 and 4 Nov 74.
3. J44 HistSums Aug and Nov 74; CINCPACFLT 060057Z Aug 74 and 231902Z Aug 74; DFSC 222124Z Nov 74.

stocks to Southeast Asia for use by non-U.S. nationals which must be replenished from fuels produced in the CONUS, including Alaska, were to be terminated immediately. The DOD order defined Southeast Asia, for this purpose, to include South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. Sales of POL to Thailand under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program were to continue only if stocks were replenished by non-CONUS (including Alaska) produced POL.[1]

(C) Late in 1973, the USDAO in Saigon assisted in negotiations for continued POL logistics support for the RVNAF and FANK which not only circumvented the Arab oil embargo, but complied with the Congressional restrictions cited in the DOD directive. The RVNAF and FANK had previously been supplied via DFSC contracts. The Arab oil embargo applied to all U.S. military contracts in the PACOM; hence, South Vietnam and Cambodia were indirectly embargoed even though they were not embargoed countries. The Governments of Vietnam and Cambodia designated (in writing) the Chief, POL Section, USDAO Saigon to represent their respective governments in POL contracting matters with international oil companies. Contracts were implemented effective 1 January 1974 on a calendar year basis. The contractors were South East Asia Services (SEAS-Shell affiliated) and Esso Eastern Products and Trading Company. SEAS contracted for 80 percent of RVNAF/FANK requirements, and ESSO 20 percent. Packaged POL was also included. The contracts differed from prior DFSC contracts in that a monthly prepayment was required, with an RVN check deposited in U.S. dollars in the Irving Trust National Bank or the Chase Manhattan Bank in New York. Also, the arrangements were considered to involve less red tape, were more responsive, and, were cheaper. After minor disruption in December 1973, Arab oil continued to flow to RVNAF and FANK forces; however, the price increased approximately 200 percent from January through June 1974.[2]

(U) This arrangement was satisfactory for most POL products; however, as the year progressed, it became apparent that sources for 115/145 aviation gasoline (AVGAS) were scarce. In a paper prepared for Admiral Gayler's appearance before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 19 June 1974, it was noted that AVGAS was a unique military specification not normally used in commercial aviation. Its scarcity dictated close monitoring of Thai, Cambodian and RVN usage because of the large proportion of old, former U.S. military, piston engine aircraft in these country air forces. The worldwide usage of AVGAS by the United States and its allies represented an insignificant fraction of the four percent of national consumption used by the U.S. military. It was, however, an important commodity to the Southeast Asian countries.[3]

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1. J44 HistSum, Jan 74; SECDEF 3811/101339Z Jan 74.
2. J44 Point Paper, 26 Mar 74, Subj: POL Logistics Support for RVNAF and FANK; J4 WEB, 23 Sep 74.
3. J44 Point Paper, 11 Jun 74, Subj: Congressional Restriction on Petroleum Supply for SEA.

(S) A similar arrangement to that for Vietnam and Cambodia assured the continued supply of POL to the Armed Forces of Laos (FAR) under the security assistance program. The method selected and approved by the State and Defense Departments was to arrange for the purchase of POL products through a Royal Lao Government (RLG) contract with a regional supplier. Thereby, direct involvement with POL supplies would be through the RLG, not U.S. Government agencies. POL requirements were submitted monthly to the RLG representative for petroleum affairs, who, in turn, forwarded them to Shell du Laos along with a U.S. Embassy check in the name of the RLG for deposit to a Shell account in New York.[1]

SAPOV Designation

(U) The use of the Sub-area Petroleum Office, Vietnam (SAPOV) designation terminated with the disestablishment of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) headquarters in March 1973. The complete absence of combatant U.S. military forces in RVN, the Vietnamization of all military POL facilities, military staffing limitations, and the expected short life of the DAO all militated against retaining a SAPOV within the DAO. Events since the disestablishment of MACV regarding the DAO POL mission (and especially after the oil embargo) caused CINCPAC to reconsider the decision to eliminate the SAPOV. The RVN contract arrangements negotiated and managed by the DAO POL staff, and the constant burden of the Cambodian military POL requirement in support of the national objectives of the United States, illustrated the point. Accordingly, effective 1 June 1974, the incumbent chief of the POL section and the POL section itself were redesignated sub-area petroleum officer and sub-area petroleum office respectively by CINCPAC. The designation was essentially administrative in nature, and no change in DAO POL policies or operations was intended nor anticipated. The SAPOV geographical area of responsibility included Vietnam and Cambodia only, and no new reporting requirements or personnel changes were imposed. The purpose of the designation was to acknowledge officially the importance of the POL mission in South Vietnam and Cambodia, and to establish the DAO POL staff as part of the PACOM Joint Petroleum Office/ Sub-area Petroleum Office system.[2]

Impact of Rising Costs on RVNAF

(U) The military FY 1974 POL program for the RVNAF amounted to $47 million. The price increase through December 1973 raised that amount to $56 million, and the final program, with price increases in January and March 1974, was $116

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1. AFSSO Udorn/DAO Vientiane 200630Z Sep 74 (EX).
2. J44 HistSum, May 74; CINCPAC 282056Z May 74; J4 WEB, 3 Jun 74.

million, or an increase of 147 percent. The FY 1975 POL program was originally submitted at $154 million, but was reduced to $137.8 million under the $1.6 billion Defense Assistance to Vietnam (DAV) authorization. When the DAV appropriation was reduced to $700 million, the POL program was cut to $86 million, of which about $60 million was authorized for funding by the DOD. Under this DAV fund reduction, POL was restricted to a ratio of 55 percent of the combat wheeled vehicle density at peacetime consumption rates. Fifty percent of the administrative vehicles were deadlined and no lubricants were allocated for deadlined equipment. More than 220 Vietnam Air Force aircraft were grounded.[1]

(U) The impact on RVNAF combat readiness of the reduced FY 1975 POL program was potentially severe. Consumption rates were drastically reduced; use of aviation fuels (AVGAS, JP-4) was off as much as 50 percent at the end of the first quarter FY 1975. At that point, and based on projected supply rates, a 90-day period of consumption at the Intensive Combat Rate (ICR) would have resulted in negative days of supply (DOS). At the RVNAF-established minimum of 60 DOS for a Theater Sustained Rate (TSR) however, adequate supplies were on hand by the end of calendar year 1974:[2]

Product	DOS (TSR)
MOGAS	63
DFM	59
JP-4	57
AVGAS	128*

* The excessive DOS for AVGAS came from prepositioned stocks at up-country locations prior to cutbacks in the VNAF flying hour program.

POL Status-Cambodia

(C) Under Project PILLAR POST, stockage levels for military POL were increased and maintained at 60 DOS in Cambodia. Military storage capacity was adequate when commercial terminals and floating barges were added to tanks at Pochentong, Ream, Battambang and Kompong Som. As of 2 January 1975, the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh reported the DOS of military POL as 61, MOGAS; 78, auto diesel; 60, AVGAS; and 28 for JP-4. The consumption of JP-4 was 252 barrels per day by the end of 1974; however, a convoy carrying 23.8 DOS was expected to restore the JP-4 level to about 40 DOS in early January.[3]

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1. J44 Point Paper, 27 Dec 74, Subj: Rising Costs-Oil Price Increases.
2. Ibid.; Final Report, USDAO Army Division, Vol. IV, POL, 18 Jun 75.
3. J44 Point Paper, 18 Jul 74, Subj: POL Status-Cambodia; J4 WEB, 6 Jan 75.

Alleged Theft/Diversion of Aviation Fuels-Cambodia

(S) On 30 April 1974, Defense Department auditors reported that, during the five month period ending 28 February 1974, the Cambodian Air Force (KAF) had used about 933,000 more gallons of aviation fuels than should have been consumed according to U.S. flying hour standards. The value of the missing fuel was set at $310,849. A large portion of the excess consumption could not be explained, and there was considerable evidence that aviation fuels delivered to the KAF were being diverted to unauthorized users. On 21 May 1974, a payment of $310,000 was made by the Cambodian Government to the U.S. Embassy as compensation for the mis-used fuel.[1]

(C) Meanwhile, however, the Chief MEDTC advised CINCPAC informally in March that misappropriation of aviation fuel was continuing. In fact, according to the deputy Chief, "If Khmer Air Force had used the suspected amount missing, they would have flown twice the number of hours reported." On 2 July, the Chief, MEDTC estimated that $159,187 worth of AVGAS and JP-4 had been stolen or diverted in April and about $100,000 worth in May. The figures were computed from issue levels versus the KAF flying hour reports for April and May. The monetary figures represented product cost only, without transportation or handling charges, and represented 34.4 percent in April and 21.5 percent in May of all aviation fuel costs.[2]

(C) After strong warnings to the Khmer Government that such losses could not be tolerated, the Chief of Staff, KAF submitted a letter to Shell Oil requesting that firm to provide into-plane refueling service in order to reduce the loss of aviation fuel. The U.S. Embassy and MEDTC agreed that into-plane refueling could reduce opportunities for theft or diversion, and requested CINCPAC support for an off-shore procurement contract. CINCPAC requested Defense Department approval, which was granted in July. Into-plane refueling service was initiated by Shell of Cambodia on 26 August, and the KAF Pochentong Airport POL storage depot was inactivated on 15 September 1974.[3]

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1. J44 Point Paper, 18 Jul 74, Subj: POL Status-Cambodia; J4 WEB, 17 Jun 74.
2. CINCPAC ALPHA 007/130339Z Mar 74; J44 Point Paper, 18 Jul 74, Subj: POL Status-Cambodia, with attached Fact Sheet, 17 Jul 74, Subj: Statistical Analysis AVFUELS Diversion Problem in Cambodia; J44 HistSum Jul 74; CHMEDTC 020505Z Jul 74.
3. J44 HistSum, Jul 74; CHMEDTC 020505Z Jul 74; CINCPAC 032109Z Jul 74; CHMEDTC 100600Z Jul 74 (BOM); CHMEDTC 201059Z Jul 74; SECDEF 1617/191741Z Jul 74; CINCUSARPAC 270019Z Jul 74; CHMEDTC 250240Z Jan 75.

POL Support for U.S. Forces in Thailand

(U) There were two systems for supplying bulk POL to U.S. Forces in Thailand. One was completely military, and serviced Sattahip and U-Tapao. The other was a commercial destination contract which distributed POL to up-country U.S. Air Force locations from Bangkok. The U.S. Army-operated Sattahip terminal had a storage capacity of 360,000 barrels, and was supplied by Military Sealift Command (MSC) tankers delivering U.S. Government-owned cargo. Pipelines were used to supply JP-4 from Sattahip to U-Tapao, which had a 665,000 barrel on-base storage capacity. In the Bangkok-to-up-country base distribution system, the product moved from contractor facilities in Bangkok by commercial trucks and by rail. The product source was commercial stocks in Singapore. During the Arab oil embargo, which extended to Singapore sources, government-furnished fuel -- primarily JP-4 -- was delivered into Sattahip from PACOM reserves. The product was transferred into small MSC and commercial tankers and delivered to the commercial facilities in Bangkok. The existing commercial rail and truck system was then used to move the fuel to up-country locations.[1]

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1. J44 Point Paper, 28 Jun 74, Subj: Thailand Petroleum Logistics Matters.

SECTION III-MUNITIONS

Costs of Ammunition

(C) Shortly after the end of FY 1974, the CINCPAC Deputy Chief of Staff, Major General John R. Guthrie, was provided an analysis of what the Director for International Logistics, Army Materiel Command (AMC) called, "...the traumatic cost growth in ammunition." On 13 July 1974, the AMC reported that the cost of ammunition was soaring and the, "...future looks bleak...." Increases had occurred in all areas of production, ranging from the acquisition of raw materials to component production to spare part acquisition, and including soaring costs for fuel and utilities. The AMC listed comparative costs for raw materials such as billet steel, bar steel, fuel oil, hydraulic oil and olive drab paint for fiscal years 1971 through 1974. For the 16 listed items, percentage increases ranged from seven (for ball bearings) to 17 (for labor) to 230 (for propane gas). These price increases translated into the following costs for five ammunition items with high usage in Southeast Asia:[1]

Nomenclature	1971-72 Unit Cost	Latest Unit Cost	Percent Increase
CTG 105mm, HE MI w/o Fuze	20.01	29.47	47
CTG 40mm, M406	3.50	4.36	25
CTG, 81mm Mortar M524 A6 w/Fuze	23.50	31.49	34
Grenade, Hand Frag M67	2.10	2.34	11
Grenade, Hand Off MK3A2 w/Fuze	2.10	2.43	16

(C) The AMC pointed out that, while the 11 cent increase in the price of the M67 hand grenade appeared small, the program quantity involved was in the thousands or larger and the extended costs amounted to a sizeable price increase. Further, since much of the existing munition stocks had been expended, the new production needed to meet many of the PACOM munitions requirements would be subject to the continuing inflationary spiral. On 17 October, new price changes were passed to the PACOM which reflected a 22.2 percent increase in the average cost per short ton of ground ammunition required for Cambodia. For Vietnam, the increase was 14.4 percent per short ton. The cost per short ton for a standard DOS to Vietnam had risen from $1,251 in November 1973 to $1,901 in June 1974 to $1,997 in November 1974 for a 60 percent increase. The cost per short ton for a standard DOS to Cambodia had risen from $1,553 in November 1973 to

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1. Hq AMC (Gen Fix to MGEN Guthrie) 131241Z Jul 74 (BOM).

$2,510 in June 1974 to $2,553 in November 1974 for a 64 percent increase. The items shown below constituted more than two-thirds of the tonnage and dollar value of the ammunition supplied to Vietnam and Cambodia, and were considered representative:[1]

ITEM	JAN 74	OCT 74	PERCENT INCREASE
CTG 5.56	.08	.10	25
CTG 40mm HE	3.50	3.60	3
CTG 60mm HE	10.00	13.58	36
CTG 81mm HE	23.50	29.84	27
CTG 105mm HE	22.75	35.70	57
CTG 105mm ILL	52.75	75.15	42
Fuze, PD M557	6.25	8.13	30
Mine, M18	18.50	24.49	32
Rocket, 66mm Heat	46.00	76.35	66
155mm HE	41.35	60.31	46
CTG 4.2 in HE	32.50	57.90	78
M67 Grenade	2.10	2.85	36
MK3 Grenade	2.10	3.04	45
M49 Trip Flare	3.00	6.92	131
Signal, ILL	7.00	11.38	63
CTG 81mm ILL	23.50	49.73	112
CTG 106mm HEAT	64.00	136.09	113

Munitions for Southeast Asia

(C) Munitions support for Southeast Asia was directed primarily toward resupply of Vietnam and Cambodia. Resupply of Vietnam was accomplished by ship through the port of Cat Lai; Cambodia was resupplied normally through the port of Vayama in Thailand. From Vayama, barges moved the munitions to Phnom Penh. An alternate route for FANK munitions was delivery to Vung Tau in Vietnam, with convoy transport from Vung Tau to Phnom Penh. Stockage objectives for Cambodia were based on the Required Supply Rate (RSR) of 30 DOS in country; 60 DOS of ground ammunition, 75 DOS of air ammunition, and 90 DOS of naval ammunition were stored in Thailand in support of FANK requirements. In Vietnam, ARVN stocked 60 DOS of ground ammunition at an intense combat rate, 30 DOS at a sustaining rate, and a one month supply of training ammunition. Vietnam air and naval stock objectives were 120 DOS.[2]

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1. Ibid.; CINCPAC ALPHA 40/220310Z Oct 74; J46 Point Paper, 26 Dec 74, Subj: Ammunition Price Increases.
2. J46 Point Paper, 21 Aug 74, Subj: Munitions Support for SEA; see next section, Transportation, for more detailed discussion of supply movements.

SOUTHEAST ASIA AIR MUNITIONS EXPENDITURES
(SHORT TONS)

JANUARY 1968 THRU DECEMBER 1974

	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1974	7,473	7,867	6,504	6,549	7,550	11,747	4,745	9,304	6,426	3,347	4,994	4,346
1973	101,390	69,976	39,538	54,727	53,765	47,480	49,885	31,648	1,640	5,593	5,274	6,313
1972	56,800	64,963	62,059	91,678	107,378	80,852	99,077	97,849	90,413	94,359	100,693	95,485
1971	70,792	66,510	92,191	85,000	76,463	60,863	49,196	51,277	51,309	47,317	50,649	67,838
1970	117,675	100,639	100,358	97,494	97,323	80,683	79,582	70,867	59,392	54,538	58,134	60,463
1969	129,684	115,759	130,141	125,090	128,312	121,774	122,794	111,046	102,163	99,908	100,509	100,158
1968	95,736	103,000	123,674	124,660	127,942	125,004	128,407	126,379	117,569	122,232	114,925	127,672

SOURCE: J46

Ammunition Highlights in Vietnam

(C) The money squeeze on munitions supply in Vietnam was compounded by a gradually increasing intensity of enemy activity which raised the expenditure rate of munitions by the RVNAF. The originally programmed $469 million for munitions in the FY 1975 budget was reduced to $268 million as part of the reduced aid voted by Congress. At the end of 1974 (mid-FY 1975), the funds available for ammunition expenditures appeared to consist of (in millions):[1]

- $268.0 Program.
- $ 22.3 from FY deliveries.
- $ 6.0 credit for suspended stocks.
- $ 24.3 Laotian excess transfers.
- $ 53.1 Special Project stock transfer (OSD figure $48).
- $ 53.6 from drawdown of in-country ground ammunition stocks.

(S) The CINCPAC Logistics staff (J4) projected a shortfall of ground munitions stocks, even with intensive conservation measures, in order to maintain the 60 DOS needed at the intensive combat rate. On 21 August, CINCPAC requested USDAO Saigon to develop a conservation plan. As a munitions conservation measurement, DAO proposed to use artillery, since artillery ammunition made up about 75 percent of the tonnage and slightly more than 50 percent of the cost of current expenditures. Based on a formula which computed allowable expenditures against actual expenditures, the DAO provided the following sample computation:[2]

Period	Computed Allowance	Actual Expenditure	Percent Excess	Conservation Factor
29 Jun 73-24 Jan 74	652,980	1,926,891	195	
1 Mar 74-15 Aug 74	823,220	1,712,360	108	45
FY 1975 (to date)	256,318	521,966	104	47

1. J46 Point Paper, 26 Nov 74, Subj: FY 75 Vietnam Ammo Planning and End of Year Position.
2. USDAO Saigon 020945Z Sep 74.

(C) The percent excess and the conservation factors had been measured for each military region (MR) for each week since 29 June 1973. It was possible to obtain a picture of MR expenditures related to the level of combat, and to determine which MR's had reduced the excess firing rate and to what relative degree. The DAO noted that ground ammunition conservation was a very pressing problem since, in the first two FY 1975 months, the ARVN had expended 27 percent of its ammunition budget of $262 million. Although some drawdown of stocks had been programmed, continued expenditures at those rates would sharply reduce stocks on hand by the end of FY 1975. In summary, the DAO stated:[1]

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> ...ammo conservation is the number one problem in-country at this time [2 September 1974]. Increased combat levels require more ammo. Reduced appropriations limit procurement. Ammo stocks are dwindling rapidly at a rate much in excess of previous years experience. ARVN has taken dramatic steps to reduce levels of expenditures as evidenced by a 45 percent reduction in excess. There is additional room for improvement.... It is hoped that a concommitant to ARVN conservation will be additional funds generated through a reduction of directed set-asides or an increase in the current appropriation level.

(S) Another measure proposed to CINCPAC by the DAO to alleviate the munitions problem was to shorten the supply pipeline. The proposal was that ammunition support for the RVN be authorized from off-shore stocks in Okinawa, Japan, or other nearby locations. This would not only shorten the pipeline, but reduce packing, crating, handling and transportation (PCH&T) costs. On 23 September, the DSAA advised that, except in specific cases approved by the Secretary of Defense, munitions requirements for both RVN and Cambodia would be filled from Service stocks in depots, ports and afloat which would provide the most expeditious delivery. Such munition requirements would be accorded priority over all demands other than those for U.S. Forces engaged in or alerted for combat. Stocks in forward locations and afloat would continue to be carried in departmental inventories and charged to departmental appropriations regardless of the eventual utilization of such stocks. Orders to fill DAV or MAP requisitions from forward locations and from stocks afloat would be charged to DAV and MAP accounts on the basis of constructive delivery, which was defined to occur at the time of issuance from the storage location for transfer to the recipient country. However, costs incurred for transportation from the CONUS to the forward storage locations or vessels of munitions

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1. Ibid.

subsequently furnished to DAV or MAP would be recovered by the military department from the DAV and MAP accounts.[1]

Ammunition Highlights in Cambodia

(S) At the beginning of 1974, MEDTC reported 12,380 short tons of munitions in storage in Cambodia, or slightly more than 35 DOS at an expenditure level of 350 short tons per day. Service-funded munitions were also stored in Thailand to support Cambodia, as stated earlier in this section, and the overall munitions posture was good. However, it was evident early in the year that FY 1974 funds could not long support the actual issue levels approximating 580 short tons per day.[2]

(S) By the end of FY 1974, MEDTC and the Commander, U.S. Support Activities Group (COMUSSAG) in Thailand had been requested to institute positive conservation measures. One item of ammunition (40mm HE cartridges) had been reduced to one DOS, and the Chief, MEDTC was requested to bring this item specifically to the attention of the FANK commander in chief. The CINCPAC Deputy Chief of Staff noted the 40mm HE production was critical, and that the cost would probably continue to rise above the 1 July 1974 price. The Chief, MEDTC replied that the FANK commander had been approached, and that the denial of this item appeared to have conveyed a painful but beneficial lesson to the FANK that U.S. logistics sources were not inexhaustable. Regardless, by July 1974, the usage rate was about 567 short tons daily, which amounted to $1.25 million per day at $2,200 per short ton. The projected funding for the first half of FY 1975 under Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) of $113.5 million (plus $23 million carried forward) would support only 337 short tons per day (at $2,200 per short ton) with no stock drawdown.[3]

(S) On 2 July, COMUSSAG, in response to a CINCPAC request, submitted an analysis of projected munitions expenditure for the first half of FY 1975 which had provided the guide for the DAO Saigon analysis discussed previously. The USSAG analysis used a combat intensity factor to establish a baseline, and projected a conservation of one-third, or a rate of about 380 short tons daily. USSAG noted that the cost of the ammunition used had increased 100 percent from October 1973 to the end of FY 1974. Thirty percent of the increase was attributable to an influx of ground weapons between November 1973 and June 1974.

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1. CINCPAC ALPHA 075/310110Z Aug 74; SECDEF 1124/231830Z Sep 74.
2. J46 Point Paper, 3 Jan 74, Subj: Cambodia Munition Support; J46 Point Paper, 22 Mar 74, Subj: Munitions Support-Cambodia.
3. CINCPAC (MGEN Guthrie to BGEN Palmer) 132305Z Jul 74 (BOM); CHMEDTC (Palmer to Guthrie) 160155Z Jul 74; J46 Point Paper, 18 Jul 74, Subj: Ammunition Conservation-Cambodia.

Seventy percent was the result of price increases. Based on expected funds, USSAG projected a shortage of $17 million by the end of calendar 1974. The proposed USSAG available supply rate of 380 short tons avoided the CINCPAC suggestion of June 1974 that the MEDTC consider a reduction to 290 short tons per day in order to align consumption with fiscal realities.[1]

(C) A review of the conservation program by the CINCPAC J4 staff at the end of September indicated that the expenditure problem had persisted. During the 89 day period from 1 July 1974 through 27 September 1974, allowable expenditures (at projected fund levels) were 337 short tons per day, which equated to 29,993 short tons. Actual expenditures were 40,487 short tons, or an overexpenditure of 10,494 short tons (35 percent), which equated to 117.9 short tons per day overage. At that rate, the available funds would be exhausted by 13 November 1974. In the 95 day period from 28 September through 31 December 1974, remaining funds would allow an average expenditure of 226.4 short tons per day, and, if approved funds were less than projected, daily issues would have to be proportionately less than 226.4 short tons.[2]

(C) On 23 September, the acting Chief, MEDTC submitted a new conservation plan which was expected to realize substantially greater savings once the FANK field commanders had been impressed with the need to monitor all expenditures and to stay within the established available supply rates. However, during a visit to Cambodia, Admiral Gayler had expressed his belief that ammunition rationing, imposed by the MEDTC, was essential in view of the reduced funds likely to be appropriated by the Congress. He therefore directed that his staff, in conjunction with MEDTC, prepare a plan to ration FANK and KAF ammunition by 25 September. On 1 October, CINCPAC noted that the new MEDTC plan of 23 September did not respond to his request for an outline rationing plan, and renewed his request for MEDTC input to a rationing plan.[3]

(C) On 4 October, CINCPAC summarized the figures developed by his J4 staff (which had projected the 226.4 short tons per day usage for the second FY 1975 quarter, as dictated by the projected CRA of $113.5 million) in a message to the USSAG. He informed the USSAG that he intended to discuss the situation with the Deputy Secretary of Defense and state his conclusion that there was no alternative to immediate U.S.-controlled rationing of calls forward and issues from in-country depots. He requested USSAG to comment. Meanwhile, the

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1. Ibid.; J46 Point Paper, 17 Jul 74, Subj: General Hunt's Ammo Analysis, Cambodia, with 1 atch, USSAG 020819Z Jul 74.
2. J46 Point Paper, 4 Oct 74, Subj: Cambodian Ammunition Situation.
3. CHMEDTC (Palmer to Guthrie) 271325Z Sep 74 (BOM); CINCPAC (Guthrie to Palmer) 010406Z Oct 74 (BOM).

Chief, MEDTC advised CINCPAC of his reasons for opposing ammunition rationing. He believed that the intensive management of FANK ammunition usage (and therefore FANK's operational prerogatives) could be viewed as a violation of the Cooper-Church legislative restrictions against U.S. involvement in combat operations. Further, a rationing plan would require a major MEDTC reorganization and additional personnel. And, from the FANK operational standpoint, reaction to crisis situations would be severely limited. In the long term, the Chief, MEDTC stated, the least desirable consequence of U.S. rationing could be that the FANK would never fully assume responsibility for the execution of a prudent conservation plan and would increase, even more, its dependence on the United States. He recommended that the new conservation plan initiated by MEDTC be given a trial period.[1]

(S) At about the same time, COMUSSAG responded to the CINCPAC's request for comment on the need for rationing. He supported the new MEDTC conservation plan, which limited average DOS to an available supply rate of 281.26 short tons for ground munitions. He provided statistics which reflected a potential 315 short tons per day within planned funds while maintaining a reserve of $15 million for contingencies. Based on his analysis, he recommended that the new conservation plan be tried while USSAG continued to monitor ammunition expenditures on a weekly basis to determine if FANK met the established goals.[2]

(S) Based on a change in the estimated dollar value of a short ton of ammunition from $2,200 to $1,850, direct rationing of FANK usage was not implemented. The lower cost per short ton resulted from a reduction in prices published on 26 September and a change in the mix of ammunition used in Cambodia. The revised available supply rate instituted by the MEDTC had reduced the usage per day during the month of October to an average of 300 short tons. Nevertheless, by early November, ammunition funding was still a problem. Only the first FY 1975 quarter CRA (for $56.4 million) had been approved; the MEDTC had received approval for a $12.7 million DOD supplemental to fund through 15 November; and, approval had been received for a MAP redistribution amounting to $24 million. All funds available, including the CRA, carry overs and MAP transfers had provided $126.5 million as of 5 November, and $89.5 million had been expended as of 1 November. The short-lived price reduction had been more than restored, with a new estimated cost per short ton of $2,350. At a daily usage of 300 short tons and $2,350 per ton, an appropriation of $284 million was needed for the balance of FY 1975.[3]

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1. CINCPAC (Guthrie to Hunt) 040339Z Oct 74 (BOM); CHMEDTC (Palmer to Guthrie) 041125Z Oct 74 (BOM).
2. AFSSO NKP (Hunt to Guthrie) 041235Z Oct 74 (BOM).
3. J46 Point Paper, 9 Oct 74, Subj: Cambodian Ammunition Situation; J46 Point Paper, 7 Nov 74, Subj: Cambodian Ammunition Situation.

(C) On 29 October, the MEDTC requested the release of $28.4 million for requirements through 31 December 1974. The request was approved, and, of the $154.9 million which had been made available by 22 November, $104.8 million had been expended at a FY 1975 daily average of 396 short tons per day. By 6 December, $2.2 million remained of the funds allocated during the first half of FY 1975. On 5 December, the Chief, MEDTC requested an initial third quarter FY 1975 incremental amount of $12.9 million, which had not been approved by the end of 1974.[1]

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1. J46 Point Paper, 18 Nov 74, Subj: Cambodian Ammunition Situation; J46 Point Paper, 26 Nov 74, Subj: Cambodian Ammunition Situation; J46 Point Paper, 10 Dec 74, Subj: Cambodian Ammunition.

SECTION IV-TRANSPORTATION

Common User Airlift-PACOM

(U) The common user airlift force in the PACOM was equipped with C-130E aircraft managed and operated by the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). The airlift force in 1974 consisted of the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing (TAW) headquarters and two squadrons at Clark Air Base, Philippines. One squadron of the 374th was located at Kadena Air Base, Okinawa. The CINCPAC Transportation Division (J47), monitored the PACOM airlift force for CINCPAC. These assets were used for intra-theater and tactical/combat missions where the Military Airlift Command (MAC) had no channel or where MAC aircraft could not operate because of short runways or the tactical situation. Most air transportation for PACOM organizations outside of Southeast Asia was provided by MAC C-141s, C-5s, or commercial contract carriers.[1]

(U) In late 1974, as a result of a major U.S. Air Force (USAF) reorganization, action was initiated to consolidate all Air Force strategic and tactical airlift forces under MAC. The MAC-TAC consolidation was effective on 1 December, and the MAC-PACAF consolidation was scheduled for 1 February 1975. The PACAF units scheduled for transfer to MAC were the 374th TAW and its three squadrons, the Ninth Aeromedical Evacuation Group at Clark Air Base, the 20th Operations Squadron at Clark, and the Sixth Aerial Port Squadron at U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Base in Thailand.[2]

PATMA/PAMPA Disestablished

(U) The PACOM Transportation Management Agency (PATMA) had been established to oversee the transportation usage and priorities of the massive logistics effort connected with the war in Vietnam. The main PATMA was located at Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii, with a field office located at U-Tapao in Thailand. On 18 May 1974, CINCPAC requested comments from PACAF and USSAG on proposed action to close the PATMA field office in Thailand. COMUSSAG was to assume management of airlift space and priority of movement for all passengers and cargo, both airland and airdrop, via C-130 aircraft between Cambodia and Thailand. All other intra-theater airlift requirements for PACOM customers previously supported through the PATMA field office in Thailand would be submitted

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 343-345; J47 Point Paper, 30 Sep 74, Subj: Airlift Situation in PACOM.
2. JCS 7939/262042Z Nov 74; J47 Talking Paper, 2 Dec 74, Subj: MAC Assumption PACAF Airlift Assets, with attached Appendix I, Annex Alpha, MAC/PACAF Programing Plan 74-32.

through Service channels to PATMA Hickam. USSAG, MACTHAI and PACAF concurred in the CINCPAC proposal, and the PATMA field office in Thailand ceased operations effective 30 June 1974.[1]

(U) On 22 August, CINCPAC proposed to disestablish the PATMA Hickam office and to task PACAF to receive and challenge/approve special airlift requests for PACOM common service airlift missions and to establish schedules for recurring PACOM common service aiflift missions. The CINCPAC J47 staff would publish policy guidance on airlift eligibility in the PACOM and determine airlift priorities when requirements exceeded capabilities. Users were to submit all requirements for PACOM common service airlift (except Cambodia) to CINCPACAF with information to CINCPAC. Through receipt of information copies of airlift requests, approvals and fragmentary orders, the CINCPAC J47 staff would monitor the performance of the airlift system. The CINCPAC component commands concurred, and, on 7 September, CINCPAC directed the disestablishment of the PATMA Hickam field office, effective 1 October 1974. The element within the PACAF staff which assumed the PATMA function was entitled the Pacific Airlift Management Office (PAMO).[2]

(U) Effective 1 November 1974, the PACOM Movements Priority Agency (PAMPA) was disestablished by CINCPAC. PAMPA had originally been established as an element of the CINCPAC Logistics staff (J46) in 1966 to act as liaison for CINCPAC between CONUS agencies and U.S. Forces in Vietnam.[3]

Military Airlift Fuel Conservation

(U) In action related to the worldwide energy crisis and the Arab oil embargo, CINCPAC had assessed, in November 1973, the overall PACOM airlift usage to determine measures to conserve fuel. Special sessions of the PACOM Joint Transportation Board (JTB) addressed the impact of the POL shortage and measures to balance fuel conservation with the continued movement of high priority cargo. As a result of these meetings, CINCPAC directed the Service components and subordinate unified commands to institute rigid supply discipline throughout the PACOM. On 30 November 1973, CINCPAC imposed a PACOM embargo against airlift of Priority 2 and below cargo except for aviation equipment, medical supplies and ship casualty repair parts. Also exempt were MAP Cambodia requirements and shipments to areas not regularly serviced by surface transportation, such as Diego Garcia, Harold Holt in Australia and the Trust Territories.

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1. J47 HistSums, May, Jun 74; CINCPAC 180323Z May 74; MACTHAI 300327Z May 74; USSAG 310905Z May 74; CINCPAC 110131Z Jun 74, which cited CINCPACAF 040120Z Jun 74; PATMA Fld Off 300610Z Jun 74; J4 WEB, 8 Jul 74.
2. CINCPAC 220157Z Aug 74; CINCPAC 072059Z Sep 74; J47 HistSum, Oct 74.
3. J4 WEB, 4 Nov 74.

Headquarters CINCPAC monitored the use of intra-theater MAC and C-130 airlift based upon previous long term experience, and instituted a cargo tonnage allocation system. By December 1973, MAC JP-4 consumption on intra-PACOM cargo airlift had dropped 32.5 percent from the October 1973 figure.[1]

(U) In February 1974, CINCPAC issued revised monthly allocations of cargo tonnage to the Service components which were even lower than the original allocations issued on 4 December 1973:[2]

	4 Dec 73	2 Feb 74
PACAF	1,319 S/T	1,052 S/T
PACFLT	759 S/T	742 S/T
USARPAC	1,190 S/T	1,142 S/T
FMFPAC	150 S/T	90 S/T

(U) Prior to the fuel shortage, MAC consumption in the PACOM had been 700,000 to 800,000 gallons of fuel per day. During the month of March 1974, MAC consumed about 525,000 gallons. In April, CINCPAC granted an increase to 670,000 gallons per day for April (a 28 percent increase over March) in response to a worldwide increase in the frequency of MAC channel flights. In view of the improved PACOM fuel position and the MAC solicitation for increased usage from PACOM transportation customers, CINCPAC rescinded the embargo of Priority 2 and below cargo on 10 April 1974.[3]

Designation of MTMC

(U) On 31 July 1974, the Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service (MTMTS) was redesignated the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). The MTMC was organized as the MTMTS and established as a major command of the U.S. Army in February 1965, when the Secretary of the Army was assigned single manager responsibility for land transportation, traffic management and common-user ocean terminals in the CONUS.[4]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 343; J47 Point Paper, 3 Jan 74; Subj: Military Airlift Fuel Conservation.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 343; J47 HistSums, Jan, Feb 74.
3. J47/Memo/122-74 of 8 Apr 74, Subj: Lifting CINCPAC Embargo on Airlift of Priority 2 and Below Cargo; CINCPAC 100114Z Apr 74; MAC 052100Z Apr 74; J47 Talking Paper, 16 Apr 74, Subj: Lifting of Embargo on Air Cargo.
4. J47 HistSum, Jul 74; SECDEF 8598/261916Z Jul 74; CDR MTMC 011447Z Aug 74.

Containerized Cargo Backlog

(U) Beginning in late 1973, a backlog of containerized cargo destined for PACOM locations developed on the West Coast. Primary destinations involved were Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines, Korea and Taiwan. The MTMTS, jointly with the MSC, issued frequent message reports on the availability of containers, container shipping space and size of the backlog. In February, the Army Material Command (AMC) loaned 1,000 MILVAN containers and 150 chassis to the MSC, and CINCPAC advised all PACOM customers that the MILVANs were to be unstuffed and returned as expeditiously as possible. By mid-May, the unbooked backlog had been reduced from about 22,000 mean tons in February to approximately 1,400 mean tons; effective on 7 May, the MTMTS ceased reporting container shortfalls.[1]

WESTPAC Army Ports Study

(U) During the period 14 July-1 August 1974, CINCPAC J47 participated in a Department of the Army (DA) study, chaired by USARPAC, of the extension of MTMC into the Pacific as the operator of PACOM Army ports. Current operations were examined at Pusan, Korea; Honshu, Japan; Okinawa, Japan; and Sattahip/Vayama, Thailand. It was found that the extension of MTMC operations to PACOM Army ports was both feasible and desirable. The main advantages included worldwide ocean terminal control, improved communications between terminals, and improved quality control. The study recommended that the proposed Transportation Terminal Units (TTUs) be placed under the operational control of local Army commanders with command control by MTMC. The assumption by MTMC of PACOM port operations was recommended as a time-phased program from July 1975 through April 1976.[2]

(U) In response to USARPAC request, CINCPAC concurred with the study on 5 December 1974 with two caveats. Firstly, the commander, Western Area MTMC would be responsible to both the commander, MTMC and to CINCPAC for operational control of PACOM Army port operations. Secondly, in view of the political implications of introducing new DOD activities into Japan and Thailand, CINCPAC requested DA to reevaluate that aspect and obtain CINCPAC approval about six months before implementing the TTU concept.[3]

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1. J47 HistSums, Feb, Mar, May 74; MTMTS 312000Z Jan 74, 061926Z May 74, 071930Z May 74; J4 WEBs 19 Feb 74 and 6 May 74.
2. J47 HistSum, Aug 74; Hq USARPAC Study, "Extension of MTMC into WESTPAC Army Ocean Terminals" of 29 Aug 74; Ltr, USARPAC GPLO-TR, 30 Aug 74, Subj: Extension of MTMC into WESTPAC Army Ocean Terminal, with atch: "WESTPAC Army Ports Study Summary," undated.
3. J47 HistSum Dec 74; CINCPAC 050136Z Dec 74.

Cambodia Airlift Support

(C) U.S. Air Force logistics support to Cambodia was a complementary element of the original plan to support Cambodia out of Thailand (SCOOT). USAF C-130 aircraft were used for airlanded or airdropped cargo to supplement the logistics deliveries made by SCOOT surface modes to Cambodia. The airlift missions originated from U-Tapao, Thailand and terminated at Pochentong Air Base (Phnom Penh) for airland or other airfields and enclaves for airdrop. The possible loss of USAF aircraft and/or aircrews in Cambodia prompted the Defense and State Departments to suggest an alternative airlift study. A team was sent from CINCPAC in early May 1974 to Thailand and Cambodia to study ways to reduce reliance on USAF C-130s. As a result, the following proposal was made to CINCPACAF, the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh and the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok:[1]

- Deliver four C-123 aircraft immediately to the KAF and obtain expedited approval for a fifth C-123;
- Bail five C-130 aircraft to a qualified contractor in Thailand;
- Immediately negotiate a sole-source contract for crew operation of five bailed C-130 aircraft.

(C) Both Embassies concurred in the proposal; PACAF concurred, except that the C-130s should be government furnished equipment (GFE) to allow for efficient and continuous USAF maintenance. PACAF also noted that, because of the potential high risk air defense environment, the C-130s should be equipped for high altitude airdrop. Since the CINCPAC study team had included legal representation, and the Staff Judge Advocate had interposed no legal obstacle to the contractor concept, the CINCPAC proposal was forwarded to the JCS on 5 June 1974. The PACAF comments were included.[2]

Contract Air Support for Cambodia

(S) On 27 June 1974, the JCS approved the CINCPAC proposal for civilian operation of five C-130 aircraft in support of Cambodia. The JCS directed the CSAF to expedite the delivery of four C-123 aircraft programmed for the KAF,

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1. J41 HistSum, May 74; CINCPAC 290300Z May 74.
2. J41 HistSum, May 74; CINCPACAF 040345Z Jun 74; J73/Memo/00140-74 of 29 Apr 74, Subj: Legal Restrictions on U.S. Air Operations in Cambodia; J73/Memo/00145-74 of 1 May 74, Subj: USAF Air Operations in Cambodia; CINCPAC 050425Z Jun 74; J47 HistSum, May 74.

and to provide one more as soon as possible. Negotiations were to begin on a contract, subject to the approval of the RTG, for civilian airlift operations, on a sole-source basis, of five GFE C-130 aircraft. On 29 June, the CSAF passed action to PACAF, which directed USSAG and the PACAF Procurement Center, in coordination with MACTHAI, to begin negotiations with Mr. William Bird, Thai Rock Products, Limited.[1]

(S) July passed with successful transfer of airlift support to the contractor awaiting approval of the RTG. Thai reluctance to approve the Bird contract was related to the political sensitivity of a "New Air America" charge by the opposition groups in Thailand. On 5 August, the State Department suggested to the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok that parallel approaches be made on the subject -- through the cabinet by the Embassy, and military-to-military by MACTHAI. On 13 August, the Deputy COMUSMACTHAI informed CINCPAC that his contacts had persuaded the Prime Minister to approve the concept that day. A meeting was scheduled with General Kriangsak on 14 August to finalize details.[2]

(S) The Kriangsak meeting resulted in the main proviso that the contract would be made under the aegis of Thai Airways; the C-130 aircraft or company must be licensed in Cambodia; civilian pilots were to be hired and salaries negotiated in Cambodia; crew immigration and customs clearances would be arranged by the Supreme Command Forward; and contract negotiations with Thai Airways, Inc. in Thailand would involve management fees. At a later meeting among the Deputy COMUSMACTHAI, Bird and the PACAF Contracting Officer, it was agreed that Bird would approach Thai Airways to propose a joint venture with Bird, Thai Airways and Air Cambodge, with Thai Airways to handle flight clearances in Thailand. The last paragraph of the COMUSMACTHAI message imparting this information noted that "Negotiations can commence as soon as [Air Chief] Marshal Boonchoo, Chairman Board Thai Airways receives the signed letter of approval from Prime Minister."[3]

(S) Six days later, on 20 August, COMUSMACTHAI informed CINCPAC that a meeting had been held between U.S. representatives and Thai Airways, the purpose of which was to resolve any conflict generated by the Prime Minister's approval letter. Allegedly, the Prime Minister had outlined a requirement that Thai Airways contract directly with the U.S. Government to provide airlift

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1. J41 HistSum Jun 74; J47 HistSum, Jun 74; JCS 2307/270017Z Jun 74; CSAF 291425Z Jun 74; CINCPACAF 040430Z Jul 74.
2. USSAG/7AF 160025Z Jul 74; CINCPAC 180332Z Jul 74; USMACTHAI 230500Z Jul 74 and 260530Z Jul 74; SECSTATE 172843/081520Z Aug 74; DEPCOMUSMACTHAI (BGEN Aderholt to Admiral Gayler, General Brown, Mr. Van Marbod) 1692/130935Z Aug 74 (BOM); J4 WEB, 29 Jul 74.
3. COMUSMACTHAI 141130Z Aug 74.

support for Cambodia. The MACTHAI representative counter-proposed that the contract be let between the U.S. Government and a Cambodian company, presumably Air Cambodge, which would then contract for flight clearance services with Thai Airways.[1]

(C) On 21 August, the Deputy COMUSMACTHAI once again announced "complete agreement" between himself and General Kriangsak, and that the PACAF Procurement Center and Thai Airways would initiate contractual negotiations on 22 August. He expected no difficulties, and no taxes would be levied on the contractor air crews. The original proposal by CSAF that non-dedicated aircraft from the Clark Air Base pool be used was not approved by the RTG in the ensuing negotiations. Rather, the RTG requested only five aircraft serial numbers be used for the GFE C-130s. PACAF recommended CSAF approval to use unmarked C-130s with a placard number system to satisfy the RTG and still permit rotation of aircraft from the Clark pool.[2]

(S) The CSAF approved the designated set of five serial numbers on unmarked C-130s, and, on 1 September 1974, the Department of the Air Force, by letter contract, entered into an agreement with Bird Air Company, Division of Bird and Sons, Incorporated to provide aircraft airlift services from U-Tapao to designated points in Cambodia. On 12 September, the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok approved a proposed Washington announcement that a $1.78 million contract had been let to the Bird Air Company for airlift support to Cambodia.[3]

(S) On the same day that the Embassy in Bangkok approved the public announcement, the U.S. Embassy in Laos took the State Department to task for concluding the Bird contract without consultation with Vientiane. The Ambassador noted that Bird had a contract with the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) to provide helicopter support for AID operations in Laos:[4]

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> ...Given the paranoia of the Pathet Lao, we will have created real problems for ourselves if it is learned here that Bird is involved in quasi-military operations in Cambodia.

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1. COMUSMACTHAI 201030Z Aug 74.
2. DEPCOMUSMACTHAI 1760/211700Z Aug 74 (BOM); CINCPAC ALPHA 056/300222Z Aug 74.
3. CINCPAC ALPHA 113/040223Z Sep 74; J4 WEB, 3 Sep 74; AMEMB Bangkok 14722/121235Z Sep 74; J4 WEB, 6 Jan 75.
4. SECSTATE 200550/121824Z Sep 74, which passed AMEMB Vientiane 7068/121140Z Sep 74 (EX).

> ...I wish to go on the record at once with regard to the grave difficulties I foresee if as anticipated this contract is surfaced in Thailand and Bird appears to be a successor to Air America with all that connotes.

(S) The first two BIRDAIR civilian crews began flying training checks in mid-September, and the first contract mission was flown on 26 September. The mission was a high altitude All Weather Aerial Delivery System (AWADS) drop and all 12 bundles of ammunition were in the drop zone at Kompong Seila. Under terms of the contract, all civilian crews received flight checks and certification from USAF personnel. On 5 November, the JCS requested CINCPAC to provide an evaluation of contractor performance versus USAF airdrop efficiency. The USAF rate of recovery from July through October had been 94.9 percent. BIRDAIRs rate through 6 November was 96.7 percent.[1]

KAF Airlift Self-Sufficiency

(S) The contracted air support to Cambodia was conceived as a transitional and interim measure to remove USAF air crews from the airlift support operation. The eventual goal, however, was to make the KAF a self-sufficient airlift force. The original proposal to hire civilian C-130 crews to fly from U-Tapao, it will be recalled, also included the provision of five additional C-123s to the KAF. On 15 July 1974, the JCS requested CINCPAC to develop a plan to attain complete KAF airlift self-sufficiency during FY 1976 based on the eventual withdrawal of all USAF-furnished equipment and personnel then supporting the Cambodian air-land/airdrop effort. The CINCPAC comments were to include consideration of increasing the KAF airlift capability; the impact of continued GFE C-130 operations on the USAF worldwide airlift requirements; the capability/desirability of reintroducing USAF C-130 aircraft and rigging teams into Thailand for emergency airlift once withdrawn; and the political ramifications of using Thailand as a staging base for Cambodia airlift operations, as well as possible alternative staging areas. CINCPAC formed a task group with PACAF and USARPAC representation and requested USSAG, the Chief, MEDTC and MACTHAI to provide inputs. On 5 August, the JCS suspense date, CINCPAC submitted an initial plan for KAF self-sufficiency. USSAG was requested to develop a time-phased implementation schedule within the guidelines of the CINCPAC submission to the JCS.[2]

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1. J41 HistSums, Sep, Oct, Nov 74; J4 WEBs, 23 Sep 74, 7 Oct 74 and 11 Nov 74; JCS 9137/050012Z Nov 74; CINCPAC 091911Z Nov 74; CINCPAC ALPHA 012/170321Z Sep 74.
2. JCS 6850/152144Z Jul 74; J4 WEBS, 22 and 29 Jul 74, and 5 Aug 74.

(S) The USSAG time-phased plan was received the last week in August. The FY 1975 costs included investment equipment and aircraft, $1.7 million; minimum aerial port and ramp construction, $1.2 million; concrete or aluminum matting over soil surface cement on apron and storage area, $3.1 million to $4.3 million; annual O&M costs for six more C-123s, $4.1 million. By early September, the investments costs had been revised to $3.45 million; the construction upgrade set at $2.06 million; and O&M revised upward to $5.15 million.[1]

(S) The USSAG plan envisioned some contract airlift between Thailand and Cambodia, and the presence of USAF C-130 airdrop capability in Southeast Asia to back up the KAF. On 7 September, CINCPAC cited to USSAG three major issues which required reexamination of the USSAG proposal, and noted the need for a more economical way to attain KAF self-sufficiency:[2]

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A. USAF involvement, including contract airlift, sensitive, and continued support unpredictable except in backup role.

B. Cost of six additional C-123K aircraft with associated improvement and O&M costs high. Particularly concerned about recurring annual O&M costs of $5 million which will constrain funding for essential commodities under present ceilings.

C. Most difficult to justify additional investment in face of current KAF under-utilization of C-123K aircraft at five S/T ACL.

(S) CINCPAC requested USSAG to identify and define the training requirement to upgrade the skills of current pilot resources in order to attain increased aircraft utilization in terms of allowable cabin load (ACL). Also, USSAG was requested to identify the priorities for space assignment (military and civil) at Pochentong with a view toward attaining better utilization of existing facilities. After a visit by CINCPAC representatives to discuss construction, O&M costs and equipment/facility utilization, CINCPAC forwarded a revised plan to the JCS on 18 September. The FY 1975 cost estimate was for $2.196 million. The estimate for annual O&M costs for FY 1976 and later was $2.878 million per year. The FY 1975 plan included six C-123K aircraft, spare

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1. CINCPAC ALPHA 041/290244Z Aug 74; J41 Point Paper, 5 Sep 74, Subj: Cambodia Airlift Support.
2. Ibid., CINCPAC 070515Z Sep 74.

engines, aerospace ground equipment (AGE), aerial port upgrade, training 10 crews and 106 maintenance people and O&M costs for one fiscal quarter. The upgrade effort was scheduled for completion by the end of FY 1975.[1]

(S) The Chief, MEDTC was authorized to discuss the plan with the KAF and the Khmer Government, with no commitment by the United States. Early discussions were to be aimed at speeding the selection of personnel for training and approval of construction plans. Potential obstacles, as assessed by the CINCPAC J4 staff, included RTG disapproval of a U.S. mobile training team (MTT) in Thailand; slow KAF/Khmer Government approval of the plan; and, slow deployment of an MTT if approved. The plan was approved by the Chairman, JCS and forwarded to the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) on 25 September. On 28 September, CINCPAC authorized the preliminary discussions.[2]

(C) On 3 October, the CINCPAC acting Chief of Staff advised the Chief, MEDTC that it was unlikely that the KAF self-sufficiency program would be funded outside of whatever funds were appropriated by Congress for MAP Cambodia. On 4 October, the DSAA confirmed that the self-sufficiency program costs must be borne by MAP funds, and suggested that FY 1975 MAP change data be submitted to allow funding of KAF program. The DSAA also requested CINCPAC to review the necessity for further expansion of the aerial port facility at Pochentong and the associated construction costs.[3]

(C) The Chief, MEDTC acknowledged the DSAA guidance, but noted that, "....Actually we have no aerial port facility, only a muddy area with some bent steel planking and some CONEX boxes and concertina wire...." He also expressed doubt that self-sufficiency could be attained by June 1975 if funding came from current sources. The CINCPAC acting Chief of Staff advised the Chief, MEDTC that the Bird contract could become politically infeasible at any time; that the Bird contract would not be renewed after 30 June 1975; and that the reintroduction of USAF air crews was unlikely. Ergo, every effort was needed to improve the KAF airlift capability so that they would not suffer serious logistics shortages when USAF and contractor support was withdrawn. MEDTC was requested to consider and comment on the following alternatives to expensive contract facility maintenance and construction:[4]

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1. Ibid.; J4 WEB, 16 Sep 74; J41 Point Paper, 23 Sep 74, Subj: KAF Airlift Self-Sufficiency; J41 Point Paper, 27 Sep 74, Subj: KAF Airlift Self-Sufficiency; CINCPAC 180356Z Sep 74.
2. Ibid.; J41 HistSum, Sep 74.
3. CINCPAC (Guthrie to Palmer) 032221Z Oct 74 (BOM); SECDEF 3783/041507Z Oct 74.
4. CHMEDTC (Palmer to Guthrie) 1359/060450Z Oct 74 (BOM); CINCPAC (Guthrie to Palmer) 102039Z Oct 74 (BOM).

* * * * *

A. Use Khmer Army engineers.

B. Divert workforce and equipment for new heliport construction to aerial port.

C. Use KAF personnel in self-help effort with technical assistance from Khmer Army engineers.

D. Reallocate ramp space.

E. Combination of above.

(C) On 21 October, the CSAF released some PACAF-owned AM-2 aluminum matting to MAP Cambodia for the KAF self-sufficiency project. The issue was at no cost to MAP, and represented a reduction in total project cost of about $159,000. On 1 November, the DSAA approved the plan, directing that contractor airlift support be terminated by 30 June 1975 and that the self-sufficiency program be funded within existing MAP. Air crew and maintenance personnel were selected by the KAF for the training program, and aerial port construction (for $342,000) was authorized for final design shortly after the DSAA approval.[1]

(C) On 14 November, the CSAF advised that the six C-123K aircraft needed for the KAF would be priced "as-is" at $104,000 per aircraft. The costs for any reconditioning would be extra. However, the only source for the aircraft was the Air Force Reserve, and CSAF had not yet received execute orders to divert the C-123s from the Reserve. By 27 November, MACTHAI advised that a country-to-country letter had been passed from Cambodia to the RTG Supreme Command; that off-base billeting of trainees at Udorn would cost approximately $46,800; and, that the U.S. Embassy did not concur with such off-base billeting. By early December, 40 aircrew and 97 maintenance trainees had been selected, and the USAF was preparing to ferry the first four C-123K aircraft diverted from the Air Force Reserve. On 31 December 1974, a contract was awarded for construction of the facilities at Pochentong with a completion of 30 June 1975.[2]

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1. CINCPAC ALPHA 45/250326Z Oct 74; J41 HistSum, Oct 74; J4 WEB, 4 Nov 74; J41 Point Paper, 5 Nov 74, Subj: KAF Airlift Self-Sufficiency.
2. J41 HistSum, Nov 74; CSAF 141553Z Nov 74; AFLC 222100Z Nov 74; USMACTHAI 271143Z Nov 74; J41 Point Paper, 10 Dec 74, Subj: KAF Airlift Self-Sufficiency; J4 WEB, 6 Jan 75.

SCOOT and SCOOT (T)

(C) After the 15 August 1973 termination of direct U.S. air support to the Cambodian Armed Forces (FANK), enabling the Cambodian Government to survive became a test of ingenuity in the selection of lines of communication (LOC) options for the resupply of vital material. When, in late 1972, it became apparent that the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Vietnam was imminent, CINCPAC developed a plan to support Cambodia out of Thailand (SCOOT). The plan provided for tugs and barges to be used as the primary method for transporting cargo from Vayama, Thailand to Phnom Penh and Kompong Som in Cambodia. One option of the SCOOT plan was the resupply of Cambodia by air from U-Tapao, Thailand when other LOC were interdicted by enemy action. Thus, the airlift support described in the preceding pages was one facet of the original SCOOT plan.[1]

(U) The SCOOT contractor, Thai Maritime Navigation Company (TMAR) provided 13 tugs and 11 barges under the contract renegotiation of late 1973. The U.S. Government provided five GFE barges. The contract term was until 30 September 1974, with provisions for three-month extensions. The monthly delivery capability to Phnom Penh from Vayama for ammunition was estimated to be about 15,000 short tons.[2]

(C) To meet the increased consumption of ammunition in January and February 1974, and at the same time reduce the use of airdrop and airland, a transshipment operation (direct discharge from deepdraft ship to barge) was conducted at Vung Tau, Vietnam in February. On 10 February, the SS PIONEER CONTRACTOR arrived at Vung Tau to transship approximately 8,000 short tons of munitions to Phnom Penh by tug and barge. Approximately 22,000 short tons of ammunition were delivered to Cambodia during February 1974; more than 20,000 short tons were delivered by surface; and, less than 10 percent of the total was moved by air. Thus was born SCOOT(T), for transshipment.[3]

(C) In January 1974, CINCPAC transmitted notice to PACOM addressees of a plan to establish a supplemental ammunition supply point in Vietnam to support Cambodia. Cargo would be transported from Vietnam to Cambodia by tug, barge or tank landing ship (LST) or a combination thereof. Original SCOOT support would continue from Vayama. The MSC Far East was tasked to provide protected tug/barge assets, and DAO Saigon was tasked to arrange for stevedore services for the ship-to-barge transfer.[4]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 335-339.
2. J47 Point Paper, 17 Jul 74, Subj: SCOOT-SCOOT/T.
3. J47 HistSum, Feb 74; J47 Point Paper, 7 Feb 74, Subj: Transshipment of Cambodia Munitions at Vung Tau; J4 WEB, 11 Feb 74.
4. J4 WEB, 21 Jan 74; CINCPAC ALPHA 053/260424Z Jan 74.

(S) The second SCOOT(T) vessel to tranship was the SS AMERICAN COURIER in March. The third vessel, the SS PIONEER MOON was the first preplanned package load for Cambodia. This April delivery contained a balanced mix of 14 separate items of critical munitions. Meanwhile, the original TMAR contract was renegotiated on 26 January 1974 for sufficient barge and tug assets to permit delivery of 20,000 short tons of munitions. Since the contract was renegotiable every three months, the contract ending on 30 June was extended for six months on 20 May during a Saigon meeting with all concerned. Based on the success of the SCOOT(T) operation, the original SCOOT assets were reduced from 21 barges (five GFE) and 17 tugs to 15 barges and 13 tugs. All barges were of 2,000 dead weight tonnage or larger.[1]

(S) On 14 September, CINCPAC J4 chaired a planning conference in Bangkok at which a new concept of providing logistic support to Cambodia was approved. Two ammunition ships, selectively loaded and scheduled approximately 18 days apart, would be programmed from off-shore supply points to call at Vung Tau and Cat Lai in Vietnam and Vayama, Thailand. Each ship would have 4,000 short tons of designated ammunition for discharge at Vung Tau. This ammo would be moved to Phnom Penh by tug and barge. Any residual capacity would be used to deliver RVNAF munitions to Cat Lai and replacement munitions to the Vayama Ammunition Depot. After discharge at Vayama, these ships would backhaul MAP Cambodia munitions and general cargo as required from Thailand to Vung Tau for discharge into SCOOT barges. The concept did not provide for the use of tugs, barges or coasters operating from Vayama after 1 January 1975. The TMAR contract would not be renewed, and U.S. flagships under MSC charter would be used to move cargo from Thailand. The SS PIONEER MOON, which had been the first SCOOT(T) vessel with a preplanned package, was also the first to backload cargo for Cambodia from Vayama for transshipment at Vung Tau. The ship arrived at Vung Tau on 18 October with approximately 3,800 short tons of cargo.[2]

Mekong Convoy Security

(S) The repeated interdiction of major highways to Phnom Penh in late 1973 and early 1974 left the Mekong River as the primary surface LOC, and resulted in increased emphasis on the security of river convoys. The Cambodian Army and Marines deployed units along both sides of the Mekong from the Vietnam border to Phnom Penh. Cambodian naval vessels escorted convoys and provided counter-mine security in front and on the flanks of the convoy. The Navy also

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1. CINCPAC ALPHA 028/270340Z Feb 74; ALPHA 29/140357Z Mar 74; ALPHA 123/290338Z Jan 74; J4 WEBs, 25 Mar 74 and 28 May 74.
2. DAO Saigon (MGEN Hunt to RADM Benton) 01473/211033Z Aug 74 (BOM); CINCPAC 180427Z Sep 74; J47 Point Paper, 3 Oct 74, Subj: New Plan for Cambodia Surface Support; J47 Point Paper, 26 Nov 74, Subj: SCOOT/SCOOT/T.

provided immediate fire support, while the KAF provided fixed and rotary wing gunship strikes and T-28 aircraft on call. Passive protection measures included the modification of ammunition barges to provide two chain link fences, with sandbags between, surrounding the cargo. Stand-off chain link fence protection for the barges was also installed. Perhaps the most ingenious measure was to lash four small escort barges to the sides of the main ammunition barges. The escort barges were filled with polyurethane styrofoam flotation material, and two 19-foot cyclone fences were installed on each shield barge.[1]

(S) The effectiveness of the security measures was summarized by USSAG in a review for CINCPAC of Mekong operations from November 1973 to November 1974. Of the 686,500 mean tons of cargo moved by Mekong convoy, only 6,006 mean tons were lost -- less than one percent. Civilian casualties were also low. SCOOT vessels had only one wounded during the period. On the other hand, POL, general cargo and grain vessels (USAID) sustained five killed and 14 wounded.[2]

Container Service for RVN

(U) On 30 June 1974, the sole-source container service to Vietnam, provided by Sea-Land, was to expire. Because of the costs of a sole-source contract, the USDAO in Saigon agreed to container service to Saigon only, vice Saigon and Danang. The DAO advised CINCPAC and MSC that 25-mile drayage and option to renew for three years were essential and that breakbulk cargo was acceptable for Danang. A new contract was signed by MSC with Sea-Land for dedicated container service between the CONUS West Coast and Saigon effective 1 July 1974. The contract was for general cargo, vehicles and refrigerated cargo, and provided for drayage within a 30-mile radius of Saigon. The first year provided for a minimum annual revenue guarantee of $6.479 million, with options for a second and third year extension.[3]

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1. J31 Point Paper, 25 Mar 74, Subj: Mekong Convoy Security Operations; CINCPAC ALPHA 110/190427Z Mar 74.
2. USSAG 220741Z Nov 74.
3. J4 WEBs, 3 Jun 74 and 22 Jul 74.

SECTION V

FACILITIES AND CONSTRUCTION

Facilities on Oahu

IPAC Facility - Funds Denied

(C) Intelligence Center-Pacific (IPAC) was established by consolidation of Service intelligence functions of the component commands on Oahu. A JCS-directed CINCPAC study concluded that more efficient intelligence support would result with IPAC; 361 manpower spaces could be saved; and a five-year O&M saving of $14.5 million could be realized. CINCPAC submitted a contingency request for U.S. Navy military construction (MILCON) funds amounting to $2.7 million to renovate the proposed IPAC operating facility at Camp Smith, Oahu. On 5 December 1974, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) advised CINCPAC that the FY 1975 rehabilitation funds for IPAC had been denied by the House-Senate conference committee. The committee acknowledged the requirement, but believed that deferral of the funds from the FY 1975 budget would not seriously degrade the intelligence capabilities of the PACOM. The DIA recommended that CINCPAC take alternative actions under advisement, to include resubmission of the request for MILCON funds or a review of alternate sites for the location of IPAC. On 15 December 1974, CINCPAC postulated several alternatives for examination by the component Services, and requested replies by 6 January 1975.[1]

Bikeway Systems on Military Installations

(U) During 1974, Admiral Gayler lent strong personal support to the installation of a connecting bikeway system on and between Hickam Air Force Base and the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor. The military bikeway system was to be designed as an integral part of a bikeway plan for the Island of Oahu developed by the City and County of Honolulu. The military system was completed by 31 October 1974, and the portion of the City-managed plan closest to the two bases was nearing completion by the end of the year. In a personal letter to the Mayor of Honolulu, Admiral Gayler proposed a meeting on bicycles when the City portion was completed to symbolize the cooperation of military and civilian communities in a worthwhile project.[2]

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1. J42 Point Paper, 4 Sep 74, Subj: IPAC Facility; J42 HistSum, Dec 74; DIA 5759/051837Z Dec 74; CINCPAC 150420Z Dec 74; for discussion of IPAC establishment, see Chapters I and IX.
2. J42 HistSums Jan-Nov 74.

MILCON in Vietnam

(U) On 21 June 1974, the Secretary of Defense advised CINCPAC that the language of the FY 1975 defense procurement bill repealed DOD authority to obligate residual Southeast Asia MILCON funds in Vietnam starting 1 July 1974. The bill also created a single appropriation for the support of the RVNAF during FY 1975, including construction projects. CINCPAC was directed to withdraw all Southeast Asia MILCON funds, identified for projects in South Vietnam but which had not yet been obligated, and to return such funds to the control of the Service headquarters concerned. To assure a smooth transition from Southeast Asia MILCON funding to the new single appropriation account, all FY 1975 construction projects were to be programmed in the security assistance program and charged to the funds appropriated in the new single account.[1]

(U) At the end of 1974, the significant on-going construction projects in Vietnam, and the final ones to be awarded from the $1.8 billion RVN MILCON funds, were:[2]

MAJOR CURRENT PROJECTS

Location	Projects	CWE*($000)	Completion Date
Saigon	Arsenal Upgrade	985	Jun 75
Saigon	Arsenal	195	Dec 74
Saigon	Clothing Factory	331	Nov 74
Saigon	450 Bed Hospital	2,387	Feb 76
Saigon	Industrial Pier	870	Oct 75
Nha Be	Commercial Power	26	Jan 75
Newport	Warehouse Sprinklers	160	Feb 75
Di An	VNMC Training Tank	281	Nov 74
Various	ARVN LOC	3,940	

*Current Working Estimate

(U) Future construction under consideration for funding from the single account Defense Assistance, Vietnam (DAV) included:[3]

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1. J42 HistSum Jun 74; SECDEF 7149/211353Z Jun 74.
2. J42 Point Paper, 26 Nov 74, Subj: Construction-Cambodia/Vietnam.
3. Ibid.

PROPOSED FY75 DAV PROJECTS

Service Sponsor	Project	Estimated Cost ($000)
ARVN	Ammo Depot Upgrade, Twelve Locations	4,300
ARVN	Cogido Ammunition Off-Load Pier	400
ARVN	Test Laboratory	100
VNN	VNN Supply Center	2,850
Marines	Water Distribution Project, Song Than	180
Marines	Water Supply, Song Than	140
Marines	Water Tower, Song Than	070
Marines	Security Lighting, Song Than	030
Marines	Perimeter Fencing, Song Than	370
Marines	Wiring & Electrical System, Song Than	100
Marines	Concrete Flooring, Song Than	100
Marines	Field Fortification, Song Than	200
VNAF	C-130 Maintenance Facilities, TSN	1,500

MILCON in Cambodia

(U) Construction in Cambodia, as of the end of 1974, was MAP-funded and accomplished under MAP procedures, as was the Vietnam DAV-funded program just described. Most construction underway in Cambodia was to improve airfields and naval base facilities. Progress during 1974 was slow because of security conditions affecting the availability of the Phnom Penh quarry site, rapid inflation and lower shipping priorities for construction materials. The projects listed below were underway at the close of the year:[1]

CURRENT PROJECTS

Location	Project	CWE ($000)	Completion Date
Pochentong AF	Airfield (Improvement)	2,480	May 75
	STOL Airfield	350	Comp-Aug 74
	Heliport	350	Feb 75
Battambang AF	Airfield (Improvement)	636	Nov 74
Ream AF	Airfield (Improvement)	653	Jun 75
Ream NB	Naval Base Upgrade (Phase I)	1,001	Nov 74

1. Ibid.

(U) Planned for future construction, but not including the KAF self-sufficiency proposals, included:[1]

Location	Project	CWE ($000)
Pochentong AF	Parallel Taxiway	1,400
Ream NB	Upgrade (Phase II)	700

Facilities/Construction in Thailand

(S) The reductions of U.S. military personnel and units in Thailand discussed in Chapter I prompted CINCPAC, COMUSMACTHAI and Service elements to examine the planned use of existing facilities vis-a-vis MILCON programs, particularly at the U-Tapao/Sattahip/Samae San complex. These airfield, port and storage facilities were programmed to be the only major bases for U.S. military operations in Thailand after FY 1976, and close coordination by the Service elements was mandatory if the existing facilities were to be used fully and effectively.[2]

Thailand Joint Facilities Planning Council

(S) Based upon observation and discussion during a staff visit to Thailand by CINCPAC J4 personnel in September, CINCPAC established a Joint Facilities Planning Council, chaired by COMUSMACTHAI, with component Service and Strategic Air Command representation. After the first Council meeting on 17 October, CINCPAC acknowledged the communication and coordination reflected in the meeting minutes to solve areas of mutual concern associated with Thailand facilities planning, and cancelled the Council. In lieu thereof, COMUSMACTHAI was charged to develop and submit, by 31 December 1974, a time/event phased, Service coordinated plan for the programmed use of facilities declared excess in the U-Tapao/Samae San/Sattahip areas. The overall objective was to insure maximum use of facilities and to minimize new construction.[3]

TRE Warehouse Relocation

(S) At about the same time that the CINCPAC staff had instituted the Joint Facilities Planning Council to emphasize the need for coordinated planning, the MACTHAI Support Group pressed for approval of a minor construction project involving relocation of the Thailand Regional Exchange (TRE) from Bangkok to

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 020330Z Oct 74, which cited CINCPAC 041856Z May 74.
3. J42 HistSum, Oct 74; CINCPAC 020330Z Oct 74; Ltr, COMUSMACTHAI, 24 Oct 74, Subj: Minutes of the Joint Facilities Planning Council; CINCPAC 262203Z Oct 74.

Camp Samae San. The original proposal was for the erection of three relocatable structures for use as TRE warehouse facilities. CINCPAC noted that, in the seven months since the project surfaced as urgent minor construction, the prospects for relocation in existing facilities at Samae San or U-Tapao were good, and suggested a delay of the TRE relocation for two to six months. Responding to a personal plea for support from Deputy COMUSMACTHAI, the CINCPAC acting Chief of Staff noted that the TRE relocation appeared to have escaped the coordination envisioned by the previously discussed MACTHAI time/event-phased facilities plan. He advised that, in order to gain the requested support, MACTHAI must demonstrate that neither Samae San nor U-Tapao had the requisite facilities; that suitable facilities would not be made available after the programmed FY 4/75 and 1/76 phase down; and, that a delay in the relocation would not be feasible. At the end of FY 1974, the minor construction aspect of the TRE relocation appeared to be a dead issue.[1]

VIASA Upgrade

(C) In May 1972, USARPAC had requested CINCPAC to validate a $2.9 million, three-phase project at Camp Vayama. This facility was known as the Vayama In-transit Ammunition Storage Area (VIASA). The three phases were to consist of construction of 20 additional ammunition storage pads; repair of 37 existing pads; and improvement of security at the VIASA complex. The storage capability of the VIASA facility was central to the single pipeline concepts embodied in the SCOOT plan. CINCPAC requested USARPAC to revise the original proposal to include Phases I and III only, in order to bring the construction within the MILCON approval authority of the Secretary of Defense. Phase II, repair of existing facilities, was to be programmed for O&M funds. On 14 July 1972, the revision was submitted in two phases: one for 12 additional ammunition storage pads; one for improvements in security. The total cost was estimated at $999,800. The repair and maintenance portion of the original proposal was submitted by USARPAC to DA as an O&M project for $681,000. The two phases were initially approved on 27 September 1972, but, on 20 August 1973, the Defense Department deferred construction. On 27 October 1973, CINCPAC reviewed the benefits to be derived from the VIASA upgrade in a message to the JCS and DA. The ground ammunition stored at Takhli could be moved; some assets at the PEPPERGRINDER (Udorn) storage facility could be relocated to reduce safety hazards; and, if PEPPERGRINDER were closed, the VIASA would be the sole source remaining in Thailand.[2]

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1. J42 HistSums, Oct, Nov, Dec 74; CINCPAC 032059Z Oct 74; USMACTHAI 200825Z Nov 74; CINCPAC (MGEN Guthrie to BGEN Aderholt) 231806Z Nov 74 (BOM); USMACTHAI 100959Z Dec 74; CINCPACAF 262000Z Dec 74.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 361, 362.

(U) On 12 January 1974, CINCPAC re-validated the VIASA upgrade construction and recommended immediate approval and funding, noting that design work had been completed on Phases I and III. On 14 February 1974, the Secretary of Defense approved the realignment of $999,800 of Southeast Asia MILCON funds for the VIASA improvements requested in Phase I and III.[1]

(C) The aforementioned closure of the PEPPERGRINDER storage facility, thus reducing ammunition storage in Thailand to the VIASA facility, was addressed by CINCPAC on 6 December 1974. CINCPAC concurred in the planned disposal of the PEPPERGRINDER installation in two phases to the RTG, provided in-country screening indicated no need for the facilities by U.S. Forces in Thailand.[2]

MILCON in Laos

(C) At the beginning of 1974, five projects of MILCON scope were underway in Laos using O&M funds, and four projects were planned for immediate implementation. However, these projects had not been programmed for approval and funding in accordance with Military Assistance Service Fund (MASF) procedures for Laos. On 23 February 1974, CINCPAC requested residual USAF MILCON funds be approved for the projects, which were:[3]

Underway

Project	Location	Cost ($000)	Est Comp Date
RLAF Supply Depot	Vientiane	200	Feb 74
RLAF Maint. Fac.	Vientiane	175	Feb 74
Hangar Modification	Vientiane	93	Feb 74
Chinaimo Log Complex	Vientiane	130	Mar 74
FAR Signal Depot	Vientiane	52	May 74

Planned

Project	Location	Cost ($000)
Parallel Taxiway	Savannakhet	689.7
LSB Facilities	Pakse	168.1
Facilities Improvements	Thanaleng	108.9
RLAF Depot Access Rd	Wattay	60.3

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
1. J42 HistSum, Jan, Feb 74; CINCPAC 120403Z Jan 74; SECDEF 5325/142201Z Feb 74.
2. CINCPAC 060511Z Dec 74.
3. J42 HistSum, Feb 74; CINCPAC 232127Z Feb 74.


(C) On 29 March, the Secretary of Defense advised that sufficient Southeast Asia MILCON funds were available to fund the underway projects at $650,000, but would require CSAF validation, as would the four programmed projects at $1.027 million. On 4 April, the CSAF advised CINCPAC of nonconcurrence with the CINCPAC proposal of 23 February. After a detailed resume' by the U.S. Ambassador to Laos of the circumstances which led to the contractual arrangements in Laos, the Defense Department approved the CINCPAC construction proposal and the CSAF concurred on 24 April.[1]


(C) On 10 May, the Secretary of Defense informed CINCPAC that the issuance of program directives for the construction had been deferred pending approval by the appropriate Congressional committees. CINCPAC solicited Defense Department action to obtain Congressional approval by 6 June 1974, which was the latest date that projects could be advertised to obligate funds by 30 June. The Defense Department approved implementation action for FY 1974 MASF projects on 31 May 1974. The program directive was issued the same day, and the CSAF advised all concerned of the DOD-approved fund levels: Headquarters U.S. Air Force 3300 (MILCON) appropriation amounting to $1.5069 million; Air Force Logistics Command 3400 (O&M) appropriation for $23,800; total, $1,5307 million.[2]


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
1. J42 HistSums, Mar, Apr 74; SECDEF 2699/292202Z Mar 74; CSAF 041943Z Apr 74; AMEMB Vientiane 8504/091106Z Apr 74; SECDEF 4461/171555Z Apr 74; CSAF 242227Z Apr 74.
2. J42 HistSums, May, Jun 74; SECDEF 4896/101349Z May 74; CINCPAC 310346Z May 74; SECDEF 7272/311736Z May 74; CSAF 102126Z Jun 74.














SECTION II--PLANS AND PROGRAMS

Communications-Electronics Planning, Thailand

(C) Planning for communications-electronics programs, and disposition of communications-electronics assets in Thailand after the conclusion of hostilities had been under study for several years. For some time such planning had been held in abeyance for the most part, but with reductions of U.S. Force levels, and withdrawal of tactical air units, further action to determine post-withdrawal requirements was prompted.

(S) In 1973, at the request of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications, COMUSMACTHAI summarized the development of the latest proposals and the decisions that had been reached so far. As outlined by COMUSMACTHAI, the original post-hostilities concept of September 1969 had envisioned the integration of the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) and U.S. long haul requirements into the U.S. Integrated Communications System (ICS), with the ultimate turnover of that system to the RTARF. CINCPAC and the JCS had concurred in this concept. The Secretary of Defense had not. The Defense Department had directed that maximum use be made of the Thai civil communications system--the Telephone Organization of Thailand (TOT)--to satisfy U.S. and allied requirements wherever practical and economical. The Department had further stated that excess equipment that would achieve RTARF combat readiness should be considered for turnover and that other equipment excess to the ICS should be considered for transfer to the Thai government for the TOT. This guidance was incorporated in the plan. As the ultimate goal was a reduction of the individual military services' long haul systems through the use of the TOT, integration of existing RTARF systems was not encouraged. A secondary goal of the guidance was enhancement of the civil system by leasing circuits from the TOT to fill U.S. as well as RTARF requirements.

(S) In January 1972, however, when MACTHAI queried the TOT regarding the possibility of establishing a specific communications link using U.S. provided equipment the response was that it was not commercially feasible. The TOT subsequently indicated it had no interest in any U.S. excess material; it had its own programs for growth and expansion and used radically different equipment. Also the TOT was very expensive compared to U.S.-operated systems. One lease package that was studied revealed that the phaseout of six U.S. sites that had an annual Operations and Maintenance cost of $881,385 would have an annual lease cost from the TOT of $1,777,292, which included a one-third discount for a minimum one-year lease. If the United States decided to lease, it would have to advance the money for additional multiplexing equipment a year to 18 months in advance before the circuits would be ready to use.

(C) COMUSMACTHAI, therefore, proposed a change in U.S. policy. His concept stated that once U.S. Forces had started redeploying, the fixed ICS system or the portions desired by the RTARF would be turned over to them in order to establish a Single Integrated Military Telecommunications System (SIMTS) to service all RTARF communications requirements, selected residual U.S. requirements, and urgent SEATO requirements during contingencies. As U.S. requirements decreased, portions of the system would be made available to the RTARF. The residual military ICS would then be an integrated U.S.-RTARF system, operated and maintained jointly, until, as the Thai became trained and capable, the system would be progressively turned over to them. Such a turnover, it was anticipated, would be under the Military Assistance Program. Its goal would be to not burden the Thai with equipment beyond their technical capabilities, or excessive to their needs, or beyond their personnel and funding resources.[1]

(S) On 4 September 1973 CINCPAC forwarded the MACTHAI proposal to the JCS. He recommended they approve the proposal and forward it to the Secretary of Defense. He noted that continuation of a viable long-haul communications system in Thailand was in keeping with U.S. goals, but Thai authorities had shown no interest in the current U.S. policy. A change in that policy was necessary before bilateral discussions could be undertaken with the Thai armed forces to determine a mutually agreeable course of action. CINCPAC reiterated his position that U.S. policy should support an RTARF long-haul system, not the TOT system.[2]

(C) No decision had been reached by the end of 1974, however. Planning continued in any case as forces were reduced. It was necessary to recognize and provide for communications support requirements for residual activities that would remain after the tactical mission was rescinded. COMUSMACTHAI had requested that Thailand agencies provide the expected duration of missions, the locations expected to require service after the withdrawal of tactical forces, statements concerning the acceptability of support by other than existing facilities (the U.S.-owned and operated ICS), and statements of acceptability of routing secure traffic over communications links owned, operated, and maintained by the RTARF or the TOT.[3]

(C) As determination of all residual user requirements was absolutely necessary for planning, CINCPAC recommended that COMUSMACTHAI host a conference of in-country communicators to refine requirements and investigate alternatives for their support. Accordingly, COMUSMACTHAI hosted such a conference on 16 and 17 September in Bangkok; representatives of CINCPACAF, the Defense Communi-

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1. COMUSMACTHAI ltr of 1 Jun 73, Subj: Change in US Policy.
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser 001094, 4 Sep 73, Subj: Change in U.S. Policy (U).
3. MACTHAI 250900Z Jun 74.

cations Agency, Pacific, and CINCPAC also attended. The JCS provided guidelines for agenda items, and noted that the overall objective should be to provide adequate communications support at minimum cost with minimum personnel requirements. The alternatives, the JCS continued, should include the use of existing facilities in reduced configuration as well as modernization with newer facilities.[1]

(C) The conferees established concentrations ("pockets") of residual requirements. Several alternatives were proposed for support of these requirements should U.S.-owned and operated systems be required. The consensus of all residual users was that reliability of future support must be on the order of that which had been provided by the ICS, but that the systems would not necessarily have to be U.S. controlled.

(S) The three pockets were to be independent and self-supporting. One was in the northwest. This was Ramasun Station, connected to Vientiane, Laos by an LRC-3 tropospheric scatter system, egressing Thailand by an installed MSC-46 satellite earth terminal at Ramasun. A second was in the northeast. This was Ko Kha, connected to Chiang Mai by an AN/TRC-90, egressing Thailand by installing an MSC-46 satellite earth terminal at Ko Kha. The MSC-46 located at Nakhon Phanom could be moved to Ko Kha to satisfy this proposal. In the south was the complex of Sattahip, Samae San, U-Tapao, and Bangkok, which would use the installed FRC microwave for transmission into the Thai commercial satellite via our entry point at Bang Pla.[2]

(C) At the end of 1974, however, all communications planning was at a standstill pending Washington-level permission to begin bilateral discussions with the Thai government to determine the equipment and facilities they desired for their SIMTS. Support of residual U.S. users might be provided by the SIMTS if ICS links to the projected "pockets" were turned over to the RTARF. Planning for support of residual users who might not be serviced by the SIMTS would be resumed as soon as Thai desires were known.[3]

Southeast Asia Facilities

(U) Certain matters regarding Southeast Asia communications came to CINCPAC's attention in 1974. The Wetwash Alpha cable from the Philippines to Vietnam was out of service for almost a month, from 27 January to 23 February, and the 439L cable between Vietnam and Thailand was out of service from 18 February to 1 March. The cableship NEPTUN repaired both breaks and the circuits to Southeast Asia disrupted by those outages were normalized.[4]

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1. JCS 5582/070053Z Sep 74; CINCPAC 210203Z Aug 74.
2. COMUSMACTHAI ltr, 10 Oct 74, Subj: Future Communications Planning - Thailand (U).
3. J6112 HistSum Nov 74.
4. J623 HistSum Feb 74.

(C) For Phnom Penh a better quality system was provided. From June 1970 to August 1973 communications for U.S. forces in Cambodia had been supplied over a 24-channel troposcatter system from Long Binh in Vietnam to the Pochentong Airport, outisde Phnom Penh. Because of deteriorating security at the Pochentong site, the Cambodia terminal was moved to a temporary site within the city, to Cambodian Armed Forces (FANK) headquarters. Permission to establish a permanent communication site within the city was obtained, and the new site (48R) was finished on 21 February 1974. It provided a better quality system for all Phnom Penh users.[1]

(U) The Defense Attache Office in Saigon requested approval of a proposed reconfiguration of Southeast Asia trunking facilities. The reconfiguration would change the U.S. cross-border group terminal points in Vietnam from Tan Son Nhut to Gia Dinh, and cross connect, through the RVN, trunks between the Philippines and Thailand. CINCPAC approved the reconfiguration and cutover plan.[2]

(U) In January the Commander of the Army Communications Command, Pacific requested that the possibility be investigated that the Federal Electric Corporation be given use of a Defense Department teletype circuit or Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) from Southeast Asia to the Continental United States. The company was the contractor for operations and maintenance of major communications systems and facilities in Vietnam and Thailand. Use of government circuits would save $100,000 a year in lease costs, which was an allowable contract cost, reimbursed by the government. The company already had an AUTODIN terminal at its New Jersey headquarters. CINCPAC approved the request, in accordance with JCS policy on AUTODIN use.[3]

Communications Satellites

(U) The Initial Defense Communications Satellite Project began with a successful launch on 16 June 1966 that placed 7 satellites in equatorial orbit. Seven more were launched on 18 January 1967 and another three on 1 July of that year, until a total of 27 were launched in Phase I. All of those launched exceeded their anticipated life span. On 23 October 1974, satellite 4-8 failed. At that time five remained fully useable and one marginally usable. As a result of the 4-8 failure, however, MUSCLE TRUNK to Washington was available only 51 percent of the time and the CINCPAC Voice Alert Network to Diego Garcia was available only 61 percent of the time.[4]

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1. J6231 HistSum Feb 74.
2. J6233 HistSum Mar 74, USDAO Saigon 020931Z Mar 74; CINCPAC 290215Z Mar 74.
3. J6233 HistSum Mar 74, CDRUSACCPAC 190115Z Jan 74; CINCPAC 020202Z Apr 74.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1966, Vol I, pp. 118; CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. I, p. 192; J6232 HistSum Oct 74.

(S) From the time of the 1966 launch an Advanced Defense Communications System was already being planned. CINCPAC's desires on the subject had been relayed to the JCS in 1966. He wanted early achievement of a high quality satellite capability that provided channels in quantity and continuous operation. He considered the requirement urgent, and proposed that the program be vigorously pursued with the most simple and uncomplicated design schemes that could be devised, even if sophisticated secure control circuits, anti-jam protection, and nuclear survivability features were not provided. He preferred a "soon-in-operation, high quality system with reasonable protection to a spoof-proof, jam-proof, highly protected facility in the 1980's."[1]

(S) Phase II had originally been designed to satisfy operational needs in the 1971-1975 time frame. In 1969 CINCPAC had provided the JCS with his own concept of satellite operation for Phase II. The concept was intended to support three categories of service: Defense Communications System mainline trunking, contingency (including restoral during nuclear war), and special users. CINCPAC also outlined his earth terminal deployment requirements.[2]

(C) In June 1973 the only remaining satellite in the initial Phase II launch suffered an anomaly and was lost. Although it did not serve the Pacific area, the loss was of interest to CINCPAC in light of the possible impact on the second launch scheduled for October 1973 and subsequently delayed until December.[3]

(U) On 13 December 1973 the Phase II Defense Satellite Communications System satellites were launched over the Continental United States. They were tested by the Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO) prior to their movement to operational locations, one to the Atlantic, the other over the western PACOM. Problems occurred in the amplifier gain controls on communications channels of both satellites. The cause of the problem was unknown. SAMSO testing was considered complete on 22 January 1974, although the problems encountered remained unresolved and under investigation. The problem was occurring infrequently (once every 1 to 2 weeks), with channel levels realigned to their original configuration, normally within less than an hour. Special Air Force testing began on 22 January and was completed by the end of the month. Satellites then began the move to their operational locations, with the PACOM satellite scheduled to arrive at 175°E on 25 February.[4]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1966, Vol. I, pp. 119-120.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1969, Vol. I, pp. 205-208.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 384.
4. Ibid.; J6123 HistSum Jan 74,

(U) The satellite actually became operational on 2 February, but because of continuing problems with the gain state changes, it suffered 9 hours and 30 minutes of communication outage in July. Because of this, the scheduled November launch of another satellite in the Phase II program was postponed by the JCS until February 1975 in order to try to get some of the problems fixed. Subsequently, as the problems continued, the launch was further postponed until May 1975. The following communications outages were directly related to DSCS II problems:[1]

August	- 7 hours, 19 minutes
September	- 2 hours, 40 minutes
October	- 3 hours, 9 minutes
November	- 2 days, 5 hours, 49 minutes
December	- 1 day, 1 hour, 46 minutes

Notwithstanding the problems, the DSCS satellite provided invaluable high capacity communications services for the PACOM and afforded dramatic improvement compared with the Phase I system.[2]

Consolidation of Telecommunications Centers on Oahu (COTCO)

(U) In June 1972 the JCS had advised CINCPAC of increased pressure to improve the speed of service of record communications and of concern for the mounting costs of military telecommunications. Consolidation of telecommunications facilities in the same geographic area was considered feasible, and on 8 September 1972 CINCPAC had submitted a concept plan for Consolidation of Telecommunications Centers on Oahu (COTCO). The Naval Electronics Systems Command was to be the responsible agency. On 6 September 1973 the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications, subsequently designated the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Telecommunications and Command, Control (DTACC), approved a JCS Joint Action Group consolidation plan and tasked the Navy for implementation. The implementation plan for Oahu was forwarded to the JCS on 15 January 1974. CINCPAC had concurred in the plan and recommended implementation. CINCPAC's role concerned determination of requirements.[3]

(U) Revisions to the plan, received at CINCPAC's headquarters in late June, provided additional privacy safeguards for Special Category messages.[4]

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1. J6232 HistSums Oct, Dec 74.
2. J6/Memo/0007-75, 5 Sep 75, Subj: 1974 CINCPAC Command History; review of draft.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 372-374; J6123 HistSum Jan 74.
4. J612 HistSum Jun 74.

(U) The JCS submitted the plan to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on 29 November. In the initial phase, which was to be implemented by July 1977, the eight manual Navy communications centers were to be automated by extending service from the Local Digital Message Exchanges (LDMX) at Camp Smith and Makalapa. (Camp Smith was the headquarters for CINCPAC and the CG, FMFPAC; Makalapa was the CINCPACFLT headquarters.) The investment of $2 million was expected to save 249 manpower spaces and be amortized in 16 months. The second phase (FY 78) called for development of a highly automated message system to reduce the number of separate communications processors required on the island. It had the potential for an additional manpower savings of 226 spaces. At an anticipated cost of $25 million for research and development (software, system integration, an advanced crypto scheme), it also had the potential for joint worldwide deployment and use. The prototype was expected to be on Oahu in March 1978 for a field test.

(U) The JCS memorandum of 29 November stated that consolidation on Oahu would be substantially completed during the near-term phase. Longer range automation, however, promised true writer-to-reader service. Savings on Oahu, beyond those achieved through the near-term program (by July 1977), did not alone warrant the $25 million investment, but the Defense Department-wide potential was considered to justify continued development.[1]

Standardization of IFF/Safe Passage Procedures

(S) On 8 September 1973 CINCPAC had advised the JCS that a review of IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) Mark X Selective Identification Feature (SIF) standing operating procedures for the identification of friendly military aircraft in general war revealed separate identification procedures in the North American Air Defense Command, the Atlantic Command, and the PACOM. As operational requirements involved deployment of forces from one geographical area to another, CINCPAC proposed that a standard emergency identification maneuver be adopted.[2]

(S) CINCNORAD concurred with the CINCPAC proposal and further proposed that CINCPAC adopt KAA-63 procedures and allow NORAD to assign Mode 2 codes

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1. J6126 Point Papers, 12 and 26 December 1974, Subj: Consolidation of Telecommunications Centers on Oahu - COTCO.
2. CINCPAC 080320Z Sep 73. Procedures were contained in the JCS-produced Allied Communications Publication 160, U.S. Supplement 1(A), IFF MARK X (SIF) Standing Operating Procedures for the Identification of Friendly Military Aircraft in General War (U), and CINCPAC Ser 00927, 3 Jun 66, Subj: Procedures for the use of IFF Mark X (SIF) in the Pacific Command, Chapter V, Procedures for Special Operations (U).

for Strategic Air Command/Military Airlift Command safe passage through the three areas. As a result of various comments and recommendations, CINCNORAD convened a working group conference in December 1973 at his headquarters at Colorado Springs to discuss proposed changes to procedures. The results of the conference were forwarded to the unified commands for comment on 14 December 1973.[1]

(S) Staffing within the PACOM resulted in some objections and counter-proposals, however, and on 13 February 1974 CINCPAC proposed that the JCS host a follow-on working conference with expanded participation to consider unique PACOM requirements, capabilities, and operational procedures.[2]

(S) The JCS convened such a conference 5 and 6 March at the Pentagon. Agreement was reached by all participants. The recommended revisions were forwarded on 8 March to applicable unified and specified commands, and by the end of the month, all had concurred.[3]

(U) As a result, a new supplement (ACP 160 US SUPP-1(B)) was approved for planning purposes to be effective 1 January 1975. A revised CINCPAC procedures instruction was also prepared; the effective date was also to be 1 January.

(S) Because of delayed deliveries of the new Mode 3 codes to be used in conjunction with the new operating procedures, CINCPAC recommended delay of implementation until 1 March 1975. CINCSAC, however, objected to the delay, as materials and instructions had already been distributed. Coordination resulted in a compromise date of 1 February 1975, and no further delays or problems were anticipated.[4]

Program Budget Decision 235

(S) In November 1970 the JCS had approved a program called, "An Urgent Upgrade of PACOM Command and Control Record Communications Capability." Subsequently, on 5 December 1973, the Office of the Secretary of Defense Program Budget Decision 235 advised that "reliance upon DCS [Defense Communications System] restoration priority system and communications alternate routing procedures should be utilized as a means of establishing continuity of service."

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1. CINCNORAD 141720Z Dec 73.
2. CINCPAC 130329Z Feb 74.
3. JCS 5225/082124Z Mar 74; CINCSAC 181341Z Mar 74; CINCLANT 122014Z Mar 74; CINCNORAD 271935Z Mar 74; CINCPAC 291850Z Mar 74.
4. J621 HistSums Jun, Dec 74; CINCPAC 060159Z Dec 74; CINCSAC 062315Z Dec 74; JCS 7047/191746Z Dec 74.

If implemented, this would have had a detrimental effect on CINCPAC's upgraded program. The original decision was restricted to Navy funding, but the precedent established could also have been carried over to the other Services. The net effect in the PACOM was to nullify the dual-homed, dual-access AUTODIN (Automatic Digital Network) capability established to support command and control message delivery to specified addressees. Dual terminal subscribers accessed to different AUTODIN switches would access a single switch. In the event of a switch failure, CINCPAC or his component/subordinate commands would be isolated.[1]

(C) CINCPAC first expressed his concern on 12 February, and followed with a 1 March message that provided the rationale for his objections, expressing doubt that JCS message delivery requirements could be met if the proposed reductions were accomplished. He requested a review of the matter with the objective of assuring retention of essential PACOM command control communications capabilities.[2]

(C) On 17 May a JCS memorandum referenced and attached a copy of a memo from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) that stated, in part, "A further review indicates that reliance under the DCS restoration priority system and alternate routing procedures to ensure continuity of service is not an acceptable alternative for selected subscribers in the event of switch failure. Accordingly, dual homing should be considered as an alternate means of satisfying the needs of these specific customers." In view of this conditional recission of PBD 235 and a review of AUTODIN terminal dual homing criteria, the JCS concluded that no further action was necessary.[3]

(U) Follow-on PACOM action, which preserved the dual-home, dual-access concept, utilized "channel packing" techniques to realize cost reductions without sacrificing effectiveness.[4]

Hawaii Switch Reconfiguration

(U) Under study at CINCPAC headquarters was a proposal forwarded through CINCPACFLT from the Commander, 14th Naval District for reconfiguration of the

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1. J622 HistSum Dec 74; COMNAVTELCOM 052343Z Feb 74; J6/Memo/024-74, 4 Mar 74, Subj: Realignment Command and Control Communications Circuits, PACOM (U). The 1970 CINCPAC upgrade program was called IIP S/PP 8-70.
2. CINCPAC 120219Z Feb and 012049Z Mar 74.
3. J6M 357-75, 17 May 74, Subj: Dual Homing of AUTODIN Access Lines; Memorandum ASD(C) to Assistant Secretary of the Navy (FM), 22 Apr 74, Subj: Dual Homing of AUTODIN Access Lines.
4. J622 HistSum Dec 74.

Hawaii switch. The system, which was expected to improve service and reduce costs, had been approved by concerned agencies in Hawaii. The concept envisioned class marking of administrative telephones; rehoming of service two-wire users to respective Dial Central Offices for AUTOVON (Automatic Voice Network) access; disestablishment of the Hawaii switch; activation of the Hawaii AUTOVON Assistance Operator facility as a manual interface for all two-wire users; and repositioning of a portion of the Hawaii switch to the AUTOVON facility to provide tactical interface capability. It would be necessary to submit the proposal to the JCS and the Defense Communications Agency for the necessary waivers and approval.[1]

Closure of Electronic Switching Center, Kunia Proposed

(C) The Electronic Switching Center (ESC) on Oahu was owned, operated, and maintained at CINCPAC's Alternate Command Facility at Kunia by the Naval Communications Station, Honolulu. The ESC system provided dedicated communications service to 90 Oahu subscribers at an annual cost of $79,600. It was a dedicated, four-wire, 476-line system capable of manual interface of the Automatic Voice Network and other voice circuits through the Hawaii switch. ESC AUTOVON calls amounted to only four percent of the total AUTOVON volume, however. Some minor user inconvenience might be experienced initially, but services formerly provided by the ESC would still be available. CINCPAC proposed deactivation of the system at such time as any required alternate communications for subscribers were available and all concerned agreed.[2]

Oahu Microwave Survey

(S) The presence in Hawaiian waters of the Soviet intelligence collection ship BAROGRAF prompted a request for information concerning this type of vessel and the types and amounts of intelligence available when such ships operated in Hawaiian waters. In a 20 September paper the National Security Agency/Central Security Service Pacific (NCPAC) summarized the Soviet ocean collection program, discussed Oahu microwave communications, and made certain recommendations.

(S) One aspect of the increased deployment of Soviet seapower, NCPAC noted, had been an extensive effort to improve their afloat intelligence capabilities. Over the past 17 years the Soviets had developed and deployed a fleet of small surface ships dedicated to intelligence purposes. The Soviet designation for these ships was "KORABL' RAZVEDKI" (KRZ); the U.S. term was "Auxiliary General Intelligence (AGI)." Their mission was to monitor activities

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1. J623 HistSum Dec 74.
2. J623 HistSum Dec 74; CINCPAC 120202Z Mar 74; J6/Memo/672-74, 7 Jun 74, Subj: Electronic Switching Center (ESC); COMFOURTEEN PEARL 020010Z Nov 74.

of Western naval forces by visual, electromagnetic, and probably acoustic means. The NCPAC also discussed several previous surveys of on-island military microwave communications, but none of these had been completely conclusive.

(S) NCPAC recommended the gathering of pertinent data concerning Oahu microwave links. This was to be a joint effort between NCPAC and CINCPAC's Communications-Data Processing Directorate. If warranted by the findings, it was recommended that CINCPACFLT be tasked to deploy an afloat platform to assess vulnerability. A joint COMSEC survey was to be conducted to determine corrective measures. Admiral Gayler approved these recommendations and broadened the scope of the effort to include commercial microwave links.[1]

(S) On 24 December CINCPAC advised that a three-phase plan had been developed for execution early in 1975. In Phase I, data was to be gathered on military and commercial microwave links that carried unsecure military voice channels. Frequencies and transmission paths would be plotted. In Phase II, CINCPACFLT was tasked to deploy an afloat platform around the periphery of Oahu to determine the interceptability of those signals 12 to 50 miles offshore. Phase III called for a joint COMSEC survey to determine the content of interceptable signals and identify corrective measures.[2]

(S) Earlier, the Defense Communications Agency, Pacific had been tasked to provide information concerning those commercial microwave links that carried military traffic. The Hawaiian Telephone Company advised that information on commercial facilities would not be available until mid-January 1975. Upon receipt of that information it would be combined with that already compiled and Phase II could commence. This was planned for the last week in January.[3]

Use of GFE Microwave System in Hawaii

(U) On 18 June the Hawaiian Telephone Company advised the Defense Commercial Communications Office, Pacific (DECCO PAC) that the company had recently made sizeable capital expenditures to improve facilities on Oahu and between Oahu and Kauai in order to best serve the needs of the Defense Department. In the preceding few months, however, there had been a trend noted toward concelling commercial facilities in favor of Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) microwave facilities, leaving a residue of very short tail segments utilizing the Defense Automatic Telephone System (DATS) facilities,

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1. J6251 HistSum Oct 74; NCPAC Paper of 20 Sep 74, Subj: Soviet Intelligence Collection Activities in Hawaiian Waters.
2. CINCPAC 242347Z Dec 74.
3. CINCPAC 300215Z Nov 74; J625 HistSum Dec 74.

and, in turn, leaving the upgraded facilities idle and non-revenue producing. The company believed this situation contrary to Defense Department policy and unfair in view of the company's expenditures to meet DECCO's requirements. They were concerned that a similar situation would occur regarding the company's planned digital network on Oahu. They asked for a statement regarding intended utilization of company-provided facilities for current and future Defense Department requirements.[1]

(U) DECCO PAC sought clarification from the phone company. The DECCO PAC understanding was that on future requirements for interconnection to GFE microwave facilities, the company would provide only the basic commercial grade circuit with no additional hardware of any kind. The company outlined its intentions in a letter on 11 July, noting that certain actions would be performed under protest and without prejudice to the position stated in the original letter of 18 June.[2]

(U) After receipt of the first telephone company letter, a special meeting of the PACOM Circuit Working Group was convened to consider the matter. The DECCO PAC representative stated that there appeared to be nothing in the tariff that prohibited the company from doing what it planned. Defense Department and Bureau of the Budget directives clearly favored use of commercial facilities when they were available. The company was not denying the use of the microwave, they were saying that it appeared that use of the system was in direct competition with parallel commercial facilities, and therefore they would not assist the user in any way to make the system work. At a subsequent meeting on 28 August the impact of planned "bare wire" interconnections was considered to be minimal by all of the Communications Validating Offices. The Services had varying numbers of circuits with leased tail segments: Army, 0; Air Force, 7; and Navy, 13. CINCPAC had 10.[3]

(U) On 19 September the Defense Communications Agency advised the phone company that they did not view the use of the GFE microwave system as contrary to Defense Department policy. The Government had a general intention to rely on commercial services when they were adequate and available, but the Department nevertheless had an obligation to provide a training base in certain critical areas and in the case of critical communications to insure that redundancy and survivability existed. The microwave system was considered in

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1. Ltr, Mr. J. K. Shannon, Director of Government Communications, Hawaiian Telephone Company to Chief, DECCO PAC, 18 Jun 73.
2. Ltr DECCO PAC to HawTel, 21 Jun 73, n.s.; Ltr, Shannon, HawTel, to DECCO PAC, 11 Jul 73, n.s.
3. J61232 HistSum Jul, Aug 73.

this light and "for these reasons you can anticipate that use of the system will continue." The DCA could not specify, however, the extent to which the Government system would be used. They noted concern about the phone company's policy statement about not providing specified levels, signaling, or circuit conditioning in those instances of DATS interconnection with Government-provided facilities. It appeared contrary to agreements for the system contractually, and from a tariff viewpoint the application of such policy appeared to have the effect of denying service to a customer and clearly discriminating against the customer's right to interconnect with customer-provided facilities. Such a policy could force additional procurement and utilization of Government facilities.[1]

(U) The company replied that it had taken the position that the military system in effect competed with commercial facilities, thereby negating the potential for diversity, broad band restoration, and "high density" rate applications afforded by a single integrated communications system shared by commercial and military applications. They asked for a joint company-Defense study of existing and projected private line services in Hawaii.[2]


(U) In November the Defense Communications Agency asked that CINCPAC advise as to the requirement for retaining the GFE microwave and on the impact on operational requirements of redundancy, survivability, and on CINCPAC's command and control posture should the system be inactivated.[3]


(U) In February 1974 CINCPAC tasked the component commands to prepare an economic analysis; the Defense Communications Agency was tasked to consolidate the information. CINCPAC later tasked the components to provide an official comment on retention of the GFE microwave, and a list of lease requirements if the GFE was not retained.[4]


(U) On 15 June CINCPAC advised all concerned that based on 1973 costs, it appeared cost effective to justify retention of at least part of the GFE microwave system. Therefore, expansion of the study by four years, to include through 1977, would be necessary to determine the effect of replacement costs, in any.[5]


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1. Ltr, DCA, Washington, D.C. to Hawaiian Telephone Company, 19 Sep 73.
2. Ltr, Shannon of HawTel to DCA, Washington, D.C., Regulatory and Leased Communications Office, 1 Nov 73.
3. DCA WASH DC 011451Z Nov 73.
4. CINCPAC 070030Z Feb 74 and 300346Z Mar 74.
5. CINCPAC 150157Z Jun 74; J6232 HistSum Dec 74.









NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY (P. 726)

[redacted]

PAL

Frequency Management

(U) In matters of frequency management, on 19 December CINCPAC promulgated a new policy requiring review and update of all radio frequency assignments on the fifth anniversary of their assignment date. This policy resulted in the identification and deletion of approximately 2,000 unused frequencies, efficient utilization of scarce spectrum resources, and more accurate and reliable records.2

(U) The annual Radio Frequency Managers' Conference was held 24-28 June in Taipei, hosted by COMUSTDC. The 45 attendees included frequency managers from throughout the PACOM and the Joint Frequency Panel in Washington, D.C. Topics included national level frequency policy matters, research and development, trends and future prognosis of the radio frequency spectrum, and discussions of on-going frequency coordination problem areas. The group also toured the Chinese Taipei Intelsat earth station.3

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1. CINCPACFLT 232312Z Dec 74; CINCPAC 312202Z Dec 74.
2. J6241 HistSum Dec 74; CINCPAC 190225Z Dec 74, which cited CINCPAC 030152Z Oct 74.
3. J624 HistSum Jun 74; CINCPAC 060033Z Apr 74.

(U) In Hawaii, on 25 September a quarterly Joint Frequency Coordinating Committee conference was held at the Air Force's 6593 Instrumentation Squadron on Oahu. In attendance were 27 frequency managers from commands in Hawaii.[1]

(U) In connection with the transfer of Eniwetok from the USAF Space and Missile Test Center to the administration of the Defense Nuclear Agency, frequency management matters were coordinated by CINCPAC staff personnel. The turnover action was completed in the spring of 1974.[2]

(U) The frequency management billet on the staff of the CINCPAC Representative Guam/TTPI had been cancelled in 1973. CINCPACFLT recommended that the frequency manager of the Naval Station Guam assume those duties. CINCPAC agreed, and sought and received the concurrence of the Commander, Naval Telecommunications Command in Washington. The Naval Communications Station Guam picked up this function for manning and operational support.[3]

(U) CINCPAC monitored the efforts by COMUS Japan to clear certain radio frequencies proposed by the U.S. Military Communications Electronics Board (MCEB) with the Japanese government. The Japan Radio Regulatory Bureau had declined to accept the Air Force Satellite Communication System frequency plan, and CINCPAC had so advised the Joint Frequency Panel on 26 May 1973. In June of that year an approach for Fleet Satellite Communications/Air Force Satellite Communications frequency clearance was also unsuccessful. The Radio Regulatory Bureau (RRB) did not feel it was the appropriate channel for negotiations on system requirements. The RRB was unwilling to commit the Japanese government in any way, either by concurring or nonconcurring. The MCEB advised in April 1974 that the U.S. view was that aspects of the system that were causing concern--the construction of earth terminals--did not require negotiation with Japanese authorities or the approval of that government as they would be located on existing U.S.-held real estate. The MCEB believed that the existing Status of Forces Agreement authorized construction and operation of those terminals within existing facilities and areas. They requested that the frequency plans be resubmitted. At a meeting in Japan on 24 April it was agreed that a precise proposal for frequencies that would be used (transmitted or received) from specific locations in Japan would be received and considered.[4]

(U) In one last frequency management matter, CINCPAC recommended on 27 November that the PACOM area Coast Guard be included in the standard MIJI program. (MIJI: Meaconing, Interference, Jamming, and Intrusion.) This was

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1. J624 HistSum Oct 74; CINCPAC 062102Z Sep 74.
2. J624 HistSum Jan 74.
3. J624 HistSum Feb 74; CINCPAC 080030Z Feb 74; COMNAVTELCOM WASH DC 121452Z Feb 74.
4. J624 HistSum Apr 74; US MCEB 171747Z Apr 74; COMUS Japan 010102Z May 74.

to assist in resolution of radio frequency interference to Coast Guard facilities. If approved, such a policy would make the Coast Guard interference reporting system compatible to that of the Defense Department and allow a broader review base for reporting, thereby increasing the probability of interference resolution. The Air Force Special Communication Center at Kelly Air Force Base, Texas, would further enhance Coast Guard interference resolution through data base participation and automatic analysis of each reported instance of interference.[1]

Korean Air Force Access to CINCPAC C-E Instruction

(U) In January CINCPACAF had requested authority for access by the Republic of Korea Air Force to Chapter 14 of the PACOM Communications-Electronics instruction. Chapter 14 concerned restoration priorities for military communications channels. They also requested Appendix I to Chapter 14, which was a copy of National Communications System (NCS) Manual 1-68 and Defense Department Directive C-4605.2 of 17 October 1968. Both the chapter and the appendix were CONFIDENTIAL. The 314th Air Division at Osan had requested release of the publication as a guideline for establishing and priorities for restoring circuits on the PEACE FORTUNE system, thereby assuring that both USAF and ROKAF circuits on this system received equitable treatment.[2]

(U) CINCPAC approved the release of Chapter 14 on 14 February; the release of Appendix I would require Defense Department approval. CINCPACAF requested that CINCPAC obtain such approval, and CINCPAC requested authority from the National Communications System. The manager of that system deemed release not appropriate, but advised that a modified version, from which features relating exclusively to U.S. interests were deleted, had been prepared and released to NATO. The modified version remained CONFIDENTIAL, but could be released. CINCPAC requested such release and the material was supplied to the 314th Air Division for use by the ROKAF.[3]

CINCPAC Message Traffic

(U) CINCPAC's message traffic was handled with that of the Fleet Marine Force Pacific by the consolidated Camp Smith Message Center under the Naval Communications Station, Honolulu. The tabulation below was prepared using the center's statistical records for messages received and dispatched and the percentage of each attributable to the CINCPAC headquarters.

---

1. J624 HistSum Dec 74; CINCPAC 271902Z Nov 74.
2. CINCPACAF 301938Z Jan 74.
3. CINCPAC 140219Z Feb 74; CINCPACAF 152200Z Mar 74; CINCPAC 270234Z Mar 74; MGR NCS WASHDC 292035Z Mar 74.

	Messages Sent	Messages Received
January	4,944	24,839
February	4,403	22,649
March	5,018	24,952
April	5,259	27,619
May	4,808	27,424
June	3,981	23,869
July	3,864	24,329
August	4,797	25,006
September	4,216	26,384
October	4,133	27,214
November	4,816	26,920
December	4,032	25,105
Monthly Average	4,524	25,526

Telecommunications Service Requests and Orders

(U) Telecommunications Service Requests and Orders originating within the PACOM required CINCPAC concurrence or approval. In the list that follows are the requests and orders on which CINCPAC took action. CINCPAC-originated requirements, such as for the CINCPAC Voice and Teletype Alert Networks and the All-Source Information Center are not shown:[1]

	Telecommunications Service Requests				Telecommunications Service Orders
	Army	Navy	Air Force	DIA	
January	56	20	70	10	33
February	88	24	74	12	23
March	55	44	110	2	18
April	33	28	78	3	16
May	32	37	69	7	19
June	20	28	41	2	9
July	21	23	61	7	24
August	42	26	36	3	24
September	15	6	285	8	9
October	14	15	76	2	11
November	24	7	88	4	18
December	15	52	78	0	8
Totals	415	310	1,066	60	212

Grand Total (Requests): 1,851

---

1. J6233 HistSums Feb, Apr, Dec 74.

Collective Routing Indicator Tests

(U) During January Collective Routing Indicator tests were conducted jointly by CINCPAC and the Defense Communications Agency, Pacific. These were to test the capability of the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) to handle fast reaction message traffic, in conjunction with the implementation of the SPP/8-70 program. The preliminary collective results of the seven tests indicated that of the 380 reporting addressees, 333 (over 90 percent) received the messages in under the 10-minute time limit.[1]

(U) In March, CINCPAC requested a new pair of Collective Routing Indicators entitled "PACRED" for the purpose of disseminating readiness information to PACOM forces. The request was approved by the JCS and the Defense Communications Agency assigned them. They were utilized for transmission of fast reaction messages to PACOM units. Final implementation messages were sent 25 April.[2]

---

1. J6223 HistSum Jan 74.
2. CINCPAC 190213Z Mar 74; JCS 1389/281906Z Mar 74; DCA 012029Z Apr 74; CINCPAC 252107Z Apr 74; CINCPAC 252109Z Apr 74. The new CRI were RUCRPRA and RUCRPRB.

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC COMMAND HISTORY


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Office of the Joint Secretary
Headquarters CINCPAC, FPO San Francisco 96610

CAMP H. M. SMITH, HAWAII
1975

~~TOP SECRET~~



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CHAPTER VII

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

SECTION I--A REVIEW

Fiscal Year 1974

(U) The Security Assistance portion of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) was comprised of the grant aid Military Assistance Program (MAP); cash and credit Foreign Military Sales (FMS); excess defense articles (EDA); the Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) program; security supporting assistance (SSA); and, war reserve stocks for allies (WRSA). For the first time in the history of the Security Assistance program, funds for fiscal year (FY) 1973 were not appropriated in a total fiscal year appropriations measure. Rather, the FY 73 program was funded by Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) throughout the fiscal year, but at levels considerably below those requested by the Administration. The FY 73 CRA established grant aid MAP at $550.6 million versus $780 million requested; SSA was set at $600 million versus $840 million requested; and FMS levels were set at $400 million versus the requested $527 million. The FY 74 appropriations bill was signed on 2 January 1974, and the final figures were, as in the previous year, considerably less than requested. MAP was set at $450 million compared with $652 million requested; SSA at 112.5 million, or $12.5 million more than requested; but, FMS at $325 million, compared with $525 million requested. Key provisions of the FAA applicable to FY 74 included:[1]

- No funds under the FAA could be used to conduct any police or related training in a foreign country. Existing Agency for International Development (AID) programs could not be transferred to some other agency of the Government to avoid this prohibition.

- Whenever possible, EDA were to be provided instead of new procurement. A ceiling of $150 million was established on the amount of foreign-located EDA which could be granted in any fiscal year without charge to MAP funds. Over that ceiling, MAP funds were to bear the "actual costs" of grant EDA, as well as the expenses incurred by the Department of Defense (DOD) in the rebuilding and rehabilitation of those items.

- The number of countries eligible to receive grant aid, other than training, was reduced from 40 to 31.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 405-414.

• Although the Administration had proposed the separation of grant military training from MAP, the FY 74 Act retained that item as an integral part of MAP. The worldwide line item for MAP training (MAPT) was $27.5 million.

• Section 514 of the Act, which had required MAP recipients to deposit an amount equal to ten percent of grant articles and services, was repealed. Billings for foreign currency payments under Section 514 ended with deliveries for the quarter ending 31 December 1973.

• As a partial offset to the repealed section, a new condition of eligibility was established. Beginning 1 July 1974, funds received by a foreign country in disposing of U.S.-furnished equipment and materiel were to be paid to the U.S. Government to meet its local currency expenses, including educational and cultural exchange activities.

• Authority was provided to draw down defense articles from DOD and Service stocks up to a ceiling of $250 million. Use of this authority required a presidential determination that such drawdown was in the security interest of the United States. The intent of Congress was expressed that, of the $250 million total drawdown authority, up to $200 million be used to provide emergency military assistance to Cambodia.

• An amendment to the Act required that the MASF program for Laos revert to standard MAP effective 30 June 1974. The remaining country under the MASF program, Vietnam, was not affected by this change.

• A new section of the Act prohibited the programming of assistance to any country in which: (a) a military base, constructed or maintained and operated with U.S. funds, was located and, (b) U.S. personnel carried out military operations from those bases, "unless and until the President has determined that the Government of such country has, consistent with security, authorized access, on a regular basis, to bona fide news media correspondents of the United States to such military base."

• The Act re-stated the prohibition of fund expenditures under any law to finance "military or paramilitary operation by the United States in or over Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia." Also prohibited was any fund expenditure under any law to finance "any military or paramilitary combat operations" by third country forces in Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam or Thailand.

Fiscal Year 1975

(U) On 24 April 1975, President Nixon transmitted to Congress his request for FY 75 foreign assistance funds. Of the $5.177 billion requested for all foreign assistance, $985 million was for MAP, $386 million for SSA, and $555 million for FMS. On 30 June 1974, the President signed the CRA for first quarter FY 75 which limited MAP funding to administrative expenses, transportation costs, training, essential items for Cambodia and Laos, and long leadtime procurement of F-5E components.[1]

(U) On 17 October, CRA was extended through the adjournment of the 93rd Congress, and, on 21 October, the DOD authorized the funding of transportation and administrative expenses pending issuance of MAP funding guidelines. The DOD guidelines for the first quarter CRA had allowed an annual rate of $800 million, based on $450 million FY 74 MAP; $250 million Cambodia drawdown; and $100 million for Laos under MASF for FY 74. The second quarter annual rate was reduced to $550 million because the CRA bill excluded the drawdown allowance of $250 million. By 1 November 1974, the above CRA guidelines had allowed no funding of materiel in the PACOM programs other than $82 million for Cambodia; $5 million for Laos; $439,000 for the Philippines; and, $78,000 for Thailand. The basic authorizing legislation for FY 75 foreign assistance was still awaiting action by both the Senate and the House.[2]

(U) Meanwhile, the Congress had removed military aid to Vietnam from the MASF category and established a DOD-controlled single account called Defense Assistance to Vietnam (DAV). As enacted, the bill was Public Law 93-437, signed on 8 October 1974 by President Ford. When the President signed the Defense Appropriations Bill, he noted that the $700 million stipulated in the bill for DAV was inadequate to provide for all of the critical needs of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) if their enemies continued to press their attack.[3]

(U) The FAA authorization bill for FY 75 was passed in December 1974. It authorized $600 million worldwide for MAP and a credit ceiling of $872 million for FMS. A $200 million ceiling was placed on MAP for Cambodia, including packing, crating, handling and transportation (PCH&T).[4]

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1. Dept of State Bulletin, 13 May 74, "President Nixon Requests Funds for Foreign Assistance for Fiscal Year," p. 531; CINCPAC ALPHA 115/020212Z Jul 74; J81 Talking Paper, 10 Oct 74, Subj: Security Assistance.
2. CINCPAC ALPHA 40/220310Z Oct 74; J81 Point Paper, 5 Nov 74, Subj: Military Assistance Funding; SECDEF 4158/042112Z Oct 74.
3. Dept of State Bulletin, 4 Nov 74, "President Ford Signs Defense Bill; Cautions on Vietnam Funding," p. 616; J81 Point Paper, 10 Oct 74, Subj: Security Assistance.
4. J8 Weekly Executive Brief (WEB), 16-22 Dec 74.

SECTION II

PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT

PACOM Security Assistance Funds

(U) On 25 March 1974, Secretary of State Kissinger responded to a 13 March letter from Senator Edward M. Kennedy on various aspects of United States policy toward Indochina. Senator Kennedy had expressed concern, inter alia, over a 6 March message from Ambassador to Vietnam Graham Martin which commented on a recent press article on the United States role in Vietnam. The Secretary assured the Senator that:[1]

* * * * *

> ...I do not believe the Ambassador is suggesting a cause-and-effect relationship between decisions in Hanoi and the views of any individual Members of Congress or their staffs. What he is describing is a very real and sophisticated propaganda effort by North Viet-Nam to bring to bear on a wide spectrum of Americans its own special view of the situation in Indochina. The Ambassador believes, and in this he has our full confidence and support, that we must counter these distortions emanating from Hanoi and continue to provide the best answers to the concerned questions many Americans have about our Indochina policy.

(U) An enclosure to Kissinger's letter provided the MASF ceilings for assistance to Vietnam and Laos, noting that the FY 75 figure was for Vietnam only, since Laos assistance would be changed to MAP funding on 1 July 1974 (in $billions):[2]

Year	Ceiling	New Obligational Authority
FY 73	2.735	2.735
FY 74	1.126	.9075
FY 75	1.6	1.450

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1. Dept of State Bulletin, 22 Apr 74, "Secretary Kissinger Responds to Senator Kennedy on Indochina Policy Issues," p. 425.
2. Ibid., p. 428.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

DOLLAR GUIDELINES

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1974

COUNTRY	1974 CEILING BY FISCAL YEAR (THOUSANDS OF DOLLARS)						
	74(1)	75(1)	76(2)	77(2)	78(2)	79(2)	80(2)
AFGHANISTAN	200	200	200	200	200	200	200
CAMBODIA	375,012	275,000(3)	180,000	60,000	55,000	50,000	45,000
CHINA	28,700(4)	400	500	500	500	500	500
INDIA	214	100	120	100	100	100	100
INDONESIA	12,200	22,700	19,254	17,000	16,700	14,500	12,500
KOREA	78,000	161,500	55,000	40,000	300	200	200
LAOS	79,900(5)	85,200	48,000	36,600	33,600	33,300	32,800
MALAYSIA	200	285	300	300	300	300	300
NEPAL	25	35	30	30	30	30	30
PAKISTAN	235	280	350	300	250	250	250
PHILIPPINES	13,800	17,900	17,354	18,000	18,000	18,000	18,000
SRI LANKA	1	15	15	15	15	15	15
THAILAND	29,773	56,000	40,254	30,000	25,000	20,000	10,000
VIETNAM	1,059,200(5)	700,000(6)	1,000,000	950,000	850,000	700,000	550,000
REGIONAL COSTS	300	365	360	360	360	360	360
TOTAL PACOM	1,677,760	1,319,980	1,361,737	1,153,405	1,000,355	837,755	670,255

SOURCE: J812

(1) Source: FY75 Congressional Presentation Document (CPD) as revised by SECSTATE 032149Z Jun 74

(2) Source: FY76-80 Program Objective Memorandum (POM)

(3) Source: Section 655 Foreign Assistance Act of 1974. Includes Section 506 Drawdown Authority.

(4) Includes "Enhance Plus" Funding

(5) Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF)

(6) Source: Public Law 93-437, 8 October 1974

SOURCE: J8

(U) As discussed in Section I of this chapter, security assistance to Vietnam for FY 75 was authorized separately under DAV for $700 million. The MAP program throughout the PACOM for fiscal years 1974 and 1975 follows (in $ millions):[1]

Country	FY 74 Funded	FY 75 Proposed	FY 75 Funded
Afghanistan	.159	.200	.212
Cambodia(1)	375.012	362.500	254.525
China(2)	28.698	.400	2.712
India(4)	.203	.100	.054
Indonesia	12.209	22.700	15.850
Korea	78.056	161.500	82.600
Laos(3)	-	85.200	20.704
Malaysia(4)	.174	.285	.283
Nepal(4)	.025	.035	.032
Pakistan(4)	.226	.280	.277
Philippines	13.834	17.900	21.010
Sri Lanka(4)	-	.015	-
Thailand	29.773	56.000	30.126
PACOM Regional	.300	.365	.364
TOTALS	538.669	707.480	428.749

(1) FY 74 includes $250 million in drawdown stocks. FY 75 includes $180.210 million in MAP and $74.315 in drawdown stocks.
(2) FY 74 includes $28.3 million in ENHANCE PLUS payback.
(3) Service funded in FY 74.
(4) Training Only.

(C) On 12 August 1974, the DOD Comptroller advised that the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 imposed requirements and changes which affected the formulation and presentation of future budget estimates. The significant changes with an immediate effect on security assistance budget input requirements were the fiscal year change from 1 July-30 June to 1 October-30 September beginning in FY 77; the requirement for a five-year MAP projection to the Congress beginning in FY 76; and, the need to prepare a three-month transition budget for the period 1 July-30 September 1976 in addition to the

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1. J81 Talking Paper, 10 Oct 74, Subj: Security Assistance; SECDEF 4367/ 032113Z Jul 75.

normal FY 76 budget. The transition to the new procedures commenced with the preparation and transmission of the FY 76 budget. All fiscal year designations beginning with FY 77 denoted the 1 October-30 September year.[1]

(S) By Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) of 29 July 1974, the DOD projected the DAV program for the five year period from FY 76 through FY 80 at $1.0 billion; $950 million; $850 million; $700 million; and, $550 million respectively. These figures included PCH&T and administrative costs. On 27 December 1974, the DOD forwarded approved dollar guidelines for PACOM MAP countries for FY 76, the transitional quarter, and FY 77 (in $ millions):[2]

	FY 76		T/Q		FY 77	
COUNTRY	MAP	FMSCR	MAP	FMSCR	MAP	FMSCR
Afghanistan(1)	.2	-	-	-	.15	-
Cambodia	361.3	-	85.1	-	318.3	-
China(1)	.5	80.0	-	8.0	.5	35.0
India(1)	.2	-	-	-	.15	-
Indonesia	17.5	12.5	-	-	15.2	12.8
Korea	48.6	100.0	-	1.5	32.7	150.0
Laos	37.4	-	-	-	26.5	-
Malaysia(1)	.3	10.0	-	-	.3	10.0
Nepal(1)	.035	-	-	-	.035	-
Pakistan(1)	.350	-	-	-	.25	-
Philippines	16.7	7.0	-	-	16.3	9.3
Sri Lanka(1)	.015	-	-	-	.015	-
Thailand	20.2	15.0	-	-	16.1	20.0
PACOM Regional(1)	.450	-	-	-	.450	-
TOTALS	503.750	224.5	85.1	9.5	426.950	237.1

(1) MAP Training Only.

Excess Property Disposal

(U) Prior to 30 June 1973, the military services were responsible for the management of property disposal operations in the PACOM. CINCPAC had designated the component Service responsible for operation of property disposal offices (PDOs) and holding activities within specific geographic areas to eliminate duplication of functions. In April 1972, a decision was made by the DOD to integrate the DOD property disposal program worldwide under management

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1. SECDEF 3265/231324Z Aug 74.
2. J8 WEB, 30 Dec-5 Jan 75.

by DSA, and, on 30 June 1973, the Defense Property Disposal Region (DPDR) - Pacific was activated in Hawaii under DSA. Seven detachments of DPDR-Pacific were established--in Guam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Korea, Okinawa, Japan and Thailand. The detachments supervised 22 PDOs throughout the PACOM.[1]

Basic Rules for EDA

(U) Even prior to passage of the FAA of 1974, EDA legislation, and the DOD implementation thereof, had required that material be thoroughly screened to insure that it was, in fact, excess to the needs of the Services. Major items of excess in the Continental United States (CONUS) required "actual value" payment (acquisition cost multiplied by a percent factor based on material condition). The percentage ranged from 5-50 percent. EDA originating outside the CONUS were non-reimbursable up to $150 million, except for Vietnam. The recipient country paid only repair and rehabilitation costs, if applicable, until the $150 million worldwide ceiling was exceeded. Then, all countries would be required to pay "actual value" or standard stock prices for major excess items.[2]

(U) Under the FAA for 1974, the basic guidelines for EDA were changed. Excesses in the CONUS were charged to MAP funds at "actual value," but not less than one-third of the original acquisition cost. Overseas EDA were provided without charge to MAP funds, up to the new limit of $100 million worldwide, at not less than one-third of "actual value"--except where Congress had established a statutory ceiling. The ceilings were: Cambodia, $200 million plus $75 million drawdown; Laos, $30 million; and Korea, an aggregate not to exceed $145 million of MAP, FMS credits and EDA. Cambodia and Laos were to pay "actual value," but not less than one-third of the acquisition cost; Korea was to pay the acquisition cost. Because of escalating PCH&T costs and scarce MAP funds, overseas EDA was to be released only on an "as is-where is" basis, and recipient countries would bear all repair and PCH&T costs.[3]

(U) Under the separate DAV account, Vietnam was required to pay for all excess articles. Within the PACOM, the transfer of reimbursable excess material from a disposal activity to Vietnam was governed by the CINCPAC Supplement to the Military Assistance and Sales Manual. This instruction provided a Military Articles Service Funded Excess (MASFEX) program to accomplish the EDA changes to the DAV account.[4]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 312.
2. J81 Point Paper, 21 Aug 74, Subj: EDA: Basic Rules.
3. J8 WEB, 23-29 Dec 74.
4. J81 Point Paper, 21 Aug 74, Subj: EDA: Basic Rules.

SLAT Agreement

(S) The Special Logistics Actions, Thailand (SLAT) agreement between the U.S. Government and the Royal Thai Government (RTG) was signed in March 1963. It provided for the prepositioning of selected material and construction of certain facilities to improve the U.S. logistics base in Thailand. Actions under SLAT in past years included augmentation of the RTG railway system with ten locomotives and 100 POL tank cars; the construction of an airfield and storage depot; and the prepositioning of railroad rails, pipeline and construction material, and supplies and equipment for a brigade task force. The drawdown of U.S. forces which began in 1970 reduced the logistics requirements, and the reduction/cancellation of projects generated materiel excess to the purpose for which originally intended. In 1972, the Public Law 91-672 amendment to the FAA imposed strict procedures for the screening of EDA. The new restriction negated the Article III provision of the SLAT agreement under which the U.S. Army, as executive agent for SLAT, had transferred some excess to the RTG. From February 1972 until June 1974, an impasse over SLAT stock disposition procedures existed because the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok believed that SLAT stocks could be, and should be, provided gratis to the RTG under SLAT Article III. The Embassy felt that failure to do so would be a breach of faith which could have serious political repercussions.[1]

(S) In June 1974, the Army renewed efforts to recover the SLAT stocks to fill worldwide DOD requirements. USARPAC and COMUSMACTHAI determined that approximately $5.2 million in stock value was involved, and recommended that CINCPAC, ARPAC and the Country Team review any contemplated action. On 8 July 1974, a joint State/Defense message specified that the stocks be screened for worldwide DOD use, and that no waiver was permissable. Stocks declared excess could be offered to the RTG at no cost to Thai security assistance funds, and normal EDA screening procedures might be waived. The joint interpretation of Article III of the SLAT agreement was that the U.S. Government retained title and could remove stocks without prior consultation with the RTG. However, the RTG must be consulted before disposal in-country. Also, the agreement did not specify transfer procedures, nor that SLAT stocks must be offered to the RTG at no cost. The joint message directed the U.S. Army to screen the SLAT stocks to determine which were EDA; which could be made available for military assistance and the value involved; and, which stocks the Army wished to retain. On 20 August, the Secretary of Defense approved CINCPAC's request for PACOM regional review and recommendations concerning the disposition of SLAT stocks. As of 8 October, $4.8 million had been reported to CONUS managers, who had issued disposition instructions for $251,000. On 20 December 1974, the Pacific Utilization and

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1. J41 Point Paper, 23 Sep 74, Subj: Special Logistics Actions, Thailand (SLAT) Agreement.

Redistribution Agency (PURA) on Guam advised that disposition instructions had been received on all SLAT secondary items reported by PURA. Eight line items had been identified for CONUS retrograde and five identified for urgent U.S. needs in Korea. The remaining 78 line items were assigned for disposal and were technically available to the RTG. However, at the end of the year, transfer to the RTG was awaiting Defense Department analysis of a Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) Section 505F agreement not yet signed by the RTG.[1]

Disposal of Cambodian MAP Excess

(C) In mid-1974, the accumulation of large quantities of scrap brass and steel shell casings throughout Cambodia became a storage problem. Shipments of brass to Thailand had begun in January 1974, and approximately 342 tons had been shipped when the RTG interposed receipt, marketing and import duty questions and the shipments were suspended. On 4 June, CINCPAC requested the Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC) to consider the sale of steel shell casings in Cambodia, with an option to advertise in Thailand and conduct the sale in Cambodia. On 6 August, the DPDR Detachment, Bangkok proposed the steel casing sales in Cambodia, combined with a demilitarization contract to smelt the brass to ingots and retrograde to Thailand for sale. CINCPAC and the Chief, MEDTC concurred and suggested a trial program with 250 tons of brass, with execution to be delayed pending an import agreement with the RTG.[2]

(C) On 23 August, CINCPAC directed MEDTC and COMUSMACTHAI jointly with DPDR to evaluate the results and feasibility of future on-site sales of steel casings in Cambodia. Retrograde to Thailand for the scrap steel was to be preferred, but was also dependent upon reaching the U.S.-RTG import agreement. On 25 September, DPDR-Pacific provided contract fund obligation authority for the brass demilitarization contract, and, on 20 November, the first DPDR-sponsored steel shell casing sales in Cambodia were completed. The successful bidder was given until 8 January 1975 to remove 1,064 short tons of steel. The high bidder paid $46,418, or about $46.00 per short ton.[3]

(C) By late December, the DPDR-Pacific had negotiated successfully with the Cambodian Armed Forces (FANK) to demilitarize the brass casings by smelting to ingots. The initial 250 tons were to be advertised in place by the DPDR-Bangkok, with an estimated net return to the U.S. Government of 40-50 cents per

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1. Ibid; J4 Weekly Executive Briefs (WEBs), 15 Oct 74 and 30 Dec 74.
2. J46 Point Paper, 21 Aug 74; Subj: Disposal of MAP Cambodia Excess Material; J4 WEB, 26 Aug 74.
3. CINCPAC 231907Z Aug 74; J4 WEBs, 23 Sep 74 and 25 Nov 74; J46 HistSum Nov 74; CHMEDTC 200318Z Nov 74.

pound. The end of year level of brass shell casings in Cambodia was estimated to be 2,200 tons.[1]

Closure of Property Disposal Holding Activity - Singapore

(U) The DSA, on 30 August 1974, supported the recommendation of the Defense Property Disposal Service (DPDS) that the Defense Property Disposal Holding Activity at Singapore be disestablished. The unit had been activated as an adjunct to the PDO in Saigon to provide a safe location at which to sell usable EDA retrograded from Vietnam. The DSA noted the reduced generation of usable property in Vietnam, and requested Assistant Secretary of Defense approval to close the Singapore activity. The Defense Department approved, and requested the State Department to notify the Government of Singapore of U.S. intentions. The U.S. Embassy was notified, and the facility was closed effective 31 October 1974.[2]

Training of U.S. Personnel

(U) Phase IV training of U.S. military personnel assigned to security assistance duties in the PACOM had been conducted by CINCPAC each year in two courses--one in mid-July and one in early November. The CINCPAC staff began, in April 1974, to plan for a consolidated period to cover the FY 75 time frame. Two five-day sessions were planned, with each session to accommodate both materiel and training planners and programmers. As in previous years, the course would consist of programming procedures, outyear planning, development of country Program Objectives Memorandums (POMs), and the conduct of the annual program update. Two one-week sessions were held at Clark Air Base in the Philippines on 30 September-11 October 1974, with 104 students from eleven PACOM MAAG/Mission posts attending.[3]

(U) Two security assistance orientation courses were conducted by the CINCPAC Directorate for Security Assistance (J8) in 1974. The first was for 26 students from J8, the component commands and U.S. DAO Saigon from 12-16 August. On 12 December, orientation was completed for 23 students from J8, component commands, the Logistics Assistance Office-Pacific and the Central Ammunition Management Office-Pacific.[4]

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1. J4 WEB, 23 Dec 74.
2. J46 HistSum Nov 74; DSA 301541Z Aug 74; SECDEF 9891/121715Z Sep 74; SECSTATE 205093/181437Z Sep 74; DPDS 5033/051841Z Nov 74.
3. CINCPAC 040052Z Apr 74 (Military Assistance Activities Bulletin No 14); J8 WEB, 21-27 Oct 74; J83 HistSum Oct 74.
4. J8 WEBs, 12-18 Aug 74 and 9-15 Dec 74; J85 HistSums Aug and Dec 74.

FAA Section 32-Political Prisoners

(S) In the FAA of 1973, which applied to FY 74, Section 32 of the Act read, "It is the sense of Congress that the President should deny any economic or military assistance to the government of any foreign country which practices the internment or imprisonment of that country's citizens for political purposes." During 1974, Congressional interest in the question of political prisoners was heightened by the intense publicity given to conditions in South Korea. In response to query by the State Department. several Embassies in the PACOM provided assessments of the application of Section 32 to their host countries. The Embassy in Seoul, South Korea considered Washington agencies better qualified to define whether there were political prisoners in the Republic of Korea (ROK) within the context of Section 32. The Embassy acknowledged, nevertheless, that the ROK Government was authoritarian and that the Park administration was determined to stay in power. Actions prohibited by various emergency measures were obviously political in nature; e.g., advocacy of constitutional revision; student demonstrations, and spreading of "false rumors." There was a pattern of interrogation, arrest and punishment, judicial or otherwise, for these political activities. In a statement to a subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 30 June 1974, a State Department spokesman acknowledged the vulnerability of the ROK to the Section 32 provision. However, he noted that, since discussions began with the Korean Government on the applicability of Section 32, a basic divergence in definition had surfaced. The ROK held that detainment or imprisonment was not because of political beliefs, but because specific laws had been violated. The record, however, made this position suspect, and Secretary Kissinger had previously testified before the Senate that the United States did not approve of Korea's policies on human rights. The State Department did not believe, regardless, that the most effective or appropriate response to violation of human rights in other countries, whether or not political prisoners were involved, was to cut off security assistance. A cut-off was a one-time sanction which, once used, removed the restraint its possible innovation might have induced.[1]

(S) The assessments provided by four other Embassies were of particular interest to CINCPAC. The Embassy in Phnom Penh maintained that the Cambodian Government had not jailed its citizens because of their political views, and the issue of political prisoners in Cambodia was not relevant to the continuance of U.S. assistance programs. The Embassy in Vientiane stated that the Royal Lao Government (RLG) did not practice internment or imprisonment of its citizens

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1. SECSTATE 162897/261955Z Jul 74, which passed AMEMB Seoul 2579/23 Apr 74; Dept of State Bulletin, 26 Aug 74, "Department Discusses the Human Rights Situation in the Republic of Korea," pp. 305-312; J81 Point Paper, 19 Aug 74, Subj: FAA, Section 32, Political Prisoners.

for political purposes; therefore, Section 32 ought not to affect the status of the U.S. assistance program in Laos. The Embassy in Bangkok stated that Thai law guaranteed to Thai citizens most of the judicial protection offered under U.S. law. The Ambassador assumed that it was not the intent of Congress that Section 32 would apply to cases of detained citizens accused of being affiliated with the illegal communist party of Thailand which was engaged in terrorist activity. With that caveat, it did not appear that Section 32 applied to the Royal Thai Government (RTG).[1]

(C) The assessment of Ambassador Martin in Saigon was that Section 32 was not applicable to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), since it prisoners were not interned nor imprisoned solely for political reasons. This was, stated the Ambassador, in spite of the fact that the country was under military attack by North Vietnam. The Ambassador conceded, as had those in the previously mentioned posts, that laws pertaining to offenses against the internal and external security of RVN existed, but the July 1974 prison population was less than 32,000. Other than persons detained for investigation or pending trial, there were none in the prison system who had not been convicted of a civil, criminal or security offense prescribed by law. The Ambassador concluded by stressing that the most important factor relevant to the rule of law and the strengthening of freedom and opportunity in the RVN was survival. The foundation of an orderly political, legal and economic system had been laid:[2]

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12. The Embassy has received scores of letters from members of Congress, from US citizens, and from organizations like Amnesty International demanding release of alleged political prisoners. In many cases the correspondents name the prisoner in question. The Embassy had checked many of these names with the Ministry of Interior. We have yet to find a documented case of a "political prisoner." The individuals either do not exist, have been released after serving sentence, have been turned over to the Communists, or are serving terms after conviction on a criminal charge. In some cases we found names of alleged prisoners misspelled, in what we believe is a deliberate attempt to add further to the distortions that interested parties have perpetrated in the "political prisoner" campaign against the GVN and US policy in Vietnam. (The

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1. SECSTATE 162896/261955Z Jul 74, which passed AMEMB Phnom Penh 5408/n.d.; SECSTATE 162893/261954Z Jul 74, which passed AMEMB Vientiane 3156/n.d.; SECSTATE 162895/1/261955Z Jul 74, which passed AMEMB Bangkok 6513/n.d.
2. SECSTATE 162894/1/261954Z Jul 74, which passed AMEMB Saigon 5239/n.d.

department should refer to the manual of instructions on political prisoner letter writing campaigns inserted in the Congressional Record October 31, 1973 by Congressman Ronald V. Dellums.)

PACOM MAAG Chiefs' Conference

(U) The annual PACOM Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) Chiefs' Conference for 1974 was held at Camp Smith, Hawaii from 19-21 November. Representatives from the DOD, State Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Service headquarters attended, as well as assistance and advisory managers from PACOM countries. Each country program manager reviewed the current status of his program; presented program objectives and guidelines for FY 77-FY 81, and listed his recommended dollar guidelines for MAP, MAP training and FMS credit. Among the agreements reached was CINCPAC support for a $300 million supplemental budget request for Vietnam; the difficulty in reconciling the true interests of the United States with nebulous terms such as "self-sufficiency" of foreign armed forces; and the potential competition for the United States as a result of co-production programs. Admiral Gayler expressed his desire to see improvement in the quality of military analysis in relation to force modernizations. He directed his staff to use their best military judgement regarding modernization programs and not to concur just because they were already in progress. The Admiral also noted the tendency for the individual U.S. military Services to support for security assistance and FMS only those items which were useful or compatible with Service needs. The DSAA director suggested the desirability of cheap, basic items for foreign sales, but noted that the Services question the source of the money for engineering development of such items. The Conference terminated with Admiral Gayler praising the lucid presentations of the participants and the frank and non-parochial views expressed.[1]

Submarine Proliferation

(S) The MAAG Chiefs' Conference presentations had included the interest of certain host countries in obtaining/expanding their submarine force. For example, Taiwan had two and wanted a third; Korea had none, but wanted some; Indonesia had indicated interest in buying four. On 5 December 1974, CINCPAC invited the attention of the Chairman, JCS to this situation. He noted that the expansion of friendly/allied submarine forces could only complicate an already complex coordination problem for U.S. submarine and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces. Aside from the obvious fact that some of those countries might not always be allies, their possession of submarines could, in any case, be counterproductive. The costs were high; the requirements were not persuasive;

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1. J81 HistSum Nov 74; CINCPAC Report, MAAG Chiefs' Conference 19-21 Nov 74.

most countries could buy and operate too few to constitute an effective force; and, the capability provided by a few submarines from several countries not under the direct control of the United States would not be worth the effort required to achieve the necessary coordination. In order to prevent the proliferation of submarines that have to be accounted for in crisis, CINCPAC stated, the United States should not support requests for submarines, whether to counter a perceived threat or for status. CINCPAC recommended that the United States discourage submarine proliferation in general, and specifically to avoid their introduction into foreign navies.[1]

(S) On 30 December, the JCS acknowledged the CINCPAC message. Although the thrust of the CINCPAC comments did not so indicate, the JCS reply ascribed CINCPAC's views as pertaining not only to the PACOM, but worldwide. Consequently, the JCS message stated, it was not considered desirable to establish a policy which would restrict the transfer of submarines worldwide, nor to preclude introduction into navies not operating submarines. The JCS advised that the U.S.-origin submarines to other navies would be considered on a case-by-case basis.[2]

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1. J53 HistSum Dec 74; CINCPAC 050135Z Dec 74.
2. JCS 3731/302321Z Dec 74.

SECTION III

MAP/MASF COUNTRY PROGRAMS

Cambodia

Funding the Program

(S) At the beginning of 1974, the Cambodia FY 74 MAP level authorized $125 million of new obligational authority (NOA) and $200 million of drawdown stocks. As programmed, the $125 million NOA represented a shortfall of about $18.6 million to buy "new" equipment (e.g., selected aircraft and vessels) which did not qualify under the Section 506 drawdown authority (in $ millions):[1]

	NOA MAP	SECTION 506 MAP	TOTALS
Investment (Equip & Trng)	34.7	21.7	56.4
O&M (Supplies and Services)	108.9	159.7	268.6
	143.6	181.4	325.0

(S) It became evident, early in 1974, that the authorized $325 million would not fund the steadily increasing combat activity, including the rapidly rising munitions expenditures discussed in the Logistics chapter of this history. On 1 February, CINCPAC forwarded to the JCS and DSAA the latest computed requirements for FY 74 Cambodia MAP (in $ millions):[2]

Ammunition (1).	$311.0
O&M Less Ammo	44.7
Premium Transportation	2.6
Dry Season Package (NIMBLE VOYAGE) (2).	8.2
Other Investment Already Funded.	4.5
Unfunded Investment/Attrition (3).	20.4
Training (Includes $1.2 million for FLY CATCHER)	7.0
Project FLY CATCHER O&M (4).	14.6
Total	$413.0

(1) Excludes FLY CATCHER
(2) For discussion of NIMBLE VOYAGE, see CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 443, 444.
(3) Lowered from $38.6 (items deferred/deleted).
(4) For discussion of FLY CATCHER (Tactical Air Improvement Plan-Cambodia), see following pages and Section IV-TRAINING.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, p. 441.
2. J83 HistSum Jan 74; CINCPAC 290351Z Jan 74; CHMEDTC 1447/301315Z Jan 74; CINCPAC 010257Z Feb 74.

No Foreign Dissemination

KHMER REPUBLIC (CAMBODIA)


(as of 1 Aug 74)

BASIC INFORMATION J8

SIZE	70,000 SQ. MI.	LIFE EXPECTANCY	52 YEARS
POPULATION	7.6 MIL	GROSS NAT. PROD. 1971	$655 MIL
ANNUAL GROWTH	3.0%	PER CAPITA	$90
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	1.2 ACRE	DEFENSE BUDGET SELF FINANCED	$122 MIL
LITERACY RATE	41%	DBSF AS % GNP	Unknown

President and Supreme Commander - LON NOL
Prime Minister - IN TAM
Minister of National Defense - D SAY
Minister of Foreign Affairs - LONG BORET
Commander in Chief, FANK - BGEN SOSTHENE FERNANDEZ

J2



OVERALL OBJECTIVE J8

TO ASSIST CAMBODIA IN MAINTAINING ITS STATUS AS AN INDEPENDENT NEUTRAL STATE.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

AMBASSADOR: PAI
HON. JOHN GUNTHER DEAN
U.S. AID REPRESENTATIVE:
CHIEF CMEDT: BGEN WILLIAM W. PALMER USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES J8

ASSIST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARMED FORCES CAPABLE OF DEFENDING THE GKR FROM THE INSURGENCY AND OF PROVIDING ITS OWN LOGISTICS AND REPAIR SUPPORT.

	MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES 76 JSOP 77	MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES J2	COMBAT CAPABILITY J31
ARMY	4 LT INF DIV, 20 INF BRIGADES, 1 MECH REGT, 74 INF BN (SEP), 1 ARTY BDE, 1 ENG BDE, 1 SIG BDE, 1 MP BDE, 1 SF CMD, 1 POLWAR BN, 1 LOG CMD, 5 REGN HQ. STRENGTH: 207,124	5 LT INF DIV, 19 INF BDE, 66 INF BN, 1 INF BDE(M), 1 SF CMD, 1 ARTY BDE, 166 RF INF CO, 33 RF ARTY BTRY. TOTAL STRENGTH 167,367. AS OF: 1 JUL 73	CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING LIMITED DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS AGAINST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION FOR KEY POPULATION CENTERS AND SELECTED LOCS FOR A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME. LIMITED OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY AGAINST INTERNAL INSURGENT FORCES.
NAVY	COASTAL PATROL SQDN (2 PC, 16 PCF, 1 ESIL, 1 LCI); RIVER PATROL (90 PBR); MINE WARFARE (8 MSM/MSR); AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE (5 CCB, 20 PBR, 24 LCM, 9 REP/REH, 1 FLAKE, 16 ASPB), AUXILIARY (45 LCM-6/8, 3 LCT, 4 LCU, 1 YD, 4 CSB, 3 MSM, 3 YFU); 5 NAVY INF BNS. STRENGTH: 9,375	28 COASTAL PATROL TYPES, 53 RIVER PATROL TYPES, 6 MINE WARFARE TYPES, 30 AMPHIBIOUS TYPES, 19 AUXILIARY TYPES, 3 NAVY INF BN. TOTAL STRENGTH 6,000. AS OF: 1 JUL 73	LIMITED INLAND WATERWAY PATROL AND CONVOY ESCORT CAPABILITY. COASTAL DEFENCE, ASW, MINE WARFARE AND TRANSPORT MISSIONS ARE BEING MARGINALLY ACCOMPLISHED DUE TO LACK OF BOATS AND CRAFT.
AIR FORCE	1 TAC BASE WING; 4 T-28 SQDN, 2 FAC SQDN, 3 GUNSHIP SQDN, 1 TRANSPORT WING; 2 TRANS SQDNS, 3 HELO SQDNS. STRENGTH: 12,373	2 FTR SQ(T-28), 1 FAC SQ(0-1), 1 GUNSHIP/FAC SQ(AU-24), 1 TRANS SQ (C-47), 1 LT HELO SQ(UH-1H). TOTAL STRENGTH 9,000. AS OF: 1 JUL 73	LIMITED CAPABILITY TO PERFORM CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OR TRANSPORT MISSIONS DUE TO CURRENT PILOT SHORTAGES AND INADEQUATE MAINTENANCE/LOGISTICAL SYSTEMS IN COUNTRY.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 122

77 Objective

SECRET

SECRET

(S) Three days after CINCPAC had submitted a program for FY 74 costs, the DSAA forwarded the CPD dollar guidelines for FY 75, including $357.71 million for Cambodia MAP material and $4.79 million for training. CINCPAC provided cost categories for this level, but noted that more than 80 percent of the $362.5 million would be spent on munitions at projected usage rates, and that a shortfall existed of some $80 million. Less than three percent of the total was programmed for materiel and services investment (in $ millions):[1]

Ammunition	$297.0
Other O&M Costs	52.8
Investment Costs	7.9
Training	4.8
Total	$362.5

(S) Meanwhile, the FY 74 CINCPAC-proposed program for $413 million received some help when the DOD requested, through the State Department, that Presidential approval be sought to draw down an additional $50 million for Cambodia MAP. In the interim, however, CINCPAC had provided an adjusted FY 74 program within the approved $325 million ceiling: $264.1 million for ammunition; $39.8 million for other O&M; $14.4 million for investment/attrition; and $6.7 million for training. To remain within the $264.1 million for ammunition, FANK consumption would have to be cut by some 25 percent. In late April, the newly-assigned U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia, John Gunther Dean, weighed in to the State Department with a pragmatic prediction that, without the $50 million additional drawdown authority, the FANK would be out of ammunition before the end of the fiscal year. And finally, as shown in the preceding section, the authority was granted, and the total FY 74 MAP for Cambodia was $375.012 million.[2]

(S) The FY 75 MAP subsisted on CRA funding until December, when the FAA for 1974 was passed. CRA funds amounting to $70 million had been released by the DOD for the first two fiscal year quarters. By November, the MEDTC and CINCPAC were concerned that the CPD level of $362.5 million for FY 75 would not be funded by the Congress. That level was considered minimal for survival of the FANK. It did not allow for replacement of aircraft, boats or trucks, and only limited quantities of weapons and combat vehicles could be funded. Nor did it allow for the inflation in ammunition prices. During FY 75, plans had been developed to move the KAF toward self-sufficiency in airlift and to

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1. J83 HistSum Feb 74; SECDEF 5974/042257Z Feb 74; CINCPAC 270144Z Feb 74.
2. J83 HistSums Mar and Apr 74; SECDEF 9402/202111Z Feb 74; CINCPAC 050316Z Mar 74; SECDEF 4030/071939Z Mar 74 and 6025/222035Z Mar 74; AMEMB Phnom Penh 5896/260446Z Apr 74.

upgrade the Khmer Navy (NMK). These programs represented unprogrammed costs over and above the $362.5 million. When the FY 75 MAP level for Cambodia was established at $200 million plus $75 million in drawdown authority, $129 million had already been spent. Since the bill specified that PCH&T costs would also be counted against the ceiling (estimated at $49 million), only $22 million remained of the $200 million NOA. By the end of the year, the cost of supply operations had been revised to $51 million, and, including obligated funds, almost all of the NOA had been spent. Without relief, the MEDTC projected that, if all of the $22 million balance were used for ammunition, the runout date would be 23 January 1975. This, of course, did not include the $75 million drawdown finally allotted by Congress.[1]

FANK Phantoms

(S) Readers of this history will recall that, in 1973, Senator Daniel Inouye and the General Accounting Office (GAO) generated considerable publicity in a report of payroll fraud in the FANK. The Embassy and MEDTC had exerted strong pressure toward personnel accounting innovations by the FANK, and these had been supported by a widely disseminated letter from President Lon Nol to all commanders. In February 1974, the Embassy estimated that the "phantom" problem had been reduced to the order of 10 to 20 thousand, but probably closer to 10,000.[2]

(C) In September 1974, after a visit to Cambodia by Admiral Gayler, the Chief, MEDTC requested that a DOD personnel audit team be sent to Cambodia to inspect FANK personnel/pay records and to discuss the phantom problem with senior FANK officers. The request was the result of recently-acquired "under the table" FANK personnel strength figures which indicated that a significant number of "phantoms" were still on the payroll. In 1973, for example, the total losses reported by the FANK were 50,557, but only 12,601 were dropped from the strength reports. As of 1 September 1974, the calendar year 1974 losses were reported as 19,443, but no adjustment had been made in FANK personnel/payroll figures. The resulting difference of 57,399 potential

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1. J83 Point Papers, 25 Nov 74, Subj: CB MAP Funding Constraints and 12 Dec 74, Subj: Impact CB MAP Based on House Action; J83 HistSum Dec 74; J83 Point Paper, circa 10 Jan 75, Subj: FY 75 Cambodia MAP Funding; CHMEDTC 061052Z Nov 74 (EX); AMEMB Phnom Penh 17140/260950Z Dec 74 (EX); CINCPAC 281927Z Dec 74.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 444-447; AMEMB Phnom Penh 2490/190850Z Feb 74.

phantoms underscored the magnitude of the problem and the urgency of the need for a personnel audit team.[1]

Tactical Air Improvement Plan-Cambodia

(S) Late in 1973, the MEDTC, CINCPAC, JCS and DSAA discussed various options to enable the FANK to meet the expected dry season offensive of early 1974--the first since the end of U.S. air support on 15 August 1973. Among the plans adopted was the Tactical Air Improvement Plan-Cambodia (TAIP-C), also known by the nickname Project FLY CATCHER. The basic DSAA plan was published on 20 November 1973, and the JCS provided terms of reference for funding on 16 January 1974. TAIP-C called for the addition to KAF assets of 22 T-28Ds, 4 AC-47s and 8 O-1Ds. The MEDTC review of the plan on 25 January also noted that, while not specifically addressed in the TAIP, an essential component of KAF tactical air capability was UH-1H gunships. Adding AU-24 strike and C-123K airlift to the package, the MEDTC estimated the in-country O&M cost for the plan as $15.2 million. The JCS guidance had stipulated that in-country O&M, including training, would be funded within the then-programmed FY 74 $325 million. Out-of-country costs (e.g., aircraft contract maintenance, AGE maintenance), the cost of the additional aircraft, conversion/preparation of O-1 aircraft, and the cost of ferry pilots were to be funded outside the $325 million ceiling.[2]

(S) In March, a contract was signed with a Thai company to provide ferry pilots to fly TAIP aircraft to and from the Thai-Am contract maintenance facility in Bangkok. The ferry service began on 14 March, and, by the end of March, contract maintenance, AGE exchange, and KAF training were all progressing satisfactorily. By May, the MEDTC advised CINCPAC, KAF performance had improved measurably, even though the projected levels of in-country assets by 1 May had not been reached, most for justifiable reasons. Since the sortie capability inherent in the actually possessed aircraft was less than had been projected, the MEDTC submitted an adjusted cost projection for the TAIP package of $13.356 million. By October, the last of four C-47s modified to gunships (AC-47) had been delivered under the TAIP.[3]

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1. CINCPAC (Lt Gen Moore to Mr. Frank Sato) 041922Z Sep 74 (BOM), which quoted MEDTC message.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 431-437 and 442-444; CHMEDTC 1167/250830Z Jan 74; J83 Point Paper, 6 Feb 74, Subj: Tactical Air Improvement Plan-Cambodia (Project FLY CATCHER) Costs (in millions).
3. CINCPAC ALPHA 007/130339Z Mar 74; J83 Point Paper, 25 Mar 74, Subj: Project FLY CATCHER; CHMEDTC 6890/180630Z May 74 and 6892/180710Z May 74; J8 WEB 7-11 Oct 74.

ROTORHEAD EXPRESS

(~~S~~) A survey conducted by U.S. Army helicopter technicians during the period 2-12 April 1974 indicated that the majority of the 43 UH-1H helicopters in the KAF were unsafe for flight by U.S. standards. Operational readiness had fallen to 50 percent for gunships and 41 percent for airlift helicopters. On 26 April, the JCS requested CINCPAC to comment on DSAA Operations Plan 74-01, "ROTORHEAD EXPRESS." The plan provided for the deployment of a U.S. Army technical assistance team to U-Tapao, Thailand to repair the UH-1H helicopters and to achieve an operational readiness rate of 80 percent for gunships and 70 percent for airlift aircraft before the end of the dry season. The Chief, MEDTC and CINCPAC concurred with the plan.[1]

(~~S~~) On 3 May, the JCS authorized CINCPAC to implement the plan, and assigned project code 9HH to ROTORHEAD EXPRESS. CINCPAC directed implementation of the plan by MEDTC, MACTHAI and USARPAC on 7 May, noting that completion of the plan was dependent upon the additional drawdown of $50 million under Section 506 of the FAA. On 15 May, the U.S. Army Forces Command established a provisional aircraft maintenance detachment and directed its deployment to Thailand.[2]

(~~S~~) On 21 May, the MEDTC requested USSAG to provide C-130 airlift support to transport the UH-1H helicopters from Pochentong Airfield in Cambodia to U-Tapao beginning 24 May. Actual repair began on 28 May, with costs estimated at $230,000 for TDY and $30,000 for each of 32 helicopters. By the end of June, 12 helicopters had been repaired, and the total to be repaired had been changed to 31 by technical re-evaluation. The project was completed on 23 July, and the highly professional and extraordinary effort of the ROTORHEAD EXPRESS Team, the many Army and Air Force supply organizations, and the host combat support group was specifically acknowledged by the U.S. Ambassador and CINCPAC.[3]

KAF Airlift Self-Sufficiency

(~~S~~) This project was addressed in detail in the Logistics chapter; it was conceived as a means to eliminate the airland/airdrop of supplies in Cambodia

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1. J83 HistSum Apr 74; JCS 3841/262236Z Apr 74; CHMEDTC 6059/291303Z Apr 74; CINCPAC 300452Z Apr 74; J8 WEB, 22-28 Apr 74.
2. CINCPAC 070409Z May 74; DA 101915Z May 74; CHMEDTC 6591/110110Z May 74; CINCUSARPAC 111208Z May 74; CDR FORSCOM 152225Z May 74.
3. CHMEDTC 7075/211028Z May 74; J83 HistSum May 74; 635 CSG 010730Z Jun 74; J83 HistSum Jun 74; AMEMB Phnom Penh 9743/230947Z Jul 74; J8 WEBs, 20-26 May 74 and 22-28 Jul 74; J83 HistSum Jul 74.

by U.S. aircrews. The interim solution, pending the training of additional KAF C-123K crews and maintenance personnel, was the contractor support discussed in the Logistics chapter. The plan provided for the addition of seven C-123K transport aircraft, three of which were to be used in the Udorn-based training program. In December 1974, the first four of seven C-123Ks were ferried to Udorn, with one flown to Pochentong as an attrition replacement. The balance of the C-123Ks were programmed for arrival in Cambodia by March 1975. Training for this project is discussed in the following section.[1]

Other MAP Support

(S) Throughout the year, intensive command attention was given by CINCPAC to the problem of supporting MEDTC within the monetary constraints previously discussed. Perhaps the most concentrated effort was applied to the operational capability of the MNK. The year began auspiciously with the delivery of NIMBLE VOYAGE craft which had been reconditioned at Subic Bay, Philippines. In March, two armored troop carriers (ATCs), two assault support patrol boats (ASPBs), two monitors, and six river patrol boats (PBRs) were delivered to MNK crews at Vung Tau, Vietnam. Twelve PBRs had been delivered in February, all of which were from new production. Four mechanized landing craft (LCM) had been allocated to Cambodia MAP for conversion to monitor configuration.[2]

(S) In June, a letter from the MNK Commodore enlisted the personal attention of the Chairman, JCS and the CNO to the replacement of MNK combat losses and the loan of additional coastal and support craft. The Chief, MEDTC endorsed the request, citing the need for ocean-going ships, a floating crane, a yard tug, and barges for mooring riverine craft. CINCPAC supported the request, but CNO replied that only substitutes for LCUs, 60-ton cranes and yard tugs were available, at considerable cost for refurbishment and, for the YFU substitute, $46,670 depreciation for each. In July and August, a 50-ton crane, a yard tug, a floating dry dock and four monitors were delivered to the MNK.[3]

(C) Also in August, the Department of the Army approved the release of four utility landing craft (LCU) and 20 LCMs from war reserve stock on Okinawa. However, the cost ($4.8 million) was too much to be assimilated by available MAP funds. The MEDTC confirmed that, if FY 75 CRA funds could be released,

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1. J8 WEBs 28 Oct-3 Nov 74; 2-8 Dec 74, 9-15 Dec 74 and 16-22 Dec 74.
2. J83 HistSums Feb and Mar 74 with nine attached messages.
3. J81 Point Paper, 18 Jul 74, Subj: Riverine Craft and Coastal/Support Craft for Cambodia; CNO 241858Z Jul 74; J83 Point Paper, 22 Aug 74, Subj: Riverine Craft for Cambodia.

nine of the Army war reserve LCMs could be bought. The Army LCMs were funded in late November for $1.2 million. By the end of the year, seven LCMs had been identified as excess at Subic; seven LCMs originally programmed under FY 74 drawdown authority were awaiting shipment; and six PBRs also programmed for FY 74 drawdown had been deferred because all PBRs were in active operational use by the U.S. Navy.[1]

(S) In January 1974, the Chief, MEDTC requested that 15 armored personnel carriers (APCs) originally programmed for delivery in June be immediately positioned in Thailand to be called forward as replacements for FANK losses during the dry season. After lengthy correspondence among CINCPAC, DSAA, DA, USARPAC and MEDTC, the DA directed the Army Materiel Command to divert 15 M113 APCs from Army Reserve assets for shipment to Cambodia. CINCPAC had strongly supported the MEDTC request, including emergency airlift if possible. The first 10 APCs arrived by surface shipment in May, and five were shipped in July.[2]

(S) In two other actions, CINCPAC determined that M-24 tanks for the FANK were not supportable because of obsolescence and unprogrammed costs, and assisted in the procurement of a contract to rebuild HD-21 tractor bulldozers. The latter had degenerated to 50 percent operability, and, after considering the alternatives (Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand), CINCPAC authorized the repair/rebuild contract be executed with the Thai TRAC, Limited in Bangkok.[3]

Indonesia

MAP/FMS Funds

(S) The security assistance program for Indonesia was administered by the Chief, U.S. Defense Liaison Group (USDLG) under the command of CINCPAC. U.S. military grant aid had been provided since 1951, except for FY 65 and FY 66 when aid was suspended during Indonesia's "confrontation" with Malaysia. From FY 67 through FY 70, dollar guidelines were in the vicinity of $3-5 million. As a result of a Washington Inter-Agency Study Group (Flanagan) report, Indonesia MAP was established at $15 million for FY 71--later increased to $18 million. A MAP ceiling of $25 million was established for FY 72 and out years.

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1. Ibid.; J83 HistSums Aug and Sep 74; J83 Point Paper, 3 Oct 74, Subj: Riverine Craft for Cambodia; J83 HistSums Oct and Nov 74; SECDEF 4098/011930Z Oct 74; CHMEDTC 300218Z Oct 74; CINCPAC 312234Z Oct 74; J83 Point Paper, 12 Dec 74, Subj: LCM-8 for Cambodia.
2. J83 HistSums Jan, Feb and Mar 74 with 11 attached messages; J8 WEB, 20-26 May 74.
3. J83 HistSums Jan, Feb and Mar 74, with 18 attached messages.

No Foreign Dissemination


INDONESIA

(as of 1 Aug 74)

BASIC INFORMATION J8

AREA	735,380 SQ MI
POPULATION	131.0 MIL
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.7%
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	4 ACRE
LITERCY RATE	43%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	48 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1971 [E]	$14.5 BIL
GNP PER CAPITA	$111
DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCED (1974)	$446.8 MIL
DBSF AS % OF GNP	3.1%

PRESIDENT - GEN Suharto J2
MINISTER OF DEFENSE/AND SECURITY - GEN Panggabean
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Adam Malik
NAVY CDR - VADM Subono
AF CDR - CHIEF AIR MARSHALL Saleh Basirah
COMMANDANT MARCORPS - GEN Anwar
ARMY CDR - LTGEN Maluran Murod
Armed Forces CINC - GEN Panggabean
Armed Forces VICE CINC - GEN Surono



OVERALL OBJECTIVE J8

CONTINUED AVAILABILITY TO THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES OF SEA AND AIR ROUTES BETWEEN PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEAN AREAS.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION PA1

U.S.AMBASSADOR --------
HON. DAVID D. NEWSOM
USAID REPRESENTATIVE
MR. RICHARD M. CASLIN
CHUSDLG ----------
COL ARCHIE GRILLS, USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES J8

1. Provide tangible evidence of U.S. support of the Suharto Government.
2. Contribute to maintenance of friendly Government of Indonesia (GOI) relations with the U.S. and Indonesia's Free World Neighbors.
3. Provide support for the development of an effective military establishment capable of maintaining internal security and self-defense, and acting as a stabilizing element in the Indonesian society, but without reviving fears among its neighbors or generating domestic political tensions.
4. Help preserve U.S. access to Indonesian raw materials.
5. When appropriate, our programs, both grant aid and sales, should be configured to enhance even[illegible] defense materiel compatibility in the area.

	MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES FY 76 [JSOP] J53	MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES* J2	COMBAT CAPABILITY J31
ARMY	15 INF BDE, 2 ABN BDE, 1 PARA/CMDO REGT, 1 ARMD CAV BDE, 4 FA REGT, 4 ADA REGT. 43 INF BN (SEP), 2 ABN BN (SEP), 5 FA BN (SEP), 1 ADA BN (SEP), 10 ENG BN (COMBT) 5 ENG BN (CONST), 1 AVN BN, 4 TRANS BN. STRENGTH: 195,000	15 Inf Bde, 2 AB Bde, 1 Para Com Regt, 1 Cav Bde, 6 FA Regt, 4 AAA Regt, 43 Inf Bn (SEP, 6 Cav Bn(SEP), 5 FA Bn, 7 CBT Eng Bn, 3 ABN Inf Bn, 1 AAA Bn(SEP), 3 Sig Bn, 1 Air Def Radar Bn, 2 QM Bn, 6 Trans Bn, 2 MP Bn, 1 Total Strength 225,000	MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND EFFECTIVELY REPEL MINOR INCURSIONS BUT NOT A MAJOR ATTACK. LIMITED OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY. OVERALL READINESS RETARDED BY LONG LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS.
NAVY	PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBAT (5 DE), COASTAL PATROL (2 PCE, 9 PG, 6 PCM, 12 PC, 6 PT/PTF, 11 PTG), MINEWARFARE (6 MSC), AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE (10 LST), AUXILIARY (13 AKL, 6 OILERS, 1 AD, 1 ATF, 2 ASL, 4 AGS, 2 AP), 1 A/C UTIL SQDN. STRENGTH: 28,000 MARINE CORPS: 4 INF BNS, 2 ASW INF BN, 1 TANK BN (AMP), 1 ARTY BN, 1 ADA BN, 1 ENG BN, 1 ROCKET BN, 1 TRACTOR BN. STRENGTH: 12,000	5 DE, 1 SS, 24 PC, 12 MSC, 9 LST, 13 Auxiliary, 1 Helo Sqdn, 1 Trans Sqdn, Total Strength 27,000 (Navy) 16,000(Marine)	PARTIALLY SUPPRESS SMUGGLING AND PROVIDE LIMITED SUPPORT FOR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION. CONDUCT ONLY TOKEN SUBMARINE INTERDICTION AND ASW OPERATIONS. INDONESIA MARINES ARE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING REGIMENTAL SIZE LANDING FORCES FOR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULTS.
AIR FORCE	1 FIS, 1 TFS, 2 LT TRANS SQDN, 1 MED TRNS SQDN, 1 SAR SQDN, 1 HELO SQDN. STRENGTH: 29,000	8 C-130, 30, C-47, 7-F-51, 2 B-26, 38 Misc Helicopters, 16 F-86 16-T-33's, 22 Misc Lt. Mod VIP Cargo Trans, and various Russian acft i.e., MIG 17, MIG 21, TU-16, helicopters, IL-14 and Misc helicopters, many of which are non-operational. Total strength: 30,400	FORCES IN PEING ARE MARGINALLY READY TO CONDUCT OFFENSIVE BOMBING OPERATIONS AND VFR AIR DEFENSE OPERATIONS FOR A LIMITED PERIOD AND TO SUPPORT MINOR GROUND OPERATIONS. A MAJORITY OF THE RUSSIAN PROVIDED AIRCRAFT ARE INOPERABLE DUE TO THE LACK OF SPARE PARTS.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 123.

Subsequent reductions in MAP appropriations by Congress resulted in MAP funding levels of $18 million FY 72, $18 million (CRA) in FY 73, and $18 million (appropriated) in FY 74. Actual funded levels were $16.9 million in FY 73 and $12.2 million in FY 74. Although no FMS had been programmed for FY 74, $3.5 million in FMS credit was added to offset the grant aid reduction.[1]

~~(S)~~ The POM levels for FY 75-80 had been established as follows (in $ millions):[2]

Fiscal Year	75	76	77	78	79	80
Grant Aid	22.5	19.3	17.0	16.7	14.5	12.5
FMS Credit	10.0	12.5	12.8	27.7	12.0	13.0
Total	32.7	31.8	29.8	27.7	26.5	25.5

TNI-AL Assistance

(U) In December 1973, the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) had accepted the offer, under FMS, to buy the USS CHARLES BERRY (DE-1035) on an "as is-where is" basis for $147,000. This was one of three destroyer escorts (DE) offered by the U.S. Navy as a result of a letter from President Nixon to President Suharto in September 1973. On 15 January, the CNO issued the implementing directive, and, on 31 January 1974, the USS BERRY was decommissioned and recommissioned in the TNI-AL as R.I.E. MARTADINATA.[3]

(U) On 16 December 1974, two U.S. Navy DEs were decommissioned and transferred to the TNI-AL. The USS CLAUD JONES (DE-1033) was recommissioned as KRI MONGISIDI and the USS MCMORRIS (DE-1036) was recommissioned as KRI NQURAH RAI.[4]

~~(C)~~ In other actions, Indonesia had shown interest in acquiring four anti-submarine frigates, four Gearing Class destroyers and four Barbel Class submarines. No positive negotiations had begun by the end of the year, but a joint State/Defense message advised the Embassy and the Chief, USDLG that the Gearing Class destroyer would not be available in FY 75, and that the Barbel

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, p. 456; J82 Point Paper, 23 Sep 74, Subj: Security Assistance in Indonesia.
2. Ibid.; SECDEF 5974/042257Z Feb 74; programmed costs for supply operations in FY 75 were $2.3 million, not included in the total POM figure. The funded level for FY 75 Indonesia MAP was $15.85 million, including supply operations (SECDEF 4367/032113Z Jul 75).
3. J82 HistSum Jan 74; CNO 151809Z Jan 74; COMFOURTEEN 312117Z Jan 74.
4. J82 HistSum Dec 74; COMFOURTEEN 170033Z Dec 74.

Class submarines would not be available for ten years.[1]

TNI-AU Assistance

(U) In early 1974, Indonesia requested price and availability (P&A) data for the possible FMS purchase of S-2, P-2, P-3 and E-2 patrol type aircraft for the Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU). In May, P&A information was requested on the OV-1A. The State Department responded by allocating $2.5 million in NOA FMS credit to Indonesia and offering three C-130B aircraft at one per year beginning in FY 74. The C-130 was known to be the number one priority for TNI-AU FMS purchases. On 17 June, the State Department informed the Ambassador that the C-130s would be available at a price reduced from $4.048 million to $2.552 million. At the same time, State advised that the FMS credit had been increased to $3.5 million. The Ambassador expressed his appreciation for the Washington effort which had enabled him to pass the bad news about the grant aid reduction in FY 74 to $12.2 million along with the good news about the FMS credit and the attractive C-130 price. The FMS agreement for C-130 purchase was signed on 28 June 1974.[2]

(C) In October, the USDLG requested an FMS estimate for new airframe procurement of 12 C/HH-3 medium lift helicopters. On 20 December 1974, the DSAA replied that neither the USAF nor the U.S. Navy possessed C/HH-3 helicopters which would be available for sale to foreign governments in the near future. The DSAA noted that commercial versions were available via direct purchase from Sikorsky Aircraft; however, this subject was pending at year's end. Also pending at the end of the year was an FMS cash purchase of 16 OV-10F aircraft at a total flyaway cost of $17.052 million. Ground support, spare and repair parts, ferry charges and 12 spare engines brought the total package to an estimated cost of $24.943 million.[3]

TNI-AD Assistance

(C) In late 1973, discussion had begun between the Indonesian Army (TNI-AD) and Cadillac Gage Corporation on the possible purchase of 58 V-150 armored cars. The TNI-AD and Department of Defense and Security (HANKAM) eventually agreed to

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1. CNO 081754Z Jul 74; CHUSDLG 120547Z Jul 74 and 310836Z Dec 74; AMEMB Jakarta 8593/120548Z Jul 74; J82 HistSum Dec 74; CINCPAC 180105Z Dec 74; SECSTATE 283777/311508Z Dec 74.
2. J82 HistSums Apr, May and Jun 74; CHUSDLG 260722Z Apr 74, 150239Z May 74, 150738Z May 74; SECSTATE 113687/302151Z May 74, 129042/172133Z Jun 74; AMEMB Jakarta 7528/190614Z Jun 74; SECDEF 4000/282154Z Jun 74.
3. J82 HistSums Oct and Dec 74; CHUSDLG 090345Z Oct 74; SECDEF 8149/202124Z Dec 74; CNO 052128Z Dec 74; CHUSDLG 270359Z Dec 74.

program 13 V-150 cars in the FY 74 MAP at a cost of $1.2165 million. After some backing and filling by the Army Tank Command concerning administrative lead time to execute a contract and purported cost increases for engineering and quality assurance, the contract was signed for delivery of the first 13 V-150s at the quoted price.[1]

Co-Production of AN/PRC-77 Radios

(C) On 23 August 1974, the USDLG advised of HANKAM interest in procurement of approximately 1,500 AN/PRC-77 radios from grant aid sources prior to 1 January 1977. The CONUS manufacturer, E Systems, Memcor Division, countered with a proposal that a co-production program be established in Indonesia, and, on 12 September, the USDLG received a written request for a Letter of Offer for the assembly/progressive manufacture of 3,000 radio sets through FMS cash sales. This was HANKAM's first request for co-production and represented another step in the transition of Indonesian security assistance from grant aid to FMS.[2]

(C) On 25 November, HANKAM advised USDLG that the E-Systems proposal for co-production was acceptable and requested a Letter of Offer for the hardware portion of the proposal. By the end of the year, a formal agreement had not been signed.[3]

Republic of Korea

Resume'

(S) Since FY 71, security assistance to the ROK had been provided within a matrix of goals, requirements and funding called the Five-Year Modernization Plan (MOD). In the years 1969 and 1970, almost all MAP money was utilized simply to maintain the force in being. At that time, the ROK was spending about 20 percent of the total budget on Defense, but was unable to augment U.S. assistance sufficiently to provide for any force modernization. As FY 71 began, 25 percent of all wheeled vehicles were inoperable and many were beyond economical repair. It was forecast that, by the end of that fiscal year, 45 percent of the engineer equipment would be inoperative. Most equipment, including over 80 percent of the ROK Navy Fleet, was 20-25 years old. In summary, the ROK Armed Forces were in seriously degraded operational straits.[4]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, p. 463; J82 HistSums Aug, Sep, Oct, Nov 74, with 9 atch messages and 1 outgoing FONECON, CINCPAC (LCOL Paige) to AMC, 10 Oct 74, Subj: Status of Contract: V-150 Armored Cars for Indonesia.
2. J82 HistSum Sep 74; CHUSDLG 250700Z Sep 74.
3. J82 HistSum Nov 74; CHUSDLG 290830Z Nov 74.
4. J8 Briefing Paper, circa 8 Jan 74, n.s.


KOREA

(as of 1 Aug 74)

BASIC INFORMATION J8

AREA	38,000 SQ MI
POPULATION	33.1 MIL
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.0%
ARABLE LAND PERCAP	.2 ACRE
LITERACY RATE	71%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	60 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. (E) 1974	$15.8 BIL
PER CAPITA	$474
DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCE(E) 1974	$599.1 MIL
AS % OF GNP	3.8 %

PRESIDENT - GEN Park, Chong Hee, ROKA (Ret) J2
PRIME MINISTER - Kim Chong-Pil
DEFENSE MINISTER - Suh Jyong Chul
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS - Kim Yong-Sik
CHAIRMAN JCS - GEN Har Sin, ROKA
C/S ARMY - GEN No Chae Hyon, ROKA
CNO - ADM Hwang Chong Yon ROKN
C/S AIR FORCE - Oek, Man Ho ROKAF
COMMANDANT, MARCORPS - MG Chong, Tae Suk



OVERALL OBJECTIVE J8

PROTECT SOUTH KOREA AGAINST RENEWED COMMUNIST AGGRESSION AND MAINTAIN CINCUNC OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF ROK FORCES.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION PAI

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON. PHILIP C. HABIB

U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. MICHAEL H. B. ADLER

COMUS KOREA
GEN RICHARD STILWELL ,USA

CHIEF, JUSMAG-K

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES J8

1. Assist ROK in achieving modernized forces capable of deterring/defending against North Korean aggression with U.S. materiel support.
2. Assist in obtaining and maintaining necessary rights, authorizations and facility arrangements for U.S. and Allied Forces and deny them to forces opposed to U.S. interests.
3. Protect U.S. facilities.
4. Assist ROK in maintaining an effective counterinfiltration capability.
5. Encourage ROK to reduce noncombatant, overhead manpower and to concentrate on enhanced use of equipment provided by the MDD Plan.

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES FY 76 JSOP J53 / MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES J2 / COMBAT CAPABILITY J31

	MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES FY 76 JSOP J53	MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES J2	COMBAT CAPABILITY J31
ARMY	17 INF DIV; 1 MECH INF DIV; 6 RESERVE DIV; 4 REAR AREA SEC DIV; 2 ARMORED BDE; 2 ADA BDE; 3 SPEC FORCES GRP; 37 CORPS/ARMY ARTY BN; 34 ENGR BN (CMBT); 6 HELO CO; 1 PSYWAR BN. STRENGTH: 527,844	17 Inf Div, 1 Inf Div(M), 2 Arm Bde, 7 Tank Bn, 1 SF Grp, 3 SF Bde, 22 Counterinfiltration Bn, 1 AAA Bn, 23 Arty Bn, 5 Helo Co., 2 ADA Bde Total Strength: 527,844 AS OF: 1 JAN 74	Maintain internal security and effectively repel aggression from North Korea, assuming adequate logistic, air & naval support from outside sources. Infantry divisions are combat ready except for some equipment shortages.
NAVY	PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBAT (8 DD/DE), COASTAL PATROL (6 PF; 5 PCE; 3 PGM; 25 PBR/CPIC; 8 PG), RIVER PATROL (9 PBR; 22 R/R PATROL (JOT); MINEWARFARE (14 MSC; 1 MMC; 8 MSB), AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE (8 LST; 10 LCM, 8 LCU; 30 LCM), AUXILIARY (2 ATA; 3 AOL; 6 AKL; 1 ARL). STRENGTH: 19,400. MARINE CORPS: 1 MAR DIV, 1 ISLAND SEC UNIT, 1 RESERVE TRNG UNIT. STRENGTH: 25,000	5 DD Types, 36 Coastal Patrol Types, 4 River Patrol Types, 12 Mine Warfare Types, 95 Amphibious Types, 9 Auxiliary Types, 1 Mar Div. Total Strength: 41,900 (Includes 22,500 Marines) AS OF: 1 APR 74	With the exception of mine countermeasures the ability of the ROK navy to perform its assigned mission is considered satisfactory. The ROK Marines are considered capable of providing reinf bn size landing forces for amphibious assault opns or larger sized forces, if lift & other suppdrt is made available.
AIR FORCE	1 FIS; 12 TFS; 1 HELO SQ; 4 TRANSPORT SQ; 1 OCEAN SURV SQ; 2 TASS; 1 TRS. STRENGTH: 28,300	10 Tac Ftr Interceptors Sq (8 F-86, F-5), 2 F-4, 1 Helo Sq (UH-1H), 4 Trans Sq (2 C-46, 1 C-54), 1 Ocean Surv Sq(S-2), 1 Tac Air Spt Sq (O-1), 1 Tac Recon Sq (RF-5). Total Strength: 28,500 AS OF: 1 JAN 74	Forces in being operationally ready to support ground operations, and conduct VFR air and limited A/W defense missions.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 124.

(S) On 5 September 1970, the President approved the ROK Force MOD Plan for an FY 71-FY 75 total MAP NOA OF $1.25 billion and 250 million of non-reimbursable transfers such as EDA and equipment of withdrawing U.S. Forces. The Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUS-Korea) prepared the plan to reflect general agreement with the ROK Government (ROKG) on the kinds and quantities of materials needed for modernization. The primary purpose was to improve and modernize, both quantitatively and qualitatively, the ability of the ROK military to deter or contain a combined attack by North Korea and the PRC, augmented only by U.S. tactical air, naval and materiel support. The National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM 129) which promulgated the MOD Plan specified that the amount of NOA was to be reduced to the extent possible by FMS credit and cash sales, use of EDA and other "no-cost" equipment transfers. The originally approved plan for FY 71-FY 75 had been (in $ millions):[1]

	FY 71	FY 72	FY 73	FY 74	FY 75	TOTAL
"0" Cost	109.7	92.9	98.6	98.9	100.0	500.1
"I" Cost	155.3	158.5	125.6	93.9	88.3	621.6
PCH&T	30.0	28.6	25.8	22.2	21.7	128.3
Subtotal	295.0	280.0	250.0	215.0	210.0	1,250.0
EDA*	178.5	24.9	19.7	11.4	15.5	250.0
Total	473.5	304.9	269.7	226.4	225.5	1,500.0

* At legal value (one-third acquisition cost)

(S) The funds appropriated by Congress had not approached the programmed figures by the end of FY 73. Likewise, EDA in the types and quantities anticipated had not been available. As a consequence, the MOD program, at its midpoint in FY 73, was considerably behind schedule. The dollar balance remaining to be funded with NOA was accepted to be about $655 million. The Koreans were aware of the total value of the program and had kept account of what had been funded. Therefore, the ROKG also recognized the $655 million as the shortfall.[2]

(S) In January 1973, the DOD informed CINCPAC of a forthcoming study of the ROK force structure based on the current and projected military situation on the Korean Peninsula. The initial input to the study was to be prepared by COMUS-Korea for the FY 73-78 time period. The COMUS-Korea study, based on parameters established in consultation with an inter-agency steering group, was forwarded to the DOD by CINCPAC in March 1973 as the Korean Force Requirements Study (KFRS). The report of the inter-agency steering group was completed

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, p. 466.
2. J8 Briefing Paper, circa 8 Jan 74, n.s.

on 31 May 1973, and, on 27 July 1973, NSDM 227 was issued. Its basic decisions were:[1]

- Extend the modernization plan with no termination date for grant aid.

- Strive to provide $1.5 billion as originally planned; i.e., to provide the end FY 73 balance of $655 million to be funded and $110 million EDA transfer.

- Maintain the programmed grant aid request levels--no rapid shift from aid to FMS credit.

- Encourage the ROK to increase the defense budget from 4.1 percent to about 5.1 percent of the gross national product.

- Modernize 16 of the 19 ROK Army (ROKA) divisions.

- Shift the force structure thrust from ground defense to active and passive air defense.

- Provide 72 F-5Es already programmed as replacements for the ROK Air Force (ROKAF) F-86s. Defer additional sophisticated air assets.

(S) At the September 1973 meeting of the Security Consultative Committee in Korea, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements presented the U.S. position regarding Korean MAP. He stated that the MOD Plan must be stretched over more time than the original five years; that the ROK must assume a greater share of the costs through FMS; and, suggested the shift in emphasis to air defense. The Secretary also proposed a joint ad hoc committee be formed to plan the shift of priority to air defense. The ad hoc committee of joint ROK-U.S. members reached agreement that increased emphasis would be placed on air defense; that an overall funding ceiling of $550 million would be used for planning; and, that program funding would consist of a grant aid/FMS combination.[2]

(S) Early in 1974, the CINCPAC staff had concluded that the emphasis on air defense had led to a distorted picture of the actual air defense needs of the ROK. CINCPAC studies had shown that, to the extent that deficiencies in air defense existed, they were in the broader context of close air support capability, tactical communications, target acquisition, battlefield surveillance

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 467-469.
2. Ibid.

and tactical air command and control. On 7-8 February 1974, CINCPAC convened a meeting to discuss the subject of Korean force development. Attendees were CINCPACAF, CINCUSARPAC, COMUS-Korea and the Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Korea (CHJUSMAGKOREA). The conferees concluded that deep penetration raids by the North Korean Air Force would not be decisive in a Korean conflict, and that programmed air defense assets were generally adequate to meet this threat. They also concluded that effective tactical air would be very important to the success of the ground war, and that the fighter/attack inventories of the ROKAF should be expanded. On 18 March, CINCPACAF conveyed the CINCPAC recommendations to the JCS with the suggestion that the Korean force development issue not be reopened to the inter-agency area, and that air defense as used in NSDM 227 be defined as including all tactical air roles and missions. On 1 April, the JCS responded to specific questions raised by CINCPACAF on 18 March. The JCS addressed planning parameters for U.S. Forces if the ROK were attacked by North Korea, and stated, "Plans required by JSCP [Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan] should include U.S. tactical air, naval and materiel support as appropriate." The JCS noted that this statement was not intended to change policy, narrow the planning options, nor impact on the primary security assistance goal for the ROK, which remained, "to move the ROK toward self-sufficiency."[1]

(S) In July 1974, the JCS clarified the reference to the JSCP as related to plans for ROK security assistance. The security assistance planning objective was to program security assistance so that only tactical air, naval and material support would be necessary. The JSCP contingency plan for JSCP FY 75 specified (in paragraph 24D), "employing such U.S. and ROK forces as may be available." The JCS affirmed that the use of U.S. air, naval and ground forces was valid for JSCP planning purposes through the end of FY 75.[2]

(S) Meanwhile, the U.S. Embassy provided an assessment of the security assistance situation from the ROKG point of view on 16 May 1974. The thrust of the Embassy message was that the ROKG had accepted the inevitable decline in MAP grant aid levels, and would, therefore, become increasingly independent. As the former dominant role of the United States in determining ROK military requirements decreased, the ROKG would increasingly expect to make its own determinations on force structure and procurement of equipment. This acceptance did not mean that the ROKG had formally abandoned its expectations in connection with the MOD Plan. It hoped for some level of grant aid in the near term and would continue to press on the question of unfulfilled MOD Plan levels in the

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1. J82 Summary Paper, 10 May 74, Subj: Korea MOD Plan; J53 Talking Paper, 3 Apr 74, Subj: Korean Force Development, which cited JCS 011423Z Apr 74.
2. JCS 7342/032013Z Jul 74.

hope of extracting as much grant assistance as possible. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) was fully aware of, and had accepted, the implications of Secretary Clement's statement (SCM 73) that FMS as well as grant assistance would be used to complete the MOD Plan. The ROKG appeared to be moving realistically and quickly to take up the post-MOD plan procurement burden as well as to meet what it viewed as its own high priority defense needs, whether in the MOD Plan or not. The Embassy suggested that the U.S. Government address the question of FMS levels available to the ROKG in coming years. It was in the U.S. interest to provide higher FMS levels, not only for security reasons, but also to assure that, as the ROKG increasingly bore its own defense costs, U.S. equipment and material retained a most-favored position in Korean procurement. The Embassy recommended, however, that so long as the United States underwrote significant parts of the ROK defense costs, the U.S. Government not countenance major ROK arms purchases from third countries.[1]

(C) The Embassy views appeared to be borne out during a visit to Washington by Defense Minister Suh of the ROKG. Responding to U.S. Undersecretary of State Carlyle Maw's observation that military and economic assistance were not popular with the U.S. Congress, Suh emphasized the growing ROK defense self-reliance. Suh conveyed the ROKG understanding of the situation and its realization that the ROK could not rely forever on U.S. aid. He also noted that, while the United States had formerly provided 80 percent of the ROK defense budget, the ROKG was now accounting for 90 percent, and could provide 100 percent in the, "not too distant future", if only the United States could extend a little assistance for a while longer. Meanwhile, Suh indicated that the ROK expected the MOD Plan to be carried out as scheduled. Finally, Suh said coordination and cooperation between U.S. and ROK forces were the cornerstones against the North Korean threat, and that the presence of U.S. Forces, "for a considerable period" was a prime necessity for ROK.[2]

(S) Embassy concern about the procurement from third country sources of ROK military equipment was well-founded. [redacted] as early as mid-1974, President Park's personal interest in the expansion and modernization of the ROKN. His interest was reported to stem primarily from his desire to provide the ROKN with a weapon system capable of effectively countering the North Korean KOMAR-mounted "STYX" missile threat. To that end, the ROKG had initiated tenders to procure the French "EXOCET" missile system, reportedly because the U.S.-made "HARPOON" missile was not available in the short-term.[3]

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1. AMEMB Seoul 3134/1/160908Z May 74.
2. SECSTATE 208631/202340Z Sep 74.
3. DOD/PRO Camp Smith 091950Z Jul 74, 150726Z Aug 74, and 060956Z Sep 74 (all EX).

(C) On 8 September, the Embassy and COMUS-Korea jointly sounded the alarm to the State and Defense Departments. The message cited strong military and political reasons why U.S.-made surface-to-surface missiles were preferable to the EXOCET. A mix of HARPOON and STANDARD ARM (anti-radiation missile) systems for the ROKN provided the best naval defense against the North Korean threat, at a lesser cost per ship/missile, than if the same ships were armed with EXOCET. Politically, the acquisition of a major armament from a third country would cause even greater problems in Congress with the security assistance program. The joint message also implied possible conflicts of interest on the part of senior ROKG officials, and recommended that the Ambassador be instructed by State to inform the ROK Prime Minister that the U.S. Government could not agree to the EXOCET purchase.[1]

(C) At about the same time, in September 1974, the State Department informed CINCPAC, the Embassy and COMUS-Korea that the U.S. Government would consent to the purchase by the ROK of a small number of Swiss "OERLIKON" 35mm anti-aircraft guns to mount on patrol boats in the ROKN inventory. On the other hand, the ROKG plan to procure five times that number for the ROKA posed a different problem relating to U.S. commercial interests, military compatibility and Congressional relations, and was unacceptable. In any event, since the OERLIKON was a modernization item, expenditures for procurement would be counted toward achievement of the MOD Plan and would be subtracted from the MOD Plan funding balance. This was in line with the original MOD program and the KFRS, since the OERLIKON was an alternative to the CHAPPARAL missile which the United States had agreed to provide at the 1973 Security Consultative Meeting.[2]

(S) In November and December, [redacted] negotiations had begun between the ROKG and British interests on possible submarine purchases. Overtures had also been made to Italian interests on small submarines and a submarine construction facility. Three of 13 TRIDENT aircraft purchased from the British Hawker-Siddeley Aviation Company were also scheduled for delivery shortly after the end of the year.[3]

(S) Another manifestation of emerging ROKG decision-making and independence was in the area of sales to third countries of military equipment manufactured in the ROK by co-production and/or license granted by U.S. manufacturers. In August, the ROKG requested permission to sell 1,500 to 2,000 Korean-manufactured

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1. AMEMB Seoul 6706/080917Z Sep 74.
2. SECSTATE 191333/101620Z Sep 74.
3. DOD/PRO Camp Smith 250826Z Nov 74 and 100757Z Dec 74 (EX); DOD/PRO 110735Z Dec 74.

M-16 rifles to the Government of Morocco on grounds of goodwill between the two countries. The CHJUSMAG-Korea responded that authority to grant approval for such a request rested in Washington because of restrictions in the Memorandum of Understanding, dated 1 March 1971, which established the rifle co-production program. The Embassy and COMUS-Korea, while acknowledging that the number of weapons involved was insignificant, nevertheless recommended to State and Defense that an exception to policy not be made in this instance. Although the U.S. Embassy in Rabat, Morroco favored the sale, the State Department agreed that it was not in the best interest of the United States to approve it.[1]

(S) Somewhat earlier, in July 1974, JUSMAG-Korea was approached by ROKG officials who requested clearance for the Korean Poong San Special Metals Company to export 280,000 rounds of 30 cal. carbine ammunition to Thailand. The Poong San factory was using equipment and technology originally provided by the Amron Company of Waukesha, Wisconsin. The Embassy noted that JUSMAG-Korea did not object to the sale, but had requested the Embassy to inquire whether any agreement between the two companies would prohibit the sale of Poong San-produced ammunition outside Korea. The Embassy requested State to investigate. The Amron company replied directly to the Embassy that no problem existed, but, in December, the State Department voiced objection. State cited the 31 October 1972 technical assistance agreement between the two companies, and declared that one article of the agreement provided for State's prior written approval for export of 30 cal. ammunition. The matter had not been resolved by the end of 1974; however, on 9 January 1975, the Embassy noted that the ROKG could challenge the State interpretation on the grounds that the wording of the agreement pertained to the licensed article. Since the proposed export was of the end product, and not the licensed equipment and technology, the Embassy believed the ROKG might challenge U.S. Government authority on the sale.[2]

(S) On 3 December, the U.S. Ambassador informed the ROK Prime Minister of U.S. refusal to consent to the ROKG purchase of the EXOCET missile or the sale of the M-16 rifles to Morocco. The M-16 decision appeared to be accepted without argument; however, the EXOCET decision was questioned on the ground that the preferred U.S. HARPOON would not be available before 1977. Therefore, the ROKG intended to purchase two EXOCET systems for the first two of ten patrol ships/multi-mission (PSMM) to be built. The French Government had formally notified the ROKG that two EXOCETs were available, and President Park had directed further negotiations. The Ambassador stressed that the U.S. Government

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1. J82 HistSum Aug 74; CHJUSMAG-K 030415Z Aug 74; AMEMB Seoul 5260/120749Z Aug 74; AMEMB Rabat 3886/151602Z Aug 74; SECSTATE 178712/151456Z Aug 74.
2. AMEMB Seoul 4562/150307Z Jul 74; SECSTATE 280490/232235Z Dec 74; AMEMB Seoul 0114/090422Z Jan 75.

did not agree, and suggested that the matter be discussed further between U.S. and ROK military experts. The Ambassador informed State that he expected the matter to be resolved on the basis of technical capabilities involved.[1]

(S) On 30 December, the Embassy reported that a ROKG purchase of five EXOCET missile systems was imminent. However, if the HARPOON could be made available in 1975, ROKG officials implied, there would be no requirement for EXOCET. As to the submarine negotiations discussed above, the Embassy reported the ROK decision to purchase five 540-ton submarines from the Vickers Company in the United Kingdom. Since the ROKG understood that the United States neither had nor was planning to have such small submarines, ROK officials sought U.S. support for procurement from a third country. Citing several other items of joint military interest, the ROKG officials made it clear that efforts to hold the line on "U.S. procurement only" were in a precarious position."[2]

MAP/FMS Funds

(TS) The FY 74 MAP grant aid appropriation for ROK was $112.3 million. The FMS credit was $25 million. The grant aid level was subsequently reduced by the DOD to a final funded FY 74 level of $78.056 million. Thus, by 30 June 1974, the MOD Plan deficit had risen to $499 million as the unfunded balance of the original $1.25 billion. This figure was by U.S. reckoning, since it included PCH&T and MAAG costs not accounted for by the ROK, which considered the unfunded balance to be $415 million.[3]

(S) In January 1974, COMUS-Korea submitted a program, with dollar levels, for the current FMS credit ceiling of $25 million (in $ millions and order of priority):[4]

M-16 Rifle Production	$ 3.0
Arsenal Expansion	2.2
PSMM Construction	6.8
PRC-77 Radio Co-Production	3.0
AIM 9-B to AIM 9-E Conversion	6.1
TOW Missile	3.9
Total	$25.0

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1. AMEMB Seoul 8033/030759Z Dec 74.
2. J82 HistSum Dec 74; AMEMB Seoul 8642/300945Z Dec 74.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, p. 423, 467; J81 Talking Paper, 10 Oct 74, Subj: Security Assistance; J51 Point Paper, 5 Sep 74, Subj: SCM, Encl 3, Issue Papers for Closed Session, 6th Paper, "End of MAP."; J8 WEB 3-9 Jan 74.
4. J82 HistSum Jan 74; COMUSKOREA 150945Z Jan 74.

(C) The first four of the above programs were begun in previous years, while the last two were awaiting funds. On 3 April, the DSA advised CHJUSMAG-Korea that an interim credit agreement against the FMS ceiling had been signed for $11 million, of which $5.5 million was direct credit for immediate bank loan bids. The ROKG drew down funds from the $5.5 million to meet urgent requirements for the PSMM and AN/PRC-77 radio co-production programs.[1]

(C) On 29 May, the State Department advised the Embassy that, in view of the drastic reduction in grant aid for FY 74, an additional $20 million in FY 74 FMS guaranteed credits were available for Korea. The following day, the Embassy replied that the ROKG had agreed to the additional FMS credit, and acknowledged understanding that the items financed therewith would be charged against the MOD Plan.[2]

(C) Meanwhile, the DSAA had forwarded dollar guidelines for FY 75 MAP and FMS. As noted in Section II, Korea MAP was proposed as $161.5 million. FMS for FY 75 was set at $52 million. In December, the FY 75 FAA stipulated that the security assistance ceiling for Korea was $145 million, including MAP, FMS credits and EDA.[3]

(S) The Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) dollar guidance for FY 76-80 was received by CINCPAC in February 1974. The guidance specified decreasing MAP grant and levels from $119 million in FY 76 to $10.2 million in FY 80. FMS levels rose from $70 million in FY 76 to $135 million in FY 79, and decreasing to $100 million in FY 80. In March, the guidance was enlarged to state that, before high performance aircraft other than replacement in the original MOD Plan were funded, a complete review of the threat and air defense requirements should be undertaken. The review required Washington approval prior to any change in program or funding.[4]

(S) On 1 August, the DSAA advised CINCPAC that the PDM had been approved on 29 July for the FY 76-80 POM. The PDM directed that the ROK program be restructured so that only modernization requirements approved by NSDM 227 were funded by grant aid. The total grant over the five year period was reduced by $136 million to $95.7 million. All grant aid was to be terminated, with the exception of training, when the NSDM 227 modernization requirements had been met. FMS credits were increased by approximately $300 million to $827 million

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1. Ibid.; J82 HistSum Apr 74; SECDEF 2743/031330Z Apr 74; J8 WEB, 1-7 Apr 74.
2. J8 WEB, 28 May-2 Jun 74.
3. SECDEF 5974/042257Z Feb 74; J8 WEB, 23-29 Dec 74; The peek at the future in Section II, provided because of the Indochina situation at the time of writing, shows that the funded FY 75 Korean MAP level was $82.6 million.
4. J8 WEBs, 25 Feb-3 Mar 74 and 11-17 Mar 74.

to off-set the decrease in grant aid and to permit further modernization. The new POM levels for the ROK (in $ millions) were:[1]

	FY 76	FY 77	FY 78	FY 79	FY 80
Grant Aid	55	40	.3	.2	.2
FMS Credit	201	177	179	150	120

(C) On 27 December, the POM revision of August had already been overtaken by new DOD guidance in preparation for the CPD of FY 76. As also shown in the previous section, FY 76 MAP for Korea was set at $48.6 million, vice the PDM of $55 million. FMS credit was set at $100 million, vice the $201 million of the PDM. For the transitional quarter, MAP training was at $200,000, with no grant aid authorized. FMS was $1.5 million. For FY 77, Korea MAP was $32.7 million, vice the PDM $40 million, and FMS was $150 million, vice the PDM $177 million.[2]

POL Support to the ROK

(C) Effective 1 July 1973, the DOD established a policy whereby commercial comsummables no longer qualified for FMS. Petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL) were included. Grant aid support for POL was also terminated on 30 June 1973. On 1 February 1974, the DOD approved, as a one-time exception, the sale of 1.4 million gallons of aviation gas (AVGAS) and six months supply of packaged lubricants. The ROK experienced difficulty in locating new sources for AVGAS and special lubricants, in spite of diligent effort, and, on 10 December 1974, COMUS-Korea advised DOD that the MND had requested, by personal letter, that the United States continue to support the needs of the ROK Forces. COMUS-Korea cited an imminent loss of operational capability for vital ROK military missions and requested another exception to policy by the DOD. On 11 December, the DSA authorized a "second and final" exception to policy. The U.S. Air Force was directed to prepare a letter of offer and acceptance for an FMS cash case amounting to 6.7 million gallons of AVGAS for delivery to Pusan, Korea after 1 December at the prevailing market price. CHJUSMAG-Korea was instructed to urge the ROKG to redouble its effort to arrange commercial procurement sources.[3]

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1. J82 HistSum Aug 74; SECDEF 3922/011923Z Aug 74; J8 WEB, 29 Jul-4 Aug 74.
2. J8 WEB, 30 Dec 74-5 Jan 75.
3. J44 Point Paper, 20 Aug 74, Subj: POL Support to ROK; J82 HistSum Feb 74; SECDEF 4350/012153Z Feb 74; COMUSKOREA 100106Z Dec 74; J82 HistSum Dec 74; SECDEF 1225/112038Z Dec 74.

ROKAF Force Structure

(S) The original modernization plan had included the replacement of F-86 aircraft in the ROK Air Force with F-5s. Earlier, in 1969, the ROKAF had received 18 F-4D aircraft under MAP to counter the threat of North Korean aggression. And finally, the U.S. Air Force had bailed 18 F-4Ds to the ROKAF to replace 36 F-5As loaned to South Vietnam during ENHANCE PLUS. That bailment was to terminate in April 1975. At the beginning of 1974, the ROKAF fighter aircraft force structure included five tactical fighter squadrons (TFS) of F-5A/B and one TFS of F-4D. The F-5s loaned to Vietnam were being returned, and, at full strength, the ROKAF possessed 90 F-5s and 18 F-4Ds in the fighter force.[1]

(S) The CINCPAC position regarding the optimum mix of fighter aircraft for the ROKAF had been developed during the February 1974 meeting previously discussed. Basically, the conferees had agreed that the mix should include five squadrons of F-5A/Bs, eight squadrons of F-5E/Fs, and the original ROKAF F-4D squadron. In May 1974, the ROKG ordered 57 F-4Es and also offered to buy the bailed F-4D squadron. By mid-year, the ROKG had proposed an eventual mix of five F-5A/B squadrons, four F-5E/F squadrons, and five F-4D/E squadrons (54 F-4Es and 36 F-4Ds). The USAF opposed the sale of the bailed squadron because F-4Ds were out of production and the aircraft were needed to restore the 3d Tactical Fighter Wing to its pre-ENHANCE PLUS strength. The JCS, CINCPAC, COMUS-Korea and JUSMAG-Korea all agreed that ROKG pressure to procure at least one squadron of F-4Es would be difficult to resist.[2]

(S) After the 1974 Security Consultative Meeting, the ROKG proposed a Basic Plan for Long Range Modernization (AIR), with the following key elements for a 16 squadron fighter aircraft force structure:[3]

	Acft	Sq
F5E (minimum)	126	
F5F (POM request)	18	
F5E/F TOTAL	144	8

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1. J53 Point Paper, 16 Aug 74, Subj: ROK Fighter Aircraft Mix.
2. Ibid.; J53 Point Paper, 5 Sep 74, Subj: F-4D Aircraft Bailed to ROKAF; J53 Point Paper, 5 Sep 74, Subj: ROK Decision to Buy F-4E Aircraft; AMEMB Seoul 5479/210803Z Aug 74; SECSTATE 184190/221524Z Aug 74; CINCPACAF 190055Z Sep 74; CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA 091125Z Oct 74 (EX).
3. J53 Talking Paper, 18 Oct 74, Subj: SCM Force Structure Issues-Korea.

	Acft	Sq
F5A (on hand)	37	
F5A (payback)	36	
F5B	10	
F5A/B TOTAL	83	5*

*F5A assets may be reorganized into four squadrons.

F4D (ROK titled)	16	
F4D (bailed)	18	
F4E (proposed)	18	
F4D/E TOTAL	52	3
TOTAL:	279	16

(S) The ROKG preference for follow-on aircraft was the light weight fighter (LWF) being evaluated by the USAF. The eventual level of F-4s desired was one wing of 54 aircraft. The position taken by the Embassy and COMUS-Korea was to sell the bailed F-4D squadron, to defer commitment on the F-4Es until the LWF fly-off, and, if the ROKG persisted, not to oppose F-4E procurement.[1]

(S) The problem of providing the F-5Es already programmed for the ROKAF was complicated by a decision made in NSDM 248 to withdraw F-4 assets from Taiwan which had been deployed to compensate for Republic of China (ROC) loans of F-5As to Vietnam during ENHANCE PLUS. The decision was to withdraw the F-4s about 1 January 1975 and to divert the first 28 F-5Es produced for Korea to Taiwan. In addition to the shortfall of aircraft, $11.5 million in support equipment originally intended for the ROKAF would also be diverted to the ROC, which had not ordered line items to support the ROC F-5E co-production program. Since grant aid to the ROC had terminated in June 1973, an FMS case would be required to provide the funding of replacement items to the ROK program. The situation was being reviewed in Washington as of April 1974.[2]

(C) Apparently, the decision was made to revert to the original F-5E delivery schedule for the ROKAF, because, on 3 July, the DOD advised that initial deliveries of the F-5E to Korea would be two in September 1974, three in October, and four in November. This schedule was based on surface delivery. On 22 July, the DSAA requested CINCPAC to reconfirm that the top priority assigned to the F-5E program for Korea in the DOD data base was accurate. CINCPAC responded on the 24th, confirming that the funding priority assigned

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1. Ibid.
2. J53 Point Paper, 12 Apr 74, Subj: ROK F-5E Program.

was valid. CINCPAC noted that the February conference on Korean air defense had agreed that, since the ground battle would determine the outcome of a North Korea/South Korea conflict, tactical aircraft deserved priority as high leverage items in the resolution of a ground battle.[1]

(S) In August, DSAA and the Air Force agencies concerned determined that the first four F-5Es would be delivered to Kwang-ju Air Base in Korea by C-5 airlift. Because of changes in shipping and handling costs and the development of more efficient rigging and loading procedures, the airlift actually saved $56,504 for the four aircraft. Delivery was made on 25 August, and a mobile training team (MTT) was deployed to assist in reassembly and functional check flights (FCF). A technical assistance team (TAT) was also deployed to assist ROKAF maintenance personnel. On 17 September, the CHJUSMAG-Korea advised that the four F-5Es had been reassembled and had passed the FCF. By 30 December 1974, nine aircraft had been delivered, and the last MTT instructor departed on 16 December 1974.[2]

(S) In October, the Embassy informed the State Department that ROKG negotiations on the co-production of 100 F-5Es with Northrop Aviation had surfaced at an estimated cost of $413.2 million. Northrop had urged the ROKG to make a decision and down payment by January 1975 in order to save an expected $2.5 million per month price increase. On 30 December 1974, the Embassy reported that the ROKG had made a tentative decision to co-produce 60 F-5E aircraft. On 31 December, the question of the bailed F-4D aircraft was settled when a joint State/Defense message authorized Embassy/COMUS-Korea action to inform the ROKG of the U.S. Government decision to sell the bailed squadron of 18 aircraft at $2.4 million each.[3]

(S) In January 1974, CINCPAC sought guidance from the JCS and DOD pertaining to the programming of F-5B aircraft in the ROK POM for FY 75-79. The question was whether the ban on "high performance aircraft" being programmed without high level approval, as stated in the MOD Plan and KFRS, applied to F-5Bs. The reply from DSAA, on 8 February, confirmed that F-5Bs were not considered high performance aircraft in the context of the references and could be programmed if priorities and funding levels would permit. If grant aid

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1. J82 HistSum, Jul 74; SECDEF 7455/032158Z Jul 74; J8 WEB, 8-14 Jul 74; SECDEF 4193/222206Z Jul 74; CINCPAC 240417Z Jul 74.
2. J82 HistSums Aug, Sep and Dec 74, with 11 attached messages; J8 WEBs, 26 Aug-1 Sep 74; 2-8 Sep 74, 9-15 Sep 74, 16-22 Sep 74.
3. J8 WEBs, 15-18 Oct 74 and 30 Dec 74-5 Jan 75; SECSTATE 284413/312353Z Dec 74 (EX); J82 HistSum Dec 74.

funds were not available, the F-5Bs could be acquired by FMS cash. Korea had programmed $35.8 million in FY 74 and FY 75 for 16 aircraft and support equipment.[1]

(S) In March, the DSAA requested CINCPAC to review the FY 74 programmed purchase of eight F-5Bs in view of the $17.3 million cost, the effect on other programmed MAP items, and the imminent termination of the F-5B production line. CINCPAC's reply noted the growing dialogue on the possible reduction of FY 74 MAP, and requested a best estimate of a downward revision to the Korea MAP ceiling before making a decision on whether to retain or revise the F-5B purchase. On 10 April, COMUS-Korea submitted new priorities to complete the balance of the FY 74 MAP funding, raising the priority of the F-5B program. CINCPAC supported the revision, but, on 24 April, DSAA advised CINCPAC that the funding of the ROK F-5B, or any other remaining FY 74 MAP, was being held in abeyance pending resolution of the FY 74 grant aid funding crisis. This resolution, as was the original allotment, would be made by the State Department, but CINCPAC was advised to plan for the cancellation of the F-5B program for Korea.[2]

(S) On 23 May, the CSAF advised that, in order to avoid a break in the production of F-5Bs and to avoid excessive start-up costs, a Letter of Offer for an FMS case was needed from the ROKG by mid-June. On 5 June, the ROKG informed CHJUSMAG-Korea of its desire to buy 16 F-5Bs as training aircraft. On 17 June, the ROKG accepted the Letter of Offer for 16 F-5Bs at a total cost of about $40 million, using a combination of FMS credit/cash and grant aid. On 20 June, the CSAF advised CINCPAC that three of the F-5Bs would be funded under FY 74 MAP; the balance would be procured through FMS.[3]

(S) In regard to the ENHANCE PLUS quid pro quo of F-5As from the ROKAF to Vietnam in return for the bailed F-4D squadron, COMUS-Korea expressed concern in August over the return of the AGE and other support equipment as part of the pay back package. On 5 August, the CHJUSMAG-Korea noted the need to discuss the imminent return from reconditioning at Ping Tung, Taiwan of the first three F-5A pay back aircraft with the ROKG. On 9 August, the CSAF authorized discussion with the ROKG, and noted that the engines, tools, AGE and other support

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1. J82 HistSum Feb 74; CINCPAC 100250Z Jan 74; SECDEF 9877/081943Z Feb 74; J8 WEB, 4-10 Feb 74.
2. J82 HistSums Mar and Apr 74; SECDEF 1388/281906Z Mar 74; CINCPAC 292237Z Mar 74; COMUSKOREA 100334Z Apr 74; CINCPAC 122323Z Apr 74; SECDEF 1192/241513Z Apr 74; J8 WEBs, 25-31 Mar 74, 8-14 Apr 74, 22-28 Apr 74.
3. J8 WEBs, 20-26 May 74, 3-9 Jun 74, 10-16 Jun 74, and 17-23 Jun 74; J82 HistSum Jun 74; CSAF 202212Z Jun 74.

equipment would be returned in kind by the Vietnam Air Force on an incremental basis. By 31 December 1974, informal information from CHJUSMAG-Korea was that seven F-5A payback aircraft had been received, along with some engines, AGE and other equipment.[1]

(S) Indicative of the ROKG moves to acquire more sophisticated equipment was the request for briefings of ROK officials on the capabilities of the laser-guided bomb (LGB) and the SHRIKE missile. CINCPAC supported the 6 November request on 12 November, but noted that the LGB and SHRIKE had been number 159 out of 163 on the 24 April 1974 ROK-U.S. ad hoc committee priority listing. Also, they had not been listed in the August 1974 report of the standing ROK-U.S. action officers' committee on ROK Force modernization. Nor had they been included in the FY 76-80 POM. On 20 December, the DSAA informed CINCPAC that the request to brief ROKG personnel had been disapproved by the State Department. State was reluctant to release LGB technology to the ROKG and could not see a need for such release. The DSAA indicated that Defense was considering a reclama of State's position and asked for additional recommendations. On 21 December, CINCPAC pointed out that the two systems had been considered important enough to recommend to the JCS in August 1974 that they be raised to priorities 14A and 14B on the ad hoc committee list. This recommendation had been included in the CINCPAC final report of the joint ROK-U.S. ad hoc committee on ROK Forces modernization dated 12 August 1974. As of 31 December, there had been no indication of the course chosen by the DOD.[2]

The Missile Programs

(S) The 29 July 1974 Secretary of Defense PDM, as amended on 22 August, directed the Department of the Army (DA) and CINCPAC to plan for successful negotiation by DOD/State of the transfer to the ROK of six U.S.-operated NIKE-HERCULES (NH) batteries, less nuclear capability, by the end of FY 77. The DA was directed to withdraw the associated nuclear warheads, also by the end of FY 77. The NH was an air defense weapon with dual delivery capability (nuclear and conventional warheads), and also could be used in the surface-to-surface mode. Ten systems were deployed and operational in the ROK in 1974--one U.S. Army battalion of six batteries and one ROKA battalion with four batteries (conventional warheads only). The nuclear weapons, components, associated items and trainers were kept under strict U.S. custody and surveillance. When the initial (July) PDM was passed by CINCPAC to COMUS-Korea, his reply noted that

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1. J82 HistSums Aug and Dec 74; COMUSKOREA 020902Z Aug 74; CHJUSMAGKOREA 051338Z Aug 74; CSAF 092130Z Aug 74.
2. J82 HistSums Nov, Dec 74; CHJUSMAGKOREA 060253Z Nov 74; CINCPAC 120246Z Nov 74; SECDEF 8167/202141Z Dec 74; CINCPAC 210157Z Dec 74.

sufficient lead time would be required to allow the ROKA to complete in-country language training and formal CONUS systems training to man the transferred NH batteries. The estimated minimum lead time was two years.[1]

(S) During the 1974 Security Consultative Meeting, the ROKG officials expressed interest in the proposed transfer, but voiced reservations about the O&M costs and the cost of training. It was agreed that the matter would be studied by the respective staffs. On 5 November, the JCS informed CINCPAC that, in the event negotiations failed, the NH system would be considered for elimination from U.S. Army inventories. CINCPAC and CINC European Command were requested to assess the effectiveness of NH and its contribution to the air defense environment. CINCPAC tasked CINCPACAF, as the executive agent for air defense in the PACOM, to develop an assessment in close coordination with CINCUSARPAC and COMUS-Korea. The 314th Air Division and COMUS-Korea assessments were included in the response from PACAF which supported the need for the NH system in the Korean air defense environment. Nevertheless, CINCPAC informed the JCS that, while the NH system complemented the HAWK missile system, NH was not critical to the air defense of South Korea. CINCPAC cited the known technical capabilities of the two systems and concluded that the superior range and altitude capability of the NH was superfluous in view of the known threat from North Korea.[2]

(S) Meanwhile, DOD broached the possibility of an accelerated turnover of the NH to the ROK by the end of 1975. The JCS opposed the idea, but the DOD persisted that ways and means be explored to accomplish the earlier turnover. The JCS instructed CINCPAC, in generating a response to the DOD (through JCS) to address the broader objective of identifying any defense arrangement whereby the NH transfer to the ROK could be accomplished by the end of 1975. CINCPAC tasked COMUS-Korea for an answer, and, on 6 December, he replied that plans called for the NH transfer prior to the end of FY 77, along with two of the three U.S. HAWK battalions prior to the end of FY 79. He did not address alternatives. On 4 January 1975, CHJUSMAG-Korea advised that the ROKG had indicated informally it's desire to accept the six U.S. batteries, and requested the DOD to provide estimated associated costs. The issue had not been resolved by the end of 1974, but, on 13 January 1975, COMUS-Korea related to the JCS and CINCPAC his conversation with the Assistant Secretary of Defense in which he remonstrated strongly

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1. J82 HistSum Aug 74; JCS 9559/312306Z Jul 74; JCS 5982/271631Z Aug 74; CINCPAC 030334Z Aug 74; COMUSKOREA 200913Z Aug 74; J54 Point Paper, 25 Nov 74, Subj: NIKE-HERCULES - ROK.
2. J53 Point Paper, 18 Oct 74, Subj: SCM Force Structure Issues - Korea; J53 HistSum Nov 74; JCS 9676/051643Z Nov 74; CINCPAC 111416Z Nov 74; CINCPACAF 212330Z Nov 74, which passed 314AD 160255Z Nov 74; CINCUNC/USFK/EUSA 190849Z Nov 74; CINCPACAF 300135Z Nov 74; CINCPAC 062015Z Dec 74.

against any attempt to turn over the NH batteries in less than 24 months after the date on which the two government agreed on the terms of the sale and the modalities of the transfer. On the following day, 14 January 1975, COMUS-Korea informed all concerned that he had, that day, received a letter of confirmation from MND Suh of ROKG acceptance of the U.S. Government offer. Regarding the timing, Minister Suh stated:[1]

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> Based on the result to date of a comprehensive exploration of detailed aspects of the transfer by the Joint ROK/US Ad Hoc Committee, it is proposed that the actual take-over should be effected in about three years. With regard to such essential aspects as acquisition of an in-country training capability, problems associated with maintaining equipment after the take-over, etc., it is hoped that these matters will be resolved through full, mutual review and discussion.

(S) Related to the transfer of the U.S.-batteries was an on-going program to up-grade those NH already possessed by the ROKA. In February 1974, the DA proposed to substitute three SAMCAP-modified NH systems for three systems originally allocated for Korea in 1971. The ROKG accepted the offer, and further requested that two additional systems be exchanged for the SAMCAP system. In August, after receiving assurance that grant aid funds were available, the ROK requested the earliest possible delivery of the five SAMCAP systems. In September, JUSMAG-Korea advised that the ROKG would pay the PCH&T charges to ship the two in-house systems to the CONUS, and, on 17 December, the U.S. Army Missile Command advised that two SAMCAP systems would be available for delivery to the ROK in July 1975, two in December 1975, and the last in January 1976.[2]

(S) Another program for upgrading missiles in Korea was the conversion of the basic HAWK to the improved HAWK. This program was also overtaken by the Congressional report endorsed in the FY 75 Military Appropriations Bill which

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1. J82 HistSum Dec 74; JCSM-443-74 of 12 Nov 74, Subj: Impact of FY 1975 Military Appropriations Bill on U.S. Army Forces in Korea; SECDEF 9202/272259Z Nov 74; JCS 1501/292040Z Nov 74; CINCPAC 040301Z Dec 74; COMUSKOREA 060533Z Dec 74; CHJUSMAGKOREA 040200Z Jan 74; CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA 130725Z Jan 75; COMUSKOREA 142342Z Jan 74.
2. J82 HistSums Sep and Dec 74; DA 222117Z Feb 74; JUSMAGKOREA 140818Z Mar 74, 021046Z Aug 74, 120735Z Sep 74; COMUSKOREA 200913Z Aug 74; J8 WEB, 16-22 Dec 74.

recommended the turnover to the ROK of NH and HAWK missiles and the withdrawal of the U.S. military personnel involved. The improvement program involved the conversion of the HAWK units from semi-mobile to full mobility. The ROKG had signed a Letter of Offer in the amount of $10.388 million for ground support equipment and some concurrent spare parts to support the conversion of one battalion of four HAWK batteries. However, the entire upgrading program became secondary to the question of timing for the eventual turnover of the HAWK units to the ROKG, whether one U.S. battalion would remain to support the U.S. Second Division, and various implications of command and control. No substantive security assistance action took place in 1974.[1]

(S) Perhaps the most startling of the missile actions during 1974 concerned the HARPOON missile. The CINCPAC POM for FY 75-80 listed the HARPOON as priority nine out of twelve on an FMS credit list for FY 76. The HARPOON progressed in priority until, in FY 80, it was listed as number one. CINCPACFLT noted, in March 1974, that the HARPOON was still in the research and development stage for installation on U.S. Navy ships. CINCPACFLT also noted the possibility, as indicated by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), that the STANDARD ARM (anti-radiation missile) system, currently installed on U.S. Navy ships, might be offered to the ROKG. On 16 July 1974, the CNO mailed a Letter of Offer for two STANDARD ARM launchers and 20 missiles to the ROKG, whose interest was for possible use on the multi-mission patrol ship (PSMM).[2]

(S) By October, after the SCM of 1974 at which the Deputy Secretary of Defense had assured the ROK MND that the HARPOON was available, State and DOD were holding price and availability data for six HARPOON systems and 60 missiles. The ROKG had requested a second offer for 12 systems and 120 missiles. On 22 November, the State Department informed the Embassy that the sale of the HARPOON to the ROKG would be approved and that a Letter of Offer would be forthcoming shortly. On 19 December, the CNO provided price and availability data and stated that a formal Letter of Offer would follow. The offer was to include two options: six systems and 60 missiles for $38 million or 12 systems and 120 missiles at $72.6 million. Delivery under both options was to begin in the third quarter of calendar 1977.[3]

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1. J82 HistSum Jul 74; J53 Point Paper, 16 Aug 74, Subj: Conversion of Basic HAWK to Improved HAWK; J53 Point Paper, 25 Nov 74, Subj: HAWK Transfer; J53 Point Paper, 26 Dec 74, Subj: 38th Air Defense Artillery Brigade; J8 WEBs, 28 May-2 Jun 74, 17-23 Jun 74, 1-7 Jul 74.
2. CINCPACFLT 190243Z Mar 74, which cited CINCPAC Ltr, Ser 00212 of 13 Mar 74 and CNO 082345Z Mar 74; J8 WEB, 15-21 Jul 74.
3. J82 HistSums Nov, Dec 74; J53 Point Paper, 18 Oct 74, Subj: SCM Force Structure Issues-Korea; SECSTATE 258636/222300Z Nov 74; CNO 192026Z Dec 74; J8 WEBs, 7-11 Oct 74 and 25 Nov-1 Dec 74.

(C) Meanwhile, CHJUSMAG-Korea advised that, on 31 July, the ROKG had signed an FMS case for four STANDARD ARM systems and 40 missiles. And, on 24 June 1974, the ROKG signed FMS cases for 114 TOW (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) missile systems.[1]

The Small Boat Program

(S) In 1971, a Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum directed the U.S. Navy to begin a development program for fast boats to combat the agent infiltration problem in the ROK and as a potential requirement in other countries. The original ROK coastal patrol interdiction craft (CPIC) program was for 20 "killer boats," as stated in NSDM 129. Development of the boat initially was to be funded by DOD, and the U.S. Navy was to fund the gun system development on the basis that the gun would be used on other Navy craft. To meet the ROK requirement, a prototype was to be constructed, tested and evaluated, with Korea authorized to use the technical data to construct a fleet of fast boats. The propulsion, communications, fire control and gun systems were to be furnished by U.S. sources and funded by MAP. In May 1972, the MND proposed, and DOD agreed, that 17 boats would be built--the prototype and eight CPIC in the United States, the balance in Korea. In October 1972, the DSAA was designated program monitor and a MAP ceiling of $52.2 million was established by DOD. Although the CPIC program was beset with funding problems, the chief obstacle to progress was the interim evaluation of the prototype. The 4 March 1974 U.S. Navy test and evaluation report stated that the prototype showed promise, but had many deficiencies which prohibited further CPIC production. CINCPAC and DOD strongly favored the "fly before buy" policy, and production of the CPIC would not be approved until successful completion of all shore testing and sea trials. This had not occurred by the end of 1974.[2]

(C) Another small boat co-production program was for a multi-mission patrol ship (PSMM). The original program consisted on three craft, two to be built by the Tacoma Boatbuilding Company (TBC) at Tacoma, Washington, and one to be built in Korea. After the TBC changed ownership, the ROKG renegotiated the PSMM program with the new owner (Reinell Industries). The program was funded in FY 73 and FY 74 FMS credits for $16 million. In 1974, the ROKG began negotiations with the joint-venture company building the third PSMM at Masan, Korea to procure five additional PSMMs with ROKG funds. The negotiations were completed

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1. J82 HistSums Apr, Jun, Jul 74; CHJUSMAGKOREA 241254Z Apr 74, 270638Z Jun 74, and 312345Z Jul 74; J8 WEBs, 18 Dec 73-3 Jan 74, 22-28 Apr 74.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 475-476; J53 Point Paper, 2 Apr 74, Subj: Coastal Patrol Interdiction Craft Development; Speedletter, CNO Ser C55 of 4 Mar 74, Subj: CNO Project T/S84 Interim Evaluation of CPIC-X; J82 HistSums Sep and Dec 74; CHJUSMAGKOREA 030245Z Sep 74.

in November 1974 with an agreement for the construction of three craft in Korea and two in Tacoma. The primary weapon selected for installation on these PSMMs was the Italian OTO Melara 76mm dual-purpose navy gun. No U.S. weapon met the capabilities of the OTO Melara. The U.S. Navy intended to procure the gun from a U.S. manufacturer under a licensing agreement for eventual installation on U.S. Navy ships; however, U.S. production would not be available for the ROK PSMM. The estimated gun cost was $6.3 million. The ROKN had selected the Emerson Electric 30mm gun mount and the Honeywell radar gunfire control system for the secondary armament and fire control system. These items had originally been designed for the CPIC.[1]

(C) In September 1974, the JUSMAG-Korea informed the CNO and CINCPAC that ROKG had embarked on a construction program for 20 patrol boats of a second generation "SCHOOLBOY" class (PBK). Actual construction began in October on the 82-foot, 80-ton craft with a design speed of 40 knots. Ordnance and fire control systems were to be purchased from U.S. manufacturers. By the end of the year, two PBKs were under construction, one at Masan and one at Pusan.[2]

Other FMS Actions

(C) The co-production of AN/PRC-77 tactical radios contracted for in August 1973 proceeded on schedule after extraordinary action to airlift radio kits to Korea in June 1974. The assembly of the first 1,500 piece part kits began on 18 July, and, by the end of November, 937 radios had been delivered to the ROK military forces. As the AN/PRC-77 radios began to replace older AN/PRC 8, 9 and 10 radios, the ROKG requested permission to issue them to the Homeland Defense Reserve Force (HDRF), the ROK equivalent of a militia and not MAP-supportable. About 10,000 radios were involved. The DOD authorized the ROKG to redistribute them to the HDRF on 8 November provided the ROKG agreed the radios continued to be subject to FAA provisions. The ROKG was urged to consider purchase of the radios under FMS. At the end of 1974, no decision had been reached by the ROKG as to whether the radios would be held as MAP-owned property or purchased under FMS.[3]

(C) FMS action also began in 1974 to upgrade the ROKA tank fleet. The upgrade consisted of night firing and improved direct fire capability for the

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, p. 475; J82 HistSum Nov 74; CHJUSMAGKOREA 130747Z Nov 74; J8 WEB, 11-17 Nov 74.
2. J82 HistSums Sep and Dec 74; CHJUSMAGKOREA 100905Z Sep 74.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, p. 447; J82 HistSums Apr, Oct, Nov, Dec 74; CDRECOM 161900Z Apr 74; CHJUSMAGKOREA 190336Z Apr 74 and 220227Z Oct 74; CINCPAC 260127Z Oct 74; SECDEF 3585/081657Z Nov 74; CINCPAC 130131Z Nov 74; CHUSMAGKOREA 230255Z Nov 74; CINCPAC ALPHA 144/040629Z Jun 74.

entire fleet (808 tanks), and the dieselizing and up-gunning of 140 M48 tanks. The ROKG had also begun to explore the possibility of co-producing M60 tanks.[1]

(S) The M-16 rifle and ammunition co-production programs had begun several years earlier, but, in 1974, the prospect that insufficient ammunition was being produced to match the rifle production loomed. The DA and JUSMAG-Korea rectified the potential imbalance by shipping ammunition from the CONUS and achieving an increased production rate at the ROK arsenal. By the end of 1974, 25 million rounds of 5.56mm ammunition had been received and 15 million more were in transit. FMS cases had provided increased raw material to accelerate ROK arsenal production, and the potential shortage had been averted.[2]

Laos

(S) The ceasefire agreement in Laos on 21 February 1973, and the 14 September 1973 Protocol to the ceasefire agreement, laid the ground work for the establishment of a Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU) on 5 April 1974. The Protocol stipulated that all foreign military personnel would be withdrawn from Laos within 60 days after the PGNU was established. Effective on 15 August 1973, the position of Defense Attache (DATT) within the Defense Attache Office (DAO) in Vientiane was established, and action began to withdraw U.S. military personnel from Laos except for 30 military positions accredited to the U.S. Mission as part of the DAO. The DATT was charged as the principal military advisor to the Ambassador; he represented the Secretary of Defense with the host country military establishment; he performed the normal intelligence functions of a defense attache; and, he managed the MAP/MASF for Laos. The Deputy Chief (DEPCH), Udorn assisted and supported the DATT in the management of the security assistance program.[3]

MASF/MAP Funds

(S) The appropriations bill for FY 74 (Public Law 93-240) directed the change of security assistance funding from MASF to MAP effective 1 July 1974. In August 1972, dollar guidelines for FY 74 and FY 75 MASF Laos were set by DOD at $300 million and $150 million respectively. In April 1973, the DEPCH and the Ambassador revised the FY 74 MASF downward to $79.8 million on the premise that the 21 February 1973 ceasefire would continue.[4]

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1. J82 HistSums Jul, Oct, Nov, Dec 74; CHJUSMAGKOREA 050424Z Jul 74; 200522Z Aug 74, 200550Z Nov 74; J8 WEB, 15-21 Jul 74.
2. J82 HistSums Jul, Dec 74; six pertinent messages.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 484-488.
4. Ibid.

No Foreign Dissemination

LAOS

(as of 1 Aug 74)

BASIC INFORMATION J8

AREA 91,430 SQ MI

ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA 1.4 ACRES

POPULATION 3.1 MIL

LITERACY RATE 15%


ANNUAL GROWTH 2.5%

LIFE EXPECTANCY 50 YEARS

DEFENSE BUDGET
SELF FINANCED (1974) $21.5 MIL DEF AS % OF GNP 22.2%

GROSS NAT PROD (1974) $163 MIL PER CAPITA $94

KING - Sri Savang Vatthana
The Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU), Inter Alia, with Prince Souvanna Phouma as Premier, and the National Political Council of Coalition (NCPC) with Prince Souphanouvong as President received investiture from his Majesty the King of Laos on 5 April 1974 following an Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation signed in Vientiane on 21 February 1973.



J8 OBJECTIVE

TO ASSIST LAOS IN MAINTAINING ITS STATUS AS AN INDEPENDENT, NEUTRAL STATE.

U. S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION PA1

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON CHARLES S. WHITEHOUSE
U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. CHARLES A. MANN
DEPUTY CHIEF JUSMAG THAILAND
BGEN HARRY C. ADERHOLT, USAF

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES J8

1. Assist in the development and support of a balanced force which is of sufficient strength to maintain internal security, to allow for the independence of the people of Laos and preclude domination of the Royal Lao Government (RLG), including a coalition government.
2. Encourage pursuit by the Royal Lao Government Armed Forces (RLGAF) of military objectives compatible with U.S. interests and strategy.
3. Assist in a workable demobilization program to reduce the size of the RLGAF to peacetime levels without disrupting the Lao economy or jeopardizing the stability of the RLG.

FY 76 JSOP	MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES J53	MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES J2	COMBAT CAPABILITY J31
ARMY	28 INF BN, 5 RECON GROUPS; 5 FA BN, 5 ENGR BN, 1 RIVER FLOTILLA, 1 PSYWAR BN. STRENGTH 28,000	121 INF BNS, 5 ARTY BN, 1 RIVER FLOTILLA, 3 RECON GRPS, 5 ENG BN, 1 PSY WAR BN, STRENGTH 69,000 (AS OF 1 JUL 73)	MAINTAIN LIMITED SECURITY PRIMARILY IN THE WESTERN HALF OF THE COUNTRY AGAINST LOCAL INSURGENT FORCES. NOT CAPABLE OF BLOCKING DETERMINED EXTERNALLY SUPPORTED AGGRESSION. LIMITED OFFENSIVE CAPABILITY. OVERALL COMBAT READINESS FAIR TO POOR.
NAVY	NONE	11 FOM-11, 3 FOM-12, 13 LCM-6, 14 PONTOON Power Boats, 2 Transports, 2 Utility Craft Total 45	MAINTAIN LIMITED SECURITY OF RIVER ROUTES AND PROVIDE LIMITED LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENT FORCES.
AIR FORCE	5 COMPOSITE SQDN (25 T-28; 15 O-1; 38 H-34; 5 AC-47; 10-C-123), 1 TRAINING SQDN (4 T-41; 10 T-28; 2 H-34; 1 C-47). STRENGTH 2,000	5 COMPOSITE SQDNS (55 T-28, 20 O1, 5 U-17, 22 H-34, 10 C123, 10 A/C-47, 15 C-47), 1 TRAINING SQDN (16 T-28, 7 T-41, 1 O1, 1 O1), 2 H34, 4 C47. STRENGTH 2,196 AS OF 1 JUL 73	Provide limited fighter-bomber, logistic and reconnaissance support to ground forces.

* DOES NOT INCLUDE PATHET LAO OR DISSIDENT NEUTRALIST MILITARY FORCES.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 125.

SECRET

Note: Previously exempted by USCINCPAC:

SECRET

(S) On 4 February 1974, the DSAA established a CPD level for FY 75 Laos MAP of $85.2 million, exclusive of $4.8 million for supply operations, but including $1.5 million for training. Reductions in the Royal Lao Government Armed Forces (FAR) strength and reductions in ammunition and construction funding resulted in a final funded FY 75 MAP of $20.704 million, including supply operations.[1]

(S) On 18 October 1974, the DATT, Vientiane provided to the DSAA a detailed analysis of the MAP envisioned for FY 76, as submitted to CINCPAC in September 1974, in order for DSAA to defend the program to the Office of Management and Budget:[2]

Material and Services, Ground	$24,128,512
Material and Services, Air	18,870,996
Training, Ground	639,475
Training, Air	522,046
Total	$44,161,029

[redacted]

Termination of Lao Irregular Forces

(S) The DSAA, on 10 June 1974, advised the Embassy in Vientiane that the DOD would finance $3.8 million through switchback procedures at the Washington level for termination/phaseout payment to the RLG for the Lao Irregular Forces (LIF). In order to provide a legal basis for the obligation of funds, the Embassy was requested to execute an MOU with the RLG pertaining to the integration of the LIF into the regular armed forces. Also to be addressed in the

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1. SECDEF 5974/042257Z Feb 74 and 4367/032113Z Jul 75; J83 Point Paper, 22 Aug 74, Subj: FY 75 Laos MAP.
2. AFSSO Udorn/DAO Vientiane 181300Z Oct 74 (EX)(BOM).
3. UDORN/DAO Vientiane Laos 040720Z Jun 74.

SECRET

MOU was the reduction of the overall strength of the RLG armed forces from 60,000 as of 1 July to 50,000 by 30 June 1975. The MOU was to stipulate that the payment was to defray the costs of the LIF integration and the force reduction, to include severance pay, salaries and subsistence. The MOU was signed by the Charge' and the Lao Minister of Defense on 13 June 1974.[1]

Materiel Redistribution/Disposition

(S) In July 1974, the DSAA initiated action to redistribute/dispose of possible excess Lao MAP/MASF materiel in Laos or at in-transit storage facilities [redacted] Effective 1 July 1974, the backup storage objective (S/O) for Laos munitions was reduced from 45 days of supply (DOS) to zero DOS. In-country S/O remained at 15 DOS. CINCPAC was tasked to advise the DAO/DEPCH to declare all RLG-titled munitions in excess of 15 DOS and one year's training requirements available for redistribution. Further, CINCPAC was directed to advise the DAO/DEPCH to declare available for redistribution all RLG-titled military end items above authorized tables of organization and equipment (TOE). Munitions and end items so declared would be treated as redistributable MAP property and transferred in accordance with MAP procedures. CINCPAC tasked USARPAC to take the DSAA directive for action, based upon items declared excess by DEPCH on 13 and 26 July, and recommended that Cambodia receive first priority for redistribution of materiel. CINCPAC concurred with the DATT request that items listed as in-country eligibles not be considered because of the political situation, and recommended to the DSAA that Laos in-country excesses be handled on a case-by-case basis. The DOD concurred.[2]

(S) By October, the DSAA had tentatively allocated $27 million of ammunition to Vietnam, as well as the U.S.-titled weapons and equipment. The RLG-titled equipment had been earmarked for Cambodia. On 23 October, the DSAA requested CINCPAC to take immediate action to re-ship the Laos excess munitions [redacted] to Vietnam. The shipment was to be at no cost to DAV except PCH&T charges for movement from storage locations in Thailand. If a forthcoming DA ammunition review/audit of MASF obligations versus deliveries proved that any of the ammunition being shipped was Army-owned and not previously obligated under the Laos MASF program, appropriate charges would be levied against the DAV program. CINCPAC passed action to USARPAC on 26 October.[3]

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1. SECDEF 6333/101925Z Jun 74; AMEMB Vientiane 4709/131127Z Jun 74.
2. CINCUSARPAC 300206Z Jul 74, which cited SECDEF 031441Z Jul 74, CINCPAC 040409Z Jul 74 and 202142Z Jul 74, and DEPCHJUSMAG Udorn 130800Z Jul 74 and 261100Z Jul 74; J83 Point Paper, 22 Aug 74, Subj: Redistribution/Disposition of Laos MAP/MASF Materiel.
3. J83 Point Paper, 18 Oct 74, Subj: Redistribution/Disposition of Laos MAP/MASF; J83 HistSum Oct 74; SECDEF 9202/231644Z Oct 74; CINCPAC 260252Z Oct 74.

(S) On 31 October, USARPAC authorized the transfer to Vietnam of $17.3 million of ground ammunition and $7.0 million of air munition. The Chief, MEDTC accepted offers for $410,876 of such equipment as M-16 rifles, carbines, mortars, machine guns and grenade launchers. The USDAO Saigon accepted $296,699 in 45-cal. pistols, grenade launchers, dump trucks, radios and an ambulance. In November, CINCPAC directed the redistribution of those items accepted, and reported those not required by Cambodia or Vietnam to the Military Departments for disposition.[1]

FY 75 Aircraft Authorization - RLAF

(C) For future reference and index purposes, the following Royal Lao Air Force aircraft authorizations were provided by the CINCPAC Security Assistance Directorate:[2]

	PREV AUTH	FY 75 AUTH	ADV ATTRITION
T-28	86	40	3
AC-47	8	6	-
C-47	19	10	1
O-1	23	15	-
V-17	7	0	-
T-41	6	10	-
H-34	43	32	6
C-123	10	10	-

Republic of the Philippines

(C) The security assistance program in the Philippines was administered by CINCPAC through the Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) Philippines. In June 1974, the Chief, JUSMAG responded to CINCPAC's request for comments on a recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report on MAP in the Philippines. He noted that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) had been able to contain the Muslim rebellion in the Mindanao-Sulu region and the threats to internal security in Luzon and the Visayas to date, but the AFP resources had been stretched to the limit. U.S. security assistance had contributed to the readiness of the AFP, and, if no further reductions were made in grant aid,

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1. J83 HistSum Nov 74; CINCUSARPAC 310210Z Oct 74; DIRMATMGT HILL AFB 082200Z Nov 74; CINCPAC 070316Z Nov 74, 072256Z Nov 74, 120215Z Nov 74, 221924Z Nov 74, 230150Z Nov 74, and 030057Z Dec 74.
2. J83 HistSum Aug 74.

No Foreign Dissemination

PHILIPPINES

(as of 1 Aug 74)

SECRET

BASIC INFORMATION (U) J825

AREA	116,000 SQ MI
POPULATION	41.5 MIL
ANNUAL GROWTH	3.3%
ARABLE LAND PER CAP	.6 ACRE
LITERACY RATE	72%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	59 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1974	$10.0 BIL
PER CAPITA	$241
DEFENSE BUDGET (SELF-FINANCED) 1974	$292.4 MIL
AS % OF GNP	2.9%

PRESIDENT-Ferdinand E. MARCOS J2

SECTY FOREIGN AFFAIRS-Carlos P. ROMULO
SECTY NATL DEFENSE-Juan P. ENRILE
CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP-GEN Romeo ESPINO, ARMY
VICE C/S AFP LGEN Rafael ILETO, AF
CG, ARMY MGEN Rafael ZAGALA, ARMY
FOIC, NAVY- RADM Hilario RUIZ, NAVY
CG, AIR FORCE- MGEN Jose RANCUDO, AF
CHIEF CONSTABULARY- MGEN Fidel RAMOS, PC



OVERALL OBJECTIVE J8

TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMED FORCES; TO ENCOURAGE PHILIPPINE MILITARY SUPPORT OF SEATO; AND TO MAINTAIN U.S. OPERATED MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR PA1
HON. WILLIAM H. SULLIVAN
U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. THOMAS C. NIBLOCK
CHIEF JUSMAG
BGEN JACK R. SADLER, USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES J8

1. Assist in obtaining and maintaining necessary rights, authorizations, and facility arrangements for U.S. and Allied Forces and deny them to forces opposed to U.S. interests.
2. Promote the security of U.S. facilities.
3. Support the development of improved internal security and anti-smuggling capabilities.
4. When appropriate, country programs, both grant aid and sales, should be configured to enhance eventual defense materiel compatibility in the area.

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES FY 76 JSOP J53		MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES J2	COMBAT CAPABILITY J31
ARMY	2 INF DIV; 3 SEP INF BDE; 1 ENG CONST BDE; 1 ARTY GP; 1 HOME DEF ABN BN; 2 CBT ENGR BN. STRENGTH: 64,200	2 Inf Div, 4 Inf Bde, 1 Arm Cav Sq, 1 Abn Bn, 1 Arty Grp, Total Strength 28,000. Constabulary: 4 zone Cmd(Bde), 3 Bn, 1 Metrocom(Bde), 1 Pres Guard Bn, Total Strength 23,500. As of: 1 JUL 73	IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CONSTABULARY, CAN MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND PERFORM COUNTER-INSURGENCY AND CIVIC ACTION MISSIONS. NOT CAPABLE OF RESISTING A MAJOR EXTERNAL ATTACK WITHOUT CONSIDERABLE OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE. BUDGET LIMITATIONS, UNDERSTRENGTH COMBAT UNITS AND LACK OF OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING ABOVE BATTALION LEVEL RETARDS COMBAT READINESS.
NAVY	PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBAT (1 DE), COASTAL PATROL (7 PF, 4 PG, 9 PGM, 53 PB, 4 PHM, 10 PBR/YSR), MINE WARFARE (2 MSO, 2 MSC), AMPHIBIOUS (10 LST, 2 LSM, 15 LCM, 3 LCPL, 4 LCPR, 25 LCVP, 5 LCMA, 2 LCU), AUXILIARY (5 AK, 2 AKL, 1 ATR, 3 AG). STRENGTH: 11,000 MARINE CORPS: 1 BDE. STRENGTH: 4,600	1 DD type, 66 Coastal Patrol types, 4 Mine Warfare types, 55 Amphibious types, 11 Auxiliary types, 1 Mar Bde. Total Strength 13,015(includes 3,200 Marines). As of: 1 JUL 73	CONDUCT LIMITED OFF SHORE PATROL AND MINOR AMPHIBIOUS AND ASW OPERATIONS.
AIR FORCE	2 TFS, 2 AIR CMDO SQ, 1 LIAISON SQ, 1 AIR RESCUE SQ, 2 AIR TRNS SQ. STRENGTH: 10,500	2 TAC FTR Sq(1 F-86, 1 F-5), 1 Air Commando Sq(UH-1H), 1 LN Sq(U-17), 1 Air Rescue Sq (UH-1H, HU-16), 2 Trans Sq(C-47). Total Strength 10,000. As of: 1 JUL 73	LIMITED CAPABILITY TO FULFILL MISSION OF ASSISTING ARMY TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND CONTRIBUTE TO DEFENSE AGAINST EXTERNAL ATTACK.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 126.

SECRET

all major Joint Strategic Objectives Plan goals would be met by the end of FY 80. There were several important factors to consider in any future planning for the termination of grant aid and other forms of military assistance. Most obvious was the relationship between the MAP and the U.S. base rights in the Philippines. While there was no official connection between unrestricted U.S. access to the bases and MAP, it had always been unofficially understood that the MAP was more or less a quid pro quo in lieu of base rent. In addition, there were several other less dramatic benefits which had become increasingly important under the martial law regime. One was the ability to help the AFP see the U.S. bases in terms of overall security, rather than only in the interests of the United States. Another was the opportunity provided by the MAP to talk about broad security concepts with an increasingly assertive AFP. A third was the liaison between the JUSMAG and the AFP in training programs which established relationships of critical importance since the advent of martial law. The Chief, JUSMAG stressed the imperative of higher FMS credit levels as grant aid declined if the United States intended to retain its position as the most desirable source for military equipment.[1]

FY 74/75 MAP Funds

(S) Grant aid for the Republic of the Philippines (ROP) in FY 74 was reduced from the originally programmed $19.5 million to $16.8 million by the appropriations bill for FY 74. As discussed in Section II, FY 74 funds were restricted to a case-by-case justification before obligation, and, after reductions imposed in favor of higher priority countries, the total amount funded in the ROP FY 74 MAP was $13.8 million. The CPD level for FY 75 was $17.9 million, and the actual funded level was $21.010 million.[2]

Accelerated Deliveries

(S) On 14 March 1974, the Chief, JUSMAG advised CINCPAC of an urgent plea from the Chief of Staff, AFP for accelerated delivery of selected FY 74 MAP items needed to cope with the Muslim situation in the Sulu-Mindanao area. The items included armored personnel carriers (APC), helicopters, grenade launchers, recoilless rifles, utility landing craft (LCU), armament subsystems and 65-foot patrol boats. CINCPAC supported the request on 16 March. Twenty APCs were delivered on 31 March, and, by 13 May, 11,693 M-16 rifles had been delivered. Both of these items were from FY 73 MAP.[3]

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1. CHJUSMAG Phil 210900Z Jun 74.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 422, 423, 491; SECDEF 5974/042257Z Feb 74; J82 Point Paper, 17 Jul 74, Subj: MAP for the ROP; SECDEF 4367/032113Z Jul 75.
3. J82 HistSums Mar, May 74; CHJUSMAGPHIL 140054Z Mar 74 and 130100Z May 74; CINCPAC 160303Z Mar 74; SECDEF 3743/202130Z Mar 74; J82 Point Paper 1 Apr 74, Subj: Accelerated Delivery of Equipment to Philippines.

(S) In April, the JCS requested CINCPAC to provide additional justification for some of the FY 74 items because their accelerated delivery was possible only by diversion or withdrawal from U.S. active or reserve forces. Responding to CINCPAC tasking, the Chief, JUSMAG provided detailed justification for the requested items. This detailed justification was prefaced by two major points which were germane to the request. In the near future, the JUSMAG noted, the U.S. Government and the ROP would commence wide-ranging, detailed negotiations on base rights and economic relations. Thus, the accelerated delivery of priority MAP items by the United States would help to establish a favorable environment for the talks. Secondly, the selected items were essential to the capability of the AFP to contain the dissident activity at a tolerable level. The ROP had made major budgetary and manpower commitments to cope with its internal security problems, and it was markedly in the interest of the United States to be as responsive as possible. The Chief, JUSMAG noted aggressive efforts by the ROP to develop in-country capabilities for the production of small arms, radios, ammunition and vehicles. Further, the level of FMS cash purchases from the United States had risen from $600,000 in April 1973 to more than $16 million under consideration as of 1 March 1974. CINCPAC strongly supported the JUSMAG justification to the JCS, noting that, for the first time in recent years, the ROP request contained only valid, approved items destined only for MAP-supported units.[1]

(C) The DSAA funded the Army items; however, the Navy items were not funded because of the long production lead time involved. The Secretary of Defense informed CINCPAC on 16 July that accelerated delivery could be considered only for five UH-1H helicopters, 500 grenade launchers and 10 recoilless rifles because of adverse readiness impact on U.S. stocks. CINCPAC replied that the commitment to assist an important long-term friend and the importance of retaining the confidence of the ROP during the military bases negotiations warranted reconsideration. Noting that such acceleration could be interpreted as assistance by the United States in the suppression of the Muslim insurgents, CINCPAC suggested that deliveries be made in a discreet manner.[2]

(C) On 2 August, the DSAA cited a State Department letter requesting Defense to, "review this matter with the view of meeting at least part the Philippine Government request due to what we consider to be overriding political considerations," and directed the DA to initiate immediate action to make the partial delivery previously described. Authority was granted to withdraw or divert the items from active or reserve resources. On 11 October, the Chief,

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1. J82 HistSum Apr 74; JCS 3859/162155Z Apr 74; JUSMAGPHIL 231000Z Apr 74; CINCPAC 280017Z Apr 74.
2. SECDEF 7379/161419Z Jul 74; J82 Point Paper, 17 Jul 74, Subj: Accelerated Delivery of Equipment to Philippines; CINCPAC 250416Z Jul 74.

JUSMAG reported that the helicopters, grenade launchers and recoilless rifles had been received.[1]

Philippine Rifle Manufacturing Project

(C) In June 1973, the ROP requested approval of an FMS loan to finance the in-country manufacture of 150,000 M-16 rifles, plus the equivalent of 22,500 M-16s in spare parts. An agreement was reached between the ROP and Colt Industries for the direct purchase, in-country assembly (initially) and production (eventually) of the rifles over a six-year period. In August 1973, the JUSMAG received the ROP request for a loan of $15.614 million, with two annual installments of $8.622 million in FY 74 and $6.992 million in FY 75. The Country Team and CINCPAC recommended approval. The Defense Department supported the request, and, as of 31 December 1973, further action awaited State Department concurrence.[2]

(S) On 27 March 1974, the State Department approved the multi-year FMS credit for the M-16 project. The FY 74 credit was for $8.622 million and $6.922 million was for FY 75. The State message to the Embassy (not to CINCPAC) advised that the FY 75 tranche was subject to sufficient NOA appropriations for FMS by Congress and that the balance of the $29.4 million total cost of the project must be borne by the ROP. In May, the Memorandum of Understanding (MOV) between the ROP and the United States was signed.[3]

COIN Aircraft/PEACE COBRA

(C) On 1 February, the Chief, JUSMAG informed CINCPAC of an apparent shift in goals for the Philippines Air Force (PAF); the former emphasis on the procurement of high performance aircraft had changed to interest in additional counter-insurgency (COIN) aircraft. In addition to a second squadron of F-5As, the PAF commander expressed interest in the availability of A-1, T-28D, A-37, A-7, B-25, B-26, OV-10, etc, which was a typical approach of many Filipino officials when discussing their needs with U.S. officials. This interest narrowed to T-28Ds after the possibility of obtaining these aircraft from Laos as surplus was raised. On 17 May, JUSMAG advised CINCPAC of an immediate, urgent need for 16 T-28Ds plus four attrition aircraft, AGE and spares to be reallocated from Laos to the Philippines as soon as possible. CINCPAC supported the requirement.[4]

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1. J82 HistSums Aug, Oct 74; SECDEF 5104/022121Z Aug 74; CHJUSMAGPHIL 110904Z Oct 74.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 495, 496.
3. J82 HistSum Apr 74; SECSTATE 061285/111910Z Apr 74, which passed SECSTATE 061285 of 27 Mar 74; SECDEF 7576/021949Z May 74; J82 Point Paper, 21 May 74, Subj: Philippine M-16 Rifle Manufacturing Plant.
4. J82 HistSum Feb 74; CHJUSMAGPHIL 010252Z Feb 74; J82 Point Paper, 21 May 74. Subj: COIN Aircraft for PAF; J82 HistSum May 74; JUSMAGPHIL 170600Z May 74 (EX) and 170830Z May 74; CINCPAC 232335Z May 74.

(C) On 12 June, the DSAA directed the transfer of 16 T-28Ds from the Royal Lao Government (RLG) to the U.S. Government after 30 June 1974, and by the U.S. Government to the ROP thereafter, as redistributable MAP property. AGE and spares were to be drawn from assets excess to RLG requirements and transferred to the ROP at the earliest practicable date. The costs of repair, rehabilitation and wing modification were to be borne by Philippine MAP, with work performed by Thai-Am at Udorn, Thailand. Contingent upon Royal Thai Government approval, the Filipino crews were to be trained by the MACTHAI TLD at Udorn beginning in July 1974. Training costs were also chargeable to MAP. The Deputy Chief, JUSMAG Udorn estimated the repair and modification costs at $227,000 for 16 aircraft.[1]

(C) The Chief, JUSMAG Philippines recommended a meeting at Udorn to refine the details of the work package, including configuration, i.e., "yankee seat" egression or "hard" seat. JUSMAG Philippines also advised that, after modification, the aircraft should be crated for shipment by sea or airlift, and that all training of Filipino aircrews would be accomplished in the ROP. The CSAF concurred in the need for a meeting, and, on 9 August, the DSAA informed the CSAF that, because of political implications, it was essential that the regional aircraft work be accomplished and all aircraft delivered to the ROP not later than 31 December 1974. On 16 August, the DSAA informed CINCPAC that an offshore procurement certificate, authorizing the procurement of the 16 T-28D aircraft rework, had been signed. The CSAF, on 23 August, assigned to the project for rework and transfer to the Philippines of the T-28Ds the nickname PEACE COBRA.[2]

(U) The first T-28Ds were loaded on a PACAF C-130 for transport to the Philippines on 28 September. On 25 October, JUSMAG Philippines acknowledged that the 16 T-28Ds should be in the Philippines by 31 December, and renewed his original request for four attrition aircraft. The attrition aircraft problem was not solved in 1974, and, as of 31 December, eight C-130 loads remained to complete the transfer of the T-28Ds and support equipment.[3]

Thailand

MAP/FMS Funds

(S) Thailand MAP funds for FY 74 were reduced from the CPD figure of $57.3 million to the appropriated figure of $35.8 million. FMS was reduced from $15 million to $10 million. Allocation of funds was withheld by DOD because of

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1. J82 HistSums Jun, Jul 74; SECDEF 8574/121843Z Jun 74; DEPCHJUSMAG Udorn 190721Z Jun 74 and 231100Z Jul 74; J82 Point Paper, 17 Jul 74, Subj: T-28D Aircraft for PAF.
2. J82 HistSum Aug 74; CHJUSMAGPHIL 012312Z Aug 74; CSAF 061820Z Aug 74 and 231619Z Aug 74; SECDEF 1329/091750Z Aug 74 and 6292/160017Z Aug 74.
3. J82 HistSums Oct, Dec 74; DEPCHJUSMAG Udorn 040931Z Oct 74; CHJUSMAGPHIL 250840Z Oct 74; CINCPACAF 312110Z Dec 74.

No Foreign Dissemination

THAILAND

(as of 1 Aug 74)


BASIC INFORMATION J8

AREA	198,500 SQ MI	LIFE EXPECTANCY	61 YEARS
POPULATION	41.0 MIL	GROSS NAT. PROD 1974	$10.0 BIL
ANNUAL GROWTH	3.4%	PER CAPITA	$244
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.7 ACRE	DEFENSE BUDGET SELF FINANCED 1974	$325 MIL
LITERACY RATE	68%	AS % GNP	3.3%

DEFENSE BUDGET INCLUDES INTERNAL SECURITY

KING - Phumiphon Adundet J2

PRIME MINISTER - Sanya Thammasak
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER - Prakop Hutasaing
CINC ARMY - GEN Krit Siwara
CINC NAVY - ADM Sa-ngad Chaloryoo



OVERALL OBJECTIVES J8

ASSIST THAILAND IN SUSTAINING NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN STRENGTHENING INTERNAL SECURITY AGAINST COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY AND RESISTING POSSIBLE OVERT AGGRESSION. PROMOTE REGIONALISM AND ASSURE US BASE RIGHTS.

U. S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON WILLIAM R. KINTNER
U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. ROGER ERNST
COMUSMACTHAI & CHIEF JUSMAG-THAI
MAJ GEN
ROBERT C. HIXON, USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES J8

1. Assist in obtaining and maintaining necessary rights, authorizations, and facility arrangements for U.S. and allied forces, and deny them to forces opposed to U.S. interest.
2. Assist RTG to develop the capability to suppress Communist insurgency and to maintain internal security.
3. Provide support for the development of Thai military capabilities to defend against limited external military threats.
4. Minimize any adverse impact of military programs on Thai economic and social development.
5. When appropriate, country programs, both grant aid and sales, should be configured to enhance eventual defense materiel compatibility in the area.

MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES FY 76 JSOP J53

ARMY	5 INF DIVS, 2 RCT, 3 SF GP, 1 ABN BN, 1 LRRP CO, 1 AIR DEF CMD, 1 155 ARTY BN, 3 AIR MOBILE CO, 1 LT AVN CO, 1 MI BN, 2 ENG BN, 2 SIG OPS BN, 1 PSY OPS BN. STRENGTH: 142,000
NAVY	PRINCIPAL SURFACE CRAFT (1 DE, 1 DEG), COASTAL PATROL (5 PF, 5 PC, 2 PGMG, 15 PGM, 7 PCE), RIVER PATROL (40 PRB), MINE WARFARE (1 MSF, 4 MSC, 12 MSL/MSB, 1 MCS), AMPHIBIOUS (4 LST, 3 LSM, 2LSIL, 1 LFS, 6 LCU, 26 LCM, 6 LCVP) AUXILIARY (2 AKL, 2 AO), 1 ASW SQDN, 1 UTILITY SQDN. STRENGTH: 20,900. MARINE CORPS: 6 INF BN, 1 HQ, 1 ARTY REGT, 1 HQ BN, 1 SVC BN, 1 MP BN. STRENGTH: 12,100
AIR FORCE	1 TFS (JET), 7 TFS (COIN), 3 TRANSPT SQ, 2 TAC SPT SQ, 1 UTIL SQ, 2 HEL SQ. STRENGTH: 41,500.

MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES J2

ARMY. 5 INF DIV, 3 SF GRP, 1 RCT, 1 ABN BN, 40 RGR TM, 2 ADA BN, 1 ARTY BN, 1 LT AVN CO, 3 AMBL CO. TOTAL STRENGTH 133,300. AS OF: 1 JUL 73

NAVY. 1 DD TYPE, 20 COASTAL PATROL TYPES, 31 RIVER PATROL TYPES, 18 MINE WARFARE TYPES, 48 AMPHIBIOUS TYPES, 4 AUXILIARY TYPES, 1 ASW SQ (S-2), 1 UTILITY SQ(HU-16, C-47), 1 RECON/CLOSE SPT SQ(O-1), 1 MAR BDE, 4 MAR INF BN, 1 MAR ARTY BN. TOTAL STRENGTH 27,390 (INCLUDES 8,390 MARINES AS OF: 1 JUL 73

AIR FORCE. 7 TAC FTR SQ(1 F/RF-5, 3 F-28, 1 OV-10 1 A-37, 1 AU-23), 1 TAC RECON SQ (T/AT/RT-33), 2 TAC SPT SQ (1 O-1, 1 AC/EC-47), 2 HELO SQ(1 UH-1H 1 CH-34), 2 TRANS SQ(1 C-123, 1 C-47), 1 UTILITY SQ(T-41). TOTAL STRENGTH 40,519. AS OF: 1 JUL 73

COMBAT CAPABILITY J31

MODERATE CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY AND OFFER LIMITED RESISTANCE TO EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. LACK OF EFFECTIVE LOGISTICAL SYSTEM; TOO MUCH DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN SOURCES.

LIMITED ABILITY TO CONDUCT COASTAL DEFENSE AND PATROL IN GULF OF THAILAND AND INTERNAL WATERWAYS, LIMITED ASW AND MINE WARFARE; TRANSPORT AND AMPHIBIOUS SUPPORT.

LIMITED AIRBORNE OPERATIONS AND CLOSE SUPPORT OF THE ARMY; DAY AIR DEFENSE. ARMY AIR ARM HAS LIMITED CAPABILITY TO FERFORM OBSERVATION AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 129.

growing combat demands in Cambodia, and the reduced FY 73 funds combined with the delay in FY 74 funding produced significant automotive, aircraft, ship, weapons, communications and spare part shortages in the Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF). As of 30 April, only $2.9 million of FY 74 funds had been released. On 3 June, CINCPAC was informed that the FY level for Thailand would be $29.773 million.[1]

(S) The FY 75 CPD level for Thailand MAP was $56 million, but no funds were requested for FMS credits. As shown in Section II, the final funded figure for FY 75 was $30.126 including costs for supply operations.[2]

(C) So far as FMS credits were concerned, the RTG had never used FMS credit to purchase defense articles; in fact, the $10 million of FMS in the FY 74 program had not been used. This probably influenced the decision to drop FMS in the FY 75 CPD. On 11 July 1974, the Embassy in Thailand informed the State Department that the RTG had requested an FMS credit agreement for $10 million. This was the first formal (letter) request by the RTG for FMS credit, and, to the Embassy, seemed to represent recognition of the need to find other ways of procuring defense equipment in the light of reduced MAP funding. The Embassy strongly endorsed the request. State replied that, subject to the availability of funds, the U.S. Government would try to satisfy the Thai request.[3]

The Program

(S) The revised funding level for FY 74 was used primarily to fund critical ammunition, engine overhauls and aircraft/automotive spare parts. Investment items included six attrition F-5s, 25 helicopters, two patrol boats and 105 trucks. The major program items (based on the $56 million CPD level) for FY 75 included (in $ millions):[4]

Aircraft (including spares)	$11.0
Patrol Boats (including spares)	1.0
Vehicles and Armament (including spares)	9.7
Ammunition	10.7

1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 422, 423; J83 HistSum Apr 74; AMEMB Bangkok 6838/261043Z Apr 74; J83 Point Paper, 3 Jul 74, Subj: Thailand FY 74 Security Assistance; COMUSMACTHAI 081010Z May 74.
2. J83 Point Paper, 18 Jul 74, Subj: Thailand-FY 75 Security Assistance; SECDEF 4367/032113Z Jul 75.
3. J83 HistSum Jul 74; AMEMB Bangkok 11266/111058Z Jul 74; SECSTATE 159466/232008Z Jul 74.
4. J83 HistSum Jun 74; J83 Point Paper, 22 Aug 74, Subj: Security Assistance-Thailand.

Communications Equipment (including spares)	$ 4.1
Other Equipment and Supplies	14.7
Repair of Equipment	1.9
Training	1.6
Technical Assistance	1.3
Total	$56.0

The Political Impact

(S) In October 1974, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in meetings with Thai officials, undertook to help the RTARF meet the need for replacement of obsolete weapons and for spare parts, especially in connection with COIN operations. At the same time, the Thai asked for assistance in strengthing RTARF self-sufficiency in weapon and spare parts production. The Secretary assured them of U.S. Government willingness to help, and described in detail possibilities for joint ventures and/or turnkey arrangements in which U.S. private capital could be used to build up the RTARF production facilities. In December, the Ambassador recalled this meeting and advanced some ideas to broaden and deepen in-country or regional production of military supplies and equipment. He specifically suggested trade-offs and co-production arrangements among such countries as Taiwan and Korea.[1]

(C) On 27 December, the Ambassador described a call on the Thai Minister of Defense at which the Thai official stressed the urgent need of the RTARF for replacement weapons and spare parts. He asked when he might receive a reply from the Deputy Secretary, and commented that high-ranking U.S. visitors continually praised U.S.-Thai friendship and cooperation and promised to help with military assistance, "but nobody ever delivers anything." The Ambassador noted that FY 75 MAP receipts by the RTARF to date totalled $978,221 for training and $877,620 for payments to U.S. technical representatives. During a call on the Thai Foreign Minister, the Ambassador reported essentially the same thrust--the essentiality of continued MAP for Thailand.[2]

Republic of Vietnam

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The combat equilibrium, with build-up of enemy and decline in U.S. military assistance, is shifting in favor of the NVA.

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1. SECSTATE 263895/1/021351Z Dec 74 (EX), which passed AMEMB Bangkok 18881 of 2 Dec 74; COMUSMACTHAI 130900Z Dec 74; for additional reference to the Secretary's visit, see Chapter X Political/Military Affairs.
2. AMEMB Bangkok 20085/270813Z Dec 74.

No Foreign Dissemination

REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

(as of 1 Aug 74)

BASIC INFORMATION I8

AREA	65,950 SQ MI
POPULATION	20.2 MIL
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.6%
ARABLE LAND PER CAPITA	.7 ACRE
LITERACY RATE	65%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	50 YEARS
GROSS NAT. PROD. 1967(E) (In constant prices)	$3.133 BIL
PER CAPITA	$155
DEFENSE BUDGET SELF-FINANCE 1971(E);	$318.6 MIL
AS % OF GNP	10.2%

PRESIDENT - Nguyen Van Thieu
VICE PRESIDENT - Than Van Huong I2
PRIME MINISTER - Tran Thien Khiem
CHIEF, JOINT GEN STAFF - GEN Cao Van Vien
COMMANDER VNAF - MAJ GEN Tran Van Minh
COMMANDER VNN - RADM Tran Van Chon
COMMANDER VNMC - BGEN Bui The Lan



OVERALL U. S. OBJECTIVES I8

TO IMPROVE AND MODERNIZE THE RVN FORCES AND TO ENABLE THEM TO COPE WITH THE ENEMY THREAT AS U. S. AND OTHER FWMAF REDEPLOY FROM SEASIA.

U. S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION PA1

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON. GRAHAM A. MARTIN

U.S. AID DIRECTOR
MR. JOHN P. ROBINSON
DAO
MGEN JOHN E. MURRAY USA

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES I8

1. Maintain the stable, balanced conditions necessary to insure peace in Indochina and SEA.
2. Continue to assure the South Vietnamese people the right of self-determination.
3. Assist in the progressive development of an effective government responsive to the South Vietnamese peoples' right to self-determination.
4. Contribute to the healing of the wounds of war and to the post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation of SVN.
5. Support a balanced RVNAF of sufficient size, strength, and professionalism to counter the principal threat facing South Vietnam.
6. Encourage the development and maintenance of a meaningful cease fire by all parties engaged in the hostilities, to include a mutual,balanced reduction of military forces.

	MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES FY 76 JSOP J53	MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES J2	COMBAT CAPABILITY J31
ARMY (ARVN)	11 INF DIVS, 1 ABN DIV, 18 ARMD CAV SQ, 3 TK BNS, 61 ARTY BNS, 4 ADA BNS, 15 RANGER GROUPS, 45 RNGR BNS, 10 MP BNS, 34 ENG BNS, 25 SIG BNS, 5 POLWAR BN, STRENGTH: 450,367.	11 INF DIV, 1 ABN INF DIV, 2 INF REGT, 1 RGR CMD, 1 RGR/ABN BN, 1 ARM CMD, 1 ARTY CMD. TOTAL STRENGTH 488,953. AS OF: 1 JUL 73	CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY OF MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS AND PRIMARY LOCs AND OFFERING EFFECTIVE RESISTANCE AGAINST AN ATTACK BY EXTERNAL FORCES. PROLONGED RESISTANCE MUST BE SUPPORTED
NAVY (VNN)	PRIN COMBATANTS 165: (DE, WHEC, PCE, PF, PGM, PCF, WPB): HARBOR DEFENSE 93; (PRB, LCPL, BW): RIVERINE: 588(PBR, RPC, LCM, ATC): COASTAL PATROL 238: (JUNK, RAIDERS): AMPHIB 13: (LST, LSSL); LOG CRAFT 379: (BW, LCM, LCVP), MINE WARFARE 47 (LCM, MSM). STRENGTH: 40,931.	2 DD Types, 7 WHEC Types, 156 COASTAL PATROL Types, 23 COASTAL JUNK PATROL Types, 592 RIVERINE FORCE, 93 HARBOR DEFENSE, 47 MINE WARFARE Types, 13 AMPHIBIOUS Types, 341 LOG & SPT FORCE. TOTAL STRENGTH 40,931. AS OF: 1 JUL 73	CHARGED WITH PATROLLING INLAND WATERWAYS AND COASTAL WATERS. SUPPORTS ARMY COUNTER-INSURGENCY ACTIONS.
AIR FORCE (VNAF)	19 TAC FTR SQDNS, 8 LN SQDNS, 2 RECON SQDNS, 5 TRANS SQDNS, 25 HELO SQDNS, 6 SPEC MISSION SQDN. STRENGTH: 64,507.	19 FTR SQ(3 A-1, 6 F-5, 10 A-37), 2 RECON SQ(1 EC-47, 1 RC-47), 25 HELO SQ(21 UH-1, 4 CH-47), 5 TRANS SQ(3 C-7, 2 C-130), 3 GUNSHIP SQ (1 AC-47, 2 AC-119), 8 LN SQ (0-1, 0-2, U-17), 1 SPT SQ(VC-47). TOTAL STRENGTH 64,507. AS OF: 1 JUL 73	CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING STRIKE OPERATIONS; PROVIDING CLOSE TACTICAL SUPPORT FOR ARMY, AND LIMITED AERIAL SUPPLY AND SUPPORT OF ABN OPNS.
MARINES	1 INF DIV (3 INF REGTS, 9 INF BNS, 3 ARTY BNS, 1 ENGR BN, 1 COMMD BN). STRENGTH: 14,145	1 DIV. TOTAL STRENGTH 14,402 AS OF: 1 JUL 73	COMMITTED TO DEFENDING AN AREA NORTH OF HUE.
TERRITORIAL FORCES	360 RF BN HQ, RF RIFLE CO 1810 STRENGTH: 324,799 6,699 PF PLATOONS STRENGTH: 223,401	1,818 RF CO. TOTAL RF STRENGTH 324,561. 6,699 PF PLAT. TOTAL PF STRENGTH 206,028. AS OF: 1 JUL 73	CONDUCT UNILATERAL AND COMBINED OPERATIONS AGAINST LOCAL FORCE VC UNITS TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR HAMLETS AND VILLAGES AND SECURE LOC'S.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 128.

SECRET

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SECRET

We must give RVNAF support of two kinds. One, money translated into hardware and logistics, * and two, a close-by U.S. air threat, backed by the will to use it.[1]

Funding the Program

(S) On 11 January, CINCPAC and the U.S. Defense Attache Office (USDAO) Saigon were informed by DSAA that the NOA for FY 74 was $820.5 million, or $264 million less than the CPD request. Two days before, on 9 January, CINCPAC was directed to align the FY 75 MASF for the RVN to a POM level of $1.45 billion based on the 7 January Presidential Budget Decision to fund FY 74 RVNAF material losses of $90.8 million and ammunition price increases of $99.2 million. Using POM accounting procedures, the $1.45 billion for FY 75 was to be programmed as follows (in $ millions):[2]

Total Equipment	$ 355.6	Army	$ 802.6
Total O&M	984.6	Navy	55.3
Training	14.6	Air Force	592.1
Supply Operations	69.2	Total	$1450.0
Admin Charges	26.0		
Total	$1450.0		

(S) The Defense Attache (DATT) in Saigon advised CINCPAC that the FY 74 level ($.8 billion NOA and $1.1 billion total obligational authority) was completely inadequate to sustain 1974 levels of combat support. The FY 74 budget for RVN MASF had been developed (original POM) at $1.6 billion based on minimal post-ceasefire combat activity, and the DATT requested CINCPAC support for a supplemental request of at least $315 million. The DATT also requested information about the FY 74 RVN program unavailable at his level because each military Service department managed its RVN program and funds separately. On 17 January, CINCPAC proposed to the DOD that a focal point be established in DSAA to coordinate FY 74 management information and eliminate the fragmentation of management responsibility. For FY 75, CINCPAC proposed a true MASF Category

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1. End of Tour Report, MGEN John E. Murray, Vietnam Report, 21 Aug 74, Vol. I, p. 107, hereafter cited as Vietnam Report; the asterisk in this extract was a footnote in which Gen Murray stated, "Money alone won't do it. The Congressmen who say, "well if they get into trouble, we'll vote the money," don't comprehend the four-month length of the pipeline to Vietnam, the back order phenomenon, and that money can't instantly be made into gun powder and delivered to the gun breach."
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, p. 516; J8 WEB, 4-14 Jan 74; SECDEF 3309/092153Z Jan 74.

IV procedure rather than the modified Category IV imposed by the DSAA in 1973.[1]

(S) Actions initiated in Washington, at CINCPAC and in Saigon to manage more efficiently the funds made available for security assistance to Vietnam are discussed in subsequent pages. For FY 74 funding, however, the situation was labeled a "funding famine" by the DATT. Army of Vietnam (ARVN) and Vietnam Air Force (VNAF) operations and maintenance support was severely reduced, and the cut-off of requisitions for ARVN supply created a "supply drought" in May through August 1974 because of the 120-day lead-time on deliveries. By mid-1974, informal information from Washington forewarned that the worst was yet to come. The "bubble" in the logistics pipeline caused by late and reduced FY 74 funding was not likely to be remedied in FY 75. On 2 August, the JCS informed CINCPAC that the one-for-one equipment replacement policy under the ceasefire agreement was no longer valid, and that only essential items would be replaced. On 7 August, the DSAA advised that the U.S. House had voted to restrict RVN funds for FY 75 to $700 million, of which $77.4 million was to be recovered from previously programmed U.S. Air Force F-5E aircraft procurement. CINCPAC, upon receiving this information, passed guidance to the USDAO suggesting a review of the FY 75 program which would eliminate all fund requests except absolutely minimum hard-core requirements. These were, in order of priority, ammunition (less training), POL and medical supplies, repair parts, and control and communications equipment. All items, even though already programmed under first quarter CRA, were to be purged if outside these minimum categories.[2]

(S) On 13 August, the U.S. Ambassador to the RVN noted the preliminary actions in the Congress and advised the State Department that, if the $700 million was enacted, along with the accompanying additional unprogrammed charges then being discussed in Congress, the survival of the RVN was in jeopardy. Not only would the military posture of the RVNAF be drastically damaged, but such evidence of the extent and durability of U.S. commitments to South Vietnam could prompt Hanoi to opt for a military solution to the war. In fact, the Ambassador stated, some intelligence sources reported that the communists were anticipating a "decisive" military breakthrough as early as the spring of 1975, when the RVNAF equipment and materiel shortages would be the most severe without additional U.S. assistance. The day following the Ambassador's message, Admiral Gayler advised the Chairman, JCS that, at the combat intensity of the previous two months, the $700 million would not support the RVNAF in facilities, equipment, supply stocks, subsistence, contractor

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 423-425; J83 Point Paper, 7 Mar 74, Subj: RVN MASF Program; CINCPAC ALPHA 013/250422Z Jan 74; CINCPAC ALPHA 123/290338Z Jan 74.
2. Op. Cit., Vietnam Report, Vol. I, p. 102; J83 HistSum Jun 74; CINCPAC ALPHA 067/080415Z Aug 74; CINCPAC 102352Z Aug 74, which cited JCS 5242/022321Z Aug 74 and SECDEF 8427/072210Z Aug 74.

support and off-shore rebuild even if the entire $700 million were available. Admiral Gayler also noted that the House action was of great concern to the senior military leaders of the RVNAF, and that according to the USDAO, these leaders were, "...shocked and dismayed and view this Congressional action a disaster...."[1]

(S) In September, stringent measures had been taken or were programmed to adjust RVNAF operations and force structure in accordance with the anticipated $700 million appropriation. CINCPAC concurred with USDAO plans to remove all A-1H, O-2, C-7, AC-47, AC-119G, T-37 and T-41 aircraft from operational status, and recommended that like measures by applied to the craft of the blue and brown water Vietnam Navy fleet. Public Law 93-365, H.R. 14592 of 5 August had already authorized the appropriation of $1.0 billion as a single Defense Assistance to Vietnam (DAV) appropriation. On 8 October, Public Law 93-437, H.R. 16243 appropriated $700 million for the FY 75 DAV. By November, the inactivation of VNAF aircraft had reduced flying hours from about 672,000 to 345,500. Deactivation was proceeding on 22 blue water ships, 148 harbor defense craft, 30 river assault groups with 459 craft and seven support bases. The revised program submitted by the USDAO in September programmed the distribution of the $700 million as follows (in $ millions):[2]

Army	$458.2
Air Force	183.3
Navy	13.3
DAO Admin	40.0
Training	5.5
Total	$700.0

(S) Since the authorized DAV was $1.0 billion, USDAO, CINCPAC and DOD analyzed the DAV requirements which were in shortfall from the original $1.45 billion program package to establish priorities for a possible $300 million supplemental appropriation if requested by the Administration. However, no such request had been presented to Congress by the end of 1974.[3]

MASF/DAV Program Management

(S) As previously noted, MASF for the RVN had been under a nominal Category IV program; however, the DOD had acceded to Service opposition and, while the

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1. AMEMB Saigon 10622/130440Z Aug 74 (EX); CINCPAC 140146Z Aug 74; COMUSSAG (General O'Keefe to Admiral Gayler) 161611Z Aug 74 (BOM).
2. CINCPAC 190320Z Sep 74; J87 Point Paper, 3 Oct 74, Subj: RVNAF FY 75 Funding; J87 Point Paper, 26 Nov 74, Subj: Critical Impact of FY 75 DAV Funding Constraints; Residual USDAO Saigon Report, "Personal Recollections," 15 Jul 75, p. 56.
3. J87 Point Paper, 11 Dec 74, Subj: Supplemental for RVNAF.

program was technically administered by CINCPAC, the component parts of the program were developed by, and funded by, the Services. The weakness of this system was illustrated by the over-obligation by the Services of the FY 74 ceiling established by Congress and the resultant notice to USDAO and CINCPAC, after the end of FY 74, that $296.3 million in FY 74 funds had been de-obligated. This programmed support could only be retained by expenditure of FY 75 funds. CINCPAC supported the USDAO request that the DSAA become the focal point for all programs affecting the RVN program early in 1974.[1]

(S) On 22 March, the DSAA advised CINCPAC that, in preparation for a possible change from MASF to MAP funding, the DOD and its agencies assumed control of development, coordination, and approval of program policies to include force structure, levels of support and major equipment characteristics. This included functional area management for the development, coordination and review of budget requests. MAP planning, programming and reporting procedures were to begin by 1 July 1974, and DSAA would issue program directives to the military departments based on program data submitted by USDAO Saigon through CINCPAC. On 16 July, the DOD issued essentially the same guidance in the context of the DAV concept, and, based on the quasi-MAP procedures required, USDAO and CINCPAC submitted coordinated changes to the USDAO terms of reference (TOR).[2]

(S) The road to centralized management of the DAV was not smooth, nor was it considered to be the best road by the U.S. Ambassador, Graham Martin. On 1 July, Martin had registered his conclusion that putting the administration of the FY 75 MASF in the DSAA and reverting to MAP procedures would not, "...provide the kind of efficient, flexible and accurate accounting and sensible program management the Congress has put us on notice it will demand...." On 8 April, he had acknowledged the, "...marvelous flexibility developed by the DOD comptrollers....", but, on 10 July, he objected strongly to the de-obligation of FY 74 funds for VNAF F-5E procurement. He cited the reason given--to stay within the MASF ceiling of $1.126 billion--as totally unacceptable, and suggested to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman, JCS that, "...we walk it back to the status quo ante before all hell breaks loose on the hill...." He noted that, in January 1974, the DSAA had advised of the total country ceiling ($1.059 billion) and had shown $164.9 million for aircraft procurement in FY 74, of which $113.6 million was for 71 F-5E aircraft. This had been recorded as approved and funded in all subsequent issues of the CINCPAC/DSAA program

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1. J87 Point Paper, 4 Sep 74, Subj: RVNAF FY 74 Funding; J83 Point Paper, 5 Feb 74, Subj: Management of RVN Military Assistance Service Funded Program; for discussion of reigning confusion at USDAO, see op. cit., Vietnam Report Vol. II, pp. I-1 through I-3.
2. J83 HistSum Apr 74; SECDEF 5838/221745Z Mar 74; USDAO Saigon 270659Z May 74; CINCPAC 210217Z Jun 74; JCS 3862/221633Z Jul 74.

status summary material report (S-8). From his point of view, Martin stated, since 83 F-5Es had been funded under prior years, the programmed F-5Es for the VNAF had all been paid for. He implied that the RVN MASF program had been "raided" from time to time, and, if there were funding problems in other programs, expressed his confidence that, "...the superb comptrollers in the DOD and the Services can solve them...without any further raiding of the RVN MASF program...." Martin also questioned the charging of PCH&T and the administrative costs of the DAO to the new separate account.[1]

(S) The Commander, U.S. Support Activities Group (USSAG), while aware of the "current flap" over the F-5E program, did not wish to become involved. However, he affirmed that the decision not to fund the balance of the F-5Es would have a serious impact on the government and high command of the RVN. If the decision were not reversed or modified, it would be an additional symbol of the direction U.S. support was taking, and could turn uneasiness to despair, with consequent affect on morale and dedication. The DATT in Saigon voiced strong concern to CINCPAC regarding the apparent misinformation being inferred by the Congress regarding the level of combat, extent of casualties, and need for strong support of the RVNAF. On 12 July, the Embassy Charge' in Saigon invited the attention of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS to Section 701, page 162 of the Senate Armed Services Committee report accompanying the DOD authorization bill:[2]

* * * * *

> The Committee was advised by the Defense Department of a problem in obligating for all of the funds provided for Air Force aircraft procurement for FY 1974, reimbursing the MAP account in the amount of $69.3 million and, at the same time, remaining within the overall MASF ceiling of $1.126 billion. As a solution, the Department proposed to defer full funding of the 71 F-5E airplanes authorized in FY 1974 over to FY 1975. The Committee has advised the Secretary to fully fund the F-5E program in fiscal year 1974 and to defer reimburse-

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1. AMEMB Saigon 9089/100430Z Jul 74 (EX), which cited AMEMB Saigon 8684/010850Z Jul 74 and 4468/080535Z Apr 74; When, in early 1974, the DOD had provided dollar guidelines for the FY 76 RVN POM of $1.060 billion, the POM submitted by USDAO had totalled $1.593 billion, which exceeded the guideline by $533.4 million. When requested by CINCPAC to adjust the POM to conform with the guideline, the USDAO declined per guidance from the Ambassador that it was not prudent to submit a POM which did not meet RVNAF needs (Source: J834 HistSum Mar 74).
2. USSAG 101102Z Jul 74 (EX); USDAO Saigon (Murray to MGEN Guthrie) 111004Z Jul 74 (BOM); AMEMB Saigon 9226/120615Z Jul 74 (EX).

ment of the MAP program for F-5As [ENHANCE PLUS payback expenses] until the FY 1975 MASF funds are available if MAP reimbursement still is desired.

(C) The Embassy Charge' concluded that, based on the foregoing quotation, the Senate intended that the entire VNAF F-5E program funding, including the last 71 aircraft, be completed in FY 74, and that reimbursement of the MAP for the F-5A payback costs in FY 75 was not mandatory.[1]

(C) In a personal message to the CINCPAC Chief of Staff, the acting DSAA explained the rationale for the DOD decisions which had elicited the strong objections from the Embassy. The amount of funds available for obligation in FY 74 had exceeded the ceiling, and approximately $296.3 million could not be utilized by Vietnam. Of this amount, the Army, Navy, and Air Force reflected unobligated balances on 30 June 1974 of $158.6, $.9, and $136.8 million respectively. The restructuring of the F-5E contract ($77.4 million) had been accomplished in order to pay back the MAP for charges incurred in connection with the F-5A ENHANCE PLUS aircraft and to stay within the Air Force portion of the MASF obligation ceiling. The DSAA stated that the FY 74 MASF funds had been de-obligated for three reasons: to repay MAP for ENHANCE PLUS costs; to remain within the Congressional ceiling; and to reprogram to meet the highest priority RVN requirements. No support, according to the DSAA, was lost by the RVN due to the de-obligation. Moreover, all charges for the support of Vietnam in FY 75 were a product of legislation and not administrative decisions, including the payment at actual value for EDA by the DAV.[2]

(C) The DATT, Major General Murray, took issue with the statement by the DSAA that no support had been lost by the RVN due to the de-obligation of funds. He maintained that support had been lost on those program lines identified as funded in FY 74 and then de-obligated. Among them, he listed $23.3 million in ammunition, $9.2 million in training, $26 million in pipeline requisitions, $14.2 million in military construction, "...not to mention the $77.4 million F-5E disaster...." Further, the DATT stated, the FY 75 program had been thrown into a maelstrom with little possibility of sane management or recovery during the year. He acknowledged the rationale for managing DAV as if it were a MAP program, but suggested that the DAV was a unique fund which might require numerous exceptions to normal MAP procedures in order to manage the program effectively. He objected to the setting of EDA value by the Services, and noted the difficulty of maintaining a workable ammunition pipeline without front-end funding authority.[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. DSAA (Fish to Moore) 121521Z Aug 74 (BOM).
3. USDAO (Murray to Fish) 150357Z Aug 74 (BOM).

(C) There was evidence during 1974 that the confidence in the DOD comptrollers expressed by the Embassy was not misplaced. In August, the costs expected to be charged to the FY 75 DAV were (in $ millions):[1]

PCH&T	$ 70
DAO Admin	50
F-5E (71 aircraft)	77
F-5A Payback	5
EC-47 Transfer	15
MILCON	15
Prior Year Long Lead-time Items	17
C-130 Joint Venture	3
Undelivered Ammo	23
Unfilled Supply Items (AF)	15
Ammo Pipeline	90
Training	10
Code 26 Personnel	UNK
Total	$390

(C) By the end of 1974, the costs to be charged against the FY 75 DAV were listed by the CINCPAC staff as $36 million for the DAO administrative budget and $74 million for PCH&T. The balance of the $700 million amounted to $590 million, of which $517.3 million had been funded by the end of December 1974.[2]

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1. J87 Point Paper, 20 Aug 74, Subj: RVNAF FY 75 Funding.
2. J87 Point Paper, 28 Dec 74, Subj: RVNAF FY 75 Funding.

SECTION IV-TRAINING

(U) For seven of the 14 PACOM countries eligible to receive grant aid funds, such assistance was restricted to CONUS training only. These were Afghanistan, China, India, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Beginning with FY 75, six countries--Cambodia, Indonesia, Korea, Laos, the Philippines and Thailand--received both materiel and training assistance under MAP. Training for the RVNAF was part of the overall DAV funding.

The Role of the MACTHAI TLD

(S) In December 1973, the Training and Logistics Detachment (TLD) was activated as an element of MACTHAI. The forerunner of the TLD was Detachment One of the 56th Special Operations Wing. Detachment One, at Udorn, Thailand, was originally concerned with Royal Lao Air Force (RLAF) training. When U.S. Air Force combat support for Cambodia stopped in August 1973, the need for special programs to improve and upgrade the Cambodian Armed Forces (FANK) was apparent. Among those adopted was the Tactical Air Improvement Plan for Cambodia (TAIP-C), which called for intensive Cambodian Air Force (KAF) pilot, combat crew, and ground maintenance training by the newly-established TLD.[1]

(S) As a result of the 1 July 1974 shift of Laos from MASF to MAP funding, the JCS requested CINCPAC to submit a plan for the continued support of KAF and RLAF training [redacted] In response to CINCPAC tasking, COMUSMACTHAI 4F AF submitted a plan which was subsequently staffed with PACAF, MEDTC, and DATT, Vientiane. The consensus was that the cost-effectiveness of the TLD was questionable in relation to the projected training requirements of the RLAF and KAF. On 2 April, CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that the TLD continue operations only until the TAIP-C training was completed. The basis for the recommendation was the in-country flying training capability of the RLAF; the overhead costs of the TLD; the lower costs of CONUS or PACAF on-the-job training (OJT). CINCPAC had also recommended continued contract maintenance support for both countries. The cost comparison of TLD operation versus CONUS and PACAF OJT training, based on available training projections as of 1 April 1974, was:[2]

Training Requirement

Cambodia	247 trainees; 8 aircrew; 239 maint specialists
Laos	189 trainees; 29 aircrew; 160 maint specialists

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 429-437; J85 HistSum Mar 74.
2. J8 WEBs, 18-24 Mar 74, 25-31 Mar 74; 1-7 Apr 74; J85 HistSum Mar 74; J85 Point Paper, 2 Apr 74, Subj: Continued Support for RLAF and KAF.

MAP TRAINING PROGRAM

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1974

COUNTRY	FY75 1/	FY76 2/	FY77 2/	FY78 2/
AFGHANISTAN	$ 200,000	$ 200,000	$ 200,000	$ 200,000
CAMBODIA	4,767,000	1,800,000	2,800,000	2,600,000
CHINA	400,000	500,000	500,000	500,000
INDIA	100,000	120,000	100,000	100,000
INDONESIA	2,537,000	1,400,000	1,800,000	1,300,000
KOREA	1,401,000	1,000,000	500,000	300,000
LAOS	1,500,000	1,200,000	900,000	600,000
MALAYSIA	285,000	300,000	300,000	300,000
NEPAL	35,000	30,000	30,000	30,000
PAKISTAN	300,000	350,000	300,000	250,000
PHILIPPINES	469,000	400,000	400,000	400,000
SRI LANKA	15,000	15,000	15,000	15,000
THAILAND	1,581,000	1,500,000	1,500,000	1,400,000
REGIONAL COSTS	365,000	360,000	360,000	360,000
TOTAL PACOM	13,961,000	9,175,000	9,705,000	8,355,000

1/ Source: FY75 Congressional Presentation Document (CPD)

2/ Source: FY76-80 Program Objectives Memorandum (POM)

SOURCE: J812

Cost of training using TL Detachment

USAF Pay and Allowances	$4,445,000
Fixed Overhead Costs	782,647
CB Course Costs	285,656
LA Course Costs	267,470
	$5,780,773

Cost of training using CONUS training, PACAF OJT and in-country RLAF flying training

CB CONUS Courses Costs	$427,640
CB OJT Costs	100,000
LA OJT Costs	23,000
LA Flying Training Costs	233,000
	$783,640

(S) On 3 June, the JCS disapproved the CINCPAC recommendation and directed that the TLD operation be continued through FY 75. Later in June, the CINCPAC J8 chaired a conference to realign the RLAF and KAF training programs. Representatives from DSAA, CSAF, PACAF, MEDTC, MACTHAI, the DEPCH Udorn and TLD Udorn attended. The conferees agreed on increased pilot training, expanded instructor pilot training, and the initiation of formal maintenance management training for the KAF. For the RLAF, the program included new pilot combat crew training and requalification of T-28, O-1D and AC-47 crews in combat crew training.[1]

(S) On 8-9 July 1974, another conference was held in Bangkok to accommodate fair and legal billing for training support, training services and contractor maintenance. The attendees agreed on all aspects of cost distribution except that for U.S. Air Force instructor pilot initial qualification and continuation training. The basic issue was whether MAP or USAF funds should be used to purchase POL and munitions for the AT-28 and O-1 instructor pilot upgrade and continuation training. Based on MACTHAI, DATT, Vientiane and CHMEDTC views, CINCPAC forwarded a recommendation to the JCS and DOD that these costs be borne by the USAF. On 3 September, the DOD approved USAF funding of the continuation

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J8 WEBs 3-9 Jun 74 and 1-7 Jul 74; CINCPAC ALPHA 015/260241Z Jan 74; J85 Point Paper, 3 Jul 74, Subj: PACOM Conference on Continued Operations of Training and Logistics Detachment (TLD) during FY 75.

training costs for instructors assigned to MACTHAI/TLD and tasked CSAF to provide the funds.[1]

(S) By August 1974, the scheduled training for FY 75 had been refined to include, for the KAF, 40 pilots and 18 instructor pilots; 121 maintenance technicians; 46 maintenance managers; and, the development of an instructor cadre. [redacted] The TLD was making a significant contribution toward KAF combat effectiveness [redacted] and the CINCPAC staff had begun to assess the need for continuation of the TLD beyond FY 75.[2]

(S) CINCPAC queried the Chief, MEDTC and the DEPCH Udorn for possible FY 76 TLD-conducted training needs. The replies cited [redacted] a KAF FY 76 flying training shortfall for instrument and night ordnance delivery of 60 pilots; and, a continuing need for maintenance training support. On 14 December 1974, CINCPAC requested JCS approval to phase down the TLD as the skills needed to complete the FY 75 training programs became superfluous. CINCPAC recommended a residual element to monitor and coordinate whatever third country contractor/USAF-conducted training might be needed in FY 76. On 1 January 1975, the JCS approved the CINCPAC phase-down plan in principle. The JCS requested CINCPAC to review the requirement for the TLD after FY 75, and to comment on the FY 75 Congressional funding limitation for Cambodia as related to its impact on FY 75 KAF aircrew and maintenance training by the TLD. The JCS requested CINCPAC's comments and recommendations by 30 January 1975.[3]

RAVEN Forward Air Controller (FAC) Training

[redacted]

1. J85 Point Paper, 18 Jul 74, Subj: USAF Instructor Pilot Initial Qualification and Continuation Training Costs; J85 Point Paper, 17 Jul 74, Subj: Conference on Logistics and Funding Support for Training and Logistics Detachment (TLD) Operation; J85 HistSum Jul 74; SECDEF 8467/100047Z Dec 74, which cited SECDEF 2136/031837Z Sep 74.
2. J85 Point Paper, 22 Aug 74, Subj: TLD FY 75 Training Program.
3. J85 Point Paper, 26 Dec 74, Subj: Drawdown of the TLD, USMACTHAI at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand; J8 WEB, 16-22 Dec 74; CINCPAC ALPHA 32/180330Z Dec 74; J85 HistSum Dec 74; CINCPAC 142123Z Dec 74; JCS 4631/010548Z Jan 75.



Cambodia

(C) The FY 75 Cambodia training dollar ceiling was originally established at $4.767 million, compared with $6.535 million in FY 74 and $1.8 million planned for FY 76. The original FY 75 program consisted of 379 students programmed for CONUS training and 1,724 students in third-country programs.[3]

(C) The plan for Khmer Air Force (KAF) airlift self-sufficiency was conceived as a means to eliminate the airland/airdrop of supplies in Cambodia by U.S. aircrews. The interim solution, pending the training of additional KAF C-123K aircrews and maintenance personnel, was the contractor support discussed in the Logistics chapter. On 22 June, the JCS approved the initiation of contract negotiations, and, on 15 July, requested CINCPAC to provide recommendations toward the attainment of KAF self-sufficiency. CINCPAC responded on 5 August with the plan to augment the KAF with C-123K aircraft and the training of 10 additional aircrews and 106 maintenance personnel. Training provided by a U.S. Air Force Mobile Team (MTT) [redacted] was considered to be the best plan. The composition of the MTT was three instructor pilots, two loadmasters, two flight engineers and 14 maintenance instructors, for a total of 21. The estimated training cost was $501,699. On 18 September, CINCPAC revised the training cost estimate to $339,821, and recommended two 12-week aircrew classes with five crews per class and 20-week maintenance training for 10 aircrews and

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 531.
2. J83 HistSum Dec 74; USDAO Vientiane 6060D/230345Z Sep 74; SECDEF 8467/100047Z Dec 74, which cited CINCPAC 270204Z Sep 74, DEPCHJUSMAG 220300Z Nov 74, CINCPAC 270105Z Nov 74, and SECDEF 032320Z Dec 74.
3. J85 Point Paper, 22 Aug 74, Subj: Cambodia SATP

106 maintenance personnel. The DSAA requested FY 75 program change data to implement the plan, noting that all costs would be borne by Cambodia MAP.[1]

(C) As of 31 December, seven student pilots, four co-pilots, five navigators, six flight engineers and eight loadmasters had arrived and were processing/testing to enter english language training on 6 January 1975. Three student pilots were due in mid-March, and 47 additional maintenance technicians scheduled to arrive on 7 January 1975. One USAF maintenance instructor was at Udorn, and three instructor pilots, two flight engineers, one loadmaster and nine maintenance technicians were due in Udorn by 13 January 1975. The student navigators and loadmasters were to be trained by KAF english-speaking instructors, which reduced the original requirement for two USAF loadmaster instructors to one. The USAF maintenance instructor requirement had been reduced by using TLD personnel to augment the MTT.[2]

Korea

(U) The primary new training program in the ROK during 1974 was initiated as the result of the F-5E deliveries by airlift discussed in Section III of this chapter. A USAF maintenance MTT consisting of a maintenance officer and 11 technicians from Williams Air Force Base arrived in Korea on 4 August 1974. They began maintenance training for ROKAF instructor pilots (IP) and maintenance technicians on 12 August. Two USAF-5E IPs arrived on 10 September and commenced flight training on 16 September. The overall mission of the MTT was to upgrade six ROKAF F-5A/B pilots into F-5Es and qualify them as IPs; upgrade two ROKAF IPs as functional test flight pilots; and, provide maintenance training for approximately 156 personnel. The maintenance training class graduated on 18 October and the formal flight training was concluded on 20 November.[3]

Laos

(C) The FY 75 Laos training dollar ceiling was established at $1.5 million, compared with $1.398 million (country total MASF) in FY 74 and $1.2 million programmed for FY 76. [redacted] The flying training program had 164 students in combat crew upgrade and refresher training in the T-28D, O-1D and AC-47 aircraft.[4]

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1. J85 HistSum Dec 74; JCS 6850/152144Z Jul 74; CINCPAC 051821Z Aug 74 and 180356Z Sep 74; SECDEF 3783/041507Z Oct 74.
2. J85 HistSum Dec 74; CHMEDTC 091010Z Nov 74.
3. J85 HistSum Dec 74.
4. J85 Point Paper, 22 Aug 74, Subj: Laos SATP.

Republic of the Philippines

(S) CONUS training for 110 Philippine Armed Forces personnel was accomplished in FY 74 at a cost of about $614,400. The dollar guideline for FY 75 training was $520,000. The program stressed resource management, specialty and technical training. The POM for FY 76-80 relected a drastic reduction in funds for training, at $4,000 for FY 76-78 and $3,000 for FY 79-80.[1]

Thailand

(S) The training dollar ceiling for FY 75 Thailand MAP was $1.581 million, compared with $1.433 in FY 74 and $1.5 planned for FY 76. The FY 75 CONUS program was for 333 students, with only 12 students scheduled for funded "overseas" training. The reason for the low "overseas" allocation was because of the no cost on-the-job in-country training available from U.S. Forces stationed in Thailand. In FY 74, 178 students were trained under this cooperative program, with 330 students projected for FY 75.[2]

Republic of Vietnam

CONUS Pilot Training Curtailed

(S) On 12 August 1974, the CSAF announced that FY 73/74 VNAF CONUS training carryover must be paid from the FY 75 DAV. The cost was estimated at $11.7 million. The DAO Saigon submitted a reclama, noting that this action failed to honor FY 74 obligations for training by the USAF, but later withdrew the objection. In coordination with the Embassy and the RVNAF Joint General Staff, the DAO then recommended a drastic curtailment of the CONUS pilot training program. As discussed in Section III of this chapter, the DAO also proposed to ground several types of aircraft in the VNAF inventory. CINCPAC and the DOD concurred in the DAO action to terminate training for 318 CONUS students on completion of their current training phases (98 in english language, 73 in T-41, 147 in phase I rotary wing) and return to Vietnam over the period from August to December 1974. Also cancelled were 40 T-38 pilot upgrade spaces in the FY 75 program. These curtailments generated a saving of $815 million. Retained in the CONUS from September 1974 to August 1975 to attain basic qualifications were 347 students (184 in T-37, 151 in rotary wing phase II, and 12 in T-38 pilot upgrade). An additional six CH-47 IPs and two F-53 pilots would complete training in FY 75.[3]

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1. J85 Point Paper, 3 Apr 74, Subj: FY 74 Military Assistance Training Program for Philippine Armed Forces.
2. J85 Point Paper, 22 Aug 74, Subj: Thailand SATP.
3. J85 HistSum Aug 74; CSAF 121947Z Aug 74; ATC 211700Z Aug 74; USDAO Saigon 270840Z Aug 74 and 280735Z Aug 74; J85 Point Paper, 24 Sep 74, Subj: VNAF CONUS Pilot Training Programs.

F-5E Training for VNAF

~~(C)~~ The F-5E training program was planned to attain in-country training self-sufficiency in FY 75. F-5E upgrade/IP training in the CONUS produced eight IPs in December 1973, 12 in March 1974 and six in June 1974. VNAF IPs began to conduct in-country training sorties in April 1974 using 22 F-5Es at Bien Hoa Air Base. A total of 42 pilots were to be trained in-country in 1974; 120 in 1975 and 22 in 1976. In the technical/maintenance training program, 54 instructor cadre completed CONUS training in October 1973 and returned to Vietnam.[1]

U.S. Contractor Training of RVNAF

(U) Upon the withdrawal of U.S. logistics and maintenance units from the RVN in January and February 1973, the existing logistics/maintenance contracts were extended and expanded. Others were added to support RVNAF operations. Most of the contracts required that the RVNAF personnel be trained to take over the contractor jobs; the contractors were to be phased out of Vietnam over a 12-month period. This ambitious plan, by April 1973, had been revised to emphasize "production" rather than training. The revision was necessary because of lack of Joint General Staff interest; little or no trainee input; trainee absenteeism; poor objectives development; and, inadequate RVNAF logistic support to the contractors. There was, until 1 July 1974, fragmented direction and oversight of the contractors, and no centralized control or monitorship of contractor training performance. On 18 July, the DOD requested CINCPAC to take command action to remedy the situation, and, by the end of August, the DAO advised that all contractor-conducted formal classroom instruction was completed. Only on-the-job training remained, and the DAO expected all contractor training to be completed by 1 January 1975.[2]

Limited Training Program for the RVNAF

~~(TS)~~ In October 1973, the JCS directed CINCPAC to submit a plan to train the RVNAF to conduct limited mining operations. CINCPAC's 20 November 1973 compliance was approved by the JCS on 6 December 1973 and CINCPAC was directed to implement the plan. The basic plan consisted of training selected RVNAF personnel at Guam by a USAF/U.S. Navy MTT. CINCPAC designated CINCPACFLT as the executive agent for the program. During the period 28 January-16 February 1974, the MTT trained nine operations/planning personnel, six VNAF IPs, 21 VNAF weapon/maintenance personnel, and six Vietnam Navy gunner/explosive ordnance disposal personnel. In-country training was completed in early April, and the period following 15 April was designated for operational readiness

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1. J85 Point Paper, 22 Aug 74, Subj: F-5E Training for VNAF.
2. J85 Point Paper, 22 Aug 74, Subj: U.S. Contractor Training of RVNAF.

training (briefings, flights, cruises, tests, exercises). The intent of the program was to give the RVNAF the potential to conduct mining operations; however, no weapons were transferred to the RVNAF. The JCS advised that the provision of mines would be predicated on flagrant North Vietnam ceasefire violations.[1]

(TS) A peripheral development to the training of the RVNAF in mine-seeding operations was the discovery that release of the DST MK-36 mine from the F-5 was complicated by an arming wire problem. Moreover, the release capabilities of the other two aircraft groomed for the operation (A-37, A-1) did not lend themselves to reliable release intervals for accuracy of delivery. The officer in charge of the USAF MTT, in fact, stated his belief that the VNAF would have serious problems in seeding a mine field with an acceptable loss probability, especially in a high threat area.[2]

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1. J85 HistSum Apr 74; CINCPACFLT 090227Z Jan 74, which cited CINCPAC 052055Z Jan 74; CINCPACFLT 090513Z Jan 74, 110241Z Jan 74, 282035Z Jan 74, which cited CINCPAC 202235Z Nov 73; USADAO Saigon 300900Z Jan 74 and 311025Z Jan 74; CINCPACFLT 010533Z Feb 74.
2. NAVMAG Guam 300315Z Jan 74; CINCPACFLT 010755Z Feb 74; ADMIN COMINEWARFOR 011846Z Feb 74; NAVMAG Guam 012345Z Feb 74.

SECTION V

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

Unified Command Responsibility in FMS

(U) In January 1974, CINCPAC advised the DSAA that he had directed his staff to devote increased attention to the role of FMS in the security assistance program. Some of CINCPAC's concern was prompted by the numbers of U.S. military briefing teams in the PACOM, and commercial representatives as well, to acquaint PACOM countries with various weapon systems available for FMS or commercial export sales. On 31 July 1974, CINCPAC Notice 4900, entitled "The Conduct of Military Export Sales" was published. The provisions of the Notice applied to all JUSMAGs, Military Missions, MAAGs, U.S. Military Groups and U.S. Military Representatives, DAOs or other military organizations exercising responsibility at the governmental level for security assistance in the countries to which they were accredited. Military export sales were defined as FMS, commercial sales, and licensed production/technology, and were recognized as an instrument of foreign policy. The Notice conveyed this policy to the security assistance missions in the PACOM:[1]

> CINCPAC will actively monitor Military Export Sales and negotiations in the PACOM area to ensure that the best possible advice and military judgment is available to host countries, the military assistance groups located therein and appropriate Washington agencies; and, provide appropriate assistance to U.S. industry concerned with Military Export Sales and negotiations.

FMS to Australia

~~(C)~~ Between FY 50 and FY 73, FMS sales to Australia amounted to over $1.0 billion. The major weapon systems purchased included the F-111, F-4, A-4 and TA-4 aircraft. Australia was the largest volume buyer through FMS cash in the PACOM; no FMS credit was granted. During 1974, the potential purchases included M-60 tanks, patrol frigates, P-3 reconnaissance aircraft and an air superiority fighter aircraft. On 30 August 1974, Minister of Defense Barnard signed an agreement to purchase two patrol frigates. The

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1. J82 Point Paper, 6 Feb 74, Subj: Unified Command Responsibility in FMS; CINCPAC ALPHA 028/270340Z Feb 74; CINCPACNOTE 4900 of 31 Jul 74, Subj: Military Export Sales in PACOM.

No Foreign Dissemination

REPUBLIC OF CHINA


(as of 1 Aug 74)

BASIC INFORMATION

AREA	13,900 SQ MI
POPULATION	15.7 MIL
ANNUAL GROWTH	2.4%
LITERACY RATE	85%
LIFE EXPECTANCY	70 YEARS
ARABLE LAND PERCAP	.1 ACRE
GROSS NAT. PROD FY 74	$9.1 BIL
PER CAPITA	$580
DEFENSE BUDGET (SELF FINANCED) FY 74	$939.6 MIL
AS % OF GNP	10.3%

PRESIDENT- Generalissimo Chiang, Kai-shek J2
PREMIER - Chiang, Ching-Kuo
DEFENSE MINISTER- Kao K'uei-yuan
CHIEF, GEN STAFF- Gen Lai, Ming-T'ang, CAF
CINC ARMY- Gen Yu, Hao-Chang
CINC NAVY- ADM Sung, Ch'ang-Chih, CN
CINC AIR FORCE- Gen Ch'en I-Fan, CAF
CINC, COMBINED SERVICE FORCE- GEN Chow, Wei-Yuan

COMMANDANT, MARCORPS- LT GEN Ho, En-Ting
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Shen Chang-Huan



OVERALL OBJECTIVE J2

TO DEFEND TAIWAN AND THE PESCADORES FROM COMMUNIST ATTACK AND TO RETAIN APPROPRIATE U.S. BASE RIGHTS ON ROC TERRITORY.

U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION PA1

U.S. AMBASSADOR
HON. LEONARD UNGER
U.S. AID DIRECTOR

CHIEF, MAAG MAJ GEN
SLADE NASH, USAF

MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE OBJECTIVES J8

1. Insure continued availability of necessary rights, authorizations, and facility arrangements for U.S. Forces.
2. Support modernization of ROC Forces essential to the initial defense of Taiwan and Pescadores within the limits of the U.S. commitment.
3. Encourage pursuit of military objectives compatible with U.S. foreign policy and strategy.

	MAJOR FORCE OBJECTIVES FY 76 JSOP J53	MAJOR COUNTRY FORCES J3	COMBAT CAPABILITY J31
ARMY	10 HVY INF DIV, 3 L INF DIV, 3 SEP ARM BDE, 1 SEP ARM/INF BDE, 2 ARMORED CAV REGT, 9 ADA BTRY (40MM SP), 2 VULCAN BN, 3 IMPROVED HAWK BN, 2 HERC BN, 3 ARMN BN, 1 AIRBORNE FORCE COMD, 10 ENG BN (COMBT), 34 ARMD/CORPS ARTY BN, 2 PSY WAR BN. STRENGTH: 300,000	12 HV INF DIV, 6 LT INF DIV, 3 ARM BDE, 1 ARM INF BDE, 2 ARM CAV REGT, 1 SW CMD (ARN), 12 ADA BTRY, 25 ARTY BN, 1 ARN BN. TOTAL STRENGTH: 354,500 AS OF: 1 JUL 74	Maintain internal security & conduct effective ground defense of Taiwan, Penghus & offshore islands against small scale attack if provided outside air, naval & logistic support. Well-organized and combat ready.
NAVY	PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBAT (24 DDG), SUBMARINES (2 SS), COASTAL PATROL (15 PCM, 6 PT), MINE WARFARE (14 MSC, 1 MMC), AMPHIBIOUS (1 LLC, 3 LSD, 1 LPR, 22 LST, 4 LSM), AUXILIARY (8 AO/AOG, 4 AKL/MSC, 1 ASD, 1 ASR, 6 ATF/MTR/ATA, 3 AGS/AMS), 1 HELO SQDN. STRENGTH: 33,600 MARINE CORPS: 2 MAR DIV, 1 LVT REGT, 1 MAR AIR GROUP, 1 COMBD BN. STRENGTH: 35,000	18 DD TYPES, 2 SS, 21 COASTAL PATROL TYPES, 14 MINE WARFARE TYPES, 58 AMPHIBIOUS TYPES, 22 AUXILIARY TYPES, 2 MAR DIV, 1 LVT REGT. TOTAL STRENGTH: 76,500 (INCLUDES 38,600 MARINES) AS OF: 1 JUL 74	The overall ability of the Chinese Navy to perform its assigned mission is considered fair. The Chinese Marines are considered capable of conducting div sized amphib operations, provided the required air & naval support, including amphib shipping, are available.
AIR FORCE	16 TFS/FIS, 1 RECCE SQDN, 1 SAR SQDN, 5 TRNS SQDN, 1 ASW SQDN, 1 TAC SPT SQDN, 10 ADA BN (40MM, 2 VULCAN BN, 4 ADA BN (90MM). STRENGTH: 70,000	11 TAC FTR INTERCEPTOR SQ (2 F-5, 5 F-100, 1 F-104, 3 F/TF-104), 1 RECON SQ (RF-104/101), 1 SAR SQ (HU-16, HH-1H, HH-3E), 7 TRNS SQ (1 C-47, C-54, C-110, C-123, 6 C-119), 1 ASW SQ (S-2), 1 TAC SPT SQ (O-1), 25 ADA BN. TOTAL STRENGTH: 82,600 AS OF: 1 JUL 74	Force combat ready. The Air Force has demonstrated its ability to perform its primary function, air defense of Taiwan under day VFR conditions. The limited all WX defense capability has improved since the F-104G sq became operational. Air defense against a low altitude threat remains a problem. Capable of providing fighter cover for naval operations in the area and tactical support for an army corps.

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 127.

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estimated cost of the vessels plus spare parts for three years was $80 million.[1]

FMS to the Republic of China

(S) Grant aid to the ROC for material was terminated on 1 July 1973. A training grant was continued at about a $500,000 annual level. The FY 74 FMS credit for the ROC was $65 million, and the CPD FY 75 level was $80 million. Numerous co-production/co-assembly projects underway in 1974 were supported with FMS credit (F-5E, UH-1H, T-53 engines, M-14 rifles and M-60 machine guns).[2]

Co-production/Co-assembly of F-5Es

(S) On 5 February 1973, a U.S.-ROC MOU was signed setting forth production and financing agreements for 100 F-5E aircraft. Contracts and agreements between Northrop Aviation and the Chinese Air Force (CAF) were signed, and construction of production facilities began. The first F-5E was scheduled for completion in January 1975. The total original program cost had been $235.2 million, but as a result of CAF-desired add-ons, the cost exceeded the $235.2 million by $30 million by mid-1974.[3]

ENHANCE PLUS Payback

(S) When the United States "borrowed" 48 F-5A aircraft from the ROC during the logistics buildup in Vietnam, just before the ceasefire, the United States agreed to deploy two USAF F-4 squadrons to Taiwan to maintain the ROC defense posture. The original payback plan had been to return 20 F-5As from Vietnam and pay for the co-production of 28 F-5Es at a cost of $49.9 million. As discussed in Section III, this plan was changed. The F-5As were to be returned after corrosion control treatment, but the F-5Es were to be diverted from scheduled delivery to Korea as a temporary replacement until the ROC co-produced aircraft were available. On 26 July 1974, the last of 20 F-5As was returned and one of the USAF F-4 squadrons was withdrawn. In order to redeploy the second F-4 squadron, the United States agreed to loan the ROC 21 F-5Es from the CONUS and the ROC was to co-produce seven F-5Es. All loaned aircraft were to have been delivered in-country by the end of May 1975.[4]

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1. J82 Point Paper, 28 Jan 74, Subj: FMS to Australia; Chief, FMS Canberra 1733/240431Z Oct 74.
2. J82 Point Paper, 24 Apr 74, Subj: U.S. Security Assistance and Foreign Military Sales to the ROC.
3. J82 Point Paper, 17 May 74, Subj: F-5E Co-production/Co-assembly in ROC.
4. J82 Point Paper, 17 May 74, Subj: Project ENHANCE PLUS Payback to ROC; J82 HistSum Aug 74; CSAF 052152Z Aug; J82 Point Paper, 9 Aug 74, Subj: Project ENHANCE PLUS Payback to ROC.

Other FMS Action

(C) On 12 March 1974, the DSAA concurred with a CINCPAC recommendation that the ROC be offered 100 M-48 tanks. The State Department approved and the case was implemented on 23 April 1974. The MOU was signed on 16 May 1974.[1]

(C) The CNO, on 11 January 1974, advised that the repair ship CADMUS was available for sale to the ROC Navy on a "as is-where is" basis for $204,000. CINCPAC concurred and the Chief, MAAG Taipei advised that the offer had been accepted. The FMS sale of six decommissioned U.S. Navy destroyers was offered on 18 April. Earlier, on 4 April another destroyer had been offered. One was subsequently deleted from the list of transfers, but the ROC accepted six.[2]

(C) In July 1974, the National Security Council and DOD approved the FMS case to convert the basic HAWK missiles possessed by the ROC to the improved configuration. The ROC Ministry of Defense directed that the letter of offer and acceptance be executed on 5 October 1974.[3]

FMS to Japan

(C) MAP grant aid to Japan was terminated in 1964 after a total of $855 million had been provided. The MAAG Japan was disestablished in July of 1969 and replaced by the Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO). The MDAO was established to advise and assist the Government of Japan (GOJ) in FMS matters and to perform certain residual MAAG functions. FMS and commercial sales for FY 74 were projected to be $139.1 million, of which $48.5 million was FMS cash. Potential sales of U.S. military equipment in 1974 included the SEA SPARROW missile, the HARPOON missile, the Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (LAMPS), the RH-53D helicopter, and the FX (experimental) tactical fighter. Although CINCPAC, COMUSJAPAN and other U.S. officials stressed the benefits to mutual security of force complementarity and standardization, the overall percentage of U.S.-Japan standardization (guns, tanks, ships, aircraft, missiles) had dropped from 80 percent in 1964 to 65 percent in 1970, and was projected to drop to 35 percent by 1977.[4]

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1. J82 HistSums Mar, Apr, Jun 74; SECDEF 7701/122030Z Mar 74; CDRUSAMC 291611Z Apr 74; CHMAAG China 130405Z Jun 74.
2. J82 HistSums Jan, Apr, May 74; CNO 112327Z Jan 74; CINCPAC 152004Z Jan 74; CHMAAG Taipei 150905Z Jan 74; CNO 191255Z Apr 74 and 191256Z Apr 74; CHMAAG Taipei 030901Z May 74; NAVSHIPS Det Portsmouth 040114Z May 74.
3. J82 HistSums Jul, Sep 74; SECDEF 6211/021717Z Jul 74 and 9759/182015Z Jul 74; CHMAAG Taipei 090811Z Sep 74.
4. J82 Point Paper, 30 Apr 74, Subj: MDAO Japan; J82 Fact Sheet, 7 Jan 74, Subj: FMS to Japan; J82 Point Paper, 30 Apr 74, Subj: Standardization in FMS to Japan; J82 Point Paper, 17 Oct 74, Subj: FMS to Japan.

(U) On 3 December 1974, the Chief, MDAO advised the CSAF that two RF-4E aircraft had been delivered to Japan. These were the first two of 14 scheduled for sale to Japan under FMS.[1]

FMS to Malaysia

(C) Malaysia was not eligible for MAP grant aid for materials, but received a training grant of about $200,000 per year. Prior to FY 74, Malaysia had purchased about $60 million under FMS. Malaysia had agreed to purchase 16 F-5E aircraft under FMS credit at a cost of $38 million, and, on 30 August, Malaysia signed a commercial contract with Lockheed Corporation for six C-130H aircraft. The estimated cost was $43 million, with first delivery scheduled in March 1976.[2]

FMS to Singapore

(C) Singapore received no grant aid. FMS credit had not been provided since FY 69 and FY 70, when FMS credit amounted to $19 million. Major purchases under FMS had been 48 A-4B excess aircraft and 230 M-113 armored personnel carriers. Potential sales were believed to include C-130s, M-48 tanks, F-5E and F-4 aircraft and medium helicopters. The Government of Singapore produced the M-16 rifle, AN/PRC-77 radio and various small arms and crew served ammunition. Singapore was interested in generating third country sales of these licensed items, but the United States position was to discourage such sales.[3]

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1. J82 HistSum Dec 74; CHMDAO 030825Z Dec 74.
2. J82 Point Paper, 21 Feb 74, Subj: Security Assistance/FMS to Malaysia; J82 HistSums May, Dec 74; USDAO Kuala Lumpur 310738Z May 74 and 050228Z Sep 74.
3. J82 Point Paper, 22 May 74, Subj: FMS to Government of Singapore; J82 Point Paper, 19 Sep 74, Subj: Security Assistance to Singapore.

CHAPTER VIII--PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE

Review of Drug and Alcohol Abuse Control Programs

(U) On 21 May the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health and Environment visited CINCPAC's headquarters on his way to a tour of the PACOM that continued through 5 June. CINCPAC staff members briefed the Assistant Secretary. That briefing provided a summary of the drug abuse control effort in the PACOM, and is summarized below.

(U) The whole drug abuse control problem was seen as a two-pronged effort. One effort was directed at the supply of illicit drugs, which is addressed in greater detail elsewhere in this chapter. The other was directed at the demand for illicit drugs and immoderate use of alcohol. This presentation focused on that demand. It was pointed out, however, that the CINCPAC staff was very active and interested in reducing the supply of illicit drugs. In an aggressive Customs effort, people, baggage, cargo, household goods, automobiles, ships, aircraft, and mail were examined or inspected for illicit drugs.

(U) The PACOM Military Services were responsible for conducting drug abuse control eduction, identification, and rehabilitation programs. When required, however, the unified command role involved pulling together various programs and expertise to bring about solutions to problems. Some PACOM subordinate unified commands had been deeply involved. COMUSTDC, for example, led the way in developing a Family Advisory Center. COMUSMACTHAI played a leading role initially in developing the Youth Treatment Center in Bangkok (subsequently operated by the State Department). Another example of the role of the unified commander was CINCPAC's recommendation to the JCS that Guam be designated as a high risk area for random urinalysis testing frequency purposes.

(U) The unified commander sought standardization of programs. There were two PACOM examples. One was establishment of the Hawaii Area Joint Military Panel for Alcohol Abuse Control, a military agency with key civilian community representation. This panel was dedicated to insuring maximum exchange of information and economic use of facilities, expertise, and efforts in alcohol abuse control. A second was the establishment of PACOM military-wide standards in discouraging immoderate use of alcohol in military clubs. Such standards were based on the principles that alcohol must not be pushed on anyone, an individual's decision not to drink must be respected, a non-discriminatory environment must exist to insure that abstainers were as accepted as those who drank responsibly, outmoded command practices should be eliminated when they

encouraged people to drink alcohol to excess, responsible use of alcohol had to be emphasized, and acceptable alternatives to alcohol abuse had to be provided.

(U) The results of a recent General Accounting Office (GAO) team survey of the PACOM were summarized. Essentially, the GAO had observed the following. Alcohol abuse was the major drug problem. More alcohol abuse control education was needed for supervisors. Problem drinkers were reluctant to be identified for fear that such action would be detrimental to their careers. Rehabilitation services were needed for senior officers and NCOs. More professional counselors were needed. Random urinalysis testing was not cost effective. (Here CINCPAC staff members had pointed out that random testing was a preventive and early identification program and as a preventive program it was difficult to apply normal cost effectiveness analysis procedures.)

(U) The urinalysis program was addressed. The trend was up for identification by command-directed urinalysis. Testing was directed more toward the target population and it had command emphasis.

(U) Use of rehabilitation programs was up in the command, principally for the Air Force because of the closing of the special treatment center at Lackland Air Force Base. Apprehensions for drugs were up in all Services; except the Marines, because of increased law enforcement efforts, marijuana dogs, and command emphasis. There was no discernible trend in the Marine Corps.

(U) The number of self and command-identified problem drinkers was up in all Services. This was attributed to more treatment facilities and professional and paraprofessional expertise, command and individual awareness, more command and supervisor referrals, and problem drinkers developing confidence in the system.[1]

(U) Following the Assistant Secretary's PACOM tour, a member of his staff was debriefed by members of the CINCPAC and component command staffs. In the Philippines, alcohol and marijuana were primary drugs of abuse, he reported. The alcohol rehab center at Clark, opened in January, was working well. In Thailand, no Defense Department dependent children had been hospitalized for drugs for the last six months. The Resident Treatment Program at the Youth Treatment Center had stopped work temporarily for lack of funds. Fifty percent of identified drug users were identified by random urinalysis testing. The SEATO medical lab was processing 900 samples a day; by shipping specimens from the Philippines to Bangkok instead of Japan, notification of results had

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1. J114 HistSum May 74. See also "Urinalysis Program" elsewhere in this chapter.

had been reduced from 8 to 4 days. In Hong Kong, the Consulate reported 10 known heroin labs, but the police had been unsuccessful in shutting them down. The military stationed there were believed to have no drug problems; the sailors transiting were subjected to ready availability of drugs. In Taiwan, drug use had decreased considerably, since the C-130 units left. In Korea, 50 percent of the identified users were identified by random urinalysis. The "no-show" rate was less than one percent (a USARPAC goal). Other than alcohol abuse, marijuana was the worst drug problem. The troops of the 2d Division were running 4 miles a day, which might be a viable alternative to drug abuse, along with other benefits. The units selected for random testing were not in the field; the division required people to come in from the field for the tests, rendering them non-productive for the day. USARPAC was taking corrective action, figuring that if mail and chow could go to the field, so could specimen bottles. In Japan, it was noted that 68 percent of the drug investigations dealt with marijuana, while on Okinawa 48 percent dealt with heroin. Policy for "no-shows" was to find them, test them, and discipline them. This was Service policy PACOM-wide. About one third of the identified drug abusers were identified by the random testing program. On Guam, both the CINCPACREP and 8th Air Force Commander had reported that drug availability and illegal use were getting worse, not better. The Navy was attempting to get an alcohol rehabilitation unit on Guam. In one general remark, the Assistant Secretary's staff member noted that while the random urinalysis program was unpopular, "it's the only thing we've got."[1]

(U) Specific CINCPAC programs to discourage immoderate use of alcohol included a draft CINCPAC instruction, which had not been published by the end of the year, and a special 3½ hour training course for senior supervisors of civilians or managers directly involved with programs affecting civilians. Also, CINCPAC dispatched a message to his component and subordinate unified commands in anticipation of the holiday season, reminding commanders of their responsibility to insure a holiday social environment that discouraged excessive alcohol consumption and that made abstinence as acceptable as use.[2]

International Narcotics Control

(S) CINCPAC participated in a number of inter-agency conferences and programs concerned with international narcotics control. He also monitored a narcotics trawler surveillance and interdiction program, the name of which was changed from VAGABOND CLIPPER to FRONTAL EDICT early in 1974.

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1. J114 HistSum Jun 74; J114 Memo, 10 Jun 74, Subj: MFR - Debrief by Mr. Holcomb, 7 Jun 74.
2. J114 HistSums Jan, Apr 74; J1441 HistSum Nov 74; CINCPAC 120250Z Nov 74.

(S) Thai fishing trawlers were used by international narcotics smugglers with a principal route around the southern tip of the RVN. The United States had no legal basis for unilateral search and seizure of those vessels, but the Government of the RVN had declared them contraband and subject to search and seizure when they were in RVN territorial waters or the continguous zone. This program was discussed in some detail in the 1973 CINCPAC Command History.[1]

(S) USN VP3 surveillance was conducted during the period 23-27 June 1974 for the Thai trawler LUANG LAP LUNG SRI; Commander Task Force 72 also participated in this surveillance, but no contact was made. Nevertheless, using information from the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Vietnamese Navy captured the trawler in the vicinity of Con Son Island on 27 June. It contained 4,950 pounds of raw opium.[2]

(S) On 14 August the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok advised that a Thai fishing trawler was picking up narcotics on or about 15 August at Koh Chic Island. Thai police reported the trawler's departure on 13 August, but adverse weather prevented effective tracking of the vessel. Visual sighting had been required, as opposed to electronic tracking by VP aircraft of the Seventh Fleet. [redacted] The Seventh Fleet had initiated FRONTAL EDICT operations using mission aircraft a total of 21 times since 1972. [redacted] Visual surveillance cost almost $156,000 in FY 74, detracted from the aircraft's primary anti-submarine role, and used a non-deployed squadron's POL allocation for a month.[3]

(S) On 20 November Admiral Gayler asked CINCPACFLT for his comments. CINCPAC said it looked to him as if the results from P3 support were minimal and not worth the effort. CINCPACFLT responded that since the April 1973 interception, P3s had logged over 500 flying hours in 50 sorties without a valid contact. At the same time the Thai government had participated to a minimum degree. He agreed that this was not effective use of P3 assets. [redacted]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 544-547; CINCPAC 091901Z Jan 74.
2. J112 HistSum Jun 74; J313 HistSum Jun 74.
3. J112 HistSum Aug 74; J112 Point Paper, 22 Aug 74; Subj: Frontal Edict (U).
4. CINCPAC 200027Z Nov 74; CINCPACFLT 040555Z Dec 74; J112 HistSum Dec 74.

(C) Among the meetings and conferences held during the year regarding international narcotics control in which CINCPAC staff participated were an East Asia Regional Narcotic Conference, sponsored by the Secretary of State in Singapore 28 January to 1 February. At that conference CINCPAC representatives discussed the necessity to reappraise the entire FRONTAL EDICT program, CINCPAC support for international narcotics control initiatives, the importance of a Drug Enforcement Administration agent full-time on Guam (see discussion below), and exchange of narcotics trafficking information.[1]

(U) Congressmen Lester L. Wolff (D.-NY) and Clement S. Zablocki (D.-WI) met with CINCPAC and component staff representatives and U.S. Customs Service people on 20 April to discuss drug trafficking prevention measures in the PACOM. The delegation expressed interest in customs inspections, including body search; medical evacuation of military dependents from Thailand for drug abuse; India as a potential source area; transshipment through the PACOM; and coordination and cooperation of all federal enforcement agencies.[2]

(U) Also in 1974 the Personnel Directorate assumed responsibility for publication of the PACOM Quarterly Narcotics Intelligence Report from the Intelligence Directorate. The first report under this new control was published on 10 April. The title was changed for the 4 June edition to the PACOM Quarterly Narcotics Trafficking Report. Other reports were published on 4 October and 10 December. Highlights of this December issue, which follow, are representative.

(C) As the quarter ended, fields in northern Thailand were being cleared for poppy and acreage was expected to increase. A new narcotics trawler route was uncovered. There appeared to be increasing Thai concern about indigenous abuse. Thai government narcotics seizures continued to increase with Thai authorities shutting down four refineries. U.S. military aircraft, body carry, accompanied baggage, and mail represented the principal ways that drugs were carried out of Thailand.

(C) The harvesting season for marijuana grown in the Japan prefecture around Misawa Air Base occurred during the reporting period. Heroin continued to be introduced into Okinawa by means of APO mail and Servicemen returning from temporary duty or leave to Thailand. The supply of LSD in Japan had moderately increased and the number of drug cases opened by Service investigative agencies increased during the quarter.

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1. SECSTATE 235699/022331Z Nov 73, J112 HistSum Jan 74.
2. J112 HistSum Apr 74.
3. CINCPAC 241857Z May 74; J112 HistSums Apr, Jun, Oct, Dec 74.

(C) In Korea there was no significant change in drug availability--marijuana was plentiful and cheap. Arrest of one soldier for possession of 5.8 pounds of marijuana led to the apprehension of two Korean nationals and seizure of 150 pounds of marijuana.

(C) In Taiwan, operations resulted in 33 apprehensions and closure of 18 drug stores involved in the sale of amphetamines and barbiturates.

(C) The Philippine government had initiated a campaign to educate school and barrio officials on narcotics law enforcement and a large-scale roundup of drug-related undesirables publicized government opposition to drug trafficking. The first indication was received that Air Force personnel at Clark were injecting heroin--smoking and sniffing were still the preferred methods of abuse.

(C) Drug use in the civilian community in Guam was evident, but had not been measured. Heroin and marijuana were the preferred drugs with heroin more readily available.

PACOM Military Customs Program

(U) As a means to reduce the threat of military personnel smuggling drugs into the United States and between countries in the PACOM, CINCPAC had initiated a military customs program in 1971. Early in 1974 CINCPAC commented on a proposed Joint Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Defense and the U.S. Customs Service. CINCPAC proposed a number of changes, some of which were included in the completed agreement, which was effective 15 April. The final agreement stated, "Unified commanders will coordinate the activities of all USCS personnel assigned to support the program within their respective areas of responsibility." This was as CINCPAC had recommended.[1]

(U) In March a PACOM Drug Suppression and Military Customs Conference/Workshop was held in Taipei, with both Service and other Federal agencies represented. The conference focused on interservice-interagency coordination, cooperation, and exchange of narcotics information; military customs goals for FY 75; resolution of mutual problem areas; assignment of permanent USCS advisors to the PACOM; and drug suppression and military customs in the various countries

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 550-553; CINCPAC ltr Ser 408, 28 Jan 74, Subj: Joint Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Defense and the United States Customs Service (USCS); CINCPAC ltr Ser 1555, 22 May 74, Subj: U.S. Customs Advisors, which transmitted the Joint Memorandum of Understanding.

of the PACOM. The termination of the temporary PACOM USCS advisors program was announced at this conference, but the importance of maintaining momentum in the program by early assignment of permanent advisors was cited by CINCPAC's Director for Personnel.[1]

(U) The assignment of five permanent USCS advisors to the PACOM was confirmed by the Department of the Army on 24 April. Also, CINCPAC requested that a USCS training team be sent for a 47-day program in the PACOM concurrent with the assignment of the permanent advisors. The first four of the permanent advisors were assigned to Thailand, Korea, Japan, and the Philippines/Taiwan, following an orientation visit in Hawaii 6-10 May.[2]

(U) The national level USCS training team finished their two-month tour of the PACOM on 4 October. They had trained 307 military customs inspectors and supervisors.[3]

(U) In 1973 CINCPAC had established a requirement for quarterly military customs reports. In the report distributed on 19 November it was noted that inspection of passengers had increased by 12 percent from the previous quarter and almost doubled from the same period the year before. For the first time since the report had been prepared, contraband (including drug seizures) had decreased (by eight percent) from the previous quarter. Drugs accounted for 19 percent of all contraband seizures and total drug seizures (327) increased by 63 percent from the previous quarter.[4]

Drug Abuse on Guam

(U) In May CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that random drug testing on Guam be increased from a low-risk frequency of 1.2 tests per person per year to a high-risk frequency of 3 tests per person per year. This recommendation had been made after concurrence by the PACOM Service headquarters and CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI. CINCSAC had initially nonconcurred, but he later withdrew his objection. The Secretary of Defense accepted the recommendation and designated Guam as a high-risk area effective 1 June 1974.[5]

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1. J112 HistSum Mar 74; CINCPAC ltr Ser 1025, 27 Mar 74, Subj: PACOM Drug Suppression and Military Customs Conference/Workshop, Taipei, 4-7 March 1974.
2. DA 242027Z Apr 74; CINCPAC 020423Z Apr 74; DA 261931Z Apr 74; CINCPAC 262350Z Apr 74.
3. J112 HistSum Oct 74.
4. J112 HistSum Nov 74; CINCPAC ltr Ser 3309, 19 Nov 74, Subj: PACOM Military Customs Report (Quarterly), 1-75.
5. CINCPAC 061741Z May 74; CINCSAC 081431Z May 74; SECDEF 7653/141526Z May 74.

(U) Efforts to provide a representative of the Drug Enforcement Agency on Guam had begun in 1973. In 1974, CINCPAC sought to make such representation permanent. A CINCPAC staff visit to Guam 15-17 July included meetings with the Governor, enforcement and judicial officials, and senior military representatives. The DEA indicated that there was an excellent chance of establishing a permanent office in Guam, and by the end of November it was learned that the permanent office was to be established early in 1975.[1]

Urinalysis Program

(U) On 5 July the U.S. Court of Military Appeals, in the matter of the United States vs. Ruiz, SPCM 8294, ruled that Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice, prohibited issuing an order that required production of a urine specimen. In that case, an individual who had been referred to a detoxification center because he had produced a positive urine sample, refused a subsequent order to void a sample of urine for a follow-up urinalysis. The court ruled that the man was protected by Article 31, when he refused to obey an order to produce evidence that could be used against him. The fact that the evidence was not for use in a court-martial was deemed immaterial by the court. On 18 July the Secretary of Defense suspended all urine testing for drug abuse, pending a court decision on the Department of the Army's petition for a rehearing of the case. It was believed that the adverse impact of suspended testing could negate progress that had been made in drug abuse in the PACOM. CINCPAC advised the JCS of his concern and requested every effort to obtain reconsideration of the court decision. The program remained suspended throughout the year.[2]

Drug Education Field Teams

(U) Drug Education Field Teams (DEFT) had first been formed in 1971. They consisted normally of a few military personnel and a couple of civilians who were ex-addicts. Following termination of hostilities in Vietnam, two DEFTs were transferred from MACV to MACTHAI. Funding for this project had been provided by the Department of the Army through FY 74. The Office of the Secretary of Defense had asked CINCPAC to pick up funding for the teams beginning in FY 75. All of the components and MACTHAI agreed that the DEFTs had

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1. J112 HistSums Jul, Nov 74; J112 Memo, 18 Jul 74, Subj: Staff Assistance Visit, Guam.
2. DA 101821Z Jul 74; SECDEF Memo for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, 18 Jul 74, Subj: Department of Defense Drug Abuse Testing Program; J114 HistSum which cited CINCPAC 270303Z Jul 74 (BOM). See also Chapter X for a discussion of legal aspects of the program and the suspension.

outlived their usefulness and that drug education could be accomplished effectively by the existing Service programs. On 26 January CINCPAC advised that the DEFT program would be terminated at the end of FY 74.[1]

(U) On 13 May the end-of-action report on the DEFTs was forwarded by MACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI; CINCPAC forwarded the report to the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, and the component commands, noting that observations and conclusions did not necessarily reflect the beliefs of CINCPAC's headquarters or of the PACOM Service headquarters. The report provided a synopsis of the DEFT concept and approach, the responses received to approximately 1,800 questionnaires distributed to participants, and some observations and conclusions. The report concluded that the DEFT concept was a valid one that should be incorporated into existing drug educational programs; the emphasis on teaching pharmacology should be reduced to the point where it was never presented except when a question was asked; military members who were ex-drug or ex-alcohol abusers should be used in efforts to improve the credibility of military rehabilitation programs; drug and alcohol education programs should be presented in a manner that emphasized discussion instead of a lecture; and an instructional cadre, not organic to a unit, was a valuable asset to the commander and the major unit's rehabilitation efforts.[2]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 547-550; J114 HistSum Jan 74; CINCPAC 260305Z Jan 74.
2. USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI ltr, 13 May 74, Subj: Drug Education Field Team (DEFT) End of Action Report; CINCPAC ltr Ser 1656, 3 Jun 74, Subj: Drug Education Field Team (DEFT) End of Action Report.

SECTION II--CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

U.S. Forces Labor Costs for Local Nationals Overseas

(U) U.S. Forces local national (LN) labor costs in the PACOM continued to rise while employment levels decreased. An LN workforce of a quarter of a million cost the U.S. Forces just over a half billion dollars in FY 70 for an average of about $2,000 per employee. Average per employee cost for an FY 74 workforce of 100,000 was estimated at just over $4,000.

(U) Per employee cost rises had been most pronounced in Japan, where the average had gone from $4,900 per year in 1970 to an estimated $8,000 for 1974, a 63 percent increase. This was based in part on a rapidly expanding economy and on significant increases in the value of the Japanese yen in relation to the U.S. dollar during that period. Korea and Taiwan percentage increases were comparable: 64 percent and 59 percent, respectively. Average dollar costs per worker, however, were significantly lower than for Japan--$2,800 and $2,390 per year respectively for 1974. Since 1970, Thailand LN employee average costs had increased by 29 percent to $1,560 per year, and Philippine LN costs by 9 percent to $1,650 per year. Continued devaluation of the piaster in Vietnam, from 118 to the dollar in October 1970 to 560 to the dollar in January 1974 had decreased the average cost per U.S. Forces Vietnamese worker from $1,500 a year in 1970 to $1,100 in 1974.[1]

(U) Specifics on workforce size and cost in the PACOM follow:[2]

Workforce Size and Cost -- FY 70 to FY 74

Fiscal Year	Workforce	Gross Cost (Approximate)	Labor Cost Index (FY 70 as base year)
1970	247,800	$514,900,000	100
1971	185,700	473,200,000	123
1972	151,800	438,600,000	139
1973	107,500	422,700,000	188
1974	100,400	428,500,000	205

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1. J121 HistSum Jan 74; J1/Memo/58-74, 22 Jan 74, Subj: PACOM U.S. Forces Local National Labor Costs.
2. Ibid.

Local National Labor Costs for Year Ending 30 June 1973

Country	Workforce	Total Cost
Japan	42,000	$299,460,000
Korea	20,500	52,890,000
Taiwan	5,000	11,000,000
Thailand	15,000	21,750,000
Philippines	22,000	35,310,000
Vietnam	3,000	2,250,000
Total	107,500	$422.660,000

(U) (C) In 1973 CINCPAC had forwarded to the Secretary of Defense a proposal from COMUS Japan that representations be made to the Government of Japan to have that government pay or share the cost of U.S. Forces LN employee labor. It was part of a U.S. balance of payments program with the purpose of having Japan assume labor costs to be incurred in the mutual defense of Japan. In July 1974, however, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs decided that the proposal was useful but not timely. He listed the burden sharing objectives in general that were being considered at the National level: reduction of the balance of payments deficit, reduction of Defense Department expenditures, allaying of Congressional funding concerns so that control of overseas deployments could be retained in the Executive Branch, and encouraging allies to maintain and improve their military forces. With respect to Japan, the first two were more pertinent. As a result of recent economic activities, however, the U.S. balance of payments position relative to Japan had changed significantly. Also, as a result of base reductions, U.S. Defense Department expenditures had been moderated. At the same time, Japan's economic position had altered significantly: increased energy costs, negative trade balance, declining Gross National Product and declining foreign reserves. For these various reasons, it did not seem appropriate to raise the labor cost sharing proposal with the Government of Japan at the time.

(C) Labor cost sharing in principle remained a useful potential future source of defense burden sharing, in Japan as elsewhere in the Pacific. At the time, however, it was believed more appropriate to attempt mitigation of rising local labor costs through on-going yearly compensation negotiations between U.S. Forces Japan and the Japan Defense Facilities Administration Agency.[1]

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1. J12 HistSum Jul 74; SECDEF 6489/022317Z Jul 74; CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 574-575.

(U) Later in July CINCPAC advised of his concurrence in a COMUS Japan/Service study on LN wage practices in relation to increasing costs. The study contained desired modifications to existing wage-setting practices governing Japanese employees. COMUS Japan was asked to identify major changes not achieved during upcoming negotiations for possible use in the Joint Committee or higher level negotiations.[1]

(U) The 24 July message opened and closed with the remark, "Contents not releasable to non-U.S. citizens." This was a requirement levied by CINCPAC in February regarding matters of labor and wage policy. With supersession of the caveat "not releasable to foreign nationals" and its replacement with the "no foreign dissem" reserved for intelligence matters, a new warning statement had been devised. CINCPAC believed that information on these labor and wage proposals was sensitive. Some were never implemented or approved, but their disclosure at any stage could adversely affect employee morale and provide organized unions, host government officials, and others with information that could be used to the disadvantage of U.S. Forces in their employer and U.S. Government representative roles.[2]

Wage and Benefits for Local National Employees

(U) CINCPAC had established a joint personnel committee with Service component representation to establish a uniform position with respect to salaries, wages, fringe benefits, and other terms and conditions of employment for non-U.S. citizen employees of U.S. Forces in the PACOM. A number of changes were made in these matters in 1974, as specified below.

Korea

(U) Revised schedules of wages for U.S. Forces local national (LN) employees in Korea were approved jointly and issued by PACOM Service component commands. The revisions, effective 1 November 1974, had been based on data obtained during a survey of 111 private sector firms from August through October. The new rates resulted in an average increase of 14.6 percent for some 21,000 paid from appropriated and nonappropriated funds. The Foreign Organization Employees Union, which represented all LN employees, had voted a countrywide strike against U.S. Forces to protest the small amount of increase and an expected 1 December effective date. The strike, which had been set for

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1. J12 HistSum Jul 74; CINCPAC 242343Z Jul 74.
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser 0104, 21 Feb 74, Subj: Protective Markings on U.S. Forces (USF) Non-U.S. Citizen Personnel Policy Proposals (U); J121 HistSum Feb 74.

29 October, was called off when the union accepted the 1 November effective date and an adjustment that provided the full increase as basic wages rather than a planned withholding of a portion of the wages for payment as a spring bonus.[1]

Philippines

(U) Revised schedules of wages for some 22,000 U.S. Forces LN employees were jointly approved and issued on 10 June. Revisions had been based on data obtained from a survey of private sector employees in April and May. The new increase, effective 1 July, resulted in an increase of two percent for manual and from one to eight percent for non-manual employees paid from appropriated and nonappropriated funds. In addition, an emergency allowance was authorized. Employees making less than 600 pesos a month would be granted up to 50 pesos to bring their pay up to the 600 peso level. This allowance also conformed to a Philippine Presidential decree. Subsequently, the emergency allowance of up to 50 pesos a month was authorized to all non-supervisory LN employees in the Philippines. This action was based on a re-analysis of the data collected during the spring survey. It corrected the earlier allowance authorized only to those who earned 600 pesos or less per month.[2]

Taiwan

(U) Revised wage schedules for Taiwan, effective on the first pay period on or after 1 September, were based on a survey of 49 private sector firms in June and July. The new rates resulted in an average increase of 19 percent for some 4,000 U.S. Forces LN general schedule and patron service employees paid from appropriated and nonappropriated funds. On 30 August, however, COMUSTDC advised that the U.S. Ambassador had requested that implementation of the revised schedules be deferred by all U.S. agencies on Taiwan until all agencies, other than those of the Defense Department, received approval for the increase. Earlier, representatives of all agencies on Taiwan had agreed to the uniform first pay period implementation. CINCPAC, therefore, appealed to the Secretary of Defense, requesting approval for Defense Department agencies

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1. J12(A) HistSum Oct 74; COMUS Korea ltr EACP-K-C&EM, 22 Oct 74, Subj: US Forces Wage and Benefits Survey Findings and Recommendations; USARPAC ltr GPPE-CL, 23 Oct 74, Subj: Authorization of US Forces Wage Schedule - Korea; COMUS Korea 290306Z Oct 74; CINCUSARPAC 310356Z Oct 74.
2. J121 HistSum Jul 74; CINCPACREP PHIL 100331Z Jun 74; CINCPACFLT 260243Z Jun 74; J121 HistSum Nov 74; CINCPACREP PHIL ltr Ser 4117, 23 Oct 74, Subj: Emergency Allowance for Filipino Employees; CINCPACFLT 190243Z Nov 74.

to implement the schedule even if other agencies (employing some 200 persons) might have to defer implementation. Approval was granted for the 1 September date.[1]

Thailand

(U) In Thailand, new pay rates were effective 10 February, based on data obtained in a survey of 60 private firms in five metropolitan areas in January and February 1974. The new pay rates resulted in an average increase of 15.5 percent for some 14,000 U.S. Forces LN employees paid from appropriated and nonappropriated funds. The increase was in addition to a 7.5 percent average pay increase that had been granted to all U.S. Forces employees in December 1973 as a settlement condition in terminating a one-week strike by Thai Regional Exchange employees.

(U) At this time also an employer-funded provident fund was authorized, a reflection of private sector practices. An amount equal to five percent of basic wages was to be set aside each pay period to be granted an employee at retirement or for involuntary separation.[2]

(U) A subsequent survey of 63 private firms in November 1974 resulted in an additional 10.8 percent increase, effective 1 January 1975. This applied to a reduced workforce of 11,500 employees along with a new longevity step added at each grade level to provide additional pay to long-tenure employees. A countrywide strike by employees of the Thai Regional Exchange had been threatened during the course of the November survey. Employee demands centered on severance pay, as noted below, under review as part of the survey. A freeze on reduction in force, imposed from 4 December 1974 to 15 January 1975, was believed to be one of the factors that helped forestall the strike.[3]

(U) Severance pay and the U.S.-funded provident fund, noted above, were repeated causes for concern, especially with the planned reductions of U.S. Forces and bases in Thailand. In June, a revised severance pay plan was approved. The plan, applicable to reductions in force, conformed to a liberalized Thai labor law that required 30 days pay if separated after employment

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1. J12 HistSums Aug, Sep 74; COMUSTDC ltr Ser C65, 5 Aug 74, Subj: Taiwan Wage Survey - 1974 (U); COMUSTDC 300842Z Aug 74; CINCPAC 310333Z Aug 74; SECDEF 8395/201825Z Sep 74.
2. J121 HistSum Feb 74; CINCPACAF 062130Z Feb 74; COMUSMACTHAI 181514Z Dec 73; CINCPAC PAO LNO Bangkok 080900Z Feb 74.
3. J121 HistSum Dec 74; CINCPACAF ltr DPCC, 27 Dec 74, Subj: Authorization of US Forces Wage Schedules - Thailand; MACTHAI 270250Z Nov 74; USMACTHAI 020704Z Dec 74.

of 180 days to 365 days, 90 days pay for one to three years of employment, and 180 days pay for employment exceeding three years. The previous law had required 30 days pay upon a RIF for all employment of 180 or more days.

(U) The provident fund, which had been instituted in February, was retained, and was to be supplemented, where necessary, to bring severance payments to the levels stated in the new law. The maximum cost increase impact was estimated at $7 million, assuming that all LN workers would be RIF'd with the drawdown of U.S. Forces.[1]

(U) The matter came under study again at the time of the November wage survey. It was determined that the provident fund would be continued. This was to be in addition to other severance pay benefits at the time of retirement or for involuntary separation. Employees hired after 1 January 1975, however, would have a three-year waiting period before provident fund accrual began.[2]

(U) In line with general U.S. Forces reductions, CINCPAC on 11 July advised COMUSMACTHAI of his concern that the civilian employee reductions were lagging relative to military personnel drawdowns. He requested that COMUSMACTHAI review Defense Department civilian manning to insure that reductions were programmed consistent with the reduced workload; he was also to report projected civilian reductions for the remainder of 1974. COMUSMACTHAI reported 14 U.S. and 2,165 non-U.S. employee RIF projections for the remainder of 1974. Of the total, 1,940 were Air Force.[3]

Reductions in Force in Japan

(U) On 26 March the Secretary of Defense approved a reduction in force and text of a public announcement affecting 655 local national employees of various Army activities on Okinawa. The RIFs were to be effective 30 June and 30 September. Timing of the approval permitted COMUS Japan to provide the Government of Japan with their desired 90-day advance notice. The reduction of the depot maintenance program (from Vietnam), budgetary constraints, reductions in manpower requirements, and a decrease in requirements for security guards were cited as principal causes. This reduction was in addition to that

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1. J121 HistSum Jun 74; AMEMB Bangkok 10128/201020Z Jun 74; MACTHAI 191345Z Jun 74; CINCPACAF 220215Z Jun 74.
2. J121 HistSum Dec 74; CINCPACAF ltr DPCC, 27 Dec 74, Subj: Authorization of US Forces Wage Schedules - Thailand.
3. CINCPAC 111847Z Jul 74; CDR USMACTHAI 230650Z Jul 74.

previously approved for Army activities in Okinawa. The earlier RIF that affected 1,300 employees (for about the same reasons) was effective 31 March.[1]

(U) (C) The above procdure, in which Secretary of Defense advance approval was required for RIF of Japanese LNs and of the public affairs announcements of such RIFs, had been established in 1971. At that time major facility adjustments were being negotiated between the governments of Japan and the United States, with attendant Japanese sensitivity to major workforce reductions. Since then, CINCPAC and COMUS Japan had established RIF procedures that took Japanese sensitivities into account. Also, by March 1974, over 9,000 employees had been deleted from U.S. rolls since May 1973--20 percent of the workforce--with 3,000 additional scheduled for reduction by 15 September 1974.

(U) (C) Accordingly, on 27 March CINCPAC requested that the Secretary review the requirement for those procedures. He recommended that approval be granted for COMUS Japan to exercise approval authority for component Service RIFs and related public announcements, after obtaining the coordination of the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and when neither activity closure or the return of real property was involved. COMUS Japan was to be charged with relaying the text of the public announcement on RIF actions to the Secretary, CINCPAC, PACOM Service components, and the concerned Military Department for information.[2]

(U) (C) The Secretary approved the CINCPAC proposal on 23 May. It was directed, however, that the text of public announcements on RIFs involving 50 or more persons be furnished to those listed above at least five working days prior to programmed release time, to permit initiation of a holding action if it was deemed necessary. RIFs that involved activity closure or the release of real property still had to be submitted to the Secretary of Defense for prior approval.[3]

(U) (C) In September the American Consul at Naha, Okinawa, provided the Embassy in Tokyo his thoughts on a proposed cut of 800 local employees of the Marines on Okinawa. (This was nearly two-thirds of the total.) The comments reflect some of the problems attendant with RIFs and funding constraints. He noted the short-range problems that would be encountered with the unions, but stated that "we can live, if we have to, with the short term fuss from the leftists," but a cut of the magnitude proposed would have serious long-term

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1. J12 HistSum Mar 74; CDRUSARJ CPZAMA 150725Z Mar 74; COMUS Japan 200225Z Mar 74; SECDEF 8370/262100Z Mar 74; SECDEF 2663/211945Z Dec 73.
2. CINCPAC 270030Z Mar 74; J12(A) HistSum May 74. The procedures established in 1971 had pertained to all RIFs involving more than 50 persons.
3. SECDEF 9865/232107Z May 74.

implications, as he saw it. He noted that of the Services the Marines had enjoyed the best support from the communities in which they were based, because they were in rural and conservative areas. The Marines were a well-regarded employer and the jobs had become an economic mainstay. The proposed wholesale firings would severely erode community support for the Marine presence, the Consul believed. He said that perhaps the most serious problems between the Marines and the community were crimes and traffic accidents. The local employees scheduled to be discharged (mostly drivers, guards, interpreters, etc.) had acted as a highly useful buffer between the community and the alien soldiers. The Consul also believed that the drastic reductions would call into question in the minds of central government officials the permanence of the Marine presence. Even though there were no plans for major reductions in Marine base holdings, it "will appear that the USMC is preparing to leave the island."[1]

U.S. Forces Nonimmigrant Alien Labor - Guam

(U) In 1970, at the request of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the Department of Justice, the Secretary of Defense made a commitment to take steps to establish a work force on Guam composed of either U.S. citizens or lawful permanent resident aliens, with the objective of terminating by 31 December 1974 the practice of employing non-resident alien workers. This involved the phaseout of some 1,300 direct hire Filipino employees, who had entered Guam under the parolee provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act. On 24 December 1974, however, the Secretary advised that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had granted a Defense Department request to extend 50 direct hire parolees (15 Navy, 35 Air Force) filling hard to replace positions to 30 June 1975.[2]

(U) A number of the parolees had accrued more than 30 days of annual leave, the maximum allowable for pay-off on termination. Because of the heavy wrap-up workload for those scheduled for separation by 31 December, the PACOM Service component commands authorized pay-off of leave in excess of 30 days as a one-time exception to policy.[3]

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1. AMCONSUL NAHA 130939Z Sep 74.
2. ASD/M&RA Memorandum, 24 Sep 70, Subj: Use of Non-Resident Aliens of Naval Activities in Guam; ASD ltr 24 Sep 70 to the Associate Commissioner for Operations, US Immigration and Naturalization Service, n.s.; SECDEF 1008/ 241703Z Dec 74.
3. CINCPACREP GUAM 112205Z Nov 74; CINCPACFLT 230044Z Nov 74.

(U) Earlier, in mid-December 1973, the CINCPACREP Guam/TTPI had expressed concern to CINCPAC on the ability of U.S. Forces, when employing non-immigrant aliens, to make commitments in response to revised Guam government policies and procedures that might be contrary to mission requirements or funding limitations. CINCPAC provided guidance to the effect that U.S. Forces employers may sign the Guam Labor Department's statement required for the employment of non-immigrant aliens. CINCPAC also recommended that a disclaimer be attached to the form which reserved the right to a U.S. Forces activity to terminate the agreement if it proved contrary to Federal law or regulation, or if it became impossible to perform because of funding limitations or mission assignments.[1]

(U) CINCPAC's Army and Air Force components and the Commander of the Pacific Exchange Systems concurred in this guidance. CINCPACFLT requested that the matter be forwarded to higher authority; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs conveyed no objection to the guidance.[2]

Wage Practices for U.S. Citizen NAF Employees Overseas

(U) On 13 June COMUSTDC questioned CINCPACAF authority to apply new wage rates to Air Force Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) employees; he requested CINCPAC guidance. One concern was the lack of uniformity among the Services in this area of personnel management and policy. COMUSTDC, therefore, had requested that Air Force activities withhold implementation. CINCPAC advised COMUSTDC that the PACAF wage schedules should be implemented. The Services had authority to update their schedules, but the Defense Department and the U.S. Civil Service Commission were moving to standardize overseas NAF wages in the near future. CINCPAC shared the concern for uniformity. In a letter to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, CINCPAC recommended the earliest possible establishment of uniform NAF schedules for application to U.S. citizens in foreign areas.[3]

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1. J12 HistSum Apr 74; CINCPACREP Guam ltr Ser 2675, 18 Dec 73, Subj: Government of Guam Laws and Regulations; application to U.S. Forces on Guam; CINCPAC ltr Ser 1415, 8 May 74, Subj: Government of Guam Laws and Regulations; application to US forces on Guam.
2. USARPAC ltr GPPE-CL, 18 Mar 74, Subj: US Forces Employment of Non-Immigrant Aliens - Guam; CINCPACAF ltr DP, 27 Feb 74, Subj: US Forces Employment of Non-Immigrant Aliens - Guam; PACEX ltr, 27 Feb 74, Subj: U.S. Forces Employment of Non-Immigrant Aliens - Guam; CINCPACFLT ltr Ser 74/1461/11 Mar 74, Subj: U.S. Forces Employment of Nonimmigrant Aliens - Guam; Memorandum for CINCPAC from ASD/M&RA, 23 Apr 74, Subj: Employment of Non-Immigrant Aliens - Guam.
3. J12 HistSum Jul 74; COMUSTDC ltr Ser 634, 13 Jun 74, Subj: U.S. Citizen Employees of Non-Appropriated Fund Activities (NAFA) Wage and Personnel Practices; CINCPAC 012112Z Aug 74; CINCPAC ltr Ser 2261, 2 Aug 74; Subj: U.S. Citizen Employees of Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) Activities Wage Practices.

Environmental and Morale Leave

(U) Leave for personnel from Cambodia had been addressed by CINCPAC in the matter of R&R, as discussed above. These personnel were eligible for travel under the Environmental and Morale Leave Program, however. Special consideration had been sought for them within that program, but not acquired. On 4 June the JCS proposed that the Military Airlift Command establish a space-assured system for assigning space available seats to personnel serving in Cambodia. MAC had declared this proposal "unfeasible." An alternate solution proposed by the JCS would have established a special category of travel, but the Office of the Secretary of Defense had advised that the preferential priority space available travel for military personnel in Cambodia over stations in similar circumstances was not warranted. Although Cambodia and Vietnam had been designated hostile fire areas, the Office of Secretary of Defense would give preferential consideration for them only within the EML program and only to and from authorized sites within the PACOM, not to the Continental United States. The JCS advised that it was not considered productive to pursue the matter further unless CINCPAC had additional information not previously considered by the Office of the Secretary.[1]

(U) In March 1974 Adak, Alaska was added to the PACOM EM&L Program with authorized destination sites of Anchorage, Alaska; Japan; and Honolulu.[2]

(U) In February 1973 the Office of the Defense Representative, India had called attention to inequities in the E&ML Program. With the disestablishment of the Military Airlift Command's Embassy flight, only commercial transportation at private expense was available; for all intents and purposes this was prohibitive, especially for enlisted personnel. He had requested CINCPAC's assistance. CINCPAC had strongly endorsed a travel program that would provide periodic funded transportation to reduce extraordinary personal expense and enhance tours of duty for those that served under clearly adverse environmental conditions. On 25 March 1974 the Defense Representative in New Delhi again requested assistance. "With the onset of the seven months' hot season, we military and our dependents in South Asia regret the fact that we are without means...to participate in the Environmental and Morale Leave Program and to enjoy a brief respite out of the subcontinent. As our colleagues in the State Department and other associated agencies make preparations for home leave or rest and recuperation leave, we are made all the more mindful of the current inequities in benefits for those who serve on foreign shores." He requested information on the status of his February 1973 proposal.[3]

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1. JCS 7941/262044Z Nov 74, which cited CINCPAC 090217Z May 74.
2. CINCPAC 191846Z Mar 74.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 585-586; DRI NEW DELHI 251140Z Mar 74.

Exchanges and Commissaries

(U) Singapore inaugurated its first Post Exchange/Commissary in mid-December 1973 and requested permission to send the manager of their operation to observe similar U.S. facilities in Bangkok. The Singapore government was to incur all expenses associated with the trip. On 15 February CINCPAC asked COMUSMACTHAI to take action on the request. The Commander of the Pacific Exchange System requested that the Thai regional exchange coordinate with COMUSMACTHAI to facilitate the proposed visit to observe exchange facilities.[1]

(U) In August, in the matter of technical supervision of the management of the JUSMAG consolidated mess in Manila, CINCPAC requested that CINCPACFLT act as executive agent, a concept identical to an existing arrangement for the USDAO Saigon mess system. (CINCPAC remained the "Immediate Superior in Command" while CINCPACFLT was executive agent of the mess systems, which operated under Navy mess management directives.) CINCPACFLT concurred.[2]

(U) On 3 April the Chief of the U.S. Defense Liaison Group Indonesia had requested that a commissary be established in the Embassy Compound in Jakarta, to be used by all military personnel assigned as well as other members of the official diplomatic community. He noted that it was not desirable to increase the size of the military community or raise the military profile; he advised that the manager of the existing employees' cooperative, a retired Army sergeant major, would be available to manage a commissary facility. The nearest commissary was at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. CINCPAC tasked CINCPACFLT to review the feasibility of the request; CINCPACFLT forwarded the request to the Commanding Officer of the Navy Resale System Office for action. After reviewing the CHUSDLG request, the Navy Resale System officer noted that Navy operations were required to conform to provisions of Navy Instructions which directed that audits and inspections of Navy exchanges and commissaries be conducted on a scheduled basis; they were conducted by that office utilizing at times the services of a commercial auditing firm. While further study might show the feasibility of establishing a Navy resale facility in Indonesia, it could not be done under the conditions recommended by the DLG Chief. Therefore, continued operation of the Co-op store appeared to be the most appropriate course of action. CINCPAC then tasked CINCPACAF to consider the feasibility

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1. COM PACEX HICKAM AFB 212106Z Feb 74, which cited CINCPAC 150331Z Feb 74.
2. CINCPAC 200229Z Aug 74; CINCPACFLT ltr to CNO Ser 75/4791, 5 Aug 74; Subj: Transfer of USDAO Saigon Mess System to Navy Cognizance; CINCPACFLT 060204Z Sep 74.

of providing direct support, via space available transportation, from Clark Air Base. CINCPACAF concurred with the request.[1]

Equal Employment Opportunity and Treatment

(U) In both the military and civilian sectors there was concern to insure equal employment opportunity and equal treatment. On 27 March 1974 an Equal Employment Opportunity Committee for CINCPAC staff civilian personnel was established. The Chief of Staff had been named Equal Employment Opportunity Officer, and the deputy named was the supervisory civilian personnel specialist on the staff. The committee was to function in a "task oriented" manner, monitoring programs and making recommendations to those EEO officers. The committee was to conduct periodic EEO reviews of the various organizational segments to determine how well the various aspects of EEO policy were being carried out. Particular attention was to be given to recruitment, employee training, supervisory training, promotions, communications, and complaint patterns. It was to serve as a "sounding board" to determine attitudes by, and toward, minorities and women throughout the headquarters. The committee was to meet periodically with the EEO officer or his deputy to discuss results of those reviews, problems that had been identified, and recommended solutions. Also to discuss ways the committee might assist the Deputy EEO officer and the command.[2]

(U) Guidance from the Secretary of the Navy in 1973 had required that each command employing 100 or more civilians develop and issue an Affirmative Action Plan (AAP) for the EEO program. The CINCPAC AAP, which covered 1974, was published on 28 May.[3]

(U) Also published in 1974 was a CINCPAC Instruction on the EEO program. CINCPACINST 12713.3 of 27 August was published in accordance with the Federal Personnel Manual and Civilian Manpower Mangement Instruction 713. The CINCPAC instruction included a statement of command policy:

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1. Ltr CHUSDLG Indonesia to CINCPAC, Ser 127, 2 Apr 74, Subj: Commissary; establishment of; and First Endorsement from CINCPAC Ser 1394, 16 May 74; and Second Endorsement from CINCPACFLT Ser 41/3499 of 4 Jun 74; Ltr Navy Resale System Office, PL2:RJC:rb, 26 Jul 74, Subj: Commissary; establishment of; CINCPAC ltr Ser 2491, 26 Aug 74, Subj: Commissary; establishment of; CINCPACAF ltr, 21 Oct 74, Subj: Commissary; Establishment of .
2. J1441 HistSum Mar 74; J01/Memo/15-74, 27 Mar 74, Subj: Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Committee for Staff CINCPAC Civilian Personnel.
3. J1441 HistSum May 74. The AAP was required by SECNAVNOTE 12713 of 30 Nov 73; the CINCPAC AAP was published as CINCPACNOTE 12713 of 28 May 74, Subj: Affirmative Action Plan (AAP) Affecting CINCPAC Staff Civilian Employees.

> ...The Commander in Chief Pacific is firmly committed to the principles of the Equal Employment Opportunity Program.
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> It is the policy of Staff CINCPAC that equal employment opportunity be afforded all qualified persons and that discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is prohibited. All levels of management and supervision shall take positive action toward achievement of the U.S. Government goal of a fully integrated work force by providing employment, training, compensation, promotion, and other employment opportunities in an equitable manner.
>
> Supervisors shall encourage employees to aspire to positions which will utilize their highest capabilities. All personnel will be given the opportunity to acquire work experience or specialized training to fit them for advancement in accordance with their abilities.[1]

(U) In matters of military equal opportunity and treatment, a CINCPAC coordinating committee met quarterly. At the January meeting reporting requirements were discussed; the Defense Department had not levied specific requirements. At the April meeting it was agreed to invite Coast Guard representation. Although most matters were in Service channels, the committee continued to monitor the subject in the PACOM.[2]

(U) During August the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Equal Opportunity visited the PACOM. Mr. H. Minton Francis and his staff were accompanied by Personnel Directorate and Service component representatives on the tour that included Guam, Okinawa, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand. Debriefings after the trip were conducted in Bangkok and Hawaii. Mr. Francis reported that he was pleased with the high percentage completion rate of Phase I race relations training. He further stated that there did not appear to be any racially explosive areas in the PACOM.[3]

(U) In one miscellaneous matter, in August CINCPAC hosted five women officers representing the Indonesian armed forces and national police. They were touring the United States to examine recruiting procedures, assignments, training, and roles for women in the Services. While at CINCPAC headquarters

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1. CINCPACINST 12713.3, 27 Aug 74, Subj: Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Program - Civilian Personnel.
2. J114 HistSums Jan, Apr 74.
3. J114 HistSum Aug 74; CINCPAC 250240Z Jul 74.

they were briefed by women representatives of the component commands on female roles in U.S. Forces. They also visited the Hawaii Armed Forces Police headquarters and the Honolulu Police Department.[1]

Joint Services Training on Taiwan

(U) Early in 1974 COMUSTDC raised the question of joint Service training in matters of equal opportunity, cultural relations, and drug abuse control. The Services each had mandatory annual training requirements for those subjects, but in some cases training resources were not available. CINCPAC requested that COMUSTDC provide a detailed proposal for a program to include course length and content and information on the necessary qualifications and availability of instructors. It would be necessary for the Service departments to approve such a program prior to certifying attendees as having fulfilled the stated annual requirement. The TDC forwarded information on their proposed race relations training course on 19 April and CINCPAC forwarded it to the JCS on 10 May, requesting that Service approval be sought.[2]

Postal Affairs

(U) Transfer of postal responsibility from the military postal system to the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) at a number of locations in the PACOM came under study in 1974. On 15 October the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics had published a memorandum that proposed disestablishment of 21 military post offices (MPOs) on Hawaii, Guam, Wake, Midway, Johnston Island, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, and the transfer of five additional MPOs to the USPS. CINCPAC learned of this indirectly, and on 12 November requested background information on possible closures of MPO/MAO (Mailing Address Only) and a complete list of facilities affected. At the same time, CINCPAC convened a meeting of all Service postal representatives to determine the impact of the proposal.[3]

(U) As a result of that meeting, CINCPAC prepared and forwarded to the JCS a list of problem areas that required more detailed study. These included excessive delay of military official mail (MOM) not mailed at first class or air mail rates, especially from remote Pacific locations. If all such mail

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1. J114 HistSum Aug 74; CNO 131906Z Jul 74.
2. J114 HistSums Mar, May 74; CINCPAC 290319Z Mar 74; COMUSTDC ltr Ser 441, 19 Apr 74, Subj: Taipei Joint Services Race Relations Training Course; CINCPAC ltr Ser 1462, 10 May 74, Subj: Joint Service Race Relations Training Course.
3. J112 HistSum Nov 74; CINCPAC 121740Z Nov 74.

were sent first class, costs would rise, detracting from apparent transportation savings. Another was the possible degradation of classified MOM security, especially those MPOs/MAOs with a large volume of classified mail. A third was the impact on morale of personnel on directed overseas tours, especially with regard to the loss of SAM/PAL (space available mail/parcel airlift). The subsequent delays, increased zone rate postal charges and excessive mail order costs, as well as inconsistency with respect to overseas MPOs in other parts of the world, would make tours to Guam and other affected locations in the PACOM even more undesirable. Defense Department mail transportation savings were not available and were requested by CINCPAC, who believed that apparent savings might be offset by increased MOM costs. He requested, also, suspension of action pending a more detailed evaluation of the impact, and formulation of component Service and unified command positions.[1]

(U) On 2 December CINCPAC staff personnel briefed the Assistant Secretary for Installations and Logistics, Mr. Arthur I. Mendolia, on the adverse impact of the possible closures. In addition to the subjects addressed above, points made at the briefing included loss or reduction of service to military patrons, increased postal costs for official mail to offset delay, loss of SAM/PAL privileges for military members and increased living costs, increased costs to CONUS families of Servicemen, and inconsistency of privileges from one postal facility to another.[2]

(U) Also on 2 December, however, CINCPAC received a message from the Office of the Secretary outlining the proposal, and noting that similar action was being considered for MPOs/MAOs in Alaska and Puerto Rico. The 21 MAOs being considered for closure as soon as possible were listed, as were the 5 MPOs that were being considered for transfer to the USPS. If adopted, it was noted, Defense Department worldwide mail transportation cost reduction was expected to be in excess of $2 million annually at current mail transportation rates. The proposal had been referred to the Services, and CINCPAC's comments and recommendations would also be fully considered prior to a final decision in this matter.[3]

(U) On 26 December CINCPAC asked his components and various other concerned PACOM commands for an evaluation and priority listing of MPOs/MAOs, and additional operational and cost information. This information was to be consolidated and forwarded to Washington early in 1975.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 150502Z Nov 74.
2. J112 HistSum Dec 74.
3. SECDEF 2647/021413Z Dec 74.
4. CINCPAC 261957Z Dec 74.

(U) Earlier, the Defense Department had announced the termination of military postal service to the overseas volunteer agencies. This impacted heavily on the country missions in the RVN and Cambodia, and the Ambassadors in both countries protested vigorously. The Defense Department reviewed the matter further, but such service to private agencies was not deemed legal, and the Chief of Naval Operations directed that the service be discontinued effective 14 November.[1]

Housing

(U) In October 1973 COMUS Korea had requested an exception to policy in matters concerning Rental Guarantee Housing in Korea. On 9 January the Office of the Secretary of Defense had advised of a one-time authorization to pay individual-sponsored families at the with-dependent rate on a selective basis in order to fill vacant Rental Guarantee Housing units. The authority was to terminate on 1 September 1974 and was not to be construed as a precedent for seeking other exceptional entitlements. An exception to regulations would also apply so that the cost of relocating members' household goods to such Rental Guarantee Housing would be borne by the U.S. Government. This ruling was revised slightly by the Per Diem, Travel and Transportation Allowance Committee to make the inclusive dates 9 January to 31 August.[2]

(U) Revised Housing Allowances were effective for up-country advisors in Thailand effective 17 January. The indexes for Bangkok and Udorn remained unchanged. A new notation was made in the Joint Travel Regulations effective 17 January, however, as follows, "A member assigned to a permanent duty station in Thailand who has been authorized by COMUSMACTHAI to have his dependents reside in Bangkok and whose dependents do reside in Bangkok will be entitled to the housing allowances prescribed for Bangkok as a member with dependents regardless of the location of his duty station.[3]

(U) SAFE HAVEN housing at Clark Air Base in the Philippines was returned to 13th Air Force control effective 8 July. In 1967, as part of a Military Assistance Command Vietnam tour extension plan, certain housing units at Clark had been allocated for the families of selected officers stationed in Southeast Asia. Certain quarters were also leased in Bangkok for the same purpose, which was to permit familities to live within "commuting" distance to encourage extending the tours of their sponsors. The JCS advised on 3 July that dependents

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1. J112 HistSum May 74; SECDEF 5250/211705Z May 74; AMEMB Saigon 7066/300500Z May 74; AMEMB Phnom Penh 7492/311217Z May 74.
2. J113 HistSum Jan 74; JCS 5240/112111Z Jan 74; PER DIEM TVL AND TR ALWS COMTE WASH DC 281640Z Jan 74.
3. J113 HistSum Feb 74; PER DIEM TVL AND TR ALWS COMTE WASH DC 171932Z Jan 74.

of sponsors who were participating in the SAFE HAVEN program and who were still in quarters at Clark would not be required to vacate until the sponsors were transferred from their current billets. The Bangkok quarters were to be addressed separately at a later time.[1]

Professional Entertainment Coordination

(U) With the anticipated disestablishment of USARPAC, responsibility for the Armed Forces Professional Entertainment Program in the PACOM was transferred to Headquarters, CINCPACAF on 22 July 1974. Nonappropriated fund support would continue to be provided through FY 75 by PACOM's component headquarters (including Fleet Marine Force Pacific) as costs were based on the number of performances received by each Service. The Defense Department agreed to transfer two civilian spaces from USARPAC to PACAF and the Air Force Welfare Board granted interim approval for PACAF to administer the joint nonappropriated fund account involved with the transfer.[2]

(U) On 15 August PACAF advised that the Department of the Army had announced that all future entertainment units touring in the Professional Entertainment Program would be accorded GS-15 equivalency. This decision had been predicated on the premise that units donating their time and talent for Department of Defense tours should be afforded the maximum support from Department facilities and services available.[3]

Nonappropriated Fund Support for Overseas Scouting Programs

(U) CINCPAC continued to support the Boy and Girl Scout Programs in the PACOM in 1974, but both Defense Department and funding support were being reviewed. Defense Department support for the scouting programs in overseas areas had long been a matter of Department policy to accommodate the dependents of military and civilian personnel serving overseas. It had also been considered appropriate to provide support for those programs, including the use of nonappropriated funds. The responsibility for determining the extent of such support in relation to other welfare and recreation requirements was left with the overseas commands.

(U) On 14 March, a memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs to his counterparts in the Services advised of a request from CINCPAC to change a Department regulation to allow space required

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1967, Vol. II, pp. 821-822; JCS 7537/032302Z Jul 74.
2. J113 HistSum Jul 74; CINCPAC 090230Z Jul 74; CINCUSARPAC 112132Z Jul 74; CINCUSARPAC 200449Z Jul 74; CINCPACAF 270100Z Jul 74.
3. CINCPAC 151935Z Aug 74.

transportation for professional scouters on a reimbursable basis. Further inquiry had revealed that in the overseas commands considerable amounts of nonappropriated funds were being put into the scouting program. The Assistant Secretary said this practice had come under increasingly close scrutiny. Considerable emphasis was being placed on decreasing, wherever possible, appropriated fund support for morale and welfare activities, and increasing the use of nonappropriated funds to make such activities self-sustaining. "Viewed in this light, the continued expenditures of nonappropriated funds for activities, which, however meritorious, do not contribute directly to the morale and welfare of the lower ranking single enlisted members become highly vulnerable to criticism." He believed it was necessary to examine such expenditures and determine if the scouting programs represented a sufficiently high-priority compared to other requirements for nonappropriated funds.[1]

(U) CINCPAC convened a meeting on 25 April at Hickam Air Force Base to discuss the matter and the impact of the Assistant Secretary's memo. At the meeting a decision was reached to ask COMUS Japan, who directed the Far East scouting programs, for revised FY 75 budgets that would reflect a nonappropriated fund support reduction of approximately 30 percent. The Boy Scout budget was to be cut from $121,098 to 93,000; the Girl Scout budget from $94,785 to $74,250. The areas covered were Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, and Taiwan. Professional executives operated the scouting programs. They were paid by nonappropriated funds that the Services (except the Marine Corps) contributed to COMUS Japan. The amount of support was prorated based on active scout enrollment.[2]

(U) On 25 July CINCPAC advised the JCS of his continued support for the scouting programs. The programs were described as a contributing element in making extensive overseas service acceptable to our professional military. This command did not agree with the implication in the 14 March memo from the Assistant Secretary that "we should back away from all NAF expenditures for activities not contributing directly to morale and welfare of lower ranking single enlisted men." Nonappropriated funds were generated by the whole military community and their use should not be restricted to one segment. Further, use of funds for programs such as scouting showed those young Servicepeople that the Services were concerned about a total life style. It was not believed that nonappropriated funds should be the sole support of overseas scouting, however, and alternative sources should be developed (such as the Combined Federal Campaign).[3]

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1. ASD (M&RA) Memorandum for The Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments (M&RA), 14 Mar 74, Subj: Nonappropriated Fund Support for Overseas Scouting Program.
2. CINCPAC 070450Z May 74.
3. CINCPAC 252346Z Jul 74.

(U) On 29 July CINCPAC held a conference to discuss the program and funding support. It was attended by representatives of the Aloha Council in Hawaii, the Western Regional Director of the Boy Scouts, and CINCUSARPAC. As a result of that meeting, COMUS Japan was tasked to provide FY 76 Boy and Girl Scout budgets to CINCPAC early in 1975 and to consider affiliating with the Aloha Council of the Boy Scouts, located in Honolulu.[1]

(U) Late in August CINCPAC recommended to the JCS that authority be granted for professional scout executives to travel throughout the PACOM using space required government air transportation reimbursed at government rate tariff from nonappropriated funds. (This was the same type of request that had triggered the 14 March memorandum from the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.) The JCS responded affirmatively, approving the request. They also provided the revised text of DOD 4515.13R "Air Transportation Eligibility."[2]

Post Secondary Civilian School Program

(U) CINCPACAF, on 17 April, requested CINCPAC assistance in obtaining funds from the other Services to continue the post secondary civilian school program. The schools that offered graduate level instruction were the Universities of Maryland, Oklahoma, Hawaii, and Southern California; the University of Maryland also offered undergraduate study and the Los Angeles City College offered technical and occupational training. CINCPAC convened a meeting of PACOM Service representatives on 29 March to discuss the matter and it was agreed that a concept of proportionate shares to provide FY 75 funds be referred to a higher level for resolution. On 27 June CINCPAC requested assistance from the JCS. The percentage of military enrollment, by Service, had been Army 29, Navy 6, Marines 11, and Air Force 54. CINCPAC advised the JCS that the program was supported in the PACOM, as it benefitted the students, the Services, and the quality of overall American life. It appeared unfair, however, for PACAF to carry the financial load for a program from which they reaped only slightly over half the benefits.[3]

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1. J114 HistSum Jul 74.
2. CINCPAC 290147Z Aug 74; JCS 4232/052054Z Sep 74.
3. J114 HistSum Jun 74; CINCPAC ltr Ser 1929, 27 Jun 74, Subj: Support for Post Secondary Civilian School Program.

SECTION IV--MISCELLANEOUS PERSONNEL ACTIVITIES

Joint Manpower Programs

(U) The Joint Manpower Program (JMP) for CINCPAC's headquarters for FY 74 was approved by the JCS on 15 April 1974. The authorized spaces totaled 822, as follows:[1]

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Marine Corps	Total
Officers	117	109	115	24	365
Enlisted	65	151	90	16	322
Civilians	0	135	0	0	135
Total	182	395	205	40	822

This JMP represented a voluntary 24 percent reduction in the headquarters staff. The 258 spaces saved were returned to the Services.

(S) Further possible reductions came under study subsequently with a review of the Unified Command Plan and PACOM reorganizations and force reductions. (This subject is discussed in considerable detail in Chapter I of this history.) In a 3 September memorandum, the Secretary of Defense had directed a 20 percent reduction in PACOM headquarters and support units by the end of FY 75, from a baseline of the FY 74 President's budget. He also requested proposals for 30 and 50 percent reductions by the end of FY 76. A Personnel annex to the PACOM input to the Unified Command Plan was completed during November.[2]

(C) The JCS Manpower Survey of CINCPAC's headquarters, originally scheduled for May 1974, was not conducted during the year. As noted in their message of postponement on 3 April, "ongoing Defense Department headquarters reduction studies would quite likely result in mission and personnel authorization changes ...that would nullify the recommendations of a survey at this time."[3]

(S) Certain other JMP actions in the PACOM in 1974 are discussed below by command. In March the Manpower Management Team formed the nucleus for two PACOM teams sent to assist COMUS Korea, COMUSTDC, and the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group to the Republic of China in preparation of revised

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1. JCS 2889/152102Z Apr 74.
2. J13 HistSums Oct, Nov 74.
3. JCS 2882/031608Z Apr 74.

JMPs to meet new authorization ceilings imposed by the Secretary of Defense. Personnel for the teams were also provided by CINCPAC's Directorates for Logistics and Security Assistance. The proposed JMPs were prepared and staffed at CINCPAC headquarters, and delivered to the JCS on 26 March. This was the proposed JMP that subordinated the MAAG China to the TDC, as recommended by CINCPAC. This program was not approved.[1]

Japan

(U) Early in January the JCS approved the FY 75 JMP for the Mutual Defense Assistance Office Japan. Authorization was for 17 spaces (7 military, 10 civilians), which was identical to the authorization for the year before.[2]

Thailand

(U) The JMP for COMUSMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI was revised during the year. Change 1 to the FY 75 JMP was approved by the JCS on 11 July, with a total authorization of 484 spaces. The reorganization of headquarters and the reductions required were addressed by CINCPAC Manpower Management Teams assisting in JMP preparation. The JMP was forwarded to the JCS on 8 October, reflecting guidance from the Secretary of Defense on reorganization of joint and U.S. Army activities in Thailand.[3]

(U) Also on 8 October CINCPAC forwarded the JMP for the USMACTHAI Support Group. This was the agency redesignated on 1 July, the former U.S. Army Support Command Thailand. As of the end of 1974, final approval of those JMPs had not been received from Washington.[4]

(U) Also for Thailand, on 29 March the JCS approved the FY 75 JMP for the U.S. Special Activities Group/7th Air Force. The new authorization of 434 (428 military and 6 U.S. civilians) was a reduction of 72 spaces (61 military and 11 civilians) from the FY 74 authorization. The reduction was over 14 percent. Further reductions and eventual disestablishment were contemplated.[5]

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1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 00243, 26 Mar 74, Subj: MAAG/Mission/MilGp Strength Adjustments (U); J132 HistSum Mar 74. See Chapter I of this history.
2. JCS 8366/032247Z Jan 74.
3. JCS 4283/112057Z Jul 74; J1311 HistSum Sep 74.
4. J1311 HistSum Dec 74.
5. JCS 2592/292056Z Mar 74.

Philippines

(U) At the request of CINCPACAF, a CINCPAC Manpower Management Survey of the American Forces Philippines Network (6204 Broadcasting Squadron, Clark Air Base) had been completed. The study report and a CINCPAC evaluation of the activity's reclama were forwarded to CINCPACAF on 23 April 1974. Recommended authorization was for 88, from the 94 previously authorized. (From 83 military, 1 U.S. civilian, and 10 Local Nationals to 74 military, 1 U.S. civilian, and 13 Local Nationals.) CINCPAC recommended tri-Service staffing (with inclusion of U.S. Marines) instead of only Air Force and Navy staffing, with requirements based on Service strength percentages. The conversion of the San Miguel affiliate station to an unmanned satellite repeater station was also recommended. CINCPAC headquarters recommended distribution and use of study recommendations to negotiate interservice support agreements and tri-Service staffing for the network.[1]

DAO Saigon Manpower Management

(U) A unique organization had been created in Saigon in 1973. Principally civilian, the office was responsible not only for traditional attache duties, but for the Military Assistance Program in the RVN. Staffing for the new organization had required major effort throughout the Defense Department, in part because of the urgency with which the employees were recruited.[2]

(U) At the time of formation of the DAO, special arrangements and exceptions to normal policy had been required to staff the agency rapidly on a temporary basis. With the prolonged life of that agency, it was necessary to reevaluate those practices. It was determined that certain practices could be modified at no detriment to recruiting capability, and would assure improving the quality of recruits.

(U) At the request of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, CINCPAC hosted a tri-Service conference on 13-14 March to update U.S. citizen civilian employee recruitment policies for staffing the DAO Saigon. Some 24 attended, representing the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington and Honolulu Service headquarters, the DAO Saigon, and CINCPAC. On 20 March the Secretary of Defense removed the restriction on the DAO employing military members who had retired in the preceding three years.

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1. J1321 HistSum Apr 74; CINCPAC ltr Ser 1278, 23 Apr 74, Subj: CINCPAC Management Study, American Forces Philippines Network (AFPN).
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 569-572.

Appointment of retired military thus became subject to regular Defense Department policy--that was 180 days after retirement, with certain exceptions.[1]

(U) There were several studies of DAO manpower, management, and funding later in 1974. From 23 September to 5 October a Navy Department team of civilian personnel specialists conducted an evaluation of civilian personnel management and administration. The review, which was made at CINCPAC's request, was oriented toward U.S. citizen employees, and resulted in recommendations designed to improve employee procurement, selection, and utilization. The Chief of the DAO accepted the recommendations of the team.[2]

(U) A CINCPAC manpower management team departed for Saigon on 7 October to assist the DAO in reviewing functions that could be deleted or moved out of Vietnam in an effort to reduce manpower and administrative costs that had to be borne by limited Defense Assistance to Vietnam funds. A second CINCPAC team departed on 11 November at the request of the DAO to assist in preparing a response to the JCS regarding reduced manpower and funding for that headquarters.[3]

(U) Earlier, in the summer, the DAO had proposed establishment of two GS 16 positions as deputies of the Army and Air Force divisions. Each incumbent would be promoted from GS-15; the Division Chiefs were colonels. CINCPAC advised that in the climate of Defense Department cutbacks and constraints it was desired not to establish executive level positions in the existing DAO organizational structure.[4]

Return of American Prisoners

(U) Two Americans were returned from captivity in Southeast Asia in 1974. They were believed to be the last two American prisoners. Both were civilians.

(C) The first was Gerald Kosh, a Navy civilian who had been captured by the People's Republic of China in the Paracel Islands on 19 January 1974. In the action, in which some Vietnamese were also captured, Chinese forces took complete control of the Paracels after ousting a small Vietnamese force. On 29 January the Office of the Secretary of Defense advised CINCPAC of the

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1. J1 HistSum Mar 74; ASD/M&RA Memo for CINCPAC, 22 Jan 74, Subj: Recruiting for U.S. Defense Attache Office, Saigon.
2. J12 HistSum Oct 74; CINCPAC 141905Z Jun 74; OCMM Washington 212036Z Jun 74; ROCMM Pearl Harbor 092043Z Sep 74; CINCPAC ltr Ser 3054, 22 Oct 74, Subj: Evaluation of Civilian Personnel Administration, USDAO Saigon.
3. J1311 HistSums Sep, Oct 74; J1321 HistSum Nov 74.
4. CINCPAC 202010Z Jul 74; J12 HistSum Jul 74.

proposed release, and procedures planned by the Hong Kong government for the return of Mr. Kosh and the Vietnamese soldiers. The Secretary advised that CINCPAC should coordinate procedures directly with the U.S. Consul in Hong Kong. Kosh was to be returned to the USAF hospital at Clark Air Base in the Philippines for medical treatment that might be required. He was released on the China-Hong Kong border at 311330 local time in January. He arrived at Clark at 310641Z, with formalities conducted in accordance with CINCPAC directives.[1]

(U) The other American was Emmet Kay, a civilian pilot who had been held prisoner since 7 May 1973. With the formation of the Laos Coalition Government of 5 April 1974, one of the provisions of the Lao Protocol required release of all prisoners within 60 days, which would be 3 June. On 9 April, a joint State and Defense Department message outlined procedures to be followed; activation of the HOMECOMING machinery was not anticipated at that time. The State Department was responsible for processing his release; they would request assistance from the Defense Department if it was necessary. Kay's briefing, however, was to be in accord with Defense Intelligence Agency instructions.[2]

(C) The subject of whether other Americans were being held captive and would be released with Emmet Kay kept arising. Lao Foreign Minister Phoumi Vongvichit repeatedly replied categorically that Kay was the only American being held by the Pathet Lao. The exchange was delayed, the Foreign Minister said, because arrangements had not been completed and a real cease-fire was being sought.[3]

(C) COL Edward Vaughn, the Embassy's Joint Casualty Resolution Center liaison officer had originally been assigned as the escort/spokesman for Mr. Kay on his release, but CINCPAC did not believe it advisable to have a military escort officer and a foreign service officer was substituted. COL Vaughn was reinstated, however, because of his experience in POW/MIA affairs, and at Mrs. Kay's request.[4]

(C) Operation HOMECOMING procedures were activated during the period 17-21 September for the release and processing at Clark Air Base. CINCPAC representatives were furnished, and the operation was consistent with previous HOMECOMING operations. When Kay arrived at Honolulu International Airport on

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1. J111 HistSum Jan 74; SECDEF 1165/292141Z Jan 74; USDLO HONG KONG 310440Z Jan 74; CINCPAC 292330Z Jan 74; 13th AF CLARK AB 311300Z Jan 74; 13th AF CLARK AB 312340Z Jan 74.
2. SECSTATE 071487/091738Z Apr 74; DIA 5195/112045Z Jan 74; J111 HistSum Apr 74.
3. AMEMB Vientiane 5233/050959Z Jul 74 and 6897/061107Z Sep 74.
4. CINCPAC 282125Z Aug 74; AMEMB Vientiane 7046/120948Z Sep 74.

21 September, the greeters included Admiral Gayler, who had made a special effort to meet all returning prisoners of war.[1]

Off-Duty Employment of Military Personnel During Labor Disputes

(U) The Hawaiian Air Tour Service was struck by the International Association of Machinists on 1 February. At the initiation of the strike, there were one Army and two Air Force enlisted personnel employed by the company; two Marines, one Army, and two Air Force enlisted personnel were subsequently hired while the strike was in effect. All personnel were working during their off-duty hours. The Servicemen did not participate in the strike. The union called the employment "scabbing" and requested that the Services and CINCPAC prohibit such activity. PACOM headquarters determined that the actions of the Servicemen were not contrary to any State or Federal statute or Defense Department directive, and the union was advised that such matters were within the purview of the individual Services. The Army and Air Force said the employees' conduct was not in contravention to Service regulations and they would not intervene in personal decisions concerning off-duty employment. The Marine Corps, however, required its personnel to terminate their employment, based on a Marine Corps order and the Navy Bureau of Personnel Manual specification that Marine and Navy personnel may not continue employment in a firm under strike.

(U) CINCPAC advised the JCS that the difference in approach to the same situation among the Services made it difficult to rationalize to the union or to the Hawaii congressional delegates to whom the union had also appealed for help. He recommended that the Services harmonize their policies on this subject.

(U) The Defense Department finally provided such guidance on 1 October, after repeated requests were made to expedite the matter. The Department determined that off-duty employment of military personnel by an organization involved in a strike was permissible if the member was on the payroll of the organization before the strike began. No military member, however, was to accept employment with an organization at a location where that organization was involved in a strike after commencement and during the course of such a strike. Implementing instructions were to be issued by the Military Departments.[2]

(U) Lawsuits filed in connection with this strike and related activities are discussed in the Political-Military Relationships chapter of this history.

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1. J111 HistSum Sep 74; 13th AF OPNS CENTER CLARK 210530Z Sep 74.
2. J115 HistSum Oct 74; CINCPAC ltr Ser 1844, 24 Jun 74, Subj: Off-Duty Employment by Military Personnel During Labor Disputes; SECDEF 4170/012059Z Oct 74.

Anti-Hijacking Jurisdiction

(U) Members of CINCPAC's Personnel and Operations Directorates prepared a revised CINCPAC instruction on the unlawful seizure of military and military contract aircraft and actions responsive to hijacking incidents involving civil aircraft in the PACOM. The draft was passed for review on 5 September. Among others who received a copy was the Director of the Pacific Asia Regional Office of the Federal Aviation Administration (in the Department of Transportation). The FAA became concerned with military authority and enforcement jurisdiction as described in Public Law 93-366, the Antihijacking Act and Air Transportation Security Act of 5 August 1974. A meeting attended by FAA and CINCPAC staff concluded that the problem could not be solved at the PACOM level.

(U) The draft CINCPAC instruction gave the senior local commander the authority to direct actions to foil any aircraft hijacking. According to the FAA regional counsel, PL 93-366 assigned the FAA exclusive responsibility for direction of law enforcement activity during hijacking within special aircraft jurisdiction (including aircraft of the national defense forces of the United States). That counsel was of the opinion that military commanders could not take unilateral action, despite the lack of an FAA presence at the majority of U.S. military air facilities in the PACOM.

(U) CINCPAC requested the guidance and assistance of the JCS in clarifying military authority with respect to hijacking. He said, "Believe the senior local commander has inherent responsibility and authority to protect DOD aircraft and personnel traveling those aircraft. In any event, doubt intent of ...[PL 93-366] is to authorize FAA to direct law enforcement activity on foreign soil."[1]

(U) When CINCPAC had not heard further on the matter by 12 December, he requested information on the status of the action from the JCS. They advised that it would be necessary to determine the interface that was to exist between military commanders and FAA law enforcement officials. Of particular concern was the extent to which the administrator of the FAA might desire to delegate authority for law enforcement activity during the in-flight phase to military commanders, especially those commands located outside the United States. The JCS had requested that the Defense Department initiate discusssions with the Department of Transportation to conclude an agreement setting forth the details for a cooperative law enforcement venture. CINCPAC was to be kept informed, and meanwhile, was to continue to operate within the guidance in JCS Policy Memo 171 of 2 April 1973.[2]

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1. J112 HistSum Nov 74; CINCPAC 140417Z Nov 74.
2. JCS 6419/182249Z Dec 74.

Gasoline Problems and Solutions

(U) Hawaii was affected as the rest of the country was by the apparent shortage of gasoline that began in December 1973. With stations, at the direction of the government, closed on Sundays and limiting purchases to 10 gallons, long lines began to form. As the fear of running out of gas spread, customers began "topping" their tanks, tempers became shorter in longer lines, and the military mission became affected when personnel could not get to their duty stations on time. During the week of 21 January the problem of lines reached serious proportions, and CINCPAC moved to develop uniform operating procedures for all Armed Forces exchanges on Oahu.

(U) The Hawaii Area Joint Committee met on 23 January at Camp Smith to finalize plans to implement a modified version of Hawaii's "GASPLAN," starting 28 January. (Hawaii was the first state to institute a form of gasoline rationing.) The "Armed Forces Gas Plan" followed the Hawaii pattern: cars with license plate numbers ending in even numbers were served on even numbered days, odd numbers on odd days. Plates ending with letters and "0" were served on even days. The 10-gallon limit continued in effect. Stations restricted service from 0600 to 0730 to uniformed military personnel; other authorized personnel could come after 0730 until the day's allocation was exhausted. Exchange stations were closed on Saturaday and Sunday.[1]

(U) CINCPAC and FMFPAC staff members were encouraged to join car pools; the CINCPAC Joint Secretary coordinated the effort. One parking lot was dedicated to parking for cars with two or more passengers.

(U) In an unrelated matter, CINCPAC, on 12 September, advised the other Services of guidance received from the Department of the Army regarding privately owned vehicles overseas. Personnel, stationed overseas, who owned 1975 vehicles equipped with catalytic converter emission control systems could expect to encounter personal inconvenience and expense, because of the requirement for lead-free gasoline. To minimize financial burdens, the Services were requested to include an advisory statement in overseas assignment orders.[2]

Commercial Life Insurance Solicitation in the PACOM

(U) A 1 April revision to the CINCPAC Instruction on the sale of commercial life insurance on military reservations contained two primary changes.

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1. CINCPAC 180441Z Jan 74; J113 HistSum Jan 74; PACEX publication "Gas Facts," 28 Jan 74 to exchange customers.
2. J1 HistSum Sep 74; CINCPAC 122249Z Sep 74.

First, more information on individuals who desired to sell insurance on military installations was required. Secondly, installation commanders were required to notify their Single Senior Military Representative when they authorized a PACOM-accredited agent to do business on their installation. This gave CINCPAC headquarters better control of the accreditation of insurance solicitors and their business practices. At the end of May the first CINCPAC Notice was published identifying persons whose commercial solicitation privileges in the PACOM had been withdrawn. This gave commands throughout the PACOM a means of insuring that persons whose solicitation privileges were withdrawn did not merely relocate to another area in the command and resume business on military reservations.[1]

Overseas Combined Federal Campaign

(U) The first "million dollar year" was achieved in the PACOM for FY 74. The total amount raised was $1,122,479.40. CINCPAC expressed special appreciation to COMUS Korea and the officer who directed that campaign; the amount collected in Korea was almost 76 percent over the previous year's effort.[2]

Command Arrangements for Pacific Stars and Stripes

(U) In 1973 Pacific Stars and Stripes, the Armed Forces newspaper, had been proposed as a Joint Manpower Program organization, not just a jointly-staffed unit, under the operational command of CINCPAC. (Administration and supervision had been delegated to CINCUSARPAC.) With authority granted by the JCS in their approval of the JMP on 7 March 1974, the U.S. Army Element of Pacific Stars and Stripes was transferred from the command jurisdiction of CINCUSARPAC to CINCPAC effective 1 April.[3]

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1. J111 HistSum Apr 74, which cited CINCPACINST 1740.1K of 1 Apr 74; J111 Hist Sum May 74, which cited CINCPACNOTE 1740, 31 May 74.
2. J113 HistSum Jan 74, Ltr, Admiral Gayler to COMUS Korea, 25 Jan 74, n.s.; Certificates of Merit to U.S. Forces Korea and CAPT A.C. McLaughlin, USA.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, p. 567; J142 HistSum Mar 74; Ltr, DA to CINCUSARPAC and CINCPAC, DAFD MFP, 13 Mar 74, Subj: Change in Command of Assignment, which cited JCS 4057/071955Z Mar 74.

CHAPTER IX

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT

Consolidation of Intelligence Functions[1]

(S) The Intelligence mission of the Pacific Command (PACOM) was to provide adequate and timely intelligence support to CINCPAC and U.S. Forces assigned in the PACOM, and to satisfy intelligence requirements of higher authority. To accomplish this mission, PACOM Intelligence activities embraced collection, analysis, production and dissemination of virtually all intelligence disciplines. At the close of 1974, some 14,000 intelligence personnel (down from a peak of 36,000 in 1972) were stationed throughout the theater. Of these 14,000 approximately 10,000 were involved in signal intelligence (SIGINT) activities.

(S) The original impetus for reductions in personnel came from the U.S. Forces withdrawal from Vietnam. Further reductions occurred as a result of the consolidation of intelligence producers on the island of Oahu into the new Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC). The personnel for IPAC were drawn from CINCPAC, the Pacific Fleet (PACFLT), Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), and the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC). Further reductions were expected as planned drawdowns and consolidations in the Pacific were implemented.

PACOM Intelligence Watch[2]

(S) On 18 November 1974, the CINCPAC Director for Intelligence (J2) realigned the Headquarters PACOM Indications and Warning Center by establishing the PACOM Intelligence Watch. This action combined into a single operation those functions previously done by the J2 Indicators and Warning Center, IPAC, and the National Security Agency Operations Group (NOG).

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1. J21 Point Paper, 27 Dec 74, Subj: Intelligence Activities and Assets in PACOM. For detailed discussion of IPAC organization, see Ch. I, Section 2, this volume. While IPAC was recognized as a joint, integrated command under CINCPAC, its functional activities in support of CINCPAC are not discussed separately in this chapter.
2. J22 HistSum Nov 74; IPAC HistSum Nov 74; J2/Memo/441-74 of 13 Nov 74, Subj: Intelligence Indications and Watch.

(S) CINCPAC J2 tasked Commander, Intelligence Center Pacific (COMIPAC) to operate the Intelligence Watch under J2 direction and guidance. To carry out his responsibilities, COMIPAC formed five intelligence watch teams with highly qualified military intelligence personnel. These teams were composed of a Duty Director for Intelligence (DDI), Operations Officer, Operations NCO, Intelligence Support Specialist and a SIGINT Support Specialist provided by the National Security Agency (NSA).

(S) The PACOM Intelligence Watch was the intelligence interface with CINCPAC, IPAC, component and sub-unified commands and national authorities. It was the control point for the PACOM Indications Net, the PACOM focal point for current intelligence, and supported the DOD Worldwide Indications and Warning System and the Military Command and Control System.

(S) The PACOM intelligence watch teams produced real-time all-source intelligence analysis, managed and coordinated real-time collection requirements, and operated situational displays. [redacted]

(S) As part of the national indications and warning upgrade, PACOM had begun assessing its baseline posture, capabilities and deficiencies and was planning for specialized, state-of-the-art intelligence support systems to ease the chore of manually assimilating and manipulating masses of intelligence data. These support systems will graphically display and continuously update target nation posture and activities to assist PACOM intelligence watch team specialists to assess more rapidly and accurately the significance of enemy actions and develop expectations as to what the enemy may do.

PACOM IDHSC Network

(C) The PACOM Intelligence Data Handling System Communications (IDHSC) network was designed to provide the intelligence community with Special Intelligence (SI) communications for on-line query and response, and bulk data exchange using internetted IDHS computers. The first Interim Operational Capability (IOC) test ended in February 1973. On 1 May 1973, the IDHSC network was upgraded to Special Activities Office (SAO) security level, and, by July 1973, new order of battle and Installation Data Files (IDF) were operational on the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on-line system (DIAOLS)/Community On-Line Intelligence Network Systems (COINS) host computers accessible to the PACOM IDHSC. In October 1973, the PACOM IDHSC switching center was moved from

Ford Island to a new Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific (FICPAC) headquarters building at Makalapa. In November, a multiplexor was installed at the FICPAC switch, providing IDHSC interactive access to the DIAOLS files at DIA. An IOC test of the FICPAC host computer was scheduled for the January-March 1974 period.[1]

(U) The evaluation began on schedule, consisting of daily two-hour access to the FICPAC Contingency Planning Facilities List (CPFL), Naval Order of Battle (NOB), and a test file AIRPORT. In February 1974, the capability of a Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) terminal off the FICPAC host computer was successfully tested.[2]

(U) Software testing to bring the second IDHSC host computer (at the PACOM Electronics Intelligence Center) on-line was completed in April, thereby making the PEC electronic order of battle (EOB) file accessible to PACOM IDHSC network users, also for two hours on weekdays. In August, the PEC was merged with IPAC, and, in October, the IPAC Hospital Point host computer successfully tested eight CRT terminals, connected to the host computer. This allowed expansion of the EOB file hours of availability to eight hours per day. The IPAC targets personnel located at Hospital Point became the primary users of these CRTs to retrieve data from the IDHSC/COINS data bases in Washington, D.C.

(U) CINCPAC J2 Collections Division personnel continued throughout 1974 to utilize the interactive READ/WRITE access to the DIAOLS Preliminary Imagery Nominations (PIN) file initially granted by DIA in December 1973. This type of access enabled analysts to make timely on-line determinations of which PIN submissions had been disapproved by DIA and for what reasons. When appropriate, these PIN submissions could be corrected on-line via the IDHSC terminal to meet DIA objections so that these PIN submissions could be validated by DIA and thereby automatically entered into the DIA Imagery Requirements Objectives File (IROF). CINCPAC analysts, however, continued to use AUTODIN to forward their initial PIN submission to DIA.

(U) PACOM interactive READ/WRITE access to the DIAOLS Intelligence Collection Requirements (ICR) file was granted by DIA in March 1974; however, full utilization of the capability was not implemented in 1974 because of lack of personnel resources. A major effort to implement PACOM use of this IDHSC on-line ICR update capability will begin in January 1975.

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 609-610.
2. J21 HistSums Feb-Dec 74 and IPAC HistSums Oct-Dec 74; all subsequent narrative re IDHSC from these sources.

(U) The installation of the Network's first WESTPAC terminal at U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) Headquarters in Seoul, Korea commenced in February 1974 and was completed in early May. A CINCPAC training/orientation visit to Korea during the period 10-21 June 1974 provided orientation briefings, IDHSC user training, and terminal/circuit operational check out for USFK area personnel. On 11 June 1974, the first operational retrieval from Washington, D.C.-hosted COINS files was conducted successfully by the Korea terminal. On 4 November, the Korea IDHSC terminal was logged down because of lack of spare parts to repair the ASR-MOD 37 TTY. CINCPAC and DIA representatives undertook special efforts to assist COMUSKOREA in obtaining these spare parts. In September and October, USFK began reporting, at CINCPAC request, the details of problems encountered on the Korea IDHSC circuit which were degrading or interrupting the intelligence output received by the terminal. On 6 November J2 requested technical assistance in isolating and resolving the continuing problems on the Korea circuit. Action in this matter was underway at the end of the year.

(U) In response to the establishment of IPAC, the CINCPAC Headquarters terminal was moved on 6 August from the third floor Building 4 to the second floor Building 80 to better support both IPAC analysts and CINCPAC Staff J2 users. Preparation also commenced for acquiring a multiplexor capability on the CINCPAC Headquarters IDHSC circuit to permit operation of a second IDHSC ASR-37 TTY terminal in Building 80, Camp Smith. The installation of this second terminal was awaiting acquisition of T-16 multiplexors (due January 1975) and a leased ASR-37 TTY from Hawaiian Telephone Company (due about April 1975).

(U) In July and August, some reconfiguration of the IDHSC network occurred with the reactivation of the PACFLT IDHSC terminal and the disestablishment of the USARPAC IDHSC terminal. During the period 5-12 August 1974, the PACFLT IDHSC terminal was reactivated and operationally tested to resume network operations following the upgrade of the terminal spaces to meet the network system high SI/SAO level security requirements. The PACFLT IDHSC terminal had been disconnected since 1 May 1973 when the PACOM IDHSC Network went to the SI/SAO system high. In July, USARPAC commenced procedures to disestablish their IDHSC terminal at Fort Shafter in preparation for the disestablishment of USARPAC by year end. The USARPAC terminal had been disconnected since March 1974, when the terminal was moved to Fort Shafter main headquarters from Shafter Flats and while security accreditation was being processed for the new terminal spaces.

(U) During August 1974, implementation planning for the establishment of an IDHSC terminal/circuit at U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (USTDC) Headquarters was reactivated with the availability of funds. Identification of equipment sources and circuit planning were underway with a target date of 30 June 1975 for activation of the USTDC IDHSC terminal.

(U) On 18 July 1974, U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) expressed a preliminary interest in acquiring an IDHSC terminal. USFJ/Fifth Air Force were requested to formulate their functional requirement to support validation of the IDHSC terminal in Japan. Formal planning commenced with the receipt of USFJ/5AF's statement of functional requirements dated 5 November 1974 for an IDHSC terminal at Yokota AFB, Japan. The functional requirements statement for Japan was validated by CINCPAC in November 1974 and forwarded to DIA for final approval.

(U) Planning for the addition of an IDHSC terminal at Headquarters Thirteenth Air Force, Clark AFB in the Philippines commenced with the receipt of its functional requirements dated 4 December 1974. This statement of functional requirements was validated by PACAF and CINCPAC and forwarded to DIA for final approval in December 1974.

(U) In late August, major progress was made toward establishment of the PACAF IDHSC circuit with equipment acquisition planning and submission of PACAF's Telecommunications Service Request (TSR) to DIA for validation. This circuit would also support PACAF IDHSC host file and high speed (CRT) terminal operations, possibly commencing in February 1975. In October and November 1974 CINCPAC Intelligence representatives personally coordinated with DIA, Defense Communications Agency, Air Force Headquarters, and PACAF for resolution of a problem of MODEM acquisition which was holding up installation of the PACAF IDHSC circuit. Upon approval of a modification of the PACAF IDHSC TSR, MODEM acquisition was commenced, thereby initiating the final action necessary to activate the PACAF circuit connection to the PACOM IDHSC Network. Circuit activation and testing was scheduled to commence 13 December 1974, but communications problems delayed successful circuit activation past the end of the year. The PACAF ASR-MOD 37 TTY IDHSC terminal was located at the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group (RTG) at Hickam AFB.

(U) In early November 1974, FICPAC completed a study of PACOM IDHSC Switch saturation problems and recommended that the PACOM 360/30 switch (64K core) be upgraded with an additional 32K core costing about $15,000. Also, certain major changes in the Switch software were recommended to permit the accommodation of foreseeable high speed (computers) and low speed (terminals) additions to the PACOM IDHSC network. The manner of identification of Switch core upgrade resources and coordination of Switch software changes with DIA remained under consideration at year's end.

(U) Important developments in expanded IDHSC Network file access during 1974 included the extension, since 23 July 1974, of access to NPIC files to eight hours daily, the loading by DIA of an expanded INSTA file (Installation file extract) called "KNGCAIF" to better meet the needs of targeting analysts, and the loading by DIA of a redesigned air order of battle (AOB) file called

"AOB-TEST" to meet certain PACOM-identified retrieval differences in the "DAOBA" file. In November 1974, the Automated Installation Intelligence Files (AIF) information available on the DIAOLS host computer was greatly expanded, with additional area coverage and increased data content in each installation record. The implementation of this new, greatly expanded on-line AIF should be completed by January 1975.

(C) In another expanded application of the IDHSC, IPAC developed the capability to provide the U.S. Support Activities Group (USSAG) J2 in Thailand with North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile (SAM) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) defense data from the DIAOLS/COINS system. An eight-level tape received from the DIAOLS/COINS terminal was converted to a five-level paper tape within the special intelligence communications (SPINTCOM) network. The first electrical transmission, on 2 October, was accepted as a "must have" improvement by USSAG.


Disclosure of Classified Information

(S) On 12 April 1974, CINCPAC suspended the authority of all PACOM service components and subordinate unified commands to release classified military information (CMI) to the Government of Laos pending guidance from the National Disclosure Policy Committee (NDPC). A policy review was necessary because the newly-formed Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU) in Laos included Pathet Lao officials as well as nationalists and neutralists. A special meeting of the NDPC was convened by DIA on 19 April to consider official suspension of all disclosures, including those under existing exceptions to national disclosure policy. Any U.S. element wishing to release CMI to Laos would have to request an exception to policy on a case-by-case basis, and such request would require U.S. Mission approval.[1]

[redacted]

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1. J23 HistSum Apr 74; CINCPAC 120155Z Apr 74; DIA 4610/171904Z Apr 74.
2. CINCPAC 040412Z May 74.



EOB Cost Reduction

(U) Late in 1974, IPAC reduced the frequency of in-house, full-file Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) site/set sheets (complete lists of all EOB data) from bi-weekly to monthly. This reduction followed the initial change from weekly frequency in June 1974. The later reduction saved an estimated $100 per month in computer paper and about ten hours of computer time. Additional savings resulted from a revised EOB format which reduced per item cost while improving readability. The new format utilized approximately 75 fewer pages per document, multiplied by the 800-plus copies distributed.[1]

(C) That the new EOB format was an improvement was attested to by unsolicited communications from the field and from DIA commending IPAC on the increased usability of the EOB publications.[2]

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1. IPAC HistSum Nov 74.
2. IPAC HistSum Dec 74.



SECTION II--INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Human Source Intelligence (HUMINT)

Current Intelligence Reporting List

(C) The Human Source Committee (HSC) of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) was established in January 1973. In July 1973, the HSC requested CINCPAC assistance in a review of quality control and dissemination of Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs). In September 1973, the DIA advised CINCPAC that the HSC had converted the previous Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Current Intelligence Reporting List (CIRL) into a USIB-sponsored collection guidance document. CINCPAC was requested to provide a narrative evaluation of the first product--the USSR CIRL for August through December 1973.[1]

(C) CINCPAC replied on 26 February 1974 with a consensus of PACOM intelligence collectors, analysts and HUMINT collection managers that the initial CIRL provided useful background and reference information. CINCPAC recommended that data releasable to foreign counterparts be identified because of considerable dependence on bilateral collection operations. Also recommended was the inclusion in the CIRL of economic alert lists and other documents containing intelligence requirements.[2]

Debriefing of Thai Volunteers

(C) In August 1974, the DIA requested CINCPAC to identify the executive agent for casualty resolution information obtained from the debriefing of Thai volunteers captured in Laos. The U.S. Support Activities Group recommended that the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) be appointed executive agent for the exploitation of the Thai volunteer repatriates. The USSAG recommendation was based on a JCRC proposal to submit questions concerning U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) and missing in action (MIAs) through the Royal Thai Government (RTG).[3]

(C) CINCPAC acknowledged the JCRC proposal, but noted that exploitation of the Thai POWs would include collateral intelligence collection as well as questions on casualty resolution. It was imperative, CINCPAC continued, that

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 618; J23 HistSum Feb 74; Ltr, DIA Ser 543, 210/DC-4A2 of 11 Sep 73, Subj: USSR Current Intelligence Reporting List (CIRL).
2. CINCPAC 260150Z Feb 74.
3. J23 HistSum Sep 74; DIA 272004Z Aug 74; USSAG/7AF 280250Z Aug 74.

the total exploitation effort be structured to deal with the RTG through a single, coordinated unit capable of interface with all U.S. agencies, and especially with the SRF in Bangkok. The responsible unit must also provide trained intelligence debriefers, implement established, approved procedures for debriefing refugees or returnees, and utilize existing channels for expeditious reporting of such information. CINCPAC noted that approved HUMINT projects in effect between the Thai Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center (AFIOC) and the U.S. military collection organizations satisfied these prerequisites. The operations and intelligence staffs of the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) coordinated the Thai exploitation projects originated by Detachment K, 500th Military Intelligence Group (MIG) and Detachment 5 of the 7602d Air Intelligence Group (AIG), and this HUMINT collection would also support the needs of the JCRC.[1]

(S) Considering the foregoing, CINCPAC designated the MACTHAI J2 as the central coordinator for exploitation of the Thai POWs.[2]

Reduction of HUMINT in Thailand

(S) The two major military units devoted to HUMINT collection in Thailand were Detachment K of the 500th MIG and Detachment 5 of the 7602d AIG. In March 1974, the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand proposed the withdrawal of both detachments on the grounds that their usefulness had diminished, that their collections were duplicative, and that they were a potential source of political embarrassment to the U.S. Government. The U.S. Ambassadors to Laos and Burma agreed with Ambassador Kintner; the former because, "...the marginal intelligence gains..." did not outweigh, "...the potential political embarrassment..." of the operation, and the latter because collections on Burma "...served no useful purpose...." The U.S. Embassy in Cambodia disagreed with the proposal to withdraw the two units unless provision was made to provide a substitute for the "go team" interrogators who entered Cambodia on as-required basis from the 500th MIG detachment in Thailand. Also, the Embassy desired the intelligence training of Khmer military personnel, conducted by the 500th MIG in Udorn and Bangkok, to continue. The strongest protest against the Kintner proposal was registered by the U.S. Defense Attache Office in Saigon. Major General John E. Murray, the Defense Attache, stated that the activities of the 500th MIG in South Vietnam, and the support it furnished to the DAO mission, were essential. Also, the bilateral HUMINT collection program

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1. CINCPAC 292136Z Aug 74.
2. Ibid.

operated by the 7602d AIG in Vietnam was very important to the overall HUMINT effort.[1]

(S) As a result of the Embassy concern, CINCPAC dispatched a team headed by the CINCPAC Inspector General to assess the HUMINT program in Thailand. At the same time, CINCPAC passed the Embassy comments to General Bennett, CINCUSARPAC. Bennett immediately acknowledged the Ambassador's desire to reduce the [redacted] military intelligence profile in Southeast Asia. He informed the Ambassador that he had directed a reduction in the 500th MIG element in February 1974, and further ordered the cessation of certain activities to which the Ambassador objected. [redacted]

(S) In early April, CINCPAC forwarded the recommendation of his inspection team to the JCS. The team recommended that Detachment K (500th MIG) be retained at reduced strength; that the two units be colocated; and that they be placed under SRF control. CINCPAC also informed Ambassador Kintner that he agreed with the views expressed by General Bennett, which would balance profile against needed tactical intelligence capability and leave the essential support of the other Southeast Asian ambassadors intact.[3]

(S) On 19 April, after a personal meeting between General Bennett and Ambassador Kintner, Bennett reaffirmed some of his previously directed actions regarding the 500th MIG detachment. These included a 40 percent reduction in personnel, cessation of Burma reporting, cessation of Thailand-based unilateral operations, and cessation of reporting in support of the SRF on insurgency in Thailand.[4]

(S) In a partial reply on 8 May, Kintner retracted his objection to reporting on the insurgency problem, which was reinstated by the 500th MIG. Although the ambassadorial interest had generated considerable introspection

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1. J23 HistSum Mar 74; AMEMB Bangkok 4768/230550Z Mar 74; AMEMB Vientiane 2408/260215Z Mar 74; AMEMB Rangoon 0794/260520Z Mar 74; AMEMB Phnom Penh 4598/291200Z Mar 74; USDAO Saigon 281100Z Mar 74; for discussion of support rendered, see CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 610-612.
2. J23 HistSum Mar 74; CINCUSARPAC 292014Z Mar 74.
3. J23 HistSum Apr 74; CINCPAC 020341Z Apr 74.
4. J23 HistSum Apr 74; CINCUSARPAC 190614Z Apr 74.

among the military headquarters concerned, and the year-end strength of both HUMINT units had been reduced, there was no further consideration during 1974 of their complete withdrawal.[1]

Provincial Observer Program

(S) In March 1973, the DIA informed CINCPAC of Defense Department participation in a plan to assign U.S. observers to provinces and regions of South Vietnam. The basic objectives, scope and requirement for a provincial collection program were detailed in CINCPAC Intelligence Plan 2-72 and in the DIA Posthostilities Intelligence Plan for Southeast Asia. Ten in-country billets were authorized by the State Department, to be attached to newly-established consulates general in Da Nang, Nha Trang, Bien Hoa and Can Tho. Operational control of the ten authorized observers was vested in the Defense Department, while general supervision for cover, security and administration was under State Department direction. Five spaces each were assigned to the 500th MIG and the 7602d AIG, which exercised indirect operational control as coordinated with and approved by USSAG and the Defense Attache Office (DAO) Saigon. Actual operational control was assumed by the U.S. Embassy in Saigon with CINCPAC concurrence. The 500th MIG and 7602d AIG published and disseminated Intelligence Information Reports (IIRs) resulting from the observer collection activity.[2]

(S) On 30 May 1974, the DAO Saigon requested CINCPAC permission to assume complete control of the provincial observer program. After obtaining comments from all concerned, CINCPAC approved the DAO request, and, on 1 July 1974, the ten observer positions were assimilated in the DAO Saigon Joint Table of Distribution.[3]

Photo Intelligence Activities

Unit Deactivated in Philippines

(C) The Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific Photo Processing Facility (FICPACFAC) at Cubi Point in the Philippines was deactivated on 30 June 1974 after ten years of operation. During that time, the facility provided readouts of U.S. Navy tactical photographic reconnaissance missions, including those

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1. J233 Point Paper, 9 May 74, Subj: General Bennett and Ambassador Kintner Agreements on U.S. Army HUMINT Element in Thailand.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 618-619.
3. J23 HistSum Jul 74; USDAO Saigon 301010Z May 74 (RODCA); CINCPAC 191833Z Jul 74 (RODCA).

from aircraft carriers in the Gulf of Tonkin. FICPACFAC also provided interpretation of GIANT SCALE SR-71 and BUFFALO HUNTER drone photography for Navy targets throughout Southeast Asia.[1]

Exploitation Consolidation on Oahu

(U) As part of the overall reorganization and consolidation of Intelligence units in Hawaii, imagery interpreters from the Army and Navy were merged with the 548th Reconnaissance Technical Group. The new unit, Pacific Photographic Processing and Interpretation Center (PIC) became operational on 12 August 1974. In accordance with the division of functional responsibilities discussed in Chapter I of this volume, the Pacific Air Forces served as executive agent for the joint element, with management by the CINCPAC Director for Intelligence. PIC's mission was first and second phase exploitation support for PACOM units and national agencies.[2]


Southeast Asia Reconnaissance

(S) The three major strategic aerial reconnaissance projects in Southeast Asia were GIANT SCALE, using SR-71 aircraft, OLYMPIC MEET, using U-2s, and the BUFFALO HUNTER drone program. These Strategic Air Command (SAC) assets were supplemented by tactical reconnaissance aircraft assigned to PACAF units.[3]

(S) In March 1974, CINCPAC asked USSAG to comment on the sortie impact on tactical reconnaissance resources, if the PACOM Imagery Requirements Objectives Program (PIROP) for Cambodia were switched to tactical recce. USSAG replied that such a change would not impact significantly on the current sortie level. On 28 March, CINCPAC advised SAC that, in order to utilize BUFFALO HUNTER drone missions more profitably, all priority one through three Cambodian PIROP requirements would be assigned to tactical recce assets effective 14 April 1974. SAC acknowledged CINCPAC's decision, and stated that drones would not be operated over Cambodia except upon direct request from CINCPAC. GIANT SCALE and OLYMPIC MEET sorties, however, would continue to be planned against outstanding Imagery Requirements Objective List (IROL) targets when adequate weather prevailed over Cambodia.[4]

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1. J23 HistSum Jun 74.
2. J23 HistSum Aug 74.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 620.
4. J23 HistSum Mar 74; CINCPAC 200109Z Mar 74; USSAG 260045Z Mar 74; CINCPAC 281829Z Mar 74; SAC 052046Z Apr 74.



(S) In October, CINCPAC notified USSAG of continuing high level interest in manned tactical reconnaissance in Southeast Asia. A mission by mission assessment was required to determine the military risk, anticipated intelligence gain, and political sensitivity of every tactical reconnaissance mission planned under the operational control of USSAG. The concern expressed by CINCPAC was that an incident involving tactical recce aircraft could adversely affect all reconnaissance operations in Southeast Asia.[3]

(S) Effective 1 November 1974, all aerial collection programs in Southeast Asia were placed under the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO). Included in this order were these strategic programs: FACE VALUE, OAK TRAIL, BUFFALO HUNTER, OLYMPIC MEET, OLYMPIC TORCH, GIANT SCALE, COMBAT APPLE, and LAFFING EAGLE.[4]

Vietnamese Air Force Reconnaissance Capability

(S) In October 1974, a proposal to upgrade the photo reconnaissance capability of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) was made by USSAG. The proposal

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1. J23 HistSum May 74; JCS 3799/281719Z May 74.
2. JCS 6252/301943Z May 74; J23 HistSum Aug 74.
3. CINCPAC 110126Z Oct 74.
4. J23 HistSum Nov 74.

was to modify VNAF C-130 aircraft to accommodate the K-28 camera system. During the ensuing debate, which did not include CINCPAC, the U.S. Air Force identified five RC-130 aircraft which were being transferred to the Air National Guard. These aircraft were scheduled to have the cameras and mounts removed, since the Guard needed C-130s, not RC-130s. The VNAF, DAO Saigon, USSAG and PACAF all agreed that C-130s possessed by the VNAF could be offered in exchange for the RC-130s owned by the Air Force. The RC-130s, with longer focal length cameras than the RF-5s possessed by the VNAF, could provide high resolution photography at altitudes above the anti-aircraft threat environment in South Vietnam.[1]

(S) On 5 December 1974, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force (CSAF) requested the Secretary of Defense to clarify authority, under the Foreign Assistance Act, to exchange the C-130s. The reply from the Comptroller, Department of Defense, was an interesting decision that the exchange could not take place without charge against the funds for Defense Assistance to Vietnam (DAV):

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> ....The DAV statute as taken from applicable provisions of the Foreign Assistance legislation requires a recipient country to agree to offer for return without charge to the USG such materiel transferred to it by the USG when it is no longer required by the recipient country. To give the recipient credit for materiel returned is in effect buying back what the USG has paid for and is entitled to receive back without payment. In essence, providing USAF C-130A [sic] aircraft to the VNAF in exchange for VNAF C-130A aircraft entails giving credit to the VNAF for the aircraft they currently possess which is contrary to the statutory requirement.

This decision was acknowledged by DAO Saigon, which stated that other methods would be pursued to upgrade and improve the VNAF recce capability. It must be said, however, that this CINCPAC historian did not comprehend the logic of the Defense Department ruling.[2]

[redacted]

1. J23 HistSum Dec 74; USSAG 222233Z Oct 74; CINCPACAF 050210Z Nov 74; USDAO 140545Z Nov 74; USSAG 201053Z Nov 74.
2. J23 HistSum Dec 74; SECDEF 1252/242149Z Dec 74; USDAO Saigon 310838Z Dec 74.



GIANT SCALE Coverage of Paracels (S)

(TS) Following the January 1974 confrontation between the PRC and South Vietnam in the Paracel Islands, the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) requested CINCPAC to obtain approval for GIANT SCALE coverage of the Paracels. Coverage was requested for both the Amphitrite and Crescent groups in order to assess battle damage and to determine the orders of battle. CINCPAC and DIA validated the CINCPACFLT request, and, on 29 January, the JCS authorized the GIANT SCALE mission. The authorization was for oblique coverage, with the SR-71 to remain outside the 12 nautical mile limit. The mission was flown on 6 February. Photography revealed the detailed disposition of PRC forces and facilities.[2]

Crash Site Photography

(C) In 1973, CINCPAC had set in motion the screening of past and current photography in Southeast Asia in support of crash site location and/or inspection by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC). By mid-1973, photos from various sources had identified 493 of about 1,000 potential sites.[3]

1. CINCPAC 152231Z Feb 74; CINCUNC/USFK/EA 230303Z Jul 74.
2. J23 HistSums Jan, Feb 74; CINCPACFLT 220243Z Jan 74; JCS 7656/252235Z Jan 74; CINCPAC 270001Z Jan 74; JCS 1176/292151Z Jan 74; for discussion of Paracels confrontation, see Political/Military chapter; the JCS defined the Amphitrite Group, including Lincoln and Woody Islands, and the Crescent Group, including Pattle, Duncan, Robert, Money and Drummond Islands, as comprising the Paracels Archipelago.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 622, 623.

(S) In February 1974, the JCRC advised CINCPAC that aerial photo coverage was needed for 186 crash sites in Southeast Asia. Accordingly, CINCPAC tasked CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT and CINCUSARPAC to review their film holdings for identified crash sites. Available imagery was to be provided to JCRC as rapidly as possible.[1]


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Indian Ocean Surveillance

(S) On 8 February 1974, the JCS directed CINCPAC and SAC to develop a plan to photograph Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean, using B-52/KC-135 aircraft as the collection platform. Representatives from CINCPAC and PACFLT attended a conference at SAC Headquarters to work on the plan. The resultant plan was CINCSAC Operations Plan 8888, entitled B-52 Maritime Operations.[3]

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1. J23 HistSum Feb 74; CINCPAC 270113Z Feb 74.
2. J23 HistSum Apr 74; COMUSKOREA 290510Z Mar 74; DIA 1670/021440Z Apr 74; PEC 040301Z Apr 74; CINCPAC 060124Z Apr 74. This PEC capability was subsequently absorbed by the newly-formed IPAC Defense Analysis Division.)
3. J23 HistSum Feb 74; JCS 9880/081944Z Feb 74.



SECTION III--TARGET INTELLIGENCE

(U) The consolidation and reorganization of Intelligence support to CINCPAC resulted in a gradual assumption by IPAC of production responsibility for target intelligence activities. This section was based on developments for the entire year, involving both the CINCPAC Directorate for Intelligence and IPAC.[1]

Retention of PACOM TLRG

(S) The 20 August 1974 meeting of the PACOM Target List Review Group (TLRG), combined with the PACOM Target Materials Review Group (PATMRG), was the first at which the IPAC members were identified separately. However, many of them had represented CINCPAC and component commands at previous meetings. During a discussion of the future of the TLRG and PATMRG, the chairman (CINCPAC) noted that the original six month implementation period during which IPAC was to become operational had been compressed to 90 and then to 30 days. While IPAC had, in theory, become operational on 12 August, some divisions were partially manned or manned by temporary duty personnel. The chairman stated that, during the transitional period, the TLRG would continue to meet. Most members agreed that the TLRG had been, and should continue to be, a forum for policy and vehicle for communication.[2]

(S) During the 12 December meeting of the TLRG, the members discussed the official status and decision making powers of the TLRG vis-a-vis the IPAC Executive Board. The Air Force member recommended that the TLRG be retained as a forum for exchanging ideas on routine PACOM targeting matters and working-level problems affecting the Service components. The forum would not be a policy-making body, but would jointly review and recommend policy proposals to be addressed to the IPAC Executive Board. For example, the TLRG would discuss proposals pertaining to nuclear and conventional targeting, agenda items for the annual DIA Target Intelligence/Tactical Targeting Materials conference, or targeting problems concerning Service component support for CINCPAC operations plans. The chairman noted that decisions by the TLRG were based upon complete staffing by all commands. Since the IPAC Executive Board did not make CINCPAC targeting policy, the members agreed that TLRG agenda items would be carried as pending items, as in the past, until staffing was completed within interested components or agencies.[3]

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1. See Chapter I for details of reorganization.
2. TLRG Minutes, 20 Aug 74; IPAC HistSum Aug-Dec 74; the minutes of TLRG, which met throughout the year, are on microfilm in the CINCPAC history archives. As sources in this section, they were cited as TLRG Minutes, with pertinent date.
3. TLRG Minutes, 12 Dec 74.

Standardization of Target Data Base

(S) In May 1973, the DIA had proposed to use the Imagery Basic Encyclopedia Numbers (IBEN) assigned by operational units in the national level Automated Installation File (AIF). The DIA would no longer re-validate targets and assign standard IBEN, but would retain all of those IBEN identified by PACOM units. In October and November 1973, an ad hoc committee appointed by CINCPAC agreed to phase out the Contingency Planning Facilities List (CPFL) data base as the IBEN were fed into the AIF. Also adopted was a proposal to review all IBEN in the CPFL to eliminate unnecessary numbers in two phases. Phase I, which eliminated selected non-military categories of targets, was completed in November 1973. During November, the ad hoc committee agreed on the criteria for Phase II. The IBEN to be retained were those with permanent facilities, such as structures, buildings or POL tanks. Installations without permanent facilities were to be eliminated from the data base.[1]

(S) In February 1974, component review and validation of all IBEN installations in the PACOM were completed. PACAF advised CINCPAC that 273 IBEN in Laos and 38 in Cambodia had been inactivated; the remaining IBEN installations which met the Phase II criteria were forwarded to the DIA for inclusion in the AIF.[2]

(S) In October and November 1974, the scheduled assumption by IPAC of IBEN/CPFL maintenance was discussed by the TLRG. Maintenance of both files was assumed by IPAC as of 1 January 1975. Actual production of the CPFL, with reimbursement of costs, was to be assigned to FICPAC.[3]

Automation of Target Selection Criteria

(S) In November 1973, the TLRG members were asked to provide recommendations for converting textual target selection criteria to a format which could be automated. The input from the components was incorporated into a master worksheet which listed qualifying categories and parameters equated to each paragraph of textual target selection criteria in each operations plan. The worksheet was passed to TLRG members in February, and, based on component comments, CINCPAC announced, in August, the production of fully coordinated automated target selection criteria for CINCPAC OPLANs 5001, 5025 and 5027. The Group was advised that, because of the programming effort involved in the conversion of existing programs to the Honeywell system, resources to program

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 632, 633.
2. J24 HistSum Feb 74; CINCPACAF 280141Z Feb 74.
3. TLRG Minutes, 15 Oct and 12 Nov 74.

the automated target selection criteria would not be available for several months. In October, the TLRG chairman announced that, after incorporating minor changes submitted by components, the criteria would be automated according to the specifications passed to the members in August.[1]

WANG 2200 System Weaponeering

(U) On 20 November 1974, the WANG 2200 system (programmable calculator) became operational under IPAC control. A project was immediately begun, and was in progress at the end of 1974, to formulate an automated nuclear weaponeering program. When completed, the WANG would automatically perform point target probability of damage (PD), equivalent target area, maximum offset distance for desired PD, single shot probability of damage, and calculate population fatalities from nuclear weapons.[2]

Tactical Intelligence/Target Materials Conference

(C) In 1973, the DIA proposed to expand the scope of future DIA Target Intelligence (TI) conferences to include the Tactical Target Materials (TTM) program. The DIA proposal was based on the fact that the TI and TTM programs were managed within the Targets activities of the DIA and the unified and specified commands. Also, the Automated Tactical Target Graphics (ATTG) program involved the production and maintenance of textual data in separate, automated data bases derived from, or directly related to the AIF. After discussion by the TLRG and the PATMRG, CINCPAC agreed with the DIA proposal.[3]

(U) In January 1974, during a joint TLRG/PATMRG meeting, items proposed by the component commands for agenda and discussion during the June 1974 conference were evaluated. Subsequently, CINCPAC submitted eleven conference agenda items and nine items for discussion during a pre-conference visit by a DIA team. In addition, the transmittal letter recommended that a world-wide working group be established to prepare an agenda item toward rewriting the ATTG specifications as written in the DIA Manual 57-23, Tactical Target Materials.[4]

(S) As a result of the afore-mentioned pre-conference discussion, CINCPAC submitted a proposal that the DIA Manual revision pertaining to ATTG standardization be adopted as a formal agenda item for the TI/TTM conference.[5]

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1. TLRG Minutes, 7 Feb 74, 2 Apr 74, 7 May 74, 18 Jun 74, 20 Aug 74, 15 Oct 74.
2. IPAC HistSum Aug-Dec 74.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 633, 634.
4. J24 HistSum Jan 74; Ltr, CINCPAC Ser 0035 of 17 Jan 74, Subj: 1974 TI/TTM Conference.
5. J24 HistSum Mar 74; Ltr, CINCPAC Ser 00247 of 27 Mar 74, Subj: Agenda Items for the 1974 TI/TTM Conference.


(C) The first combined TI/TTM conference was held at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia on 3-7 June 1974. At a preliminary TTM working group meeting, the matter of ATTG specifications was discussed. During the conference, the DIA was tasked to develop a standard method for annotating ATTG material. In pursuing the subject, the DIA requested all unified and specified commands to provide the rationale for their annotation methods. During the preparation of the response to DIA, it became apparent that the slightly different annotation methods used by the two PACOM ATTG producers--PACAF and FICPAC--could be reconciled into one PACOM standard method. In December 1974, CINCPAC forwarded to the DIA a system for a standard ATTG annotation method. The method entailed identification of functional areas by the same alphabetical designator for all installations of the same category. For example, the runway at each airfield would be annotated as Area A, POL storage as Area B, etc. The absence of one or more alphabetic designators would indicate that those functional areas were not present at that particular installation. CINCPAC recommended the adoption of this method in the formulation of the universal annotation system for ATTGs.[1]

Indian Ocean Target List (C)

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1. J24 HistSum Jun 74; J21 HistSum Dec 74; Ltr, CINCPAC Ser C695 of 24 Dec 74, Subj: Standard ATTG Annotation Method.
2. TLRG Minutes, 15 Oct 74; CINCPAC 102344Z Oct 74.



Southeast Asia Target Activity

TENNIS RACKET

(TS) When the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was disestablished, the development of many operations and contingency plans was assumed by the Commander, U.S. Support Activities Group (COMUSSAG) under the command and guidance of CINCPAC. TENNIS RACKET was an extension of the concept executed during the LINEBACKER I and II strikes of late 1972 and early 1973. The basic

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1. TLRG Minutes, 12 Nov 74.
2. TLRG Minutes, 12 Dec 74; IPAC HistSum Aug-Dec 74.
3. Ibid.

plan listed surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites and SAM support facilities as the highest priority targets, and the heartland of North Vietnam as the basic targeting objective. Three major systems were marked for destruction. These were the major lines of communication (LOC), concentrations of military equipment and supplies, and industrial facilities. On 31 December 1973, COMUSSAG forwarded a proposed revision of the TENNIS RACKET target list for review and approval by CINCPAC. Based on the review, a revised CINCPAC TENNIS RACKET list was published on 29 January 1974. The new list contained 144 North Vietnam targets, with 69 based on assets in the PACOM and 75 identified for strike by air augmentation forces.[1]

(TS) Several revisions to the target list for TENNIS RACKET were approved by CINCPAC during 1974 as a result of continuing target analysis.[2]

PRIME HIT

(TS) The PRIME HIT operations plan had, as its initial objective, the total destruction of the Khe Sanh missile complex installed by North Vietnam. Option I of the plan specified B-52, tactical air and F-111 strikes against SAM sites and equipment in Khe Sanh (including logistical support, airfields and troop concentrations). This option also included STEEL TIGER (Laos) strikes below the Mu Gia pass against LOC, support facilities and troops. Overflight of North Vietnam was prohibited. Option II included the Option I objectives, plus multiple target complexes in South Vietnam, the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and the southern portion of North Vietnam (Route Package I). In January 1974, COMUSSAG submitted an up-dated PRIME HIT plan for approval by CINCPAC. A summary of the plan targets included:[3]

	TACAIR TGTS	B-52 TGTS	FAC SEGMENTS	STRIKE TOTALS
Khe Sanh*	19	15	4	38
STEEL TIGER*	36	38	28	102
VN RP 1	34	0	11	45
VS MR-1	18	25	0	43

*Targets common to Options 1 and 2. All others in Option 2.

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1. J24 HistSum Jan 74; COMUSSAG 310400Z Dec 73; CINCPAC 240403Z Jan 74.
2. J24 HistSums Apr, Sep 74; TENNIS RACKET Target List, 1 May 74, microfilm archives, CINCPAC History Branch.
3. J24 HistSum Jan 74; COMUSSAG 210930Z Jan 74 (TSSE); PRIME HIT Target List, 14 Jun 74, microfilm archives, CINCPAC History Branch.

	TACAIR TGTS	B-52 TGTS	FAC SEGMENTS	STRIKE TOTALS
VS MR-II	1	1	0	2
VS MR-III	20	3	0	23
Quang Tri	0	0	12	12
A Shau	0	0	13	13
Pleiku	0	0	3	3
Kontum	0	0	2	2
Tonale Cham	0	0	2	2
TOTALS	128	82	75	285**

**Total strikes increased to 285 vice 250 in last PRIME HIT list. Also some targets are hit by more than one weapon system.

USSAG Target Function Disposition

(S) In October 1974, the TLRG discussed the responsibility for operations plan target list maintenance upon disestablishment of USSAG. During a conference in Bangkok, attended by a CINCPAC targets representative, USSAG and PACAF were tasked to formulate a plan by 15 January 1975 for the disestablishment of USSAG. Since National Security Council and JCS requirements for current Southeast Asian target information could be expected to continue, the TLRG concensus was that IPAC should plan to assume target responsibility for the TENNIS RACKET and PRIME HIT plans after USSAG was phased out.[1]

NKTTL

(S) The TLRG recommended, in May 1973, that the Korean Tactical Target List (KTTL) be discontinued because the data was available in such publications as the AIF and ATTG file. CINCPAC formally discontinued the KTTL on 7 July 1973.[2]

(S) In February 1974, the CINCPAC J2 directed that a meeting be held among CINCPAC and component intelligence personnel to develop a North Korea Tactical Target List (NKTTL). [redacted] When published, the non-nuclear target list would support the Offensive Air Operations Appendix to the Operations Annex of CINCPAC Operation Plan 5027.[3]

1. TLRG Minutes, 15 Oct 74, 12 Nov 74, 12 Dec 74.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, p. 636.
3. J24 HistSum Feb 74; CINCPAC 020426Z Feb 74; CINCPAC 050621Z Feb 74.

(S) Initial distribution of the NKTTL by CINCPAC was made in March. [redacted]


(C) In May 1974, CINCPAC adopted an addition of three NKTTL installations, dropped two, and changed the priority of eleven targets based on the latest all-source intelligence. In October, IPAC submitted eight additions and two deletions. [redacted]

SKCATL

[redacted]

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1. J24 HistSum Mar 74; CINCPAC 190242Z Mar 74.
2. J24 HistSum May 74; TLRG Minutes, 15 Oct 74; IPAC HistSum Nov 74.
3. TLRG Minutes, 2 Apr 74.
4. TLRG Minutes, 7 May 74; Ltr, PACAF to TLRG, n.d., Subj: CINCPAC OPLAN 5027.




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1. TLRG Minutes, 18 Jun 74; CINCPAC 230420Z May 74 (BOM); COMUSKOREA 152346Z Jun 74 (BOM).
2. TLRG Minutes, 20 Aug 74.
3. TLRG Minutes, 15 Oct 74.
4. TLRG Minutes, 12 Nov 74 and 12 Dec 74; Ltr, PACAF to TLRG, 11 Nov 74, Subj: Discussion Items for TLRG Meeting.

[redacted]

'NUCLEAR TARGETING (P. 722)


1. J24 HistSum Jul 74.



SIOP (p. 731)

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
1. TLRG Minutes, 15 Jul 74.
2. J24 HistSum Aug 74.



SIOP

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1. J542 Precis: JCS Guidance for Preparation of Plans for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons, n.d., microfilm archives, CINCPAC History Branch.



SIOP

The J2 letter to DIA also stated that PACAF had been requested to develop a Penetration Analysis System to support the IPAC Air Defense Analysis Functions. The development proposal consisted of three phases:2

* * * * *

a. Phase I will portray the air defense environment of a specified area based upon the altitude and reflectivity factor of the penetrating aircraft. This will be accomplished as follows:

(1) Create a composite data base by extracting specific information from AAA, SAM, EOB, and AOB Files. Identify to

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1. J24 HistSum Oct 74.
2. J21 HistSum Dec 74; Ltr, CINCPAC Ser 213/5854 of 6 Dec 74, Subj: Nuclear Options Target Intelligence Coordination.

ADAC those data elements not available in presently maintained files.

(2) Develop a program to list specified information pertaining to defensive sites and create parameters in magnetic tape format for input to the Gerber Plotter.

(3) Develop a plot program to portray the total or specified threat environment.

(4) Develop an AIDES TPP for CRT display of information which will also be available via hard copy listing.

b. Phase II will portray the hostile environment to be encountered by the penetrating aircraft along a specified route. This will be accomplished as follows:

(1) Develop a program to list defensive sites and create parameters in magnetic tape format depicting specific penetration corridors for input to the Gerber-Plotter.

(2) Develop a plot program to portray the total or specified threat along that corridor.


(3) Develop an AIDES TPP for CRT display of information which will also be available via hard copy listing.

c. Phase III will provide the capability to select the route of least resistance commensurate with mission requirements and penetrating aircraft capabilities. This will be accomplished as follows:

(1) Develop a program to list specified information pertaining to defensive sites which will enable analysts to select route of least resistance. Parameters will be created in magnetic tape format for input to the Gerber Plotter for presenting a visual display of optimum routes of least resistance.


(2) Develop a plot program to portray the threat environment and routes of least resistance.

(3) Develop an AIDES TPP for CRT display of information which will also be available via hard copy listing.



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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.



SECTION IV--MAPPING, CHARTING, GEODESY

PACOM MC&G Realignments

(U) In January 1974, the CINCPAC Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G) Division of J2 initiated the first discussion of operational and functional concepts for a proposed centralized MC&G center. A target date of 1 July 1974 was established. In March, CINCPAC defined the mission and function of the PACOM MC&G to USARPAC, and requested submission of a draft organizational structure and an assessment of the impact on plans for the Center upon deactivation of ARPAC. In April, USARPAC conveyed its intention to use the 652d Engineer Battalion as the nucleus for the Center, and stated that development of the requested organizational structure depended upon Department of the Army (DA) planning for the future Army force structure in Hawaii.[1]

(U) The establishment of a centralized and consolidated MC&G Center for the PACOM was part of the overall consolidation of Intelligence functions (see Chapter I); the designation of USARPAC as Executive Agent was overtaken by the deactivation of ARPAC effective 31 December 1974. On 12 December 1974, CINCUSARPAC informed U.S. Army field units of changes caused by the reorganization of command structure in the PACOM. After the disestablishment of USARPAC, submission of area requirements for standard MC&G products by Army components of subordinate unified commands would be made through the subordinate unified command to CINCPAC. Under the terms of reference for the residual U.S. Army CINCPAC Support Group (CSG), which was designated as CINCPAC's executive agent for the PACOM MC&G Center, these requests would be forwarded by CINCPAC to the CSG.[2]


(U) Meanwhile, in November, the CINCPAC Director for Intelligence reorganized his staff after IPAC became operational. The code for the MC&G Division was changed from J26 to J25, and the division lost one 05-level staff officer.

(U) During the upheaval of PACOM reorganization and Intelligence consolidation of 1974, other evolutions within the MC&G area were underway. In February, the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) accepted a longstanding CINCPAC proposal that map distribution facilities on the island of Oahu be consolidated under DMA into a single facility. The DMA's Topographic Center (DMATC) agreed to assume

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1. J26 HistSum Jan, Mar, Apr 74; CINCPAC 220038Z Jan 74; CINCPAC 050040Z Mar 74; CINCUSARPAC 180615Z Apr 74.
2. CINCUSARPAC 120224Z Dec 74.

map distribution responsibility from the 652d Engineer Battalion on or before 1 November 1974. The DMA's Hydrographic (DMAHC) and Aerospace Centers (DMAAC) would be consolidated, and topographic map stockage and distribution would be moved from Fort Shafter (Army) to Hickam Air Force Base, thus colocating all three activities. In June, during an audit of PACOM MC&G activities, the Defense Department auditor confirmed the desirability for map and chart distribution facilities in the PACOM to be consolidated and/or reduced to a single facility on Oahu.[1]



(U) In September, conferences were held at CINCPAC with DMA and U.S. Army representatives to coordinate the transfer of Hawaii Map Depot operations to DMATC, effective 1 November 1974. Also discussed was the long range effect of the proposed DMA consolidation of all MC&G distribution functions on Oahu, tentatively scheduled for 1 April 1975. The CINCPAC MC&G Division firmly endorsed both the transfer and consolidation on the grounds of cost effectiveness and operational efficiency.[4]

(U) On 1 November, the DMATC assumed operation of the Hawaii Map Depot, culminating more than two years of staff planning and coordination. Since July 1972, the DMAHC and DMAAC had operated all in-theater aeronautical and hydrographic MC&G distribution through field offices, but topographic distribution had been a function of the theater Army component.[5]

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1. J26 HistSum Feb, Jun 74.
2. CINCPAC 022124Z Nov 74.
3. DMA 181852Z Nov 74.
4. J26 HistSum Sep 74.
5. J25 HistSum Nov 74.

PACOM Aerial Cartographic Capability

(U) In January 1974, the CINCPAC MC&G Review Group discussed a potential degradation in the aerial cartographic capability in the PACOM. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) had proposed the elimination of VQ-1 cartographic assets on economic grounds. In February, CINCPAC requested PACFLT to acquire complete aerial photographic coverage of the Hawaiian Islands so that the 652d Engineer Battalion could recompile military training area maps in support of a DMATC production assignment. This project was raised in priority to assure acquisition prior to the phase-out of VQ-1 assets.[1]

(U) In March, CINCPAC requested PACAF to investigate the feasibility of providing RF-4C service to meet the training map up-date. Approximately 3,525 flight line miles were involved. On 5 April, PACAF replied that the use of PACAF-owned RF-4Cs was not feasible because the time the aircraft would be withdrawn from tactical reconnaissance squadrons would adversely impact on current operations and OPLAN commitments. Moreover, the logistics support would involve as many as 20 maintenance personnel. A little more than two weeks later, on 18 April, CINCPACFLT advised CINCPAC that PACFLT's aerial cartographic mapping capability would cease to exist as of 1 June 1974.[2]

(U) In May, CINCPAC requested the DMA to assure the processing of aerial cartographic photo requests in the PACOM area after 1 June. The DMA responded that valid requirements would be assumed by the DMA commercial contract program, which was scheduled to begin on 1 July 1974. In August, CINCPAC forwarded to DMA for commercial processing the outstanding aerial cartographic requirements in the PACOM.[3]

Value of ROC Exchange Agreement

(C) In March 1974, the Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) on Taiwan requested statistics relating to the value of products resulting from the U.S.-Republic of China map exchange agreement. The DMA replied that maps provided the U.S. by the China Topographic Service from 1955 to 1966 were valued at $20 million. For the period 1966-1978, the cooperative project for 1:50,000 scale maps of Mainland China would result in a savings to the U.S. of an additional $10 million. Total savings for 1955-1978 would approximate $30 million.[4]

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1. J26 HistSum Jan, Feb 74; CINCPAC 130119Z Feb 74.
2. J26 HistSum Mar, Apr 74; CINCPACAF 050318Z Apr 74; CINCPACFLT 230343Z Apr 74.
3. J26 HistSum May, Aug 74; DMA 161236Z May 74; Ltr, CINCPAC Ser 2278 of 5 Aug 74.
4. J26 HistSum Mar 74.

Topographic Maps to Singapore

(U) The U.S. Defense Attache Office (USDAO) in Singapore requested approval, in April 1974, to release certain map sheets to the Armed Forces of Singapore, CINCPAC responded that large scale topographic maps required third country approval, since adjacent countries would be depicted. After further investigation, the request was denied by the Malaysian and Republic of Korean Governments.[1]

Use of Maps for Foreign Student Training

(U) In March and April 1974, the DMATC requested CINCPAC to procure host country approval for release of certain large scale topographic maps for retention by third country students in U.S. Service schools. CINCPAC notified DMATC, in August, that the Governments of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Thailand had approved release of the maps.[2]

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1. J26 HistSum May 74; USDAO Singapore 290836Z Apr 74.
2. J26 HistSum Aug 74; DMATC 271939Z Mar 74, 081644Z Apr 74, and 161912Z Apr 74; CINCPAC 130104Z Aug 74.

CHAPTER X

POLITICAL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

SECTION I--OVERVIEW

Selected Chronology 1974

(U) In retrospect, 1974 seemed like an uneventful year. Analysis of the following chronology, however, indicated otherwise:

3 Jan - President Nixon signed a $5.8 billion appropriations bill for FY 74 foreign aid.

18 Jan - Accord reached on separation of Israeli-Egyptian Forces along the Suez Canal.

20 Jan - Saigon reported South Vietnam military forces on Paracel Islands engaged with People's Republic of China (PRC) armed forces.

21 Jan - South Vietnam forces overcome by PRC, which took sole possession of Paracels.

26 Jan - First long-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) tests of multiple warhead missiles by Russia completed.

5 Feb - South Vietnam replied to PRC statement that China would not tolerate Vietnamese presence on the Spratley Islands by reaffirming its claim.

5 Feb - The Republic of the Philippines (ROP) reasserted claim to Spratleys, countering the Saigon statement.

15 Feb - The Republic of (South) Korea (ROK) announced the sinking of one ROK fishing boat and the seizure of another by North Korean gunboats.

4 Mar - Prime Minister Edward Heath of Great Britain resigned.

5 Mar - Prime Minister Harold Wilson formed new English cabinet.

18 Mar - The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced the lifting of the oil embargo.

29 Mar - The United States and Royal Thai Government (RTG) announced the planned reduction of U.S. military personnel in Thailand from 35,000 to 25,000.

2 Apr - President Georges Pompidou of France died.

4 Apr - The U.S. House of Representatives defeated a $474 million supplemental appropriation for Vietnam military assistance.

5 Apr - The Royal Laotian Government announced the formation of a Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU), with neutralist Souvanna Phouma as premier.

6 May - Chancellor Willy Brandt of the Federal Republic of (West) Germany resigned.

16 May - Helmut Schmidt elected to succeed Brandt as Chancellor of West Germany.

18 May - The Government of India announced its first underground nuclear explosion, thus becoming the sixth nation to explode a nuclear device.

21 May - Premier Sanya Dharmasakti of Thailand resigned after eight months in office. The country was placed on military alert.

24 May - Sanya of Thailand agreed to form a new cabinet.

27 May - Valery Giscard d'Estaing was inaugurated President of France, succeeding Georges Pompidou.

31 May - Accord reached on separation of Israeli-Syrian forces on the Golan Heights.

1 Jun - Premier Sanya of Thailand swore in a new all-civilian cabinet.

17 Jun - The PRC exploded a nuclear device. The same day, France began a series of eight announced explosions in the South Pacific.

27 Jun - President Nixon and Secretary General Leonid Breshnev of Russia began summit talks in Moscow.

1 Jul - President Juan Peron of Argentina died. His wife, the Vice President, assumed the presidency.

2 Jul - Brezhnev announced in Moscow that he and Nixon agreed on an underground nuclear test limitation and a lowered defensive missile ceiling, but could not agree on controls over offensive missile systems.

3 Jul - Concluding six days of conferences in Moscow and at Yalta, Nixon and Brezhnev "pledged" that their nations would negotiate an interim arms control agreement to remain in force until 1985.

4 Jul - U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated that the United States and Russia could not agree on how to balance missile totals and warhead totals. That was the chief obstacle to agreement on permanent curbs on nuclear offensive arms.

15 Jul - President Makarios of Cyprus was deposed in a military coup.

20 Jul - Turkey invaded Cyprus.

8 Aug - President Nixon announced his resignation effective at noon on 9 August.

9 Aug - Gerald R. Ford was sworn in as President.

14 Aug - Greece withdrew troops from NATO. President Ford warned Greece and Turkey that armed conflict between the two countries would stop U.S. military aid to both.

15 Aug - An attempted assassination of President Park Chung Hee of South Korea misfired when the assassin killed Park's wife.

19 Aug - U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus Rodger P. Davies was killed by Cypriot rioters.

28 Aug - South Vietnam Government officials announced the discovery of traces of oil in a trial well almost 200 miles south of the Vietnam coast in the South China Sea.

29 Aug - The United Nations Law of the Sea Conference ended. Representatives from 150 nations discussed at least 100 issues without reaching formal agreement.

31 Aug - Prime Minister Norman E. Kirk of New Zealand died.

4 Sep - Formal diplomatic relations were established between the United States and the Democratic Republic of (East) Germany.

6 Sep - Wallace E. Rowling succeeded Kirk as Prime Minister of New Zealand.

11 Sep - Greece formally withdrew from the NATO Defense Planning Committee.

24 Sep - An informal trade agreement was reached between the Philippines and the PRC. China agreed to buy raw materials and to sell oil to the ROP. Diplomatic relations were not established.

14 Oct - Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura of Japan was asked in the Japanese Parliament whether U.S. warships had been allowed to bring nuclear arms into Japanese territory. The controversy arose after testimony by retired U.S. Rear Admiral Gene R. LaRocque before a U.S. congressional subcommittee of the Joint Congressional Committe on Atomic Energy. La Rocque had stated, on 10 September, that American warships did not unload their nuclear weapons before entering Japanese ports.

16 Oct - Congress passed a bill to stop military aid to Turkey.

17 Oct - President Ford vetoed the 16 October bill. Both Houses passed a new bill establishing 10 December as the cut-off date for aid to Turkey.

18 Oct - President Ford signed the 17 October measure.

24 Oct - The United States announced the first successful firing of a Minuteman I ICBM when dropped from an airplane.

1 Nov - After several months if demonstrations, riots, charges of corruption and oppression by elements of the press, Buddhists, Catholics and assorted politicians, retired General Duong Van Minh denounced the "violence-thirsty government" of President Nguyen Van Thieu in South Vietnam. Buddhist leader Thich Tri Thu joined in the call for Thieu's ouster. (The same country-wide agitation preceded the murders of South Vietnam President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother on 1 November 1963.)

3 Nov - The Philippines offered amnesty to "ideological subversives" in an apparent attempt to reconcile all opposition groups - - the church, the Muslim rebels and the Communists.

19 Nov - President Ford arrived in Japan, to be greeted by Emperor Hirohito.

22 Nov - President Ford arrived in South Korea.

23 Nov - President Ford and Secretary General Brezhnev began talks in Vladivostok.

25 Nov - In a joint communique, Ford and Brezhnev announced a tentative agreement to limit the number of U.S. and Russian offensive weapons. Details were to be negotiated in 1975.

26 Nov - Premier Kakuei Tanaka of Japan submitted resignation.

28 Nov - The United Nations General Assembly voted to allow the Cambodian Government of President Lon Nol to retain its seat in the U.N.

2 Dec - Israel confirmed its ability to produce nuclear weapons.

- At a televised news conference, President Ford disclosed tentative details of the arms control agreement reached with Brezhnev eight days before in Vladivostok. Both parties agreed to a ceiling of 2,400 long-range missiles and bombers.

3 Dec - In order to reduce the national deficit, the United Kingdom proposed a reduction in military forces on Cyprus, closure of a naval base in South Africa, and the withdrawal of troops from Hong Kong and Singapore.

9 Dec - The Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution to continue the U.N. Command in South Korea. The vote was 61-42, with 32 abstentions.

18 Dec - Takeo Miki was elected Premier of Japan.

- The fiscal year 1975 foreign aid authorization bill for $2.69 billion was sent to the White House. With certain restrictions, the measure authorized the resumption of aid to Turkey through 5 February 1975.

30 Dec - President Ford signed foreign aid authorization bill.

1 Jan 75 - Communist-led Cambodian forces began an assault on Phnom Penh.

2 Jan 75 - In an interview, Secretary of State Kissinger stated that he would not rule out the use of force against oil-producing nations, "where there is some actual strangulation of the industrialized world."

Recapitulation

(U) During 1974, many events occurred with the potential for significant long-range impact on the political and military relationships of the United States and the Pacific Command. Perhaps the most historic development was the coup staged by a handful of countries blessed with an abundance of oil. The end of the oil embargo on 18 March 1974 did not signal the end of financial and economic crisis for the industrialized nations. Because the price of oil from the petroleum exporting countries had quadrupled in less than one year,

the importing nations, including the United States, were faced with a policy dilemma of major proportions. Economic, political or military measures involving grave risks and inherent costs of their own appeared to be necessary to cope with the militant position of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).[1]

(U) Another phenomenon of 1974 was the number of changes in national leadership of the major powers. Only in Russia and China were the leaders apparently the same. Britain, France, West Germany, Japan and the United States lost leaders who had instigated important innovations in the foreign policies of their countries. Further, the abilities, or even the intentions of the new leaders to continue the policies of their predecessors would inevitably influence existing and future economic, political and military relationships.

(U) Among the smaller nations, two changes in leadership were of interest in the Pacific Command--one directly, the other indirectly. The untimely death of Prime Minister Kirk opened the way for major foreign policy changes by New Zealand. Political and military ramifications for CINCPAC were implicit in the New Zealand attitude toward the Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Mutual Security Treaty, its support of the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), and its position on free passage for nuclear vessels. If, for example, New Zealand were to withdraw from the FPDA, the balance of power vacuum created by the British withdrawal from East of Suez would be further exacerbated.

(U) Indirectly, the overthrow of President Makarios and the subsequent invasion of Cyprus by Turkey also concerned CINCPAC. The confrontation between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, and the killing of the U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus, provoked a political storm in the United States, but, more importantly, weakened the right flank of the NATO defenses. On 14 August, Greece withdrew its troop support to the NATO Defense Planning Committee. In October, Congress stopped the supply of U.S. military equipment to Turkey, and, at the end of the year, sizable Turkish military forces remained in Cyprus. Thus, any need to reinforce the NATO defenses would affect U.S. military forces in other theaters, including the Pacific.

(U) It was during this eruption of violence in the Mediterranean that the transition of American leadership took place. Makarios was deposed on 15 July, and Turkey invaded Cyprus on 20 July. Ten days after President Ford's inauguration on 9 August, the U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus was killed. In the Mid-East,

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1. This section based primarily on 1974 Dept of State Bulletins and the periodical Current History. Supplemental sources are cited when applicable.

the Arab-Israeli dispute had remained sensitive throughout the year, and violations of the cease-fire in Indochina had intensified. The People's Republic of China (PRC) had taken outright possession of the Paracel Islands by force, and, in Northeast Asia, North Korea had resumed its probes of South Korea defenses. Further, the circumstances leading to the change in U.S. leadership, and the evolving relationships between the Legislative and Executive Branches, raised questions among Asian leaders of U.S. intentions and resolve.

(S) During and after the presidential transition, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff invoked special security precautions to guard against opportunistic adventurism by nations hostile to the United States. On 8 August, the day that President Nixon announced his resignation, all unified and specified commands were directed to increase vigilance short of raising defense alert conditions (DEFCONs). The Chairman was advised that, in the Pacific Command, local security would be tightened and a heightened Intelligence Watch would be instituted. On 16 August, the Chairman acknowledged the precautionary measures taken by U.S. military forces:[1]

* * * * *

> In my judgment, the critical period of the transition has run its course and the world recognizes that the change was both smooth and now complete. Accordingly, I have no objection to returning to routine vigilance at this time, except, of course, for those activities associated with the current Cyprus situation.

Later in the year, on 18 December, Secretary of State Kissinger stated that his greatest satisfaction in the conduct of foreign policy in 1974 was that the United States managed the presidential transition without a disaster.

(U) As previously stated, violations of the cease-fire in Southeast Asia by North Vietnam increased in scope and intensity during 1974. By the end of the year, there were almost 300,000 North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam, supported by heavy artillery, tanks and surface-to-air missiles. In Cambodia, government forces had held their own until the supply routes were cut by the Khmer Rouge. In spite of massive airlift re-supply operations, government troops were hard pressed as the year ended.[2]

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1. CINCPAC ALPHA 072/090420Z Aug 74; JCS 6897/161716Z Aug 74, which cited JCS 082030Z Aug 74.
2. For discussion of Cambodian resupply operations, see Vol. I, Chapter V, Logistics.

Definitions of Detente

(S) A year-end review of selected Pacific area highlights for 1974 was published on 1 January 1975 by the Intelligence Center Pacific (IPAC). As seen by IPAC, 1974 was a successful year for Brezhnev's policy of detente with the United States, highlighted by the strategic arms limitation agreement with President Ford at Vladivostok. In South Asia, the Russians had strengthened their relations with India, Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen. The highly visible naval presence of the Soviets in the area was considered to be a political asset. Russia was expected to continue to stress detente with the West, coupled with various forms of economic competition.[1]

(U) Judging by the statements of U.S. officials during the year, the policy of detente called Brezhnev's by IPAC continued also to be the policy of the Nixon and Ford administrations. For example, on 15 May the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs defined detente before a House subcommittee as, "a relaxation of tensions" which did not imply "entente" or an understanding or alliance. He recited the substantial achievements of recent years toward improved relations with Russia, not the least of which was the "two-way" flow of ideas, information and people concerning the peaceful uses of atomic energy, protection of the environment, and science and technology. He acknowledged that there was no uniform preception of detente, either in the United States or other countries, but rejected any relationship of detente to appeasement:[2]

* * * * *

> ...We are not dealing with the Soviet Union from a position of weakness. On the contrary, the preservation of our military strength is a prerequisite for detente, and military strength inferior to none is the only national defense posture which can ever be acceptable to the United States....

(U) The phrase "inferior to none" in the above quotation was a quantum modification of the post World War II perception of the United States as the strongest nation in the world. That its use was not inadvertent appeared to be borne out by Secretary of State Kissinger's statement on 28 October to the Indian Council on World Affairs in New Delhi. Kissinger reviewed the benefits

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1. COMIPAC Special Report No. 6, 012211Z Jan 75.
2. Dept. of State Bulletin, 3 Jun 74, "U.S.-Soviet Detente: Perceptions and Purposes", Statement to Subcommittee on Europe of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 15 May 1974 by Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs.

to be derived from detente with Russia and China, and enumerated three principal policy objectives of the United States. These were: to foster a new spirit of responsibility and restraint among all powers; to limit and ultimately to reduce nuclear weapons competition; and, to build global cooperation to meet unprecedented global problems. He called the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) among the most crucial negotiations ever conducted, stating that the agreements already signed by the United States and the Soviet Union represented major steps twoard strategic stability. Citing the global food and energy crises, Kissinger stated that the traditional agenda of international affairs--the balance among major powers and the security of nations--no longer defined the perils or possibilities of the world. Perhaps the most significant statements in the Kissinger address were these:[1]

* * * * *

> ...Condominium, hegemony, spheres of influence, are historically obsolete and morally and politically untenable ....In a real sense the world is no longer divided between East and West, North and South, developed and developing, consumer and producer. We will solve our problems together, or we will not solve them at all.

(U) Earlier in the year, Secretary Kissinger had discussed the complexity of the SALT II issue, which dealt with qualitative rather than quantitative restrictions. Since the Soviet Union had emphasized large land-based weapons, while the United States had emphasized smaller and "presumably" more flexible land-based weapons, the definition of equivalence, Kissinger stated, was objectively difficult. This question of equivalence surfaced what appeared to be a lack of consensus in the Administration. In June, Senator William Fulbright voiced his disagreement with the position of the Secretary of Defense on detente, stating that the Secretary, "evidently feels free to undercut the Administration's detente policy by pressing for a wholly unnecessary equivalence with the Soviet Union in 'throw weight' and numbers of missile launchers, despite an American advantage of more than 3 to 1 in warheads."[2]

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1. Dept. of State Bulletin, 25 Nov 74, "Toward a Global Community: The Common Cause of India and America," Address before Indian Council on World Affairs at New Delhi on 28 Oct 74 (text from press release) by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.
2. Dept. of State Bulletin, 29 Apr 74, News Conference held by Secretary Kissinger after White House meeting among Nixon, Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei' Gromyko; Digest, "Items of Interest," Rpt. #94 of 27 Jun 74 by U.S. Navy Office of Legislative Affairs.

(U) Also in June, a Georgia Representative (Blackburn) took a different tack. His discussion of detente was related to the "two-way flow of ideas" previously mentioned. He stated that a margin of military advantage could be maintained by U.S. possession of a number of sophisticated technologies, the retention of which was critical to national security. He asserted that American technology and computers had been used to perfect Russian ICBMs and to speed the development of MIRVs by the Soviets. He also cited a National Security Council study which indicated a greater out-flow of military-related technology to Russia than had been generally known, and blamed, "Government's detente euphoria" for serious export loopholes.[1]

(U) An unusual juxtaposition of views concerning detente was revealed by Senator James Buckley and George Meany of the American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). In a speech to the Overseas Press Club on 31 October, Buckley expressed concern over the shape and nature of the SALT II negotiations, considering that Soviet compliance with SALT I was doubtful. On the basis of information acquired from, "knowledgeable individuals in and out of government," he charged that the Soviet Union had engaged in, "patterns of activity" which either deliberately breached SALT I or, at best, stretched every ambiguity and advantage available in the accords. These activities, Buckley stated, raised serious questions as to Soviet intentions in the continuing negotiations to limit strategic weapons. A growing awareness, he said, of the extent of the advantages conferred upon Russia by SALT I and the degree of Soviet exploitation of those advantages, made it imperative that SALT II provide for true parity in strategic forces.[2]

(U) In his statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 1 October, Meany questioned the definition of detente:[3]

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> And so I began to hunt around for a good definition of detente. And I discovered something interesting. I discovered that this detente has suddenly become very ambiguous. Suddenly this great idea--this "conceptual breakthrough," to use one of Secretary Kissinger's favorite phrases--is like gossamer. You can't grab hold of it.

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1. Ibid.
2. Washington Report, Nov 74, "U.S.-Soviet Arms Agreement," Speech to Overseas Press Club by Senator James L. Buckley on 31 Oct 74.
3. Ibid.; "Political Aspects of Soviet-American Detente," Statement to Senate Foreign Relations Committee by George Meany, President AFL-CIO on 1 Oct 74.

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> ...What has happened is that, as public disillusionment with detente mounts, its proponents are retreating into a rhetoric of dampened expectations, of fuzzy ambiguity. You might call it a revolution of falling expectations.

(U) Meany declared that, if detente, in essence, was the avoidance of nuclear war, then detente was the same as cold war. And if that were true, "...the American people thought they were buying something more. To them, detente meant not just something negative but something positive--not just restraint but cooperation..." This expectation was based, according to Meany, on the twelve, "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," and a joint Nixon-Brezhnev communique of May 1972 which declared:

* * * * *

> The U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. have a special responsibility....to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would increase international tensions.

He then turned to the Russian perception of detente by quoting Lenin in 1921:

* * * * *

> As a result of my own personal observations during the years of my emigration, I must say that the so-called cultural strata of Western Europe and America was not capable of understanding the contemporary state of affairs nor the actual alignment of forces; we must regard these strata as deaf mutes and act with respect to them accordingly....The capitalists of the entire world, and their governments, in the rush of conquering Soviet markets, will close their eyes to the realities, and will thus become blind deaf mutes. They will open credits which will serve as a support for the Communist Party in their countries and will provide us with essential materials and technology thus restoring our military industries, essential for our future victorious attacks on our suppliers. Speaking otherwise, they will be working to prepare their own suicides.

Based on that quotation, Meany listed the meanings of detente to the Soviet Union:

- Detente is based on U.S. weakness.
- Detente means intensification of ideological warfare.
- Detente means an undermining of NATO.
- Detente means ultimate Soviet military superiority over the West.
- Detente means recognition by the West of the Soviet Union's ownership of Eastern Europe.
- Detente means withdrawal of American forces from Europe.

Lastly, Meany addressed the fundamental interest of his organization--the granting of Most Favored Nation status to the Soviet Union. He cited a "one-way" trend in economic relations between Russia and the United States in which most economic benefits flowed to Russia. Statistics for U.S.-Soviet trade in the first half of 1974, according to Meany, showed U.S. exports down over 54 percent from the first half of 1973, while imports from the Soviet Union had risen by 125 percent. Calling Export-Import Bank loans to Russia at six and seven percent a welfare program, he stated that the American people would not tolerate this "phony detente" much longer:[1]

* * * * *

> ....We are not building lasting structures of peace. We are building castles of sand on the watery foundations of petty greed, wishful thinking, irresponsibility, self-indulgence, and plain old ignorance.
>
> The inability to face the world as it is, and to understand clearly the nature of freedom's enemies everywhere, is really the greatest threat to peace today. That threat is nowhere more clearly posed than in the delusion we call detente.

(U) The statements of Buckley and Meany--a conservative politician and a spokesman for American labor--were noteworthy only because of their common

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1. Ibid.

warnings against Russia, in contrast to their historically contrary views on the domestic issues. The bearing on CINCPAC's political-military relationships of the efficacy of detente was tenuous, but tangible. Russia's real intentions vis-a-vis detente and/or arms limitations were obviously open to speculation however, the growth of Soviet military presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans was a matter of record and a continuing CINCPAC concern during 1974.[1]

(U) Truly blue water operations by Soviet naval forces in the Pacific and Indian Oceans were a recent development. While still not massive by 1974, they were growing. Unlike other Soviet fleets, the Pacific and Northern fleets had access to open water, possessed submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and were commanded by five-star admirals. The Pacific fleet differed also because it possessed the greatest percentage of maritime aviation and the most manpower. However, the submarine was Russia's pre-eminent naval weapon, and its general purpose forces were tailored for interdiction of sea lines of communications (LOC) rather than the maintenance of their own LOC. Pacific merchant fleet operations were increasing, but had not yet reached the levels of those in the Black or Baltic Seas. The Soviet fishing industry, much of which was in the Pacific, was greater than all other countries except Japan and Peru. The various components of the Russian maritime effort, all of which would be subordinate to the Navy in wartime, complemented each other, but were limited by the lack of port and shipyard systems.[2]

(C) On the eastern perimeter of the Indian Ocean, Russia maintained a varied presence in and near Chittagong, Bangladesh's only important port on the Bay of Bengal. In March 1972, the Bengali and Russians had agreed that the Soviet Navy would begin salvage operations to clear Chittagong Harbor of vessels sunk during the 1971 war with Pakistan. As many as a dozen mine-sweepers plus auxiliary vessels were deployed. Clearing operations were to be completed by the end of 1973, but the agreement was extended into 1974. In addition to the naval presence, the Soviets maintained an Air Force assembly and advisory mission at Patanga Air Force Base near Chittagong to service MIG-21 aircraft newly acquired by Bangladesh. In the economic sphere, Russia had begun to train Bengali fishermen; the joint operation of Soviet-supplied fishing trawlers was scheduled for expansion to include a fisheries training center in Chittagong.[3]

(U) Back in the Pacific, the Soviet Union began the test firing of their new large MIRV-equipped missiles. On 20 February and again on 25 February,

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1. CINCPAC Command Histories, 1971, 1972, 1973.
2. J533 Point Paper, 20 Sep 74, Subj: Evolving Soviet Maritime Activities and Strategy in the Pacific Basin, Jul 74.
3. J221 Point Paper, 22 Mar 74, Subj: Soviet Presence in Chittagong.

U.S. observers reported the re-entry of several warheads, indicating the likelihood that these had been independently targeted. On 1 March, Russia closed out the series of tests, during which nine rockets of four different types had been test-fired. In October 1974, just prior to the crucial SALT talks, the Soviet Union completed ten days of super-rocket tests in the mid-Pacific. Among the tests was the first full-scale firing of the SLBM with a range of 4,600 miles--some 2,000 miles more distance than the Polaris and Poseidon missiles of the United States. Later that month, another scheduled ten day test was completed in three days. Among the missiles tested was the multi-warhead type fired earlier in the year.[1]

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1. J74 HistSum, Feb and Oct 74.

SECTION II

PACOM PACT ACTIVITY

SEATO

(U) The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed to administer the Southeast Asia Collective Security Treaty (Manila Pact) in 1954. The eight original SEATO member nations were Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and the United States. By the end of 1973, Pakistan had withdrawn and France was inactive.[1]

(S) In April 1973, the U.S. Military Adviser (MILAD) to SEATO (Admiral Gayler) submitted a proposal to the JCS for a reorganization of the Military Planning Office (MPO). Essentially, his proposal abolished the MPO as a force planning organization, integrated military personnel into the Office of Counter-subversion/Insurgency, and shelved existing overt aggression plans. The JCS approved CINCPAC's proposal, and on 9 June 1973, Admiral Gayler submitted the proposal, as USMILAD, for the Secretary General's review.[2]

(S) The 18th SEATO Council Meeting was held at the United Nations in New York on 28 September 1973. Admiral Gayler did not attend, but his recommendations for reorganization were adopted. Three days before, on 25 September, Senators Church, Aiken and Byrd introduced a resolution in the U.S. Senate that U.S. participation in both the Manila Pact and SEATO be reviewed by the Foreign Relations Committee no later than 31 March 1974.[3]

(U) On 6 March 1974, the Deputy Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Robert S. Ingersoll, testified before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the need for the Manila Pact and SEATO. Administration policy was that the Pact and SEATO had not outlived their usefulness. They provided evidence of the continuing interest of the United States in East Asian affairs. The fear that the Manila Pact could involve the United States in another Southeast Asian war was exaggerated, since its wording specified that action to meet overt aggression be taken only according to the constitutional processes of each member. He acknowledged the consensus reached on reorganization during the September 1973 Council meeting, and indicated that the

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, p. 653.
2. Ibid., p. 654.
3. Ibid., pp. 656-660.

United States would continue to support the Pact and SEATO, "...for the time being...."[1]

SEATO Reorganization

(C) On 31 January 1974, the MPO ceased to exist as a separate entity, and the remaining officers assumed duties in the new Office of Security Affairs (OSA). The OSA had three divisions--Intelligence and Insurgency Analysis, Advisory and Training, and Exercise Planning and Support. The normal United States personnel commitment to the OSA was one planner and one insurgency analyst billet rotated among the United States, United Kingdom and Australia. If the Deputy Secretary General or the Director of OSA were designated military billets, one of those could be filled by a U.S. military officer.[2]

(C) Overall manning of SEATO headquarters was reduced by about 50 percent; other actions directed by the Council of Ministers included:[3]

- SEATO Plans (some 33 of them) shelved and updated only at the request of the MILADs.
- A seminar on counterinsurgency held annually and a larger exercise (usually maritime) held every other year.
- MILAD Conferences held annually (instead of semi-annually) in Bangkok.

(C) On 3 June, the JCS approved the transfer of the U.S. MILAD Representative functions from the encumbered separate billet to the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI), and on 6 June, CINCPAC requested COMUSMACTHAI to assume the MILADREP duties upon the departure of the incumbent, Colonel De Rienzo. COMUSMACTHAI was authorized to further delegate the duties. In August, COMUSMACTHAI advised that the MILADREP duties had been delegated to Colonel K.B. Ebner, U.S. Army, under MACTHAI command but attached to the Political-Military Section of the U.S. Embassy, Bangkok. Colonel Ebner assumed these duties on 1 September 1974, and the billet was dropped from the CINCPAC Joint Manpower Program (JMP) and Joint Table of Distribution (JTD).[4]

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1. Dept. of State Bulletin, 1 Apr 74, pp. 345-348, "Department Discusses Continued Need for Manila Pact and SEATO," statement by Robert S. Ingersoll, Assistant Secretary of State for EA/PA to Senate FRC on 6 Mar 74, hereafter cited as Ingersoll Statement.
2. J57 HistSum Feb 74.
3. J57 HistSum May 74.
4. J51 HistSum Nov 74; CINCPAC 062220Z Jun 74; USMACTHAI 141001Z Aug 74.

SEATO Budget

(C) The Council of Ministers Representatives (Ambassadorial level), at a 25 June 1974 meeting in Bangkok, approved the budget contribution formula proposed by the United States. The new formula entailed equal percentage increases for each member for fiscal year 1975 in lieu of the Secretary General's proposal for a pro-rata based formula, which would have raised the United States to 31.8 percent. The new contribution percentages were agreed to as follows:[1]

Australia	17.08
New Zealand	11.58
Philippines	11.58
Thailand	11.58
United Kingdom	19.58
United States	28.60

(C) The Council Representatives also approved a fiscal year 1975 SEATO budget of approximately $1.313 million, of which the U.S. assessment would amount to $367,761, or about $50,000 less than fiscal year 1974.[2]

Need for MILAD Conference

(C) As previously noted, Admiral Gayler had not attended the 18th SEATO Council meeting in September 1973. By agreement among the MILADs of member nations, there had been no MILAD conference in 1973. In May, the United Kingdom MILAD was informed by the Australian MILAD that, by agreement among the Australian, New Zealand and United States MILADs, no action would be taken toward a MILAD conference for 1974. The U.K. MILAD noted that the SEATO Council had recommended a yearly MILAD meeting, separate from the Council meetings. Since the last MILAD meeting had been in October 1972, he assumed that the Thai and Filipino MILAD and the Secretary General would be expecting one for 1974. The Australian MILAD suggested to Admiral Gayler that he (and

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 10434/260705Z Jun 74; the previous percentages were U.S. - 25; U.K. - 16; Australia and France - 13.5; New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand - 8. The new percentages were necessary because Pakistan and France no longer contributed.
2. Ibid.

the others) inform their respective MILAD Representatives of their feeling that no substantive business existed to justify a 1974 MILAD Conference. CINCPAC acted on the suggestion, and recommended that no meeting be held in 1974.[1]

(C) On 1 November, the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok reported that General Kriangsak Chomanan, Chief of Staff, Supreme Command Forward had replaced Air Chief Marshal Thawi Chunlasap as Thai MILAD to SEATO. Kriangsak conveyed some surprise over the minimal role of the MILADs since the disestablishment of the MPO. He indicated interest in having the MILADs become more active, with special attention to supporting the Thai counterinsurgency effort. In December, CINCPAC informed the Embassy that he could see nothing substantive on the horizon worth the expense in both time and money to bring the MILADs together. He stated that past MILAD meetings had been essentially pro-forma rubber stamps of subcommittee work. Accordingly, unless something substantive surfaced, Admiral Gayler felt that no MILAD conference should be held in 1975, and that the need for one in 1976 be carefully assessed in December 1975.[2]

19th Council Meeting

(C) Preparations for the 19th SEATO Council of Ministers Meeting were characterized by the reluctance of some members (Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom) to commit a ministerial-level chief delegate to the meeting. The U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines reported Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos Romulo's opinion that SEATO policy was "generally adrift" and that the next meeting "might be a shambles." The U.S. State Department advised the Ambassador that the United States did not concur in Romulo's opinion, noting that SEATO had been effectively reorganized to reflect changing conditions in Asia.[3]

(C) The meeting was held in New York on 3 October 1974, and all SEATO members were represented by foreign ministers except New Zealand and the United Kingdom. The former cited the death of Prime Minister Kirk as the reason, while the latter cited forthcoming elections. This was, nonetheless, an improvement over 1973, when only two of the six active members were represented by foreign ministers. No MILADs attended the meeting.[4]

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1. J57 HistSum May 74; Defense Canberra 010620Z May 74; CINCPAC 070259Z May 74.
2. J51 HistSum Dec 74; AMEMB Bangkok 17309/011000Z Nov 74; CINCPAC 121909Z Dec 74.
3. AMEMB Bangkok 9434/101231Z Jun 74; AMEMB Wellington 1889/190201Z Jun 74; SECSTATE 134688/221815Z Jun 74; AMEMB Bangkok 10429/260551Z Jun 74; SECSTATE 152878/152313Z Jul 74; AMEMB Canberra 4667/220003Z Jul 74; AMEMB Bangkok 12404/311154Z Jul 74; AMEMB Manila 9915/200413Z Aug 74; SECSTATE 185974/232159Z Aug 74; SECSTATE 188872/281638Z Aug 74; AMEMB Bangkok 13975/290946Z Aug 74.
3. J51 HistSum Nov 74; USMISSION USUN New York 3673/032233Z Oct 74.

(C) Secretary of State Kissinger delivered the opening remarks, in which he discussed detente and the complex world of 1974 compared with that of 20 years before when SEATO was founded. During a luncheon meeting, Kissinger commented that, since both the United States and Russia had ample nuclear weapons to destroy one another, numerical superiority meant little. Secondly, he stated that the United States no longer takes issue with the style of government a country may have if the people are satisfied.[1]

(C) The meeting was generally non-substantive; the focus was on endorsement of the "new" SEATO fashioned during 1973 and discussions of world events. Trade and commodity prices, especially oil, constantly recurred in discussions. The consensus was that, as the consuming states plunged into debt, world instability would be the norm.[2]

SEATO Exercise PX-50

(C) SEATO Exercise PX-50 was held 12-25 June 1974 in Thailand. The exercise was originally programmed as a command post exercise. Subsequent to the revision of SEATO's role and the shelving of MPO Plans, PX-50 was changed to a countersubversion and insurgency symposium. Delegations from each member nation included civilian police as well as military officers skilled in counter-insurgency. The Department of State Director of Public Safety lectured on the "Problem of the Urban Guerrilla." The U.S. delegation was headed by a member of the U.S. Mission in Bangkok. The exercise was sponsored by the United States and Thailand, and was the first of the "new look" exercises since the integration of the civil and military sides of SEATO. Its purpose was to acquaint SEATO delegates with problems facing civil and military authorities in combating insurgency in northern and northeastern Thailand.[3]

ANZUS

(S) The ANZUS Security Treaty had been signed by Australia, New Zealand and the United States on 1 September 1951. Since that time, Australia and New Zealand had pressed for more frequent meetings, and had not sought to de-emphasize this organization as they had SEATO. In a normal year, five ANZUS meetings were held--the Council meeting, Official Talks, MILREP meeting, and two Staff level visits.[4]

(C) The 23rd ANZUS Council Meeting had been scheduled in 1973, but was not held because of the timing confusion of the SEATO Council Meeting, with which

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1. Ibid.
2. Ibid.
3. J51 HistSum Nov 74.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 660-663; J57 HistSum Apr 74.

the ANZUS meetings had formerly coincided. Thus, the meeting held on 26, 27 February 1974 was the 23rd in the series. Admiral Gayler, the accredited U.S. Military Representative (MILREP) to ANZUS accompanied Deputy Secretary of State Rush to the meeting in Wellington, New Zealand. A meeting of the ANZUS MILREPs followed on 28 February.[1]

(C) The Council Meeting was marked by constructive, candid, wide-ranging discussions and efforts to keep differences of views within the council and to avoid the most contentious issues. Prime Minister Kirk, the New Zealand Representative, did not raise the issue of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, which was opposed by the United States. U.S. perceptions of defense-related issues (Diego Garcia, nuclear policy, Vietnam) were likewise not challenged. Permanence and importance of ANZUS to Australia and New Zealand was a constant refrain, with Kirk stressing that the Treaty must become more than a Security Pact. Parliamentary exchanges among members were proposed; New Zealand and Australia (Foreign Minister Willesee) pressed for ANZUS support of regional cooperation, but, at the same time, strongly reaffirmed continued military exercises and consultations among ANZUS partners. Admiral Gayler gave a short presentation on the changing security situation in Asia/Pacific. He focused on Soviet force improvement, both strategic and tactical, the current situation in the region, and stressed the need for American forward presence.[2]

(S) The MILREPs (Lieutenant General Webb, New Zealand, Admiral Smith, Australia, and Admiral Gayler), at their meeting, discussed the energy crisis, Indian Ocean, Indochina, Five Power Defense Arrangement and issues which arose at the Council Meeting. Admiral Smith and General Webb emphasized the value of MILREP Meetings and suggested they be continued at 12 month intervals - in conjunction with the Council Meetings if possible. Likewise, the MILREPs agreed to continue with the lower level staff visits.[3]

Staff Level Meetings

(S) The third ANZUS Staff Level Meeting was held in Sidney, Australia on 25-27 June 1974. The U.S. delegation was headed by Brigadier General J.E. Stannard, CINCPAC Deputy Director for Plans. Australia led the discussion of joint ANZUS Exercise KANGAROO I, which was considered beneficial to all forces involved. Australia reported that a number of planning and command/control problems surfaced because of its lack of joint planning experience. Regarding future ANZUS exercises, New Zealand pressed for a specific long range exercise schedule, and preferred that exercises be confined to the

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1. J57 HistSum Mar 74.
2. Ibid.; SECSTATE 041029/1/010951Z Mar 74.
3. Ibid.; CINCPAC 072151Z Mar 74 (EX).

Pacific Basin, avoiding the South China Sea and Indian Ocean.[1]

(S) The fourth Staff Level Meeting was held in Auckland, New Zealand on 3-5 December 1974. General Stannard again was the chief U.S. delegate. Policy guidelines for future exercises were discussed, and the New Zealand delegation briefed the meeting on Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA). The headquarters of ANZUK (Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom) was to be disestablished on 1 January 1975, and the forces dedicated to ANZUK (and support of the FPDA), would revert to national control. New Zealand planned to retain forces in Singapore despite the Australian/United Kingdom withdrawal. The U.S. delegation discussed the fuel oil shortage, the need to develop alternate sources of energy, and the imperative of open lines of communication in the Pacific/Indian Ocean areas.[2]

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1. CINCPAC 100231Z Jul 74.
2. J51 HistSum Dec 74; CINCPAC 120411Z Dec 74.

SECTION III--PACOM POLITICAL AND LEGAL POLICY

Unified Command Posture

(C) Pacific Command political-military relationships in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas were based on the concept that the Pacific Basin is one strategic entity. The integrated command and control exercised by CINCPAC provided one U.S. military voice in relationships with the military leaders of the entire area and a common link for U.S. collective and bi-lateral defense agreements. The unified command provided one responsive headquarters for direction by National Command Authorities and the flexibility to shift forces and coordinate land, sea and air operations throughout the Pacific Basin.[1]

(S) In October 1974, CINCPAC forwarded to the Chairman of the JCS his annual posture statement--a detailed analysis of the need for forward deployments of U.S. military forces in the Pacific Basin. While the statement by Admiral Gayler discussed viable alternatives and the associated risks involved in the withdrawal of forward deployments, he stressed his previously stated conviction that such a withdrawal was not in the best interests of the United States. Since the Pacific area held the key to a significant part of the future of the world, it was in the interests of the United States to have a major role in the development of the area. The nations of the Pacific needed freedom and security in order to be able to develop economically and politically, and the most important requisite for such development was regional stability. The Admiral acknowledged that nationalism and inter-regional differences impeded the progress of regional cooperation. He was certain, however, that without the stabilizing influence of U.S. military presence and security assistance, peaceful growth and evolutionary change would not be easy.[2]

(TS) In mid-1974, the CINCPAC Directorate of Plans coordinated a study to define the meaning and implications of the term "PACOM Lines of Communications." The conclusions of the study were summarized as follows:[3]

- PACOM geography is a major determinant of PACOM strategic concepts and resultant deployment and employment of assigned forces.

- Vastness of PACOM area makes continuous availability of LOC and timely flow of commerce/forces/support along them vital to CINCPAC strategy. CINCPAC strategy requires continuing emphasis on the security of LOC.

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1. J561 Point Paper, 4 Sep 74, Subj: U.S. Military Organization Pacific Basin.
2. J533 HistSum Oct 74; CINCPAC 142210Z Oct 74 (EX).
3. J533 HistSum Dec 74; J533 Point Paper, 4 Sep 74, Subj: PACOM LOC Study.

• Choke points are critical strategic locations; restrictions on LOC choke points can adversely affect implementation of CINCPAC strategy. National efforts necessary to assure they remain in friendly hands.

• Political threat to LOC can develop rapidly as in Middle East crises.

• USSR is primary military threat to LOC, and the primary threat to PACOM sea LOC is cruise missile and attack submarines.

• Primary military vulnerability to PACOM air LOC is loss of/damage to enroute support facilities and forward bases.

• A major military vulnerability of transportation systems is the danger of air/missile attacks on terminals.

Paracel/Spratley/Senkaku Island Disputes

(S) Although the inter-regional differences cited by Admiral Gayler included religious, racial and cultural, the pragmatic considerations of economics were perhaps the most demonstrable during 1974. Such specks on the world map as the Paracels, the Spratleys and the Senkakus had gradually assumed significance far beyond their size as sources of friction because of their real or potential proximity to petroleum deposits in the East and South China Seas. Pattle Island of the Crescent Group of Paracel Islands had been garrisoned by France in the 1930's. During World War II, Japan had claimed the Paracels by conquest. This claim was withdrawn after the war, and, when the French withdrew from Indochina in 1955, South Vietnam assumed control of the French lighthouse on Pattle Island and stationed a small detachment of troops there. Meanwhile the PRC has occupied the northernmost Amphitrite Group, and a de facto division developed in which South Vietnam had garrisoned the Crescent Group and the PRC the Amphitrite Group. The original impetus for each country had been the commercial development of extensive guano deposits.[1]

(U) In January 1974, the joint occupation of the Paracel Islands by the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) and the PRC erupted into armed conflict. On the 19th, a 60-man PRC vessel was sunk and an RVN gunboat was destroyed with 100 people aboard. On the 20th, Chinese troops and planes attacked RVN positions. The South Vietnam strongholds reportedly collapsed within 20 minutes, leaving the PRC in sole possession of the Paracel Islands. On 21 January, the RVN filed a formal complaint against the PRC in the United Nations.[2]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. I, pp. 242-245.
2. J74 HistSum Jan 74.

(C) The RVN also requested the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to consider the Paracels issue. The U.S. State Department advised the U.S. Ambassador in Bangkok (SEATO Headquarters) that the United States doubted the competence of SEATO to consider the Paracels question. The U.S. Government position was that any effort to inject SEATO into the situation would be harmful to the organization and to the interests of the RVN. The U.S. Ambassador in Saigon also was instructed to counsel the RVN that "notification" to SEATO was the prudent course. The Republic of the Philippines (ROP) expressed informal, off-the-record disagreement with the U.S. position that SEATO was not the proper forum for the Paracels question. The U.S. Embassy in Manila speculated that the ROP wanted a collective and/or preemptive SEATO remonstration to the PRC, backed by the United States. Such a precedent would assist the ROP if its claim to the Spratley Islands were directly challenged by the PRC.1

(S) The Philippines had claimed the Spratley Islands in 1971 in spite of long-standing claims by the PRC, RVN and Taiwan. Since the 1950s, Taiwan had maintained a garrison of marines on the largest island, Itu Aba. In July 1971, the ROP announced the deployment of 200 troops to three islets in the group and ROP intention to construct an airfield and permanent garrison facilities.2


(U) On 31 January 1974, the RVN dispatched a task force to the Spratleys with orders from President Thieu to occupy the islands. On 1 February, the RVN landed forces on four of the atolls to establish the RVN claim, and, by 4 February, the RVN had occupied seven atolls. Taiwan had filed a formal protest with the RVN Government. On 6 February, the ROP joined the action with a formal protest to the Taiwan and RVN Governments. On the 11th, Filipino troops took control of two more islands in the Spratley group. In March, the RVN announced that frogmen and engineers with construction materials would arrive in the Spratleys to consolidate its sovereignty claim.3

[redacted]

1. CINCPAC ALPHA 250422Z Jan 74; CINCPAC ALPHA 260424Z Jan 74.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. II, pp. 549-551.
3. J74 HistSums Jan-Mar 74.



(S) By the end of 1974, oil exploration activities were underway in Po Hai Bay, China, the Korean Straits, the northwest sector off Taiwan, the Sulu Sea, Philippines, the South China Sea, RVN, and the Indonesian Archipelago. Off-shore reserves were still largely unproven, but promising test drilling had led to estimates as high as the Middle East reserves. Nearly 20 oil companies were either exploring, drilling or negotiating for the right to do so in hastily granted, often overlapping concessions.



Indian Ocean Policy

(U) CINCPAC's position, as expressed previously, was that the protection of air and sea LOC was imperative in the context of a credible national strategy and national defense. The LOC in the Indian Ocean, because of the distance involved, were particularly vulnerable to interdiction by hostile forces. In March 1974, this position was supported before Congress by a State

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1970, Vol. II, pp. 33, 34.
2. J73/Memo/040-74 of 30 Jan 74, Subj: Conflicting Claims to Senkaku Islands.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. II, pp. 549, 550.
4. IPAC Point Paper, 15 Nov 74, Subj: Oil Exploration-Asia.

Department official, who stated:[1]

> Geographically, the Indian Ocean is a vital international body of water which must remain available to U.S. surface traffic, commercial as well as military. Our airlines crisscross the region in routes the length and breadth of Africa as well as the vital round-the-world routes over the Middle East. Our presence on the Indian Ocean reinforces the proposition that the seas belong to everyone.

(C) The U.S. policy decision to make periodic port calls and transits of straits and to conduct naval exercises was complicated by substantive political and military issues. Many of the littoral states advocated an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZP), and opposed any increase in U.S. presence. They also opposed further expansion of the Diego Garcia base. India supported the IOZP originally presented in the United Nations by Sri Lanka, and was highly critical of U.S. naval deployments. The scheduled reopening of the Suez Canal foreshadowed a stronger Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and the U.S. Congress had resisted the allocation of Diego Garcia construction funds at the same time that Thailand had balked at the staging of Indian Ocean reconnaissance flights from Thai bases. Contributing to the strategic imperative for the United States was the reduced United Kingdom strength in the Singapore area. This raised the relative profile of the United States presence and made the Malacca Strait more vulnerable to enemy interdiction. These issues, and how they were debated, are addressed below.[2]

Diego Garcia/Indian Ocean Policy Debate

(S) For several years, CINCPAC had stressed, in presentations to Congress and in speeches, the increasing Russian presence in the Indian Ocean. In 1970, CINCPAC developed a contingency plan for periodic show-of-the-flag operations and, in 1971, the National Security council approved port calls and small exercises by Pacific Fleet ships in order to maintain a modest, but persistent, presence in the Indian Ocean. Also approved was the increased use of Singapore logistics facilities, continuing development of the Diego Garcia facility, and periodic maritime patrols.[3]

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1. State Dept. Bulletin, 8 Apr 74, "U.S. Interests and Activities in the Indian Ocean Area," statement by Seymour Weiss before Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, hereafter cited as Weiss Statement.
2. J514 Point Paper, 19 Aug 74, Subj: Political-Military Policy Planning South Asia; J513 Point Paper, 16 Aug 74, Subj: Political-Military Policy Planning Oceania Area.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 584-586.

(S) The development of a joint U.S./U.K. military facility on the British-owned island of Diego Garcia in the Chagos Archipelago had been proposed in 1968. By 1970, the original JCS proposal for a modest logistics facility had been reduced to Secretary of Defense approval of an austere communications facility for $19 million. The approved three-phase construction program called for harbor dredging, POL storage for 60,000 barrels, a pontoon causeway, and an 8,000-foot runway. First increment funds were approved by Congress in the fiscal year (FY) 1971 military construction bill in November 1970. The formal agreement for joint operation of the facility by the United States and United Kingdom was signed on 24 October 1972; the joint Defense/State Department enunciation of the U.S. position relative to Diego Garcia was its need as a gap filler in U.S. world-wide communications.[1]

(S) Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean began in earnest in 1968, and had grown steadily. It reflected increasing Soviet awareness of the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean littoral in a political or military contest with the People's Republic of China (PRC), and, to a somewhat lesser degree, the United States. To support the U.S. port visits, transits and naval exercises needed to counter-balance the increasing Soviet presence, CINCPAC had continued to stress the need for a usable logistics base at Diego Garcia. In late 1973 and early 1974, consultations began between the United States and Britain toward an agreement on expanded Diego Garcia construction. Simultaneously, the Defense Department and JCS began preliminary briefing to members of Congress on the planned expansion of facilities. Guidance from the State Department to the field on notification to third country governments restricted release until after formal presentation of the FY 74 supplemental budget request to the Congress. The guidance also included special handling discretion to those Missions whose host countries were particularly sensitive to implications of a military buildup in the Indian Ocean. The thrust of the authorized statement was different from the 1972 "communications link" policy:[2]

* * * * *

> The United States plans to improve support capabilities at the naval communications facility located on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. With new construction authorized by the British Government and the U.S. Congress, the small island in the middle of the Indian Ocean will provide safe anchorage for U.S./U.K. military ships, and additional parking for aircraft. A $29 million construction package, which was part of the supplemental military appropriations budget

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1. Ibid.
2. CINCPAC 240305Z Jan 74; SECSTATE 019236/292239Z Jan 74; SECSTATE 022250/1/012310Z Feb 74.

handed to Congress in January 1974, will permit improvement of ship support facilities, lengthening of the existing 8,000 ft. runway, expansion of the airfield ramp area and construction of additional fuel storage facilities and billets. Construction should be completed in 1976. The new facilities will provide limited support to U.S./U.K. forces operating in the Indian Ocean from time to time.

(S) On 4 February, the supplemental request was forwarded to Capitol Hill; later that month, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and the JCS Chairman Admiral Moorer testified to Congress that the limited naval base proposed was essential to U.S. military operations in the Indian Ocean. In March, the JCS informed CINCPAC that the intended construction would support such operations as the periodic deployment of a carrier task group; an amphibious task group with an embarked marine amphibious unit and associated logistic support ships; a maritime air patrol squadron; air force units with associated tanker support; and forward-based support elements for air force heavy airlift, such as C-141 and C-5 aircraft. The JCS listed the major items which could be supported with prior Navy fund authorizations and the Navy FY 74 supplemental budget request:1

- Dredging of lagoon to provide sufficient anchorage to accommodate a carrier task group, plus logistic supply ships, including a tender.

- Extension of existing runway to 12,000 feet.

- Expansion of airfield parking areas by 65,000 square yards of hardstand.

- Fuel storage increased by 480,000 barrels.

- Increased storage for other consumables and supplies, to include an additional 37,000 square feet of covered storage.

- Increased permanent billeting/messing facilities for additional communications, fleet support, aerial port and transient personnel.

- Expansion of aircraft maintenance facilities.

- Additional electrical power utilities.

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1. J74 HistSum, Feb 74; JCS 9623/142042Z Mar 74.

(S) The budget supplemental requested by the U.S. Air Force provided for an additional 160,000 barrels of jet fuel storage, 25,000 square yards of hardstand and 6,000 square yards of protective open storage area for munitions.[1]

(S) As the year passed, it became apparent that Congressional opposition placed the Diego Garcia expansion in jeopardy. At the same time, the British asked for clarification of the planned uses of Diego Garcia, which required United Kingdom agreement, for reconnaissance and amphibious operations and for storage of nuclear weapons on the island. British officials had stated the need for specific commitments to joint decisions on nuclear weapons storage, intelligence-gathering flights other than maritime reconnaissance or surveillance, and on amphibious deployments to the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) for training or exercises. In September, the U.S. Embassy in London was informed by British officials that no formal commitment by the Labor Government to the Ad Referendum Agreement on Diego Garcia expansion reached in January 1974 could be expected after anticipated October elections. In fact, according to the Embassy, it was important to, "...minimize all aspects of public attention to Diego Garcia to assure that Ad Referendum Agreement does not become election issue."[2]

(S) In October, the U.S. State Department reported British concern over littoral country (especially commonwealth) and other pressures for some form of arms limitation in the Indian Ocean area. Citing such factors as the Australian proposal for U.S.-U.S.S.R. talks on naval force restraint and United Nations resolutions favoring an IOZP and Nuclear Free Zone, British officials foresaw increasing public and parliamentary queries relating to the Diego Garcia expansion. Meanwhile, the $29 million for construction had been transferred to the FY 75 budget, and President Ford had publicly stated his support for limited expansion of the Diego Garcia base.[3]

(S) In November, the British briefed the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense on the result of the British review of their overall defense posture. On 3 December, the results were presented to the British Parliament; in addition to specific reductions in their military forces, the review included approval of the agreement between the two governments to expand Diego Garcia facilities.[4]

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1. Ibid.
2. J513 Point Paper, 21 May 74, Subj: Diego Garcia Expansion, AMEMB London 12078/181234Z Sep 74.
3. SECSTATE 241093/1/012357Z Nov 74; J51 HistSum, Nov 74.
4. J514 Point Paper, 10 Dec 74, Subj: British Defense Review; SECSTATE 264711/1/030040Z Dec 74; discussion of implications of further British Force withdrawals follows in this section.

(U) While the British had finally given formal approval to the agreement in principle of January 1974, the Diego Garcia expansion legislation received a severe buffeting by Congress. By the end of 1974, Congress had passed, and President Ford had signed, the FY 75 Military Construction authorization bill which included $18.1 million for Diego Garcia--$3.3 million for the Air Force and $14.8 million for the Navy. However, an appropriations bill had not been passed, and the authorization bill had imposed specific constraints on Diego Garcia spending:[1]

* * * * *

> President must advise Congress in writing that he has evaluated "all military and foreign policy implications regarding the need for U.S. facilities at Diego Garcia."
>
> President must certify to Congress in writing that the Diego Garcia expansion is "essential to the national interest."
>
> Sixty days of continuous congressional session must have expired following certification.
>
> Neither House, within that 60-day period, has passed a resolution disapproving the project.

(U) On 19 December, a Defense Department spokesman explained, during a news briefing, that unless and until specific new money was appropriated by Congress, any new money obligated for Diego Garcia expansion would have to come from funds actually appropriated--that is, out of the individual Service budget. Further, even this could not be done unless the President stipulated to, and Congress did not object to, the provisions of the authorization bill.[2]

(U) The political reaction to the Diego Garcia matter and its ramifications for military presence in the Indian Ocean by the littoral and commonwealth states was significant. Perhaps the earliest hint was the French Press Agency release from London on 5 February 1974, shortly after the first announcement that further expansion of Diego Garcia was under discussion:[3]

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1. SECSTATE 273663/131724Z Dec 74.
2. SECDEF 7195/192018Z Dec 74.
3. The Honolulu Advertiser, 5 Feb 74, "U.S. Granted New Sub Base," Agence France-Presse.

LONDON-The United States has persuaded Britain to grant nuclear submarine base facilities on the island of Diego Garcia, in the British Indian Ocean territory, the Daily Mail said here yesterday.

The paper said "intense pressure" had been exerted from the U.S. Defense Department. British consent had been won only after 10 days of negotiations.

Simultaneous announcements would be made in London and Washington later this week, the newspaper added. The object of the deal, it affirmed, was to increase the U.S. Polaris presence in the Indian Ocean, in light of recent Soviet increases in the region.

(S) In May, during periodic talks between U.S. and British diplomats on Indian Ocean policy, the British expressed concern regarding pressures generated by littoral states, and a CINCPAC paper summarized the overall political reaction:[1]

Soviet press has condemned the base expansion agreement, but has kept comments in the context of threat to riparian states rather than to Soviet interests. New China News Agency commentary has referred to the agreement as another example of superpowers stepping up expansion and intensifying rivalry in the region. Hanoi, some two weeks late in making a statement, condemned the U.S. and Great Britain and noted the base expansion agreement as another furtherance of the aggressive global strategy of U.S. imperialism.

There has been almost no reaction observed from East African or Middle East countries. The Tanzanian Foreign Ministry stated to U.S. Embassy personnel that it perceives the military presence by any major power in the region an unnecessary intrusion. The Malagasy Republic issued a mild official protest statement to the press expressing "serious concern."

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1. J221 Point Paper, May 74, Subj: Political Reaction to the U.S./U.K. Diego Garcia Base Expansion Agreement; AMEMB London 05783/091720Z May 74.

As expected, most reaction, almost all adverse, has come from the principal riparian states, the main theme being that the base agreement is yet another act counter to the Zone of Peace concept. India's reaction has been the most voluminous, in the form of official statements by Prime Minister Gandhi and Foreign Minister Singh, communist party demonstrations at the U.S. and U.K. Embassies, and a cascade of negative press commentary. Sri Lanka's Mrs. Bandaranaike had her Ambassador in Washington and London deliver formal letters to the two contracting governments, expressing her deep concern and urging reconsideration. Reaction from Bangladesh, late in coming, was in the form of concern expressed by the government and strong surprise, indignation and resentment expressed by the Bangladesh Communist Party and Peace Council. Although no public reaction has come from Pakistan, the government has indicated privately that it would welcome a strengthened U.S. naval presence in the area.

Burma sides with her neighbors to the West on the Zone of Peace concept, but has made no specific comment on the base expansion. Thailand reacted late, with mixed comments. A press story quoted a Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying Thailand wants the area free from any outside interference, but that a balance of two world powers in the Indian Ocean is preferable to just one.

Reaction from Indonesia was also late in coming, but began with a moderately critical statement by Foreign Minister Malik, deploring superpower failure to understand riparian Zone of Peace desires--that the Indian Ocean is becoming a zone of rivalry and soon the Chinese would enter the race. President Suharto, usually quiet on such issues, followed with a statement opposing the base expansion as harmful to peace and contrary to the wishes of the Indonesian people. Both official statements were followed by heavy press coverage. Malaysia's action has so far been only some negative press coverage, with nothing from Singapore.

Official and press reaction from Australia has been mixed. Foreign Minister Willesee expressed mild concern over the negative impact the base expansion may have on the Zone of Peace resolution, but noted the extensions as minor. Liberal Opposition Leader Snedden strongly supports the U.S.

action and sharply criticized the Whitlam government for "inability or unwillingness to grasp realities of the international situation." Press comments have indicated embarrassment to the government due to its desire to reduce military activity in the southern hemisphere, but press statements also admit that the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace would be difficult to realize. Prime Minister Kirk of New Zealand also opposes a buildup of any military presence in the Indian Ocean, but his statement was not printed in the press, indicating low-level popular concern.

(S) The New Zealand Prime Minister's deepest and most emotional feelings were against nuclear testing. He had been in the forefront of international moves to halt French atmospheric testing in the Pacific. He also strongly supported the establishment of a Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ) in the South Pacific. The only internationally accepted NFZ was that in Latin America (LANFZ), and the U.S. Government position was that an NFZ must include verification provisions, participation by all states in an area and initiated by them, and each zone considered on its merits. Specifically, the U.S. position noted the essentiality of participation by all states whose failure to participate could render the agreement ineffective. In February 1974, the U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand explained to Prime Minister Kirk that strengthening of Diego Garcia was related to the growing Soviet presence and the impact of the reopening of the Suez Canal. Kirk had previously stated that New Zealand supported the IOZP proposal, and that the buildup of any nation's military presence (including the U.S.S.R.) was not welcome. Nevertheless, the New Zealand Government under Kirk professed support of the ANZUS Treaty and Nixon Doctrine in spite of public opposition to, "major power confrontations, especially nuclear.[1]

(U) Pertinent to the U.S. position on the NFZ, France announced at least eight nuclear explosions in the South Pacific during 1974, and the PRC set off at least one atmospheric explosion, equivalent to one million tons of TNT, on 17 June, the same day as the French began their series. However, the most unexpected nuclear explosion of 1974 was announced by India on 18 May. This was believed to be in the 10-15 kiloton range. India thus became the sixth nation in the world with a known nuclear capability.[2]

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1. J511 Point Paper, 23 May 74, Subj: Nuclear Testing and Nuclear Free Zone (NFZ); AMEMB Wellington 2462/140332Z Feb 74. Kirk died on 29 Aug 74. For Suez Canal discussion, see following pages.
2. J74 HistSum May 74; also see introductory chronology, this chapter.

India test consolidated US posture in region

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(C) The reactions to India's explosion were varied. In the United States, Secretary of State Kissinger, in a statement to the U.S. Senate, said, "We believe that the most urgent problem now, or one of the most urgent problems, is to get a universal policy of non-proliferation." Consultations took place between Canada, which had supplied some of the reactor material to India, and the United States, and the U.S. Ambassador to India (Moynihan) urged that delivery of nuclear materials to India be halted.[1]

(C) Another reported reaction was that of the Shah of Iran, who was quoted in the French press as criticizing the Indian atomic bomb explosion and stating his intention to acquire nuclear weapons. Strong official denials of the Shah's reported comments were issued by Iranian spokesmen, who said that the Shah was misquoted. What he really said, according to these spokesmen, was that Iran had no plans to build nuclear weapons, but might have to revise its policy if other non-nuclear nations do so. The U.S. Ambassador speculated that the Shah may have intended to signal Iran's intentions if Israel or Egypt were to go nuclear.[2]

(C) The Indian Government announcement of the nuclear explosion had stressed its need for research and development of the peaceful uses of atomic power. On 9 July 1974, the Chairman of the Indian Space Research Organization was quoted in the Indian press that India was capable of producing intermediate range ballistic missiles; that India produced its own solid propellant; and that the propellant was strong enough to produce an IRBM. This was the first reference in print, according to the U.S. Embassy, to a military use for India's "peaceful" space program.[3]

(S) Despite the universal shock over India's nuclear explosion, there was evidence that there could be fringe benefits for the United States policy in the Indian Ocean. India had been among the most vociferous opponents of the Diego Garcia expansion, and among the most strident proponents of an IOZP. Australia had suggested U.S.-U.S.S.R. mediation on arms control in the Indian Ocean, and the British, during discussion on the expansion agreement, had pressed for a statement that U.S.-U.K. would conduct joint consultations on arms restraints in the Indian Ocean area. Evidence of a change of attitude, at least among U.S. allies, surfaced in September during a visit to Pacific Command headquarters by Prime Minister Gough Whitlam of Australia. The U.S. Ambassador to Australia acknowledged Whitlam's, "...high regard..." for Admiral Gayler, and suggested that Whitlam could be particularly receptive to a discussion regarding the Diego Garcia facility and U.S. presence in the Indian

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1. AMEMB New Delhi 10237/011657Z Aug 74.
2. AMEMB Tehran 5192/251338Z Jun 74.
3. AMEMB New Delhi 9150/101025Z Jul 74.

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Ocean. This was, according to the Ambassador, because Whitlam's shock over India's nuclear explosion had softened his pro-Indian views and made him more prone to, "...follow lead of reputable Asian leaders like Suharto and Razak, rather than get too far out in front himself." The Shah of Iran had expressed his support of U.S. plans for Diego Garcia to Whitlam during a visit, and, according to the Shah, Whitlam had agreed. If so, said the Ambassador, "...this is a new development." Whitlam was also expected to express to Admiral Gayler his support for the continuation of U.S. base facilities in Australia, which would be, "...a change from Whitlam of before July of this year."[1]

(U) Since, in the previously discussed reaction to the Diego Garcia question, President Suharto of Indonesia had expressed public opposition to the expansion plans, the wisdom of following his lead was debatable. However, the position taken by the smaller nations publicly was sometimes different from that taken during official discussions between governments. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Clements, divulged this during a news conference at the Pentagon on 8 October after a trip to the Far East. He had talked with leaders of South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Thailand and South Vietnam. Clements stated that he had "found concurrence" in every country he visited with, "...our presence in the Indian Ocean, including our construction plans for the support facilities on Diego Garcia." In response to a question as to whether this concurrence did not represent a change of position for Thailand and Indonesia, the Secretary replied:[2]

* * * * *

> I do not know what they have said publicly and I would suspect some of the things we discussed could well be at slight variance with a public position.... I can only tell you what I already said, that without exception, our presence in the Indian Ocean was well understood and was looked upon with favor.

(S) During Clement's meeting with Lee Quan Yew of Singapore, the Prime Minister not only endorsed U.S. plans for Diego Garcia, but stated that increased visits to Singapore by U.S. Fleet units would be welcome. As reported by the U.S. Embassy, Lee, "...referred to our development plans for Diego Garcia and said this was essential if our Indian Ocean position was to be stable and credible...."[3]

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1. SECSTATE 264711/1/030040Z Dec 74; EMBASSY New Delhi 16580/121415Z Dec 74; AMEMB Canberra 6340/270555Z Sep 74.
2. SECDEF 6616/090018Z Oct 74.
3. AMEMB Singapore 3951/300405Z Sep 74.

(S) Lee's comments were made in the context of overall U.S. policy in Southeast Asia (addressed in subsequent pages), but reflected no doubt about the need for a visible U.S. presence in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. Apparently, the need to balance Russian presence in the Indian Ocean and to assure continued freedom of the seas was not considered a "policy" by many U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the Asian countries. More specifically, the development of Diego Garcia on the grounds of logistics cost effectiveness was questioned. The U.S. Ambassador to India, on 26 April 1974, initiated a "colloquy" among his Asian counterparts by suggesting the need for a, "...simple, consistent, long-range rationale for whatever we are going to do with respect to deployments and basing out here." He acknowledged that, from New Delhi, he didn't have the full picture of U.S. interests with regard to U.S. military posture in the Indian Ocean. He posed a series of questions, the answers to which were necessary to, "...all of us diplomats if they (sic) are to comprehend the well-springs of our policy in this area of the world." The thrust of his message was his understanding that, "...the Indian Government is sincere in its belief that a substantial U.S. military presence in the Indian Ocean is not in the Indian interest....", and that Indian opposition to the U.S. presence in the Indian Ocean, "...just happens to parallel the Soviet interest...." Ambassador Moynihan postulated actions which would wrest the political initiative from Russia by affirmation of U.S. support for a peaceful Indian Ocean and active overtures for consultation with relevant countries on the issue.[1]

(S) The New Delhi cable spawned a host of replies. The Ambassador to Thailand cited increasing Thai concern about U.S. actions and policy in the Indian Ocean, and he endorsed Moynihan's recommendation for, "...an authoritative and politically acceptable statement for public use on this subject...." The Ambassador to Iran noted his lack of a problem, and suggested careful examination of the utility of a "major statement" which connoted a willingness to diminish the presence and interest of the United States in the area. The Ambassador to France suggested bilateral discussions with France and other U.S. allies before making declarations in support of restraints on military deployments in the Indian Ocean. The Malaysian post noted the expressed, but still passive, opposition to U.S. policy. The Government of Malaysia ascribed the Indian Ocean debate to great power politics which were inevitable, and there was little likelihood, according to the Ambassador, that any statement or rationale would change this negative attitude. He questioned the "open sea lanes" rationale which was publicly espoused by the United States, and suggested that, if a, "complex strategic power game...." was necessary vis-a-vis Russia regardless of littoral state complaints, it would be better to,

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1. AMEMB New Delhi 5616/261630Z Apr 74.

"...keep quiet and bear the costs." The U.S. Consul in Hong Kong outlined reasons for tacit PRC support of the United States in the Indian Ocean as a counterforce to Russian influence. The U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh also had no real problem, but agreed that a comprehensive policy explanation would benefit the diplomatic corps. While the arguments for saying nothing were persuasive, the issue would not go away and the United States could be increasingly on the defensive, responding to rhetorical attacks on an ad hoc basis.[1]

(S) Almost two months after Moynihan's first cable in April, the U.S. Ambassador to Thailand initiated a, "second round of discussion" to help clarify the "debate." Ambassador Kintner's cable viewed the "propaganda" as a shambles because of the inclusion of the funding request for Diego Garcia construction in the FY 74 supplemental budget. The result was to create a sense of new emergency and consequent "publicity uproar." He stressed the need for, "...adequate Washington-level policy coordination and appreciation of the potential adverse reaction overseas...."[2]

(S) On 2 August, the Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby, was reported to have warned that the Diego Garcia buildup would provoke the Soviets to follow suit. This was apparently the last straw for Ambassador Moynihan, whose blistering cable to the State Department was difficult to paraphrase:[3]

> 1. From the time the Diego Garcia plan leaked to the press last winter and the New Delhi Embassy was accordingly apprised of the matter, we have carried the brunt of the defensive effort overseas. As some will recall, I almost got my ass thrown out of India for trying to make our case to the Madras Press Corps. India, as incomparably the largest country around here, as one pathologically suspicious of American military intentions, and as the country whose name is attached to the ocean, has naturally been the locus of Asian opposition. I have worked hard to persuade the Minister of External Affairs here not to make this a bilateral issue between India and the United States. Only last week in Parliament he declared that he would not do so, pointing to the thirty-odd other nations also concerned. In the House

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 7092/011146Z May 74; AMEMB Tehran 3581/060512Z May 74; AMEMB Paris 11228/082209Z May 74; AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 2145/091000Z May 74; AMCONSUL Hong Kong 5195/090815Z May 74; AMEMB Dacca 2133/130935Z May 74; et al.
2. AMEMB Bangkok 10334/241202Z Jun 74.
3. AMEMB New Delhi 11114/220536Z Aug 74.

of Representatives, if I am not mistaken, the one consistent spokesman for the Pentagon plan is the one--and only--Congressman to visit New Delhi during my tenure. No less a departmental journal than "Open Forum" featured as the lead article of its first issue a patriotic declamation by me on behalf of a strong Navy. I not only write such things, I believe them.

2. Further, this Embassy has sought, by cables such as this one, to stimulate thinking about how we can best make our case--what the best case is--in the thirty-odd capitals concerned. We have felt, and we have been right, that Washington has had a defeatist attitude in this matter, a post-Vietnam collapse of confidence in our ability to win support from any Asian nation which we do not occupy militarily. "Faint heart ne'er won fair Ferozabad," we have cried, asking what Farragut would lead our pennanted and indomitable ironclads into the shot and shell of Asian intrigue.

3. Withal, we begin to waver. First came the testimony by the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency which substantially endorsed the initial academic criticism of the move, stating that far from keeping the Russians out of the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia would draw them in. If they come in of their own accord once we get the canal open, we remain free to react to them, rather than leaving it for them to react to us.

4. Now, featured in all the Indian Press--as was the testimony of Director Colby--is that of Governor Harriman who has told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that it would be sheer "folly" to expand Diego Garcia without first having tried to negotiate an agreement with the Soviets to bar or diminish military activity in the Indian Ocean. I worked for Governor Harriman for many years, and I have a perhaps special regard for his sense of these matters. But the more important fact is that his is merely the most recent of a series of well informed statements of men of prudent reputation who ask that we hold off a bit. These statements are, of course, widely publicized in India and, I should think, Asia.

5. Now comes the further report from Washington that Chairman Fulbright has expressed his grave doubts about the undertaking. This would mean that the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee dealing with South Asia, Lee Hamilton, have both expressed their opposition to this move by the military. As a supporter of the American military, it would seem to me that a prudent respect for the Foreign Policy Committees of the Congress now ordains at very least a reconsideration of this move.

6. Why not? The President has made clear that he does not mean to cut back on American defense. But Diego Garcia is seen in Asia as essentially an offensive action or one designed ultimately to support offensive action. Since the budget has to be cut somewhere, what about this tiny cut which would have such a large symbolic impact on Asia. Obviously, it should be accompanied by some effort at agreement with the Soviets. If a year or so later Soviet deployments grow, our approaches to the Soviets abort, or other contingencies arise, Diego Garcia can rise again from the briny deep.

7. The defense we are now apparently prepared to make of Diego Garcia is that it provides an economically cost-effective way of supporting periodic U.S. naval deployments into the Indian Ocean. I won't argue that. It probably does. But politically it seems to me it is not cost effective. Could we not think about spending a few million more, as the Russians do, by putting some additional support ships in with our fleet units when they are in the area? At least for now.

(S) Ambassador Moynihan's apparent concern about the jeopardy of his posterior if the Diego Garcia expansion was not delayed was acknowledged by Ambassador Kintner, who expressed his gratification that Moynihan's posterior had not been damaged. He also agreed with Moynihan that the Diego Garcia expansion should be delayed until a well-publicized effort to reach an arms agreement with Russia on the Indian Ocean military presence had been mounted. He noted that U.S. actions in the Indian Ocean had become an increasingly sensitive issue with the Royal Thai Government (RTG). The views of Moynihan and Kintner were finally endorsed by the Ambassador closest to the problem--Manhard in Port Louis, Mauritius. Manhard agreed to the need to seek mutual restraints with Russia, with appropriate publicity, because he doubted that such overtures would be welcomed by the Russians. As things were, he stated,

the United States was receiving all of the criticism while Russia was winning friends and influencing nations at the expense of the United States.[1]

(S) Shortly after his message supporting the Bangkok and New Delhi position on the Diego Garcia issue, Ambassador Manhard alerted the State Department to possible legal as well as political ramifications of the question. The Prime Minister of Mauritius had been supported politically by India and Russia, and he had reportedly threatened to give a naval facility to Russia if the United States proceeded with its plans for Diego Garcia. Legally, according to the Ambassador, the original agreement by which Mauritius became independent from the United Kingdom was on shaky ground because of the rising tide of non-aligned nationalism and continuing British withdrawal symptoms. The Diego Garcia agreements between the United States and Britain, which had once looked solid, "...may turn into quicksand before too long."[2]

(U) This assessment could have been based on a United Nations Decolonization Subcommittee report published about one month earlier, on 23 August:[3]

> In the smaller territories, such as Guam, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Bermuda and others, the colonial powers and their allies have continued to maintain and establish military bases and other installations, contrary to the interests of the peoples of these territories. The special committee notes, for example, that under the terms of agreements reached in 1966 and 1972 with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States of America maintains a naval communication facility on Diego Garcia to provide a link between its defense communication centers in Australia and Ethiopia. The construction of the United States facility led to the closing of the copra plantations on Diego Garcia and the Islands of Salomon and Peros Banos and the evacuation of the 128 inhabitants to Mauritius for resettlement.
>
> The Special Committee expresses its deep concern at the proposed expansion of the military facilities on Diego Garcia and the other islands, bearing in mind the provisions of General Assembly Res. 3080 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973 relating to the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone

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1. SECSTATE 186109/1/232231Z Aug 74, retransmitting AMEMB Bangkok 13687 (EX); SECSTATE 208175/1/202142Z Sep 74, retransmitting AMEMB Port Louis 0802 (EX).
2. AMEMB Port Louis 0818/271315Z Sep 74.
3. USMISSION USUN NY 2947/272003Z Aug 74.

of Peace. The Special Committee supports the claims of the Government of Mauritius that the United Kingdom Government, by granting permission to the United States to expand its facilities on Diego Garcia, has violated the original agreement under which it withdrew the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritian administration. It will be recalled that in 1967 the United Kingdom Government had given Mauritius a solemn assurance that Diego Garcia would be used only as a communications center. The Mauritian Govt has stated that unless this promise is adhered to, it will take the issue to the International Court of Justice.

On the basis of the above conclusions, the Subcommittee recommends to the Special Committee that it call upon the Govt of the United Kingdom to withdraw from the agreement with the United States on the establishment of military installations in the Indian Ocean.

(S) In December 1974, the United Nations General Assembly Committee I approved a resolution on the IOZP by a vote of 79-0, with 27 abstentions including the United States, Russia, United Kingdom and France. The resolution stated that the creation of the IOZP required the elimination of all manifestations of great power military presence in the region. A like resolution had been adopted in the United Nations one year before. A reasonable conclusion was that the dominance of the body by smaller, neo-nationalist states would negate an attempt to change the negative attitudes of the Indian Ocean littoral states toward the Diego Garcia facility. An interesting deviation from the opposition voiced by east and central African leaders was that of President Banda of Malawi. His nation, of course, was several states inland from the Indian Ocean. In any case, he expressed his full approval of the base at Diego Garcia, stating that the Soviets may have changed tactics but not their ultimate strategic aim of world domination. He favored detente, but with constant watchfulness and preparedness. Banda concluded his remarks to the U.S. Ambassador with a smiling comment that, "...he wants no part of the Russian devil; he knows the British and American devils well and prefers them anytime."[1]

P-3 Surveillance from Thailand

(S) The previously discussed concern of Ambassador Kintner for the RTG reaction to U.S. activity in the Indian Ocean was related to U.S. naval aircraft (P-3) patrols staged from U-Tapao in Thailand to the Indian Ocean. The

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1. USMISSION USUN NY 5643/092357Z Dec 74; SECSTATE 211138/251606Z Sep 74, which retransmitted AMEMB Blantyre 1244.

P-3 maritime surveillance flights from Thailand constituted one facet of Indian Ocean coverage, the others being staged from Bandar Abbas, Iran and Diego Garcia. Elimination of U-Tapao for P-3 staging would adversely affect surveillance in the Bay of Bengal, Malacca Strait and associated shipping lanes. On 12 July 1975, the RTG informed the Ambassador of its desire that all reconnaissance flights from U-Tapao over the Indian Ocean be stopped. At that time, support flights to Diego Garcia by P-3 or cargo-type aircraft were not included in the RTG notification. Nevertheless, the Ambassador advised State that no such flight should be authorized without his prior approval pending clarification from the RTG.[1]

(S) The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT) immediately reviewed the effect on operational flexibility of the P-3 stoppage and solicited Admiral Gayler's support toward reconsideration by the RTG. However, because the Bangkok press had given the RTG request wide coverage, such reconsideration was highly unlikely, according to the Ambassador. On 13 July, the JCS directed CINCPAC to order a standdown of all P-3 Indian Ocean operations orginating from U-Tapao. CINCPAC complied, noting in his order to CINCPACFLT that P-3 reconnaissance and logistics flights into and from U-Tapao for operations over the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand were to be continued based on approval by the Thai Supreme Command Headquarters (Forward).[2]

(S) On 16 July, the State Department expressed concern over the P-3 situation and directed the Ambassador to advance strong representation at the highest levels of the RTG for reconsideration of the Thai position. The Ambassador responded by quoting the draft of a paper entitled "Thoughts on the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace" which he had presented to the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs. This paper postulated the emergence of two rival groups of nations whose struggle for control of the Indian Ocean would involve all of the littoral states, including Thailand. The paper also explained the basis of U.S. policy in the Indian Ocean in a concise and lucid fashion which seemed to elude the Ambassador during the previously discussed "colloquy" with Moynihan:[3]

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> The United States' interest is in keeping the Indian Ocean area from falling under the hegemony of any single power, keeping the sea lanes open, and safeguarding the long-established principle of freedom of the seas....

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1. J514 Point Ppaer, 7 Jun 74; Subj: Indian Ocean Surveillance Flights; AMEMB Bangkok 11314/120658Z Jul 74; 11324/120759Z Jul 74; 11379/121228Z Jul 74.
2. CINCPACFLT 130535Z Jul 74 (EX); AMEMB Bangkok 11389/130552Z Jul 74; JCS 5828/131149Z Jul 74; CINCPAC 131220Z and 132120Z Jul 74; AMEMB Bangkok 11434/151107Z Jul 74.
3. SECSTATE 153952/1/162259Z Jul 74; AMEMB Bangkok 11547/170520Z Jul 74.

(S) On the same day, however, Ambassador Kintner advised the State Department that, in his judgment, the United States should not seek a reversal of the Thai decision, "at this time." He reminded State that he had given advance warning of the possibility that the P-3 flights might be stopped, but that he had, "...received no playback whatsoever indicative of advance military planning for contingencies such as the July 12 demarche." Further, although some Thai military contacts had suggested that the flights could be resumed, "...with some kind of tacit under the table agreement to keep these flights secret....," Kintner did not believe such an approach was realistic.[1]

(S) Although the feedback may not have reached Thailand, CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT had, in fact, initiated discussions concerning alternates to P-3 staging from U-Tapao prior to the RTG decision. In June, CINCPAC had requested CINCPACFLT to assess the feasibility of Changi Airfield in Singapore as an alternative to U-Tapao. The June reply had recommended against Changi to avoid erosion of the U.S. position regarding the criticality of the U-Tapao operations. In July, CINCPACFLT provided a political and operational analysis of the Changi option which granted its probable political palatability but stressed inherent limitations associated with security, maintenance, operational support and significantly increased expense. In sum, CINCPACFLT recommended against overtures to Singapore until after anticipated Washington-level discussions with the RTG had taken place.[2]

(S) On 18 July, Ambassador Kintner repeated his previously stated opinion that the RTG Foreign Minister had agreed to request the P-3 flight cancellation in order to protect, "...the other security assets we possess in Thailand." The following day, he reiterated his doubt that the RTG would reverse its decision, and, on 20 July, advised State that the decision reflected the emergence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the voice of RTG policy, vice the previous military dominance. This was confirmed during a subsequent conversation between Kintner and the Thai Ambassador to the United States, Anan Panyarachun. Anan criticized the Americans in Thailand for working too closely with the military in the past, and Kintner believed Anan to be the driving force behind the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' decision to ban the P-3 reconnaissance flights into the Indian Ocean.[3]

(C) On 24 July, the State Department instructed the Ambassador to force the issue of whether all P-3 flights from U-Tapao (support, logistics) to the Indian Ocean were considered by the RTG to be included in their ban, or if only

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 11615/171420Z Jul 74.
2. CINCPACFLT 172045Z Jul 74 (EX).
3. AMEMB Bangkok 11664/181021Z Jul 74; 11780/191146Z Jul 74; 11791/200731Z Jul 74; and, 11918/231019Z Jul 74.

reconnaissance missions were prohibited. On 26 July, Kintner reported that the Thai Foreign Minister agreed, reluctantly, that P-3 support flights could "continue" pending final decision by the Prime Minister.[1]

(S) Meanwhile, at about the same time, the Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army, General Krit Siwara, reiterated his suggestion that the United States conduct covert Indian Ocean operations to the CINCPAC Chief of Staff, LGEN William G. Moore. Krit criticized the actions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as unrelated to military realities, but ignored the difficulty of keeping covert flights secret. He was non-committal on the political dangers if such flights became known. General Moore explained the difficulties which the Thai denial of U-Tapao as a base for Indian Ocean reconnaissance entailed, and stressed the importance of maintaining a strategic balance in the Indian Ocean. Krit acknowledged his understanding of Moore's position. In a subsequent call on Air Chief Marshal Dawee by General Moore, Dawee espoused the same concept as Krit on the conduct of covert reconnaissance operations. He also expressed a derogatory view of the performance by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[2]

(S) On 29 July, the JCS authorized CINCPAC to resume P-3 Indian Ocean logistics and administrative flights from U-Tapao. Such flights were required to land outside Thailand (e.g., Diego Garcia) before assuming a reconnaissance mission. The prohibition against reconnaissance flights from U-Tapao into the Indian Ocean was continued.[3]

(S) In August, the Ambassador suggested that the Thai Deputy Foreign Minister be invited to accompany a P-3 "food and material" flight from U-Tapao to Diego Garcia. CINCPAC initially opposed such a flight, but, on 15 August, the State Department "reluctantly" approved the observation flight subject to agreement by the United Kingdom. On 19 August, the Deputy Foreign Minister (Chatchai Chunhawan) was quoted in a headlined Thai press story as having requested the U.S. Embassy to arrange a trip to Diego Garcia for him. On 22 August, the Ambassador acknowledged Admiral Gayler's cooperation in confirming the invitation to Chatchai, and noted that the publicity before British concurrence was unfortunate.[4]

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1. SECSTATE 161054/242308Z Jul 74; AMEMB Bangkok 12193/261421Z Jul 74.
2. SECSTATE 161676/251849Z Jul 74, which transmitted AMEMB Bangkok 12034 (EX).
3. CINCPAC 300130Z Jul 74, which cited JCS 1615/292244Z Jul 74.
4. AMEMB Bangkok 13069/131117Z Aug 74, which cited CINCPAC 110120Z Aug 74; SECSTATE 179217/152136Z Aug 74; AMEMB Bangkok 13368/190130Z Aug 74; and, 13614/221156Z Aug 74.

(C) The Ambassador's concern about the Chatchai press interview was well-founded. The British Foreign Office was concerned that the use of Diego Garcia, which had been a dormant political issue in Britain, could become alive if undue publicity were given to visits by foreign officials. On 4 September, however, the British gave conditional approval to the Chatchai visit. One condition was that an agreed press line be developed between the United States and United Kingdom. The thrust of the line desired by the United Kingdom was that acknowledgment of maritime reconnaissance flights from Diego Garcia would be "a last resort." The other condition was that the U.S. Government explain to Chatchai that further publicity was undesirable. The U.S. Government agreed to the question and answer formula advanced by the British Government, but, on 24 October, the U.S. Embassy in London reported that the United Kingdom was concerned about the Thai publicity, and that the time was not right to approve the visit.[1]

(S) During a visit to Thailand by Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements, then Acting Foreign Minister Chatchai remained non-committal on the P-3 reconnaissance flight ban, although he expressed his "deep concern" over the Soviet naval buildup in the Indian Ocean. He also intimated that a low-key visit to Diego Garcia would not suit his purpose, since he wanted to be able to, "...educate the Thai people about the Soviet threat to Southeast Asia from the west." Chatchai was informed that, in any case, a decision would not be made by the United Kingdom until after the forthcoming British elections. At year's end, no further action had been taken, and none was contemplated by either the United States or the United Kingdom unless Chatchai renewed his request.[2]

Alternatives to P-3 Staging from U-Tapao

(C) As mentioned briefly in passing, CINCPAC and CINCPACFLT had examined options for staging of P-3 reconnaissance from other locations than U-Tapao airbase in Thailand as early as June, or more than one month before the RTG had "requested" the flights to stop. After the standdown ordered by the JCS, the publicity given to the RTG decision was accompanied by sudden Australian press interest in the use of the Australian-owned Cocos Island for occasional P-3 refueling flights. The U.S. Ambassador to Australia reported one press article which contrasted, "...Australian permission for these flights with Prime Minister Whitlam's support for a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in the Indian Ocean."[3]

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1. AMEMB London 10912/231744Z Aug 74; 11321/041602Z Sep 74, and 13927/241712Z Oct 74.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 12847/030616Z Oct 74, which passed AMEMB Bangkok msg of 2 Oct 74 (EX); J514 Point Paper, 13 Nov 74, Subj: P-3 Operations Thailand.
3. AMEMB Canberra 4527/160753Z Jul 74.

(S) On 6 August, CINCPAC advised CINCPACFLT that the use of Changi Air Base in Singapore for refueling on P-3 flights from Cubi Point in the Philippines to Diego Garcia should be reconsidered. Also, CINCPAC requested CINCPACFLT to consider whether increased use of Cocos Island might be helpful to cover the Malacca Strait area if reconnaissance from U-Tapao were not resumed.[1]

(S) In reply, CINCPACFLT noted that the P-3 was capable of unrefueled transit directly between Cubi Point and Diego Garcia. However, the distance (approximately 3,100 nautical miles) precluded the effective conduct of ocean surveillance, including anti-submarine reconnaissance, enroute. The major ocean areas of interest in the surveillance of Soviet activity in the eastern Indian Ocean were the Andaman Sea, the Southern Bay of Bengal and the eastern Indian Ocean north of the equator. The P-3 range and endurance limitations would prevent economical surveillance of most of this area from either Diego Garcia or Cocos Island. With some loss of coverage in the northernmost Bay of Bengal, operations from Changi would provide surveillance of the strategic exit from the Malacca Strait and Indian Ocean. These operations were not possible without the use of U-Tapao. CINCPACFLT reiterated previous comments regarding the operational and logistics considerations inherent in the use of Changi, but noted that Changi was operationally more suitable than Cocos Island.[2]

(S) In September, the alternatives were expanded to include Butterworth Air Base in Malaysia. Butterworth was 500 miles south of U-Tapao and adjacent to the Malacca Strait. However, all of the alternatives--Butterworth, Changi and Cocos Islands--presented potential political problems regardless of their geographic suitability from an operational standpoint. The Malaysian Government was a strong advocate of the zone of peace and neutrality espoused by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and would consider an approach by the United States as a political risk. While limited use of Changi could be acceptable to Singapore from an internal political standpoint, its dependance on Arab oil rendered it vulnerable to pressure. The Australian Labor Government would be reluctant to approve operational basing of P-3s at Cocos Island. The Staff recommendation to CINCPAC was to press for an early decision by the RTG on the continued use of U-Tapao, and to refrain from any overt negotiations with other countries until a firm decision was forthcoming from the Thai. No such decision had been made by the end of 1974.[3]

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1. CINCPACFLT 232241Z Aug 74, which cited CINCPAC 060221Z Aug 74.
2. Ibid.
3. J514 Point Paper, 3 Sep 74, Subj: Analysis of Alternatives to U-Tapao for P-3 Staging.

MIDLINK 74 Participation

(TS) In April 1974, CINCPAC was advised by the JCS to plan the deployment of a Seventh Fleet Task Group to participate in the Indian Ocean exercise MIDLINK beginning about 10 November 1974. MIDLINK was the nickname for a series of joint/combined exercises conducted by the nations of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). These nations were Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and United Kingdom. The United States, while not a CENTO member, had participated in previous exercises as an observer. In August, the JCS approved the deployment of an aircraft carrier, a submarine, and appropriate escorts, stipulating that the submarine transit, by whatever route, would be sub-surface.[1]

(S) On 22 August, CINCPACFLT noted that plans specified transit of the carrier (CVA) task group to the Indian Ocean via the Malacca Strait. Citing the expected termination of the Law of the Sea Conference on 29 August, CINCPACFLT requested CINCPAC's concurrence to allow surface transit of the submarine with the balance of the task group through the Strait. The reason for the Fleet request was that overt transit would allow more effective use of the submarine in the support role and in training exercises. However, the JCS determined that the principle of unimpeded passage through, over and under international waters espoused by the United States in the Law of the Sea Conference would be compromised by a surface transit so soon after the end of the Conference, at which the issue had not been settled. Accordingly, a covert transit using an alternate strait was directed.[2]

(S) Meanwhile, on 29 August, Ambassador to India Moynihan weighed in with a cautionary message entitled "MIDLINK 74 or the New Armada." He hoped that, "...someone back there..." had focused on the political aspects of the U.S. participation in MIDLINK. He disclaimed any intent to offer advice on military exercises, but noted that MIDLINK 74 was, "...the grandest and largest CENTO exercise in a decade...." He wondered whether U.S. participation was consonant with the general interests of the United States in stability, reconciliation and detente in South Asia, and noted the sensitivity of the general role of Diego Garcia and great power Indian Ocean presence. He conceded that the exercise may have been designed to worry the Soviets, reassure the Pakistanis, warn the Indians, assert U.S. naval rights and the importance of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. "On the other hand," he stated, "it may not."[3]

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1. JCS 8677/191817Z Aug 74, which cited JCS 1543/242248Z Apr 74; JCS 5305/211738Z May 74, and CINCPAC 200156Z Jul 74 and 010104Z Aug 74.
2. CINCPACFLT 222207Z Aug 74; JCS 5584/271941Z Sep 74.
3. SECSTATE 189741/290154Z Aug 74, which passed AMEMB New Delhi 10744 of 13 Aug 74 (EX).

(S) It was unclear whether Ambassador Moynihan's comments had been considered by the State Department, but, on 5 November, a joint State/Defense message alerted all diplomatic posts in Asia and the Middle East to the upcoming deployment. They were told that the USS CONSTELLATION, accompanied by two destroyers, a destroyer escort, and a fast combat support ship, would be operating in the Indian Ocean for about 30 days. These surface vessels would transit the Malacca Strait, but no public announcement was planned of the transit. The presence of the task group in the Indian Ocean could be acknowledged on a response-to-query basis that the routine deployment was in keeping with stated U.S. policy to operate ships periodically in the Indian Ocean on a more frequent basis than before late 1973. The U.S. Missions were informed that the task group would participate with Britain, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan in MIDLINK 74 in the Arabian Sea. This fact could also be confirmed in response to query only.[1]

(C) Since the passage of the carrier task group into the Indian Ocean via the Malacca Strait was not concealed, its presence was announced after entry into the Indian Ocean on 10 November. On 15 November, the Indian Foreign Minister expressed to both houses of Parliament the, "...deep concern and misgivings..." of the Indian Government about the U.S. naval task group entry into the Indian Ocean. However, he indicated that India would not make it a bilateral issue, but would try to mobilize world opinion and proceed through the United Nations. He noted that Seventh Fleet deployments prior to this had occurred in March and June of 1974, and that they were cause for great concern. Upon being pressed, he stated that, while India was concerned, it recognized the presence of the United States, United Kingdom, French and Soviet Navies in the Indian Ocean as a "fact of life." He also stated that India and the United States had "agreed to disagree" on this subject during Secretary of State Kissinger's visit in October 1974. He told the Parliament that the Indian Navy had been informed in advance of the entry of the task group.[2]

(S) On 19 November, the aforementioned diplomatic posts were informed by the State Department of a JCS decision temporarily to withdraw the CONSTELLATION and two escorts from the MIDLINK exercise (scheduled from 20-30 November). The detached forces from MIDLINK were directed to make a 36-hour excursion into the Persian Gulf, after which the task group would rejoin the exercise. Pakistan's initial reaction to the temporary absence of the CONSTELLATION and escorts from MIDLINK was excited, angry and volatile. Iran expressed disappointment, while the United Kingdom and Turkey offered little commentary. The Chief, U.S. Element of CENTO expected that the initial disappointment shared by allied players would be alleviated upon return of the task group.[3]

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1. SECSTATE 242794/1/050100Z Nov 74.
2. AMEMB New Delhi 15423/151300Z Nov 74.
3. SECSTATE 255250/192249Z Nov 74; SECDEF 4595/212131Z Nov 74; CHUSELMCENTO 231410Z Nov 74 (EX).

(S) This judgment was apparently sound, since the Chief of the U.S. Element informed the JCS on 3 December that MIDLINK had been a success. The play of the USS CONSTELLATION after return from the Gulf had more than offset the earlier disappointments and no residue of adverse attitudes had been apparent. The participation by the United States in MIDLINK 74 and the "show of flag" incursion to the Persian Gulf had made a powerful impact in the region. The exercise had provided valuable training in combined operations for all participants. The showing of the American flag in the Indian ocean and the Persian Gulf was a gesture not lost on the Soviet Union, South Asia and the Middle East; in fact, a Soviet cruiser and escorts had watched the whole exercise.[1]

(U) Both the JCS Chairman and the U.S. Commander in Chief, European Command concurred that the Pacific Fleet task group had performed in an outstandingly professional manner in meeting the objectives of Indian Ocean policy.[2]

(S) The U.S. policy of more frequent naval presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans paid dividends during a visit to Singapore by the CONSTELLATION task group and Carrier Task Force 77. The Singapore Minister of Defense proposed U.S. Navy-Singapore Air Force air defense exercises with U.S. Navy ships enroute to or from Singapore. At about the same time, the Commandant of the Indonesian Marines suggested combined U.S.-Indonesian marine amphibious exercises. Regarding the latter, CINCPACFLT was cautioned by CINCPAC that such exercises were politically sensitive, and that all initiative for combined exercises must come from Indonesia.[3]

(S) Regarding the Singapore suggestion, CINCPAC authorized CINCPACFLT to obtain a diplomatic evaluation from the U.S. Mission in Singapore. The U.S. Defense Attache Office (USDAO) replied that, by mutual consent in the Five Power Defense Agreement (FPDA), the air defense of Singapore was vested in the Integrated Air Defense Command (IADC) at Butterworth in Malaysia, commanded by an Australian air marshal. Therefore, no direct U.S. Navy-Singapore air defense exercise was possible. However, there was reason to believe that the IADC would welcome simulated air attack services by U.S. carriers. The acceptance of such services would require FPDA approval, and such an offer to the IADC would demonstrate U.S. support for the FPDA, while, at the same time, avoiding the high visibility of a bilateral exercise.[4]

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1. CHUSELMCENTO 031600Z Dec 74.
2. USCINCEUR 20343/011250Z Dec 74; JCS 4611/041505Z and 1709/091840Z Dec 74.
3. CINCPAC ALPHA 033/190110Z Oct 74.
4. USDAO Singapore 1615/260505Z Oct 74.

(S) In response to CINCPAC query of 12 October, the CINCPAC Representative (CINCPACREP) Australia signified Australian willingness to engage in joint naval/air exercises so long as they were identifiable with ANZUS activities. However, the Australian Foreign Affairs Department remained sensitive to and would probably disapprove joint exercises associated with U.S. ships going to or from the Indian Ocean, "...if they appear to be part of a U.S. Naval build-up in the Indian Ocean."[1]

Reopening of Suez Canal

(S) A joint United States, Russia, France, and Egypt minesweeping and dredging operation to clear the Suez Canal began in 1974, and the Canal was expected to be re-opened for shipping sometime in 1975. The planned re-opening had significant military implications for the Russian Indian Ocean naval force and for Pacific Command forces whose mission included the protection of vital LOC in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The transit time of the Russian Fleet to the Indian Ocean by naval forces in the west would be substantially reduced. Logistics problems for Soviet Indian Ocean deployments would be simplified and Soviet surge capability for crisis deployments would be enhanced. All major Soviet surface combatant vessels could transit the canal, and faster and larger deliveries of military supplies to client states east of Suez would be possible.[2]

(U) The political and military ramifications of the reopening of the Canal were discussed by the New York Times Service in November 1974, based upon alleged military planning sources in the United States, Great Britain and "other maritime powers." These planners, according to the article, believed the reopening of the Suez Canal would lead to an expansion of Soviet political and military activity in an area, "...of the greatest strategic importance." Included were the sea routes to Iran and the Persian Gulf States. Iran was likely to be the power most affected by increased Russian activity, since it was the military power between Israel and India and was considered to be capable of defending the Strait of Hormuz--through which the Persian Gulf passes into the Arabian Sea--against any combination of neighboring states. But the cited American sources doubted that Iran could keep the strait open in the event of Soviet air and sea intervention. Ships of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet, which supplied their forces in the Mediterranean, could be expected to assume the naval mission in the Indian Ocean from their Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok. At considerable cost and effort, the Russians had been able to maintain approximately 20 ships of various types in the Indian Ocean. They were expected to

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1. USAFLO/CINCPACREP Canberra Aust 310613Z Oct 74, which cited CINCPAC 120316Z Oct 74.
2. IPAC Point Paper, 5 Nov 74, Subj: Reopening of Suez Canal.

increase this strength once they were, "nearer the locker room" of Black Sea bases, according to, "intelligence analysts."[1]

(U) Soviet strategic doctrine, "as put by neutral spokesmen," required a presence in the western Indian Ocean to discourage the appearance of American ballistic missile submarines within range of Russian industrial targets. On the other hand, U.S. naval units on patrol came from Seventh Fleet bases 5,000 miles to the east in the Philippines. According to the writer's, "American and many European sources," the projected U.S. base improvements on the British island of Diego Garcia would probably not maintain a balance between the United States and Russia after the Suez was reopened.[2]

British Defense Review

(S) In 1974, the five year old British movement to reduce its military forces east of Suez again surfaced during a British Defense Review initiated early in the year. In December 1974, a CINCPAC staff paper was prepared for a trip to Washington by Admiral Gayler, during which he expected to discuss Pacific Command concerns with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS. These Defense officials had been briefed, on 12 November 1974, by the British Defense Review Team on United Kingdom force reductions as a result of their review. The results were reported to Parliament on 3 December:[3]

- Withdrawal of forces from Singapore by 1976.
- Hong Kong garrison reduced by one battalion.
- Mauritius and Gan (Maldives) will be abandoned.
- Brunei evacuated.
- Oman (and Masirah) evacuated with termination of commitment to the Sultan.
- Simonstown Agreement will be terminated.
- Strike aircraft withdrawn from Cyprus.

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1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 15 Nov 74, "Soviets and Canal Reopening" by Drew Middleton, N.Y. Times Services.
2. Ibid.
3. J514 Point Paper, 10 Dec 74, Subj: British Defense Review.

- Malta forces phased down beginning 1977; withdrawal in 1979 on termination of agreement.

- Gibraltar retained.

- All CENTO forces withdrawn; Britain to remain member.

- Closure of 12 bases in the United Kingdom and reductions of air and naval assets.

(S) Among the decisions was the long-awaited approval of the U.S. plan for upgrading the facilities at Diego Garcia. However, the evacuations and abandonments in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas reduced the allied presence and influence and restricted the flexibility of deployed forces by elimination of strategically significant base sites. The conclusion of the CINCPAC staff paper was that effort should be made to influence a British decision to retain presence or access to facilities at Gan, Masirah and Singapore.[1]

(S) The CINCPAC staff summary of the impact of the British Defense Review was followed up by a message to the JCS Chairman emphasizing Admiral Gayler's concern with regard to the Indian Ocean/Arabian Sea areas. The Chairman replied, on 27 December, that the JCS and Defense had supported a strong U.S. representation to the British against the Masirah and other Indian Ocean actions. In light of its relative proximity to Diego Garcia, no representation was made concerning the Gan base in the Maldive Islands. This effort appeared to succeed, based on a statement to the NATO Military Committee by the Chief of the British Defense Staff on 3 December, "...We do not think it would be right in present circumstances to make any changes in the arrangements with the Sultan of Oman...."[2]

Law of the Sea

(U) The adoption of international conventions governing seabed exploration was complicated by the need for worldwide acceptance of the definition of territorial seas. Questions regarding off-shore mineral resource exploration, fishery grounds and environmental controls were raised by conflicting claims to territorial sea boundaries, the continental shelves, and "innocent passage" versus "free passage" through, over and under the straits of the world. On 17 December 1970, the United Nations General Assembly approved a resolution which established a Law of the Sea (LOS) Conference, with preliminary meetings beginning in 1971.[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. JCS 2438/271658Z Dec 74, which cited CINCPAC 102339Z Dec 74 (EX).
3. CINCPAC Command History 1971, Vol. II, pp. 549, 551.

(TS) The most important considerations to be discussed by the LOS conference from the U.S. military point of view were those pertaining to the breadth of territorial seas, combined with the right of all nations to free transit through, over and under international straits. In 1972, the JCS requested CINCPAC to reply to a series of questions, the answers to which could reinforce the U.S. position on the right to unimpeded transit. In reply, CINCPAC named five straits considered to be essential to U.S. military interests--Tsuguru, La Perouse, San Bernardino, Malacca and Sunda. Tsuguru Strait provided direct northern passage between the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean. La Perouse Strait provided a passage between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan. San Bernardino Strait/Verdi Island Passage provided the most direct sea route between Guam and Subic Bay in the Philippines. The Malacca/Singapore Strait was the primary sea route to the Indian Ocean, and Sunda Strait the primary route to the Southern Indian Ocean and the northwest coast of Australia.[1]

(U) After six preparatory sessions during 1971, 1972 and 1973, the inaugural session of the LOS Conference was held in December 1973 in New York. The various committees and working groups were chosen for the substantive LOS Conference, to be held in Caracas, Venezuela beginning on 20 June 1974.[2]

(S) During the preliminary discussions prior to the June 1974 meeting, a majority of states asserted claims to a territorial sea of 12 miles. If accepted, more than 100 straits would be overlapped by territorial seas. A number of states asserted that warships and other ships of special characteristics were not entitled to "innocent passage" through the territorial seas. Other states, including Indonesia and the Philippines advanced the archipelago concept in which the waters enclosed within straight lines joining their outermost points would be established as internal waters subject to the sovereignty of that state. Innocent passage of foreign vessels would be allowed through archipelagic waters, but the state would be empowered to designate sea lanes for such passage. The U.S. position going into the Conference was that acceptance of a 12 mile limit was conditioned upon the recognition of the right of free passage (unimpeded passage) through, over and under international straits. This would permit overflight by aircraft and submerged passage by submarines as well as surface transit. The United States had firmly resisted the archipelagic concept, but, based on the growing support for the concept, had initiated overtures toward a compromise proposal. Thus, the United States had developed a position which limited the land-to-water ratio to no more than 1:5 and the use of straight connecting lines no longer than 80 miles. This would limit the application of the archipelago concept to

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 587, 588.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 667, 668.

states whose component islands formed a common geographic, cultural, economic and political entity.[1]

(S) Beginning in 1973 (with Micronesia) and into mid-1974, the United States had dispatched several LOS negotiating teams throughout the world to discuss the LOS issues and assure understanding of the U.S. position. The United States had approached Indonesia, the Philippines and the Fiji Islands, as well as Micronesia, in attempts to reach some accommodation of views. The primary divergence of positions pertained to the concept of "archipelagic waters" with free passage vis-a-vis the "internal waters" concept with sovereign right to determine internal passage criteria. Akin to the basic archipelagic determination was the U.S. proposal that each island would have its own territorial seas versus the archipelagic states position that the territorial seas should extend seaward from the baselines of the archipelago.[2]

(S) In May 1974, Admiral Gayler requested his Staff Judge Advocate (J73) to recapitulate the positions of the United States and the Philippines on the archipelago concept. The J73 reply noted that draft articles delineating the island states position had been submitted by Fiji, Indonesia, Mauritius and the Philippines during the December 1973 preparatory session. After reviewing the basic differences noted above, an attached enclosure by the CINCPAC Directorate of Plans (J5) summarized the military effects of the Philippine position:[3]

> The Archipelagic Concept has no significant influence on our use of the Luzon Strait as it would still lie in international waters, or San Bernardino Strait because it is already within the territorial seas of the Philippine Islands.
>
> Surigao, Mindoro and Balabac Straits are all in international waters. The Archipelagic Concept would encompass Surigao and Mindoro Straits within Philippines territorial waters. This concept in conjunction with the 12 mile limit applied to Malaysia would also encompass the Balabac Strait.

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1. J73 Point Papers, 20 Feb 74 and 23 May 74, Subj: Law of the Sea; J73/Memo/00137-74 of 29 Apr 74, Subj: PACOM LOC Study, with draft Annex, Subj: Legal Factors Relating to LOC.
2. J73 Point Paper, 18 Jan 74, Subj: Law of the Sea and Micronesia; J73/Memo/00155-74 of 9 May 74, Subj: Law of the Sea: Archipelago Negotiations with Republic of Philippines (S).
3. Ibid; with attachment 12, Subj: Military Appraisal.

The primary significance of the Archipelagic Concept is to deny us the use of the Sulu and Celebes Seas and the free use of Surigao, Mindoro and Balabac Straits. These would be very important to the avoidance of submarines and surface combatants in time of war or crisis; as long as we have a mutual defense treaty with the Philippine Islands, we have no real military problem in Philippine Archipelagic waters. Our main concern is the restrictions we would suffer in other parts of the world should we accept the GOP concept.

(C) The foregoing brief resume' depicted the overall situation regarding the LOS relationship to the U.S. policy of unimpeded freedom of the seas. Throughout the year, the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate provided summaries to Admiral Gayler of LOS developments in weekly briefs, exerpts from which follow:

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(C) Law of the Sea. The Congress of Micronesia Law of the Sea Committee has reaffirmed and refined its position concerning the establishment of a three zone archipelago concept for the UN sponsored Law of the Sea Conference. The first zone would establish as internal waters the area within straight lines between the outermost islands and reefs of Micronesia. The second zone would embrace as territorial waters the area 12 miles out from the straight lines used in the first zone. The third zone would establish a 200 mile resource area, extending outward from the second zone, in which Micronesia would reserve the rights to all resources, but would not regulate passage of ships and planes (HICOMTERPACIS 091100Z Jan 74). We informally learned that a representative from the US Law of the Sea Task Force will meet with the Micronesian Law of the Sea Committee later this month in an attempt to reach agreement on Law of the Sea matters and to work out an agreement whereby a Micronesian representative would be included in the US delegation to the UN sponsored Law of the Sea Conference to be held in Caracas, Venezuela, from 30 June to 29 August 1974.[1]

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1. J73/Memo/015-74 of 14 Jan 74, Subj: Weekly Executive Brief (WEB), 4-13 Jan 74.

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(U) Law of the Sea. The Micronesian Law of the Sea Committee submitted a 106-page report on Law of the Sea to the Senate and House of Representatives of the Congress of Micronesia on 22 January. The Chairman of the Committee pointed out to the Senate that meetings are continuing with representatives of the US Department of State in an effort to assure that Micronesian interests are independently presented at the UN sponsored Law of the Sea Conference scheduled to be held this summer in Caracas, Venezuela (HICOMTERPACIS 220510Z Jan 74).[1]

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(U) Law of the Sea. We informally learned the recent meeting on Saipan between representatives of the State Department and the Congress of Micronesia Joint Committee on LOS did not resolve the question of the presentation of Micronesian interests at this summer's UN sponsored LOS Conference. The U.S. Interagency Task Force on LOS is still studying the matter.[2]

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(U) Law of the Sea. The US Interagency Task Force on LOS advised Senator Andon AMARAICH, in his capacity as Chairman of the Congress of Micronesia Joint Committee on LOS, that the US will be pleased to have a Micronesian member accredited to the US delegation for the specific purpose of making a direct presentation of the position of the Congress of Micronesia to the LOS Conference (SECSTATE 030008/140029Z Feb 74). This apparently means the Micronesian position is so inconsistent with the US position that common ground cannot be reached.[3]

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(C) Law of the Sea. SECSTATE has advised that the U.S. will undertake intensive efforts to gain the maximum

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1. J73/Memo/36-74 of 28 Jan 74, Subj: WEB, 21-27 Jan 74.
2. J73/Memo/54-74 of 4 Feb 74, Subj: WEB, 28 Jan-3 Feb 74.
3. J73/Memo/69-74 of 25 Feb 74, Subj: WEB, 19-24 Feb 74.

support for U.S. LOS positions for the upcoming UN sponsored LOS Conference. Detailed guidance and materials on all major LOS issues of importance to the U.S. will be sent to all diplomatic posts and military POLADs to assist in the effort. In addition, teams from Washington will visit selected countries in support of this effort. (SECSTATE 222329Z Feb 74)[1]

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(S) Law of the Sea. Department of State has issued the first of a series of Airgrams to diplomatic posts and military POLADs on LOS issues for the forthcoming LOS Conference. The airgram outlines the territorial sea, international straits and archipelago issues and is intended for use by posts in making contact with host governments in an effort to gain an understanding of, and support for, US positions. It notes that the archipelago question is currently being reviewed with a view toward developing a formal US position on the matter (Department of State Airgram A-1666).[2]

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(U) Law of the Sea. Department of State has issued three more Airgrams on LOS issues for the forthcoming LOS Conference. These Airgrams discuss marine scientific research, marine pollution, and zone-locked States. Additional Airgrams on selected LOS issues are expected in the future.[3]

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(S) Law of the Sea. Department of State issued two more Airgrams on LOS issues for the forthcoming LOS Conference. One of the Airgrams forwards an article on the Preparation for Law of the Sea Conference which summarizes the preparatory negotiations of all States and the other Airgram details approaches to invitees to the LOS Conference which have not participated in the preparatory sessions. Professor John Norton MOORE, Assistant to the Special Representative of the

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1. J73/Memo/078-74 of 4 Mar 74, Subj: WEB, 25 Feb-3 Mar 74.
2. J73/Memo/084-74 of 11 Mar 74, Subj: WEB, 4-10 Mar 74.
3. J73/Memo/92-74 of 18 Mar 74, Subj: WEB, 11-17 Mar 74.

President for the LOS Conference is heading a team which will visit Indonesia in an attempt to reach a reasonable accommodation on the archipelago issue so as to defuse this potentially troublesome issue prior to the opening of the substantive session of the LOS Conference. President Nixon and President Suharto have recently exchanged letters on the matter. We do not hold these letters.[1]

(S) Law of the Sea. The LOS Task Force team, which visited Indonesia 25-26 March, has apparently accomplished a breakthrough in the attempt to find a mutually acceptable accommodation on archipelago, straits, and passage issues. GOI has the matter under active consideration and has indicated it will confer with the archipelagic States (Fiji, Mauritius, and the Philippines) with whom it co-sponsored draft articles on the archipelago concept at the preparatory sessions of the LOS Conference. A major problem which still exists is the reluctance of Indonesia and Malaysia to agree that Malacca is an international strait. Mr. Bernard OXMAN of the LOS Task Force team has gone on to Australia to discuss LOS matters with GOA authorities and will also visit Manila to brief Ambassador Sullivan on the results of the discussions with GOI. While in Manila, Oxman may also confer with GOP authorities on LOS issues. The remaining members of the LOS team have returned to Washington.[2]

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(S) Law of the Sea.

Thailand. The Chief of Treaty Department, Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after a briefing by an Embassy officer, indicated there were no basic differences between the USG and his government concerning LOS. However, he did state fisheries were the primary Thai concern and he would appreciate up-dated information on the USG position on fisheries. (AMEMB Bangkok 100945Z Apr 74)

Malaysia. The Embassy opined to State that a visit of the U.S. LOS team to Kuala Lumpur to discuss LOS issues with Malaysian officials would be "highly useful". It

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1. J73/Memo/0098-74 of 25 Mar 74, Subj: WEB, 18-24 Mar 74.
2. J73/Memo/0106-74 of 1 Apr 74, Subj: WEB, 25-31 Mar 74.

did concede, however, that few concrete results could be expected unless there was major breakthrough on the archipelago issue. (AMEMB Kuala Lumpur 080830Z Apr 74)[1]

(S) Law of the Sea.[2]

John Norton Moore, Chairman of the Task Force and Deputy Special Representative of the President for the LOS Conference, will visit Bangkok and Manila in early June. His visit to Manila will be a follow-up of the explanation provided to GOP by Indonesian LOS experts concerning the U.S. archipelago proposal. U.S. will support archipelago concept provided right of free transit through archipelagic waters and international straits is assured. (SECSTATE 241450Z Apr 74.)

Honorable Howard W. Pollock, Chairman of Working Group on Micronesia of the NSC Task Force on LOS and Deputy Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, will visit Saipan on May 21 and 22. Purpose of the visit is to explain procedure for inclusion of one Micronesian representative on U.S. delegation to the LOS Conference for the limited purpose of making one direct presentation of the Congress of Micronesia's position to the conference. (SECSTATE 242336Z Apr 74.)

Mr. Bernard Oxman, Special Assistant to the Special Representative of the President for the LOS Conference and State Department Assistant Legal Advisor for Oceans, Environment, and Scientific Affairs, will visit Seoul, Saigon, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur during 27 May - 3 June. (SECSTATE 240044Z Apr 74.)

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(S) Law of the Sea. On Saturday (18 May) evening I discussed LOS matters with CDR Paul Ake, who was on his way to Micronesia. Ake is a lawyer in JCS J5 and a member of the DOD Task Force on LOS. He informed that RADM Morris, the JCS representative on the U.S. LOS Team, after having consulted with Indonesian LOS Team members in Washington, would travel to Manila for LOS discussions with Philippine officials on or about 5 June. RADM Morris originated CJCS 180039Z May 74

1. J73/Memo/0117-74 of 15 Apr 74, Subj: WEB, 8-14 Apr 74.
2. J73/Memo/00141-74 of 29 Apr 74, Subj: WEB, 22-29 Apr 74.

which pinpoints sensitivity of ship movements through Indonesian waters particularly for the period of the Caracas LOS Conference.

(S) Law of the Sea. SECSTATE advised of results of U.S.-Indonesian consultations 31 May-1 June in Washington re archipelago issues. U.S. agreed that one percent of archipilagic lines could be in excess of 80 miles (up to 100 miles), that territorial sea could be measured seaward of the archipelagic lines, and that "passage areas" could be called "sealanes" provided GOI agrees to U.S. position re passage. Principal area of disagreement is right overflight by aircraft over archipelagic waters and international straits, but U.S. LOS team expects GOI to assent to U.S. position on this matter. GOI team signaled intention to split off from such other archipelagic States, e.g., Philippines, which do not approve eventual U.S.-GOI agreement re archipelagoes (SECSTATE 030620Z June 74).[2]

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(S) Law of the Sea. John Norton Moore, Deputy Special Representative of the President for LOS Conference, advised that 5-6 June meeting with Philippine LOS team went well and PHIL team promised response to U.S. archipelago proposal in first few weeks at Caracas (AMEMB Manila 070003Z Jun 74).[3]

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(S) Law of the Sea. On 13 June AMEMB Jakarta received GOI notes on U.S.-Indonesia LOS meeting in Washington, 31 May-1 June. The Embassy had delivered U.S. notes on the meeting to GOI on 10 June. The exchange of notes reflected substantial agreement on archipelago issues except that GOI: (1) does not consider the question of overflight to be a subject for the LOS Conference; and (2) does not feel free to talk on the problem of passage through international straits because the Malacca straits involve its most immediate neighbors, Malaysia and Singapore. GOI did agree to consult with the U.S. both during and after the Caracas conference. (AMEMB Jakarta 140810Z Jun 74.)[4]

1. J73/Memo/00162-74 of 20 May 74, Subj: WEB, 13-19 May 74.
2. J73/Memo/00176-74 of 3 Jun 74, Subj: WEB, 28 May-2 Jun 74.
3. J73/Memo/0182-74 of 10 Jun 74, Subj: WEB, 3-9 Jun 74.
4. J73/Memo/0189-74 of 17 Jun 74, Subj: WEB, 10-16 Jun 74.

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(S) Law of the Sea. A split has developed in GOJ between the FONOFF and JDA over the issue transit through international straits. The FONOFF favors the U.S. position of free (unimpeded) transit, whereas the JDA wants to restrict passage through the Tsugaru Strait between Honshu and Hokkaido to innocent passage (SECSTATE 220113Z Jun 74). I learned by informal contact with JCS that the SECSTATE message was readdressed to the U.S. LOS delegation in Caracas for comment to assist the FONOFF on the matter.[1]

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(U) Law of the Sea. Press reports disclose that agreement on voting procedures for the LOS Conference was reached on 27 June. Under the agreement, the Conference will seek consensus whenever possible, but if that is not achieved, a vote will be taken. Measures will then be adopted by 2/3rds majority of nations present and voting. The 2/3rds majority must be at least the equivalent of 51% of the nations participating in that particular session of the Conference. This procedural agreement clears the way for the Conference to consider substantive matters.[2]

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(U) Law of the Sea. Press reports indicate the U.S., in the LOS Conference, declared readiness to agree to a 12 mile territorial sea and a 200 mile "economic zone" wherein coastal nations would exercise control over fishing and mineral resources. The U.S. conditioned such agreement on guarantee of the right of unimpeded transit through and over international straits.[3]

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(U) Law of the Sea. The U.S. Delegation to the LOS Conference reported that the plenary statements of most nations

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1. J73/Memo/00196-74 of 24 Jun 74, Subj: WEB, 17-23 Jun 74.
2. J73/Memo/0206-74 of 1 Jul 74, Subj: WEB, 24-30 Jun 74.
3. J73/Memo/218-74 of 15 Jul 74, Subj: WEB, 8-14 Jul 74.

supported a 12 mile territorial sea and a 200 mile economic zone. Positions on straits varied.[1]

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(C) Law of the Sea. At the LOS Conference the various committees met. In Committee II (Straits, Territorial Sea, Economic Zone, etc.) debate centered on the committee chairman's text defining "main trends." The Turks expressed concern that a 12 mile territorial sea would effectively cut-off Turkish access to high seas through Greek islands. Whether archipelagic water should be included in the definition of territorial seas or considered separately was debated. In private discussions the U.S. determined the U.S. and Indonesia had substantial areas of agreement on archipelagos, but major differences on overflight in archipelagic sea-lanes, width of such sea-lanes, and support for U.S. straits positions.[2]

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(C) Law of the Sea. Reporting for the week of 19-25 July, the U.S. Delegation at the LOS Conference claimed, "Major bright spot is clear shift in our direction on straits." East Europeans, Arabs, and Israel supported "unimpeded" or "free" passage. On the myriad other issues, however, there was substantial disagreement and "unless there is a substantial change in current pattern there will be only limited progress on substance at this session, thus throwing into question UN timetable for completion of treaty." (SECSTATE 167420/011817Z Aug 74.)[3]

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(C) Law of the Sea. The U.S. Delegation to the LOS Conference reported, for the period 26 Jul-1 Aug, that the USSR informed it and the Arabs make a distinction between commercial and warship transit of straits. France had strong reservations concerning the archipelago concept, and USSR rejected it. Overall, a "sense of disquietude" continued. (SECSTATE 170925/061813Z Aug 74.)

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1. J73/Memo/0245-74 of 29 Jul 75, Subj: WEB, 22-28 Jul 74.
2. J73/Memo/0256-74 of 5 Aug 74, Subj: WEB, 29 Jul-4 Aug 74.
3. J73/Memo/0263-74 of 12 Aug 74, Subj: WEB, 5-11 Aug 74.

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(C) Law of the Sea. Mid-session analysis by U.S. delegation paints a disappointing picture of reluctance on part of most participants to make key decisions or negotiate specific texts. A treaty will clearly not come out of the Caracas conference and a decision has not yet been made on when the next session will be held in 1975, or whether there will be one long session or two shorter sessions. U.S. delegation, however, sees some likelihood of more progress in last weeks of Caracas session (session ends on 29 August) as realization spreads of consequences of Caracas failure. (SECSTATE 152034Z Aug 74).[1]

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(C) Law of the Sea. Latest message from U.S. delegation to LOS conference covering August 9-16 highlights readjustments of political postures of various States. For example, USSR delegation no longer is consulting in advance with other members of the group of 5 (US, UK, France and Japan) on East European proposals, although such proposals take into account attitudes of the group. In addition, the solidarity of other groups of States is not quite as strong as before and the U.S. delegation is being contacted more frequently by other delegations outside of such groups. (SECSTATE 221334Z Aug 74, SECSTATE 221335Z Aug 74). The Caracas session of the conference will end on 29 August and, although no treaty will come out of the session, U.S. positions on the various subjects and issues appear to be assured of inclusion in the alternative texts and proposals being formulated during this session. The formulation will serve as the starting point for the 1975 session of the conference.[2]

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(C) Law of the Sea. The wrap up of the Caracas LOS Conference still was not received, although the U.S. LOS Delegation described it as lengthy (SECSTATE 193108/032206Z Sep 74). In a related development, STATE asked all embassies

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1. J73/Memo/0278-74 of 19 Aug 74, Subj: WEB, 12-18 Aug 74.
2. J73/Memo/0284-74 of 26 Aug 74, Subj: WEB, 19-25 Aug 74.

to comment on U.S. Senate bills which would unilaterally establish U.S. rights to minerals in the deep seabed and a 200 mile economic zone (SECSTATE 193107/032205Z Sep 74).[1]

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(S) Law of the Sea. Citing growing support in the Caracas LOS Conference for "an innocent passage regime which requires surfaced transit of straits by submarines," JCS felt a surfaced Malacca strait submarine transit "could lend unacceptable support to such a position which is counter to U.S. interests." JCS directed a covert transit using an alternate strait (JCS 271941Z Sep 74).[2]

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(S) Law of the Sea. In a television interview the Indonesian Minister of Justice/LOS Delegation Chief stated that major maritime powers such as the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had supported the GOI's archipelago principle with certain conditions. He cited three major issues and said GOI was reviewing the question of how to deal with these conditions. The Embassy believed this to be a signal the GOI was open to compromise. (AMEMB Jakarta 12336/080915Z Oct 74.) Shortly thereafter, the Embassy proposed, and the GOI accepted, discussions with the U.S. LOS team headed by John Norton Moore in Jakarta, 2-4 December 1974. (AMEMB Jakarta 12514/100410Z Oct 74.)[3]

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(U) Law of the Sea. At the United Nations, the Sri Lanka Permanent Representative and LOS Conference President addressed the "Indian Ocean Peace Zone." Purportedly speaking for the littoral states, he said:

> The major maritime powers and all those who depend on the unrestricted passage of commercial traffic through the Indian Ocean may be assured that such passage will be granted to them in any

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1. J73/Memo/0304-74 of 9 Sep 74, Subj: WEB, 3-8 Sep 74.
2. J73/Memo/00331-74 of 30 Sep 74, Subj: WEB, 23-29 Sep 74.
3. J73/Memo/00348-74 of 15 Oct 74, Subj: WEB, 7-14 Oct 74.

arrangements to give effect to the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. The lines of communication across the Indian Ocean must be kept open for vessels and aircraft of all kinds and of all nations subject only to the condition that this passage across and over the Indian Ocean does not constitute a threat to the peace, good order, sovereignty and territorial [integrity]. (Emphasis supplied.)[1]

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(C) Law of the Sea. The UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean is preparing a draft resolution. In its present form the draft resolution would urge littoral states, the permanent members of the Security Council, and major maritime users to give tangible support to establishment and preservation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. It would also call upon the "great powers" to refrain from increasing their military presence in the Indian Ocean. (USMISSION USUN 4415/ 250115Z Oct 74).[2]

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(S) Law of the Sea.

SECSTATE instructed the US Mission to the UN to abstain in the voting on the Indian Ocean Peace Zone Resolution (SECSTATE 251014/141444Z Nov 74).

SECSTATE cautioned all diplomatic posts not to raise the issue of straits at this time unless specifically instructed to do so. If queried by host governments, posts should take the line there must be no distinction between commercial and military transit and rights must include overflight and submerged transit (SECSTATE 243425/160120Z Nov 74).

SECSTATE has proposed 11-13 December and 16-17 December for bi-lateral LOS talks with Indonesia and the Philippines, respectively (SECSTATE 248922/121524Z,

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1. J73/Memo/0359-74 of 21 Oct 74, Subj: WEB, 15-20 Oct 74; note that this and some subsequent J73 Briefs illustrate the inter-relationship between LOS and the previous Indian Ocean policy discussion.
2. J73/Memo/0366-74 of 29 Oct 74, Subj: WEB, 21-28 Oct 74

252269/151759Z Nov 74). During recent bi-lateral talks, the Indonesians told the New Zealanders that Indonesia and the U.S. have agreed on principles concerning archipelagos and straits, including passage and overflight, and an American delegation would be visiting Jakarta soon to work out details (AMEMB Jakarta 13865/140900Z Nov 74).[1]

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(C) Law of the Sea. On 6 December members of the staff held discussions, in my office, with RADM Max Morris, JCS LOS Representative. RADM Morris and Professor John Norton Moore were en route to Indonesia and the Philippines. RADM Morris hopes to secure agreement on draft articles concerning archipelago concepts. He believes this will produce public written positions which may stimulate and spur lagging world-wide negotiations preparatory to the March 1975 Geneva LOS Convention. He also expects more active negotiations after 28 December when the President approves the official U.S. positions on LOS.[2]

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(S) Law of the Sea. The Indian Ocean has been labeled an Internation Zone of Peace by a majority of voting members of the United Nations General Assembly. This position does not "square" with currently accepted principles of customary and conventional International Law which is that "freedom of the high seas" includes (1) Freedom of navigation; (2) Freedom of fishing; (3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; (4) Freedom to fly over the high seas. India has been described as a "reluctant supporter" of the U.N. Resolution. Publicly, she must strongly oppose "Big Power" presence in the Indian Ocean, while privately she does not wish to foreclose her own naval and nuclear options. When the British announced approval of U.S.-Diego Garcia expansion plans, the GOI issued a joint communique with the German Democratic Republic which strongly opposed strengthening foreign bases in the Indian Ocean, "like the one on Diego Garcia".[3]

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1. J73/Memo/00382-74 of 18 Nov 74, Subj: WEB, 11-17 Nov 74.
2. J73/Memo/0407-74 of 9 Dec 74, Subj: WEB, 2-8 Dec 74.
3. J73/Memo/00415-74 of 16 Dec 74, Subj: WEB, 9-15 Dec 74.

(C) In the foregoing exerpts from the Weekly Executive Briefs (WEBs) of the Staff Judge Advocate, the entry for 9 September noted a State Department request for embassies to comment on U.S. Senate bills which would unilaterally establish U.S. rights to minerals in the deep seabed and a 200 mile economic zone. This 3 September query by State was followed on 5 September by testimony against such unilateral action during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the proposed bills. The State Department spokesmen reviewed the long and difficult negotiations toward an international LOS agreement, and warned that unilateral action by the United States at this stage would prompt retaliatory actions by other nations. More importantly, such action would make any LOS agreement in the United Nations highly unlikely. This judgment was supported by replies to the State message from the Australia and New Zealand U.S. Embassies. Both judged that, if the U.S. unilateral deep seabed fisheries legislation passed, similar and perhaps more drastic actions by the two countries were virtually certain.[1]

Legislation Re U.S. Involvement in Hostilities

(U) In September 1973, the CINCPAC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) published the first of a series of Newsletters, the purpose of which was to circulate and exchange information on international law matters within the Pacific Command. In the first Newsletter for 1974, the CINCPAC SJA reviewed the two most important pieces of legislation concerning the involvement of the United States in hostilities. The letter noted that, while decisions as to the applicability of such statutes probably would be made either in Washington or by CINCPAC, field commanders might question their judge advocates and lawyers. The Newsletter offered the following brief statements:[2]

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War Powers Resolution. PL 93-148, effective 7 November 1973, places partial restraints upon the President's power to introduce U.S. armed forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances. In general, a sixty day limitation is

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1. Dept of State Bulletin, 23 Sep 74, statements to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on 5 Sep by Carlyle E. Maw, Under Secretary of State; John R. Stevenson, Spec. Rep. of the President and Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, and John N. Moore, Dep. Spec. Rep. and Deputy Chairman; AMEMB Canberra 5785/040745Z Sep 74; AMEMB Wellington 2803/060030Z Sep 74.
2. CINCPAC SJA Newsletter 1-74 of 31 Mar 74.

placed on such introduction. However, Congress may during the sixty day period by concurrent resolution direct the President to remove the US armed forces. Text of the War Powers Resolution can be found at 50 USCA 1541-1548 (1974 pocket part) and in US Code Congressional and Administrative News, 1973, No. 11, 15 December 1973.

"Stop the Bombing Amendment." This is the legislation which brought to a halt our combat activities in Cambodia. As a general proposition it, in effect, prohibits combat activities by the United States military forces in or over or from off shores of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia. This, unlike the War Powers Resolution, is "purse strings" legislation. It was first enacted in appropriations acts. (See for example section 108, PL 93-52, Continuing Appropriations, 1974, and section 307, PL 93-53, Second Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1973.) Congress has now enacted the prohibition into permanent law in section 30 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, PL 93-189, approved 17 December 1973. This permanent provision can be found in a note to 22 USCA 2151 (page 45, 1974 pocket part) and in US Congressional and Administrative News, 1973, No. 12, 25 January 1974, p. 4919.

CINCPAC Inventory of International Agreements

(U) In January 1974, the office of the CINCPAC SJA published the first data automated inventory of international agreements in the Pacific Command. The CINCPAC inventory was of previously unpublished classified and unclassified agreements, and would be updated as newly concluded agreements were identified and added to the data base. The inventory was designed to remove a major workload from the field; i.e., the manual preparation of annual inventories.[1]

Selected Politico-Military-Legal Subjects

Legality of U.S. Military Operations

(U) The CINCPAC SJA was called upon, with increasing frequency, to give opinions on the legality of U.S. military operations in the Pacific. The principal legal authorities involved were the Vietnam Cease-fire Agreements,

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1. Ibid; J73/Memo/54-74 of 4 Feb 74, WEB, 28 Jan-3 Feb 74; CINCPAC ltr Ser 0076 of 30 Jan 74, Subj: CINCPAC Inventory of International Agreements.
2. J73 HistSum, Mar-Jun, Sep 74; specific cases are discussed under applicable countries in Chapters V and VII.

the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148), the "Stop the Bombing" amendment (P.L. 93-189), the Cooper-Church amendment (P.L. 91-652), and the Cambodia personnel limitation (P.L. 93-226).

United States Versus Ruiz

(U) On 5 July 1974, the Court of Military Appeals, in United States versus Private R. J. Ruiz, U.S. Army, ruled that Article 31(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) was broader in scope than the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and that the right of military personnel against self-incrimination applied to administrative as well as criminal proceedings. The court thus found that an order to the plaintiff by his commanding officer to provide a urine sample violated Article 31 and was unlawful. The court offered a solution to the problem raised by the ruling: that service personnel who refuse to produce a urine sample, after being advised under Article 31, be discharged honorably. On 12 July, the Department of the Army filed a petition for reconsideration; on 18 July, the Defense Department ordered the suspension of all urinalysis programs. On 12 August, the Army petition for a rehearing was denied. Pending a decision by Defense as to other cources of action, the urinalysis program remained suspended for the rest of the year.[1]

Micronesian War Damage Claims.

(U) In February 1974, the Chairman, Foreign Claims Settlement Commission visited the CINCPAC SJA. The Commission, located in Washington, D.C., had cognizance over war damage and allied claims specifically referred to it by the Congress. Among its tasks was the adjudication of Micronesian war damage claims. The total claimed by Micronesia was approximately $2.4 billion, but only $30 million was available for settlement. The Chairman speculated that payments for valid claims would probably have to be pro-rated. The commission had been staffed for 5,000 expected claims. Since 11,000 were filed, his trip to Saipan was to investigate means to speed the adjudication process.[2]

Suits Against Admiral Gayler, et al.

(U) On 18 September 1974, CINCPAC was served with the process and complaint in a civil suit of Honolulu District Lodge 51, International Association of

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1. J73 HistSums, Jul, Aug 74; DA 101821Z Jul 74; J73 Memo For Record, 18 Jul 74, Subj: Drug Exemption Program (Urinalysis); J73/Memo/274-74 of 16 Aug 74, Subj: DOD Urinalysis Program (US v Ruiz); J73/Memo/218-74 of 15 Jul 74, Subj: WEB, 8-14 Jul 74; J73/Memo/232-74 of 22 Jul 74, Subj: WEB 15-21 Jul 74.
2. J73/Memo/63-74 of 19 Feb 74, Subj: WEB, 9-18 Feb 74; this subject included for easy table of contents or index reference, but did not at that time directly involve CINCPAC.

Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO against Admiral Gayler, Secretary of the Army Calloway, Secretary of the Air Force McLucas, General Louis L. Wilson, CINCPACAF, and General Richard G. Stillwell, acting CINCUSARPAC. The complaint alleged that the defendants failed to apply and enforce service regulations and Federal laws by permitting servicemen to work during off-duty hours for Hawaii Air Tour Service (HATS) which was being struck by the plaintiff. In addition to injunctive relief, the plaintiff asked for damages against the defendants in their personal capacities. Accordingly, it was necessary for Admiral Gayler to request in writing that the U.S. Attorney provide legal representation.[1]

(U) On 1 October, the Defense Department promulgated new policy guidance which prohibited service members from accepting employment with firms being struck. On 7 October, the CINCPAC SJA notified Admiral Gayler that the hearing on the preliminary injunction, scheduled for that day, had been cancelled by agreement between the attorneys to withdraw the suit. Meanwhile, the Army and Air Force components had directed that the new Defense policy be enforced by terminating all employment begun after the strike.[2]

(U) Although the objectives of the union may have been met, ten of the servicemen involved felt themselves aggrieved. They filed a suit in the U.S. District Court of Hawaii to enjoin termination of their employment. The process and complaint were received on 16 October on behalf of James M. Beasley, et al. against Admiral Gayler, Calloway, McLucas, Wilson and Stillwell, with the additional inclusion of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. Since the defendants were sued in their official capacities, rather than personnally, no special request for representation was necessary. On 18 October, the plaintiffs withdrew their action "without prejudice." They could, as a legal matter, reinstitute the action, but there were no further developments for the balance of 1974.[3]

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1. J73/Memo/313-74 of 18 Sep 74, Subj: Civil Suit by Union re Off-Duty Employment of Military Personnel; CINCPAC 190232Z Sep 74; Navy JAG 231735Z Sep 74; J73/Memo/324-74 of 24 Sep 74, Subj: Civil Suit by Union re Off-Duty Employment of Military Personnel; Ltr, CINCPAC (Admiral Gayler) to U.S. Attorney (Mr. Fong), 24 Sep 74, n.s.; CINCPAC 250124Z Sep 74.
2. SECDEF 4170/012059Z Oct 74; J73/Memo/337-74 of 7 Oct 74, Subj: Civil Suit by Union re Off-Duty Employment of Military Personnel; CINCUSARPAC 050256Z Oct 74; CINCPACAF 032015Z Oct 74
3. J73/Memo/349-74 of 16 Oct 74, Subj: Item for Admiral Gayler's Daily Summary - Civil Suit; CINCPAC (J73) Ltr to Office of the Secretary of Defense, General Counsel, 16 Oct 74, Subj: Civil Suit Against Admiral Gayler - HATS; CINCPAC 170244Z Oct 74; CINCPAC 230209Z Oct 74.

(U) Project FRESH (Facilities Requirements Evaluation, State of Hawaii) was a comprehensive review of all Department of Defense real property holdings in Hawaii. The study considered, among other factors, the projected force levels to be stationed in Hawaii; the availability of facilities to support these forces; current and future uses of all bases; opportunities for consolidation or joint use of military facilities; and, the feasibility of releasing unneeded real estate. On 17 September 1973, a local environmental protection group, the Life of the Land, et al., brought suit against the Secretary of Defense on grounds of violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969. On 26 December 1973, the CINCPAC SJA was notified that the Secretary of Defense had been served with a copy of the complaint, but no trial date had been set by the end of 1973.[1]

(U) On 14 February 1974, the law suit against Project FRESH was dismissed in the local U.S. District Court. In March, the CINCPAC SJA received the Judge's Order and Judgment. The Order indicated that the FRESH Plan itself did not violate the NEPA nor the Defense Department directive on Environmental Impact Statements. The Order implied that NEPA would not apply unless and until the Secretary of Defense attempted to execute the plan or portions thereof.[2]

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, p. 678; also see Chapter V, Section V of that history.
2. J73/Memo/084-74 of 10 Mar 74, Subj: WEB, 4-10 74.

SECTION IV

COUNTRY RELATIONSHIPS

Australia

(S) Late 1973 and early 1974 public opinion polls in Australia reflected a decline in the popularity of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and his Australian Labor Party (ALP). By contrast, the popularity of Opposition Leader Billy Snedden had risen. Media interest in U.S. installations in Australia had declined following the announcement by the Government of Australia (GOA) that Northwest Cape negotiations had been successfully concluded, and the implication that major concessions had been made by the United States. Actual concessions had been minor but important for GOA face-saving.[1]

(U) In April 1974, the GOA announced, during an ASEAN meeting in Canberra, the donation of $5 million toward projects suitable for cooperation between ASEAN and GOA. During the meeting, held on 16-17 April to discuss economic cooperation between the GOA and ASEAN, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs summarized the foreign policy of Australia thusly:[2]

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> Our foreign policy seeks a more independent stance in international affairs, an image that is less military-oriented and not open to suggestions of racialism, and recognition for Australia as a distinctive, fair-minded, cooperative middle power in the Asian-Pacific region, as in the world at large.

(U) One week before, the Minister for Defense addressed the Australian House of Representatives in a far-ranging review of Australia's defense policy. He stressed the GOA assessment that no real strategic or regional threat existed nor was likely to for at least 15 years. He announced additional cutbacks in defense manpower and procurement, stating that, in view of the low threat probability, "...We simply cannot go on wasting resources...." In the same presentation he affirmed GOA support to ANZUS and the FPDA, denying,

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 681-684; J221 Point Paper, 8 Mar 74, Subj: Current Situation in Australia.
2. Australian Foreign Affairs Record, Apr 74, pp. 280-283.

however, that Australia would, "...simply sit back and rely on the ANZUS treaty."[1]

(C) In May 1974, elections in Australia returned the ALP to power, but without a clearcut majority. The ALP caucus elected Dr. James Cairns as Deputy Prime Minister replacing Lance Barnard, who retained the Defense Minister Portfolio. Cairns was opposed to long-term continuation of U.S. defense facilities in Australia, but believed that advancing technology would, in due course, lead to their obsolescence.[2]

(S) In July, the U.S. Ambassador reported on a three-hour conversation with Whitlam and the Foreign Minister (Willesee) during which Whitlam recognized the importance of the U.S. installations, not only to the United States, but to, "...promote the negotiating process between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. This is of course of great importance to all countries, Australia included...." Neither Whitlam nor Willesee believed that Cairns, in spite of previously-expressed strong opposition to the U.S. facilities, would associate himself with the anti-base movement.[3]

(S) By the end of the year, the economic realities of unemployment, inflation, strikes and soaring wages found Whitlam fighting for survival as Australia's economy followed the downward trend of the industrialized world. While the administration was preoccupied with domestic affairs, the U.S. Embassy cautioned that the future of U.S. defense facilities in Australia could prove a contentious issue during the biennial ALP conference in February 1975. An anti-foreign military bases group had been established in Canberra on 3 November, preceded by a letter to the editor of the Canberra Times which stated that the presence of foreign military bases hampered Australia's effort to build an independent foreign policy and invited nuclear attack. Moreover, the platform committee of the ALP included inveterate critics of the U.S. facilities.[4]

Shipping Levy on U.S. Navy-Chartered Vessel

(C) In December 1973, a question had arisen regarding the liability of a vessel chartered by the U.S. Military Sealift Transport Service (MSTS) to pay a levy under an Australian domestic law entitled "The Pollution of the Sea by Oil (Shipping Levy) Act of 1972." The U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General (JAG) considered vessels time-chartered by the MSTS to be vessels of the U.S. Armed Forces, and hence included within the Agreed Minute to Article 23 of the Status

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1. Ibid, pp. 269-278; J511 Summary Paper, 5 Mar 74, Subj: Australian Defense Strategy.
2. J513 Point Paper, 19 Jun 74, Subj: Aftermath of Australian Elections.
3. SECSTATE 160797/242127Z Jul 74 (EX).
4. IPAC Point Paper, 29 Jan 75, Subj: Current Situation in Australia; AMEMB Canberra 7298/060723Z Nov 74.

of Forces Act. Accordingly, the Navy JAG instructed CINCPAC to direct that no levy be paid pending further discussion. The vessel in question, the SS AMERICAN CHALLENGER, had departed Northwest Cape without payment, but a promise to pay had been made. CINCPAC requested copies of the Australian statute and implementing regulations so that the Navy JAG and CINCPAC could review and generate future guidance on the matter. Subsequent messages advised of the GOA position that only U.S. Government-owned and operated vessels were exempt from payment of the levy.[1]

(C) In response to Navy JAG query, the CINCPAC Representative (CINCPACREP) in Australia confirmed, on 23 January 1974, the GOA position that Military Sea lift Command (MSC) chartered vessels were not considered to be MSC vessels; therefore, the SOFA did not apply. On 26 February, CINCPAC was informed of a 5 February letter from the Australian Department of Transportation which directed withdrawal of the levy previously imposed on the SS AMERICAN CHALLENGER. The rationale advanced was that the levy should not be imposed under the Act on ships which "belong to" the United States--the test being whether the ship and crew were under the absolute control of the United States, even though chartered. Interpretation of the Act, according to the letter, should not be confined to the "owned by" criterion.[2]

Republic of China

U.S.-ROC Relations

(S) The problem of two Chinas had been a U.S. foreign policy dilemma since the ouster of the Republic of China (ROC) from the United Nations in 1971. The Shanghai Communique of 28 February 1972, issued during President Nixon's trip to the People's Republic of China (PRC), had a more lasting effect on U.S.-ROC relationships. The progressive reduction of U.S. military forces and installations on Taiwan "as tensions in the area diminished" proceeded apace, and, by late 1974, some chinks in the armor of "oriental inscrutability" were apparent. Repeated assurances that overtures to Peking did not alter the long-standing obligations of the United States under the Mutual Security Treaty had initially enabled the ROC to adjust to its new international environment. By

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, p. 683.
2. J73 HistSums Jan, Feb 74; Navy JAG 161600Z Jan 74; CINCPAC 180204Z Jan 74; USAFLO/CINCPACREP Australia 230050Z Jan 74; CINCPACFLT 260151Z Feb 74, which passed NAVCOMMSTA Harold E. Holt 220930Z Feb 74; the MSTS was redesignated MSC after passage of the Act.

September 1974, there was evidence that senior ROC military leaders had begun to reassess the United States policy toward the ROC and to express suspicion, bitterness and disillusionment.[1]

(S) In November, the U.S. Embassy submitted to the State Department an assessment of likely ROC reaction to President Ford's scheduled visit to Peking in February 1975. The Ambassador stressed that his assessment was only for "the next few months" and that U.S. willingness to offer reassuring statements and gestures, as well as the general economic situation on Taiwan, could influence even a short-term appraisal. In brief, the Embassy expected no panic, but the politically sophisticated would interpret the Ford visit as evidence of inevitable U.S. recognition of the PRC. The suspicion of ultimate U.S. intentions, already present in senior military circles, would increase, and pressure would increase to obtain as much military hardware as possible against the day when the pipeline would be shut down. U.S. decisions on key military hardware requests would be scrutinized closely for possible political significance.[2]

(S) The prevailing sensitivity of United States and PACOM political-military relationships with the ROC was also evidenced by the repeated examinations of command relationships and rank structure vis-a-vis CINCPAC and the U.S. military organizations in Taiwan. For the third successive year, the CINCPAC SJA repeated his enjoinder against merging Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) personnel with the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (TDC), noting the special diplomatic placement of MAAG activities under the direction and control of the Chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission. In December, during his visit to CINCPAC, Robin Olds, staff consultant to the Senate Armed Services Committee, asked whether it was true that the Commander, USTDC three-star billet was essentially for political reasons. He was informed that CINCPAC had been instructed to make no changes in the separate identity of the MAAG and TDC or the status of flag/general officers without prior approval.[3]

(C) Against this international and CINCPAC-level background, the routine relationships of the U.S. military forces on Taiwan were based on the provisions of the SOFA. The SOFA provided for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the ROC over U.S. personnel only by recalling the SOFA-stipulated waiver for certain types of offenses. The intention of the ROC to recall a SOFA waiver of jurisdiction was conveyed to U.S. officials on a case-by-case basis, and

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1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 685, 686; IPAC Point Paper, 4 Nov 74, Subj: Republic of China Status; DOD/PRO 081930Z Oct 74 (EX).
2. AMEMB Taipei 7109/300516Z Nov 74.
3. J73 HistSum Mar 74; J73/Memo/0095-74 of 21 Mar 74, Subj: MAAG China-TDC JMP; CINCPAC 210347Z Dec 74, which cited JCS 3895/111300Z Jul 74.

usually involved crimes of violence or the possession, use and sale of narcotics. Certain cases generated disagreement between ROC and U.S. officials on interpretation of the SOFA and Chinese law. Some of these disagreements involved the application of Chinese martial law to U.S. personnel; the definition of narcotics; the definition of the inter se and "directed against provisions of the SOFA; and, the changing of charges and raising of lower court sentences by appellate levels of the Chinese judiciary.[1]

Altering of Sentence - Lutz

(U) The case of SGT Ronald A. Lutz originally had offered no challenge to SOFA interpretation. Lutz had been charged with the murder of a Chinese female, in 1972, in a case which involved particularly grisly details. He was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment for negligent homicide on 10 January 1973. Lutz appealed, and on 12 July 1973, was found guilty of homicide under a different article of the Chinese criminal code and sentenced to five years imprisonment. He appealed to the Supreme Court, which, on 30 November 1973, ordered the case returned to the Taiwan High Court.[2]

(U) On 12 February 1974, a rehearing on Lutz' homicide conviction was conducted by the Taichung High Court. The court granted a two week delay to enable Lutz to obtain information from the FBI regarding the pubic hair comparison tests conducted earlier in his trial proceedings. On 21 May 1974, the final hearing was held, and judgment was announced on 28 May. Lutz was found guilty of homicide and sentenced to five years.[3]

(U) In October, Lutz' local base officials received advance notice that the Taiwan Supreme Court would return the case to the Taichung Branch, Taiwan High Court for rehearing. The local judge advocate noted that this would be the fourth hearing since the incident on 22 April 1972, during which time Lutz had been on international hold with his activities closely monitored. The installation commander considered this a form of disciplinary action which had served the cause of justice, and requested the TDC to intercede with the ROC for dismissal of the charge. The TDC replied that no grounds under Chinese law of SOFA existed for dismissal.[4]

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1. CINCPAC Command Histories, 1970, 1971, 1972, Vol. II, in which detailed accounts of specific cases may be found. Beginning with the 1973 history, individual cases were acknowledged, but only to address specific aspects of the SOFA.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, p. 687.
3. J73 HistSums, Feb and May 74, 6217 CSG 120600Z Feb 74; 6217 CSG 090730Z, 210630Z, 280240Z Feb 74.
4. J73 HistSum Oct 74; 6217 CSS 180220Z Oct 74; COMUSTDC 210501Z Oct 74.

(U) On 7 November, the 6217th Combat Support Squadron (Ching Chuan Kang Air Base) advised that the Supreme Court had remanded Lutz' case to the Taichung Branch for another rehearing. Contrary to the installation commander's belief that justice had been served, the Supreme Court decision noted the brutal nature of the case and that the sentence of five years was a procedural error, in that Chinese law specified a minimum of ten years for homicide. In other words, insufficient justification existed to apply Article 59 of the ROC criminal code, which stated, "A punishment may be reduced at discretion because of extenuating circumstances." In reviewing the case for CINCPAC, the TDC noted that the original 18 month sentence for negligent homicide had been appealed against the advice of counsel. Consequently, the expectation was that the High Court would find Lutz guilty once again, and that the sentence would be ten years, rather than five.[1]

(U) On 19 December, an investigative hearing was held during which Lutz requested the testimony of three witnesses who lived in the apartment building where the alleged murder took place. He also presented documentary evidence in mitigation, including performance reports and statements from supervisors. The year ended, however, with the Lutz case still undecided, and the next High Court hearing scheduled for 9 January 1975.[2]

Status of Alien SOFA Dependent - Ransdorf

(U) In 1973, a Chinese female spouse of a U.S. Air Force member was arrested for possession, use and sale of heroin at her husband's off-base quarters. Since the female was a ROC citizen, Chinese officials stated that she was not entitled to trial as a SOFA dependent--which primarily involved her right to confront witnesses against her. The TDC had strongly protested this ROC interpretation of the SOFA to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). The woman was eventually allowed to confront the witness, which implied due process as a SOFA dependent, but no official commitment was made by the ROC, and the question had not been resolved at the TDC-MOFA level in 1973.[3]

(U) In June 1974, a similar case involved the Chinese wife of TSGT Joseph M. Ransdorf, U.S. Air Force member stationed at Tainan Air Base. Local Chinese authorities refused to provide Air Force officials with a copy of the judgment against her on the grounds that Chinese nationals were not subject to SOFA provisions. The woman paid a fine and the case was closed. Nevertheless, the basic question remained at the end of 1974.[4]

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1. J73 HistSum Nov 74; 6217 CSS 270800Z Nov 74; COMUSTDC 130735Z Nov 74.
2. J73 HistSum Dec 74; 6217 CSS 200845Z Dec 74.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 687, 688.
2. J73 HistSum Jun 74; 6214 ABG 062345Z Jun 74.

First Pre-trial Confinement by ROC - Jenkins

(U) The case of SP5 Rodney V. Jenkins, U.S. Army, was noteworthy because his was the first known instance of pre-trial confinement by ROC authorities since the SOFA. Jenkins was apprehended by Chinese and U.S. Navy investigators at his home while in possession of heroin and marijuana. He was alleged to be regularly involved in the buying and selling of both substances. He was initially confined at the facilities of the Headquarters Support Activity Taipei. After notice of serious incident to the ROC and subsequent recall of jurisdiction, Jenkins was released to ROC authority for confinement on the grounds that the U.S. confinement facility was not secure enough to assure Jenkins availability for trial. A pre-detention hearing was held at the Taipei Prosecutor's office on 30 December 1974, and Jenkins was transported to the New Taipei prison, where he awaited trial in 1975. Meanwhile, CINCPAC requested TDC to advise the reason for the appointment of a U.S. Navy trial observer rather than one from the Service of the accused, of which three were available in Taipei. No reply had been received at years' end.[1]

Japan

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> ....Despite the reported success we and the Japanese have had in surmounting practical problems in our bilateral relations, the appearance of every new source of friction invariably gives rise to anxious soul searching and widespread journalistic speculation about the survival of the relationship itself. The durability of the U.S.-Japan relationship is demonstrated by its survival of periodic crises; yet doubts about its resilience and adaptability persist.[2]

The Presidential Visit

(U) As was obvious by the preceding quotation, the key role of Japan in U.S. foreign policy was not only acknowledged, but singled out for emphasis by ranking U.S. State and Defense Department officials. In this instance, Secretary Ingersoll's theme was the "fine tuning" of the U.S.-Japan relation-

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1. J73 HistSum Dec 74; CDRUSAELM MAAG Taipei 180403Z Dec 74; COMUSTDC 180941Z Dec 74; ADMIN COMUSTDC 300115Z Dec 74 and 310605Z Dec 74; CDR USACC 270916Z Dec 74; HEDSUPPACT Taipei 310400Z Dec 74; CINCPAC 310243Z Dec 74.
2. Dept of State Bulletin, 25 Mar 74, "Japan and Its Relationship with the United States," Address by Robert S. Ingersol, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs on 28 Feb 74.

ship--by which he referred to the necessary adjustments of policy by both governments to meet new problems or to accommodate new developments in old problem areas. He stressed the imperatives of political, economic and strategic interdependence which called for maturity and pragmatism in dealing with sources of friction. In 1974, as in past years, political, economic and military realities continued to test this relationship.[1]

(C) Japan's political and economic situation deteriorated badly in 1974, but showed some signs of improvement at year's end. Premier Kakuei Tanaka resigned on 26 November after a series of setbacks--inability to control inflation, a Diet Upper House election defeat in July, the resignation of two cabinet ministers, and a scandal about his personal finances. The factionalized Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) elected Prime Minister Takeo Miki as a compromise selection on 9 December. Japan's economy was in a recession, and the real gross national product was expected to show a decline of one or two percent for the first time in postwar years. During the months preceding President Ford's visit to Japan, inflation was at an annual rate of 23 percent. Unemployment, virtually unheard of prior to the rise in oil prices, was rising rapidly. Unionized labor was expected to demand increases of up to 20 percent, with nationwide strikes a definite possibility.[2]

(S) Thus it was that the presidential trip to Japan which Ford inherited from Nixon after the Watergate debacle was scheduled during the political turbulence just before Tanaka's resignation. Normal precautions against inadvertent incidents caused by the U.S. military operations in Northeast Asia were directed by the JCS. These included specific limitations for reconnaissance operations and surface vessels; launches or recoveries from Japanese bases (including Okinawa) were prohibited during President Ford's physical presence in Japan and South Korea. On the Japanese side, notice had been given to the Government that several organizations would demonstrate in protest to the visit. The "National Students' United Movement to Oppose the Ford Visit, Demand Early Opening of Special Diet Session, and Overthrow the Tanaka Cabinet" was one example of demonstration titles. Another was entitled, "Workers' and Students' General Uprising to Oppose the Ford Visit and Block Nuclear Armament of Japan." Japanese security forces had pinpointed 68 areas between the airport and Tokyo to be watched closely or patrolled to prevent encroachment by demonstrators on possible ground transportation routes.[3]

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1. Ibid.
2. COMIPAC 012211Z Jan 74; IPAC Point Paper, 5 Nov 74, Subj: Japan Situation.
3. CINCPAC ALPHA 016/120254Z Nov 74; CDR COMD & COORD SET DP ZAMA 171410Z Nov 74.


(U) On 11 November, during a press conference in Tokyo, Prime Minister Tanaka was asked whether he intended to raise the subject of nuclear weapons in Japan with President Ford. He replied that he didn't think the subject would be raised because, "...it is a technical matter and I see no need to raise such matters at the summit."[1]

(S) In his bi-weekly report to Admiral Gayler on matters of interest to U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ), COMUS Japan stated that, in spite of potential obstacles, the Ford visit not only was smooth and uneventful, but appeared to have been an unqualified success.[2] [redacted] The heavy security measures in effect were clearly not aimed at the Japanese people nor the threat of massive political demonstrations, but rather against possible desperate action by hard-core radicals. Although some critics had questioned the appropriateness and utility of the visit, it appeared that the visit justified itself, since, [redacted]

Political Influences on Military Relationships

[redacted]

1. AMEMB Tokyo 14713/120800Z Nov 74.
2. COMUSJAPAN 070622Z Dec 74.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 163-167; COMUSJAPAN 170932Z Jan 74.



1. Ibid.

(U) In March, a speculative Washington press report cited apparent disagreement between the Pentagon and the State Department regarding U.S. policy in Asia. Crediting a "senior Pentagon official" and "senior foreign policy officials" for the views expressed in the article, differences were especially stressed in assessments of foreign policy toward Japan. The "foreign policy officials" were alleged to have stated that there was no evidence that Japan was rethinking its defense posture. On the other hand, the "senior Pentagon official" was quoted as saying that the Japanese would re-think their entire self-defense program.[1]


[redacted]

(S) The PACAF comments of March 1974 took on added significance in October, when the U.S. Embassy noted the intention of the director general of the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) to discuss bilateral planning with Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. Director General Yamanaka informed a Diet committee of his intentions, and his statement drew almost no comment or criticism. The Embassy stressed, however, that contingency planning remained a sensitive subject in Japan and that the U.S. Government should move carefully and at the pace set by Japan.[3]


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
1. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 5 Mar 74, "The U.S. in Asia", Leslie H. Gelb, New York Times Service.
2. CINCPACAF 230200Z Mar 74.
3. AMEMB Tokyo 13310/110915Z Oct 74.




1./. J52 Point Paper, 10 Oct 74, Subj: Yamanaka Discussions with Secretary Schlesinger; J53 Point Paper, 20 Dec 74, Subj: U.S.-Japan Force Complementarity.




1. J73 HistSum Jul 74; COMNAVFORJAPAN 111048Z Jul 74; 131240Z Jul 74; 170844Z Jul 74; 180831Z Jul 74; 190818Z Jul 74; 220945Z Jul 74; 232025Z Jul 74; 241022Z Jul 74; 290919Z Jul 74; USS MIDWAY 140203Z Jul 74; COMUSJAPAN 170205Z Jul 74.
2. J73/Memo/00219-74 of 15 Jul 74, Subj: Defense Request for CINCPAC as Witness-USS MIDWAY Cases.



1. J74 HistSum Aug 74; COMNAVFORJAPAN 141005Z Aug 74, 150436Z Aug 74.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 10698/160950Z Aug 74.



1. COMNAVFORJAPAN 191155Z Aug 74; AMEMB Tokyo 10870/210850Z Aug 74.
2. AMEMB Tokyo 12995/070426Z Oct 74; AMCONSUL NAHA 425/070850Z Oct 74; SECSTATE 221059/072343Z Oct 74; Honolulu Advertiser, 8 Oct 74, "Japan Furor Over N-arms", Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post Service, dateline Tokyo; AMEMB Tokyo 13060/080020Z Oct 74; AMCONSUL Naha 090821Z Oct 74; COMNAVFORJAPAN 090835Z Oct 74.



(U) This judgment was borne out by COMUS Japan's report of the top ten domestic news stories compiled by Japanese newspapers--some with lists selected

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1. COMNAVFORJAPAN 110821Z Oct 74; SECSTATE 225791/120013Z Oct 74; AMEMB Tokyo 13328/140730Z Oct 74.
2. CINCPAC ALPHA 17/170342Z Oct 74.
3. AMEMB Seoul 6547/022310Z Oct 74 (EX).

by readers, and some selected by editors. Both lists accorded the Tanaka resignation the number one position. Below that, the priorities were different. The editors listed President Ford's visit as number two, and the Larocque congressional testimony on nuclear weapons as number seven. The readers did not choose the Larocque story among the top ten. COMUS Japan noted that, while it was impossible to define precisely the significance of the published lists, they tended to underscore the unpredictable character of the nuclear problem. He speculated that the Japanese people assessed the likelihood as small that they could force a departure from the traditional positions established by both governments in responding to allegations over the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan by U.S. Forces. If so, it could suggest that established U.S. policy on this sensitive issue had been more effective than generally realized. It was also possible that the Japanese people placed a high value on the overall Japan-U.S. relationship and were unwilling to jeopardize it over what they perceived as a more secondary issue.[1]

Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction-Ie Shima Range

[redacted]

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1. COMUSJAPAN 140700Z Jan 75.

[redacted]

Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction-Case Load

(U) In August 1974, the CINCPAC SJA advised CINCPAC that the number of U.S. Forces personnel in post-trial confinement in Japan (127 as of May 1974) was considerably higher than in the next highest country, West Germany (84). It was also much higher, both in numbers and proportionally, than any other PACOM country. The statistics available indicated that the high confinement rate in Japan was related to drug offenses. Responding to a letter from the CINCPAC Chief of Staff, COMUS Japan provided a detailed analysis of the Japan confinement rate, attributing the high rate to the hard line approach taken by the Japanese on drug cases, especially on Okinawa. He had no panacea, but opined

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1. J73 HistSum Jul 74; J73/Memo/239-74 of 24 Jul 74, Subj: Shooting Incident at Ie Shima Range; J73/Memo/0243-74 of 26 Jul 74, Subj: Latest Info re Ie Shima Shooting Case; 19 messages, microfilmed, CINCPAC History Archives.
2. J73 HistSums Aug-Dec 74; 27 messages, microfilmed, CINCPAC History Archives.
3. AMEMB Tokyo 16829/270808Z Dec 74.

that persistent education and rehabilitation efforts could be a long term solution. By 30 November, the number in confinement had risen to 146.[1]

Korea

U.S.-Korea Relations

(U) The first United States security commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK) ante-dated the Korean Conflict by about six months, when the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement was signed on 26 January 1950. Concurrently, a U.S. Military Advisory Group to the ROK was established. The Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) entered into force on 17 November 1954. Under Article IV of the MDT a SOFA was signed on 9 July 1966. Related to these agreements was the agreement regarding the status of United Nations forces in Japan, signed on 19 February 1954, which authorized the use of bases in Japan to conduct operations of the United Nations Command. Under agreed minutes between the ROK and U.S. Governments, ROK Armed Forces were to remain under the operational control of the United Nations Command so long as that Command had responsibility for the defense of the ROK.[2]

(U) Since the Korean Armistice in 1953, the primary objective of the United States in the Korean Peninsula had been to prevent violence between North and South Korea. In 1971 and 1972, indications were that the two Koreas were amenable to the beginning of reconciliation, and these steps toward stability and peace coincided with the cessation of armed infiltration by North Korea. However, in December 1973, North Korean incursions around five U.N.-controlled islands off the west coast of the Peninsula had alarmed the ROK and U.S. military officials as well.[3]

(S) Provocations and probing continued during 1974, and relations between the two Koreas were characterized by a return to bitter polemics. Propaganda warfare became heated at times; South Korean ships were sunk and captured in February and June, and a private ROK aircraft was shot at in July when it strayed too close to the Military Demarkation Line (MDL). South Korea claimed to have sunk at least one North Korean vessel and was known by U.S. officials to have disabled and captured another. Charges and counter-charges were rife, with some of the more acrimonious exchanges taking place during meetings of the

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1. J73 HistSums Aug and Dec 74; J73/Memo/264-74 of 12 Aug 74, Subj: FCJ Cases in Japan; Ltr, Hq USFJ to CINCPAC, personal from LGEN Galligan to LGEN Moore, 5 Sep 74; Rpt, U.S. Personnel in Post-Trial Confinement in Foreign Penal Institutions, 1 Sep-30 Nov 74.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol, II, p. 701.
3. Ibid., p. 702

Military Armistice Commision (MAC).[1]

(S) Because of the increased scope of North Korean operations along the Northern Limit Line (seaward extension of the MDL), South Korea and the United Nations Command began a staged buildup of the five off-shore islands to preempt a North Korean occupation without resistance. In November, a North Korean tunnel across the MDL was discovered, and South Korea requested the United Nations to "take note" of the incident.[2]

(S) Internally, the anti-government pressure from students and Christians and political opposition to the repressive measures of the Park Chung Hee administration continued. During 1974, President Park issued specific "emergency" decrees which outlawed any expressed opposition to the Constitution or the Government. Trials of dissidents by court-martial were common, with sentences passed on high officials of the Protestant and Catholic churches as well as the political opposition.[3]

(S) The Park Government's diplomatic problems with Japan as a result of the Kim Tae Jung kidnapping case in 1973 continued in 1974. On 14 August, the ROK Government announced that their investigation into the Kim abduction from Japan was ended, since they had been unable to find evidence against those suspected of involvement. The Japanese MOFA expressed regret, because the Japanese police believed there was hard evidence against the culprits. Relations reached a critical stage following the attempted assassination of Park and the slaying of his wife on 15 August by a Japanese-born Korean. The Japanese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister offered condolences, and Prime Minister Tanaka attended the funeral for Park's wife. However, the Japanese police investigation into the assassin's political background was blocked by anti-Park and North Korean sympathizers of Korean blood in Japan. The culprit, Mun Se-Kwang, had reportedly confessed and implicated the Japan-based Korean opposition to the Park regime.[4]

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1. AMEMB Seoul 4369/060345Z Jul 74, 4514/111007Z Jul 74, 4748/230143Z Jul 74; COMNAVFORKOREA 270301Z Jul 74; CINCUNC Seoul 131020Z Aug 74; COMIPAC 012211Z Jan 75.
2. Ibid.; CINCUNC Seoul 030459Z Feb 74; 080920Z May 74; USMISSION UN 5257/210130Z Nov 74.
3. AMEMB Seoul 4402/080830Z Jul 74 and 5302/130955Z Aug 74; J22 Point Paper, 11 Jun 74, Subj: Korean Situation Report; IPAC Point Paper, 15 Nov 74, Subj: Korean Situation.
4. AMEMB Seoul 5859/160913Z Aug 74; J22 Point Paper, 19 Mar 74, Subj: Status of Kim Tae Jung Case; AMEMB Tokyo 10635/160240Z Aug 74; AMEMB Seoul 5377/161100Z Aug 74; SSO Korea 2798/171800Z Aug 74 (BOM); AMEMB Seoul 5439/200956Z Aug 74; SSO PACOM 34-74/200206Z Aug 74 (BOM); DOD/PRO Camp Smith 230730Z Aug 74; AMEMB Seoul 5712/041001Z Sep 74.

(S) These developments concerned CINCPAC as well as the diplomatic corps, since the carefully-nurtured cooperation between Japan and South Korea was a key to the concept of total force posture and forward basing in Northeast Asia. The allegation that the Japan-based, pro-North Korean Chosen Soren was involved in the assassination of Park's wife not only strained relations between Japan and the ROK, but added fuel to the growing apprehension of the ROK Government engendered by the North Korean probes of South Korean defenses. Although relations between the two Koreas remained frigid during 1974, there were indications that the ROK was attempting to improve its relations with Japan by the end of the year. The ROK had requested a resumption of ministerial level consultation and Japanese developmental and commodity loans, and had invited a team of Japanese journalists to study life in South Korea. This overture was accepted, since Japan statistics indicated South Korea to be Japan's largest export customer after the United States.[1]

(U) Coupled with the ROK internal unrest and external diplomatic difficulties was their concern over continued U.S. presence in South Korea and continued security assistance toward modernization of the ROK Armed Forces. The international stature of the ROK was preserved on 9 December when the United Nations General Assembly voted against a resolution to dissolve the United Nations Command. Their concern about the U.S. position was alleviated somewhat by the visit of President Ford to South Korea on 22 November, following his visit to Japan. The reaction to the President's visit was overwhelmingly favorable, and President Park was personally impressed, pleased and reassured by Ford's reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment to the ROK.[2]

Seventh U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting

(S) The seventh annual U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) convened on 23 September 1974 at CINCPAC Headquarters. After a welcome by Admiral Gayler and opening statements by Deputy Secretary of Defense William Clements and Defense Minister Suh, a briefing was presented by U.S. representatives on the North Korean threat to the ROK. The briefing highlighted the increase in the war-making potential of North Korea during the preceding 12 months, concluding that, although North Korea possessed the capability to initiate a surprise attack against the ROK, they could not support large scale hostilities without outside support and that such support from the PRC or Russia was unlikely. The ROK responded with an intelligence assessment which stressed the North Korean strategy for surprise attack and a short-term war, noting the number of North Korean regular and para-military units available. As in the previous year, the difference between the two assessments was of

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1. IPAC Point Paper, 20 Sep 74, Subj: Korean Problems; DOD/PRO Camp Smith 202300Z Nov 74.
2. AMEMB Seoul 7980/290851Z Nov 74.

capabilities versus intentions.[1]

(U) During the second session on 24 September, Minister Suh and Secretary Clements reviewed the progress made in modernization of the ROK Armed Forces. Clements commended the ROK efforts toward self-reliance in defense and assured Suh that the United States would strive to continue its assistance in the force modernization program and development of ROK defense industries.[2]

The ROK Constitution and FCJ

(S) The declaration of martial law by President Park in 1972 had changed the terms of reference for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction under the SOFA, which guaranteed U.S. military personnel, dependents and civilian employees due process when jurisdiction was exercised by a Korean court. For the two month duration of martial law, the right of the ROK to recall waivers of jurisdiction under Article XXII of the SOFA was suspended. A similar problem regarding due process was inherent in the revised ROK constitution which became effective after martial law was revoked. Article 53 of the new constitution gave the president broad powers to suspend civil rights and control the judiciary when an emergency existed or was anticipated. Thus, invocation of Article 53 would create a situation analogous to martial law even though martial law was not declared.[3]

(S) In January 1973, a draft text was presented to the SOFA Joint Committee by the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUS Korea) calling for automatic suspension of SOFA Article XXII if Article 53 of the ROK constitution were invoked. The ROK declined to accept automatic suspension of the FCJ provision, but did agree "to consult" with the U.S. authorities if requested. On 8 January 1974, the ROK Government did invoke Article 53 of the constitution, and the U.S. military authorities immediately requested such consultation. These consultations resulted in the transmittal by representatives of the ROK Government to the U.S. Government of informal written assurances which were made a matter of official record in the minutes of the 91st Joint Committee meeting:[4]

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1. J51 HistSum Nov 74; CINCPAC 250401Z Sep 74.
2. J51 HistSum Nov 74; CINCPAC 250350Z Sep 74.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, pp. 633, 634.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 703, 704; J73 HistSum Jan 74; Extract, Minutes of 91st Joint Committee Meeting, with Incl 30, Statement by ROK Government.

With reference to the Emergency Measures proclaimed by the President pursuant to Article 53 of the Constitution on January 8, 1974, the Government of the Republic of Korea is of the following views as regards the ROK-US Status of Forces Agreement:

1. The provisions of the Emergency Measures of January 8 will not be applied against members of the U.S. Armed forces, civilian component and their dependents covered by the SOFA.

2. With the exception of Emergency Measures the normal judicial processes remain operational and with regard to all criminal actions against those covered by the SOFA Article XXII, the SOFA remains in full force and effect and all safeguards of the SOFA are guaranteed.

Republic of the Philippines

Politico-Military Recapitulation

(S) During 1974, President Marcos remained firmly in control of the Philippines; no credible political threat to his regime was apparent. The major threat to stability from a military standpoint was internal. The dissident New People's Army (NPA) continued to be active on Luzon, and appeared to have extended its guerrilla and terrorist activities to the Visayas and Mindanao during the year. In the Mindanao-Sulu Muslim uprising, combat activity increased significantly, and there were indications that the rebel command and control techniques had improved and that anti-tank rockets had been added to their arsenal. Arab countries and Islamic organizations put steady pressure (including the potential interruption of the Philippine oil supply) on the Marcos regime to produce a political solution to the Muslim rebellion. Arab hawks and doves visited Manila, Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta seeking to influence the outcome of possible peace negotiations; as the year ended, high level Filipino representatives were scheduled for a conference with Arab representatives to explore avenues for reconciliation.[1]

(S) The dominant theme in the foreign policy of this former U.S. Commonwealth was nationalism and self-reliance. In pursuit of these goals in 1974, Marcos made overtures to the PRC, Russia and other Bloc countries to establish

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1. J22 Point Paper, 16 Jul 74, Subj: Current Situation in the Philippines; IPAC Point Paper, 5 Nov 74, Subj: Current Situation Issues in the Philippines; COMIPAC 012211Z Jan 75.

diplomatic, trade and technical assistance agreements. In September, the PRC and Philippine Governments announced an informal trade agreement for the purchase of PRC oil and Philippine raw materials. The same month, the wife of the president visited Peking, where she was accorded an impressive (and impressionable) reception. In October, the controlled media gave heavy coverage of the Foreign Policy and National Security Councils' approval to establish full diplomatic relations with Russia and the PRC.[1]

(S) The U.S. Embassy in Manila viewed the, "lavish hospitality and singular honors" showered on Mrs. Marcos during her nine-day China trip as indicative of the priority assigned by the Chinese leadership to normalization of relations with the Philippines. While acknowledging that Marcos would be cautious and calculating in his responses, the pattern of moves toward eventual diplomatic recognition, according to the Embassy, was inexorable. Apparently, this trend toward adjustment by the Philippines and other Southeast Asian nations to the realities of PRC influence was disturbing to the U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines, William Sullivan. In what he termed an attempt to, "...precipitate policy by acupuncture," Sullivan released a cable entitled, "The Yellow Peril" in May 1974, in which he postulated the probability that the PRC would eventually establish hegemony over Indochina and the rest of Southeast Asia at the expense of United States, Japanese and Russian influence. He invited responses to his analysis in somewhat the same fashion as his counterpart in India, Ambassador Moynihan, was to do a month or so later regarding Indian Ocean policy. The responses to Sullivan's original cable were not supportive of his analysis. Most did not agree that the PRC was capable of becoming the dominant influence in Southeast Asia, and some did not agree that, even if capable, such was the PRC goal.[2]

(S) In a following message, Sullivan reiterated his view that China's long-term goals posed a direct challenge to U.S. and Japanese interests in Southeast Asia. He acknowledged the differing opinions of the other diplomatic posts, some of which were singular to individual items at each post. Nevertheless, he signified his interest in developing a matrix of policy:[3]

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6. For example, here in Manila we are badly in need of some policy guidance with respect to the future of the U.S.

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1. Ibid.; J74 HistSum Sep 74; AMEMB Manila 11946/050536Z Oct 74.
2. AMEMB Manila 11675/300751Z Sep 74; AMEMB Manila 6127/240629Z May 74; AMEMB Rangoon 1769/251100Z Jun 74, which cited AMCONSUL Hong Kong 6603; AMEMB Tokyo 8434/260935Z, which cited SECSTATE 135787; SECSTATE 150343/1/112237Z Jul 74, which passed AMEMB Taipei 4173.
3. AMEMB Manila 8141/090410Z Jul 74.

military presence in Southeast Asia. Our two military bases in Clark and Subic constitute the principal facilities in this area, and are available to us only until 1991, under current arrangements. Seventeen years is a relatively short time, for planning purposes, and its horizons need to be addressed. If we truly intend to leave these bases in 1991 (or if we are compelled to do so before that time either by the U.S. Congress or external influences) we ought to begin working now on the implications of such a decision. Mindful of the rather disorderly way in which the British left Singapore, we ought to give some orderly thought to the arrangements for our departure.

7. If we presume, as in all the responses to the Yellow Peril cable, that the United States is going to continue to have a strategic role to play in Southeast Asia, we presumably must find some other base structure from which to play that role, and prepare the nations in the region for the shift. If we presume, contrary to our current posture, that the United States will not repeat not play a direct strategic role in this region, we must begin now to develop some security substitutes to replace us. We need to determine whether we think this ought to be an indigenous grouping of nations, or multinational abnegation along the lines of Malaysia's "zone of peace and neutrality," or merely catch-as-catch-can.

8. It may be that, upon due consideration of all alternatives, a policy decision will be taken to attempt to hold on to our bases here after 1991. Such a decision would set a totally different set of actions into train. There would need to be arrangements here in the Philippines (at some cost), arrangements to placate the ASEAN states, arrangements directed towards the great powers, and arrangements vis-a-vis our local allies.

9. As matters now stand, we are in the anomalous position of assuming that our base rights will terminate, as agreed, in 1991, but comporting ourselves as though we expect to be here in perpetuity. Since we clearly can not repeat not have it both ways, we need a decision. That decision will also have consequences for American investment in the Philippines, and our trade and aid programs, as well as widespread consequence in the whole region.

(S) The conclusion of the Ambassador was that the prime consideration in a decision about U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia was Chinese policy in Southeast Asia. Until some consensus solidified into coherent guidance, "...those of us attempting to implement U.S. policy in this part of the world...." would suffer from, "...an insufficiency of conceptual content."[1]

(S) As the senior U.S. military commander in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Admiral Gayler was, of course, interested in the colloquy regarding policy guidance touched off by Ambassadors Moynihan and Sullivan. However, in his contacts with Sullivan, he and his chief of staff, LGEN William Moore, concerned themselves with the purely military aspects of the political environment in the Philippines. The importance of the U.S. bases in the Philippines to the forward basing strategy called for close attention to the political and military issues with potential impact on the tenure of the bases and the nuances of people-to-people relationships. The terms of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA) had been under negotiation for several years, and, on 28 April 1974, Ambassador Sullivan informed Admiral Gayler that he did not anticipate insurmountable difficulties in reaching eventual agreement on MBA provisions. In July, General Moore reported that the Muslim insurgency in the South was demoralizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) because they were not being allowed to win in spite of significant and bloody casualties. Ambassador Sullivan told Moore that the Muslims were unlikely to settle for a negotiated peace except on their own terms--secession from the Republic of the Sulus and part of Mindanao--but there was little possibility that the Philippine Government would invoke the Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States to provide U.S. troops. Concerning the renegotiation of the MBA and the Mutual Assistance Agreement (MAA), the Ambassador believed the Philippines would probably press for a base rental provision because Military Assistance Program (MAP) levels were too low to provide the equipment needed to cope with the insurgents in the North and the rebellion in the South. In view of the mood of the U.S. Congress regarding foreign aid, however, Sullivan advised that Marcos had decided to delay the MBA negotiations so long as the Congressional mood persisted.[2]

Ambush Slaying of Three USN Officers

(S) On 13 April 1974, three U.S. Navy officers assigned to the Subic Bay Naval Supply Depot were ambushed and killed while riding a jeep in the Mariveles area. The ambush was reportedly perpetrated by members of the NPA--

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1. Ibid.
2. J51 Point Paper, 10 Oct 74, Subj: Importance of Philippines in Pacific Strategy; J51 Point Paper, 5 Nov 74; Subj: Issues Affecting U.S./Philippines; J73/Memo/0142-74 of 29 Apr 74, Subj: Items of Legal Interest in 28 Apr 74 Discussion with Ambassador Sullivan; AFSSO Udorn/Chief of Staff CINCPAC 230220Z Jul 74 (EX).

specifically, a group headed by Teofilo Valenzuela. This killing had been preceded, on 6 April, by a running gun battle between the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and dissidents believed to be NPA members 30 miles south of Clark Air Base, and the killing of three Filipinos in Tarlac near Camp O'Donnell. According to the Office of Special Investigation (OSI), the increase in dissident activity did not represent a threat to Clark Air Base, and no evidence existed that U.S. personnel or installations were being specifically targeted. The PC had established a task force (DAHLIA) numbering some 400 troops to track down and capture the NPA group connected with the ambush of the Navy officers, but, by the end of the year, none of the NPA members responsible had been apprehended.[1]

MBA Negotiations

(S) In 1972, U.S. and Philippines negotiators reached agreement on revisions to all but six of the 29 articles in the MBA. These were: criminal jurisdiction; immigration; shipping and navigation; exemption from customs and taxes; personnel tax exemption; and, base tenure. In early 1974, the Government of the Philippines (GOP) indicated interest in resuming the MBA negotiations, setting off a flurry of exchanges of view regarding various positions already well massaged by all parties in previous years. As previously noted, the ardor of the GOP cooled and no substantive progress was apparent during 1974.[2]

(S) Even though the negotiations were never officially resumed, there were two developments related to the issue worthy of special note. In May, before it became apparent that Marcos would stall the negotiations, the CINCPAC SJA advised the Chief of Staff that a paper on the MBA, originated by an unknown Filipino source, proposed such new negotiating points as Filipino base commanders at U.S. bases and rental for the use of the bases. Other points addressed in the paper, which had been "slipped under" Ambassador Sullivan's door, included specific reference to nuclear weapons control, immediate response by U.S. Forces to aggression against the Philippines, and the flying of only the Philippine flag over bases occupied by U.S. Forces.[3]

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1. Analysis, NISO Philippines, 17 May 74, Subj: Evaluation of Local Dissident Activity Subic/Clark; CINCPACREPPHIL 080923Z Nov 74 (EX); COMNAVBASE Subic 210947Z Nov 74 (EX) and 261240Z Nov 74 (EX).
2. For detailed discussions of U.S. positions, see previous CINCPAC Command Histories; J51 Point Paper, 24 Sep 74, Subj: Status of U.S./Phil MBA Renegotiations; 16 State and AMEMB Manila messages filed in CINCPAC History Archives; J73 HistSums Jan-Dec 74.
3. J73/Memo/00163-74 of 21 May 74, Subj: CINCPAC Representation in Philippine MBA Negotiations; J01/Memo/35-74 of 1 Jun 74, Subj: Philippine MBA Negotiations, with 1 encl: Paper on Military Bases Agreement.

(S) In subsequent exchanges of information with the State Department, the Ambassador attributed the Philippine "desiderata" to Juan Ponce Enrile, the GOP Minister of Defense. In any case, the general thrust of the paper had apparently been conveyed to the chief Filipino negotiator, former vice president and senator Emmanuel Palaez. The Ambassador advised State that Palaez had suggested the writing of a treaty in which the U.S. bases in the Philippines could be seen as playing a key role in the defense of the Western Pacific region, or perhaps the smaller areas encompassed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The State Department replied that the Palaez concepts embodied renegotiations of a larger scope than initially planned. State was especially concerned about any interrelationship between the U.S. bases and their function in defense of the Western Pacific if any broadening of U.S. commitments to the Philippines were implied. Also objectionable was any linkage between MAP and the U.S. bases, which Palaez' enthusiasm for Philippine "self-reliance" during the discussions seemed to imply.[1]

(S) In a more detailed report of Palaez' views, it was evident that some major points of the "desiderata" given to Sullivan in May had been espoused by Palaez. He proposed a generalized U.S.-GOP mutual defense treaty which would assert U.S. defense policy in original treaty terms, but would also, in terms of the Nixon Doctrine, endorse Philippine efforts toward self-reliance and eventual development of a regional defense capability. There would be annexes to this treaty. One would be the MBA as revised by future negotiations. Another was a vaguely conceived plan for concrete self-reliance objectives to be supported by MAP and other U.S. assistance. A third annex, to "comfort" ASEAN neighbors and emphasize the defensive nature of the bases, would state that the United States would never launch nuclear weapons from bases in the Philippines without the express consent of the GOP. The Ambassador assured the State Department that there was no reason to panic over this new approach to negotiation by the GOP since:[2]

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A. We have a perfectly valid agreement which is legally binding until 1991;

B. The Philippine Government wishes to retain our bases here; and

C. The Philippine Government does not rpt not wish a confrontation with the United States over this issue.

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1. AMEMB Manila 7082/140847Z Jun 74, 7260/190144Z Jun 74, 7611/260810Z Jun 74; SECSTATE 140348/281952Z Jun 74.
2. AMEMB Manila 7899/030813Z Jul 74 and 7900/030814Z Jul 74.

(C) On 29 July, the Ambassador submitted for State Department review a draft text of a U.S.-Philippine "Declaration of Principles," the purpose of which was to make the MBA negotiations, "...more palatable both to the Filipinos and to their Asian neighbors...." The text stressed the contributions toward regional stability made by the U.S.-Philippine partnership and emphasized the non-aggressive nature of the MDT. In August, CINCPAC informed the Ambassador of his concern with Articles VII and VIII of the proposed "Declaration of Principles." Specifically, CINCPAC noted that the achievement of, "...a posture of full self-reliance by the Armed Forces of the Philippines...," cited as the objective and justification for the MDT and the presence of U.S. bases was unrealistic. The Ambassador replied that he did not share CINCPAC's concern over the formal expression of U.S. support of AFP self-reliance. He stated that Article VII of the Declaration addressed the "ultimate objective" of full military and economic self-reliance, which he presumed CINCPAC recognized as a utopian goal.[1]

(C) On 14 September, CINCPAC acknowledged previous internal U.S. Government support of AFP self-reliance, but noted the agreed phrase, "to promote greater self-reliance" was considerably different from the concept of "full self-reliance" in the Declaration. Also, CINCPAC acknowledged his understanding of the utopian aspects of the Declaration wording, but cautioned that "...public rhetoric..." of that kind fostered situations in which the United States was open to public charges of failure to honor commitments. Further, CINCPAC queried, what was to preclude a unilateral Philippine determination of full self-reliance, thereby negating U.S. presence, if a change of political climate led to a decision by the GOP to oust the U.S. Forces from the bases? Concluding what was apparently the final CINCPAC input to the strawman Declaration, CINCPAC questioned whether, apart from the semantics, a Declaration of Principles was really in the best interests of the United States. He noted that the goal in MBA negotiations should be the retention of maximum flexibility, and that any pronouncement which placed boundaries on the U.S.-Philippine relationship appeared to be counter-productive.[2]

Mutual Defense Board Meetings

(C) The MDB was established on 15 May 1958 under the U.S.-Philippine Council of Foreign Ministers provided by the MDT. The purpose of the MDB was to allow direct liaison and consultation among appropriate authorities of the two countries on military matters of mutual concern. The GOP provided a permanent MDB office, and administrative costs were shared. CINCPAC was the

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1. AMEMB Manila 9008/290925Z Jul 74; CINCPAC 160150Z Aug 74; AMEMB Manila 9992/210637Z Aug 74.
2. CINCPAC 140121Z Sep 74.

U.S. co-chairman, but was normally represented by the CINCPAC Representative in the Philippines (CINCPACREPPHIL). The GOP co-chairman was the Chief of Staff, AFP. Monthly meetings had been held since 9 June 1958, and the anniversary meetings were usually attended by CINCPAC.[1]

(U) The Sixteenth Anniversary Meeting was held on 29 May 1974 in Manila. Admiral Gayler and Ambassador William H. Sullivan (vice Secretary of State Kissinger) represented the United States. The GOP was represented by Foreign Affairs Secretary Carlos P. Romulo and General Romeo Espino.[2]

(C) Since the MDB meetings were monthly, the only other 1974 meeting of more than routine interest was that on 4-5 November 1974 (MDB 74-10), which was hosted by CINCPAC in Hawaii. Subjects discussed during the two-day meeting included revisions to MDB Operations Plan (OPLAN) 1-70 and the possibility of establishing new committees for security assistance and legal matters. These subjects were to be studied during future meetings and presented for resolution at the May 1975 MDB anniversary meeting.[3]

MDB OPLAN 1-70

(S) The MDB published the first bilateral plan in August 1965. Two updated versions had since been published, with OPLAN 1-70 as the effective plan through 1974. The Plan provided for the defense of the Philippines against external aggression, with parallel command structures for each country. Coordination of national forces was accomplished through a Joint Coordination Control Center (JCCC). The first combined Command Post Exercise (CPX) of the plan was held on 8-10 May 1973. CPX UGNAYAN ALPHA addressed questions of command, coordination and communications within the exercise headquarters and the JCCC.[4]

(S) The post-exercise report of UGNAYAN ALPHA questioned the practicality of the "parallel" command structure in which each commander retained command and control of his national forces. The report, prepared jointly by the MDB staff, recommended that national force commanders delegate supervisory and command/control authority to the JCCC. During the formulative years of the Plan in the early 1960's, CINCPAC had specifically rejected a single chain of command because several tasks under the Plan required U.S. unilateral operations in areas outside Philippine jurisdiction. Other U.S. tasks, such as base defense, were duplicated in Philippine tasks, but defense of their country was a Filipino responsibility. U.S. operations were supportive in nature and

1. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 706, 707.
2. Brochure, Phil-US Mutual Defense Board Sixteenth Anniversary 74-5 Meeting, May 29, 1974, U.S. Embassy, Manila, R.P.
3. J51 HistSum Nov 74.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 707,708.

designed primarily to provide external defense. The AFP would be engaged primarily in internal defense measures, assisted by those U.S. Forces which might be made available.[1]

(S) On 22 February, the JCS affirmed that, contrary to widespread belief, there were no statutory constraints upon command of U.S. Forces by foreign nationals. The United States had historically attempted to avoid such a practice, but no overall guidance addressed the question, and each situation was dealt with on its own merits. Consequently, CINCPAC reiterated that the parallel command concept in MDB 1-70 remained valid, but that efforts should be made to improve operations within that concept.[2]

Thailand

Thai Politics and U.S. Presence

(S) On 15 October 1973, in the wake of violent demonstrations against the Royal Thai Government (RTG), the major figures in the military hierarchy resigned their posts and fled the country. Acceding to the office of Prime Minister was Sanya Thammasak. At that time, the fundamental moving force had been the student movement, which strenuously and violently objected to the U.S. military presence in Thailand and to the Thai military regime which had allowed the build-up of that presence. Early in 1974, according to the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, the Thai public ire had been shifted from foreign to domestic targets. The political importance of the student-professor alliance had faded, but the new, dominantly civilian government was more open than had been its authoritarian militarily-oriented predecessor. In March 1974, the RTG had announced a reduction of 10,000 U.S. military personnel in Thailand during the balance of the year, which was expected to reflect Thai initiative on the issue and mollify the opposition.[3]

(S) In May, Foreign Minister Charunphan was reported to have asserted the friendship between the Thai and Americans in a press interview. He stressed that U.S. withdrawals from Thailand were based on prior consultation between

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1. CINCPACREPPHIL 230056Z Mar 74; J52 Point Paper, 18 Jul 74, Subj: MDB OPLAN 1-70 Command and Control Arrangements.
2. JCS 2341/221604Z Feb 74; Brief, CINCPACREPPHIL (N31), 16 May 74, Subj: Update of MDB OPLAN 1-70 and Reexamination of "Parallel Command" Structure as a Result of UGNAYAN ALPHA, which cited CINCPAC 270100Z Apr 74; CINCPACREPPHIL 300816Z Sep 74, which cited CINCPAC 210311Z Jun 74.
3. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol II, pp. 713, 714; AMEMB Bangkok 7023/010130Z May 73.

the two governments, and that a gradual withdrawal, not a precipitous one, was desirable because of the Indochina situation. In contrast, Acting Defense Minister Dawee revealed the deep-seated animosity of the Thai for the Vietnamese during a discussion with the Ambassador on 8 May. Dawee advised that the unilateral extension of territorial fishing rights by South Vietnam, and seizure of Thai boats, had caused a deterioration in relations between the two countries. Under the curcumstances, he stated, the presence of U.S. air power in Thailand to support the Saigon government could be hard to justify to the Thai people.[1]

(U) While the Foreign Minister was issuing reassuring statements regarding the need for continuing Thai-U.S. friendship, the Sanya government was encountering increasing problems domestically. Inflation, unemployment, rural development and land reform problems prompted Sanya to resign his post on 21 May, after about eight months in office. On the 24th, he agreed to form a new cabinet, and, on 1 June, the new all-civilian Sanya cabinet was sworn in.[2]

(S) In July, the Sanya administration weathered another crisis when riots broke out in the Chinese quarter of Bangkok. On 5 July, Sanya declared a state of emergency which high Thai officials were careful to assure the Ambassador was not to be construed as martial law. The Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (COMUSMACTHAI) advised CINCPAC that U.S. military personnel had been told to stay home, off the streets and out of sight as much as possible. The Ambassador reported that the riots, from 3-7 July, originated in the contempt of the Chinese community for the Bangkok police. The riots were not directed at the U.S. military presence in Thailand, but some student activists, frustrated in attempts to generate public support for anti-American Fourth of July demonstrations, advanced the theory that Americans, or at least the CIA, were responsible for the rioting.[3]

(S) Meanwhile, new Defense Minister Khruan had convened the Thai Joint Defense Council on 17 and 18 June. He had stressed the danger to Thailand's freedom and its monarchy from internal and external forces and the need to exercise care in dialogues with communist countries. He was reported to have stated the absolute necessity for Thailand to remain a staunch ally of the United States. That Khruan's views were not unanimous was evident in a lecture to the Thai Naval War College on 7 June by General Surakit, Chief of Staff, Thai Armed Forces Supreme Command. He was reported to have stated that the reduction in U.S. military aid was serious, and that increasing

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1. AMEMB Bangkok 7091/011142Z May 74 and 7458/081112Z May 74.
2. J74 HistSum May, Jun 74; J22 Point Paper, 15 Jul 74, Subj: The Political Situation in Thailand.
3. AMEMB Bangkok 10926/041936Z Jul 74; MGEN Mellen (COMUSMACTHAI) to Admiral Gayler, 050359Z Jul 74 (BOM); SECSTATE 145057/051209Z Jul 74, which passed Bangkok 10934 (EX); AMEMB Bangkok 11038/081246Z Jul 74.

insistence on trading off the use of Thai bases for U.S. military assistance would be considered.[1]

(C) During the last half of 1974, the two Thai views expressed in the above paragraph--continued friendship and alliance, but only with adequate compensation--became the norm. The Ambassador reported a meeting in July with a visiting American professor at which Foreign Ministry officials, including the Thai Ambassador to the United States, manifested uncertainty about the future stability and security of Asia and deep-seated resentment toward the United States. They, "...bitterly assailed the U.S., accusing it of having eroded the security and stability of Southeast Asia and of being an unreliable ally to Thailand...." The Director General for Information at the Foreign Ministry, Pracha, said that America never should have gotten involved in Vietnam if it did not plan to win, since half measures were worse than none. Both Pracha and the Thai Ambassador to the United States, Anan, questioned what Thailand was achieving through its alliance with the United States besides an increased threat to its independence and a lessened capability to defend itself. The U.S. Ambassador hoped Washington would note and bear in mind the clear evidence of changing Thai attitudes implicit in these opinions.[2]

(S) A few days later, the U.S. Ambassador summarized for the State Department changes in the style of government under Prime Minister Sanya, noting that Sanya had opened up a dialogue with the public and had made unprecedented use of television and radio to bolster the standing of his government with the public. Political parties were emerging and the military was less evident. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as noted previously in this chapter, had become increasingly assertive in foreign policy decision-making vis a vis the military. In September, the Thai Ambassador placed continued friendship in juxtaposition with quid pro quo during a meeting in Washington with Secretary Kissinger, and this line was supported when the Thai Foreign Minister met with Kissinger on 1 October.[3]

(S) At about the same time (1 October) as the Charunphan-Kissinger meeting in New York, Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements was meeting in Bangkok with the Thai Minister of Defense (Khruan) and the acting Foreign Minister

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1. DOD/PRO Camp Smith 080911Z Jul 74 and 111350Z Jul 74; for discussion of Thailand MAP, see Chapter VII.
2. SECSTATE 157182/1/192230Z Jul 74, which passed AMEMB Bangkok 11629/180627Z Jul 74.
3. AMEMB Bangkok 11955/231234Z Jul 74; SECSTATE 208885/220236Z Sep 74 (EX); SECSTATE 220110/050057Z Oct 74, which passed USMISSION USUN 3599; Note, msg transmitted by SECSTATE without DTG. 050057Z for CINCPAC file purposes only (EX).

(Chatchai). At both meetings, the protagonists expressed mutual admiration. During the Khruan meeting, the Thai Defense Minister contrasted the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, where equipment and supplies had been left behind, with U.S. drawdowns in Thailand, where nothing was left. Clements noted that the United States had not yet departed Thailand. During the Chatchai meeting, the acting Foreign Minister said that Thailand supported the United States 100 percent, but that, "...he must ask how much the U.S. supports Thailand...." He noted the declining assistance to the Thai people from the United States, citing the savings accrued by launching B-52s over Vietnam from Thailand rather than Guam. He lamented the "poor condition" that Thailand and the Thai Armed Forces found themselves in after a quarter-century of U.S. military aid, and made a strong plea for U.S. assistance to make the Thai Armed Forces self-sufficient.[1]

(S) Thus it was that, even though previous joint announcements regarding the U.S. Forces reduction of 10,000 men during 1974 had been made, the U.S. Embassy took issue with the wide distribution of "execute" messages in Defense Department channels on an F-105G squadron redeployment. The Embassy message was passed to CINCPAC, as the sole addressee, on 1 October by the State Department, and expressed strong concern that the news of the redeployment would be leaked before the RTG had been informed. The Embassy Charge' urged that further message traffic on the subject be handled in the most limited channels until he had consulted with the Thai Supreme Command. The following day, State (info CINCPAC) was advised that Supreme Command Chief of Staff Kriangsak had, "...agreed to redeployments...." This message was answered by the State Department with a reminder that the civilian side of the RTG should also be consulted, in order that the U.S. Government not appear to favor one side over the other.[2]

(S) About one month later, COMUSMACTHAI provided the CINCPAC Chief of Staff his assessment of the political-military influences on the U.S. presence in Thailand. He doubted that either the continued U.S. presence or the drawdown would be a major political theme in the upcoming 26 January 1975 elections. This opinion was based primarily on the fact that many prominent and influential Thai military, political and business interests continued to recognize the value of the U.S. presence in Thailand. While acknowledging the need to consider the impact of all U.S. actions or inactions on the political scene, COMUSMACTHAI did not believe that the U.S. military would be pressured into a stampede-like reaction.[3]

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1. AMEMB Tokyo 12846/030611Z Oct 74, which passed AMEMB Bangkok no cite 2 Oct 74 (EX); AMEMB Tokyo 12847/030616Z Oct 74, which passed AMEMB Bangkok no cite 2 Oct 74 (EX).
2. SECSTATE 216032/011834Z Oct 74, which passed AMEMB Bangkok 15747/1 Oct 74 (EX); AMEMB Bangkok 15858/021004Z Oct 74; SECSTATE 217506/022238Z Oct 74.
3. COMUSMACTHAI 310005Z Oct 74, which cited CINCPAC 171940Z Oct 74 (EX).

(S) As the year ended, the U.S. Embassy had proposed, and State rejected, consultations regarding future U.S. Forces drawdowns with the existing Thai administration. State advised that the U.S. Government was not yet ready to tell the Thai precisely what the U.S. force structure would be in Thailand in coming months. Further, State questioned the practicality (and reliability) of negotiating with a lame-duck government.[1]

(S) Having discussed previously in this chapter the attempts by Ambassadors Moynihan of India and Sullivan of the Philippines to evoke policy by "colloquy," it was interesting to note that Ambassador Kintner of Thailand also entered the lists. Kintner had participated in the exchange of messages initiated by Moynihan and Sullivan, and, on 27 September, he solicited the views of his counterparts on his assessment of U.S. interests in Southeast Asia in a global context. He also desired to provoke a dialogue, building on the exchanges initiated by Moynihan and Sullivan. He hoped to help Washington define for Southeast Asia (and the surrounding waters) its relationship to the world-wide interests of the United States; the goals; achievement costs; and the most promising policies to pursue these goals. He based his analysis on certain strategic assumptions, and discussed various scenarios in which the United States, Russia or the PRC would retain or achieve hegemony in Southeast Asia.[2]

(S) There was at least one acknowledgment of Kintner's message. Ambassador Dean in Cambodia expressed disagreement with some of Kintner's assumptions and statements. For example, he posed, "...the very real possibility..." that ascendancy in Southeast Asia might not be gained by the United States, Russia or the PRC. Rather, by reason of a vacuum created by the failure of these three to reach a tacit understanding over the area, the way could be open, "...for the fox - - North Vietnam - - to slip in and carry off the chickens..." Dean concluded with the pragmatic observation that, whether the foreign policy establishment liked it or not, policy was planned in an atmosphere of very real domestic constraints, and no policy suggestion can fail to take domestic public and congressional attitudes into account.[3]

Army General Court-Martial Authority.

(S) As the result of U.S. military reorganizations in Thailand, the only U.S. Army general court-martial convening authority in Thailand was dissolved

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1. SECSTATE 259379/241948Z Nov 74; AMEMB Bangkok 18615/261040Z Nov 74; SECSTATE 283136/1/301708Z Dec 74, which passed AMEMB Bangkok 20195/301041Z Dec 74 (EX); SECSTATE 003604/081505Z Jan 75.
2. AMEMB Bangkok 15626/271141Z Sep 74 (EX).
3. AMEMB Phnom Penh 13462/080430Z Oct 74.

upon inaction of the U.S. Army Support Group, Thailand on 1 July 1974. On 17 August 1974, the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Pacific approved the proposal of COMUSMACTHAI that he be designated general court-martial convening authority for U.S. Army personnel in Thailand. This authority would be exercised in the COMUSMACTHAI capacity as Commander, U.S. Army Element, U.S. MACTHAI. At the same time, U.S. Army Pacific initiated action to change Army Regulation 1-32 to authorize the Commander, U.S. Army Element, MACTHAI to exercise disciplinary control over U.S. Army personnel in Thailand, to include the attachment of Army units and personnel for court-martial jurisdiction.[1]

Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction

(C) No SOFA or other formal agreement existed between the U.S. Government and the RTG pertaining to criminal jurisdiction over U.S. military and civilian personnel. In practice, the Thai did not normally press for jurisdiction over duty or inter se cases, but regularly exercised jurisdiction over U.S. personnel in off-duty cases. In 1974, the old murder case against Specialist Four Richard L. Breedlove, U.S. Army, was finally closed. Breedlove had been convicted by an original trial court, but acquitted by the intermediate appellate court. Upon appeal of the acquittal by the prosecution, the Supreme Court affirmed the acquittal on 27 March 1974. COMUSMACTHAI directed the Army Support Command to remove Breedlove from the country and to annote his records to preclude reassignment to Thailand.[2]

(U) The case of Specialist Four Joseph F. Wheeler, U.S. Army, was noteworthy only because it provided evidence of the change in Thai attitudes previously discussed in this chapter. Wheeler was arrested by Thai police for possession of marihuana on 3 February 1974. He was assigned to a unit whose personnel had diplomatic immunity. However, at his preliminary investigation, the Thai Chief of Police (Udorn) required that Wheeler produce a letter from the RTG Ministry of Foreign Affairs verifying his immunity status. Previously the Thai authorities had been satisfied with certification from the MACTHAI SJA as to the individual status of this unit's members. The District Court judge informed Wheeler that he would need a certified, notarized document from the Foreign Affairs Ministry and a witness from that agency to testify in court. The U.S. Embassy initially informed MACTHAI that sensitive local conditions and joint interest in narcotics control justified a waiver of immunity. This position was later reversed, and representatives of the Embassy, MACTHAI SJA and the RTG proceeded to Udorn, where

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1. J73 HistSum, Aug 74; COMUSMACTHAI 160800Z Aug 74; CINCUSARPAC 170314Z Aug 74.
2. CINCPAC Command History 1972, Vol. II, P. 651; CDRUSARSUPTHAI 270942Z Mar 74; MACTHAI (JA) 290838Z Mar 74; J73 HistSum, Mar 74.

the court subsequently issued a non-prosecution order closing the case.[1]

(U) Another FCJ case which did nothing to improve U.S.-Thai relations was the arrest by local police of PFC Stephen Bissig, U.S. Army on 24 December 1973. Bissig was charged with possession of heroin and released to his unit pursuant to a standard custody receipt which guaranteed his presence for trial. He forged emergency leave orders and departed to the United States, surrendered to Army authorities on the east coast, and stated that his life would be endangered if he were returned to Thailand. Threats on his life could not be substantiated; accordingly, his unit commander and all U.S. Army echelons above in Thailand pressed for his return to face trial. CINCPAC requested COMUSMACTHAI to comment as to whether Bissig could be protected if returned. Meanwhile, the local RTG authorities had threatened to issue arrest warrants for the officer who had signed the custody receint and the base Provost Marshal if they did not produce Bissig for trial. MACTHAI assured CINCPAC that Bissig would be protected, and that his return to Thailand was, "...absolutely essential for continuing U.S.-Thai relations." Based on these assurances, Bissig was returned and stood trial on 18 March. He pled guilty and was sentenced to seven months imprisonment, incarcerated in Chon Buri prison, and segregated with special guard surveillance to insure his safety.[2]

(U) In a case reminscent of the martial law connotations in Korea and the Philippines, SSGT John Cannon, Jr., U.S. Air Force was charged with assault and battery on 16 December 1973. Trial was set for 27 March 1974 before a military court under provisions of martial law established by the former RTG military regime. Under the penal code thus established, Cannon would have had no right of appeal. CINCPAC requested COMUSMACTHAI to investigate, since the right of appeal was guaranteed to U.S. personnel by a U.S.-RTG exchange of notes in 1968. The local (Takhli) court position was that the exchange of notes did not give American servicemen a right denied to a Thai citizen. After talks between MACTHAI, Embassy and RTG authorities, the matter was resolved by a fortuitous RTG Defense Ministry ruling which had come into force on 20 March 1974. This ruling provided that all persons tried in military courts have the right of appeal except in three categories of offenses: offenses against the King; internal security violations; and, communist activity. Cannon then pled guilty and received a three months sentence, suspended for two years.[3]

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1. J73 HistSum Feb 74; CDRUSARSUPTHAI 050838Z Feb 74; COMUSMACTHAI 060855Z Feb 74; MACTHAI (JA) 150055Z Feb 74 and 230137Z Feb 74; CDRUSARSUPTHAI 251019Z Feb 74.
2. J73 HistSums Feb and Mar 74; 12 messages microfilmed in CINCPAC History Archives.
3. J73 HistSum Mar 74; nine messages microfilmed in CINCPAC History Archives.

(U) On 5 July 1974, PFC Kenneth R. Ralston, U.S. Army, desecrated the Thai flag by stamping on it and throwing it into a canal. Thai authorities brought charges against him, after which he pled guilty to charges of disrespect to the national flag of Thailand and public drunkenness. He was sentenced to one year and $125 fine, reduced by half in view of his guilty plea. More than 30 press photographers and reporters were present at the trial. The U.S. Ambassador apologized for the incident in a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Subsequently, the possibility that Ralston might be included in a general pardon proclamation connoting the adoption of a new constitution was raised. However, the MACTHAI SJA noted that Ralston's offense was, "an offense against the internal security of Thailand," and would not qualify for an amnesty declaration. This case had been potentially explosive from the standpoint of U.S.-Thai relations because it happened during the same Fourth of July weekend as the Chinatown riots previously discussed. That it did not so develop was possibly because the Foreign Ministry Director of Information, during an interview with the Thai press, noted that Thai feeling about the incident was identical to American feeling when the U.S. flag had been burned by Thai demonstrators.[1]

(U) There were two FCJ cases during 1974 which, although not connected, nevertheless illustrated the mounting sensitivity of Thai authorities to the U.S. military presence and their diminishing willingness to cooperate with the U.S. military authorities. In each case, a procedural error on the part of local base U.S. officials complicated what normally should have been routine official duty and inter se cases. In the first case, Specialist Four Jimmy M. Holland had caused the death of a Thai pedestrian while on duty as a military policeman. Local base authorities allowed Holland to be arraigned in a Thai court before the claim to U.S. jurisdiction as an official duty case had been made. In the other case, Specialists Dennis W. Johnson and Mathew S. Muse were implicated in the theft of six U.S. Government vehicles from Camp Samae San. A base U.S. Army official had requested Thai police to investigate the theft, and when three Thai security guards were accused along with the two U.S. Army men, the Thai authorities rejected the inter se claim of base and MACTHAI officials. Despite representations to high level RTG agencies by MACTHAI and the U.S. Embassy, they refused to intervene. Holland was tried and convicted in spite of the official duty nature of his case, and at the end of 1974, Thai police and local prosecutors had threatened to turn the Muse-Johnson case over to Bangkok authorities if the men were not produced in court. When COMUSMACTHAI and the U.S. Embassy opted for release

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1. J73 HistSums Jul, Sep, Dec 74; CDRUSARSUPTHAI 081011Z Jul 74; 100936Z Jul 74; J73/Memo/214-74 of 10 Jul 74, Subj: Flag Incident in Thailand; AMEMB Bangkok 11218/110512Z Jul 74; MACTHAI (JA) 250325Z Sep 74; 121000Z Dec 74.

of the two U.S. military men to Thai authorities, CINCPAC registered concern to the Secretary of Defense and to COMUSMACTHAI. CINCPAC cited the Holland official duty case, and noted that the Muse-Johnson inter se case contributed to an apparent erosion of U.S. interests in FCJ. While CINCPAC did not recommend unyielding insistence on the exercise of primary jurisdiction in this case, which also involved local nationals, he recommended that any waiver of jurisdiction be accompanied by appropriate reference to the spirit of cooperation being shown by the U.S. Government.[1]

Cambodia

(S) As in the political-military discussions which follow on Laos and South Vietnam, the military situation in Cambodia during 1974 was variously described as promising, unpredictable, and deteriorating. Political bickering, corruption and economic chaos characterized the Khmer Government and the military hiearchy was riddled with opportunists maneuvering for position.

Military Situation.

(S) When, in February, the Cambodian Armed Forces (FANK) successfully repulsed a Khmer Communist (KC) attack against Phnom Penh, the KC were forced to the defensive in many areas, and the FANK took the initiative. By mid-year, the U.S. Embassy and "mission military analysts" were reciting specific facts, figures and illustrative examples of FANK successes reminiscent of the "measurements of progress" in Vietnam in years gone by. This analysis was supported by other intelligence assessments, and bolstered by the euphoria of a 9 July offer by the Khmer Prime Minister to negotiate with the KC.[2]

(S) A more sober appraisal, on 29 Jul 1974, of the developing KC pressure on Battambang noted that the poor performance of the FANK around Battambang was partly due to lack of experience in a long-tranquil area. The FANK had not yet tackled the problems which combat had forced it to try to overcome elsewhere in the country: poor leadership and organization; payroll ghosts; indifferent training and discipline; and, poor morale. The Commanding General had been in place more than five years, and while he was a superb business man, was not a good military commander. He did have close ties with Lon Nol and the Phnom Penh Chinese business community, and relieving him would be very difficult.[3]

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1. J73 HistSums, Apr-Dec 74; 28 documents, microfilm file, CINCPAC History Archives.
2. J22 Point Paper, 17 Jul 74, Subj: Cambodia Situation; AMEMB Phnom Penh 5020/051326Z Apr 74; SECSTATE 156311/1/182353Z Jul 74, which passed AMEMB Phnom Penh 9527/17 Jul 74; DOD/PRO Camp Smith 232017Z Jul 74 (EX).
3. AMEMB Phnom Penh 10008/291050Z Jul 74.

Help from the Press

(C) In July, in response to requests from the State Department, the U.S. Embassy provided instances of U.S. national wire service reporters, "...going off half-cocked and filing semi-sensational stories that lack any basis in fact." In this particular summation, the stories were all from the United Press International (UPI). A 6 July story alleged that the KC had sunk a Khmer Navy gunboat carrying smuggled food to South Vietnam. On 16 May, the UPI reported that the KC, "...hit Mekong convoy in heaviest attack of current dry season, sank one ammo barge and set two others ablaze." The dispatch further stated that "...American Embassy values ammo on sunk barge at $1.5 million." The Embassy had already reported that the attack was less severe than others and that no ammo barge had been sunk, nor even damaged; ergo, the $1.5 million assertion was patently false. On 4 June, the UPI had reported the killing of the Khmer Minister of Education by the Khmer police while he was being used as a shield by dissenting students. The fact, as verified by Khmer journalists and other eye witnesses, was that the Minister had not been killed by the police, but by the students themselves inside the barricaded Lycee (University). On or about 20 June, the UPI, based on a KC clandestine radio broadcast, reported the capture by the KC of a "former army officer," Ronald Sanderson. The truth was that Sanderson had not been captured, but was alive and well in Kompong Som.[1]

(S) Other instances of less than helpful press reporting included speculation that the return to Cambodia of President Lon Nol's brother, Lon Non, presaged a coup supported by the United States. Other reports alleged that former Khmer Government military officers were leading guerrilla attacks by the KC. Neither of these speculative reports were true. Lon Non was the source of considerable heartburn to the U.S. Embassy, which disapproved of his political machinations and sowing of dissent among Cambodia's leaders. The story of Khmer defections was not supported by U.S. intelligence sources, which could cite only one case--a FANK major who had reportedly defected on 5 August 1973. That was almost 18 months before the CINCPAC Chief of Staff requested the Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC) to comment on the stories.[2]

CINCPAC Assessment

(TS) In September 1974, Admiral Gayler conveyed to General Brown, Chairman, JCS his personal impressions of the Cambodian situation. The comparative

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1. AMEMB Phnom Penh 9245/110946Z Jul 74; SECSTATE 151294/122214Z Jul 74.
2. SECSTATE 220178/051754Z Oct 74, which passed AMEMB Phnom Penh 13104/30 Sep 74 (EX); CINCPAC (Moore) to CHMEDTC (Palmer) 281911Z Dec 74 (BOM); CHMEDTC (Palmer) to CINCPAC (Moore) 091309Z Jan 75 (BOM).

quiet on the military front was not a signal for optimism. The military situation then was stabilized by high water, mutual exhaustion, inertia and ineptitude. A dry season push by the KC would constitute a grave military threat; if U.S. aid were below sustaining levels and signals of U.S. lack of interest were discerned, that, in the Admiral's words, would, "...probably pull the plug." There were signs that the FANK had improved in some areas, but military unity was complicated by political maneuvering of generals and politicians. In a broad sense, the strategic situation had not changed. Government forces still held the capital, most important towns and most of the people. The KC held most of the countryside, food production and the strategic initiative. The Mekong was open for convoys, but most roads were interdicted. The general outlook appeared to be more of the same in the wet season (if U.S. support continued), but in a new dry-season offensive by the KC, said the Admiral, "...I cannot say who would win that one." He cited two, "...striking and important political facts..." observed during his visit--all leading Cambodians felt totally dependent on the United States, and all, including the military, talked about a negotiated accommodation with the KC as the way to go. They talked about negotiating from strength, but never about winning in the sense of final defeat of the communists. Admiral Gayler did not have a "handy" explicit statement of policy, but if the United States purpose was to strengthen the Khmer Government enough to induce the KC to negotiate, Cambodian effort and U.S. support were the ingredients. He therefore recommended vigorous reclamas in every arena against aid cuts, continued pressure for the Government to perform and the FANK to improve, and strong representations to the PRC to, "...call off the dogs...." All was dependent on restoration of the aid cuts. If not forthcoming, "...we'd better make some serious efforts to get a negotiated settlement now. At some point, the military trend will begin to follow the aid trend."[1]

Diplomatic Assessment

(C) Almost four weeks after Admiral Gayler's visit to Cambodia, the U.S. Ambassador enumerated for the State Department certain steps he had initiated to infuse a greater sense of self-confidence into the Cambodians, deflate the potential for unrest and improve the social and political climate. These involved concessions to the teachers and students, measures to convince key leaders to stay in country or to return promptly if they were already abroad, explanations of economic measures taken by the United States, and steps to assure proper payroll control for military and civilian government personnel. While Admiral Gayler's reaction when the Cambodians wanted to, "...hand him the baby..." was to return it firmly, the Ambassador's reaction was different:[2]

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1. CINCPAC 022327Z Sep 74 (BOM).
2. SECSTATE 220179/051755Z Oct 74, which passed AMEMB Phnom Penh 13020/ 28 Sep 74 (EX).

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Conclusion which can be drawn from all of these examples is that when Khmer lose confidence in themselves and GKR apparatus grinds to a halt, U.S. Mission must step in to provide necessary ingredient to keep GKR functioning. Mission is keeping its cool here and I remain hopeful that we can continue to muddle through here for a while longer. However, it is continued confidence by Khmer of all social strata in U.S.G. and not in their own leadership which keeps Khmer moving and accepting GKR's orders and making sacrifices required by war.

(S) On 15 November, the U.S. Embassy reported a 14 November conversation with the Prime Minister, Long Boret, in which President Lon Nol was said to be becoming progressively more pessimistic about the future of the Republic and his own role in it. Lon Nol was disturbed about the anti-Thieu demonstrations in South Vietnam, the deteriorating economic situation in Cambodia, and his own future and security if a negotiated settlement were reached with the KC. By 4 December, the State Department expressed concern over reports that Long Boret intended to resign, "...unless civilian control over the military is established." At the end of the year, Long Boret's pique with the military had apparently been overcome. The Ambassador reported that, on 27 December, he had held an intimate luncheon for Prime Minister Long Boret and FANK Commander in Chief, Lieutenant General Sosthene Fernandez at which they had buried the hatchet. Although the two men had been friends for years, an incident of a personal nature had caused a deep breach, especially on Long Boret's part. After the, "...occasionally emotional three hour session...," the two men had parted with a warm handshake. If, as intimated by the Ambassador, self-confidence was the key to Cambodian survival, the new year began auspiciously. Earlier in December, the U.S. Embassy had reported Long Boret's surprise and pleasure at his reception by Admiral Gayler in Honolulu, and was impressed by the extent to which CINCPAC followed events in Cambodia. Long Boret was, at that time, returning from a successful defense of the Cambodian position in the United Nations. Thus, assurances of Cambodia's international standing, CINCPAC's familiarity with the Cambodian situation, and his reconciliation with the FANK Commander in Chief could be expected to instill confidence in any Prime Minister.[1]

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1. SECSTATE 256663/1/210202Z Nov 74, which passed AMEMB Phnom Penh 15319/ 15 Nov 74 (EX); SECSTATE 266186/042037Z Dec 74 (EX); SECSTATE 283828/ 311638Z Dec 74, which passed AMEMB Phnom Penh 17212/27 Dec 74 (EX); AMEMB Phnom Penh 16376/100542Z Dec 74.

Laos

Formation of Lao Coalition Government

(U) Pursuant to the Laos cease-fire agreement of 21 February 1973 and its implementing Protocol of 14 September 1973, the Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU) and the Joint National Political Council (JNPC) of the Kingdom of Laos were formally invested by King Sri Savang Vatthana on 5 April 1974. Under the Protocol, all foreign troops were to be withdrawn from Laos within 60 days after the PGNU was established. The same 60 day period had been specified for the exchange of prisoners held by the Royal Lao Government (RLG), known as the Vientiane side, and the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF), known as Pathet Lao.[1]

(S) The two sides had agreed that governmental issues would be decided by unanimity, first within the PGNU ministries and then between the PGNU and the JNPC. Since the ministries were jointly manned, and the JNPC was headed by the nominal LPF Chief, Souphanouvong, the Ambassador noted the potential for competition, friction and stalemate which clouded the future effectiveness of governmental operations.[2]

Withdrawal of U.S. Military Personnel.

(U) On 3 June 1974, a news dispatch from Vientiane reported the complete withdrawal of U.S. military and paramilitary personnel from Laos. "The Americans left as quietly as they had come. There were no official announcements...." The article went on to acknowledge that the United States was one day ahead of the 60-day period set by the Protocol, and that this contrasted with North Vietnam's failure to withdraw at least 30,000 combat troops remaining in Laos.[3]

Illness of Prime Minister

(S) On 12 July, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma had a heart attack which was initially not announced by the RLG. Medical assistance was immediately provided by the U.S. Embassy, and a U.S. aircraft was kept on stand-by until 14 July for possible medical evacuation of Souvanna. On the 16th, the Ambassador reported that, while Vientiane remained calm, several months of recuperation would leave a void of leadership which could not be solved by

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1. AMEMB Vientiane 2760/051007Z Apr 74.
2. AMEMB Vientiane 2768/051040Z Apr 74.
3. Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 3 Jun 74, "U.S. Completes Laos Military Withdrawal," Tammy Arbuckle, Washington Star-News, dateline Vientiane, Laos.

the Lao Protocol. The deputy prime ministers were not ranked, nor was a replacement specified in the event of Souvanna's incapacity or death. Similarly, the Lao constitution did not address temporary substitution for an incapacitated Prime Minister. In spite of this dilemma--finding an interim replacement whose decisions would be accepted by both sides--the Ambassador was heartened by the absence of tension in the city.[1]

FCJ and Diplomatic Immunity.

(U) (C) Prior to the withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Laos, Sergeant First Class Eluterio R. Cantu, U.S. Army, became a suspect in a Lao police investigation into the murder of a local female of Vietnamese origin. Cantu was a member of JCS Project 404, which raised questions as to possible diplomatic immunity as a member of the U.S. Mission in Laos. Although the Project 404 mission had been tacitly approved by the Prime Minister, the assigned personnel were not accredited as members of the diplomatic community. During the discussions among various U.S. authorities regarding the application of diplomatic immunity, the deadline for withdrawal of all U.S. military, except 30 accredited Defense Attache personnel and 19 U.S. Marine guards, was approaching. The Prime Minister gave his permission for Cantu to leave Laos, and he had barely arrived in Udorn, Thailand when a Vientiane/Pathet Lao detachment of police arrived at the U.S. Embassy to take Cantu into custody. Cantu eventually arrived in the United States, which mooted the immunity question. For the record and possible precedent referral, the U.S. Embassy stated its understanding that, "...no real basis for a claim of diplomatic immunity exists...".[2]

Vietnam

(U) CINCPAC's relationships in Vietnam during 1974 were concerned primarily with the security assistance mission of the U.S. Defense Attache Office (USDAO) in Saigon, as discussed in Chapters V and VII of this history.

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1. SECSTATE 151947/131256Z Jul 74, which passed AMEMB Vientiane 5477/13 Jul 74 (EX); SECSTATE 151948/131331Z Jul 74, which passed AMEMB Vientiane 5476/13 Jul 74 (EX); AMEMB Vientiane 5497/140810Z Jul 74; AMEMB Vientiane 5570/161102Z Jul 74.
2. J73 HistSums, May and Jun 74; U.S. DAO Vientiane 9509/041422Z May 74; DA Wash 071745Z May 74; SECSTATE 095077/082005Z May 74; AMEMB Vientiane 3703/091139Z May 74; 4314/310948Z May 74; 4355/010935Z Jun 74; SECSTATE 116200/032243Z Jun 74; 405 CSG 040530Z Jun 74; CDRUSAJFKCENMA Ft Bragg 141320Z Jun 74.

CHAPTER XI

OTHER SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES

SECTION I--PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

Official Activities of the Commander in Chief

(U) CINCPAC's numerous trips, speeches, and press conferences are highlighted below. Distinguished visitors and visits by news media are also listed. Events for the year are listed chronologically.[1]

(U) Guam-Japan Trip, 24-30 January: Admiral Gayler arrived in Guam on 25 January for a three-day visit that included a tour of the island and side trips to Saipan and Tinian. While on Guam he met with local civic leaders and was briefed by Rear Admiral George S. Morrison, Commander Naval Forces Marianas and CINCPAC Representative Guam/Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Before departing on 28 January, the Admiral held a news conference. He then flew to Tokyo to attend a Security Consultative Committee meeting of representatives of the Governments of Japan and the United States. Topics of discussion included the security and energy situation in Asia as well as mutual interest basing arrangements on Okinawa.

(U) Veterans Foreign Wars Briefing, Camp Smith, 22 January: Admiral Gayler presented a special unclassified Pacific Command briefing to 65 national and state officials of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Attendees included retired Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., CINCPAC from 1968 to 1972 and now Chairman of the Veterans of Foreign Wars' Advisory Committee on Cemeteries and Memorials, and Ray Soden, Commander in Chief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

(U) California-Alabama-Washington, D.C. Trip, 11-16 February: Admiral Gayler was interviewed by Roy Neal for an NBC special report on the nationally televised "Today Show" at NBC studios in Burbank, California, during a stopover in Los Angeles on 12 February. After the interview, the Admiral flew to Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, where he spoke to students of the Air War College and Senior Officers' Orientation Course on 13 February. While in Alabama he also was interviewed by representatives of the Birmingham News and WAPI-TV. He then flew to Washington, D.C. On 14 February the Admiral was a guest of the Washington Post editorial board for lunch and discussions, and called on Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Navy Secretary John W. Warner; Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt; and other Defense

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1. Material for this section was taken from J74 HistSums Jan-Dec 74.

Department and government officials. On 15 February Admiral Gayler called on Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger and was interviewed by the editorial board of U.S. News and World Report.

(U) Press Conference, Camp Smith, 22 February: Admiral Gayler held a press conference at Camp Smith for 11 local media representatives. Questions dealt exclusively with the fuel shortage in Hawaii. Hal (Aku) Lewis of KGMB Radio also interviewed the Admiral over the telephone concerning fuel problems.

(U) New Zealand Trip, 24 February-2 March: Admiral Gayler joined Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush in Wellington, New Zealand on 26 February to attend the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Council Meeting. After the meetings, the Admiral remained in New Zealand to attend a meeting of ANZUS military representatives on 28 February. While in New Zealand, the Admiral called on Prime Minister Norman Kirk, Defense Minister A.J. Faulkner, and other government and defense officials.


(U) Australia Trip, 12-21 March: Admiral Gayler arrived in Canberra on 13 March for an eight-day visit to Australia that included meetings with top government officials and an extensive tour of the major cities and defense facilities on the continent. U.S. Ambassador Marshall Green hosted a reception for the Admiral on the evening of his arrival. On 14 March Admiral Gayler met with the Australian Joint Chiefs of Staff and called on Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and Defence Minister Lance Barnard. The next day he flew to Sydney where he visited the Underwater Demolition Team School and held informal discussions with local leaders. He was also given a guided tour of the harbor by representatives of the Royal Australian Navy. On 17 March he returned to Canberra for discussions with Ambassador Green. On 18 March he flew to Adelaide where he spent the day before continuing on to Perth, where he visited Cockburn Sound, site of a proposed joint U.S.-Australia Navy facility. His next stop was at the Royal Australian Air Force Base at Learmonth on 20 March. He then proceeded to U.S. Naval Communications Station Harold E. Holt for a tour of the facility. 21 March was spent touring the mineral area by VT-29 aircraft. Last stop on the tour was Darwin for a brief layover before returning to Honolulu.

(U) Bike Week in Hawaii, 24-30 March: Admiral and Mrs. Gayler biked with a caravan from Pearl Harbor to Iolani Palace in downtown Honolulu to participate in ceremonies opening Bike Week in Hawaii on 24 March. On 26 March, Admiral Gayler kicked off "Military Bike Day" by riding from his quarters to Camp Smith on a bicycle. All three local TV channels carried film of the event on evening news programs. Photographs also appeared in the Honolulu Advertiser and Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

(U) U.S. News and World Report, 25 March: U.S. News and World Report carried a four-page interview with Admiral Gayler in its 25 March issue. Both wire services and CBS used excerpts during their 17 March reports. On 22 March, Don Baker of KITV interviewed the Admiral regarding the magazine article. Portions of the interview were aired on 23 and 24 March.

(U) Vietnam Veteran's Day, 29 March: Vietnam Veteran's Day observance was held at the Punchbowl Cemetery on 29 March. Speakers for the event were Admiral Gayler; Hawaii's Acting Governor George R. Ariyoshi; Mayor Frank F. Fasi of Honolulu; and Robert Ellis, President, Chamber of Commerce of Hawaii.

(U) Gene Hunter Interview, 1 April: Admiral Gayler was quoted extensively on the Soviet military buildup in the Indian Ocean in a lengthy article by Gene Hunter, Honolulu Advertiser associate editor. The article, accompanied by a picture of the Admiral, appeared in the Honolulu Star Bulletin and Advertiser on 7 April. Its appearance followed an interview of Admiral Gayler by Mr. Hunter in the Pacific Command headquarters on 1 April.



Admiral Gayler enroute to work on Military Bike Day, uphill all the way.

(U) San Francisco-Washington-Norfolk-Seattle Trip, 4-12 April: Admiral Gayler arrived in San Francisco on 4 April to begin an 11-day tour of three major cities, a tour that included two speeches and numerous meetings with Federal, military, and civilian officials. His first address was delivered before the Commonwealth Club of California on 5 April. In Washington, D.C., the following day, he met with John McLucas, Under Secretary of the Air Force, before attending the afternoon wedding of James G. Zumwalt II, son of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, in Silver Springs, Maryland. On 8 April, Admiral Gayler met with

William Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense. The next day, he talked with Senators John McClellan (D.-AR) and John Stennis (D.-MS) and Lieutenant General G.M. Seignious, Director of the Joint Staff, before attending an evening concert in the Kennedy Center. On 10 April, Admiral Gayler talked with Vice President Gerald Ford, Secretary Schlesinger, General Creighton Abrams, the Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Zumwalt before attending an evening play at Ford's Theatre. The following day he delivered his second and final address of the trip, before the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia. He was quoted the following day in a Norfolk Virginian Pilot article as feeling that a reopened Suez Canal would be a "mixed blessing." On 12 April, Admiral Gayler visited the Boeing Aircraft Company and met with its top executives in Seattle, Washington. He flew back to Hawaii after concluding discussions with T.A. Wilson, Chairman of the Board of Boeing Aircraft Company, and R.W. Taylor, Vice President and General Manager of the Military Systems Group.[1]

(U) Freedom's Foundation Dinner, 22 April: Admiral Gayler attended the Freedom's Foundation pre-dinner cocktail hour in the Ilikai Hotel on 22 April and the Honolulu Military Press Night dinner and skit at the Cannon Club that same evening.


(U) Emperor's Birthday Reception, 29 April: Admiral Gayler attended an evening reception to celebrate the birthday of His Majesty The Emperor of Japan on 29 April. The reception was given by Consul General Tamio Kora in his Honolulu home, and preceded dinner and a show at the Hilton Hawaiian Village Hotel.

(U) Governors' Visit, 13 May: Admiral Gayler gave a 90-minute briefing to six visiting governors who were enroute to the People's Republic of China. Following the Pacific Command briefing, he escorted Governors Daniel J. Evans of Washington, Calvin L. Rampton of Utah, Arch A. Moore, Jr. of West Virginia, Robert D. Ray of Iowa, Marvin Mandel of Maryland, and Philip W. Noel of Rhode Island to lunch in the Pacific Command Flag Mess.

(U) Armed Forces Day Luncheon Speech, 16 May: Admiral Gayler delivered an hour-long address before 250 people at the Armed Forces Day Luncheon in the Pacific Ballroom of the Ilikai Hotel. Also on the dais were Acting Governor Ariyoshi, Mayor Fasi, and a number of other military commanders. Various media personnel recorded the speech, which received exposure that evening and the following day.

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1. In a short article in Pacific Stars and Stripes on 8 April the Admiral was quoted briefly on the trend toward detente among nations, attributed to his address to the Commonwealth Club.



President Marcos presents the Legion of Honor

(U) Philippines-Singapore Trip, 27 May-4 June: Admiral Gayler arrived at Clark Air Base on 28 May for three days of discussions with U.S. and foreign officials. Escorted by U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines William H. Sullivan, he called on Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile; Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, General Romeo C. Espino; and Secretary of Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo. Admiral Gayler was briefed at 13th Air Force Headquarters on 30 May before his afternoon departure for Singapore. During his four days in Singapore he met with various U.S. military and Embassy officials. He also met with Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Goh Keng Swee and participated in a two-day International Institute of Strategic Studies Conference dealing with the Great Powers and Southeast Asia on 1 June. After the conference, Admiral Gayler departed for a five-hour visit to Diego Garcia on 3 June. Shortly after his return to Clark Air Base, the next morning, Admiral Gayler was awarded the Legion of Honor by President Ferdinand E. Marcos at Malacanang Palace. After attending a Law of the Sea Conference at the U.S. Embassy, he departed for Guam. Following a refueling stop, he departed for Hickam Air Force Base, where he arrived on 5 June.

(U) Washington, D.C. Trip, 18-21 June: Admiral Gayler arrived at Andrews Air Force Base on 19 June for two days of meetings with Pentagon officials and to testify before the House Foreign Affairs Committee for Security Assistance. Prior to delivering testimony on the morning of 19 June, Admiral Gayler met with Admiral Moorer. That afternoon he met with Brigadier General Joseph R. Ulatowski, Commander of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, and Vice Admiral Ray Peet, Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency. On 20 June, Admiral Gayler met with John Dexter, Country Director for Thailand/Burma in the State Department; Robert Ingersoll, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. He departed Andrews Air Force Base that evening and arrived at Hickam Air Force Base on 21 June.

(U) New York- Newport- Washington, D.C. Trip, 24 June-2 July: Admiral Gayler arrived at the Newark, New Jersey, airport on 25 June to begin a week-long visit which would include interviews with reporters and editors of several prestigious national news periodicals. The first such interview was with the editors of the Wall Street Journal on 25 June. On 26 June he met with newsmen representing Parade magazine and Time-Life Incorporated before departing for the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island to speak before the Current Strategy Forum. The next day, after meeting with Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, President of the Naval War College, Admiral Gayler departed for Peconic, Long Island, where he toured the Grumman Calverton Facility and was briefed by Grumman executives. He arrived at Andrews Air Force Base that evening. The morning of 28 June was spent at the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing and at meetings with Senator John J. Sparkman, (D.-AL), and Representative Lee H. Hamilton (D.-IN). The afternoon was spent conferring with several Pentagon and Defense Department officials including Secretary Schlesinger and Deputy Secretary Clements. After meeting with General George S. Brown, new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, CINCPACFLT, Admiral Gayler departed for the U.S. Naval Academy to attend change of command ceremonies for the Chief of Naval Operations. Vice President Gerald Ford was guest speaker. On 1 July, Admiral Gayler was interviewed by Alan Horton, Pentagon correspondent for the Scripps Howard Newspaper Alliance; Mike Getler, Washington Post Pentagon correspondent; and Fred Hoffman, Associated Press Pentagon correspondent. He met again with General Brown. Before departing Washington on 2 July, he attended the retirement review for Admiral Moorer, outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He arrived at Hickam Air Force Base early that evening.

(U) CONUS Trip, 29 July-1 August: Admiral Gayler arrived at Moffett Air Force Base, California on 30 July for a day-long working session at the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School. While there, he met with Rear Admiral Isham Linder, Superintendent, and other senior officers. The next day Admiral Gayler departed for the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, where he attended discussions

with various corporation officials. That evening he flew to Phoenix, Arizona where he dined with various representatives of Honeywell Information Systems. On 1 August, Admiral Gayler was interviewed by Pat Murphy, editorial editor of the Phoenix Arizona Republic. Afterward, Admiral Gayler attended a series of briefings at Honeywell before his departure for McChord Air Force Base, Washington, and leave in the Seattle area. He returned to Hawaii on 12 August.

(U) Seattle Times Background Meeting, 2 August: During his brief vacation in Washington, Admiral Gayler met with various editorial staff reporters of the Seattle Times. He delivered a 20-minute PACOM overview followed by questions and answers in the newspaper's conference room. Attending the session were reporters Svein Gilje, military editor; Glenn Carter, maritime specialist; Bob Blethen, city editor, and other senior staffers.

(U) American Bar Association Speech, 11-16 August: Admiral Gayler delivered two speeches before the American Bar Association during their week-long convention at the Sheraton-Waikiki Hotel in Honolulu. His speeches were to the Military Standing Committee and the Judge Advocate General Association banquet.

(U) Thailand-Cambodia-South Vietnam-Japan Trip, 25 August-5 September: Admiral Gayler arrived at Don Muang Airfield, Bangkok on 27 August to begin three days of discussions and meetings with various U.S. military and Thai government officials. While there he met with Major General Robert C. Hixon, USA, COMUSMACTHAI, and attended a USMACTHAI staff briefing. He also met with U.S. Ambassador William R. Kintner. Two days later Admiral Gayler flew to Udorn to begin a day of travel throughout the country. He also visited Nakhon Phanom and U-Tapao, and he saw a SCOOT (Support Cambodia out of Thailand) rigging site and an All Weather Aerial Delivery System aircraft. On 30 August, Admiral Gayler arrived at Pochentong Air Base, Phnom Penh, and spent the day with Cambodian President Lon Nol and other government officials. That afternoon he arrived at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in the RVN, and was met by W.J. Lehmann, Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy, and Major General Ira Hunt, Jr., Acting Defense Attache. He talked with General Cao Van Vien, Chief of the Joint General Staff. On 31 August he met with President Nguyen Van Thieu before returning to Thailand. Admiral Gayler flew to Yokota Air Base, Japan, on 2 September. The next day he conferred with U.S. and Japanese officials, including Japanese Foreign Minister Toshio Kimura. He met with James Hodgson, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, the following day. Admiral Gayler also attended a Liberal Democratic Party Security Study Group meeting and met various Japan Defense Agency officials. On 5 September he visited Misawa and Iwakuni for U.S. military meetings and discussions. Admiral Gayler departed that afternoon and arrived in Hawaii the same day.

(U) Washington, D.C. Trip, 6-11 September: Admiral Gayler arrived at Washington National Airport on 6 September to attend the funeral of General Creighton W. Abrams, the Army Chief of Staff, and to attend several meetings with Defense and State Department officials. During his stay in Washington, the Admiral met with Secretary of Defense Schlesinger; Deputy Secretary Clements; Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Philip C. Habib; U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia John G. Dean; General Brown; Admiral James L. Holloway, USN, Chief of Naval Operations; General Frederick C. Weyand, USA, new Army Chief of Staff; and General David C. Jones, USAF, Air Force Chief of Staff. Admiral Gayler departed Washington on 11 September and arrived at Hickam Air Force Base that same night.

(U) Emmet Kay Homecoming, 21 September: Admiral Gayler was one of several dignitaries on hand at Honolulu International Airport on 21 September to welcome home the last known American prisoner of war, civilian pilot Emmet Kay.

(U) U.S.-Republic of Korea Security Consultative Meeting, 23-24 September: The seventh annual U.S.-Republic of Korea Security Consultative Meeting was held at CINCPAC headquarters 23 and 24 September. Deputy Secretary of Defense Clements, the senior U.S. representative at the meeting, was the host. Other key U.S. delegates were U.S. Ambassador to Korea Richard L. Sneider; Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Robert Ellsworth; General Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Admiral Gayler; and General Richard G. Stilwell, USA, Commander U.S. Forces Korea. The Korean contingent was led by Minister of National Defense Suh Jyong Chul. Other key delegates were Ambassador to the United States Hahm Pyong Cheou; General Han Shin, Chief of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs for Political Affairs Kim Chun Tai.

(U) Mainland Trip, 14-25 October: Admiral Gayler departed Hawaii for an 11-day speaking tour on 14 October. His first address was at the Navy Day luncheon of the San Francisco Navy League. This speech received news coverage in, and editorial support from, the San Francisco Examiner. On 16 October he presented a luncheon address followed by a news conference to the San Antonio Rotary Club and that evening he addressed the Alamo Chapter of the Air Force Association. On 19 October he arrived at Tulsa, Oklahoma for a dinner address to the second annual Oklahoma Navy League Ball. On 23 October he addressed the Midland, Texas, Lions Club. The following day he addressed the Midland Rotary Club. He arrived in Hawaii on the evening of 25 October.

(U) Aloha Week Parade, 26 October: Admiral Gayler was a guest in the Aloha Week Parade.

(U) Veterans Day, 28 October: Admiral Gayler was the principal speaker at the dedication of the Armed Forces Memorial at St. Andrews Cathedral in Honolulu. The ceremony received good coverage in the Honolulu Advertiser.

(U) AUSA Address, 29 October: Admiral Gayler addressed the Hawaii Chapter of the Association of the United States Army at their membership meeting in the Princess Kaiulani Hotel. The speech received good coverage in a Lyle Nelson column in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

(U) Pearl Harbor Shipyard Change of Command, 30 October: Admiral Gayler was the principal speaker and guest at the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard Change of Command ceremony. The change of command was covered by the Advertiser and the Star-Bulletin.

(U) Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Board Meeting, 4-5 November: The annual Republic of the Philippines-United States Mutual Defense Board meeting was held at PACOM Headquarters, Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii, 4 and 5 November.

(U) Mainland Trip, 9-15 November: Admiral Gayler visited the mainland 9-15 November to deliver three speeches and confer with State and Defense Department officials. On 11 November the admiral met briefly with Lieutenant General Robert E. Hails, USAF, Vice Commander of the Tactical Air Command at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia. Later that day at Norfolk he met with Admiral Ralph Cousins, USN, Commander in Chief Atlantic, and delivered a speech to the Armed Forces Staff College before continuing on to Washington, D.C. During his stay in Washington, 11 to 14 November, Admiral Gayler met with various State and Defense Department officials including Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Assistant Secretary of State Habib, and General Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On 15 November he arrived in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where he was the principal speaker at the World Affairs Council. He returned to Hawaii that night.

(U) PACOM Security Assistance Review, 19-21 November: The annual review of Security Assistance Programs in the Pacific Command was held at Camp Smith 19-21 November. U.S. military and civilian officials representing 15 Asian countries, the State and Defense Departments, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were on hand for the conference.

(U) Chiefs of Mission Conference, 6-8 December: Admiral Gayler hosted the Chiefs of Mission Conference, 6-8 December at Camp Smith.

(U) KAPPA 74 Conference, 9-13 December: With the Honorable Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Admiral Gayler co-hosted the KAPPA 74 Conference at CINCPAC's Camp Smith headquarters, 9-13 December.

(U) Washington, D.C. Visit, 15-21 December: Admiral Gayler visited Washington, D.C. 16 to 21 December, to participate in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff workshop and to confer with Defense, State Department, and National Security Agency officials. During his visit he also attended the retirement ceremony for General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA, former Commander in Chief Europe.

Distinguished Visitors to the Command

(U) Prince Charles Visit, 5 March: Admiral Gayler hosted the commanding officer and officers of the British ship HMS JUPITER during a reception at his official quarters at Pearl Harbor. Guests included Crown Prince Charles, who was serving as a commissioned officer in the British Navy. The ship was in Hawaii for a one-week visit.



Admiral and Mrs. Gayler greet Crown Prince Charles

(U) Gerald Ford Visit, 16-17 May: Admiral Gayler welcomed Vice President Gerald Ford to Pacific Command Headquarters on 17 May. Following a 90-minute briefing, Admiral Gayler took him on an afternoon barge tour of Pearl Harbor. The Vice President, who had arrived in Honolulu the evening before, was in Hawaii for four days, primarily for rest and relaxation.



Vice President Ford talks with newsmen at Camp Smith

(U) Prime Minister of Australia, 8 October: Admiral Gayler met Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam on 8 October at Honolulu International Airport for a one-hour discussion.

(U) Other distinguished visitors in 1974 included:

2 January--Lance H. Barnard, Australian Defense Minister.

7 January--Admiral George W. Anderson (Ret.), Chief of Naval Operations from 1961 to 1963.

10 January--Congressman William G. Bray (R.-IN).

14 January--W.B. Pritchett, First Assistant Secretary of Defense, Australia.

16 January--William K. Brehm, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs); Dr. Albert C. Hall, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence); Christian Chapman, Director, East Asian Affairs, Department of State.

17 January--Yoshio Okawara, Director, American Bureau, Japanese Government.

31 January--Lieutenant General Victor Krulak (USMC, Ret.); U.S. Ambassador Francis J. Underhill, Malaysia; Dennis J. Doolin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).

1 February--General George S. Brown, Chief of Staff U.S. Air Force; Captain Marcial Fournier, Commanding Officer, Spanish Naval Ship JUAN SEBASTIAN DE ELCANO; and Captain Angel Liberal, Spanish Naval Attache, Washington, D.C.

5 February--Sir James Plimsoll, Australian Ambassador to the United States.

6 February--Philip E. Barringer, Director, Foreign Military Rights Affairs, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs).

11 February--Congressman William L. Dickinson (R-AL).

22 February--George R. Ariyoshi, Acting Governor of Hawaii.

23 February--Congressman Clement J. Zablocki (D-WI).

11 March--Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secretary of State.

25 March--Davis E. Boster, U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh.

25 March--Hugh G. Appling, Deputy Chief of Mission, Saigon.

25 March--Lieutenant General Gribble, Chief of Engineers, United States Army.

28 March--Rufus Wilson, Superintendent, National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific.

29 March--John Gunther Dean, U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia.

1 April--Davis E. Boster, U.S. Ambassador to Bangladesh.

2 April--Earl Butz, Secretary of Agriculture.

3 April--Howard Rosenblum, National Security Agency.

3 April--Armistead Selden, U.S. Ambassador to New Zealand.

16 April--Samuel R. Preston, House Appropriations Committee.

16 April--Vice Admiral Vincent DePoix, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

17 April--Jack L. Bowers, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Installations and Logistics).

18 April--Tamio Kora, the Consul General of Japan.

29 April--Clifton Forster, Deputy Director of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States Information Service.

2 May--Leonard Unger, U.S. Ambassador to Taiwan.

10 May--William R. Kintner, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand.

10 May--Lieutenant General Lew Allen, USAF, Director of the National Security Agency.

10 May--Dr. John J. Brady, Jr., and John H. Sullivan, House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs.

13 May--Daniel J. Evans, Governor of Washington.

13 May--Calvin L. Rampton, Governor of Utah.

13 May--Arch A. Moore, Jr., Governor of West Virginia.

13 May--Robert D. Ray, Governor of Iowa.

13 May--Marvin Mandel, Governor of Maryland.

13 May--Philip W. Noel, Governor of Rhode Island.

13 May--Rear Admiral Paul C. Boyd, Inspector General of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

14 May--Lester E. Edmond, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

15 May--Lieutenant General Walter T. Galligan, COMUS Japan.

21 May--Major General John E. Murray, Defense Attache, Saigon.

24 May--Dr. Nguyen Tien Hung, Commissioner General of State for Planning, RVN.

5 June--Lieutenant General Gordon T. Gould, Director, Defense Communications Agency.

6 June--Brigadier General R.G. Trefy, Defense Attache to Laos.

6 June--David G. Barr, Consul General of Great Britain.

7 June--Major General George Keegan, Director of Intelligence, USAF.

13 June--Robert V. Keeley, Deputy Chief of Mission, Phnom Penh (designate).

17 June--Lieutenant General W.H. Robinson, Jr., Director, Defense Supply Agency.

21 June--Charles Tevis, National Security Agency.

24 June--General John J. Vogt, Jr., Commander in Chief, Pacific Air Forces.

3 July--Eugene Kopp, Deputy Director, U.S. Information Agency.

12 July--James D. Hodgson, U.S. Ambassador to Japan.

15 July--Roger W. Sullivan, Republic of China desk, State Department.

22 July--Marshall Green, U.S. Ambassador to Australia.

23 July--Major General Thomas Mellen, USA, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand.

29 July--General Robert E. Cushman, Commandant U.S. Marine Corps

13 August--Major General Thomas Miller, USMC, Deputy Commander FMFPAC.

14 August--Vice Admiral Edwin K. Snyder, USN, COMUSTDC (designate).

19 August--Lieutenant General John J. Burns, USAF, Commander USSAG/7th AF (designate)

23 August--Philip C. Habib, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea.

13 September--Mr. Te-chieh Poo, Republic of China Consul General in Hawaii.

19 September--Dr. Donald R. Cotter, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Atomic Energy.

25 September--Dr. Robert J. Hermann, Deputy Director, National Security Agency, Research and Engineering.

26 September--Rear Admiral Max K. Morris, USN, JCS Representative, Law of the Sea Matters.

30 October--Ambassador F. Haydn Williams, the President's Personal Representative for Micronesian Status Negotiations.

31 October--Melvin R. Laird, former Secretary of Defense.

1 November--J. William Middendorf II, Secretary of the Navy.

4 November--Rear Admiral E.C. Thorne, Chief of Naval Staff, New Zealand.

7 November--Mr. Hitoshi Utsumi, Secretary General, Japanese National Defense Council.

8 November--General Motoharu Shirakawa, Chairman, Joint Staff Council, Japanese Defense Agency.

18 November--Thomas W. Aston, Esquire, British Consul-General, Los Angeles, California.

21 November--Christopher Van Hollen, U.S. Ambassador to Maldives and Sri Lanka.

26 November--Mr. William C. Sherman, Department of State.

4 December--Lieutenant General Young Je Lee, Director, Defense Securities Agency, Republic of Korea.

12 December--Admiral Hiraichi Samejima, Chief Maritime Self-Defense Force, Japanese Defense Agency.

30 December--Senator Samuel Nunn (D.-GA), Senate Armed Services Committee.

31 December--David D. Newsom, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia.

Media Visitors to CINCPAC

(U) The following media representatives also called on CINCPAC in 1974:

18 January--Peter Pepper, KHON-TV, Honolulu, conducted a lengthy television interview with Admiral Gayler to discuss current military topics including the energy/fuel situation. Short segments of the interview were featured during evening news broadcasts 22-25 January.

4 March--Clare Hollingsworth, London Telegraph, Tokyo Bureau.

22 March--Don Baker, KITV.

28 March--Tilman Durdin, New York Times.

1 April--Gene Hunter, Honolulu Advertiser Associate Editor.

30 April--Tsu Sung-chiu, publisher of the Taipei Central Daily News.

27 September--Mr. Akira Ogata, Chief Commentator, NHK-TV (Japan).

SECTION II--MEDICAL ACTIVITIES

PACOM Joint Medical Regulating Office Relocated to Hawaii

(U) The Far East Joint Medical Regulating Office (FEJMRO) had been established at Camp Zama, Japan in 1965 because of the U.S. Army hospital buildup in Japan as a result of activity in Southeast Asia. CINCPAC had delegated the responsibility for operating the joint office to CINCUSARPAC, who further delegated it to the U.S. Army Japan for operation and logistic support. An area joint medical regulating office in Saigon, also established in 1965, was placed under the operational control of the FEJMRO. On 1 January 1970 the FEJMRO was placed under the direct operational control of the CINCPAC Surgeon and redesignated the PACOM Joint Medical Regulating Office (PACOMJMRO). On 1 January 1972 the Saigon office was phased out of operation, and regulating functions for Southeast Asia were assumed by the U.S. Army Medical Command, Vietnam. On 1 October 1972, all medical regulating functions and activities for the PACOM were assumed by the PACOMJMRO in Japan.

(U) On 19 May 1972 CINCPACAF had proposed that the JMRO be relocated from Camp Zama to Clark Air Base in the Philippines. On 11 August of that year CINCPAC replied that it probably would be extremely difficult to obtain the high priority for provision of dedicated communications equipment at Clark that existed at Camp Zama. Also, a degree of integration into the 9th Aeromedical Evacuation Group staff offices was not considered desirable. Aeromedical evacuation routing of Southeast Asia patients to the Continental United States had shifted so that the majority now transited Clark, but this was expected to continue to decrease.[1]

(U) In 1974, however, the matter of relocation of the PACOMJMRO was considered again in connection with the anticipated disestablishment of USARPAC. It was determined that the functions of the PACOMJMRO could be absorbed by the personnel already assigned to the CINCPAC Surgeon's office with the addition of only one person and a minimum budget increase. Both CINCUSARPAC and CINCPACAF concurred, although the USAF Hospital at Clark still thought that Clark was a better relocation site. On 6 June CINCPAC announced the relocation to Camp Smith, which was effective 1 July 1974. CINCPAC provided procedures to be used during the changeover.[2]

1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 3048, 11 Aug 72, Subj: Pacific Command Joint Medical Regulating Office.
2. CINCPAC ltr Ser 966, 21 Mar 74, Subj: Relocation of the Pacific Command Joint Medical Regulating Office (PACOMJMRO); and CINCUSARPAC 1st Ind to that letter of 11 Apr 74; CINCPACAF ltr of 25 Apr 74, Subj: Relocation of the Pacific Command Joint Medical Regulating Office (PACOMJMRO) (Your Ltr, 21 Mar 74); CINCPAC 061900Z Jun 74.

Regionalization of Peacetime Health Care Support Overseas

(U) In November CINCPAC was tasked to implement by 1 January 1975 a plan from the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the Armed Forces Regional Health Services System (Overseas). The basic goal of the system was to improve delivery of health care to all Department of Defense beneficiaries by increasing productivity and achieving economies in resources, while providing a concurrent improvement in patient and staff satisfaction and insuring that no degradation of quality ensued. Coordinating supervision of the system was to be exercised by the Military Medical Regions Coordinating Office (MMRCO), which consisted of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (for Health and Environment) and the Surgeon Generals of the Services. For purposes of command or resources management, each staff medical officer or medical facility commander would continue to be responsible and responsive to the next higher commander in his Service's chain of command. Each medical facility commander would continue to request and receive resources from his own Service through established programming and budgeting systems.

(U) Effective 1 January 1975 the PACOM was divided into five military medical regions for peacetime delivery of health care. These were the Mid-Pacific (which included Hawaii, Midway, Wake and Johnston Island); the Southwest Pacific (which included the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Diego Garcia, and Indonesia); the Marianas (which included also Australia and New Zealand); Korea; and Japan, including the Ryukyus. Each military medical region was to be coordinated by a tri-Service regional review committee. The senior staff medical officer from each Service in the region would constitute the committee. Chairmanship would be rotated periodically as determined locally.

(U) The regional review committees were to report, through CINCPAC, to the MMRCO. They were to perform a continuing assessment of health services' capabilities and operations, particularly from the standpoint of quality, efficiency, and economy; a continuing assessment of the need for increased or decreased services, facilities, or other resources within their regions; and to identify management improvements and procedures for health service within their regions. Commanders of subordinate unified commands and CINCPAC Representatives in areas in which committees were established were to assist in coordination and resolution of problem areas as required. The chairman of each committee was to report on progress quarterly, listing specific actions taken during the quarter or discussing those problem areas or legitimate constraints that prevented necessary changes and innovations needed to accomplish optimum results.[1]

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1. CINCPAC 042012Z Dec 74, which cited JCS 1865/66-1 of 20 Nov 74 and OASD (H&E) Memo of 18 Nov 74.

(U) On 16 December the USAF Hospital at Clark Air Base in the Philippines requested a list of the Army and Navy facilities in the Southwest Pacific region. On 18 December CINCPAC provided all concerned with a list for all regions in the PACOM.[1]

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1. US HOSP CLARK AB PHIL 160230Z Dec 74; CINCPAC 180049Z Dec 74.

SECTION III--COMPTROLLER ACTIVITIES

Military Banking

(C) During a CINCPAC staff visit to the DAO Saigon, it was discovered that an unauthorized Limited Depository Account in U.S. dollars was being maintained by the disbursing officer with the American Express banking facility. CINCPAC, in requesting an audit, noted that the account should have been closed with the withdrawal of Military Payment Certificates in March 1973. The account had been reactivated in U.S. dollars, however, and had contained a balance as high as $5.8 million on 1 August 1973. The DAO Disbursing Office, Saigon had requested guidance from the Navy on closing the account earlier, and on 28 February CINCPAC requested that the Naval Audit Service Systems audit the activity as soon as possible in order to review cash accountability since March 1973. Three auditors and one Naval Investigative Service agent completed their two-week review and debriefed at CINCPAC headquarters in March. On 18 October CINCPAC forwarded to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OASD(C)) the completed review of this unauthorized U.S. dollar account. Investigation revealed that there was no substantiation of malfeasance by the individuals involved.[1]

(U) In June, in accordance with instructions from the OASD(C), CINCPAC approved closure of the Limited Depository Account with the American Express Military Banking Facility (MBF) at Subic Bay, in the Philippines, and authorized establishment of a U.S. dollar custody account in its place.[2]

(U) Earlier, in March, a member of CINCPAC's staff accompanied two representatives of the U.S. Treasury Department on a two-week inspection of MBFs in the PACOM. Items noted that required further study included the need for vaults on Guam, the reevaluation of "custody accounts" on Okinawa, a dollar recoupment program, refund of excess profits derived from baht sales in Thailand, and monthly reporting procedures. Certain of these subjects are discussed in more detail in the material that follows.[3]

(U) In June, the use of the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN) by MBFs in overseas areas was approved by the Departments of Defense and Treasury.[4]

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1. CINCPAC 280149Z Feb 74; J72 HistSums, Mar, Apr 74, which cited CINCPAC 050126Z Mar 74; J72 HistSums Oct-Nov 74, which cited CINCPAC ltr Ser 3018 of 18 Oct 74.
2. J72 HistSum Jun 74, which cited CINCPAC 180100Z Jun 74.
3. J72 HistSums Mar-Apr 74.
4. J72 HistSum Jun 74, which cited SECDEF 1962/261756Z Jun 74 and CINCPAC 290131Z Jun 74.

(U) A conference on MBF in the PACOM was held by the Treasury Department in Washington 17-19 December. It was attended by representatives of the OASD(C), the Treasury Department Fiscal Service, COMUS Korea, COMUS Japan, and CINCPAC (as well as American Express, the Bank of America, and the Chase Manhattan and First National City Banks). The spiraling inflation in Japan and wage demands of local national employees of MBFs were driving the cost of operating the MBFs to the point where it was no longer feasible to continue military banking as it had been operated. It was agreed at the meeting that the banks that operated MBFs were to transfer local nationals to commercial facilities, and replace them where needed with U.S. dependents, if that was possible. OASD(C) agreed to perform a cost benefit study to determine when the costs would exceed the benefits of having MBFs in Japan.[1]

Funding

(U) The subordinate unified commands throughout the PACOM were funded, as CINCPAC was, by the Navy. The accompanying chart shows programmed administrative cost for FY 75 for the PACOM joint commands. The CINCPAC Operations and Maintenance (Navy) budgets for FY 75 and 76 were submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations on 8 May 1974. They totalled $57,590,900 and $57,822,300 respectively. For FY 74, on 22 February the Chief of Naval Operations provided an additional $14,377,000 for the Defense Attache Office, Saigon, to bring the total for FY 74 to $42,250,000.[2]

(U) Additional funds were provided as follows: on 19 June the CNO provided $30,000 in FY 75 contingency of the Navy funds for the PACOM. The allocation to subordinate commands and the staff was made in June. In July the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs/Defense Security Assistance Agency provided $23,900 in FY 75 Military Assistance Program representation funds for the PACOM. CINCPAC informed the MAAGs and Missions of the amounts available for their use.[3]

(U) One major funding change occurred when, effective 1 July, the Secretary of Defense designated the Navy to provide administrative and logistic support to the newly established MACTHAI Support Group. (This command had formerly been designated the U.S. Army Support Command Thailand.) This support included budgeting, funding, and accounting responsibilities previously performed by the Army. Support for COMUSMACTHAI continued to be Navy funded. For FY 75,

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1. SECDEF 7124/062382Z Dec 74; J72 HistSum Dec 74.
2. J72 HistSum, May 74, which cited CINCPAC ltr Ser 1412 of 8 May 74; J72 HistSums, Jan, Feb 74, which cited CNO 221714Z Feb 74.
3. J72 HistSums Jun, Jul 74, which cited CNO 191709Z Jun 74 and SECDEF 091500Z Jul 74.

PACOM JOINT COMMANDS (O&M(n) FUNDED)

FY 1975 PROGRAMMED ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS

AS OF 30 JUNE 1974

IN THOUSANDS

ORGANIZATION	U.S. COSTS				HOST COUNTRY AIK
	CINCPAC O&M(n) FUNDED	SHARED ADMIN SUPPORT	MILITARY DEPT. SUPPORT *	TOTAL U.S. COSTS	
PACOM HQ	$ 7,148.4	$	$ 16,421.5	$ 23,570.0	$
COMUS JAPAN	875.1		1,069.3	1,944.4	
COMUS KOREA	2,876.2		3,803.7	6,679.9	
COMUS TDC	410.5		1,724.0	2,134.5	55.4
USSAG	951.0		1,445.3	2,396.3	
COMUS MACTHAI	1,692.3	284.9	2538.0	4,515.2	
JCRC	1,137.4		1,666.2	2,803.6	
IPAC	2,835.5		3,257.6	6,092.8	
**DAO SAIGON	42,500.0		1,327.0	43,827.8	
TOTAL	$ 60,426.1	$ 284.9	$ 33,252.6	$ 93,963.7	$ 55.4

*MILITARY PAY ONLY
**TRANSFER TO MAP IN FY75

SOURCE: Command Digest, 15 Aug 74, p. 117.

MACTHAI Support Group activities continued to be Army funded, on a reimbursable basis. For FY 76, a fund transfer between the Army and Navy was to be made at the Washington level. Support provided those activities directly funded by the Services would continue on a direct reimbursement basis.[1]

(U) Also effective on 1 July, funding for the Republic of Vietnam program was transferred from Military Assistance Service Funded programs to a separate account titled Military Assistance South Vietnamese Forces (MASVF). Management and control of this account were to be similar to administration under the Military Assistance Program. Administrative and supply operation costs (PCH&T--Packing, Crating, Handling and Transportation) were also to be charged to this new account. Management of the Vietnam program would follow general MAP policies and practices. The administrative budget (T-20) would include all DAO Saigon administrative costs, personnel, commissary operations, communications support, etc.[2]

(U) Starting in FY 75 Military Assistance for Laos had become funded in the Military Assistance appropriation rather than the military functions appropriation. Obligations of military function appropriations were not authorized after 30 June 1974. FY 75 and subsequent Military Assistance to Laos would be programmed and administered in accordance with Military Assistance programming, control, and accounting procedures.[3]

Dollar Recoupment

(U) U.S. agencies had a continuing requirement for U.S. dollars overseas. This money had originally been procured from a Central Funding Office. The "dollar recoupment" program was a means by which commercial banks that bought U.S. currency overseas in a particular country recycled it into the U.S. system by providing those same dollars to the MBFs in their area. There was a profit for the banks, but this retention in-country was cheaper and easier on the United States than the previous long-distance currency transfers.

(U) A COMUSMACTHAI message of 27 March outlined the program there. In late 1972 that headquarters had become aware that U.S. currency was being shipped from the Pacific Central Funding Office to some installations while at

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1. J72 Point Paper, 20 Aug 74, Subj: Funding Support for MACTHAI/MACTHAI Support Group; J72 HistSum, Aug 74, which cited JCS 7220/162128Z Aug 74. See also Chapter I for a discussion of this reorganization and other command arrangements in Thailand.
2. CNO 052250Z Jun 74; J72 HistSum Dec 74.
3. SECDEF 2196/251403Z Apr 74.

the same time currency in the same denominations was being shipped out. MACTHAI as the Single Senior Military Representative exercised currency control authority for Thailand, and had published a regulation applicable to all Defense Department disbursing officers to provide a standard operating procedure designed to maintain an efficient central funding operation. In Thailand significant amounts of currency had been recouped: in 1971, $6,875,000; in 1972, $19,960,000; and in 1973, $9,846,000.

(U) The Comptroller of the Central Funding Office visited MACTHAI in November 1973 for the purpose of achievment of U.S. dollar self-sufficiency in Thailand. A revitalized recoupment program enabled achievement of this goal in February and March 1974. But MACTHAI's role in Thailand in this matter was not clear and he requested CINCPAC guidance.[1]

(U) On 3 May, however, the OASD(C) discontinued the entire dollar recoupment program in the PACOM because of the excess amounts being recouped. The program was to be reinstated, as recommended by CINCPAC on a case-by-case basis. Approval was to be based on the adequacy of administrative controls to be implemented. Within these guidelines, CINCPAC approved MACTHAI's request to reinstate the program in Thailand.[2]

(U) Subsequently the Secretary of Defense authorized resumption of recoupment programs in both Korea and Taiwan, again to be in accordance with PACOM guidance and procedures. Also, in September, resumption was authorized in Okinawa and the Philippines.[3]

Central Funding Operations

(U) Responsibility for central funding--the acquisition, storage, and bulk distribution of U.S. currency--after the disestablishment of USARPAC came under study. CINCUSARPAC, who was charged with responsibility for the function had further assigned it to the U.S. Army Japan, and specifically to the finance officer of the U.S. Army Base Command, Okinawa. This had been a logical assignment, CINCUSARPAC said, when military payment certificates were the official medium of exchange for all cash transactions in Vietnam and Korea, because the Army had been responsible for MPC. But MPCs had been discontinued and in recent months the primary funding had been in support of the Air Force with the Navy second and the Army third. Also, with the energy crisis, the Army funding mission had become more dependent on Military Airlift Command flights

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1. MACTHAI 270710Z Mar 74.
2. Ibid., which cited SECDEF 4349/092355Z May and CINCPAC 110307Z May 74
3. J72 HistSums, Jun, Jul 74, which cited SECDEF 2635/271610Z Jun 74 and CINCPAC 290131Z Jun 74 and 020157Z Jul 74; J72 HistSum, Sep 74, which cited SECDEF 2110/031806Z Sep 74 and CINCPAC 060026Z Sep 74.

than the use of dedicated aircraft, a situation that required extremely close coordination because of the security requirements for this kind of cargo. CINCUSARPAC requested that the Army be released from this central funding mission and that it be transferred to another Service.[1]

(U) CINCPAC had proposed that CINCPACAF assume this responsibility. On 31 May, however, CINCPACAF advised that he did not concur that the phasing down of a Service force faster than another should be the primary basis for transferring functions. He believed that the absence of the Army major headquarters should have little influence on the Army's ability to carry on the function. Also, the decision to allow the recoupment of dollars in Thailand would alleviate the need for frequent large shipments of dollars there. The responsibility for central funding in the PACOM was shifted from Headquarters USARPAC to the U.S. Army Japan by CINCPAC direction on 1 December.[2]

(U) On 7 December CINCPAC requested that the PACOM commands review central funding procedures, which had been modified with the change in responsibility. Sub-funding offices were to pick up currency from the Central Funding Office Okinawa in lieu of delivery by a courier of that agency. This had been directed because it was anticipated that there would be a reduction in central funding requirements because the dollar recoupment programs would fill most of the money needs. CINCPAC requested information on the impact of this revision in procedures by early 1975. He also requested that if a major currency requirement continued to exist, affected agencies provide CINCPAC with a summary of actions to recoup dollars and the anticipated monthly dollar requirement not met by recoupment.[3]

Foreign Currency Purchases - Thailand

(U) In the summer of 1973 the study of baht sales for use by U.S. Forces had become a matter of concern. With a devaluation of Thai currency, the U.S. commercial banks earned excess profits. The Treasury and Defense Departments agreed that any advantage generated from local purchases should accrue to the United States rather than an intermediary. COMUSMACTHAI had plans to establish a MACTHAI Currency Control Office, but these were held in abeyance. However, a test of direct purchase of baht on the open market had begun as 1973 ended.[4]

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1. CINCUSARPAC 030437Z Apr 74.
2. CINCPACAF 312331Z May 74; J72 HistSum, Sep 74, which cited CINCPAC 260351Z Sep 74.
3. CINCPAC 070124Z Dec 74.
4. CINCPAC Command History 1973, Vol. II, pp. 735-736.

(U) The tests were successful, and on 16 April 1974 the Secretaries of Defense and Treasury authorized COMUSMACTHAI to enter the bankers' market to purchase local currency needed for U.S. Forces at the most favorable rate. Earlier, on 1 April COMUSMACTHAI had advised that he and the Embassy economic representatives had entered into discussions with five major Thai banks to determine conditions for the sale of baht. The banks were advised that the United States would buy from whoever provided the best rate of exchange over the Exchange Equalization Fund buying rate. American banks were advised that they were also to be allowed to compete.[1]

(U) General Accounting Office representatives who reviewed military financial matters in Thailand expressed satisfaction with the baht funding procedures.[2]

Piaster Exchange Rates

(U) In Vietnam in 1974 the piaster continued to devalue periodically, as follows: on 4 February the rate was 575 to $1. U.S.; on 4 March it was 590 to 1; on 24 March 605 to 1; on 24 April it was 620 to 1; on 5 July 630 to 1; on 23 August it was 655 to 1; on 26 September 670 to 1; and on 10 December it was 685 to 1.[3]

Tri-Service Disbursing Proposed

(U) A CINCPAC survey team recommendation following a review of Defense Department activities in the Taipei area concerned disbursing offices and raised the possibility of the Navy disbursing office assuming the tri-Service pay function. One problem was the varying degree of Service progress toward achieving full implementation of the Joint Uniformed Military Pay System (JUMPS). The Army operated completely under the JUMPS; the Navy would not be converted until a year from the time of the study (March 1975). The Air Force system was similar to the JUMPS, but full implementation of JUMPS was not expected until late 1974. On 19 March CINCPAC asked about the feasibility of the Navy's assumption of this funding responsibility. The Navy Comptroller advised, however, that it was not feasible at the time because of the varying stages of completion of JUMPS by the Services.[4]

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1. MACTHAI 010904Z Apr 74; J72 HistSums, Mar, Apr 74, which cited SECDEF 161653Z Apr 74 and CINCPAC 170102Z Apr 74.
2. MACTHAI 020907Z Jul 74.
3. J72 HistSums, 1974.
4. CINCPAC 190239Z Mar 74; J72 HistSums, Mar, Apr 74, which cited NAVCOMPT 281345Z Mar 74.

Audits

(U) Throughout the year CINCPAC's staff reviewed and commented on a number of audit reports prepared on PACOM agencies. In 1974 CINCPAC also prepared an annual progress report on the status of actions to correct deficiencies disclosed by audits (as directed by the Defense Department's Military Assistance Manual). This annual report, submitted to the Defense Security Assistance Agency (Comptroller), included the status of actions in Korea, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Laos.[1]

(U) Review of the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft report of 15 February on "Improvements Needed in U.S. Contractor Training of RVNAF" (OSD Case 3779) was completed and comments forwarded to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics on 19 March.[2]

(U) Also reviewed was the GAO report on "Savings in Interest Costs Realized by Reducing Cash on Hand at Overseas Activities" of 21 March 1974 (OSD Case 3804); comments were forwarded to ASD(C) on 16 April.[3]

(U) On 7 June CINCPAC authorized COMUSTDC to make a CINCPAC survey team report regarding the use of administrative vehicles available for review by representatives of the GAO.[4]

(U) In consonance with guidance from the ASD(C), CINCPAC provided the GAO Honolulu with a copy of a Headquarters PACOM study entitled, "Review of DOD Activities in the Taipei Area, 11-22 February 1974." That office was also provided with Headquarters PACOM comments on a GAO review of Special Forces in Thailand (Code 49217).[5]

(U) In September CINCPAC recommended to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Audit additional areas of interest for audit coverage in FY 76. The list included equity and uniformity of Service housing policies and procedures in Hawaii, Japan, Korea, and Guam; equal opportunity training policies and requirements; identification and treatment of drug and alcohol abusers; military postal operations; military customs programs; and management

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1. CINCPAC ltr Ser 0062, 23 Jan 74, Subj: Annual Progress Report on Status of Actions to Correct Deficiencies Disclosed by Audits.
2. J72 HistSums, Mar, Apr 74, which cited CINCPAC 192354Z Mar 74.
3. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC ltr Ser 1215 of 16 Apr 74.
4. J72 HistSum, Jun 74, which cited CINCPAC 070128Z Jun 74.
5. J72 HistSum, Aug 74, which cited CINCPAC ltr of 20 Aug 74, SECDEF 6786/ 161449Z Aug 74, and CINCPAC ltr Ser 0413 of 6 Aug 74.

and utilization of funds appropriated for administrative support of unified headquarters in the PACOM.[1]

(U) CINCPAC also forwarded to DASD (Audit) the current status of actions taken on their findings on a recent audit of in-country procurement in the RVNAF on 11 September.[2]

(U) On 19 November the GAO began their survey of DOD activities in the PACOM. This was part of a worldwide review of how the department was reducing forces and realigning commands. The review included visits to the component command headquarters. CINCPAC advised the JCS of the GAO audit visitors.[3]

(U) Also in November CINCPAC provided comments on a GAO draft report of 4 October on "U.S. Assistance and Other Expenditures Benefiting Thailand" to the OASD for International Security Affairs (Security Assistance) and the Defense Security Assistance Agency. This was OSD Case 3918, GAO code 49217.[4]

(U) On 16 December CINCPAC provided the GAO Honolulu with edited statistical data on war reserve requirements based on Service input to the 1 October 1974 CINCPAC Situation Report. The JCS had approved release of this data if it were edited of all references to specific operation plans, specific areas of operations, and potential enemies.[5]

(U) Another GAO request concerned a copy of the CINCPAC document called SOLACE--PACOM Study of Logistic Alternatives, Concepts, and Effectiveness. The JCS gave approval to release specific portions if they were sanitized of all references to war plans. Appropriately edited data was provided; specifically, portions dealing with Service methodology for designating and computing war reserves.[6]

Reports

(U) The CINCPAC Comptroller was responsible for monitoring the PACOM reporting programs. A current list of recurring reports required by CINCPAC under the PACOM Unified Reporting Structure (PURS) was published in the spring. A total of 179 reports represented an estimated annual cost of $2.1 million in material and the manpower resources required to produce and process them.[7]

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1. CINCPAC 070509Z Sep 74.
2. J72 HistSum, Sep 74, which cited CINCPAC ltr Ser 2655 of 11 Sep 74.
3. J72 HistSums, Oct, Nov 74, which cited CINCPAC 262016Z Nov 74.
4. Ibid., which cited CINCPAC 050042Z Nov 74.
5. JCS 9943/111534Z Dec 74; CINCPAC ltr Ser T309, 16 Dec 74, Subj: Classified Documents.
6. CINCPAC ltr of 10 Jan 75, Subj: Classified Documents.
7. J72 HistSums, Mar, Apr 74, which cited CINCPAC Notice 5214 of 16 Apr 74.

Appendix I

JCS Unified Action Guidance

(U) JCS Publication 2, Unified Action Armed Forces, set forth principles, doctrines, and functions governing the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States when two or more Services or elements thereof were acting together. It provided military guidance governing both exercise of command by unified, specified, joint task force, and other joint force commanders and doctrine for unified operations and training.

(U) Periodically in this history specific paragraphs of JCS Publication 2 are cited, particularly in matters of command arrangements and relationships. To assist readers in understanding these relationships, the following paragraphs, referenced elsewhere in the history, are quoted from the edition of JCS Publication 2 in effect at the time most were being studied, the edition of 23 November 1959, as amended through April 1973. The paragraphs quoted are substantially identical in the revision of 1 October 1974.

30201. Definitions

a. Command. The term "Command" has several meanings.

(1) The authority vested in an individual of the Armed Forces for the direction, coordination and control of military forces.

(2) An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action.

(3) A unit or units, an organization or an area under the command of one individual.

b. Operational Command. Those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational Command should be exercised by the use of the assigned normal organizational units through their responsible commanders or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising operational command. It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, and unit training, except when a subordinate commander requests assistance.

(The term is synonymous with OPERATIONAL CONTROL and is uniquely applied to the operational control exercised by the commanders of unified and specified commands over assigned forces in accordance with the National Security Act of 1947, as amended and revised (10 U.S.C. 124)). (See paragraphs 30202 and 30203 for specific guidance.)

c. Operational Control. See OPERATIONAL COMMAND.

d. Mission.

(1) The objective, that is the task, together with its purpose, thereby clearly indicating the action to be taken and the reason therefor.

(2) In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit, a task.

(3) The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task.

e. Objective.

(1) In the abstract sense, it is the effect desired.

(2) In the concrete sense, it is the physical object of the action taken.

30202. Specific Guidance on Exercise of Operational Command

a. Within the framework of the basic definition set forth in 30201b (above), and within the provisions of policies and directives imposed by higher authority and by legislation, the commander of a unified command or specified command is authorized to:

(1) Plan for, deploy, direct, control and coordinate the actions of assigned forces in conformity with b and c below.

(2) Conduct joint training exercises, as may be required to achieve effective employment of the forces of his command as a whole, in accordance with doctrine for

unified operations and training as established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; establish such training policies for joint operations as are required to accomplish the mission.

(3) Exercise directive authority within his command in the field of logistics (par. 30203).

(4) Establish such personnel policies as required to insure uniform standards of military conduct.

(5) Exercise directive authority over all elements of his command, in accordance with policies and procedures established by higher authority, in relationships with foreign governments, including the armed forces thereof, and other agencies of the U.S. Government.

(6) Establish plans, policies, and over-all requirements for the intelligence activities of his command.

(7) Review the recommendations bearing on the budget from the component commanders to their parent Military Departments to verify that the recommendations are in agreement with his plans and programs.

(8) Participate in the development and acquisition of his command and control system and direct the system's operation (par. 302104).

b. Within unified commands, operational command will be exercised through the Service component commanders (subject to the exception addressed in par. 30215c(1)(f), or be exercised through the commanders of subordinate commands, when such commands are established by the unified commander in accordance with criteria and procedures set forth herein.

c. Within specified commands, operational command will be exercised through the commanders of appropriate subordinate commands established by the specified commander (subject to the exception addressed in par. 30215c (1) (f)). When the subordinate command structure involves the forces of two or more Services, any deviation from the principle of component command will be recommended by the specified commander for approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

30203. Specific Guidance on Exercise of Directive Authority in the Field of Logistics

a. Within unified and specified commands, the authorization of directive authority is intended to insure:

(1) Effectiveness and economy of operation;

(2) Prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service components of a command.

b. This authorization of directive authority is not intended to:

(1) Discontinue Service responsibility for logistic support.

(2) Discourage continuation of techniques of coordination by consultation and agreement;

(3) Disrupt effective procedures, efficient utilization of facilities or organization.

c. The Military Departments and Services continue to have responsibility under the direction of the Secretary of Defense for the logistic and administrative support of component commands. Under conditions short of war, the scope of the logistic and administrative responsibilities exercised by the commander of a unified command will be consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, departmental policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and such other specific conditions as are prescribed by the Secretary of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In some instances the desired policy of the commander of a unified command may, in his opinion or in the opinion of the Service component commander concerned, be inconsistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, departmental policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, or with local conditions. In such cases the comments and recommendations of the commander of the unified command, together with the comments of the component commanders concerned in cases of nonconcurrences, shall normally be referred to the depart-

ment concerned for appropriate consideration, and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if the nonconcurrence is not resolved with the responsible department. Under wartime conditions and where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the logistic authority and responsibility of commanders of unified commands are expanded to authorize them to utilize all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned to their commands as necessary for the accomplishment of their missions under the approved war plan being implemented.

d. Prior to effecting a change in logistic support, including base adjustments, which affects significantly the capability of a component command of a unified or specified command, the Military Departments or Services shall insure that the commander of the unified or specified command concerned and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are advised in a timely manner of the intended action.

30215. Methods of Exercising Command and Obtaining Coordination

a. In accordance with the principles set forth in the preceding paragraphs, command will be exercised and coordination will be obtained as set forth below. These methods are described and defined in detail later in this section.

b. Command of unified and specified commands will be exercised as provided herein, and as otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense.

c. Methods of Exercising Command.

(1) By the commander of a unified command:

(a) Through the Service component commanders.

(b) Establishing a subordinate unified command.

(c) Establishing a uni-Service force reporting directly to the commander of the unified command.

(d) Establishing a joint task force.

(e) Attaching elements of one force to another force.

(f) Directly to specific operational forces which, due to the mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, must remain immediately responsive to the commander. Such specific forces must be identified by the commander and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Defense.

(2) By the commander of a specified command:

(a) Through the commanders of appropriate subordinate commands.

(b) Establishing a joint task force.

(c) Establishing a uni-Service force reporting directly to the commander of the specified command.

(d) Attaching elements of one force to another force.

d. Methods of Obtaining Coordination.

(1) Prescribing action in support.

(2) Establishing a coordinating authority.

e. Determination of Method to be Used.

The method of command or coordination to be used will be determined by the commander of the unified or specified command exercising the command enumerated above.

30225. Command of Component Forces or Other Subordinate Commands

Forces assigned to a unified command will normally consist of two or more Service components, each of which will be commanded directly by an officer of that component. Operational command by the unified commander will be exercised through the Service component commanders (subject to the exception addressed in paragraph 30215c(1) (f)), or through the commanders of subordinate commands established in accordance with the procedures and criteria set forth herein. Unless authorized by the establishing authority, the unified commander will not also act as the commander of any of the Service components or other subordinate commands. In exercising operational command, the unified commander shall take cognizance of the prerogatives and responsibilities of his service component commanders as indicated in paragraphs 30232 and 30233. Commanders of Service components will communicate directly with their respective Chiefs of Service on matters which are the responsibilities of the Military Departments and Services.

30231. Component Commands

a. Designation of Component Commanders. With the exception of the commander of a unified command and members of his joint staff, the senior officer of each Service assigned to a unified command and qualified for command by the regulations of his own Service is the commander of the component of his Service unless another officer is so designated by competent authority.

b. Composition of Component Commands. A component command consists of the component commander and all those individuals, units, detachments, organizations or installations under his military command which have been assigned to the operational command of the commander of the unified command. Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations or installations may operate directly under the component commander in his service role, and should contribute to the mission of the unified commander as appropriate.

30232. Responsibilities of Component Commanders

Each component commander is charged with the responsibility for making recommendations to the commander of the

unified command on the proper employment of his component, and for accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned by the commander of the unified command. Component commanders will inform commanders of their unified or specified commands of planning for significant changes in logistic support, including base adjustments, sufficiently early in the planning process to enable the commander of the unified or specified command to express his views and to have them considered prior to implementation or final decision.

a. The component commander is responsible within his command for:

(1) Internal administration and discipline, except as may be otherwise provided in Section 4, Chapter III.

(2) Training in own Service doctrines, techniques and tactical methods.

(3) Logistic functions normal to the component, except as otherwise directed by higher authority or herein.

(4) Tactical employment of the forces of his component.

(5) Service intelligence matters.

b. The component commander communicates directly with his Chief of Service on uni-Service matters relating to administration, personnel, training (U.S. and allied), logistics, communications, doctrine and combat development, and other matters when of uni-Service interest. Where intelligence and counterintelligence matters are a uni-Service responsibility, he will communicate directly with his Chief of Service.

c. The component commander is responsible to the commander of the unified command for the conduct of training, as directed, of elements of the other Services in:

(1) Joint operations for which his own Service has or may be assigned primary responsibility, and, also,

(2) Operations for which his facilities and capabilities are suitable.

d. The selection and nomination of specific units for subordinate forces to meet the operational requirements of the commander of a unified command are normally the function of the component commander. These units revert to his command whenever such subordinate forces are dissolved.

e. The operating details of any service logistic support system will be retained and exercised by the commanders of the Service components in accordance with their departmental instructions, subject to the directive authority of the commander of the unified command, as indicated in paragraph 30203.

30233. Additional Missions of an Officer Assigned as a Component Commander

The officer who is assigned as a component commander may be assigned missions or tasks not within the purview of authority of the commander of a unified command. Such missions and tasks must not conflict with and should contribute to the over-all mission of the commander of the unified command.

30234. Authority of Commanders of Subordinate Unified Commands and Their Component Commanders

A commander of a subordinate unified command (i.e., a unified command established by the commander of an existing unified command established by the President, paragraph 30221) within his area of responsibility and subject to modification by the authority appointing him to such command has functions, authorities and responsibilities similar to those of the commander of a unified command established by the President. However, commanders of Service components of subordinate unified commands will communicate directly with the commanders of the Service components of the unified command on matters which are the responsibility of the Military Departments and Services, or as directed by their Chief of Service. Similarly, their component commanders have responsibilities and missions similar to those enumerated in paragraphs 30231, 30232, and 30233.

30281. Definition and Scope of Authority [Coordinating Authority]

A Coordinating Authority is a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services, or two or more forces of the same Service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement, he shall refer the matter to the appointing authority.

30282. When a Coordinating Authority is Applicable

A Coordinating Authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. It is useful when it is desired to coordinate two or more agencies for a special common task without disturbing normal organizational relationships in other matters.

30283. Joint Force Not Implied

Designation of a Coordinating Authority does not establish a joint force.

30813. Command Relationships [Communications]

* * * * *

b. Commanders of overseas unified commands will develop agreements which clearly delineate their relationships with the DCA field organizations within their areas of responsibility. The agreements will be governed by the guidance contained in reference 30801f [DOD Directive 5105.19, "Defense Communications Agency (DCA)."], additional guidance issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the following policy.

* * * * *

(2) The commanders of the overseas unified commands have operational command authority over the Service operating elements of the DCS, through the Service component commanders. In accordance with reference 30801f, DCA field organizations, under the command of the Director, DCA, exercise operational direction over the DCS operating

elements. The terms "operational command" and "operational direction," as used herein, encompass similar elements of authority. Consequently, operating elements of the DCS are subject to authoritative direction from different sources. To avoid conflicting direction, the commanders of overseas unified commands will normally exercise those aspects of operational command involved in the direct operation of the DCS by expressing their DCS operational requirements to the senior DCA field organization serving their areas of responsibility.

GLOSSARY

A

AAA	Antiaircraft Artillery
AAP	Affirmative Action Plan
ABNCP	Airborne Command Post
ACL	Allowable Cabin Load
ACP	Allied Communication Publication
ADC	Aerospace Defense Command
ADP	Automatic Data Processing
AEP	Army Element Pacific
AFIOC	Armed Forces Intelligence Operations Center
AFL-CIO	American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
AFSSO	Air Force Security Service Office
AGE	Aerospace Ground Equipment
AGI	Auxiliary General Intelligence
AID	Agency for International Development
AIF	Automated Installation Intelligence File
AIG	Air Intelligence Group; Address Indicator Group
ALCOM	Alaskan Command
ALCON	All Concerned
ALPHA	A Message to CINCPAC When Away From Headquarters
AMC	Army Materiel Command
AMEMB	American Embassy
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand, United States (Treaty)
AOB	Air Order of Battle
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier; Army Petroleum Center
APO	Army Post Office
ARPA	Advanced Research Projects Agency
ARPAC	Army Pacific
ARRS	Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam
ASA	Army Security Agency; Association of Southeast Asia
ASD	Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASD(C)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
ASD(H&E)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Environment)
ASD(I&L)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics

ASD(ISA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
ASD(M&RA)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASIC	All-Source Information Center
ASPB	Assault Support Patrol Boat
ASW	Antisubmarine Warfare
ATC	Armored Troop Carriers; Air Training Command
ATTG	Automated Tactical Target Graphics
AUSA	Association of the United States Army
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital Network
AUTOVON	Automatic Voice Network
AVGAS	Aviation Gasoline
AWADS	All Weather Aerial Delivery System

B

BALFRAM	Balanced Force Requirements Analysis Methodology
BEQ	Bachelor Enlisted Quarters
BIOT	British Indian Ocean Territory
BOM	By Other Means

C

C	Confidential
C^2	Command and Control
C^4	Command, Control, Communications, and Computers
CAF	Chinese Air Force; Command Advisory Facility
CAF/ROC	Command Advisory Function/Reconnaissance Operations Center
CAOSOP	Coordination of Atomic Operations Standard Operating Procedures
CAT	Civil Action Team
CAX	Civic Action Exercise
CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
CEQ	Council on Environmental Quality
CHJUSMAG-K	Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Korea
CHJUSMAGPHIL	Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Philippines
CHJUSMAGTHAI	Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand
CHMAAG	Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group
CHMEDTC	Chief, Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia
CHOP	Change Operational Control
CHUSDLG	Chief U.S. Defense Liaison Group (Indonesia)

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCAL	Commander in Chief Alaska
CINCEUR	Commander in Chief Europe
CINCLANT	Commander in Chief Atlanta
CINCLANTFLT	Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
CINCONAD	Commander in Chief, Continental Air Defense Command
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief Pacific
CINCPACAF	Commander in Chief Pacific Air Forces
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet
CINCPACINST	Commander in Chief Pacific Instruction
CINCPACREP	Commander in Chief Pacific Representative
CINCPACREPPHIL	CINCPAC Representative, Philippines
CINCSAC	Commander in Chief Strategic Air Command
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
CINCUSARPAC	Commander in Chief United States Army Pacific
CIRL	Current Intelligence Reporting List
CLSU	Crypto Logistics Support Unit (Thailand)
CMI	Classified Military Information
CMS	Communications Security Material System
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
CNTL	Command Nuclear Target List
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COINS	Community On-Line Intelligence Network Systems
COMAFPAC	Commander Air Forces Pacific
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
COMIPAC	Commander, Intelligence Center Pacific
COMNAVFORPHIL	Commander, Naval Forces Philippines
COMSEC	Communications Security
COMSWPACOM	Commander Southwest Pacific Command
COMUS	Commander, United States Forces
COMUSJ	Commander U.S. Forces, Japan
COMUS Japan	Commander U.S. Forces, Japan
COMUS Korea	Commander U.S. Forces, Korea
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand
COMUSMACV	Commander, United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
COMUSTDC	Commander, United States Taiwan Defense Command
CONUS	Continental United States
COTCO	Consolidation of Telecommunications Centers on the Island of Oahu
CPD	Congressional Presentation Document (Foreign Aid)
CPFL	Contingency Planning Facilities List

CPIC	Coastal Patrol and Interdiction Craft
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CRA	Continuing Resolution Authority
CRI	Collective Routing Indicators
CRT	Cathode Ray Tube
CSAF	Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
CS/CT	Combat Support/Coordination Team
CSG	CINCPAC Support Group; Combat Support Group
CW	Continuous Wave
CWE	Current Working Estimate

D

DA	Department of the Army
DAO	Defense Attache Office
DART	Deployable Automatic Relay Terminal; Disaster Assistance and Relief Team
DATS	Defense Automatic Telephone System
DATT	Defense Attache
DAV	Defense Assistance for Vietnam
DCS	Defense Communications System
DDI	Duty Director of Intelligence
DE	Damage Expectancy; Destroyer Escort
DECCO-PAC	Defense Commercial Communication Office, Pacific
DEFCON	Defense Readiness Condition
DEFT	Drug Education Field Team
DEPCH	Deputy Chief
DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI	Deputy Chief Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand
DEPREP	Deployment Reporting System
DFAA	Defense Facilities Administration Agency (Japan)
DFM	Diesel Fuel Marine
DFSC	Defense Fuel Supply Center
DGZ	Desired Ground Zero
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAOLS	Defense Intelligence Agency On-Line System
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DMAAC	Defense Mapping Agency Aerospace Center
DMAHC	Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic Center
DMATC	Defense Mapping Agency Topographic Center
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DOD	Department of Defense
DOS	Days of Supply
DPA	Defense Production Act

DPDR	Defense Property Disposal Region
DPDS	Defense Property Disposal Service
DPSC	Defense Petroleum Supply Center
DRILS	Defense Retail Interservice Logistic Support Program
DRIS	Defense Retail Inter-Service Support
DSA	Defense Supply Agency
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency
DSR-P	Defense Subsistence Region-Pacific
DSTP	Director of Strategic Target Planning
DTACCS	Director, Telecommunications and Command, Control Systems
DWT	Division Wing Team (Marine)

E

EALG	East Asia Liaison Group
EAM	Emergency Action Message
EDA	Excess Defense Articles (MAP)
E&E	Evasion and Escape
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
EMCON	Emission Control
E&ML	Environmental & Morale Leave
EOB	Electronic Order of Battle
ERCS	Emergency Rocket Communications System
ESC	Electronic Switching Center
EUCOM	European Command
EUSA	Eighth U.S. Army
EX	Exclusive (for)

F

FAA	Federal Aviation Agency; Foreign Assistance Act; Foreign Assistance Appropriations
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FANK	Forces Armees Nationale Khmeres (Cambodia)
FAR	Forces Armees Royale (Laos)
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FCF	Functional Check Flights
FCJ	Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction
FE	Far East
FEB	Federal Executive Board
FICPAC	Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific
FICPACFAC	Fleet Intelligence Center Pacific Photo Processing Facility

FMFPAC	Fleet Marine Forces Pacific
FMS	Foreign Military Sales; Field Maintenance Squadron
FORDAD	Foreign Disclosure Automated Data (System)
FORGEN	Force Generation
FORSCOM	Forces Command (U.S. Army)
FOT	Follow-On Operational Test
FPDA	Five Power Defense Arrangement (Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, U.K.)
FPJMC	Four-Party Joint Military Commission
FPJMT	Four-Party Joint Military Team
FPO	Fleet Post Office
FRD	Formerly Restricted Data
FRESH	Facilities Requirements Evaluation, State of Hawaii
FROKA	First Republic of Korea Army
FY	Fiscal Year

G

GAO	General Accounting Office
GCI	Ground Controlled Intercept
GFE	Government Furnished Equipment
GKR	Government of the Khmer Republic
GOI	Government of Indonesia
GOJ	Government of Japan
GOK	Government of Korea
GOP	Government of the Philippines
GOS	Government of Singapore
GOT	Gulf of Tonkin

H

HANKAM	Indonesian Department of Defense and Security
HASZG	Hawaii Area Sub-Zone Group
HATS	Hawaii Air Tour Service
HDRF	Homeland Defense Reserve Force (Korea)
HF	High Frequency
HistSum	Historical Summary
HRR	High Resolution Radar
HSC	Human Source Committee
HUMINT	Human Resources Intelligence

I

IBEN	Interim (Imagery) Basic Encyclopedia Numbers
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
ICP	Inventory Control Point; In-Country Procurement
ICR	Intensive Combat Rate; Intelligence Collection Requirement
ICS	Integrated Communications System
IDF	Installation Data Files
IDHSC	Intelligence Data Handling System Communications Network
IFF	Identification, Friend or Foe
IG	Inspector General
IIR	Intelligence Information Report
IJCS-PAC	Integrated Joint Communications Systems-Pacific
IOC	Interim Operational Capability
IOZP	Indian Ocean Zone of Peace
IP	Instructor Pilot
IPAC	Intelligence Center Pacific
IPG	Implementation Planning Group
IR	Infra-red; Intelligence Report
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
IRCM	Infrared Countermeasures
IROF	Imagery Requirements Objectives Files
IROL	Imagery Reconnaissance Objectives List
ISA	International Security Affairs

J

JAOCK	Joint Air Operations Center Korea
JASDF	Japan Air Self-Defense Force
JCAB	Japan Civil Aviation Bureau
JCC	Joint Coordination Center
JCCC	Joint Coordination Control Center
JCP	Japan Communist Party
JCRC	Joint Casualty Resolution Center
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
JFAP	Japan Facilities Adjustment Program
JIS	JOPS Interim Software
JISB	Joint Interservice Support Board
JMP	Joint Manpower Program
JMRO	Joint Medical Regulating Office
JNPC	Joint National Political Council
JOPS	Joint Operation Planning System

JPECG	Joint PACOM Exercise Control Group
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSOP	Joint Strategic Objectives Plan
JSP	Japan Socialist Party
JSTPS	Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff
JTCG-METCAL	Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Meteorology and Calibration
JTD	Joint Table of Distribution
JTF	Joint Task Force
JUMPS	Joint Uniformed Military Pay System
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group
JUSMAGK	Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, Korea
JUSMAGTHAI	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand

K

KAF	Khmer Air Force (Cambodia)
KC	Khmer Communists
KFRS	Korean Force Requirements Study
KTTL	Korean Tactical Target List

L

LAMP	Laos Ammunition Procedures
LANFZ	Latin America Nuclear Free Zone
LANTCOM	Atlantic Command
LANTFLT	U.S. Atlantic Fleet
LCM	Mechanized Landing Craft
LCU	Utility Landing Craft
LDMX	Local Digital Message Exchange
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
LF	Low Frequency
LGB	Laser Guided Bombs
LIF	Lao Irregular Forces
LN	Local National
LNO	Limited Nuclear Options
LOC	Line(s) of Communication
LOS	Law of the Sea
LPF	Laos Patriotic Forces; Lao Patriotic Front
LWF	Light Weight Fighter

M

MAA	Mutual Assistance Agreement
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAC	Military Airlift Command; Military Assistance Command; Military Armistice Commission
MACTHAI	Military Assistance Command, Thailand
MAO	Mailing Address Only; Major Attack Options
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funded
MASFEX	Military Articles Service Funded Excess
MATP	Military Assistance Training Program
MBA	Military Bases Agreement
MBF	Military Banking Facility
MCD-P	Management Control Detachment-Pacific
MCEB	Military Communication-Electronics Board
MC&G	Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy
MDAO	Mutual Defense Assistance Office
MDB	Mutual Defense Board
MDL	Military Demarkation Line
MDT	Mutual Defense Treaty
MEDTC	Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia
MEECN	Minimum Essential Emergency Communications Network
MIA	Missing in Action
MIDPAC	Mid-Pacific
MIG	Military Intelligence Group
MIJI	Meaconing, Interference, Jamming and Intrusion
MILAD	Military Advisor
MILADREP	Military Advisor's Representative
MILCON	Military Construction
MILREP	Military Representative
MILVAN	Containerized Cargo Carrier
MIRV	Multiple Independently-Targeted Reentry Vehicle
MMRCO	Military Medical Regions Coordinating Office
MND	Ministry of National Defense
MNK	Marine Nationale Khmer (Cambodian Navy)
MOD	Ministry of Defense; Modernization
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOGAS	Automotive Gasoline
MOM	Military Official Mail
MORS	Military Operations Research Symposium
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPC	Military Payment Certificate; Mobile Processing Center
MPO	Military Post Office

MPSC	Marianas Political Status Commission
MR	Military Region
MRG	Movement Requirements Generator
MSC	Military Sealift Command
MSEL	Master Scenario Events List
MST	Mobile Support Team; Mutual Security Treaty
MTMC	Military Traffic Management Command
MTMTS	Military Transportation Management and Terminal Service (old)
MTT	Mobile Training Team

N

NAF	Non-Appropriated Funds
NAFA	Non-Appropriated Fund Activity
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFOR	Naval Forces
NCA	National Command Authority
NCPAC	National Security Agency/Central Security Service Pacific
NDF	Navy Distillate Fuel
NDPC	National Disclosure Policy Committee
NEACOM	Northeast Asia Command
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NFZ	Nuclear Free Zone
NH	Nike-Hercules
NKP	Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand
NKTTL	North Korean Tactical Target List
NLG	National Lawyers Guild
NMCS	National Military Command System
NMCSSC	National Military Command System Support Center
NOA	New Obligational Authority
NOB	Naval Order of Battle
NOG	National Security Agency Pacific Operations Group
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command
NOTIC	Nuclear Options Target Intelligence Coordination
NPA	New People's Army
NSA	National Security Agency
NSAPAC	National Security Agency Pacific
NSD	Naval Supply Depot
NSDM	National Security Decision Memorandum
NSOC	National SIGINT Operations Center
NSTL	National Strategic Target List
NTDS	Navy Tactical Data System

NUDET	Nuclear Detonation
NWRS	Nuclear Weapons Requirements Study

O

OASD	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
OJT	On-the-Job Training
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OPCON	Operational Control
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPSEC	Operations Security
OR/SA	Operations Research/Systems Analysis
OSA	Office of Special Activities; Overseas Supply Agency
OTH	Over-the-Horizon

P

P&A	Price and Availability
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACEX	Pacific Exchange Systems (Army and Air Force)
PACFLT	United States Pacific Fleet
PACOM	Pacific Command
PAF	Philippine Air Force
PAL	Permissive Action Link; Parcel Airlift
PAMO	Pacific Airlift Management Office
PAMPA	PACOM Movements Priority Agency (see PATMA)
PARPRO	Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program
PATMA	PACOM Transportation Management Agency (old)
PATMRG	PACOM Target Materials Review Group
PBR	River Patrol Boat
PCH&T	Packing, Crating, Handling, and Transportation
PD	Probability of Damage
PDM	Program Decision Memorandum
PDO	Property Disposal Office
PEC	PACOM Electronic Intelligence Center (old)
PGNU	Provisional Government of National Union (Laos)
PIC	Processing and Interpretation Center
PIN	Preliminary Imagery Nominations
PIRAZ	Positive Identification Radar Advisory Zone
PMRG	Political/Military Review Group
POL	Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
POM	Program Objectives Memorandum (MAP)
POW	Prisoner of War

PRC	People's Republic of China
PRG	Provisional Revolutionary Government of the RVN (Viet Cong)
PSMM	Patrol Ship Multi-Mission
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
PUBCOM	Public Communications
PURA	Pacific Utilization and Redistribution Agency
PURS	PACOM Uniform Reporting Structure
PWRR	Prepositioned War Reserve Requirements
PWRS	Pre-Positioned War Reserve Stock
PX	Post Exchange

R

RAEC	Research and Engineering Consultant
R&D	Research and Development
RDT&E	Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
RECA	Residual Capabilities Assessment
RIF	Reduction in Force
RISOP	Red Integrated Strategic Offensive Plan
RLA	Royal Laotian Army
RLAF	Royal Laotion Air Force
RLG	Royal Laotian Government
RNO	Regional Nuclear Options
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan); Required Operational Capability
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army
ROKAF	Republic of Korea Air Force
ROKF	Republic of Korea Forces
ROKG	Republic of Korea Government
ROKN	Republic of Korea Navy
ROP	Republic of the Philippines
RORRCP	Revised Okinawa Reversion Related Construction Program
ROSE	Reorganization of Overseas Elements
R&R	Rest and Recuperation
RRB	Radio Regulatory Bureau
RSR	Required Supply Rate
RTAF	Royal Thai Armed Forces
RTG	Royal Thai Government
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

S

S	Secret
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAFASIA	Security Assistance Force Asia
SAG	Scientific Analysis Group
SAGA	Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile; Space Available Mail
SAM/PAL	Space Available Mail/Parcel Airlift
SAMSO	Space and Missile Systems Organization
SAO	Selected Attack Options
SAPO	Sub-Area Petroleum Office
SAR	Search and Rescue
SATP	Security Assistance Training Program
SCG	Security Consultative Group (Japan)
SCM	Security Consultative Meeting (Korea)
SCOOT	Support Cambodia Out Of Thailand
SEA	Southeast Asia
SEADAB	Southeast Asia Data Base
SEAS	South East Asia Service
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SI	Special Intelligence
SIF	Selective Identification Feature
SIGINT	Signal Intelligence
SIMTS	Single Integrated Military Telecommunications System
SIOP	Single Integrated Operation Plan
SITREP	Situation Report
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SLAT	Special Logistics Actions, Thailand
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
SMRIS	Soviet Missile Range Instrumentation Ship
S/O	Stockage Objective
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOLACE	Study of Logistics Alternatives, Concepts, and Effectiveness
SPINTCOMM	Special Intelligence Communications
Sq	Squadron
SRF	Special Reporting Facility
SRI	Stanford Research Institute
SSA	Security Supporting Assistance
SSB	Single Side Band

SSBN	Single Side Band Network; Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine
SSMR	Single Senior Military Representative
S/T	Short Tons
SUSMA	Senior United States Military Authority
SVN	South Vietnam
SWPACOM	Southwest Pacific Command
SZG	Special Zone Group

T

TAC	Tactical Air Command; Tactical Air Control
TACAIR	Tactical Air
TACAMO	Nickname for Airborne Very Low Frequency Radio Broadcasting
TACC	Tactical Air Control Center
TACS	Tactical Air Control System
TADS	Tactical Air Defense Systems
TAIP-C	Tactical Air Improvement Plan-Cambodia
TALES	Transportation and Logistics Estimation System
TAT	Technical Assistance Team
TAW	Tactical Airlift Wing
TBC	Tacoma Boatbuilding Company
TDC	Taiwan Defense Command
TFE	Transportation Feasibility Estimator
TFS	Tactical Fighter Squadron
TI	Target Intelligence
TLD	Training and Logistics Detachment
TLRG	Target List Review Group
TMAR	Thai Maritime Navigation Company
TNI-AD	Indonesian Army
TNI-AL	Indonesian Navy
TNI-AU	Indonesian Air Force
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOT	Telephone Organization of Thailand
TOW	Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Command (Link Guided Missile)
TRE	Thailand Regional Exchange
TROKA	Third Republic of Korea Army
TS	Top Secret
TSR	Telecommunications Service Request
TTM	Tactical Target Materials
TTPI	Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands
TTU	Transportation Terminal Units

U

U	Unclassified
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UPI	United Press International
USAEIGHT	Eighth United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USARHAW	U.S. Army Hawaii (old)
USARJ	U.S. Army, Japan
USARPAC	U.S. Army Pacific (old)
USASCH	U.S. Army Support Command Hawaii
USCA	United States Code (Annotated)
USCINCEUR	U.S. Commander in Chief Europe
USCINCSOUTH	Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command
USDAO	U.S. Defense Attache Office
USDLG	U.S. Defense Liaison Group (Indonesia)
USDR	United States Defense Representatives (in Foreign Countries)
USIB	U.S. Intelligence Board
USPS	U.S. Postal Service
USSAG	U.S. Security Assistance Group
USSSO	U.S. State Sending Office

V

VIASA	Vayama In-Transit Ammunition Storage Area
VLF	Very Low Frequency
VNAF	Republic of Vietnam Air Force
VNN	Republic of Vietnam Navy
VVAW	Vietnam Veterans Against War

W

WEB	Weekly Executive Brief
WIMS	World-Wide Integrated Management Subsistence
WLG	Washington Liaison Group
WRSA	War Reserve Stocks for Allies
WWMCCS	World-Wide Military Command and Control System

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