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B-1B

AIR COMBAT COMMAND

B-1 NUCLEAR REROLE PLAN



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HEADQUARTERS AIR COMBAT COMMAND

LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, VIRGINIA

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HQ ACC B-1 Nuclear Rerole Plan (U)

1. (U) Overview

1.1. (U) This plan addresses the steps necessary for the reconstitution of B-1 nuclear capability after conversion to a conventional-only role. This plan does not constitute authority to commit, obligate, expend funds, nor direct policy, but provides guidance and a game plan to regain B-1 nuclear war-fighting capability should the need arise. In addition, the plan does not provide authorization and funding for spares, bit & piece part, and supportability for communication systems for SIOP assets, SIOP systems, and support equipment (SE). The most significant issues associated with B-1 nuclear reconstitution are aircraft nuclear hardness & surety, avionics software, nuclear mission planning capability, nuclear weapons storage, nuclear reconstitution support equipment, maintenance & security forces manpower authorizations, and unit-level C3. Other issues include training, secure work centers, personnel security actions, PRP certification, logistical support, and survivable aircraft command & control communications.

2. (U) Facts & Assumptions

2.1. (U) Fact: The B-1 SIOP commitment ended 1 Oct 97.

2.2. (U) Fact: The Sep 92 B-1 Washington Summit included an agreement that to conventionally role the B-1 would neither preclude future B-1 nuclear capabilities (if necessary), nor demand a high cost to maintain an immediate nuclear capability.

2.3. (U) Assumption: In the event of a national emergency and/or a failure of a portion of TRIAD, the Air Force will be directed by the National Command Authority (NCA) to recapture a B-1 nuclear capability. This plan is feasible only if the NCA directs that the nuclear mission of the B-1 will take priority over all other B-1 missions.

2.3.1. (U) This reduces normal nuclear certification ☐

2.3.2. (U) Ongoing B-1 upgrades, hardware & software, which would hinder rerole will halt, and assets will be concentrated on completing nuclear rerole of the B-1.

2.3.3. (U) The B-1's nuclear mission will take priority over its conventional mission for those aircraft affected.

2.4. (U) Assumption: ☐

☐ The preferred order of aircraft utilization is
☐ A significant realignment of aircraft and personnel between bases will require an environmental assessment.

2.5. (U) Assumption: In accordance with current guidance, recovery of nuclear capability will not constitute more than movement of aircraft, personnel, weapons, support equipment & spares, personnel training/certification, reinstallation of sensors & alarms in storage and maintenance facilities, reconfiguration/test of suspension equipment, and software modifications & certifications.

2.6. (U) Assumption: Nuclear hardness and surety will be maintained throughout the Conventional Mission Upgrade Program (CMUP). If fielded hardware does not meet specifications, the required changes will exceed the ☐ criteria to accomplish nuclear reconstitution.

2.6.1. (U) Fact: USSTRATCOM requires retaining the ability to produce a nuclear mission tape, aircraft EMP (electromagnetic pulse) integrity and survivable aircraft communications systems.

2.7. (U) Assumption: Design certification of B-1 hardware will be maintained as specified by AFI 91-103, Air Force Nuclear Safety Certification Program, and AFMAN 91-118, Safety Design and Evaluation Criteria for Nuclear Weapons Systems.

2.8. (U) Fact: The unit must pass an Initial Nuclear Surety Inspection (INSI) prior to receipt of weapons.

2.8.1 (U) Assumption: The Weapon Storage Area will be brought to DoD and USAF standards as specified in this plan.

2.9. (U) Assumption: The installation commander at the base selected for the rerole mission will support Security Forces (SF) with augmentees to man non-critical posts for the duration of the mission or until sufficient SF members can be identified and relocated.

2.9.1. (U) Assumption: Upon direction to rerole, SF personnel will be PCS'd to the rerole base.

2.9.2. (U) Assumption: Missions at the current ACC SIOP-tasked units will remain the same.

2.9.3. (U) Assumption: All current Force Protection standards will be adhered to.

3. (U) Limiting Factors

3.1. (U) Under START II parameters, conventional-only B-1 units cannot train or exercise aircrews for nuclear missions.

3.1.1. (U) As the length of time the B-1 is relieved from a nuclear capability increases, expect a loss of nuclear expertise among the operational and support personnel. Once nuclear expertise is completely exhausted, the most experienced personnel available will use existing nuclear tech data to gain the required nuclear expertise.

3.2. (U) Under START II parameters, conventional-only B-1 aircraft cannot be used for nuclear missions or exercises.

3.3. (U) Under START II parameters, conventional-only B-1 aircraft shall be based separately from heavy bombers with nuclear roles.

3.3.1. (U) Each Party shall locate storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armament no less than 100 kilometers (63 miles) from any air base where heavy bombers in a convention-only role are based.

3.4. (U) USSTRATCOM has not identified Dyess AFB or Ellsworth AFB as recipients of SCAMP terminals.

3.5. (U) Currently all Miniature Receive Terminals (MRTs) have been removed from B-1s. These systems are undergoing modifications for usage on

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3.6. (U) ACC/SF does not have the manpower required to support the B-1 nuclear role while simultaneously supporting OPLAN 8044 without an increase of roughly 250 new authorizations (a cost of \$10M annually).

4. (U) Existing Capability

4.1. (U) Aircrew personnel will be in-place for training to nuclear mission capable. Sufficient aircrew personnel will be transferred from the alternate ACC B-1 base to the primary role base to meet the required numbers.

4.2. (U) B-1 Block C aircraft will be in place and maintenance will retain & store all applicable 1B-1B-21 AME (Alternate Mission Equipment) in serviceable order. Sufficient B-1 Block C aircraft will be flown in from the alternate ACC B-1 base to the primary role base to meet the required numbers.

4.3. (U) Integrated Maintenance Facility (IMF) is available with B-1 unique launcher loading frame for repair/testing.

5. (U) START Treaty Considerations

5.1. (U) START

5.1.1. (U) The forward moveable weapons bulkhead must remain in the factory/original position to prevent internal carriage of Air Launch Cruise Missile (ALCM)/Advanced Cruise Missiles (ACM).

5.1.1.2. (U) Unique, specialized equipment used to reposition the forward weapons bulkheads will not be located at B-1 bases.

5.1.2. (U) The U.S. can role the B-1 to conventional without treaty implications.

5.2. (U) START II

5.2.1. (U) The U.S. has declared its intentions under START II to reorient to a conventional-only mission the entire B-1 fleet (excluding the 2 B-1 test aircraft).

5.2.2. (U) Once conventionally reoriented, START II allows for a one-time role of the B-1 to the nuclear role from the reoriented conventional role. There are no constraints on role of the aircraft. Under START II criteria, for each B-1 roled to a nuclear mission, a 16 warheads "weapons load" will be accredited, regardless of actual configuration, towards treaty-imposed weapons ceilings.

5.2.2.1. (U) If only part of the B-1 fleet is nuclear roled, they must be based separately from conventional-only B-1s and have a National Technical Means (NTM) observable difference to differentiate between the nuclear and conventional aircraft.

5.2.2.2. (U) Any B-1 returned to a nuclear role shall not subsequently be reoriented to a conventional role.

5.2.3. (U) Conventional-only B-1 aircraft cannot be used for nuclear missions or exercises.

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6. (U) Conventional Mission Upgrade Program (CMUP) Timeline: Block C available

U
6.1. (\$) The B-1 Conventional Mission Upgrade Program (CMUP) upgrades do not have a nuclear requirement. A nuclear mission planning capability will be added to AFMSS B-1 AWE software when directed to rerole to nuclear.

6.1.1. (U) Contractors and the SPO are working closely with Nuclear Weapons Integration personnel to ensure developmental hardware/software will be nuclear certifiable.

6.1.2. (U) Nuclear hardness and surety will be maintained throughout the Conventional Mission Upgrade Program (CMUP). The "Operational Requirements Document (ORD) CAF 357-92 (SAC 007-92) I/II-B. Rev 2 for B-1 Conventional Mission Upgrade Program" (S), 2 Apr 96 directs that:

6.1.2.1. (U) The B-1 weapon system's existing nuclear surety and hardness must not be compromised. New equipment and modifications to/for the aircraft, support equipment (SE), or facilities must not degrade nuclear surety and hardness requirements when said modifications/SE/facilities will be used for conventional missions.

6.1.2.2. (U) Hardware and software data protection features must be integrated into the system.

6.1.2.3. (U) The ability to employ nuclear gravity weapons will be retained. For compatibility certification, the B-1 must be added to the approved list of aircraft for the weapons to be carried.

U
6.2. (\$) The B-1 has ☐ This capability will ☐

6.2.1. (U) Block C version of the B-1 AFS have separate nuclear and conventional software loads. The nuclear load contains software for the B61 and B83 gravity weapons which are Nuclear Certified on the B-1B. Single CITS and EMUX software loads support nuclear software.

6.2.2. (U) Mission Data Preparation System (MDPS) provides support for Block C aircraft. B-1 nuclear mission planning support will end when MDPS is replaced by AFMSS.

6.2.3. (U) The 36 ETS will maintain the current SIOP mission data in caretaker status (no updates) until the current ALQ-161 is replaced by IDECM.

U
6.3. (\$) The timeline to ☐ Cost to develop and test nuclear software ROM is \$30M; the Logicon AFMSS B-1 A/W/E nuclear capability ROM is \$4M.

6.3.1. (U) Block D version of the B-1 AFS adds JDAM, GPS, GMTT and other capabilities to two separate conventional software loads. Block D will not include a nuclear capable load.

6.3.2. (U) Major design changes would be required to the AFS to integrate the nuclear bomb functions with GPS and Kalman Filter changes. CITS and EMUX will be modified and are backward compatible with previous Block versions of AFS.

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6.3.3. (U) EC mission data is the only aspect of the B-1's EC that would require additional work/dollars for rerole. To bring back EC mission data after Block C would require approximately \$300K and 4 to 5 months to update and test replacement mission data.

7. (U) Logistics ☐ ☐ Cost: \$142M

7.1. (U) Launchers:

7.1.1. (U) The installation of a CMUP Conventional Kit on the B-1 launcher is not considered a modification and does not render it non-nuclear certified. The launcher will still be capable of rapid conversion from conventional to nuclear if the Nuclear Kits and the nuclear operational checkout capability exists.

7.1.2. (U) The Conventional Kit and its unique weapon kits (i.e. JDAM, MK84, etc.) can be removed and the Nuclear Kit and its unique weapon kits (i.e. B83 & B61) can be installed. After Nuclear/Weapon Kits are installed on the launcher, a successful Operational Serviceability test, and either an Electronic Systems Test Set (ESTS) Empty Launcher Test or an Aircraft Weapons Preload Tester (WPT) Launcher Simulator (8 point) test (on a Nuclear Certified Aircraft) are required prior to uploading nuclear weapons.

7.1.3. (U) The heart of the Conventional Kit is the Common Weapons Interface Unit (CWIU) which converts Smart Conventional Weapon MIL-STD-1760 data to/from the aircraft MIL-STD-1553 data bus system. When the Conventional Kit is installed the launcher is MIL-STD-1760 capable; when the Nuclear Kit is installed it is only MIL-STD-1553 capable.

7.1.4. (U) The B-1 180-inch launchers will continue to be nuclear certified following the installation of Conventional Kits. After the 126 Conventional Kits are delivered and installed (FY00/01), all excess launchers, launcher Nuclear Kits, and ejectors will be placed in extended storage off ACC installations (likely depot or AMARC).

7.1.4.1. (U) Rerole of launchers with Conventional Kits installed will not be difficult. 199 B-1 launchers are being maintained or are in long term storage at Dyess & Ellsworth until installation of Conventional Kits (FY00/01). After all Conventional Weapon Kits are procured and installed, ACC will request Depot Disposition (long term storage off ACC bases-AMARC) for all excess launchers.

7.1.4.2. (U) Sufficient quantities of conventional launchers should be available for reconfiguration to nuclear without shipment of launchers from AMARC.

7.1.4.3. (U) A sufficient number of B-1 launcher Nuclear Weapon Kits (Nuclear Bomb, B-61, and B-83 Kits) will remain on station in long-term storage until all Conventional Weapon Kits are procured and installed. After all Conventional Weapon Kits are procured and installed, ACC will request Depot Disposition (long-term storage off ACC bases-AMARC) for all Nuclear Weapon Kit. Conventional Kits would be removed and Nuclear Kits installed (estimate 3 days per launcher).

7.2. (U) Nuclear Launcher Testing:

7.2.1. (U) B-1 Nuclear-Certified Launcher requires an Operational Serviceability test, either an Electronic Systems Test Set (ESTS) Empty Launcher Test or an Aircraft Weapons Preload Tester (WPT) Launcher Simulator (8 point) test (on a Nuclear Certified aircraft) prior to uploading nuclear weapons.

7.2.1.1. (U) Using ESTS & 2MOXX's: Equipment and personnel are on site through FY99/1 (estimate 1 day per launcher).

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7.2.1.2. (U) Using nuclear certified aircraft WPT & 2W1X1's personnel: Equipment and personnel are on site until last Block C aircraft (nuclear certified) is no longer available (estimate 1 day per launcher). Block D & E aircraft will require nuclear capable software prior to aircraft/launcher WPT.

7.3. (U) Nuclear Launcher Equipment:

7.3.1. (U) The ESTS are scheduled to be removed from Dyess & Ellsworth NLT FY99/1. For short term B-1 rerole, using a nuclear-certified aircraft, a WPT could be used until the ESTS is installed. If a long-term rerole is required, the ESTS and associated support equipment would need to be shipped into the IMF (estimate maximum of 6 months) for restoration of ESTS operations (shipment/installation of equipment and training/certification of AFSC 2MOXX personnel). All other specific support equipment required to support the nuclear system could be in place within ☐ ☐

7.3.2. (U) Restoration of PAL capability at the MOB requires approximately \$5K to ship (courier required) PAL controller/tester, power supply and cable set.

7.4. (U) Facilities:

7.4.1. (U) Integrated Maintenance Facility (IMF) is available with B-1 unique launcher loading frame for reconfiguration/repair/testing.

7.4.2. (U) Conventional munitions may require redistribution to facilitate nuclear weapons storage.

7.5. (U) Weapons:

7.5.1. (U) Facilities, equipment, and personnel must be ready and NSI certified ☐ ☐ will be transported ☐ of B-1 weapons stockpile.

7.5.2. (U) ☐ unit successfully completes an INSI. Once the unit passes an INSI ☐

7.5.2.1. (U) Maintaining ☐

☐ additional ACC/AFMC manpower authorizations as well as DOE support ☐ modifications.

7.5.2.2. (U) If B-1 rerole is for B-2 replacement, ☐ to include the B-1 weapon carriage.

7.5.3. (U) Inert training weapons are required to support unit training.

7.6. (U) Personnel:

7.6.1. (U) Approximately 55 2W2XX, Nuclear Weapons Specialist, will be required at the selected B-1 rerole base and certified on B-1 nuclear operations (nuclear suspension kit installations may be combined 2W2XX/2W1X1 operation). There is no requirement for AETC to retain B-1 nuclear launcher maintenance/load training (B-1 launcher maintenance/load training will only focus on conventional configurations). "On the job" training will require experienced technicians to provide instruction.

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7.6.2. (U) AFSC 2W1X1, Armament System Specialist, manpower authorizations for conventional tasked B-1 squadrons are sufficient to support nuclear generation activities once personnel are PRP certified. Load crew personnel must be trained and certified to perform nuclear loading tasks (all required load crews can be certified within 60 days of receipt of training munitions).

7.6.3. (U) If ESTS operations are to be restored at the MOB, approximately 33 AFSC 2M0XX, Missile Systems Specialist, will be required at the selected B-1 rerole base and trained on B-1 ESTS Empty Launcher Test operations. If ESTS operations are not restored at the MOB, launcher test operations (8-station Weapons Preload Test) must be performed by AFSC 2W1X1 personnel on aircraft following launcher reconfiguration for nuclear carriage and aircraft re-certification (nuclear software upgrade and system WPT). There is no requirement for AETC to retain B-1 nuclear launcher maintenance/testing. "On the job" training will require experienced technicians to provide instruction.

7.7. (U) Logistic Support:

7.7.1. (U) Logistic support will be maintained at the level required by the unit's Design Operational Capabilities (DOC) statement.

7.7.2. (U) Maintenance will retain and store all applicable 1B-1B-21 AME (Alternate Mission Equipment) in serviceable order. When the B-1 was relieved of its role in SIOP, the aircraft maintenance procedures did not change. Specifically, the nuclear hardness of the B-1 is still maintained according to the applicable technical data.

7.7.2.1. (U) The installation of the line replaceable units requires bonding checks; aircraft wiring harnesses are nuclear hardened and EMP shielded. The backshops perform chassis bonding checks during LRU maintenance. The flash blindness protection system is periodically checked.

7.7.2.2. (U) MRT is currently available ☐ and will remain installed until the B-1 is relieved of the requirement by USSTRATCOM. There are no plans to reinstall the MRT on any additional B-1s. Estimated cost for each additional aircraft MRT installation is \$300K. MRTs left on aircraft will not be maintained or receive operations checks, and will be removed from the Mission Essential Subsystem List (MESL).

7.7.3. (U) There has been no relaxation of the requirement to maintain the designed nuclear hardness of the B-1 aircraft, therefore there would be no added cost associated with these items if a B-1 nuclear rerole was directed.

7.8. (U) Spares and Support Equipment:

7.8.1. (U) SIOP B-1 spares kits must be provided to support ☐ The kits will be either a high priority mission spares kit (HPMSK) as previously used or a separate mobility readiness spares package (MRSP) built for the specific SIOP WMP 5 scenario. Spares, if available, will be used from the current mobility readiness spares packages that are tailored to support the conventional WMP 5 tasking. Using the existing spares packages to support both conventional and SIOP commitments places operational supportability at risk. To eliminate this risk, a separate spares package would be required to support both conventional and SIOP commitments. Spares previously used for B-1 nuclear capability have been transferred to the B-52 program.

7.8.2. (U) Spares kits for nuclear missions will have priority over conventional missions. The cost of maintaining two spares packages which can support nuclear rerole is estimated at \$141M (based on FY98 costs and no inflation factor) and under normal conditions takes 3-4 years to procure.

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7.8.3. (U) ALC will relocate nuclear LRUs, launcher configuration kits, and support equipment (SE) to the base (as applicable). The ALCs and bases will not be funded to maintain added spares authorizations or provide repair support for SIOP requirements prior to rerole execution.

7.8.3.1. (U) No SIOP peculiar or additional SE is required to support the B-1 rerole over current authorized levels. However, since the B-1 SIOP requirement is gone, authorizations could be lowered and some SE may be declared excess and turned in the AFMC depots. When SE is returned to depot stocks for a prolonged period it may become eligible for disposal action.

7.8.3.2. (U) If disposal occurs, the SE will need replacement to effectively support a nuclear rerole. At this time, a methodology is not available to identify (or save) SE that could be disposed of. Replacement costs of potential disposals are unavailable.

8. (U) Weapons Storage ☐ ☐ Cost: \$3.5M

8.1. (U) The former weapon storage structures and Weapon Storage Areas (WSAs) will be brought back up to nuclear standards, to include assigning & training personnel and receipt of a NSI certification.

8.2. (U) B-1 WSAs will be converted to Munition Storage Areas and are planned to lose perimeter alarms, TV monitors and storage igloo/maintenance facility sensors (hardware, wiring, security force alarm monitors/sensor operators and maintenance contractors). Storage areas will be reconstituted back to nuclear security standards. Estimate an 18 month timeline.

8.2.1 (U) If Intrusion Detection System (IDS) components and associated equipment are not in place within estimated timelines, additional security forces beyond those in addition to authorizations stated in para 10.2 may be required.

8.2.2 (U) Site surveys with ESC will be required to determine the actual condition of sites, along with associated costs. The Dyess WSA fence was completed in 1997 and will probably not require replacement. A preliminary estimate for utilities and conduit for sensors is \$1M. The Ellsworth WSA fence was replaced in 1994 and was not constructed to recent sensor specifications. A preliminary estimate to replace the interior fence and provide utilities and conduit for sensors is \$3.5M.

8.2.3. (U) The fence replacement, utilities and conduit work (if required) is considered repair work and will not require MILCON. The WSA electronic security sensor system must be reinstalled. Most sensors (interior and perimeter), annunciators and camera surveillance equipment have already been removed from the rerole bases. Foundations for camera poles on the perimeter along the fences are still available and believed to be in good shape.

8.2.4. (U) 5 to 10 PRP IDS maintenance positions (AFSC 2E1X4) are required to support the sensor system. Additional costs are required to establish supply points, training classes and work areas.

((8.3. (U) Reinsertion of nuclear weapons into the B-1 MSAs will require displacement of conventional weapons. Development of contingency nuclear munitions storage plans and MOAs will be required to avoid nuclear and explosive safety issues. ☐ ☐

9. (U) Aircrew ☐ ☐ Additional Cost: Minimal

9.1. (U) B-1 aircrew training requirements are based on a standardized 12 PAA B-1 squadron and crew ratio of 1.3, resulting in approximately 16 crews per squadron.

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9.1.1. (U) The time required to train a squadron of ☐ time due to greater demands on the staff. This does not include time associated with PRP certification, security investigations/clearances, Combat Mission Folder (CMF) construction, or staff training necessary to support aircrews, but expect these actions to be accomplished concurrent to aircrew training.

9.1.2. (U) Command and control procedures (CCP) training for aircrews can be completed within 90 days.

9.2. (U) The B-1 FTU will provide the cadre of instructors for aircrew nuclear training. Aircrews will come from the selected rerole bases.

10. (U) Security Forces ☐ ☐ Cost: \$10M

10.1. (U) PRP certification is dependent upon two factors: number of personnel requiring PRP certification who possess a current security clearance/investigation (possible limiting factor) and local policy timelines to process all necessary PRP certifications.

10.1.1. (U) Current projections for security investigation processing are a minimum of 6 months for Top Secret, SSBI, 90-120 days for Secret National Agency Check (NAC), and approximately 160 days for Periodic Reinvestigations (PR). PRP certification from start to finish (barring quality, medical and security investigation issues) can be completed in 60-120 days.

10.2. (U) The number of assigned personnel is proportional to the number of manpower authorizations and the command manning averages (by AFSC). Security Force (3PXXX) requirements will be approximately 508 authorizations for the WSA, to provide security for generation of aircraft, alert parking areas and weapons convoys. Site surveys should be conducted at the rerole base to determine exact manpower requirements.

10.2.1. (U) Current ACC/SF does not have the manpower required to support the B-1 nuclear rerole while simultaneously supporting OPLAN 8044 without an increase of roughly 250 new authorizations (a cost of \$10M annually).

10.2.2. (U) The change to a conventional-only tasked DOC for B-1 units will result in a reduction of key nuclear operational personnel command-wide. Should the B-1 unit be reroled to a nuclear tasked DOC, the enlisted assignments process requires approximately 4 to 6 months lead time to ensure the "right" personnel are assigned to support the units new mission requirements.

10.2.3. (U) If Intrusion Detection System (IDS) components and associated equipment are not in place within estimated timelines, an additional 110 security forces authorizations beyond the authorizations stated in para 10.2 may be required.

10.2.4. (U) In the interim, TDY manning assistance (worked through the AFSC functional managers) is a viable temporary solution to the manning shortfalls.

10.3. (U) An additional 20 security forces response vehicles are required to support security patrols for the WSA, generation area and alert parking area.

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11. (U) Command, Control and Communications



Cost: Minimal

11.1. (U) Strategic C3 systems will be in place, inactive, or be made available if directed. Communication equipment has remained in place at the units.

11.1.1. (U) USSTRATCOM requires the following systems for strategic connectivity: AFSATCOM/Milstar UHF DAMA, Miniature Receive Terminal (MRT), Transfer Module Service Set (TMSS), HF radio for Combat Crew Communications, Aircrew Alerting Communications EMP (AACE) upgrade procurement and installation, EMP Hardened Dispersal Communications (EHDC) deployment/employment, Strategic Automated Command and Control System (SACCS)/Force Management Information System (FMIS), and Strategic Operational Conference System (SOCS) for command post communications. Associated training can be completed within 90 days of communication system(s) procurement.

11.2. (U) From an EAP-STRAT training perspective, the impacts of rerole are not overly restrictive. All command post controller and aircrew EAP-STRAT training could be fulfilled ☐ Associated C2 system training could be fulfilled within 90 days of C2 system procurement. Command and control procedures (CCP) training for aircrews can be completed within 90 days. ☐

11.3. (U) Procure COMSEC documents, if available will require ☐ from order to delivery. PC documents, if available (NSA only makes the required amount for the current SIOP; ☐ depending on the urgency of the situation. Order the current EAPSTARTS from USSTRATCOM J331, which will require 30 to 45 days. ☐

11.4. (U) If Strategic C3 systems are not present, they will have to be installed and the appropriate support infrastructure in place. Time required for acquisition and installation varies from 1 to 5 years. To meet new requirements, entire equipment sets must be purchased with a lead-time of 1 to 2 years.

12. (U) Tech Data/Operating Instructions/Training Standards



Cost: Minimal

12.1. (U) Past experience has shown one of the biggest hurdles to overcome in resurrecting past capabilities is the loss of key information across all functional areas and levels once a capability is withdrawn. Reconstitution will require saving a copy of all pertinent B-1 nuclear related tech orders, diagrams, facility drawings, photographs, nuclear safety assessments, operating instructions, regulations, and course training standards. Maintenance, operations, and training concepts/plans will be developed and validated. Data and T.O.s can be rescinded and sent to Oklahoma City to be archived for up to 7 years.

12.2. (U) A copy of any publications (e.g., technical orders) and documents (e.g., aircraft compatibility and control drawings or automated test equipment specifications) addressing the last known nuclear-safety-certified design should be retained along with technical orders outlining procedures for nuclear operations (e.g., weapons loading and delivery).

12.2.1. (U) SA-ALC/NWIO will revive, modify, or develop T.O.s for nuclear certified equipment.

12.2.2. (U) T.O.s will now be maintained through the present Block C version until the year 2001. At that point SA-ALC/NWIO will archive the data and T.O.s. Decertification will remove the B-1 from the T.O. 00-110N-16 certified nuclear equipment list. It will not delete common support equipment. B-1 peculiar support equipment will be retained to support the rerole requirement.

12.2.3. (U) Nuclear Weapons Loading technical orders and associate checklists will require re-verification and publication.

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13. (U) Safety and Surety ☐ ☐ Cost: Minimal

13.1. (U) B-1 nuclear certification will end when Block D hardware/software is installed fleetwide. At that point, the B-1 Nuclear Safety Rules will be rescinded, Weapon System Certification will be withdrawn, and the Aircraft Compatibility Control Drawings (ACCDs) will be revoked.

13.1.1. (U) ACCDs are the interface control documents between the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Energy (DoE).

13.2. (U) Prior to resumption of a B-1 nuclear role, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons System Safety Group (NWSSG) will accomplish a safety study of the weapon system. The study will be conducted to determine if the B-1 nuclear weapon system design safety features, security features, and operational procedures continue to comply with the DoD Nuclear Weapons System Safety Standards. Additionally, as part of the study, the NWSSG will prepare proposed nuclear weapons system safety rules for the B-1.

13.2.1. (U) The safety study will be scheduled for completion approximately 120 days before the HQ USAF/XON approved rules need-date as required by DoD Directive 3150.2, DoD Nuclear Weapons System Safety Program, and AFI 91-102, Nuclear Weapons System Studies, Operational Safety Reviews and Safety Rules.

13.2.2. (U) Rules need-date will be established based on when initial operational capability (IOC) is required. Rules need-date should be at least 90 days earlier than IOC to allow tasked B-1 unit(s) the opportunity to accomplish training and prepare for successful completion of an INSI as specified in AFI 90-201, Inspector General Activities.

13.2.3. (U) To support the NWSSG study, ACC will prepare a B-1 Operation Plan Data Document (OPDD) and obtain HQ USAF/XON approval of the OPDD at least 6 months prior to proposed study date.

13.2.4. (U) A Technical Nuclear Safety Analysis (TNSA) may be required to assess whether design certification of the B-1B hardware and software has been maintained. If HQ AFSC/SEWN determines a TNSA is required, it will be prepared by the engineering support agency (SA-ALC/NWI) per AFI 91-102 using information contained in the OPDD as the basis for analysis. The TNSA, if required, will be completed at least 2 weeks before the NWSSG study.

13.3. (U) Recertification of the B-1 weapon system requires coordination between the Air Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), DoD and DoE before the Assistant Secretary of Defense approves Nuclear safety Rules for the weapon system. This process requires approximately 90-120 days.

13.3.1. (U) Weapons will need to be test dropped to update safety, surety and planning factors.

13.4. (U) A significant realignment of aircraft and personnel between bases will require an environmental assessment. This process requires approximately 12 months.

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14. (U) Projected B-1 Nuclear Rerole Timeline



15. (U) Summary

15.1. (U) There are a large number of tasks associated with accomplishing a nuclear rerole of the B-1 weapon system. Outside factors are also at work, which will influence and complicate these tasks. However, ACC will maintain the capability to nuclear rerole the B-1 while keeping within provisions of START II. Nevertheless, there continues a risk that as time and events move forward, the expense – both dollars and duration – to accomplish B-1 nuclear rerole may make it unrealistic and impractical. This plan, by encapsulating actions necessary to reconstitute the B-1, seeks to minimize that risk. Finally, while clearly recognizing the political and arms control aspects of nuclear reconstitution, ACC also firmly believes any need for B-1 nuclear rerole must be based upon USCINSTRAT warfighting requirements.

16. (U) Recommendation

15.1. (U) Recommend this ACC B-1 nuclear rerole plan be reviewed as Block milestones in the CMUP upgrades are achieved.

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