1. (U) PURPOSE: Obtain COMACC approval on the HQ ACC plan addressing the recovery of B-1 nuclear capability after conversion to a conventional-only role (Tab 1).

2. (U) BACKGROUND:

a. (U) During the Sep 92 B-1 Washington Summit, CSAF committed to a conventional upgrade program to significantly improve B-1 conventional capabilities. These upgrades would neither preclude future nuclear capabilities (if necessary) nor demand the high cost to maintain an immediate nuclear capability. In Jun 93, CSAF requested ACC take the lead, with USSTRATCOM, to develop a proposal for the timely recovery of nuclear capability in the B-1 (Tab 2).

b. (U) In May 93, ACC proposed an option which would require approximately \( \text{\checkmark} \) to rereole the B-1 (Tab 3). In Aug 93, DCINCSTRAT supported ACC’s plan for an \( \text{\checkmark} \).

In Aug 93, ACC sent a message to CSAF stating ACC and USSTRATCOM had reached an agreement to maintain a capability to rereole conventional B-1s to nuclear in \( \text{\checkmark} \).

c. (U) Currently conventional B-1s are able to rereole to nuclear capable IAW START/START II treaties. Although B-1s are not equipped to utilize ALCM/ACM, under the START treaty nuclear cruise missile integration for the B-1 is restricted. The forward moveable weapons bulkhead must remain in the factory/original position to prevent internal carriage of ALCM/ACM. The B-1 can nuclear rereole with nuclear gravity weapons without START treaty implications. The START II treaty allows for a one-time nuclear rereole of the B-1 fleet from the reoriented conventional role.

d. (U) DoD’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), page 4, states that reorientation will not preclude the return of the B-1 fleet to a strategic nuclear role in keeping with provisions of the START II treaty (Tab 6). The SECDEF’s Defense Planning Guidance, FY 1999-2002, adds in keeping with provisions of START II, the Air Force will retain the ability to rereole B-1s as strategic nuclear bombers should conditions warrant (Tab 7).
3. (U) DISCUSSION: The ACC staff has developed a conceptional plan addressing the recovery of B-1 nuclear capability after conversion to a conventional-only role which is in keeping with provisions of START II.

   a. (U) In accordance with current guidance, recovery of nuclear capability will not constitute more than movement of aircraft, weapons, personnel, and support equipment, training and certification of personnel, software modifications and certifications, and reinstallation of sensors & alarms in storage and maintenance facilities. Nuclear hardness and surety will be maintained throughout the Conventional Mission Upgrade Program (CMUP).

   b. (U) A B-1 nuclear rerole plan does not constitute authority to commit, obligate, or expend funds. It is not to direct policy, but merely establish planning guidance should the need ever arise to regain a nuclear war-fighting capability.

   c. (U) The most significant issues associated with B-1 rerole are: aircraft nuclear hardness & surety, avionics software and nuclear mission planning capability; nuclear weapons storage and support equipment; maintenance & security forces manpower authorizations; and unit level C3.

   d. (U) Other important issues include: training, secure work centers, personnel security actions/PRP certification, and survivable aircraft command & control communications.

4. (U) VIEWS OF OTHERS: HQ ACC has provided two letter coordination. Listed below are the concerns:

   a. (U) DOT and LGS's concerns are that to implement B-1 nuclear rerole could be very expensive and will cost B-1 conventional capability. DRP's concern is that the CMUP effort would come to a halt to meet the schedule and cost estimates given by the SPO.

   b. (U) HQ USSTRATCOM is revisiting their justification for current/future rerole requirement. USSTRATCOM no longer has a requirement for B-1 aircraft to be equipped with the MRT.

5. (U) RECOMMENDATION: Approve HQ ACC B-1 Nuclear Rerole Plan.

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Tabs
1. HQ ACC Nuclear Rerole Plan, 14 Oct 98 (S)
2. CSAF Message, 15 Jun 93 (S)
3. COMACC Message, 12 May 93 (S)
4. DCINCSTRAT Message, 10 Aug 93 (S)
5. COMACC Message, 20 Aug 93 (S)
6. DoD's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Memo, 11 Sep 95 (S)
7. SECDEF's Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), FY 1999-2002 (S)

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