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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR COMBAT COMMAND
LANGLEY AIR FORCE BASE, VIRGINIA

24 Apr 98

MEMORANDUM FOR ~~DON~~
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Obtained Under the
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by Hans M. Kristensen

FROM: DDON

SUBJECT: Trip Report – USSTRATCOM/J5 B-1B Nuclear Rerole Discussions

1. (U) PURPOSE: Discuss with MGen Marcotte (STRAT/J5) and USSTRATCOM staff status of ACC B-1B Nuclear Rerole Plan and potential of eliminating nuclear rerole requirement.
2. (U) TRAVELER: Lt Col Jerry D. Garrett (HQ ACC/DON)
3. (U) ITINERARY: Travel to Offutt AFB, NE on 20 Apr with return to Langley AFB on 21 Apr.
4. (U) DISCUSSION
 - a) (U) (\$) During the 1993-94 SecDef-directed Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), CINCSTRAT advocated force structure strategy. A key element of this strategy included releasing the B-1B to a "Conventional Only" role to The NPR embraced this strategy and the B-1B nuclear rerole requirement was formalized
 - b) (U) (\$) Within the last few months, USSTRATCOM staff has been re-examining the need for maintaining the B-1B rerole requirement and appears supportive for eliminating it. As a part of this re-examination process, MGen Marcotte requested the ACC B-1B Nuclear Rerole Brief presented during the 1998 Bomber Day Conference be provided again to he and his staff. A 16 March attempt to meet with MGen Marcotte's requested was cancelled due to a sever snow storm at Offutt. A 21 April presentation was the first opportunity all parties were available to convene.
 - c) (U) (\$) MGen Marcotte/staff were very pleased with the brief and ACC progress in identifying B-1B rerole tasks and timelines. However, he stated more detailed information is needed before pursuing

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relief of the rerole task and subsequently requested both ACC and his staff work collectively to better define:

(1) ^u (\$) Specific costs for both maintaining a rerole capability as well as cost associated with the actual rerole execution. This includes costs in training, personnel,....)

(2) (U) Capability and costs associated with maintaining USSTRATCOM B-1B automated planning systems and analysis tools.

(3) ^u (\$) Concept of Operations for employing a nuclear reroled B-1B, to include:

(a) ^u (\$) How many B-1Bs would require rerole and in what configuration? ACC plan current projects Some of the USSTRATCOM staff indicated they preferred

(b) ^u (\$) Given status/evolution of enemy air defenses, could a B-1B of tried leg)? i.e., failure

(c) ^u (\$) Define WSA requirements. Would weapons

when tasked to generate?

(d) ^u (\$) How best to maintain nuclear expertise while minimizing START II costs? One potential option would be to establish

mission capability. vweapon trainers, in lieu of actual weapons, would be utilized to maintain nuclear loading and maintenance training. Furthermore, with less than aircraft assigned, START II "Accountable Weapons" could be minimized.

d) (U) Future/Pending Actions.

(1) (U) MGen Marcotte advised of 28 May 98 B-1B Rerole Project Officer Group (POG) meeting in which members (ACC/B-1B SPO/AFMC/Contractors/USSTRATCOM) are to deliver detailed cost estimates based upon rerole event timelines developed during Feb 98 POG meeting. This, in addition to USSTRATCOM estimates for maintaining B-1B planning/analysis capabilities, will provide a better overall picture of the B-1B rerole price tag.

(2) (U) HQ ACC/DON drafting B-1B Operational Planning Data Document (OPDD) to reflect rerole tasks, timelines and responsibilities based upon POG examination. Expect finished product for Air Staff/DoD coordination NLT 1 July 98. ACC/DON also seeking a continuation of current B-1B nuclear safety rules pending coordination and approval of revised B-1B OPDD. Current nuclear safety rules expire 30 April, 1998.

(3) ^u (Q) MGen Marcotte expressed significant reluctance in pursuing elimination of B-1B nuclear rerole requirement without first "testing the waters" at HQ ACC. Specifically, he did not want to engage the initiative. MGen Marcotte proposed holding a mini-summit (Jun-Aug; level of attendance most probably O-6) to


reassess rolerole return on investment once *all costs* and USSTRATCOM warfighting requirements are better defined. Much of this analysis and USSTRATCOM/ACC coordination could be accomplished during the May POG meeting. If the mini-summit produces a decision to proceed with eliminating rolerole requirement, each organization would then solidify support throughout their chain of command prior to engaging the Pentagon community.

5. (U) OTHER ISSUES/CONCERNS

a) ^u B-1B transfer to AF Reserves/Guard continues as a potential AF force structure option. This realignment would seem to support eliminating the B-1B rolerole requirement. However, if not relieved and B-1Bs are transferred to Reserves/Guard, the complexities of rolerole actions would multiple significantly.

b) ^u (\$) With combined elimination of [(b) (1)] cover targeting] requirements.

6. ^u (\$) RECOMMENDATIONS. Continue to analyze B-1B nuclear rolerole actions, costs and target coverage implications. Report May 98 B-1B Rolerole POG and mini-summit results to ACC Directors for discussion with USSTRATCOM Directors on decision to engage Joint Staff/OSD on eliminating B-1B nuclear rolerole requirement.


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