NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** This report is distributed to e-mail participants of the NAPS Network. The following is the complete transcript of the press briefing given by a senior US State Department official following the joint US-ROK briefing of the DPRK on the four-party peace talks proposal in New York on March 5. The official, who attended the briefing session, was speaking on "background" and therefore was unidentified. The transcript was provided by the United States Information Agency (USIA). A summary of this press briefing was included in the March 6 Daily Report. -------------------- BRIEFING BY SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL ON THE U.S.-ROK JOINT BRIEFING FOR THE DPRK ON THE U.S.-ROK PROPOSAL FOR FOUR- PARTY PEACE TALKS Hilton Hotel New York City March 5, 1997 SENIOR OFFICIAL: Hello everyone. I'll just make a brief factual statement, then I'll make a couple of comments, and then I will invite your questions. But there isn't going to be an awful lot more that I'll be in a position to say than this. The joint U.S.-ROK briefing of the North Korean delegation about the four-party peace proposal of Presidents Clinton and Kim occurred by common agreement of all three parties involved in a serious and sincere atmosphere. The North Korean delegate, Vice Minister Kim Gye Gwan, thanked my ROK counterpart, Deputy Minister Song Young Shik, and me for our comments and replied that he would report them fully to his capital for consideration. He asked a number of questions for clarification, and we responded, offering as well to provide any further information that would be of assistance to the DPRK in making its decision as to acceptance of the proposal. The DPRK delegation indicated that they would reply formally, after consideration in Pyongyang, to our presentation. For those of you with stopwatches, I'll note that we began at 9:00 A.M. this morning, broke for a lunch break, reconvened at 2:30 P.M., and concluded at 4:30 P.M. I believe that this was a good start. I think that what we sought to do today was to demonstrate to the North Koreans that we had on the table before them a serious proposal, one that was being made in a sense of sincerity, and I have every reason to believe that they took that at face value and will report it as such to Pyongyang. I must say, on a more personal note, that about five years ago, I observed to Vice Minister Kim, I had greeted him at the airport here in New York when he came in the North Korean delegation to meet with us -- that was with Under Secretary of State Arnold Kanter on our side and Party Secretary Kim Young Sun on their side. And I commented to him that I thought that we would make progress a little more quickly than this but that here, five years later, we have arrived at a point that I thought was a threshold for now making the progress that I looked for those five years back. I do think that all three delegations came to this with remarkably similar attitudes of seriousness of purpose; all three delegations are perfectly well aware of the historic opportunity that we have, and I thought that the meeting went forward in an atmosphere of, as we have said before, sincerity and seriousness that I took as a good sign. So, with those few personal observations, I'll invite your questions. Q: I'm Terril Jones of Associated Press. I just wonder if you could describe as much as you can the outline of the basics of the proposals and what kind of either instructions or mandate that the Chinese gave to represent their interests. SENIOR OFFICIAL: The proposal is not very complicated. We proposed that we meet, four parties, in a place to be determined, at a level to be determined, an agenda to talk about peace (inaudible) and a peace mechanism, and then a peace agreement. No strings attached. Everything's on the table. We did not go into this with any mandate from the Chinese, although we are keeping them informed. Q: Hitoshi Omae of Nikkei, Japanese newspaper. What is your feeling of the North Koreans' understanding of your proposal, and when would expect their response? SENIOR OFFICIAL: I was very impressed by the apparent clearness of understanding of the North Korean side. As I mentioned at the outset, they asked some questions for clarification. I thought their questions indicated understanding and seriousness. They were not frivolous. And since I have complete faith in the worthiness of our proposal, I believe that the North Koreans will immediately perceive that in Pyongyang and that they will quickly accept it. Q: Colin Lynch of the Boston Globe. Can you characterize the arguments that you presented to the North Koreans to make a case for why it would be in their interest -- in their economic, political, and security interest -- and also whether this issue will be taken up at the bilaterals on Friday? SENIOR OFFICIAL: Let me answer the second question first. It is not going to be taken up in the bilateral talks. Those are about bilateral issues. As for the first, I really cannot go into the details of what we discussed. However, as I have backgrounded in the past, all parties have put forward proposals from time to time about how to get to peace and security, and the four-party talks is a vehicle to attempt to embrace points of commonality in those proposals. So, I would not try to make you look for what is there about the proposal that is brand new and unique. In fact, there is going to be in this a good deal that has been proposed at one time or another by the North Korean side. Q: Yasushi Fujii from Kyodo News. Mr. Senior Official, could you tell us whether North Korea has asked for food aid directly or linked assistance as a condition for accepting the four-party peace talks, and as for clarification which you're going to detail, would you to tell us whether you plan to have any kind of follow-up session with North Korea to make your position much more clear to them? SENIOR OFFICIAL: North Korea's appeal for help with its temporary food shortfall was made publicly and is not linked to the four- party proposal, nor have we made any kind of promise along those lines on our side as a means of attracting them into this. This is about peace and security. What was the second part of your question Mr. Fujii? Q: Do you plan to have any kind of follow-up session for clarification? SENIOR OFFICIAL: There's no such plan. Q: Ralph Begleiter with CNN. I'm going to ask several questions, so I'll throw them out, and you can do with them whatever you like. Did the North Koreans only ask questions, or did they offer any suggestions, ideas, proposals, however you want to characterize it? That's number one. Number two, did the subject come up, was it raised by anyone in the room, of the defector who currently is in Beijing? Was there any kind of reference by the North Korean delegate to other developments in Pyongyang, for example, descriptions of recent political developments there, the two defense ministers or replacements thereof, that sort of thing, or references to Kim's accession to titles in July? How did the North and South Korean delegates deal with one other in this room? Did the North Korean delegate, for example, address the South Korean delegate, or did they address all their comments to you? And do you have any feeling for when you might hear an answer from the North Korean delegation about their consideration of your proposals made today? SENIOR OFFICIAL: The North Korean side did not offer only questions. Of course they had comments themselves. I thought all of their questions and their comments were relevant. Other subjects unrelated to this did not arise on any side. The atmosphere was all very cordial. Cordial is actually probably the wrong word. I think that the words that we've been using are serious and sincere, and that actually has the great benefit of being accurate. Q: Also agreed upon? SENIOR OFFICIAL: You might say that. Q: You read a statement at the beginning, right? That was an agreed statement? SENIOR OFFICIAL: No. We didn't make an agreed statement. I think that your question about was there sort of three-way discussion is an interesting one. Yes, they did speak directly to one another. I will not pretend to know intimately whether every word used was one that ought to have been used, but I think it was. No one has suggested otherwise to me. And it seemed to me that this was in every way the kind of meeting that you would have wanted it to be. The question of when might it occur, I have really no hints on that. But, as I said before, I think that it's a good proposal, and they've got every reason to accept it very shortly. Q: Takahata from the Mainichi newspaper. Concerning the problem of opening liaison offices with each other between the United States and North Korea, have you talked about that today? Or even if you don't talk about it today, have you reached any timing in the future when to open it? SENIOR OFFICIAL: Mr. Takahata, the United States and the DPRK will hold a bilateral meeting to address bilateral issues on Friday, and that's one of them. Q: So, you didn't talk about it today? SENIOR OFFICIAL: Right. Q: Max Ruston, VOA. Could you go into a bit more detail about the questions that the North Koreans asked, even the broad areas about the topics, something more (inaudible)? SENIOR OFFICIAL: No, I'm sorry. I can't do that. Q: Nagoshi, from Jiji Press. During the talks, did the South Korean side raise the possibility of co-sponsoring (inaudible) with the North? SENIOR OFFICIAL: Not in these talks. You'll have to ask them whether that came up in private. Q: Excuse me, I just want to clarify. It sounds like you said the food issue did not come up in these talks. And, following up on that, do you anticipate or is there any discussions between the U.S. and North Korea about repairing the apparent misunderstandings or problems with Cargill? SENIOR OFFICIAL: These talks covered security and our effort to get to a four-way discussion of the security issues that would include economic cooperation and, implicitly, that can be a vehicle for addressing food. However, what I want to emphasize to you that is that this was a briefing about the talks. These are not the talks. And so there weren't any offers made, and it did not come up in the sense that you are asking. And the commercial negotiations that you referred to, and about which I will not speak directly, were not (inaudible) either. Q: Excuse me, I just want to clarify that. Since I'm not regularly covering the State Department, I don't speak State Department talk. SENIOR OFFICIAL: Who does? Q: I don't know -- If I understand, it sounds like you're saying then that food came up as an issue that might be discussed but you -- there was no back and forth on this, right? SENIOR OFFICIAL: I think that's right. Q: Did they bring it up? SENIOR OFFICIAL: We tried to lay out for them our concept of security as a broad concept, in a way that we hoped would be appealing and relevant to them. Q: Sakamoto from the Yomiuri Shimbun. Just to follow up. So did you make clear to North Koreans that security issue would include economic cooperation, which actually means food aid? Did you make it clear? SENIOR OFFICIAL: I believe it was clear. Q: But did you physically tell them about that, that the security issue is a broad concept which includes economic cooperation? SENIOR OFFICIAL: Well, let me say that I think that the North Korean delegation was extremely intelligent and did not seem to have difficulty understanding our presentation. (Laughter) Q: One more question. The North Koreans are still saying they are going to further study the proposal. And, actually, that is the words, almost same words they said before this joint briefing. What kind of progress in concrete terms did you see as far as North Koreans are concerned? SENIOR OFFICIAL: Other than the fact that they came to a joint briefing, which is in itself a rather positive response to our proposal, I cannot offer a specific example of progress in the way you're asking that. But I believe that the Joint Briefing itself is modest progress. North Korean diplomats have sat down with South Korean and American diplomats to talk about the possibility of getting to peace talks, and that beats all of the alternatives. Q: Norman Kempster with the Los Angeles Times. Is this the first, or the most extensive, or how would you characterize it, face-to- face between diplomats of North and South Korea? SENIOR OFFICIAL: Well, that's a factual question that you hardly need me to provide you with the answer. But the history of this is that North Korean and South Korean diplomats have been involved in the whole history of dialogue between North and South Korea. However, this is the first time that the diplomats were the people who were conducting the talks exclusively. Q: (Inaudible) with NHK, Japan Broadcasting Corporation. About a place and level of the four-party talks, did the U.S. and South Korean side make any specific proposal, or that issue was not discussed at all? SENIOR OFFICIAL: We offered some thoughts, but these are not take-it-or-leave-it. Sort of just suggestions. Q: Will you describe them a little bit? SENIOR OFFICIAL: There's no reason to. Q: Liz Trotta of the Washington Times. You said it's the first bilateral meeting. What about 1994, when they were at the prime ministerial level? SENIOR OFFICIAL: The actual question was, was this the first time that diplomats had led, and I was trying to be clear that is this not the first time that diplomats have been involved in talks. This is the first time that diplomats have led such talks. You're absolutely right that the prime ministers -- Q: I mean, it's higher if it's done at the prime ministerial level, so how really exclusive is it? SENIOR OFFICIAL: You are absolutely right. That is exactly the point I was trying to make. Q: Peter Gold, Fuji Television. You said that you have no hint of when they're going to get back to you, and there's no timetable for a response. They're going to go back and consider and study. Is there any mechanism to get a response out of them if they wait another year or longer? Or are you just going to sit back and wait for them? SENIOR OFFICIAL: Well, I think at this point the right thing to do is wait. Q: And is there a mechanism that can wait some significant period of time? SENIOR OFFICIAL: We'll wait and be patient. Q: Steve Meyers of the New York Times. You mean to say that you're not going to, or you're not expecting a response by, say, the end of the week? SENIOR OFFICIAL: I don't have any particular expectations. Q: One way or the other? SENIOR OFFICIAL: Right. Q: And it could come at the beginning of the week or (inaudible)? SENIOR OFFICIAL: I'd be delighted if they got back to us very quickly, but, no, I don't have particular expectation. Q: Can I follow up this question. Hitoshi Omae of Nikkei again. So, regarding the four-party talks, you are going to use the bilateral channel with North Korea, or you're sticking to the cooperation, consultation with South Korea and the Chinese? Or you're going to encourage North Korea by using bilateral channel? SENIOR OFFICIAL: No, we have a bilateral agenda that we need to cover in our bilateral channel, and we're not going to use our bilateral meeting to have Round Two of the Joint Briefing. Q: There was a military member of the delegation on the U.S. side. I don't know the North Korean delegation well enough to know whether anyone there in any way represented military interests, but how much discussion was there of military issues? SENIOR OFFICIAL: This was not a -- I guess this is really worth clarifying again. This was not a discussion of issues. This was a briefing about our proposal to sit down and have talks. And so, of course, in its broadest sense, a number of issues -- and earlier there was mention of food and here mention of military issues -- in the broadest sense, of course these things came up as parts of sentences, but they were not extended discussions. Q: Well, maybe if you want to choose to call it a briefing, that's fine. How much briefing and how many questions and how many comments were there -- I would call that a discussion, but you might choose not to -- was there on military sorts of issues, for example, confidence-building measures or reduction of forces, or any kind of -- that sort of thing. SENIOR OFFICIAL: Well, I really can't get into to the contents of the briefing, but I believe it has been clear from our previous backgrounders that confidence-building measures are a rather essential element of the approach that we are going to try to pursue. Q: Yukio Kashiyama from the Japanese newspaper Sankei. Did you discuss the recent defector from North Korea? SENIOR OFFICIAL: Thank you for a question that I can answer with a single word. No. Q: Could you tell us what role that China is playing, why China isn't playing a role as an observer at the briefings, whether you'd like to see them playing a more direct role even though we haven't gotten to the four-way talks? SENIOR OFFICIAL: This briefing was in response to a question, or rather a request for answers to questions from the North Korean side, questions that could be answered by the U.S. and the ROK. We have been keeping the Chinese informed, but they didn't ask to be involved in this briefing. Q: Just to follow up on an earlier question, did the North Korean side let on or provide you with any information or news about the North Korean leadership or confirm anything that would (end?) speculation or thoughts or unconfirmed reports, and did they mention anything about wanting to wait until the third anniversary of Kim Il-sung's death before taking any action on any level? SENIOR OFFICIAL: No to all of the above. Q: We were told before the Briefing that this would be the highest hurdle prior to the actual four-party talks. Do you feel that it's still the same? Another question is, are you more confident now after the Joint Briefing that actually the four- party, official four-party talks could commence? SENIOR OFFICIAL: There were several things that might have happened today that didn't happen. And I would say that of all of the possible things that might have happened, this was probably the next best day that we could have had. The best day would have been if the North Koreans would have come bursting out saying, yes we want to come. They didn't do that. But in all other respects this was a good outcome. Q: (Inaudible) from WTN. (Inaudible) (didn't?) say that that was one of the issues that you discussed at length, but did the North Koreans give any indication that the food shortage and possible food aid might be the main reason why they came to this? SENIOR OFFICIAL: No, they did not. This discussion about food is not about the four-party talks. The North Korean need for food is a matter of their public statements, and it's something that they acknowledge. They did not come to this meeting asking us about food, and we did not suggest to them that there was some sort of a food reward in it for them. Q: Well, can I follow up on that though. Last week when Madeleine Albright was abroad, she said that it depends how much North Korea is suffering in order to get them to the table, so that that's why I'm asking you if they admitted that they felt pressure to come to these talks. SENIOR OFFICIAL: They did not say anything of the sort. Q: Could you briefly describe what is North Korea's response to the USA's and South Korea's four-party (inaudible)? Sorry, I'm late. (Laughter) SENIOR OFFICIAL: Well, to cut to their bottom line, it is that they will report it to Pyongyang, and we believe that they will do so accurately. And then we will wait for their reply. That was their response. Q: Could you characterize "it" one more time, please? SENIOR OFFICIAL: I'm sorry? Q: Could you characterize "it" one more time? SENIOR OFFICIAL: The briefing. The briefing. They will report our briefing. Q: Not the proposal? SENIOR OFFICIAL: The contents of the briefing, which were the -- the briefing about the proposal. Q: You spoke quite a bit about the North Koreans, characterizing the North Korean and U.S. sides. What about the South Korean side. There was some question in the past about their behavior in the tense atmosphere. How would you characterize what they said? How much did they talk? Did they say anything unexpected? SENIOR OFFICIAL: The South Korean side spoke approximately 50 percent of the time, maybe 51 percent. And I thought that -- it's not giving away anything to say that I thought their presentations were very well crafted, very free of any negative implications. We have used previously the words serious and sincere, but that applies equally to the South Korean presentations. They were ably led by their Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Song Young Shik, and I thought that in his presentations, particularly, there was a personal warmth that shone through very clearly. I think he was a perfect choice for the job. Q: Again on a personal note, since you reflected on that as well, I just wonder if you could tell us what is your ethnicity, personally, and are you fluent in the Korean language yourself? SENIOR OFFICIAL: My familiarity with the Korean language is not fit to be described. (Laughter) Not at all, really. And that's about all I have to say. Thank you very much for your attention.