SECTION III--SECURITY ASSISTANCE

(U) During his announcement on establishing diplomatic relations between the United States and China, President Carter stated, "I have paid special attention to insuring that normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic will not jeopardize the well-being of the people of Taiwan." The Taiwan Relations Act contained the provision that the United States would make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as might be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The nature and quantity of such defense articles and services would be determined by the President and Congress based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. A determination on Taiwan's defense needs would include a review by United States military activities.

(CL) As a result of severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan no new commitments for security assistance would be made with Taiwan during 1979. Requests for security assistance items would continue during 1979 short of obtaining approval or commitment. Items that had already been committed to Taiwan prior to 1 January 1979 would be delivered on schedule, including equipment, training of military students, spare parts, and follow-on items such as ammunition. The United States would continue to provide follow-on support such as material, technical training, technical assistance, and technical data packages to support U.S. systems or items already furnished or being provided as a result of existing commitments. Further, Taiwan military students enrolled or to be enrolled per letters of offer and acceptance (LOA's) signed prior to 31 December 1978 would complete training.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS)

General FMS procedures developed with respect to Taiwan after normalization were as follows: LOAs, the basic exchange which committed the U.S. Government and the purchaser to a contractual agreement, would be routed between the two unofficial entities; communications in other related areas would be directly between the Taiwan unofficial entity (CCNAAR) and the responsible elements of the DOD. In some cases, primarily in Taiwan, communications between the U.S. unofficial entity (AIT) and the responsible elements of the Government on Taiwan were authorized. The only written communication between elements of the two governments were restricted to automated requisitioning and notices by electronic means.

1. Text of the President's Address to the Nation, 15 Dec 78; Taiwan Relations Act, PL 96-8 of 10 Apr 79.
2. CINCPAC 1919032 Jan 79 (C/NF), DECL 16 Jan 85.
3. SECSTATE 010125Z Mar 79 (C) (EX), GDS 2/28/85.
Taiwan Military Training

(U) CINCPAC advised the JCS in early January 1979 that there were 12 Taiwanese students attending CONUS military training. An additional 138 were scheduled during the remainder of FY 79. Of these, 29 students would not complete training until after 1979, including one as late as December 1981. In addition to these students, two armed forces members were assigned as liaison representatives at the Air Force Logistics Command and Navy International Logistics Control Office, and the USAF Academy had a Chinese language instructor. CINCPAC proposed to inform MAAG China that the scheduled students would complete their training and recommended continuation of duty for the other three officers. The JCS answered that, while the official decision on Taiwan Armed Forces training had not been made, indications were that the students then enrolled or to be enrolled per signed LOAs would complete training.

(8) After the State Department directed the American Embassy, Taipei not to issue visas for Taiwan military students until future notice, pending a decision on continuation of CONUS training, CINCPAC requested that the JCS pursue an early decision on future training and on official visits to the United States by Taiwan military authorities. The JCS reply was that there was a general consensus that some types of training in U.S. military educational/training facilities would continue; however, no decision had yet been made. Meanwhile, the State Department advised the Embassy in Taipei to issue visas to Taiwan military personnel scheduled to receive training at commercial facilities. Training at U.S. commercial facilities did not represent official contact between governmental representatives, was not affected by normalization, and was to be encouraged.

(8) On 21 February 1979, the Embassy in Taipei acknowledged at the State Department guidance and agreed that future GONT military training requests should be met as far as possible through private U.S. corporations providing equipment. However, the Embassy indicated that there were special GONT concerns which should be borne in mind which, if not adequately met, could cause the GONT to take their case to the U.S. Congress. CINCPAC supported the Embassy position, informing the JCS that technical and professional military training should be an integral part of the support package for equipment purchased previously, as well as for equipment to be sold to Taiwan in the future. In late March 1979, the JCS provided detailed procedures for the training of Taiwan military personnel at U.S. military facilities. In summary, the United States would provide technical training to members of Taiwan's armed forces only when the training in question could

1. CINCPAC 062350Z Jan 79 (U); J4 Taiwan Withdrawal Status Report (S), 8 May 78, p. 129.
2. J4 Taiwan Withdrawal Status Report (S), 8 May 78, pp. 129-130; CINCPAC 310053Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 26 Jan 85; JCS 052107Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 1 Feb 85.

CONFIDENTIAL
not be provided by Taiwan's own military school system or was not reasonably available from commercial sources. DOD would investigate the feasibility of contracting out technical training to civilian sources. The annual technical training program would be prepared by AIT-Taipei from Taiwan military requests and forwarded to CINCPAC for review and forwarding to DOD. Final approval would follow current FMS procedures; i.e., State and Defense Department approval required.

Military Assistance Program

(U) CINCPAC recommended that existing disposition/residual rights of MAP equipment either continue as it had been or that such equipment be sold or transferred free. The JCS advised that the DOD position was for the United States to retain title to the residual rights as long as the GONT retained the equipment.

1. AMEMB Taipei 210749Z Feb 79 (C), GOS 02/21/85; CINCPAC 230552Z Feb 79 (C), DECL 22 Feb 85; JCS 232300Z Mar 79 (C), DECL 23 Mar 85.
2. J4 Taiwan Withdrawal Status Report (C), 8 May 78, p. 132; CINCPAC 191903Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 16 Jan 85.
CHAPTER V

COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS

SECTION I--WITHDRAWAL ACTIONS

1. CINCPAC 180634Z Dec 78 (TSX/NF) (EX), DECL 16 Dec 84.
2. CINCPAC 220210Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 20 Dec 84.
(U) On 2 February 1979, COMUSTDC requested that CINCPAC take action to stop any additional requests for C-E asset removal not previously approved. Continuing requests for the removal of additional equipment had begun to give Taiwan authorities the impression that the United States was bailing a piecemeal communication system and this was adverse to baiment negotiations. On 8 February 1979, CINCPAC informed all concerned that the list of C-E equipment approved for removal was frozen and any future requests required the approval of the CINCPAC Directorate for Communications-Data Processing.

IJCST Bailment

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Ibid.
2. COMUSTDC 220624Z Dec 78 (C), DECL 1 May 79; COMUSTDC 300227Z Dec 78 (C), DG/C/28 Dec 86.
3. JCS 032323Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 3 Jan 85.
4. CINCPAC 132049Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 11 Jan 85.
5. COMUSTDC 020826Z Feb 79 (C), DECL 1 Jan 80; CINCPAC 080229Z Feb 79 (U)

----CONFIDENTIAL----

56
(U) COMUSTDC submitted a new proposed bailment, based on CINCPAC's 27 January 1979 comments, and indicated that formal discussions on this bailment would be held on 8 February 1979, via the military subcommittee of the Joint SOFA Committee. PACAF concurred with the substance of the proposed agreement, understanding that the format (bailment) required Defense and State Department approval. CDRUSACSG concurred with the proposal. CINCPAC also concurred with this proposal and submitted it to the JCS with the understanding that the DOD General Counsel's Office was comfortable with the bailment concept. CINCPAC pointed out that the agreement for the disposition of C-E assets in Thailand was prepared as both a bailment agreement and a memorandum of agreement, but CINCPAC was satisfied with the single bailment agreement. Expedient approval of the bailment was requested along with authority for the Joint Committee to enter the agreement on behalf of the United States as soon as possible.

(U) The above information was relayed to COMUSTDC and discussed with Taiwan authorities at a 5 March 1979 meeting. A third revision, dated 6 March 1979, was forwarded to CINCPAC and passed to the JCS. The Taiwan MND representative agreed to pay all O&M costs. Joint inventories were begun on 16 March 1979, and on 1 April 1979 Taiwan assumed O&M responsibility for the microwave system.

1. JCS 081441Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 3 Jan 85; COMUSTDC 170605Z Jan 79 (U); CINCPAC 270157Z Jan 79 (U).
2. HQ PACAF 030400Z Feb 79 (C/NF), DECL 2 Feb 85.
3. COMUSTDC 070834Z Feb 79 (U), HQ PACAF 100120Z Feb 79 (U); CDRUSACSG 122355Z Feb 79 (U); CINCPAC 151912Z Feb 79 (U).
4. JCS 282246Z Feb 79 (C), DECL 27 Feb 85.
5. COMUSTDC 080610Z Mar 79 (U).
(U) As with other agreements being worked in Taiwan and reviewed in Washington, D.C., a time delay developed. By the time the JCS approved the second revision agreement on 14 April, COMUSTDC had already prepared a fifth revision. The JCS cancelled their 14 April 1979 direction, reviewed the latest revision and approved the COMUSTDC 8 March 1979 proposal with incorporation of certain changes. CINCPAC requested that COMUSTDC meet with the Taiwan representatives and obtain their concurrence with the JCS recommended changes.

(U) A sixth and final revision, dated 24 April 1979, was prepared and signed by representatives of AIT and CCNAA.

1. JCS 140139Z Apr 79 (U); JCS 162336Z Apr 79 (U); CINCPAC 170255Z Apr 79 (U), DECL 16 Apr 85.
2. Communications Bailment Agreement dtd 24 Apr 79.
SECTION II--AIT/DOD COMMUNICATIONS

1. COMUSTDC 230825Z Jan 79 (C), DECL 85.
2. CINCPAC 240335Z Jan 79 (S/NF) (BOM), DECL 22 Jan 85.
3. CINCPAC 071819Z Feb 79 (C), DECL 6 Feb 85.
4. CINCPAC 020527Z Mar 79 (S/NF) (BOM), DECL 1 Mar 85; AMEMB Taipei 230814Z Feb 79 (C), XDS-3, 22 Feb 79.
1. CINCPAC 090240Z Mar 79 (TS/NE) (BOM), DECL 6 Mar 09; JCS 310008Z Mar 79 (C), DECL 28 Mar 85.
2. CINCPAC 310420Z Mar 79 (SYNF), DECL 30 Mar 85.
3. COMUSTDC 120740Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 13 Apr 85; JCS 131931Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 13 Apr 85.
4. NSA 171437Z Apr 79 (C), REVW 17 Apr 2009; CINCPAC 181946Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 18 Apr 85.
(U) In March 1979, COMUSTDC received a request from the Director General of the Taiwan Information Office to transfer, in place and cost free, the Armed Forces Network Taiwan (AFNT) equipment and facilities. AFNT would be used to provide nonprofit English language public service broadcasting to the international community on Taiwan. The expatriate community had strong feelings over the loss of the AFNT. This led to the American Chamber of Commerce obtaining permission from the Taiwan Government to establish a noncommercial, nonprofit English language radio station, funded by contributions from the foreign business community. COMUSTDC supported this request both for the enhanced quality of life it would provide for the expatriate community and for improved relations with the people on Taiwan. It also afforded the commander the capability to have emergency communication, through late April 1979, in the event of natural disaster or other emergencies which might otherwise affect the withdrawal.

(U) By message on 17 March 1979, CINCPAC supported COMUSTDC’s request as being in the best interest of the U.S. Government and because of the substantial benefits to the United States which would accrue, in accordance with Title IV of the Federal Property Act (40 USC 511-514). The head of the executive agency involved, in this case Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), was required to make the substantial benefit determination. CINCPAC requested that the JCS effect the necessary coordination with CNO.

(U) The JCS requested that the CNO make the substantial benefits determination based on an initial cost of $300,000, and residual value of $25,000. On 2 April 1979, the CNO advised that transfer of the AFNT facilities and equipment to the GONT was considered to be in the best interest of the United States and requested appropriate procedures and instruments be implemented locally to effect the transfer upon the establishment of AIT. Preliminary turnover operations were to commence immediately, since the American community in Taipei wanted to commence broadcasting immediately following cessation of AFNT operations on 15 April 1979. Naval Broadcast Service (NAVBCSTSVC) Detachment 31, Taipei was directed to take appropriate actions to achieve a smooth transition.

(U) The JCS authorized transfer of AFNT equipment in two phases: NAVBCSTSVC Det 31 to AIT and AIT to CCNAA. This was accomplished and the International Community Radio in Taiwan began operation on 16 April 1979.

1. COMUSTDC 12233Z Mar 79 (U).
2. CINCPAC 172145Z Mar 79 (U).
3. JCS 302230Z Mar 79 (U); CNO 021654Z Apr 79 (U).
4. JCS 131745Z Apr 79 (U); COMUSTDC Terminal History (1 January 1978 – 30 April 1979), p. 31, (U), DECL 30 April 85.
CHAPTER VI
MILITARY OPERATIONS
SECTION I—EXERCISES

During 1978, PACOM had conducted 15 exercises with the GONT. Five were significant joint/combined exercises and ten were routine. These exercises provided a training base for Taiwan military personnel. CINCPAC's position was that it was necessary, during the life of the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), to schedule exercises to train and evaluate GONT command and control capabilities under simulated battle conditions. Therefore, he identified to the JCS three options, ranging from canceling the entire exercise program to continuing scheduled exercises during 1979. The recommendation was to modify the existing exercise program commensurate with the withdrawal schedule of COMUSTDC.1

Exercise Scheduling

The first exercises to be affected by the normalization announcement were SHARKHUNT, SALVEX and EAGLE/LARK, scheduled for January 1979. The American Embassy, Taipei, supported these exercises and stated that besides the political advantages in demonstrating the validity of our ongoing security commitment during the remaining life of the MDT, the JCS advised that the exercises were canceled.2

During February, March and April 1979, CINCPAC made attempts to have EAGLE/LARK/BLUESKY or LARK exercises approved. A total of six exercises were planned, coordinated and canceled during the first four months of 1979. Cancellations were made in each case as a result of State Department decisions that they could cause misinterpretation of U.S. intentions in the

1. CINCPAC 180634Z Dec 78 (S/NF) (BOM), DECL 16 Dec 84.
2. CINCPAC 230017Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 79; CINCPAC 030640Z Jan 79 (S), BOM, DECL 2 Jan 85; Amembassy Taipei 030722Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 3 Jan 85; JCS 092234Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 8 Jan 85; JCS 040054Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 3 Jan 85.
area. Finally, in early May 1979, the JCS advised that the Secretary of Defense had indicated that there would be no more joint/combined military exercises with Taiwan.

**Taiwan Strait Patrols**

(T) Taiwan Strait Patrols (TSPs) were routinely conducted by U.S. Navy ships at the direction of COMSEVENTHFLT in connection with normal transits of the strait and were coordinated with the Taiwan Navy through COMUSTDC. Since COMUSTDC was being disestablished on 30 April 1979, CINCPACFLT requested authorization to discontinue TSPs after 30 April. COMUSTDC disagreed with the request and supported continuation of TSPs through the MDT period utilizing AIT-T as the interface. COMUSTDC foresaw TSPs as the only vehicle available for maintaining a visible interface between the GONT and U.S. military forces past 30 April. Because guidance on U.S.-Taiwan relationships had not been fully developed at that time, CINCPAC held in abeyance the authority to discontinue TSPs until the overall U.S. policy was announced.

---

1. CINCPAC 082309Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 5 Jan 85; CINCPAC 220306Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 5 Jan 85; CINCPAC 020305Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 1 Mar 85; JCS 222309Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 22 Mar 85; CINCPAC 102107Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 24 Mar 85; JCS 111817Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 11 Apr 85; JCS 080339Z May 79 (S), DECL 8 May 85; COMUSTDC Terminal Command History, 1 Jan 78-30 Apr 79 (S), DECL 30 Apr 85, p. 53; J78/Memo/99-79 of 27 Aug 79 (S).

2. CINCPACFLT 150001Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 11 Feb 85; COMUSTDC 210012Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 1 Jan 84; CINCPAC 222030Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 1 Jan 84.
SECTION II—SHIP VISITS

Four ship visits were scheduled during the Christmas period 1978 and five ship visits were scheduled during the following New Year period. An additional 20 ships were scheduled for the first quarter of 1979. The options available were to continue ship visits as scheduled; cancel all ship visits; or, depending on the attitude of the Taiwan Government and the security situation, continue with the immediate (holiday period) visits and scale down subsequent visits until the political situation stabilized. The consensus was to continue the Christmas period visits but to cancel the New Year period visits because this period coincided with the day (1 January 1979) when the United States severed diplomatic relations with the Taiwan.

In early January 1979, Admiral Weisner advised General Jones, Chairman of the JCS, that he had modified his position of late December 1978 to continue ship visits, at least through January 1979, in accordance with the first quarter employment schedule. Admiral Weisner's new position was to continue ship visits through the year but with a tempo scaled down gradually to a level that by the fourth quarter could include visits to Mainland China as well. Specifically, January visits would be reduced by 50 percent and future months would be further decreased through the fourth quarter. The JCS responded that no ship visits were to be conducted until a change in guidance from higher authority, which they were attempting to have reviewed, was received. The CINCPAC response was cancellation of ship visits through 17 January 1979, leaving three January 1979 visits held in abeyance pending review of existing guidance.

When no change in guidance was received by mid-February 1979, resulting in additional ship visit cancellations, CINCPAC placed all ship visits in abeyance until a ship visit policy was established by higher authority. The JCS were requested to assist in expediting the ship visit decision. In the meantime, CINCPACFLT proposed guidelines for Taiwan port visits when or if a resumption of ship visits was authorized.

On 23 March 1979, the JCS informed CINCPAC that a total of 34 ship visits, commencing that month, was approved for the remainder of 1979. As many as six ships (October 1979) could visit in a month. CINCPAC was requested to advise of any March visits contemplated and to set in motion

1. CINCPAC 180634Z Dec 78 (MN/NF) (EX), DECL 16 Dec 84; CINCPAC 200126Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 31 Jan 79; AMEMBASSY Taipei 200932Z Dec 78 (S), GDS 12/20/84; JCS 201916Z Dec 78 (S) (EX), DECL 20 Dec 84; CINCPAC 230017Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 79.
2. CINCPAC 230017Z Dec 78 (S), DECL 31 Dec 79; CINCPAC 030640Z Jan 79 (S) (EX), DECL 2 Jan 85; JCS 040054Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 3 Jan 85; CINCPAC 082309Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 5 Jan 85.
3. CINCPAC 102253Z Jan 79 (S), DECL 10 Jan 85; CINCPAC 182059Z Feb 79 (S), DECL 17 Feb 81; CINCPACFLT 302057Z Jan 79 (CN/NF), DECL 31 Jan 85.
visit schedules for subsequent quarters for JCS review and approval. Two ships visited Taiwan on very short notice (28 March 1979). A second quarter 1979 ship visit schedule, containing six ships, was submitted on 3 April 1979.1 The JCS approved the April and May visits (three ships) on 10 April 1979.

1. JCS 231945Z Mar 79 ( ), DECL 22 Mar 85; CINCPACFLT 241904Z 30 Jun 79; JCS 262233Z Mar 79 ( ), DECL 26 Mar 79; CINCPAC 031031Z Apr 79 ( ), DECL 30 Mar 80.
SECRET

SECTION III—AIRCRAFT TRANSIT RIGHTS

(U) Prior to all U.S. military forces leaving Taiwan, Detachment 1 of the 13th Air Force at Clark AB was responsible for U.S. aircraft clearances/overflights on Taiwan. As the withdrawal was completed, COMUSTDC, with technical assistance from the Clark detachment, assumed responsibility. In early May 1979, AIT-I, through the CINCPAC liaison officers, accepted primary responsibility and the CINCPAC Provisional Plans Office monitored this activity and provided assistance as required.

Aircraft Clearances/Overflights

(U) U.S. aircraft, either landing on Taiwan or flying through the Taiwan airspace, previously received approval via a system known as "Mother Hubbard." Effective 1 May 1979, a new procedure, called "Dragon," was established. Dignitary flights previously covered under diplomatic clearances followed the same "Dragon" procedures, but were called "Dragon Victor." The first "Dragon" and "Dragon Victor" flights were conducted on 5 and 14 May 1979 respectively.

Aircraft Landing Rights

(‡) In January 1979, CINCPAC provided rationale to the JCS for retaining aircraft landing rights. CINCPAC indicated that U.S. military flights through Taiwan were necessary to support aircraft, medical and search and rescue emergencies; the programmed depot maintenance operation; and to retain flexibility, e.g., weather divert fields. Since this remained an unresolved issue in mid-March 1979, Admiral Weisner reemphasized its importance to General Jones. The PACOM view was that transient military aircraft landing rights were necessary to support helicopter and tactical aircraft deployments between the Philippines and North East Asia. The capability to land on Taiwan, even under limited circumstances, provided the flexibility necessary for these deployments and Military Airlift Command support options and the safety provided by emergency diverts and weather evacuation bases. The reply from the Chairman of the JCS was that the only option that had been retained was emergency landing rights. Any additional rationale that could strengthen the case would be appreciated. The rationale was provided by early April 1979. As a result of this information, the JCS forwarded a memorandum to the Office of the Secretary of Defense emphasizing retention of landing rights that had operational and humanitarian implications.

1. COMUSTDC 191205Z Apr 79 (‡), DECL 82; CINCPAC 021959Z May 79 (U); CINCPAC 022123Z May 79 (U).
2. CINCPAC 181946Z Mar 79 (‡) (BOM), DECL 17 Mar 85; JCS 262236Z Mar 79 (‡) (BOM), DECL 22 Mar 85; CINCPAC 050316Z Apr 79 (‡), DECL 31 Mar 85; JCS 142127Z Apr 79 (‡) (BOM), DECL 11 Apr 85.
By the end of April 1979 and the withdrawal of all U.S. forces, the issue of landing rights was still under review at the Washington level. In the interest of safety, CINCPAC issued an interim policy for aircraft emergency landings on Taiwan. The overriding consideration was aircrew/aerialcraft safety.

1. CINCPAC 2822552 Apr 79 (C), DECL 27 Apr 85.
SECRET

SECTION IV--INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

(U) There were in excess of 250 Defense-related agreements between Taiwan and the United States in existence in December 1978. When the Christopher mission visited Taipei in late December 1978, Mr. Armacost discussed with the Taiwan authorities the possible termination of these agreements. This led to a request from the JCS and the Office of the Secretary of Defense General Counsel to review these agreements for the purpose of determining which agreements might be terminated and which would remain in effect.

2. CINCPAC 060329Z Mar 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 09.
3. CINCPAC 060412Z Apr 79 (S), DECL 31 Dec 09.

SECRET

69 (Reverse Blank p.70)
PART II
1 May - 31 December 1979

CHAPTER I
PLANNING

SECTION I--PLANS

Operation Plans

(U) CINCPAC OPLAN 5025, COMUSTOC OPLAN 5025, and MND-USTOC OPLAN ROCHESTER were cancelled effective 1 January 1980. CINCPAC components were advised to retain CINCPAC OPLAN 5025 and supporting plans on file for two years.

1. CINCPAC 0502442 Feb 80 (U).
2. A CONPLAN was an Operation Plan in Concept Format, an operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require expansion into an OPLAN or an Operation Order prior to implementation.
CHAPTER II
PERSONNEL
SECTION I--TRAVEL TO TAIWAN

Official Travel

CINCPAC Role

(U) The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and JCS guidance on authorized DOD civilian travel to Taiwan had not referred to the role that CINCPAC would play in the clearance process. CINCPAC's opinion was that a continuing interest and responsibility did exist to maintain a controlling or monitoring position in established clearance procedures. This resulted in a proposal to OSD for one of two alternatives: the first would continue existing procedures prescribed for travel by senior officials to Taiwan (i.e., traveler first obtain concurrence of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), ASD (ISA), and then area clearance by CINCPAC); the second would place CINCPAC in the approval chain prior to ASD (ISA). CINCPAC preferred the first alternative.

(U) The ASD (ISA) acknowledged CINCPAC's continuing interest in official DOD civilian travel to Taiwan. Because of the unique circumstances involved, however, such travel would require OSD (ISA) and State Department concurrence and final National Security Council approval. Therefore, the procedures outlined in March 1979 were modified, to wit: requests originating in the PACOM area were submitted to CINCPAC headquarters for recommendation and forwarded to OSD (ISA); requests originating outside the PACOM area were submitted directly to OSD (ISA), with a copy to CINCPAC. CINCPAC then provided recommendations directly to OSD (ISA).

Travel Conducted

(--) At the end of 1979, 66 DOD civilians had been authorized to travel to Taiwan under the new guidelines; 39 had commenced travel. The major reasons for travel included:

- Foreign Military Sales cases: 39
- Administering WRM Contracts/Property Disposal/Installation Transfer: 10
- Supervising contract work at Air Asia: 7

---

1. JCS 062032Z Mar 79 (7), DECL 5 Mar 85; SECDEF 132005Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 11 Apr 85; CINCPAC 280316Z Apr 79 (C), DECL 26 Apr 85.
2. SECDEF 090457Z May 79 (U); J781 Point Paper, 7 Dec 79, Subj: DOD Civilians on Taiwan After 30 Apr 79 (C)

SECRET

(Reverse Blank p. 74)
CHAPTER III
ORGANIZATIONS
SECTION I--PROVISIONAL PLANS OFFICE

Disestablishment

(U) A CINCPAC Notice advised that normal operations for the PPO would cease on 17 December 1979 and various administrative actions would occur during the period 17-31 December 1979 to provide for an orderly disestablishment of the PPO on 31 December 1979.

Drawdown

(U) The accompanying chart gives the end-of-month strength for the PPO from March thru December 1979, displaying the buildup and gradual decline in personnel. By 31 December 1979, two military were scheduled to remain at CINCPAC until March and May 1980, when they would be transferred to a CONUS and sea command respectively. One civilian remained at CINCPAC; 9 military remained on Oahu in various commands; 10 military were transferred to CONUS commands; 1 military was transferred to an overseas command; and 1 military was transferred to sea duty.

1. CINCPAC Notice S3020 of 14 Dec 79, Subj: Terms of Reference for the Director, Provisional Plans Office (U).
SECTII

SECTION II-AMERICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN

DOD-Related Billets

AIT-Taipei Manning

(U) Of the six personnel originally nominated for DOD related billets, four accepted. These were the two International Logistics Officers (formerly heads of the Army and Air Force desks at MAAG China), an Administrative Officer (retired senior NCO at the 6217th Air Base Squadron at CCK Air Base, and a Senior Plans Liaison Officer (retired Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USTDC). The two active duty officers retired and arrived on Taiwan on 16 June 1979. The Administrative Officer and Senior Plans Liaison Officer were hired on Taiwan. The second nominee for Senior International Logistics Officer accepted and retired from the Air Force, arriving in Taiwan 10 June 1979. The alternate selection for Plans Coordinator was a retired Marine officer. He arrived in Taiwan 14 June 1979.

(U) The two temporary billets were terminated effective 31 December 1979.

AIT-Washington Manning

(U) In May 1979, a position was added and filled at the Headquarters office to coordinate all DOD-assigned activities. Title of the position was Political/Military Liaison Officer.


1. SECSTATE 120220Z May 79 (U); Jl35 HistSum Apr 79; SECSTATE 052247Z Jun 79 (C); J781 HistSum May 79.
2. J5325 HistSum Aug 79 (C); DECL Jan 85; J78/Memo/10 July 79, Subj: DOD Representation in American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), (C); DIA 062049Z Aug 79 (C); DECL 1 Aug 85; J781 HistSum, Sep 79.
3. CINCPAC 252341Z Oct 79 (U).
CINCPAC-AIT Relationships

(S) The JCS answer to CINCPAC's message of 31 March 1979 (received on 10 May) was not definitive. The Director of the Plans and Policy Directorate, LT GEN Lawson, advised the CINCPAC Chief of Staff, LT GEN Poston, that there was difficulty in providing specific responses because there was no precedent for relations with an organization such as AIT and, therefore, no policy to draw upon. He suggested that those questions which could be answered in the near future would be answered, but for the others, they were best left to time and experience.

(S) In the CINCPAC quarterly report to the Secretary of Defense for the period ending June 1979, the need for improvement in the CINCPAC-AIT relationship was mentioned. Mr. Armacost, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, was asked by the Secretary of Defense to obtain additional information on this problem area. In replying to Mr. Armacost, Admiral Weisner advised that, since the quarterly report was submitted, his concern for maintaining an adequate information flow from Taiwan had been somewhat reduced. There had been improvements in the informal contacts between the CINCPAC representatives in AIT and the MND; also resolution of FMS procedures to maintain the JCS and CINCPAC in the decision process was expected. Admiral Weisner remained concerned that policy decisions limiting the DOD/Taiwan interface should be subject to CINCPAC and JCS scrutiny.

(U) According to a November 1979 PPO working paper, however, no real improvement in AIT-MND contact was apparent. Coordination procedures in Taiwan continued to remain more restrictive than in Washington, D.C., and the GONT MND had complained about the lack of official contact with the AIT CINCPAC representatives. With the termination of the CINCPAC representative billets, the Senior International Logistics Officer/Chief Technical Affairs Section and the Segior Studies and Research Specialist assumed all the DOD related functions.

1. JCS 102116Z May 79 (C).
(U) During the course of the period May through December 1979, RADM Lei's presence was of benefit to both Taiwan and the United States and enhanced the understanding between the two countries in deference to the new relationships. He was of considerable assistance in efforts to complete facility transfer negotiations between AIT Taipei and CCNAF Taipei; obtain equitable residual value for facilities and equipment transferred; and enable removal of selected War Reserve Materiel from Taiwan. After each of several discussions with the PACOM staff, RADM Lei dispatched messages to his counterparts on Taiwan and, in all instances, negotiating positions were altered in favor of the United States.

1. J78/Memo/C-32-79, 13 Dec 79, Subj: Taiwan Matters (U); J78/Memo/C-33-79, 19 Dec 79, Subj: RADM Lei Hsui-Ming (Sherman) ROCN (Ret.), Chief, Liaison Division, CCNAF (U).