NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** October 24, 1998 The following is the first in a regular series of Taiwan Reports prepared by Dr. Chen Jie, a Research Fellow at Monash University in Australia, for distribution over NAPSNet. Today's report contains summaries of Taiwanese reactions to the recent visit to the PRC by Koo Chen-fu, chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation. Except where otherwise noted, the summaries come from the Taiwan daily newspaper China Times. ---------------------- Koo Chen-fu, Chairman of the Taipei-based Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), has just ended his visit to China (14-19 October, 1998). This is the first meeting between Koo and his mainland Chinese counterpart, Wang Daohan, Chief of the Beijing-based Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), since they held a high-profile meeting in Singapore in 1993. Also significant is that this is the first time since 1949 a senior public figure, authorized by Taipei, went to mainland China to conduct direct dialogue with the Chinese officials about the fundamentals in bilateral relations. Apart from Wang, Koo also met President Jiang Zemin and Vice Premier Qian Qicheng, in charge of foreign policy and Taiwan relations. Starting from the eve of the visit, and throughout Koo’s activities in China, Taiwanese media featured a heated debate. The following are summaries of the comments made by opposition politicians, academics and others in Taiwan’s leading newspaper China Times, and the paper’s own editorials. The dates are indicated in brackets. The listing of summaries follows the time sequence. Prof. Zhao Chuansan, National Chengchi University (13 Oct): That Koo’s visit is defined as just a courtesy call does not conceal its significance as a turning point in the relations across the Taiwan Strait. Despite the calm and low-profile facade, both sides have high expectations of the visit. For China, this is the first time President Jiang Zemin has handled the so-called "Taiwan issue" since the missile crisis in 1996. Deng Xiaping’s death, Hong Kong’s hand-over, personal power consolidation at the 15th Party Congress, and the Sino-US summit - these developments have convinced Jiang that the time is ripe for tackling Taiwan relations. Editorial (13 Oct): The mere fact that the visit has been arranged signals the end of the three-year long hostility and the beginning of another period of interaction and dialogue. Considering the bickering in the lead up to the visit, and the long standing hostility between the two sides, the visit should be considered a great success if it can create a harmonious atmosphere, build up good will, and re-open the door to exchanges. To rush to any agreement or consensus is not necessary, and to expect any dramatic breakthrough is unrealistic. Editorial of Industry and Commerce Daily (a subsidiary of China Times) (14 Oct.): Both international and domestic circumstances are different from those surrounding the first Koo-Wang meeting in Singapore in 1993. The international situation is now in favor of the two sides co-existing and solving their disputes peacefully, instead of playing brinkmanship. The Asian economic crisis has also highlighted the degree of interdependence between the two sides. It has also made it necessary for Taiwan and China to establish some consultative mechanism in order to jointly deal with the crisis. On his part, Jiang Zemin has consolidated his power base through the 15th Party Congress. As a result, he may naturally want to see some breakthrough in relations with Taiwan. In Taiwan, President Lee Teng-hui must also seriously think of making a historic contribution to relations with China in the remaining years of his term. This is in the interest of long-term stability of Taiwan. In addition, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has changed fundamentally. They demonstrated an emotional and blind opposition to the first Koo-Wang meeting in Singapore, while this time they have shown a calm attitude and want to participate and contribute. However, despite all these changes, it is not realistic to expect any dramatic breakthrough overnight. There is no panacea for the accumulated problems in Taiwan-China relations. Prof. Shao Zhonghai, National Chengchi University (14 Oct.): This is a visit without specific topics for discussion. Yet this flexibility can actually lead to progress in dialogue. They can talk more frankly and extensively, and achieve deeper mutual understanding and good will. In fact, this already happened in the private talks between Chinese leaders and other Taiwanese visitors, and between Chinese and Taiwanese academics in their candid discussions, when no official agenda was set. Zhou Yangsan, New Party member of Legislative Yuan (14 Oct.): We should do three things: push Beijing to make more efforts to protect the interests of Taiwanese investors in China; broaden the scope of exchanges in order to build up mutual trust; and create a favorable climate for reciprocal visits between the leaders. Lin Zhuosui, DPP member of Legislative Yuan (14 Oct.): The government has promised that the dialogue with China will reflect the mainstream opinions of the Taiwanese society. If that is true, then certainly it should bear in mind several discoveries in various opinion polls. First, the number of citizens in favor of independence has become larger than that of those in favor of unification. Second, as for the majority who favor the maintaining of the status quo, eventual independence is the goal for most of them. Third, culturally, while a small minority call themselves Chinese, there are far more citizens who classify themselves as Taiwanese. Fourth, for most people, particularly the young generations, ROC is equal to Taiwan. They demonstrate no China sentiment. Taiwanese leaders’ rhetoric about the visit so far has not convinced me that they have taken the above developments into account. Prof. Yang Kaihuang, Soochow University (16 Oct.): Judging by the meetings so far, China appears to have a well designed strategy to confine the discussions strictly to political issues, and create a public impression that Koo’s visit is all about political discussions instead of an occasion desired by Taiwan to re-open the channel to deal with the more important technical issues in bilateral relations. Taiwan has to readjust its own strategy. Wang Pingyun, lawyer (16 Oct.): Koo raised the Potsdam Declaration to prove that Taiwan belongs to the Republic of China, not the People’s Republic of China. This was followed by President Lee’s similar remarks. This resort to international law should be commended. For a long time, the government has always shifted between "power politics" and "moralism" in dealing with the international status of Taiwan. Adherence to law reflects an international trend in the post-Cold War era and democratization in Taiwan. Still, the Potsdam Declaration is problematic for Taiwan’s current purpose in two aspects. First, in 1949, neither the ROC nor the PRC acknowledged the division of historical China. The ROC did so only since 1990, and the international community still follows Beijing’s claim to be the sole legitimate government of the whole of China. Second, the Declaration’s legal status is lower than that of the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan. Yet in that treaty, Japan only renounced its sovereignty over Taiwan, without specifying which country should takeover Taiwan. Also, we should have no illusion about the significance of legality in relations with China. In other words, to get it legally right may not necessarily make Beijing accept Taipei’s argument. Still, to have one’s stand backed by international law is better than being dominated by jungle law. Lin Zhuosui, DPP member of Legislative Yuan (18 Oct.) : China’s approach is an extension of its "big power" strategy. As a new major power in East Asia, China has been trying to organize a regional order in cooperation with the US, Japan, and Russia since 1996. Part of this policy is to use the tacit commitment from major powers to contain Taiwan. The 1996 missile crisis made China realize the significance of the US and Japan in dealing with Taiwan. This is complemented by friendly gestures towards Taiwan. Hence the Koo visit. We should play the democracy card as a countermeasure, and Koo’s invitation to Wang to observe the Taiwanese elections this year should be commended. Ran Liang, identity unknown (18 Oct.): America is an extremely important factor in China-Taiwan relations. Beijing in fact has always taken America seriously in its Taiwan policy. While previously it regarded America as a chief stumbling block in solving the Taiwan issue, now China is more interested in cooperating with America to contain Taiwan. On its part, Taiwan feels more strongly the factor of America ever since Washington established diplomatic relations with Beijing. Still, this factor has become more positive for Taiwan in recent years, thanks to the kind of support Taiwan has won in America for its democratization. In a way, for both Taipei and Beijing, meetings during Koo’s visit are for ears in Washington. Prof. Zhang Linzheng, National Taiwan University (19 Oct.): On the key issues of "one China" and unification, the two sides have simply made their own respective statements. There has been no convergence so far. Prof. Guo Zhengliang, Soochow University, and senior adviser to DPP (19 Oct.): Koo’ visit has ended friendly, and Wang has accepted an invitation to visit Taiwan. However, the two sides are still sharply divided politically, and these divergences are in fact intensifying. Those who earlier expected the visit to generate new thinking and pave the way for a summit must now be frustrated. Beijing has firmly insisted that "one China" is the People’s Republic of China. Wang’s liberal remark last year - that "one China" referred to the historical China and a future unified China - was simply not heard during Koo’s visit. Stalemate in relations will continue, pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan will develop, Taipei’s "wait and see" attitude will be reinforced, and diplomatic conflict will intensify. This will have negative impact on the development of all-round exchanges with China. The mainstream KMT (Kuomintang) will therefore move even closer to the DPP’s stand, and partisan divisions on China policy will be blurred during the coming elections. The hardening of Beijing’s policy also makes one wonder whether Jiang Zemin actually controls Beijing’s Taiwan policy. It may well be that Jiang wants to play down his difference of opinions with his conservative colleagues in order to solve other more important problems. Editorial (19 Oct.): Through Koo’s visit, the two sides have achieved a chance to express their stands in a most direct and comprehensive manner. They have further understood each other on various fundamental issues, including their differences and the huge task to tackle these differences. They have agreed to conduct further dialogues, and it can be expected that bilateral technical issues, Taipei’s priority, will also be dealt with. With frankness, good will, patience and time, ice can be melted between Taiwan and China. Prof. Ye Tanyu, Cheung-Hsing University (20 Oct.): Making use of the atmosphere created by the Koo-Wang meeting, the ruling and opposition parties should seek to achieve consensus on China policy and foreign policy. Such a consensus can be reached: first, Taiwan should actively participate in the international community and seek virtuous interaction with China at the same time; second, Taiwan is the priority for all political parties, and they must all protect its stability, dignity and prosperity; third, Taiwan should not slacken its domestic and external defense; fourth, talks with China should stress technical issues, and should not rush into high level political negotiations. To achieve this consensus, the fight over independence versus unification has to end, and bickering over national identity has to be called off. Zhang Huiying, identity unknown (20 Oct.): Some of Taipei’s words and behavior during Koo’s visit are obviously for foreigners’ consumption. Taipei’s activism in dialogue and its shift from rejecting political discussion to "flexibility on topics" are meant to tell the international community that Taipei is not the troublemaker in the region. This can win Taipei some support. Additionally, over the recent two years, China has gained a solid ground in international relations. It has built up relations with major powers, and the US has been used by China to lay pressure on Taiwan. As a result, Taiwan has tried not to be squeezed by the two powers. It has to prevent a situation where deals about Taiwan are cut without Taiwan. Taipei must play its democracy card against China to win international support. This fits in with the strategies of major powers, including the US. Washington’s engagement policy towards China is to ultimately push China toward democratization and thus reduce China’s threat to regional stability and to US interests. Taiwan’s political model is what the US can suggest to China to learn and follow. Thus, to play the democracy card can remind the US not to get too biased in favor of China. Also, Taiwan needs a forum to speak to the international community, and this forum is provided by Koo’s visit. Usually, Taiwan’s stand is unheeded, and yet Beijing’s stand--such as its "one China" principle--is well known. For Koo to go to Beijing and express Taipei’s views to Jiang Zemin face-to-face helps Taiwan’s voice to be heard internationally. Zhang Jingchen, Independent member of Legislative Yuan (21 Oct.): This dialogue has been wholly led by China along its line of political debate on "one China." Taiwan has had no chance to steer the process towards re-establishing a systemic consultation channel to deal with technical issues. Yet these issues should be top priority, considering the volume of actual exchanges, especially in economic and trade areas, across the Taiwan Strait. While further highlighting the fundamental differences between the two sides, the visit has not contributed to the improvement of substantive relations. If the two sides continue to adhere to different agendas for dialogue, relations may even retreat backwards. Taiwan should take more initiatives in determining the dialogue topics. For example, the two sides can talk about joint efforts in solving the regional economic crisis. This can help change the international view of Taiwan as a "troublemaker," and also lay a foundation for other discussions on technical issues which are more relevant to bilateral relations. ---------------------