NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** FORMER US OFFICIALS COMMENT ON DPRK VISIT July 24, 1997 This report is distributed to e-mail participants of the NAPS Network. The following is the complete unofficial transcript of the July 22 news conference by former US Ambassador to the ROK James Laney and former US Senator Sam Nunn, held in Seoul on the conclusion of their visit to the DPRK. The transcript was provided July 23 by the United States Information Agency (USIA). A summary of this news conference was included in the July 24 Daily Report. -------------------- PRESS CONFERENCE, JULY 22, 1997 U.S. EMBASSY / USIS - SEOUL, KOREA HONORABLE JAMES T. LANEY HONORABLE SAM NUNN MR. KIM SUKHAN EMBASSY SPOKESMAN PATRICK LINEHAN: Good afternoon. Welcome to the U.S. Information Service. This afternoon we have two very distinguished gentlemen from the state of Georgia, Senator Sam Nunn and former Ambassador to the Republic of Korea James T. Laney. Ambassador Laney will open with a prepared statement. Mr. Ambassador? AMBASSADOR LANEY: Thank you very much. It's good to be in Seoul after a very brief trip to Pyongyang. Mr. Sukhan Kim and Senator Sam Nunn and I went up there in a private, unofficial visit from Sunday through this morning. And we held frank and sometimes tough but useful discussions with key officials of the DPRK Foreign Ministry and the Korean People's Army about promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. The DPRK officials expressed appreciation for the international community's response to their food shortage and appealed for continued humanitarian aid. They also asked for the removal of US economic sanctions and for increased economic cooperation. On our part, we urged early and full participation by the DPRK in the Four Party talks to bring about lasting peace and security. We also emphasized that Four Party talks were the best vehicle to address increased economic cooperation with the U.S., the ROK, and the world community, including long-term solutions to the DPRK's agricultural difficulties. In that regard, we discussed with DPRK officials the importance and urgency of economic and agricultural reforms. We also stressed to the DPRK the importance of the Agreed Framework in Geneva 1994 and its full implementation, and the need for early resumption of high-level South-North dialogue. DPRK officials raised the need to re-establish a channel of communication to prevent and resolve problems and incidents along the DMZ. We emphasized our concern about ongoing tension along the DMZ and stressed the need to address such tension and increase communication between the DPRK, the U.S., and the ROK. Reflecting on our trip to Pyongyang, we believe there is no more pressing problem than the establishment of lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, an issue we are convinced needs sustained, high-level attention by all parties involved. This is the end of our statement. Senator Nunn will give some of our discussion with officials in the North at this time. SENATOR NUNN: Thank you Ambassador Laney. I am delighted to be back in Seoul, and this was indeed a very interesting trip. It was my first trip North. Of course I've been here many times and followed the security situation on the Korean Peninsula for many years. I also followed the tremendous, dynamic economic progress made here in the South for many years. So let me just try to give you a flavor of what we discussed, at least from the point of view of what we stated to them. The first thing we did was make clear, as Ambassador Laney's statement just read indicates, that we were not official spokesmen for the United States Government. We're both private citizens now, both former government officials. Second thing we made clear was that we were not negotiating: we were primarily on a fact-finding mission. Also made it clear, and we stressed, that we would report the United States Government at the highest levels what we found, any observations we might have, any recommendations, so that was clear. I also stressed, we stressed, that there were several things we were pleased with, in terms of development. One was that we now have a Framework Agreement; the second that the Four Party talks, at least the preparatory stage of those talks, is slated, scheduled to start on August the 5th. And, third, we expressed pleasure that there was cooperation in terms of the DPRK officials in assisting our teams of military people in looking for indications of Missing in Action, and other indications that are very important to the American people regarding the people who are missing in the Korean War. So those were things we were pleased about. We expressed concern on several points. One is, Ambassador Laney made it very clear that there was a frustration that, after President Clinton made a proposal for Four Party talks, it has taken fifteen months for us to really even get a date to sit down and have preparatory talks. That is a matter of frustration. Another matter of frustration to the United States, and I'm sure here in the ROK, is that there is no North-South dialogue in spite of the fact there was an agreement, a Basic Agreement in 1991 pledging both North and South to that dialogue. The third point that we made related to the Four Party talks. We expressed that there had been so much history of game-playing, debates about the size of the table and the shape of the table and process and procedure, that we hoped that that would not happen with the Four Party talks. We stressed that it is important that those talks be substantive, they be meaningful, and that we not have a lot of preliminary, tactical game-playing, but that we go to the heart of the issues. As Ambassador Laney stated, each official we met with indicated an appreciation for the food aid that has already been either sent or pledged by both the United States as well as ROK, as well as the world community. We stressed that the humanitarian aid was in the tradition of the people of the United States in the sympathy of real hunger in the world and real suffering. We also stated that structural reform had to be made, that humanitarian aid could not continue indefinitely because it would not have the support of our people unless certain changes are made to address the long-term problems that afflict the agricultural segment in the North. I stated that from our perspective there were two dangers on the Korean Peninsula, two grave dangers. One danger of course is the food and economic situation in the North. But the other danger, also a real danger, the danger of some type of conflict and confrontation brought about by the very large military force arrayed on the border, particularly on the Northern side, where something like two-thirds of their military forces are very near the border. And I stated very clearly that I felt that both of these dangers had to be dealt with, not simply one. We stated that there were two roads and that a choice had to be made by the DPRK as to which road they would take. The old road we are all familiar with, a road based on threats, based on very high risk, based on very large military forces -- that road has been tried for a long time and it has lead to the political and economic isolation of the North, and created a real hardship for the people on the Korean Peninsula. But we stated that that was not the only choice: there was another choice. There was a new road that could be taken. And that road would be based on cooperation, not on threats. That road would be based on sincere, substantive, Four Party talks. That road would be based on a sincere, substantive North-South dialogue. That road would lead to communication between the people of the North and the South, between the families in the North and the South, reconciliation between loved ones in the North and the South. And that road would lead to very great risk reduction, reducing the risk of any kind of conflict or confrontation. That road could also, over a period of time, have great potential for all the Korean people, particularly the people in the DPRK, by leading to reconstruction with assistance from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. And fundamentally would that road if taken, if the road to cooperation is taken, could lead to the end of political and economic isolation of the North and hardship for their people. And, finally, I said that that new road of cooperation, if it is the road chosen by the North, could lead to President Clinton's vision as stated in April of this year, and I quote him. Begin quote: "US policy seeks not just to provide food aid, but to work with North Korea in restructuring its entire economy." End quote. Q: Sohn Ji Ei with CNN. Could you tell some of the reaction that you got from North Korean officials, and was there any indication from the North Korean officials that you met about when Kim Jong Il will assume the presidency of North Korea? AMBASSADOR LANEY: There was no indication as to the date of Kim Jong Il's succession. We could infer, and this was just our surmise, that it might well come this fall. There were certain indications, but nothing conclusive and they did not mention that. Their reaction, on the one hand, as Senator Nunn has pointed out, was great appreciation for the assistance, but also an emphasis upon the continuing need for assistance, and in fact they...a real impoverishment of their entire economy. At the same time they were very strong in their determination that the outside world, the US or the ROK or any combination of nations, would not be successful in trying to force them to change their system. So we had a lot of discussion about what kinds of adjustments could be made within the system, and whether or not those adjustments could be made acceptable and consistent with their understanding of socialism. How that would work out, of course remains to be seen. But that was a great part of our discussion. Q: I'm from Munwha Ilbo. First of all, when you were debriefing Minister Yoo Jong Ha, General Tilelli was also present there in the meeting. Was there any need for him to be present in your meeting with our Minister Yoo? Secondly, the North Korean broadcasters while you were in Pyongyang emphasized through their broadcasting that you have met with General Li Chan Bok, who is in charge of their DMZ presence. So I would like to know in regard to this if there was any discussion in relation to military matters while you were there. SENATOR NUNN: I would say on the question of Gen. Tilelli, he was there at our invitation, and I'm sure that he was welcomed by the Foreign Minister. But we wanted him to understand the nature of our trip and we were giving the Foreign minister a full briefing on what we heard and what we learned and our observations, so we also wanted General Tilelli to understand that because of his responsibilities. On the General Lee part of that question, we did meet with the general. We discussed military issues, we discussed my own thinking that we need to, in the Four Party talks, discuss things like a hotline, things like improved communications between our militaries, our country, the North as well as the South. We need to discuss issues like forward observers; 'we need to discuss issues like having military observers view the exercises in both the North and the South; we need to discuss ways to reduce the military forces that are so close to the border, we need to do all we can to build confidence so that we will not have any kind of conflict on the Korean Peninsula. So we discussed all of those things. The General of course gave us his views. He has a different view in many respects, but the one thing we did agree on, and that is we do need to find ways to improve the communications. There is no question that the lack of communications is a danger and an added risk. We are hoping that the Four Party Talks and other avenues perhaps will give us that kind of communication that we need. Q: BBC: (Inaudible) AMBASSADOR LANEY: No, they made no specific requests, and we used the invitation as a fact-finding visit, as Senator Nunn pointed out, and are reporting our observations and indeed, to our government, recommendations when we go back. We were briefed in Washington, and we're consulting here, but I think it was an attempt at communication. Maybe it's the first step out of the kind of isolation that we've seen, and we all know how important communication is. The media is one of the most important ways. We'd like to see more media in North Korea. SENATOR NUNN: Just to add, they did repeatedly talk the need for food aid. The request was not specific to us, but they did clearly want the message to go to the United States Government that they appreciated what had already been given but that they needed more. Q: Katheryn Lee of the Economist. In your opinion, how serious is the food problem in North Korea, and do you have any recommendations of new plans in mind to solve the problem? Mr. Kim Sukhan: I feel that the food issue is a really serious one. We were driving around Pyongyang city and kids were really dirty, and they were not well dressed, and we saw no one who really looked healthy and good. So, in my opinion, the problem is very severe, and wherever we went they really asked for food. In fact, they felt pressure that they need at least one million tons sometime this year. Of course we made no commitment to that. The first recommendation, I think we need a strategy to deal with this food issue and basically we need to talk to the ROK, and also get together and design to deal with that issue in the context of the August 5th Four Party Talk. SENATOR NUNN: I might add to that that we were well fed while we were there, but every time we ate, we thought we wished we could have shared with the people who really were in need. That was my thought. In fact, I even expressed that at the banquet last evening to our hosts. The only other thing I would add -- and I have no idea whether this is the basis of any kind of determination or analysis -- but I have never been in a city where riding all over the city for two days in almost every direction and getting out on the outskirts, I never saw anyone with any food or beverage in their hands. I never saw anyone eating anything. Even the restaurants -- I'm sure there are restaurants there, and I'm sure some people were dining in them - - but it was very hard to ever see one. Every now and then you would see one, but we saw no one or at least I saw no one with a candy bar, or with a soft drink, or with a sandwich, or with an orange, with an apple, with anything while we were there. Q: I understand that Senator Nunn is going to China to join with former President Carter. I would like to ask you what the purpose of your visit with Mr. Carter in Beijing in China is, and if there is any plan for you to go to North Korea again via China. That's my first question. My second question is: I heard that the North Koreans are planning on announcing a very serious announcement on the 25th. Did you hear anything concerning this scheduled announcement, what it is about? SENATOR NUNN: Would you repeat that the announcement when? I didn't get that. Interpreter: July 25th. SENATOR NUNN: An announcement from whom? Interpreter: From North Korea. SENATOR NUNN: No, I don't know anything about a June 25th announcement. We heard nothing about that. On the trip to China, I will be joining former President Carter in China tomorrow afternoon. He and his wife are there at the invitation of the Chinese government. My wife and I will be accompanying them. We will have high-level discussions with China on many issues, including economic, including I'm sure security, and I'm sure we will discuss the situation in North Korea. That was not the original purpose of the trip. That trip is totally separate from this trip. I have no plans to go back to North Korea. That is not in any way connected with the Carter agenda. President Carter and the Carter Center have been studying village elections that have been held in China. Very small villages have had real elections where there have been members of the party defeated, and so forth. That's on a very small scale, but the Carter Center has been working on that, studying it, and President Carter has had a team of people from the Carter Center going to China and observing those elections. And one of the things that will be discussed there is how that process can be strengthened and how it can be increased. [end transcript]