NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE AND SECURITY NETWORK ***** SPECIAL REPORT ***** April 14, 1998 The following are extended excerpts from an interview given by General Eugene E. Habiger, Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command, to the Defense Writer's Group in Washington on March 31, 1998. Habiger answered questions on US nuclear policy and the nuclear posture of Russia and China, as well as disarmament issues. The complete text of the interview can be found at: http://www.stratcom.af.mil/testimony/dwg.htm ------------------------------------------------------------ General Eugene E. Habiger Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command Interview with Defense Writer's Group Wash DC 31 March 1998 Q: Recently you had some meetings with your counterpart from Russia, General Yakovlev, and I wonder if you would spend a few minutes here talking about what you discussed, what came out of that, and what is likely to ensue as a result of those meetings? Habiger: First of all the military-to-military contacts that I've been associated with began in April of last year when I had the opportunity to host, then Gen Sergeyev, who is the commander in chief of their missile forces back then. I took him to F E Warren and took him into a nuclear weapons storage area, I didn't ask anybody, I just did it, in the spirit of openness. The intent was hopefully that he would reciprocate which he did at Secretary Cohen's request. I had the opportunity to be the first non-Soviet, non-Russian ever to go into a Nuclear Weapons Area inside of Russia. This occurred in late October of last year - an extraordinary achievement. They were very open to me and what they were trying to do was show me they are deadly serious about the security and safety of the nuclear weapons. As you recall last summer there was a great deal of activity in the press about loose nukes in Russia, the fences that were broken down that sort of thing. Well, I went to one base and I was told it was representative of their missile bases and I would tell you that from what I saw if it was representative of the 19 or so missile bases they are deadly serious about the safety and security of their nuclear weapons.... Accompanying him, at my request, was General (Mikhail) Oparin. General Oparin is commander of the Russian bomber forces.... So General Oparin came with his chief navigator and I had General Phil Ford, who is commander of 8th Air Force, my bomber task force commander take General Oparin to Whiteman, where he saw the B-2, he climbed all over the B-2, he flew the B-2 simulator, he saw how we guard nuclear weapons at a bomber base, and General Ford took him to Dyess to show him our B-1 operation and to show him cause I want to make this point that our B-1s are no longer nuclear bombers their [sic] conventional only. And Oparin was able to see that. Again in a move that we can hopefully gain some reciprocal visits, I had General Ford take Oparin to Kirtland AFB where we have a nuclear weapon storage area for tactical nuclear weapons, because I will get to this point in a few minutes, if I have any concerns about Russian safety and security of nuclear weapons it's in the tactical area, cause there's so damn many of them. And they have not allowed us much insight into their tactical nuclear weapon storage sites. Gen Oparin got to see that at Kirtland, and General Ford took him back to Barksdale where General Ford has his headquarters and in addition an orientation program, General Oparin got to fly a B- 52, include air refueling, got to sit in the seat while refueling, got to fly a simulated low-level bomber, of course, no weapons involved. Then General Oparin has agreed to an exchange program where we will probably see a Russian bomber or two go to Barksdale and again, it's to get this cross-flow of discussions at the crew member level so that - the Cold War is over and we need to start laying the ground work for future discussions.... Q: General, recently there has been some discussion about de- alerting of some US nuclear forces, I wonder if you could give us your view on whether you think that's a good idea. Some have called for unilateral de-alerting forces of US forces and the administration is saying that it should be done in conjunction with the Russians. What's your view on that? Habiger: Ok, first of all let me ask you a question. Why should we de-alert? Reporter: You're the CINCSTRAT. Habiger: You all need to know that I did two things in the past couple of months. First of all I was getting tired of having Frank Gafney taking cheap shots at us selling the farm, and I was getting tired of Bruce Blair taking cheap shots as why we needed a farm. In mid-December I had Frank out for two days and told him why we hadn't sold the farm. I think we did a pretty good job of convincing him. And then in an extraordinary step I took the initiative. I invited Bruce Blair, he brought Frank VonHipple, and Hal Fvierson out and I spent about 8 hours with those guys. And just to show them and try to get into their do- loop as to why they're pushing for de-alerting. Here's the point I made to them. The glide path we're on now for de-alerting is stable, its verifiable, and it's well thought out. Today the Russians have almost 3,000 weapons on alert, under START II those numbers will be down to around to a 1,000 or so, and under START III those numbers will be down to probably less than 700. What's the problem? What problem are we working here? The United States has taken some extraordinary steps. Is anyone here from the New York Times? OK, when Bruce Blair was there (STRATCOM) in mid-January there was editorial in the New York Times that said United States ought to move out in de-alerting, let's replicate what happened back in 1992 when the United States and Russia de- alerted several hundred ICBMs. That's flat out wrong, the United States in 1991 unilaterally de-alerted 450 Minuteman II's. The Russians did not reciprocate, in spite of what the New York Times said. Now Gorbachev in a press conference said he was going to reciprocate, but he never did. If you look at the things, and I have had our folks construct the things that we have done since 1990 to do the kind of things you talked about Bill. There are 19 separate items that the United States has accomplished and the Russians have reciprocated in 6 of those 19. So I get back to the basic question, "what's the problem?" Now I know what the problem is, the problem is were trying to get down to lower and lower weapons on alert. Well, we're doing that in a rationale, verifiable manner. And when you start doing things unilaterally, and again I don't want to sound like an arm waver, cause I'm not, then you start planting seeds, well maybe we can pull something off here. Q: Pull something off in what sense? Habiger: You look for vulnerabilities. Q: In your view de-alerting would not be a good idea? Habiger: No, I said unilaterally, de-alerting would not be a good idea. My point is, we're de-alerting at a pretty rapid rate right now. Q: What can you tell us about the Chinese strategic nuclear modernization, and does that pose a current or future challenge? Habiger: First of all the Chinese are in no way, I think at this point, to be considered an enemy to the United States. We've got some extraordinary things going on in all levels of our government in terms of visits and exchanges and economic cooperation. The Chinese do have an intercontinental nuclear capability and they have a deployment of a intercontinental ballistic missile that reaches most of the United States except for Southern Florida. And as a matter of fact, one of you, a year-and-a-half ago, when I was here, used that line as, "See you in Miami, it's the place to go," so, don't do it to me again this time guys. But they are modernizing their forces. The ICBM they have now is a single warhead they're looking at putting a new system with a multiple independent reentry vehicle. The Chinese built one ballistic missile submarine in the early 80s, it has not been very successful it has been in dry dock most of the time and they just laid the keel for a new submarine within the past year or so and we expect to see that submarine operational in five or six years. With a new missile.... And, oh, by the way, hopefully we'll use the B-52 until the year 2030-2035. Now think about that, that's a pretty old airplane. But let me put it in perspective for you, you think about the Boeing 767/757 it conjures an image of a pretty modern airplane. The average number of fly hours on a Boeing 757 today is about 27,000 hour. Average number of hours in a 767 today is about 20,000 hours. The average number of flight hours on a B-52 that I have today is about 14,500 hours. So what we have essentially is a 1961 Oldsmobile that's been driven by an old lady school teacher for many years.... Q: General, I would like to do a follow-up on the de-alerting and then ask another question. On the follow up, the administration is however looking at de-alerting in the context of trying to help the Russians implement closer up to schedule to START II accord and I believe a study done by you in conjunction with the Joint Chiefs of Staff I wonder if you can talk about the kinds of things you looked at, the kinds of things we and the Russians might do on a reciprocal basis to help them get back on the START II time line. And my second question is START III, talking about going down to 2,000 warheads, can the United States, in your opinion go down to that many warheads and continue to provide an effective nuclear umbrella for the new states that are being absorbed into NATO and that includes the Baltics. There are some people who believe that eventually if the Baltics commit to NATO, 2,000 are not going to be sufficient number of warheads to extend our nuclear umbrella effectively to cover all of NATO, should the Baltics be brought in. Could you talk about that please? Habiger: Ok, the first question about de-alerting, it's too early for me to even start talking about that. There's a lot of leverage. That's being worked at a very high level. It's more of a policy issue at this point as compared to a warfighting issue. Q: Are you comfortable with that? Habiger: Very comfortable, because I'm part of the process. The folks in the White House talked to me. Whenever the issue of arms control is discussed in the tank I sit in on the deliberations, I don't get to vote, I understand that but I'm part of the deliberation. They listen to us so we have great credibility. So, too soon for me to comment on that. In terms of is 2,000 enough. We began this analysis back in the summer of 1996. We saw the handwriting on the wall, that START III was coming. We were way out in front of everyone else. We did three things. Number one we looked at potential target base, number one, and how we cover that target base. Number two we had a contractor who does war games for us. I had these folks look at various scenarios, with eliminating legs of the Triad to see if we can get by with just a diad. And then the third thing we did is I had Ambassador Paul Robinson who works for me as part of the Strategic Advisory Group on a pro-bono basis, he runs a policy sub-committee of that advisory group and I asked him to look at the policy implications as we go to lower and lower force levels. All of that came together in November in 1996, it all meshed and then early December Shali called me and said "Hey, Gene you need to get serious because the President is going to go to Helsinki." And I said, "Hey boss, how about next week, I'll come show you what we've got." We showed him the analysis and I could not have written the script any better for Helsinki, on the 2,000-2,500. Do I feel comfortable, yes. And the other thing I really don't see a linkage between NATO Baltic states and nuclear weapons.... Q: Looking back to the Nuclear Poster Review in 1994 it stated at that time that the United States did not need any new design, production or design of new nuclear warheads. Was that meant to be the policy that was going to last through time and if that's still true today? Or was that a description of the reality of the time that in 1994 it wasn't necessary, but perhaps in the coming years? And the second question on the Russians ability to maintain their level of nuclear weapons at even the 2,000-2,500 for START III. If you anticipated those numbers to go down (inaudible) be more around just a thousand, with attrition and obsolescence. Habiger: Getting back to your question about the current state of our nuclear weapons, the statement that the nuclear posture review is accurate and still is. The Department of Energy has proposed a science-based stewardship plan to the tune of about $4.5B a year for about 10 years. I fully support that program that will obviate testing.... Q: Just a quick follow-up. If it turns out that they do start getting down to levels of around a thousand warheads, is that the kind of thing that the United States might want to follow them down and sit there at that level, say a reciprocal agreement that we don't need anymore than a thousand ourselves. Or is there a floor above that for which we just can't go down. Habiger: I don't even want to come close to drawing a line in the sand with a number. But I go back to the third piece of the puzzle I told you we did in the summer of '96 when I had Ambassador Robinson look at the policy implications. As you go down to the lower and lower numbers the policy folks need to start thinking about issues such as extended deterrence. You know if we go to such low numbers perhaps you drive some of our allies into nuclear weapons programs only because they perceive extended deterrence is no longer applicable to them. That is point number 1. Point number 2 is as you go to lower and lower force levels, the counter force targeting strategy is no longer applicable because you don't have the weapons to cover all the targets so then you go into counter value and that's back to "City Busting." So those are some of the issues that you need to look at. To say that this is the number is much more than just looking at the data. That's why I said we looked at this thing in a much more macro perspective. Q: You said China is not considered an enemy and you say the same about Russia? Habiger: Yes, but from where I'm coming from is as follows: And this is a rhetorical question. What is the only thing that can destroy the United States of America as we know it today? It's the 6,000 nuclear weapons that are out there in Russia. Under START II, what is the only thing that can destroy the United States of America. It would be those 3,000 to 3,500 nuclear weapons out there. The anomaly that we're faced with is the fact that the Cold War ended and did the looser really lose? Did you see a demobilization? Did you see all those nuclear weapons come down in Russia? No. It took us almost 40 plus years, to build this nuclear machine and now we're in the eighth year in bringing this nuclear machine down and I think we're doing a pretty good job. And, oh by the way, for those of you who want to get into an historical perspective, the United States in the summer of 1946, under the leadership of a great statesman, Baruch went to the United Nations in June of that year saying let's do away with all nuclear weapons. The only nuclear weapons were in the hands of the United States in 1946. He went to the United Nations Security Council under the sponsorship of the State Department and made the proposal. The Russians rejected the proposal out of hand, the French and the British did not support us, because they had nuclear weapons of their own. My point to you is, we had a unique opportunity in 1946 and the United States was the initiator of that opportunity that never came to fruition. Q: Can you ever imagine nuclear weapons being used by the Russians? For any reason? Habiger: If they are ever used against us, or anyone else, then the concept of deterrence has failed. And the concept of deterrence is to make it such a horrific act and that the response would be so devastating and overwhelming that no one would even think of using a nuclear weapon. And again, let me go back to a theme that I think it is important for you to hear and that is I agree with what a number of people have been saying over the past several months, that we should do away with all the nuclear weapons in the world. I agree with that, because it is the policy of the United States of America. Zero nuclear weapons is the policy of the United States of America and has been our policy since 1968. For over thirty years, the policy of the United States of America has been zero nuclear weapons. Article 6 of the Nonproliferation Treaty the United States is one of the first three nations to sign that over 177 nations have signed it today. Article 6 says the ultimate goal of this treaty is the total elimination of nuclear weapons on the face of the earth. But you need to read the fine print. Given the proper preconditions and that's the hang-up. I doubt if we'll ever see the proper preconditions where you have zero nuclear weapons on the earth. Q: How would you prioritize the threat? What are the threats as far as you're concerned as CINCSTRAT out there and then I have a follow-up. Habiger: I don't think we can put it in terms of a threat. It gets back to this concept of what's the issue, the issue is what can destroy the United States what can impede our national security and it's those 6,000 nuclear weapons. I don't think we have a nation state out there that is our enemy. It's just the ending of the Cold War was such an historical anomaly trying to get those nuclear weapons down to lower and lower levels is the issue. Q: So essentially one nuclear weapon out there is a threat, it's not directed at any one specific place? Habiger: Yes. The other part of the nuclear weapon issue is as Bob Bell has so eloquently discussed in his comments over the past couple of months. We now have a policy that's articulated that says nuclear weapons will be used in response to the use of rogue states using weapons of mass destruction. Reporter: I don't think they really said that, did they? They've suggested that? Habiger: Suggested it. I'm not saying, I'm suggesting it. Let the record reflect, I suggested it.... Q: Could you elaborate a little more on the concept of using nuclear weapons as a deterrent against chem and bio. In a recent example of Iraq it's still hard to imagine, let's say Iraq used Scuds and showered Israel with anthrax hit our base at AlJabar with anthrax, it's still hard to imagine using a nuclear weapon against them, but I just kind of wonder does that really work as a deterrent in a situation like that? Habiger: Obviously, a policy question. But if you go back and look at the record in terms of since the end of the Cold War. How often did we use that massive and devastating response. We used it against Sadam Hussein in 1990 and we used it against North Korea in 1995 when they started to get out of the box with the nuclear reactor business. It appears it gets the message across pretty quickly. Q. Does any tailoring of our force need to be done to accommodate that? Low-yield, that kind of thing? Habiger: No. We've got everything we need. Low-yield, high- yield, medium-yield. You call, we haul. Q. Nuclear hand grenades? Habiger: No, we don't have man-packs. Q: What's your opinion about deploying a national missile defense and what are the Russians doing at Yamatau mountain? Habiger: I'm in complete agreement with the administration's approach on National Missile Defense in terms of taking a look at what we've got at the end of the three year period and then looking at the threat is, how much it will cost and what the technology is and then making a decision about deploying a system. So no problem with that. Yamatau is a major concern to me. I've asked senior Russian leadership about it. This is a facility that's been undergoing construction since 1978. There are over 20,000 people working there today, and we are very interested in it. I've asked senior Russian leadership what's going on there and the answer I've received from two different, very high-level sources is that "it's not a military installation, don't worry about it." It is a national governmental crisis control center is the way it's been described to me. I've asked to go there and I've also asked to go to Kozvinski Mountain and I was told both facilities are not ready for visitors yet. Q: Why is a major concern to you? Habiger: Well, because I don't know what's going on there. Q: Do you suspect something military? Are the Strategic Rocket Forces involved? Habiger: I have no indications of that, no, none at all. Q: I'm still a little unclear on this issue of using nuclear weapons in response to an attack by a Rogue state using weapons of mass destruction? What is your understanding of what that standing policy is? Habiger: I'm going to dodge this one, I have a very thorough understanding, but I'm going to let Bob Bell continue to be the spokesman because it's a policy issue. Q: Yes, you walked up to it and suggested that, in fact, if I wrote down what you said correctly, "we now have a policy of saying that nuclear weapons would be used or could be used against a rogue state using weapons of mass destruction? Under what circumstances, like what kind of weapons of mass destruction attack might invite that response. Habiger: Again, I'll refer you back to the quotes by Bob Bell over the last couple of months. It's a policy issue I don't want to get into. Q: Doesn't this determine how you do business though? Habiger: Policy makers tell me how to do my business. I don't mean to sound sarcastic, but for me as a warfighter, or commander in chief of a Unified command to get into policy issues would not be appropriate. Q: Let's go to the other end of the missile defense for a minute, should you actually have to worry about, God forbid, actually getting through. Could you talk about the current capabilities of Soviet missile defense system, the dedicated system, the declared system whatever residual capabilities reside in the SA- 10 or the -12? And to my astonishment, you and I may be the only two people in the room who've been here long enough to remember this, somebody has resuscitated the SA-5 and that's apparently back out on the street? Habiger: I'm not worried about the -10 or the -12, not worried about the SA-5. The numbers of SA-5s sites is going down dramatically. I'm at odds with the intelligence community regarding the ABM system around Moscow, in terms of its capability. The Russians have told me that the system is no longer operational. Q: Do you accept that? Habiger: My view is the system is not as capable as the intelligence community says, how's that. Q: But that's not the same as saying it's not operational? Habiger: That's right. Q: You say you fully support the administration's stockpile stewardship management program, part of that is the comprehensive test ban treaty. It's been lingering up on the hill because the chairman of the foreign relations committee basically doesn't believe that we can do without testing. Have you been up to the hill to tell them you're comfortable with the program, and do you see a need to pass this treaty very quickly? Habiger: Yes I have, and I have. Let me just say one thing. I appreciate the opportunity to come talk to you. I have a standing offer, some of you have taken me up on it. Come out to Omaha, come out one afternoon, we'll get you out by noon the next day, the Midwest Express has a great flight, first class seats, chocolate chip cookies, but we would like to have you out, number one. Number two, please call us for follow up. My frustration is you write stuff, I don't care if you slam-dunk us, but do it with the right data. Ok. If I'm going to take a gut shot I want to make sure that we helped construct the bullet. End of Interview